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July 23, 1885.—Desert land en-
tries ; 4 L. D., 51 495
August 4, 1885.—Railroad indem-
nity selections ; 4 L. D., 90 110
June 27, 1887.—Desert land en-
try ; final proof ; 5 L. D., 708
January 11, 1889.—Application to
amend; 8 L. D., 187
July 17, 1889.—Final proof; 9 L.
D., 123
April 22, 1891.—School indem-
nity; 12 L. D., 400
April 11, 1895.—Isolated tract;
20 L. D., 305
November 30, 1897. — Mineral
lands ; classification ; 25 L. D.,
446
December 15, 1897.—Mining regu-
lations ; 25 L. D., 561, par. 52__
February 3, 1898.-—Mineral appli-
cation ; notice; 26 L. D., 145
March 23, 1898.—Mineral land;
classification ; 26 L. D., 423
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June 10, 1898.—Offered and un-
offered lands ; act of May 18,
1898; 27 L. I)., G8 244
February 14, 1899.—Regulations
under act of July 1, 1898; ad-
justment of Northern Pacific
grant; 28 L. D., 103 106,154,662
June 24, 1899.—Mining regula-
tions; 28 L. I)., 594, pars. 44
and 51 571
Paragraph 52 280
July 14, 1899.—Application to
enter; 29 L. D., 29 368,438
December 18, 1899.—Forest re-
serves ; lieu selection ; 29 L. D.,
391 299
January 18, 1900.—Use of timber
on public mineral lands ; 29 L.
D., 571 .___ 79
February 10, 1900.—Use of timber
on nonmineral public lands ; 29
L. D., 572 79
March 6, 1900.—Lieu selection ;
act June 4, 1897 ; 29 L. D., 578- 578
June 27, 1900.—Second home-
stead ; act June 5, 1900; 30 L.
!>., 374 115
January 22, 1901.—Repayment ;
30 L. P.. 430 329, 618
September 21, 1901.—School in-
demnity selections ; 30 L. P.,
Jill 245
July 20, 1901.—Mining regula-
tions; 31 L. I)., 474, pars. 22,
23, and 24 . 263
Paragraph 42 592
Paragraphs 39, 40, and 52 554
Paragraph 47 ! 286, 585
Paragraphs 74 to 77 184
December 6, 1901.—Wichita, etc.,
lands ; mining claim within
townsite; 31 L. D., 154 55
July 7, 1902.—Forest reserve; lieu
selection ; 31 L. D., 372 89
July 9, 1902.—Confirmation ; 31
L. D., 368 174
September 19, 1002.—Timber cut-
ting; 31 L. D., 412 82
February 11, 1903.—Reclamation
act; 32 L. D., 6___, 159
March 3, 1903.—Reclamation act;
artesian wells; 32 L. P.. 278___ 533
March 6, 1003.— School indemnity
selection ; .-,2 L. 1)., 39 245
Page.
March 20, 1903.—Attendance of
witnesses: 32 L. P.. 132 ion
April o, 1903.— Kiowa, etc., lands:
school sections ; mining laws ; :;j
L. D., 95
August 7, 19< 13.—Soldiers' addi-
tional ; approximation ; 32 L.
P., 200 412
August 21, 1903.—Reclamation
act; area of entry; ."'.2 L. P.,
237 66
January 13, 1904.—Reclamation
act: mineral locations; timber
and stone applications; .'{2 L. P.,
387 157,160,655
January 28, 1904.—Reclamation
act; reservoir lands; 32 L. P.,
416 IM
February 11, 1904.— Righl of way ;
32 L. P., 481, par. 2 583
February 17, 1904.—Desert land ;
cultivation; proof; 32 L. P.,
456 500
May 10, 1904.—School land ; 32
L. P., 604 ISO
May 25, 1904.—Kinkaid Act; :;u
L. P., 670 62, 87, 275, 503, 54G
July 12, 1904.—Reclamation act
;
withdrawal; 33 L. P., 104 160
August 1, 1904.—Town sites in
Alaska ; 33 L. P., 163 71, 287
August 9, 1904.—School lands
Indian reservation; 33 L. P.,
1S1 487,660
May 16, 1905.—Repeal of lieu se-
lection acts; 33 L. P., 558 566
June 3, 1905.—Uintah lands; 33
L. P., 610 ::n
June 6, 1905.—Reclamation act
;
withdrawal; 33 L. P., 607__ 162,
312, 421, 447. 4s<>. 561
June 8, 1905.— Rights of way in
forest reserves; 33 L. P.. 609__ 65
June 13, 1905.—Uintah lands ; ::.".
L. P., 010 177
June 29, 1905.—Act August 30,
1S00 : acreage ; 33 L. P.. •lot; 2 1 )
Augusl 21. 1905.—Kinkaid Act;
:;4 L. D., 87 503,546
September 28, 1905.—Right of
way; 34 L. D., 212, pars. 3 and
00 583
Paragraph 54, right of way— 693
October 12. 1905. Reclamation
act ; withdrawal : 34 L. P.. L58 422
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March 3, 1851 (9 Stat.. 031), sec.
13, private claim 100
July 22, 1S04 I 10 Stat., 308), sec.
s, private claim 507
September 30, 1854 ( 1<» Stat., ,
1109), spirituous liquors 417
March It, 1855 (1<» Stat., 701),
bounty land warrant 21,551,606,611
June 3. L856 t 11 Slat.. 20), rail
road grant
March ::. 1857 ill Stat., 195),
Minnesota railroad granl
June 22. I860 I 12 Stat., 85), sec.
1 1. private claim
June 2::. I860 I 12 Stat, 90), land
warrant
Page.
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Page.
July 24, 1861 (12 Stat., 274), com-
pensation of volunteers 294
August G, 1861 (12 Stat, 326),
compensation of volunteers 294
May 20, 1862 (12 Stat., 392),
homestead 66
February 24, 1863 (12 Stat., 664),
sec. 2, school land 186
May 5, 1864 (13 Stat., 64), Min-
nesota railroad grant 107
May 5, 1864 (13 Stat.. 66), Wis-
consin railroad grant 389
May 5, 1864 (13 Stat., 668), Red
Lake and Pembina treaty 416
May 28, 1864 (13 Stat., 94), town-
site entry 27
July 1, 1864 (13 Stat., 332), sec.
6, survey 189
July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365),
Northern Pacific 107, 147, 665
March 3, 1865 (13 Stat., 526),
Minnesota railroad grant 631
June 21, 1866 (14 Stat., 66),
homestead 21
July 13, 1866 (14 Stat, 93), Min-
nesota railroad grant 107
July 23, 1866 (14 Stat, 218), sec.
8, private claim 189
July 26, 1866 (14 Stat, 251),
mining claim 722
July 26, 1866 (14 Stat., 289), Kan-
sas railroad grant 504
July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), At-
lantic and Pacific 110, 551
April 29, 1868 (15 Stat., 635),.
Sioux lands 703
May 31, 1870 (16 Stat, 378),
Northern Pacific 105, 147, 209, 665
July 9, 1870 (16 Stat., 217), min-
ing claim 318
July 15, 1870 (16 Stat, 304), pri-
vate entry 507
July 15, 1870 (10 Stat, 335, 361),
sees. 9 and 10, Indian allot-
ments 208
April 4, 1872 (17 Stat., 49), sol-
diers' homestead 335
May 10, 1872 (17 Stat., 91), min-
ing claim 318,722
May 29, 1872 (17 Stat., 165, 185),
Winnebago Indians 208
June 5, 1872 (17 Stat, 226), Bit-
ter Root Valley lands 313
June 8, 1872 (17 Stat, 333), sol-
diers' homestead 335
March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 605), sol-
diers' homestead 335
February 11, 1874 (18 Stat, 15),
Bitter Root Valley lands 314
March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 482),
right of way 593,621
July 4, 1876 (19 Stat., 73), sec-
tion 2303, R. S 21
July 31, 1876 (19 Stat, 102, 121),
surveys 138
Page.
March 1, 1877 (19 Stat, 267) Cali-
fornia school land 271
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377), des-
ert land 493,677
June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 88) tim-
ber cutting 79
June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), tim-
ber and stone 105, 113,
116, 122, 123, 129, 133,
139, 377, 381, 582, 705
January 22, 1880 (21 Stat., 61),
mineral land 319
May 14, 1880 (21 Stat, 140), sec.
2, contestant 375, 399, 529, 616, 678
June 8, 1880 (21 Stat., 166), in-
sane settler 169
June 16, 1880 (21 Stat, 287), sec.
2, repayment 552, 61S
April 26, 1882 (22 Stat, 49), min-
ing claim 316
March 1, 1883 (22 Stat, 433, 444),
Indian allotment 703
July 4, 1884 (23 Stat., 73), right
of way 624
July 4, 1884 (23 Stat, 76, 79), Co-
lumbia Indian reservation 127
July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 103), aban-
doned military reservation 296
March 3, 1885 (23 Stat, 340),
Umatilla lands 627
February 8, 1887 (24 Stat, 388),
sec. 4, nonreservation Indians 381
Sec. 6, citizenship 256, 703
March 3, 1887 (24 Stat, 556), sec.
5, right of purchase 576, 631
October 2, 1888 (25 Stat, 505,
526), arid land 223
January 14, 1889 (25 Stat, 642),
Chippewa Indian lands 94, 620, 709
February 22, 1889 (25 Stat., 676),
States admitted 486
Sees. 10 and 11, school land__ 658, 718
Sec. 17, public buildings 139
March 2, 1889 (25 Stat, 854),
sec. 1, private entry 22, 243
Sec. 5, additional homestead- 538
Sec. 6, additional homestead- 9,
295, 539, 639, 647
See. 7, final proof 601
March 2, 1889 (25 Stat, 888),
sec. 13, allotments 253
November 2, 1889 (26 Stat., 1549),
South Dakota 719
May 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 81), sec.
22, Oklahoma townsite_ 356
May 14, 1890 (26 Stat., 109), sec.
4, sale of lots 531
August 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 371,
391), right of way 223
August 30, 1890 (26 Stat, 371,
391), area of entry 244,518
September 29, 1890 (26 Stat.,
496), forfeiture act 390
October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 658),
Round Valley reservation 248
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February 28, 1801 (20 Stat., 796),
school land 121,366,434,
March 3, 1801 (26 Stat., 854), sec.
6, confirmation
Sec. 8, confirmation
See. 10, survey of private land
claims
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1093),
timber cutting 79,
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat, 1095),
sec. 2, desert land 386, 466,
Sec. 5, homestead
Sec. 6, commutation
Sec 7, confirmation
Sec. 8, timber cutting 78,
Sec. 11, Alaskan townsites
Sec. 16, townsite on mineral
lands 102,
Sec. 17, area of entry
Sees. 18, 19, 20, and 21, right
of way
Sec. 24, forest lands
August 4, 1892 (27 Stat, 348),
timber and stone land 105,
August 5, 1802 (27 Stat., 390),
railroad indemnity
March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 572,
593), preference right
July 16, 1894 (28 Stat, 107), sec.
6, Utah school land
Sec. 10, school land
August 13, 1894 (28 Stat, 279),
surety on bond
August 15, 1894 (28 Stat, 286,
314), Yankton Sioux
August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372,
394), public surveys 139,
August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372,
397), soldiers' additional cer-
tificate
August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372,
422), sec. 4. desert land
January 21, 1895 (28 Stat., 635),
righl of way
February 26, 1895 (28 Stat, 683),
mineral lands 211,
March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 876,
894), Wichita lands
March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 876,
894-899), school land
April 7. 1896 (29 Stat., 90) Ari-
zona school land
April is, 1896 (29 Stat., 95), Fort
Asslnnlboine
May ll. 1896 (29 Stat, 116 1, va-
cated townsite
May 14, 1896 (29 Stat, 120),
right of way
May 21, 1896 (2!) Stat. 1l>7»
right of way
January 13, 1897 (29 Stat, 184),
reservoir site
February 22, 1897 (21) Stat.. 902),
Brack Hills forest reserve
February 22, 1897 (2!) Stat.. 904),
Washington forest reserve
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614, 659
509
507
136
112, 247
407. (177
66, 280
297
173
112, 247
102, 287
277, 598
244
212
20
117, 381
211
140, 301
486
486
216
415
434, 661
687
453, 589
229
284, 662
164
55
186
296, 654
357
229
223
224
658
127
February 26, 1807 (29 Stat., 599),
reservoir sites 223
June 4, 1S07 (30 Stat., 11. 36),
forest reserves 12,
23, 81, 89, 91, 113, 11.",, 120, 122,
127. 151, 200. 299, 301, 377,
380, 459, 520, 564, 578, 603
June 7, 1897 (30 Stat.. 87), Un-
compahgre lands 648
May 11, 1898 (30 Stat, 404),
right of way 21 l
May 14, 1898 (30 Stat.. 109), sec.
1, Alaskan homestead 11
Sec. 6, right of way l:i
Sec. 7, reservations 20
May 18, 1898 (30 Stat.. (18),
offering ' 243
June 10, 1898 (30 Stat.. 473),
military service 206, 536
June 21, 1898 (30 Stat.. 484),
New .Mexico 14::. 371, 549, .v.io
July 1, 1898 (30 Stat, 507, 618),
timber cutting 81,113
July 1, 1898 (30 Stat.. .107. 620),
Northern Pacific adjustment 106,
146, 154, 209, 210. 304, 4s i, 575, 661
July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 652, 674),
townsite boards 531
March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 993), sec.
3, railroad land 23, 89, 1 18, 151, 661
March 2, 1899 (31 Stat.. L939),
treaty with Great Britain .",3
April 17, looi) (31 Stat., 134),
railroad grant _: 620
May 17, 1900 (31 Stat, 179), free
homesteads 250
May 19, 1900 (31 Stat., 180),
Fort Buford 347
June 5, 1900 (31 Stat., 207), sec.
2, second homestead 8,436,630.0 17
Sec. 3, second homestead 114
June 6, 1900 (31 Stat.. 321, 136),
chap. 63, depositions 71
June 6, 1900 (31 Stat., 588, 011 i.
forest reserve 89,116,297
June 6, 1900 (31 Stat. 672, 676
680), Comanche, Kiowa, etc.,
lands 54, 163
June 6, 1900 (31 Stat.. 683), set-
tlement by unmarried woman __ 314
February 15, 1901 (31 Stat.. 700 i
.
right of way l'l's. 693
March 1, 1901 (31 Stat.. 847),
soldiers' homestead— 2,393,633,641
March .",. 1901 (31 Stat., L058,
1083), sec. 3. rlgbl of way 289, 679
March :;. 1901 (31 Stat., L093),
Kiowa, etc., lands 165
February 28, 1902 (32 Stat., 13),
sec. 13, railroad rights of way 504
March Ll, 1902 (32 Stat, ''>::».
amending section 2294, R. S 682
April l.".. L902 (32 Stat, 106),
settlers in forest reserves 658
May :;. L902 (32 Stat., 188), school
lands :; ''''''
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May 22, 1002 (32 Stat., 203),
commutation and second en-
tries 8,039,647
May 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 245, 263),
Uintah and Ute lands 1, 176, 306
May 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 245, 275),
Indian lands 418
June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), re-
clamation act 17, 29,
66, 156, 159, 186, 312, 347, 352, 445,
454. 482, 544, 550, 560, 567, 633, 653
June 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 400),
Chippewa lands 709
June 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 400, 402),
forestry lands 25
July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., 730), Um-
atilla lands 627
January 31, 1903 (32 Stat., 790),
attendance of witnesses 400
February 9, 1903 (32 Stat., 820),
townsite 98,621,709
February 11, 1903 (32 Stat.,
822), indemnity school lands__ 369
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat., 982,
998), Uintah lands 1,307
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat., 982,
998), Uncompahgre lands 648,651
March 4, 1904 (33 Stat., 59), affi-
davits, proofs, oaths 540,682
April 19, 1904 (33 Stat., 184),
settlers on railroad grants 389
April 21, 1904 (33 Stat., 189,
207), Uintah lands 1,307
April 21, 1904 (33 Stat, 189,211),
Indian reservation ; lieu selec-
tion 666
April 23, 1904 (33 Stat., 297), In-
dian allotments and patents 253
April 27, 1904 (33 Stat., 352),
Crow Indian lands 632,638
April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 452),
Court of Private Land Claims 517
Page.
April 28, 1004 (33 Stat., 527),
second and additional home-
steads 8, 61, 114, 436, 639, 647, 701
April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 545), min-
ing claim ; patent 683
April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), Ne-
braska lands 61, 87, 135,
274, 436, 468, 502, 528, 546, 573, 690
December 21, 1904 (33 Stat., 595),
Yakima lands 14
February 1, 1905 (33 Stat., 628),
sec. 1, rights of way in forest
reserves 20,229
February 7, 1905 (33 Stat., 702),
Sierra forest reserve 15
February 8, 1905 (33 Stat., 706),
Round Valley lands 248
February 24, 1905 (33 Stat., 813),
Mobile and Girard lands 517
March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1016),
Shoshone lands 640, 645
•March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1032),
reclamation fund 483
March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1048,
1061), Osage townsites 419
March 3, 1905 (33 Stat, 1048,
1068), Diocese of Duluth 709
March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1048,
1069), Uintah lands 7,176,307,550
March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1264),
forest reserves 459, 565, 578, 604
January 27, 1906 (Public, No. 7),
Uintah lands 452
March 15, 1906 (Public, No. 46),
Yellowstone forest reserve 700
April 17, 1906 (Public, No. 106),
St. Paul, M. and M. lands 630
April 26, 1906 (Public, No. 129),
sec. 12, town lots 680
May 8, 1906 (Public, No. 149), In-
dian patent 705
REVISED STATUTES CITED AND CONSTRUED.
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
442
452
2238
2259
2275
2276
434,600
600
2289 66, 314, 538
2290
2291
2294
2297
— 314
48, 128, 169
2301 248
2304
2305
2306
2, 118, 248
249, 335
2307
304, 312, 335,
346, 520, 560,
118,335
2308.
Page. Page.
456 Section 2309— 177. 248,453
549 Section 2318__ 721
605 Section 2320__ _ 11,323,471
226 Section 2321__ 571
314 Section
Section
•>•>*>•> 323
614, 659 2325— 11,
614,659 41, 183, 2S4, 309, 323,
701, 702 462, 571 572, 584, 685
499, 532 Section 2326__ __ 75,316 , 32L , 402, 570, 685
499, 532 Section 2327 683
682 Section 2329— 11, 261
464 Section 2330— 11,43,45,261
295, 297 Section 2331— 11,43,45, 261
335, 633 Section 2332— 182,462
393, 633 Section 2333— 75, 196
248, 292, Section 2335— 284, 316, 369
339, 343, Section 2336— 323
654, 686 Section 2337— 321
339, 343 Sections 2347 to 2352__ 178,
476 200 , 267, 444, 448
REVISED STATUTES CITED AND CONSTRUED. XXIX
Section 2348.
Section 2354.
Section 2380.
Section 2381.
Section 2382.
Section 2384.
Section 2387.
Page.
267
243
17
17
95
«>r,
5, 02
1
Page.
Section 2388 25,62]
Section 2389 621
Seel ion 2392 598
Section 2441 611
Sections 2450. to 2457 40
Section 24.")1 4o
Section 2455 :;.".T
RULES OF PRACTICE CITED AND CONSTRUED.
Rule 34_.
Rule 115-
Page.
ISO
373

DECISIONS
RELATING TO
THE PUBLIC LANDS,
opening of till: utntah indian reservation lands in the
state of utah.
By the President of the United States of America.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, it was provided by the act of Congress, approved May
27, A. I). 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among other things, that on October
1, 1903, the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in
the State of Utah, ** shall be restored to the public domain : Provided,
That persons entering any of said lands under the homestead laws
shall pay therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-live cent- per
acre;
"
And. whereas, the time for the opening of said unallotted lands was
extended to October 1, 1904, by the act of Congress, approved March
3, 1903 (32 Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10. L905, by the
act of Congress, approved April 21, 1904 (33 Stat, 207), and was
again extended to not later than September 1. 1905, by the act of Con-
gress, approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., loc*!)). which Last named act
provided, among other things:
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such tracts as may have been sel
aside as national forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were disposed of by
the act of Congress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be
disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws
Of the United States, and shall he opened to settlement and entry by proclama-
tion of the President, which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which
these lands may he settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to
make entry thereof: and no person shall he permitted to settle upon, occupy, or
enter any of said lands, except as prescribed in said proclamation, until after
the expiration of sixty days from the time when the same are thereh\ opened
to settlement and entry: Provided, Thai the rights of honorably discharged
Union soldiers and sailors of the late civil and the Spanish war or Philippine
insurrection, as defined and described in sections twenty-three hundred and four
and twenty-three hundred and live of the Revised Statutes, as amended bj the
act of March first, nineteen hundred and one. shall not be abridged :
5194—Vol. :'»4—(»r> m 1 '
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Now, therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by said acts
of Congress, do hereby declare and make known that all the unal-
lotted lands in said reservation, excepting such as have at that time
been reserved for military, forestry, and other purposes, and such
mineral lands as may have been disposed of under existing laws, will,
on and after the 28th day of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry, settlement, and dis-
position under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite
laws of the United States; and it is further directed and prescribed
that
:
Commencing at 9 o'clock a. m., Tuesday, August 1, 1905, and end-
ing at 6 o'clock p. m., Saturday, August 12, 1905, a registration will
be had at Vernal, Price, and Provo, State of Utah, and at Grand
Junction, State of Colorado, for the purpose of ascertaining what
persons desire to enter, settle upon, and acquire title to any of said
lands under the homestead law, and of ascertaining their qualifica-
tions so to do. To obtain registration each applicant will be required
to show himself duly qualified, by written application to be made
only on a blank form provided by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, to make homestead entry of these lands under existing
laws, and to give the registering officer such appropriate matters of
description and identity as will protect the applicant and the Gov-
ernment against any attempted impersonation. Registration can not
be effected through the use of the mails or the employment of an
agent, excepting that honorably discharged soldiers and sailors en-
titled to the benefits of section 2304 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, as amended by the act of Congress, approved March
1, 1901 (31 Stat., 847), may present their applications for registra-
tion and due proofs of their qualifications through an agent of their
own selection, having a duly executed power of attorney on a blank
form provided by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, but
no person will be permitted to act as agent for more than one such
soldier or sailor. No person will be permitted to register more than
once or in any other than his true name.
Each applicant who shows himself duly qualified will be registered
and given a nontransferable certificate to that effect, which will entitle
him to go upon and examine the lands to be opened hereunder; but
the only purpose for which he can go upon and examine said lands is
that of enabling him later on, as herein provided, to understandingly
select the lands for which he may make entry. No one will be permit-
ted to make settlement upon any of said lands in advance of the
opening herein provided for, and during the first sixty days follow-
ing said opening no one but registered applicants will be permitted
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to make homestead settlement upon any of said land-, and then only
in pursuance of a homestead entry duly allowed by the local land
officers, or of a soldier's declaratory statement duly accepted by such
officers.
The order in which, during the first sixty days following the open-
ing, the registered applicants will be permitted to make homestead
entry of the lands opened hereunder, will be determined by a drawing
for the district publicly held at Provo, Utah, commencing at 9 o'clock
a. m., Thursday, August 17, 1905, and continuing for such period as
may be necessary to complete the same. The drawing will be had
under the supervision and immediate observance of a committee of
three persons whose integrity is such as to make their control of the
diawing a guaranty of its fairness. The members of this committee
will be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who will prescribe
suitable compensation for their services. Preparatory to this drawing
the registration officers will, at the time of registering each applicant
who shows himself duly qualified, make out a card, which must be
signed by the applicant, and giving such a description of the applicant
as will enable the local land officers to thereafter identify him. This
card will be subsequently sealed in a separate envelope which will
bear no other distinguishing label or mark than such as may be neces-
sary to show that it is to go into the drawing. These envelopes will
be carefully preserved and remain sealed until opened in the course of
the drawing herein provided. When the registration is completed all
of these sealed envelopes will be brought together at the place of
drawing and turned over to the committee in charge of the drawing,
who, in such manner as in their judgment will be attended with entire
fairness and equality of opportunity, shall proceed to draw out and
open the separate envelopes and to give to each inclosed card a
number in the order in which the envelope containing the same is
drawn. The result of the drawing will be certified by the committee
to the officers of the district and will determine the order in which
the applicants may make homestead entry of said lands and settle-
ment thereon.
Notice of the drawings, stating the name of each applicant and
number assigned to him by the drawing, will be posted each day at
the place of drawing, and each applicant will be notified of his num-
ber and of the day upon which he must make his entry by a postal
card mailed to him at the address given by him at the time of regis-
tration. The result of each day's drawing will also be given to the
press to be published as a matter of news. Application^ for home
stead entry of said lands during the first sixty days following the
opening can be made only by registered applicant- and in l he order
established by the drawing.
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Commencing on Monday, August 28, 1905, at 9 o'clock a. m., the
applications of those drawing numbers 1 to 50, inclusive, must be
presented at the land office in the town of Vernal, Utah, in the land
district in which said lands are situated, and will be considered in
their numerical order during the first day, and the applications of
those drawing numbers 51 to 100, inclusive, must be presented and
will be considered in their numerical order during the second day.
and so on at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under
the homestead law, and desired thereunder, have been entered. If
any applicant fails to appear and present his application for entry
when the number assigned to him by the drawing is reached, his
right to entry will be passed until after the other applications as-
signed for that day have been disposed of, when he will be given
another opportunity to make entry, failing in which he will be deemed
to have abandoned his right to make entry under such drawing.
To obtain the allowance of a homestead entry, each applicant must
personally present the certificate of registration theretofore issued to
him, together with a regular homestead application and the necessary
accompanying proofs, together with the regular land office fees, but
an honorably discharged soldier or sailor may file his declaratory
statement through his agent, who can represent but one soldier or
sailor as in the matter of registration.
Persons who make homestead entry for any of these lands will be
required to pay therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre when they make final proof, but no payment, other
than the usual fees and commissions will be required at the time the
entry is made.
Persons who apply to make entry of these lands prior to October
27, 1905, will not be required to file the usual nonmineral affidavit
with their applications to enter, but such affidavit must be filed before
final proof is accepted under their entries; but all persons who make
entry after that date will be required to file that affidavit with their
applications to enter.
The production of the certificate of registration will be dispensed
with only upon satisfactory proof of its loss or destruction. If at
the time of considering his regular application for entry it appears
that an applicant is disqualified from making homestead entry of
these lands, his application will be rejected, notwithstanding his
prior registration. If any applicant shall register more than once
hereunder, or in any other than his true name, or shall transfer his
registration certificate, he will thereby lose all the benefits of the
registration and drawing herein provided for, and will be precluded
from entering or settling upon any of said lands during the first
sixty days following said opening.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 5
Any person or persons desiring to found, or to suggesl establishing,
a town site upon any of the said lands, at any point, may, at any time
before the opening herein provided for, file in the land office a written
application to that effect, describing by legal subdivision- the lands
intended to be affected, and stating fully and under oath the necessil v
or propriety of founding or establishing a town at that place. The
local officers will forthwith transmit said petition to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office with their recommendation in the
premises. Such Commissioner, if he believes the public interests will
be subserved thereby, will, if the Secretary of the Interior approve
thereof, issue an order withdrawing the lands described in such peti-
tion, or any portion thereof, from homestead entry and settlement and
directing that the same be held for the time being for disposal under
the town site laws of the United States in such manner as the Secre-
tary of the Interior may from time to time direct; and, if at any time
after such withdrawal has been made it is determined that the lands
so withdrawn are not needed for town site purposes they may be
released from such withdrawal and then disposed of under the gen-
eral provisions of the homestead laws in the manner prescribed herein.
All persons are especially admonished that under the said act of
Congress approved March 3, 1905, it is provided that no person shall
be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any of said lands, except
in the manner prescribed in this proclamation, until after the expira-
tion of sixty days from the time when the same are opened to >ett le-
nient and entry. After the expiration of the said period of sixty
days, but not before, as hereinbefore prescribed, any of said lands
remaining undisposed of may be settled upon, occupied, and entered
under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of
the United States in like manner as if the manner of effecting such
settlement, occupancy, and entry had not been prescribed herein in
obedience to law.
The Secretary of the Interior shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations necessary to carry into full effect the opening herein pro-
vided for.
In witness whereof,-I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington this 1 4 1 1 1 day of duly, in
(seal.] the year of our Lord 1905, and of the Independence of the
United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
Theodore Roose^ rlt.
By the Presidenl :
Axvey A. Adee,
Acting Secretary of State.
() DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
OPENING OF THE UINTAH INDIAN RESERVATION LANDS IN THE STATE
OE UTAH.
By the President of the United States of America.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, it was declared in my proclamation of July 14, in the
year of our Lord 1905, prescribing the manner in which certain lands
within the Uintah Indian Reservation should be opened to settlement
and entry under the homestead and townsite Liavs of the United
States, among other things, as follows:
Commencing on Monday, August 28, 1905, at 9 o'clock a. m., the applications
of those drawing numbers 1 to 50, inclusive, must be presented at the land office
in the.town of Vernal, Utah, in the land district in which said lands are situated,
and will be considered in their numerical order during the first day, and the
applications of those drawing numbers 51 to 100, inclusive, must be presented
and will be considered in their numerical order during the second day, and so on
at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under the homestead law,
and desired thereunder, have been entered. If any applicant fails to appear
and present his application for entry when the number assigned to him by the
drawing is reached, his right to enter will be passed until after the other
applications assigned for that day have been disposed of, when he will be given
tmother opportunity to make entry, failing in which he will be deemed to have
abandoned his right to make entry under such drawing
;
And, whereas, there now appear to be ample reasons for a modi-
fication of said provision;
Now, therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by said act of
Congress, and for the purpose of modifying the provision of said
proclamation above quoted, do hereby declare and direct that said
provision be modified to read as follows:
Commencing oh Monday, August 28, 1905, at 9 o'clock a. m., the applications
of those drawing numbers 1 to 111, inclusive, must be presented at the land
office in the town of Vernal, Utah, in the land district in which said lands are
situated, and will be considered in their numerical order during the first day,
and the applications of those drawing numbers 112 to 222, inclusive, must be
presented and will be considered in their numerical order during the second day,-
find so on at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under the home-
stead law, and desired thereunder, have been entered. If any applicant fails to
appear and present his application for entry when the number assigned to him
by the drawing is reached, his right to enter will be passed until after the other
applications assigned for that day have been disposed of, when he will be given
another opportunity to make entry, failing in which he will be deemed to have
abandoned his right to make entry under such drawing.
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In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington this 2d day of August, in
[seal.] the year of our Lord 1905, and of the Independence of the
United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
T. Roosevelt.
By the President
:
Alvey A. A dee,
Acting Secretary of State,
REGULATIONS GOVERNING OPENING <>I UINTAH RESERVATION IX
UTAH.
Circular.
Department oe the [nterior,
Gex era l Land Offic
i
:
.
Washington, D. C, July 15, 1905.
Register and Receiver,
United States Land Office, Vernal, Utah.
Gentlemen: The following regulations are hereby prescribed for
the purpose of carrying into effect the opening of the Uintah Indian
Reservation in the State of Utah, provided for in the act of Congress
of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), and in the President's proclamation
of July 14, 1905, thereunder :
First. Applications either to file soldiers' declaratory statement or
make homestead entry of these lands, must, on presentation, in ac-
cordance with proclamation opening said lands to entry and settle-
ment, be accepted or rejected, but local officers may, in their discre
tion, permit amendment of a defective application during the day
only on which same is presented.
Second. No appeal to the General Land Office will be allowed or
considered unless taken within one day, Sundays excepted, after the
rejection of the application.
Third. After rejection of an application, whether an appeal be
taken or not, the land will continue to be subject to entry a- before,
excepting that any subsequent applicant for the same land must be
informed of the prior rejected application and that the subsequent
application, if allowed, will be subject to the disposition of the prior
application upon the appeal, if any is taken from the rejection
thereof, which fact must be noted upon the receipt or certificate
issued upon the allowance of the subsequent application.
Fourth. Where an appeal is taken the paper- will he immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will he at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
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with appropriate recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided and closed.
Fifth. Applications to contest entries allowed for these lands filed
during the sixty days from date of opening will also be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will be at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the interior
with proper recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided.
Sixth. These regulations Avill supersede, during the sixty days
from the opening of these lands, any rule of practice or other regu-
lation governing the disposition of applications with which they may
conflict, and will apply to all appeals taken from the action of the
local officers during said period of sixty days.
Seventh. The purpose of these regulations is to provide an ade-
quate and speedy method of correcting any material errors in local
offices, and at the same time to discourage groundless appeals and put
it out of the power of a disappointed applicant to indefinitely tie up
the land or force another to pay him to withdraw his appeal.
Give all possible publicity, through the press and otherwise, to these
regulations.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
:
F. L. Campbell, Acting Secretary.
uintah indian lands-persons not qualified to enter.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, July 15, 1905.
The following persons are not qualified to make homestead entry
of the lands of the Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah
:
1. Any person who has made a prior homestead entry and is not
entitled to make a second homestead entry. Under the act of June
5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267), any person avIio made a homestead entry and
commuted the same prior to June 5, 1900, is entitled to make a second
homestead entry; under the act of May 22, 1902 (32 Stat., 203), any
person who made final five-year proof, prior to May 17, 1900, on lands
to be sold for the benefit of Indians, and paid the price provided by
law opening the land to settlement, and who would have been entitled
under the " free homestead " law to have received title without such
payment, had not proof been made prior thereto, is entitled to make a
second homestead entry; under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat.,
527), any person who, prior to April 28, 1904, made homestead entry
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but was unable to perfect the entry on account of sonic unavoidable
complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of an
honest mistake as to the character of the land, provided he made a
bona fide effort to comply with the homestead law and did not relin-
quish his entry for a consideration, is entitled to make a second home-
stead entry; under section 2 of said act any person who has made a
homestead entry of a quantity of land containing less than L60 acres,
and is still owning and occupying the same, may enter a sufficient
quantity of lands contiguous to the lands embraced in his original
entry to make up the full amount of 1G0 acres: under section 6 of the
act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), any person who has made a
homestead entry for less than 160 acres, and has received the receiver's
final receipt therefor, is entitled to enter enough additional land, not
necessarily contiguous to the original entry, to make 160 acres.
2. A married woman, unless she has been deserted or abandoned
by her husband.
3. One not a citizen of the United States, and who has not declared
his intention to become such.
4. Anyone under 21 years of age, not the head of a family, unless
he served in the Army or Navy of the United States for not less than
fourteen days during actual war.
5. Anyone who is the proprietor of more than 100 acres of land
in any State or Territory.
6. One who has acquired title to, or is claiming under any of the
public land laws, in pursuance of settlement or entries made since
August 30, 1890, an amount of land, other than mineral land, which,
with the tract now sought to be entered, will exceed in the aggregate
320 acres.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
:
F. L. Campbell,
Acting Secretary.
mining claim—approximation survey.
Chicago Placer Mining Claim. 1 '
The rule of approximation permitted in entries under the homestead and other
public-land laws providing for the disposal of uonmineral lands has no
application to locations and entries under the mining laws.
A portion of an irregular legal subdivision is not sufficiently identified to
enable the Department to accurately describe the same in a patent by an
attempted description thereol in terms of the public land surveys, and
where patent is soughl to a placer mining claim embracing a portion of an
irregular legal subdivision or lot an official survey of the particular portion
claimed will be required.
" Not reported in volume 31.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( S. V. P.
)
Office, September 16, 1902. ( G. F. P.
)
May 7, 1901, J. H. Sarsfield made entry for the Chicago placer
mining claim, Leadville, Colorado, for certain lands described in
the certificate of entry as " lots 1 and 2 in Sec. 3, the S. i of lot 3 in
Sec. 3, the N. \ of N. \ of SE. \ of NW. i, Sec. 3, the S. \ of S. \ of
lot 4 in Sec. 3, the N. \ of SE. J of NW. J, Sec. 3, the S. \ of S. \ of
lot 1 in Sec. 4, and the N. \ of SE. \ of NE. \ of Sec. 4, in township
8 south, range 78 west," By the public survey of said sections 3 and
4 ( approved March 2, 1883) the quarter sections in which the Chi-
cago claim is situated are represented to be fractional, the lands in the
north half of each quarter section being designated as lots, each lot
containing more than forty acres, while the lands in the south half
of each quarter section are legal subdivisions of forty acres each.
By reason of approved surveys of certain lode and millsite claims,
as shown by a diagram prepared and transmitted to your office by the
United States Surveyor General, the areas of said lots 1 and 2 of
section 3 have been reduced by several acres each. None of the land
embraced in the surveys of the lode and millsite claims is included in
the entry.
The Chicago claim appears to have been located February 21, 1901.
The location embraces the land described in the certificate of entry.
According to the public survey and the aforesaid diagram, the claim
as located and entered contains an area of 165.03 acres. The area
stated in the certificate of entry and paid for by the entryman is 160
acres.
April 5, 1902, your office, upon examination of the record, required
the entryman to eliminate from the Chicago claim the area in excess
of 160 acres, either by relinquishment of one of the tracts embraced
therein, or by a survey of the claim. A motion for review, in which
the entryman asked to be allowed to pay for the excess area under the
rule of approximation usually applied to entries under the home-
stead laws, was dismissed by your office May 20, 1902. The entryman
has appealed to the Department.
The rule of approximation under which persons seeking title to
non-mineral public lands are permitted to pay for and include in an
entry whatever excess there may be in the claims asserted over and
above the amount limited by the law under which title is sought,
provided such excess is not greater than the deficiency would be
should a legal subdivision be excluded from the entry, is a rule of
administrative expediency relating to entries under the homestead
and other laws which provide for the disposal of lands by legal sub-
divisions only, and where a literal interpretation of the law would,
by reason of irregular areas of legal subdivisions, resulting from una-
' DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 11
voidable causes in the public surveys, frequently limit the entryman
(o less land than he is entitled to enter under the law.
The laws providing for the location, entry and patent oi* public
lands valuable for minerals are materially different from the home-
stead and other laws which provide for the disposal of non-mineral
lands. By the latter laws (excepting the act of May 14, 1898, 30
Stat., 401), under which title may be acquired to unsurveyed lands
in the District of Alaska, through soldiers' additional homestead
rights, 28 L. D., 149-50) lands are disposed of after the public
surveys have been extended over them, and only by the legal subdi-
visions of such surveys. Under the former, mineral lands may be
located, entered and patented either before or after the public sur-
veys have been extended to them, and, excepting as to placer claim-.
which if upon unsurveyed lands may be located and entered by legal
subdivisions, and with respect to which it is provided that in all cases
the locations "shall conform as near as practicable with the United
States system of public land surveys, and the rectangular subdivi-
sions of such surveys," and that where such claims "cannot be con-
formed to legal subdivisions, survey and plat shall be made as on
unsurveyed lands," it is not required that mineral lands shall be dis-
posed of by legal subdivisions. See Sees. 2320, 2325, 2329, 2330 and
2331 of the Revised Statutes. By section 2330 it is provided that
—
no location of a placer claim, made after the ninth day of July, eighteen hundred
and seventy, shall exceed one hundred and sixty acres for any one person or
association of persons.
In the administration of the placer mining law a literal interpre-
tation may be given to the provision limiting the number of acres that
may be included in a single location without working injustice to
any claimant thereunder. Location and entry may be made accord-
ing to legal subdivisions when the lands have been surveyed, or if
the claim can not be conformed to legal subdivisions, survey and plat
are provided for, as in the case of unsurveyed lands. A person seek-
ing title under a placer location which embraces more than 160 acres
sutlers no loss of any portion of his entry right because required to
reduce his claim to the number of acres allowed by law. for the reason
that he may have the exact area to which he i> entitled under the law
described by a survey and plat, showing accurately the boundaries
of his claim.
It follows from what has been said that there is no warrant for
the application of the rule of approximation to locations ami entries
under the mining laws.
There is another objection to the entry not noticed in your office
decision. Portions of the lands stated to be embraced in the entry
are not described in such manner as to sufficiently identify them.
These portions are referred to in the entry certificates a- "the S. J
12 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
of lot 3 in Sec. 3," " the S. | of S. \ of lot 4 in Sec. 3," " the S. \ of S. J
of lot 1 in Sec. 4," and are parts of irregular-shaped tracts designated
as lots by the public survey. It would be impossible from the descrip-
tion given in the entry certificate to identify the lands claimed under
the location and entry. This can be done only by a survey of the
portions of said lots intended to be embraced in the entry. If the
entryman shall elect to retain the lands claimed in said lots 3 and 4
in Sec. 3, and lot 1 in Sec. 4, or any portion or portions thereof, he
must have a survey of the same made, so that the portion or portions
retained may be properly identified.
No survey will be required as to ten-acre tracts of regular legal sub-
divisions or of entire lots, but where it is sought to embrace only a
portion of such tracts or lots a survey of the same must be furnished
as in the case of unsurveyed lands. In no event can the entry be
allowed to stand for more than 160 acres of land.
Your office decision is therefore modified to conform to the views
herein expressed.
PENDING SCHOOL INDEMNITY SELECTION—APPLICATION COVERING
SAME LAND.
Santa Fe Pacific R. R. Co. v. State of California.
Pending the disposition of a school land indemnity selection, even though erro-
neously received, no other application including any portion of the land
emhraced in such selection should be accepted, nor will any rights be con-
sidered as initiated by the tender of any such application.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
July 3, 1905. ( F. W. C.
)
The Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company has appealed from your
Office decision of December 10, 1904, rejecting its application, prof-
fered under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), to select the SW. \
of NE. I and NE. i of SE. J of Sec. 26, T. 28 N., R. 6 E., M. D. M.,
Susanville, California, land district, in lieu of an equal quantity of
land relinquished to the United States in the San Francisco Moun-
tains forest reserve, because of certain prior school indemnity selec-
tions made of said lands; also its applications to contest the State's
selections covering these lands; the latter action being because of
the fact that they were made by one H. D. Burroughs, admittedly
not as initiating a contest in his own name to be prosecuted in his
own interest, but as attorney for and on behalf of the Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad Company.
With regard to the State's selection covering these lands, your office
decision states that the selection of the SW. J of NE. J of Sec. 26, was
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made on March 12, 11)02, and that the selection of the XK. | of SE. \
of Sec. 20, was made on February 16, 11)04. With regard to the Last-
mentioned selection, the fact is that the State's selection was made on
October 10, 1903. The list filed on that date, including this tract,
also embraced other selections, and, upon examination thereof, it was
found that certain of the selections were improperly allowed, and the
selection of those tracts was canceled, the State subsequently, on Feb-
ruary 16, 11)04, filing what is termed an amendatory list, embracing
all the selections included within the original list, with the exception
of those canceled, the selection in each instance being on account of
the same basis assigned in the original list.
With regard to the State's selections, that of March 12, 1902, was
on account of a part of section 16 lost to the State because the land in
place was patented under the swamp land grant. With regard to the
selection of October 10, 1903, the selection was claimed on account of
a portion of a section 16 which had been previously withdrawn for
examination and investigation with a view to its possible inclusion
within a forest reserve.
The selections were accepted by the local officers, duly entered of
record, and were pending undisposed of at the time of the proffer of
the selection by the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, and it was
because of the pendency of such selections, and without regard to their
validity, that your office and the local officers held that the land cov-
ered thereby was not subject to selection under the act of June 4,
1897, supra.
This action is affirmed. Good administration requires that, pend-
ing the disposition of a selection, even though erroneously received.
no other application including any portion of the land embraced
in said selection should be accepted, nor should any rights be con-
sidered as initiated by the tender of any such application.
With regard to the affidavits filed as the basis for the contest of the
State's selections, your office decision rightly held that the applica-
tions presented were insufficient, and the action rejecting the same is
also affirmed. The proffered selection of the Santa Fe Pacific Rail-
road Company will stand rejected.
MOUNT RANTER FOREST RESERVE—YAKIMA INDIAN LANDS—ACT OF
DECEMBER 91, 1904.
I ffSTRTJCTIONS.
The authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior by the acl of Decern
ber 21, l!)ol. (o sell and dispose of certain lands claimed by the rakiina
Indians and adjoining their then-recognized reservation on the west, held
to embrace such of said lands as fall within the limits of the Mount Kanier
forest reserve.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) July 3, 1905. (G. 13. G.)
Referring to your office letter " R " of the 28th ultimo, I have to
state that upon careful examination of the question therein sub-
mitted, it is clearly the opinion of this Department that the act of
December 21, 1904 (33 Stat., 595), recognizes the claim of the Yakima
Nation of Indians to that strip of country adjoining their then-
recognized reservation on the west, " containing approximately two
hundred and ninety-three thousand, eight hundred and thirty-seven
acres according to the findings, after examination, of Mr. E. C.
Barnard, topographer of the Geological Survey, approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, April seventh, nineteen hundred;" that
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to sell or
dispose of all such lands, except such as may have been allotted or to
which valid rights have not been acquired prior to March 5, 1904,
by bona fide settlers or purchasers under the public land laws; and
that this authority and direction embrace so much of said lands as
falls within the limits of the Mount Ranier forest reserve, as estab-
lished by executive proclamation of February 22, 1897. Your office
will be governed accordingly in the administration of said act.
ISOLATED TRACT-PUBLIC SALE-NOTICE-CIRCULAR OF APRIL
11, 1895, AMENDED.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, July 3, 1905.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
Gentlemen : Referring to the form of notice for publication to be
used in public land sales, as prescribed by circular of April 11, 1895
(20 L. D., 305), I have to direct that hereafter when instructions are
received from this office ordering into market, at public sale, any iso-
lated tract or tracts of land, you will not only specify in such notice
the day of the month and place for such sale, but also the hour of
commencement of sale.
Very respectfully, • J. H. Fimple,
Acting Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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LANDS SEGREGATED FROM YOSEMITE NAT[ONAL PARK ANT) INCLUDED
IN SIERRA FOREST RESERVE—RIGHT <>I WAV V< T OF FJEBRTJ VKY 7
1905.
Circular.
Department oe the [nteriqr,
Washington, I). 0., July 7, 1905.
This act [February 7. 1905, 33 Stat, 702], so far as it relates to the
use of the lands within the addition to the Sierra Forest Reserve
made by it, for right of way purposes, is as follows:
Provided, That all those tracts or parcels of lands described in section one
of the said act of October first, eighteen hundred and ninety, and not included
within the metes and hounds of the land above described, he. and the same are
hereby, included in and made part of the Sierra Forest Reserve: .1//'/ provided
further, That the Secretary of the Interior may require the payment of such
price as he may deem proper for privileges on the land herein segregated from
the Yosemite National Park and made a part of the Sierra Forest Reserve
accorded under the act approved February fifteenth, nineteen hundred and one,
relating to rights of way over certain parks, reservations, and other lands, and
other acts concerning rights of way over public lands: and the moneys received
from the privileges accorded on the lands herein segregated and included in the
Sierra Forest Reserve shall he paid into the Treasury of the United States, to
be expended, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in the man-
agement, improvement, and protection of the forest lands herein set aside and
reserved, which shall hereafter be known as the "Yosemite National Park."
Sec. 2. That none of the lands patented and in private ownership in the area
hereby included in the Sierra Forest Reserve shall have the privileges of the
lieu-land scrip provisions of the land laws, hut otherwise to be in all respects
under the laws and regulations affecting the forest reserves, and immediately
upon the passage of this act all laws, rules, and regulations affecting forest
reservations, including the right to change the boundaries thereof by Executive
proclamation, shall take effect and be in force within the limits of the territory
excluded by this act from the Yosemite National Park, except as herein other-
wise provided.
The several acts of Congress authorizing the use of lands within
forest reserves for right-of-way purposes are applicable to this por-
tion of the Sierra Forest Reserve, with the condition, however, that
the Secretary of the Interior may require the beneficiary to pay a
suitable price for the privileges accorded therein.
The Department of Agriculture is vested with jurisdiction to pass
upon all applications under any law of the United States providing
for the granting of a permission to occupy' and use lands in a forest
reserve, which occupation or use is temporary in character, and which.
if granted, will in no wise affect the fee or cloud the title of the
United States should the reserve be discontinued. The Departmenl
of the Interior is vested with jurisdiction over all applications affect
ing lands within a forest reserve the granting of which amounts to an
easement running with the land. Any permission or license granted
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by the Agricultural Department is subject to any later disposal of
the lands by the Department of the Interior.
All applications for privileges other than of a temporary character
within the said addition to the Sierra Forest Reserve should be in
accordance with the regulations heretofore prescribed in similar cases.
Before final approval is given to any application for a privilege on
or over these lands, the Secretary of the Interior will fix the price
therefor and the payment thereof will be necessary before final
approval is given.
When the payment is made at the local land office, the receiver will
charge the amount paid on his list of unearned moneys and deposit
the same to his official credit until he is advised of the allowance
or rejection of the application. If the application be allowed, he will
cover the money into the Treasury to the credit of the special fund
provided for by this act, to be expended under the direction of the
/Secretary of the Interior in the management, improvement, and pro-
zection of the Yosemite National Park; if rejected, the amount will
be returned to the applicant and a proper receipt taken therefor.
In addition to the foregoing, and before such application will be
approved, the applicant must expressly agree to enter into a contract
whereby he shall bind himself to make further annual payments
for such privilege should the Secretary of the Interior, upon con-
sideration of the facts in each particular case, so prescribe. Such
payments when required, shall be made to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, to be placed to the credit of the special fund provided for in the
act of February 7, 1905, to be expended in the management, improve-
ment, and protection of the Yosemite National Park.
An applicant for the privilege of transporting persons and material
through the reserve to the Yosemite National Park will also be
required, when in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior the
convenience of the public requires it, to file in the Department a stipu-
lation agreeing to transport the cars of any other person or company
over its road upon the payment of such reasonable charge as may be
determined upon between the parties, or by the Secretary of the
Interior.
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
land withdrawn under act of june 17, 1902 -townsite.
Instructions.
Directions given relative to the survey, subdivision, appraisal and sale of certain
lands in Idaho within the irrigable area of the Minidoka reclamation project,
withdrawn from entry, except under the homestead law, for disposal in
accordance with the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, and subsequently
reserved by the President, under section 2380 of the Revised Statutes, as a
town site.
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Acting Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of fh< Gi ru ral Land
(S. V. P.) Office, July 8, I!)').',. , E. V. B. |
Your reports of May 23, 1005, and June 16, L905, as well as th •
reports of the Director of the Geological Survey of May :'.. L905,
June 1, 1905, and June 3, 1905, relative to the survey and sale of
certain lands in Idaho that have been reserved by the President under
section 2380, Revised Statutes, as a townsite, have been considered by
the Department.
The lands reserved are all of section 15. except the K.
J SE. j-, and
lots 3 and 4, section 22, T. 10 S., R. 23 E., B. M., Hailey," Idaho, con-
taining in the aggregate 632.70 acres. The order of reservation also
improperly embraced lands in section 16, belonging to the State of
Idaho, but the order was ineffective as to those lands, as the United
States had no jurisdiction and control over them, and they should
not be considered in making the survey of the townsite.
The lands being within the irrigable area and susceptible of recla-
mation from the irrigation works of the contemplated Minidoka
project, had formerly been withdrawn from entry, except under the
homestead law. for the purpose of being disposed of only in con-
formity with the provisions of the act of June 17. 1902 ( 32 Stat.. 388)
,
and were thus placed directly under the control of the Reclamation
Service. Subsequent!}^ upon the recommendation and advice of th"
Director of the Geological Survey that the lands in question were
suitable for townsite purposes and would become a center of popula-
tion, they were reserved by the President under the following section
(2380) of the Revised Statutes:
The President is authorized to reserve from the public lands, whether sur-
veyed or unsurveyed, town-sites on the shores of harbors, at the junction of
rivers, important portages, or any natural or prospective centers of population.
They were thereupon taken from under the immediate jurisdiction
and control of the Geological Survey and were restored to the control
of the General Land Office, as the bureau provided by law for super
vising the survey and sale of such reservations as public lands of tli«'
United States under the following provision (2381) of the Revised
Statutes:
When, in the opinion of the President, the public interests require it. ii shall
be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause any of such reservations,
or part thereof, to be surveyed into urban or suburban lots of suitable size,
and to tix by appraisement of disinterested persons their cash value, and in offer
the same for sale at public outcry to the bighesl bidder, and thence afterward
to be held subject to sale at private entry according to sudi regulations as the
Secretary of the Interior may prescribe; but no lot shall be disposed of at public
sale or private entry for less than the appraised value thereof; and all such
sales shall be conducted by the register and receiver of the land office in the
r»is>4— Vol. ::t <>r> m —2
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district in which the reservation may he situated, in accordance with the
instructions of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
It being desirable that the lands reserved should be opened for
occupancy as early as practicable, it becomes the duty of this Depart-
ment to have them surveyed and subdivided into suitable lots, blocks,
streets, alleys and necessary reservations for public uses and to have
the lots appraised at their cash value and offered for sale at public
outcry to the highest bidder, and to provide by appropriate regula-
tions for the disposal at private entry of the lands remaining unsold
at the public offering.
You will therefore take immediate steps to have the exterior
boundaries of the reservation surveyed without regard to the State
lands adjoining, and to have the lands so segregated subdivided
into streets, alleys, blocks and lots and to lay out such reservations
for public parks as may be desirable for public use, due regard being
had to the future necessities of the inhabitants of the townsite. You
Avill have the lots appraised by disinterested persons at their cash
value and have them offered for sale at public outcry to the highest
bidder for cash, the sale to be conducted by the register and receiver
in accordance with such instructions from your office as may be given.
The Director of the Geological Survey submits with one of his
reports a plat of a proposed subdivision of the townsite, which, as to
the streets, alleys, blocks, lots and reservations for parks indicated
thereon, appears to be free from objection, and no reason appears why
the suggestion may not be accepted by your office and the survey be
made accordingly. It is not intended by this suggestion to restrict
your office in the exercise of its judgment, but you are free to make
such recommendation as may seem advisable.
There is no authority under the act to make the other reservation
indicated upon the plat. The dedication of portions of the reserva-
tion for public parks may be exercised as a necessary incident to the
power to lay out streets and alleys for the public use, but the law
evidently contemplates that the lots and blocks shall be sold to the
highest bidder unless reserved for government purposes.
The plat indicates that certain lots are to be used for particular
purposes. The suggestion merely indicated the reason for restricting
the area of the lots thus designated, and not that such condition be
imposed at the sale, as there is no authority to prescribe the purpose
for which any lot must be used.
In having the townsite surveyed you may make use of such service
as the Reclamation Service may be able to render, but it must be made
under your direction and subject to your approval. The mere fact
that the land reserved is within the irrigable area of an irrigation
project and susceptible of reclamation, makes no difference in the
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proceedings for the disposal of the lands. They musl be disposed of
as all other lands reserved for townsite purposes under section 2380.
After the approval of the survey, the land- will be offered for sale
to the highest bidder for cash after the usual notice, and the land
remaining unsold at the public offering will thereafter be subject to
private cash entry under such regulations as may hereafter be pre-
scribed. There is no authority to sell any such lands except for cash.
The law requiring that they shall be appraised at their cash value,
necessarily implies that they shall be sold for cash.
Northern Pacific Railway Co.
Motion for review of departmental decision of June 8. 1905, 33
L. D., 601, denied by Acting Secretary Campbell, July 12, 1905.
RIGHT OF WAY—ALASKAN LANDS—SEC. 6 ACT <>I MAY 14, 1898.
A. B. W. Mining Company.
The provisions of section 6 of the act of May 14, 18 (.)S. conferring upon the Sec-
retary of the Interior authority to sell to the owner or owners of a wagon
road or tramway, not to exceed twenty acres of* public land, for terminal
facilities, at each end of the road, contemplates the sale of an absolute fee
in the lands, and where the lands, at the date applied for, are included
within a forest reserve, they are not subject to sale under said section, not-
withstanding the wagon road or tramway in connection with which they .ire
desired may have been constructed prior to»the creation of the reserve.
In view of the provisions of the act of February 1. r.)n.~>, transferring to the
Secretary of Agriculture the execution of certain laws affecting public
lands within the limits of forest reserves, and the construction placed upon
that act by the Secretary of the Interior and concurred in by the Secretary
of Agriculture, applications for permits for use of rights of way within for-
est reserves on account of wagon roads or tramways, under section <*» of the
act of May 14, 1898, come within the jurisdiction ami control of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture.
Acting Secretary Campbell to fix- Commissiont / of the Gt n< ral L>m<l
(S. V. P.) Offl'rr. Jul;, 12, 1905. ( F. W. ( J. )
The A. I). W. Mining Company has appealed from your office (In-
cision of May 3, L904, refusing to submit, with favorable recommenda-
tion, its application for the issue of a permit under section 6 of the
act of May 14, L898 (30 Stat., 409, 411). on account of its constructed
tramway, as shown upon it- map accompanying it- application,
having a length of L.59 milesj and rejecting it> application i<» purchase
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two certain tracts of land, as terminals to said tramway, covering
11.886 acres and 20 acres, respectively, for the reason that the lands
affected by the several applications are within the limits of the with-
drawal made by proclamation August 20, 1902, creating the Alex-
ander Archipelago Forest Reserve in the Juneau land district,
Alaska, said reserve having been created under the provisions of sec-
tion 24 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat,, 1095).
In its appeal the mining company claims to be the owner of cer-
tain mining properties on Prince of Wales Island, Alaska, about one
mile from the shore of Hollis Bay and on an arm of Kassan Bay;
that during the autumn of 1901 the company constructed a tramway
from its mill and reduction works to the beach, which was prior to
the creation of the forest reserve, and it is urged that the subsequent
action creating such reserve should not affect its rights previously
acquired under the act of 1898.
By section 7 of the act of 1898 it is provided
:
That this act shall not apply to any lands within the limits of any military,
park, Indian, or other reservation unless such right of way shall be provided for
by act of Congress.
Section 6 of the act of 1898 provides that the Secretary of the In-
terior may issue a permit by instrument in writing authorizing the
use of a right of way over the public domain in the district of Alaska
for the construction of wagon roads and tramways. By the same
section the Secretary is also authorized to sell to the owner or owners
of any such wagon road or tramway not to exceed twenty acres of
public land at each terminal, at the rate of $1.25 per acre, evidently
designed for terminal facilities. The right given under a permit for
use of right of way issued under this section for the construction of
a wagon road or tranrway, is separate and distinct from the right to
purchase grounds for terminal facilities. The latter contemplates
an absolute fee in the lands, and the fact that such lands are, at the
date applied for, included within a forest reserve is a sufficient bar
to the purchase. Your decision, in so far as it rejected the applica-
tions for terminal grounds, is, for that reason, affirmed, and in this
connection it is noted that the lands applied for seem to be largely
in excess of what would seem to be needed when the actual length of
the road is considered.
With regard to the application for permit for the use of the right
of way .actually occupied by the constructed tramway, in view of the
provisions of the act of February 1, 1905 (33 Stat., 628), transferring
to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture the execution of
certain of the laws affecting public lands within the limits of forest
reserves, the departmental letter of June 8, last, addressed to the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, defining the jurisdictions of the two depart-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 21
incuts over the granting of rights and privileges within such reserves,
and of the letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, dated June L3,
last, assenting, this Department is of opinion that the question as to
the future occupation of the reserve by the tramway in question ls a
matter for consideration by the Secretary of Agriculture, and. for
this reason, it is directed that the papers relating to the application
in question be forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture, with a copy
of this decision, and that the applicant company be fully advised in
the premises.
military bounty land warrant—unoffered land-equitable
adjudication .
Roy McDonald.
Where the only objection to confirmation of a military bounty land warrant
location, made in good faith, is the purely technical one that through inad-
vertence of the land department the land covered thereby was never for-
mally offered at public sale under the provisions of the act of July t. L876,
as it should have been, of which fact the locator was ignorant, the location
may be referred to the Board of Equitable Adjudication for confirmation
under Rule 11.
Act 'nig Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) Office, July 12, 1905. ( J. R. W.
)
Roy McDonald appealed from your decision of November 25, 190-1,
requiring him to show cause why his location of bounty land warrant
! L5,547 should not be canceled as to the SE. I of the NW, i, Sec. 6,
T. 4 S., R. 22 W., La. M., New Orleans, Louisiana.
April 7, L903, Roy McDonald located military bounty land warrant
115,547, one hundred and sixty acres, on the S\V. \ of the XK. ]. the
SE. J of the NAY. '.and the X. | of the SE. ], Sec. 6, T. 1 S., R. 22 W.
The warrant was issued tinder the act of March 3, L855 ( 10 Stat..
701 ). to the widow of a soldier of the First Mississippi Volunteers,
for service in the Mexican war, and was locatable only on lands sub-
ject to entry at the minimum or graduated price.
All the land located was by the act of June 21, L866 ( 1 1 Stat.. 66),
withdrawn from disposal except under the homestead law. and upon
repeal of that restriction by the act of July 1. ls7C> ( 1!> Stat.. 7:')). it
was provided
:
That the repeal of said section shall not have the effect to Impair the right,
complete or inchoate, of any homestead settler, and no land occupied by such
settler at the time that this act shall take effed shall he subject 1" entry, pre
emption, or sale: .\>i<l provided, 'That the public lands affected by this act shall
he offered at public sale as soon as practicable, from time to time ami accord-
ing to the provisions of existing law. and shall not he subject to private entrj
until they are so offered.
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The subdivision here in question never was offered at public sale
under the act of 1876, supra, and your office held that by express terms
of that act it did not again become subject to entry and was not sub-
ject to location under the warrant.
The appeal alleges error in holding that a military bounty land
warrant will not take an unoffered tract of public land which is gen-
erally subject to disposal under the general laws.
The restriction of the right of location to land subject to private
entry was, as the law then stood, for protection of the United States
against appropriation of public lands before it had opportunity to
realize a better price by offering its lands at public sale. What was
intended was to grant as a bounty so much land as was expressed in
the warrant of lands subject to private appropriation generally at the
minimum or lower graduated price. The provisions of the act of
1876, supra, had no other purpose than to protect settlers and to pro-
tect the United States in obtaining a higher price, by another offer
at public sale. The latter object has been abandoned and the land
can not be offered, since the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854),
withdrew all lands from sale except in the State of Missouri. There
is no doubt but that the location was made in good faith, that the case
is meritorious, and that objection to approval of the location is purely
the technical one that the land, through some inadvertence of the land
department, was never formally reoffered under the act of 1876, of
which fact the locator was ignorant.
In view of the Department the case is therefore within the princi-
ples announced in the cases of J. M. McDonald (15 L. D., 257), and
Pecard v. Camens et al. (4 L. D., 152), and the case will be referred to
the Board of Equitable Adjudication for confirmation under the 11th
rule, promulgated October 3, 1846.
SWAMP LAND—ADJUSTMENT-CHARACTER OF LAND.
Culligan v. State of Minnesota.
In the adjustment of all claims for public lands in the State of Minnesota
initiated in accordance with law prior to survey of the lands, in instances
where selection thereof is made by the State under its swamp land grant,
and the field notes of survey afford a sufficient basis for such selection, the
land department will, by hearing or otherwise, determine the true character
of the lands, notwithstanding the return of the field notes of survey of the
township.
Acting Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S.V.P.) Office, July 13,1905. (G. B. G.)
Departmental decision of April 14, 1904 (not reported), affirmed
your office decision of June 17, 1904, which rejected the application
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of Patrick Culligan to contest the swamp land selection- of the State
of Minnesota to certain lands in sections 25 and 26, town-hip 57 north.
range 8 west. Diihith land district. Minnesota, more particularly
described in your said office decision. A motion for review of i In-
decision was filed by Culligan and duly entertained, November 29,
1<)04.
The decision complained of was ruled under direction \o. 2 of the
general regulations given by this Department March L6, L903 (32 L.
T)., 65), for the future adjustment of the swamp land grant to the
State of Minnesota, which direction was as follows:
(2) All existing contests or controversies in which there is no claim of
actual and bona fide homestead or pre-emption settlement, will he disposed of
under the original plan of following the tield notes, there being nothing in sucl;
contests or controversies which would equitably entitle the claimants adverse
to the State to have the contest disposed of under the rule announced in the
Lachance decision.
Direction No. 1 of these same regulations provides that all exist inn-
contests and controversies between the State and an actual and bona
fide homestead or pre-emption settler shall be disposed of under the
rule announced in the "Lachance 1 decision" (4 L. I).. 17*.)). which
was, by ordering a hearing, to afford such homestead or pre-emption
claimant an opportunity to prove the character and condition of the
land involved at the date of the swamp land grant to the State of
Minnesota. There is also a further direction (No. 4) which provides
that all contests or controversies thereafter begun (after March 16,
11)08), respecting the swampy or non-swampy character of lands in
said State, whether theretofore or thereafter surveyed, shall be deter-
mined by the field-notes of survey.
The motion for review admits that the decision complained of i< in
strict accord with these regulations, but asks that the regulation- be
reformed.
After most careful consideration, and upon a more comprehensive
view of the subject, it is believed that the regulations in question
should be amended to afford relief in cases of the character here
presented.
The claim of Culligan arose upon certain forest lieu selections
under the act of June 4, 1<S (.)7 (30 Stat., 11, 36), and a selection by
the Northern Pacific Railway Company under the act of March 2,
1S!) (.) (30 Stat., <)<>:*, 994), and upon the subsequent assignment of the
claims to him. The acts in question authorized the selection of
unsurveyed lands, and the selections in question were in Pact made
prior to the survey of the township in which they arc situated, and
were in fact a mere exchange of lands. At the date of the selections
it was not known, and not possible to know or surmise, that the field
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notes of the survey to be thereafter made would designate these lands
as swamp. The selectors, therefore, were without other notice of the
character of this land than such as resulted from an examination
upon the ground. It is sufficiently alleged that such examination
was made and showed the land in controversy to be high and dry, and
not swamp, and movant asks that he be permitted to show this at a
hearing.
It is thought that in equity and good conscience this should be done,
and it is so ordered.
In the further adjustment of all claims heretofore or hereafter
initiated in accordance with law for public lands in the State of
Minnesota, prior to the survey thereof, in instances where a selection
of such lands is made by the State under its swamp land grant, and
the field-notes of survey afford a sufficient basis for such selection,
your office will, by hearing, or otherwise, determine the true character
of the land, notwithstanding the return in the field-notes of survey of
the township.
townsite entry—trustee—section 2387, revised statutes.
Bena Towtnsite.
The term " judge of the county court for the county," employed in section 2387
of the Revised Statutes to designate the officer authorized to make town-
site entry under said section, as trustee for the several use and benefit of
the occupants of the townsite, embraces any presiding judicial officer of a
court having jurisdiction within the county; and where any one of several
officers coming within the purview of the statute is designated by the State
legislature as the proper officer to assume the trust and make the entry,
such designation is entitled to be recognized by the officers of the land
department.
Acting Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) Office, July IS, 1905. (J. R. W.)
The Bena Townsite settlers appealed from your decision of April
14, 1905, rejecting the application of W. S. McClenahan as '' Judge of
the District (County) Court in and for Cass County, Minnesota," to
make entry of the SW. J NW. J, W. ± SW. i, Sec/26, SE. I SE. },
Sec. 27, and NE. J, Sec. 34, T. 145 N., R. 28 W., 5th P. M., Cass Lake,
Minnesota, as the Bena Townsite.
The only matter presented by the appeal is the question whether
under the laws of the United States and of Minnesota the judge of
the district court having jurisdiction within the county wherein is
an urban settlement upon public lands, or the probate judge of such
county, is the proper officer, as trustee to the several use of the occu-
pants, to make the townsite entry.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 25
October 27, 1903, there was filed in the Local office the declaratory
statement of "W. S. McClenahan, Judge of the District (County)
Court, in and for Cass County." Minnesota, that :
about twenty persons have on the 19th day of October, L903, settled upOD and
occupied as a townsite the description .... and I do hereby declare my
intention to claim the said tracts of land as and for a townsite in trust for the
several use aud benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective
interests.
November 22, 1904, the local office rejected the application, because
(1) the land was not subject to townsite entry, and (2) that appli-
cant as district judge is not authorized to make such entry. Decem-
ber 23, 1904, he appealed to your office.
June 27, 1904, J. G. McGarry, "judge of the probate (county)
court of Cass county, Minnesota,'' filed a like statement, which the
local office rejected, June 29, 1904, because it was instructed, Decem-
ber 2, 1903, to allow no entries, or other disposition of these lands,
which were temporarily withdrawn and reserved for forestry pur-
poses under the act of June 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 400, 402). McGarry
took no appeal.
April 14, 1905, your office affirmed the action of the local office,
and held that the
—
judges of the District Courts of Minnesota are not authorized under sections
2387 and 2388, U. S. Rev. Stat., to act as trustees for townsite occupants of the
public land .... but their action in rejecting the declaratory statement filed by
Judge McGarry is hereby reversed.
May 15, 1905, Judge McClenahan withdrew his application, and
June 10, 1905, notified the local office that such action was inadvert-
ent and should not be considered as effective. June 13, 1905. lie filed
his appeal and authority to counsel to represent him before the
Department.
Section 2387 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides :
Whenever any portion of the public lands have been or may lie settled upon
and occupied as a town-site, not subject to entry under the agricultural pre-
emption laws, it is lawful, in case such town be incorporated, for the corporate
authorities thereof, and. if not incorporated, for the judge of the county court
for the county in which such town is situated, to enter at the proper land office,
and at the minimum price, the land so settled and occupied in trust for the
several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective
interests; the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such
town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such regula-
tions as may he prescribed by the legislative authority of the State or Territory
in which the same may be situated.
The term "county court " is clearly not intended to he the name <>l
a particular court, for the statute is general and i- intended to be
operative in all States where'there are public land-, and in many such
States, as Minnesota, there are no courts known by thai name. The
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words " judge of the county court for the county " can have no other
meaning than the presiding judicial officer of a court having juris-
diction within the county. In designating the judge of the county
court Congress sought to assure that the trustee should be a person
of sound discretion and integrity.
The statute does not provide for the administration of the trust,
but merely for protection of the interests of the United States in re-
quiring payment for the lands thus appropriated by urban settle-
ment. It leaves the administration of the trust arising from a com-
munity appropriation of public lands to the local authority, by pro-
viding that the trustee shall administer his trust " under such regu-
lations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State
or Territory in which the same may be situated."
Under the judicial system of the State of Minnesota there is no
court named the county court. There exist at least three courts
which are county courts, and have original jurisdiction to adjudicate
rights of persons or rights in property arising in the county within
which, and for which they sit. The district court has original juris-
diction of all civil causes involving more than one hundred dollars
and of criminal causes punishable by fine of more than one hundred
dollars, or imprisonment for more than three months; (2) justices
of the peace whose jurisdiction is limited to causes below that of
the district court and not involving title to real estate; (3) the pro-
bate court with jurisdiction of estates of decedents and persons under
guardianship. While the legislature is empowered to establish other
courts, and so might have established a county court by name, it has
not done so, and the district court is the only court under the judicial
system of that State having general civil and criminal jurisdiction
throughout the county. It may more appropriately be regarded as
the county court than either of the others, the jurisdiction of which
is inferior and more narrowly limited.
The legislature by an act now codified under chapter 42, Official
Trusts, Statutes of Minnesota 1894, section 4255, has provided
:
When the corporate authorities of any town, or the judge of the district court
for any county in which any town is situated, enter, at the proper land-office,
the land or any part of the land settled and occupied as the site of such town,
pursuant to and by virtue of the provisions of the act of congress, entitled "An
act for the relief of the citizens of towns upon the lands of the United States
under certain circumstances," passed May 23d, A. D. 1854, such corporate
authorities, or judge (as the case may be), shall dispose of and convey the
title to such lands, or to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares thereof, to
the persons hereinafter described, and in the manner hereinafter specified.
This act recognizes the judge of the district court of the county to
be the proper person and the officer under the judicial system of that
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State intended and designated by the act of Congress as judge of the
"county court." The date of this act is not given, but it is clear
that this legislation was of early date, as it appears in the case of
Village of Mankato v. Meagher ( 17 Minn.. 26'5, 270), that the town-
site of the village of Mankato was entered by the district judge,
trustee, March 21, L856,and in Carson v. Smith ( L2 Minn.—Spencer
546, 552), the townsite of Winona was entered by the district judge
as trustee August L6, L855. It thus appears that the district court
judge was not only recognized by the State legislature to be "the
judge of the county court " within the meaning of the townsite act.
hut that the land department at least fifty years ago also recognized
him as the proper officer in that State to make entry under the stat-
ute. No reason appears to make a change in the practice that has
now obtained for more than half a century and under which rights
have grown up.
Nothing in the published departmental decisions is inconsistent
with regarding the judge of the district court, in Minnesota, as the
"judge of the county court" within the meaning of the townsite
legislation of Congress. The case of Woodruff Townsite (15 L. D.,
205) arose in Utah Territory, and the townsite entry was made by the
probate judge. There existed in that Territory no court named by
law " the county court/' The legislature of Utah provided that for
the purpose of selections of townsites the probate judge of any county
" shall he deemed and is hereby designated as the judge of the county
court for such county." There were then in Utah two courts of
jurisdiction throughout the county: (1) the district court of general
jurisdiction, and (2) probate courts with jurisdiction in decedents'
estates, guardianship, "and like matters."' and in divorce. In - desig-
nating the probate judge as judge of the county court for purposes
of townsite entry, the legislature did no more than to designate which
one of two official incumbents it deemed the proper officer to be
charged with the trust. The land department accepted that designa-
tion made by the local legislative authority.
In Cofield v. McClelland (16 Wall.', 331), Congress specially
authorized the probate judge of Arapahoe county to make the entry
( 13 Stat., 94). As Congress had plenary power, the case is not per-
tinent here. Congress might name any person or officer as such
trustee, and his acceptance of the trust would authorize such entry.
In Montana, there being no "county court " by name established by
law, the local legislature (Laws of Montana. L869, p. s <>) designated
" The judge of the probate court " a- the proper officer to make town-
site entry. In Ashby v. Hall ( 119 U. S., 52(1), in an action of eject-
ment wherein title and the validity of the entry were necessarily
involved, the court upheld an entry made by such officer.
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In Kansas there was no county court established with such name.
The probate court was limited to settlement of estates of decedents,
matters of guardianship, indenture of apprentices and habeas corpus
(Compiled Laws, Kansas, 1873, p. 325). The act of October 31,
1868 (ib., 1873, p. 972), made it the duty of the probate judge to make
townsite entries. In McTaggart /'.Harrison (12 Kan., 62, 66) the
court held that a townsite entry made by such officer was lawful
under the laws of the United States, and his duty under the State
law. Sherry v. Sampson (11 Kansas, 611) was an action of eject-
ment to recover possession of a lot in a town entered by the probate
judge. The court held
:
The " probate court " in one sense is a " county court." And it would seem
from the action of the government that the words, " county court," as used in
said act, were intended to mean any county court by whatever name such court
might be known, and whether it was a county court for probate matters only, or
whether it was a county court for general, common-law, chancery, or other juris-
diction.
No well considered decision known to the Department is inconsist-
ent with this view. The purport and intent of the townsite act is that
an entry in trust to the several occupants shall be made by the judge
of a court having jurisdiction over the county where the land lies.
This fulfils all the conditions respecting the qualification of the trus-
tee. If there be several such persons, judges of different courts hav-
ing jurisdiction over the cQimty, no objection lies in any legislation
of Congress against designation of the particular officer b}^ local
law, as was done in the Colorado and Kansas cases. It is not an
objection that the legislature of Minnesota designated the judge of
the district court, instead of following the legislatures of Utah and
Kansas by designating the probate judge. Had those States desig-
nated the presiding officer of some other court of jurisdiction over the
county, such designation would have been equally conclusive.
So that the officer designated by local authority is within the gen-
eral description of the act of Congress and is the judge of a judicial
tribunal having jurisdiction of the county wherein the townsite is
situated, all requisite conditions imposed by Congress are met, and
such designation is entitled to be recognized by the officers of the
land department. In the particular case here, the judge of the dis-
trict court, and not the judge of the j^robate court, was charged with
the duty of assuming the trust and making the entry, and his appli-
cation should be received and that of McGarry rejected.
Your decision is reversed.
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arid land-desert land entry—act of june 17, 1902.
Instructions.
Lands held by virtue of a desert land entry arc held in private ownership within
the meaning of the act of June 17. 1902, and the entryman or his assignee
is entitled to the same rights and privileges and is subject to the same con
ditions and limitations, so far as the right to the use of water is concerned,
as any other owner of lands within the irrigable area of an irrigation
project constructed under the provisions of said act.
Acting Secretary Campbell to the Director of the Geological Survi >/.
(S. V. P.) July U, 1905. (E. F. B.)
The Department has considered the suggestions contained in your
letter of June 6, 1905, relative to the right of a desert land entryman
to subscribe for a right to the use of water from irrigation works to
be constructed by the government under the act of June 17, 1902 i 32
Stat., 388).
It is assumed that the land referred to is within the irrigable area
of a contemplated project, but having been entered prior to with-
drawal is not subject to disposal under the provisions of the recla-
mation act and can only be brought under its provisions by cancella-
tion of the entry, from voluntary relinquishment or otherwise, in
which event it would immediately .become subject to disposal only
under the provisions of that act, according to such units and areas
as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.
An incipient entry under the desert land act confers more than an
inchoate right. The act requires part payment of the purchase money
with the initial entry, which thereby vests in the entryman an
equitable right to the land, subject to be divested by failure to per-
form conditions subsequent, in which event the act declares "the lands
shall revert to the United States, and the twenty-five cents advanced
payment shall be forfeited to the United States, and the entry -hall
be cancelled."
Until such forfeiture has been incurred, the entryman has an
equitable right or interest in the land which can be ripened into a
perfect title by fulfilling the conditions required by the act. am! may
transfer and assign such right and interest in the entry to another,
who will by such assignment succeed to all the rights ami interest
and assume all the obligations of the original entryman.
While such entrymen or assignees arc not invested with the legal
title, they have such an equitable right and interest in the land as
to constitute them proprietors within the spirit and purpose o\ the
act of June IT. L902, and the right to the use of water ma\ be granted
to such proprietors if they bring themselves within that provision oi
the act that "no right to the use of water for hind in private own-
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ership shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres
to any one landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any land-
owner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such land, or occu-
pant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said land."
If the entry is for more than 160 acres of land, the entryman can-
not secure the benefit of the act unless he relinquishes the excess, as no
assignment of a portion of the entry will be recognized. (Luther J.
Prior, 32 L. D., 608.)
With regard to the limit of time for making final proof under the
desert land act, it is not advisable to anticipate that question. The
same difficulty is presented in entries under the homestead law. All
that is necessary to determine at present is that lands entered under
the desert land law are to be considered as lands in private owner-
ship and the entryman or assignees under such entries are to be
treated in the manner contemplated by the act for the owners of
lands.
residence-abandonment-official employment.
Ray v. Shirley.
The fact that a homestead entryman holds an official position the duties of
which are required to be performed at some place other than on the land
embraced in his entry, constitutes no sufficient excuse for his absence from
the claim, unless it be shown that his absence is actually due to his official
position or employment.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, July 17, 1905. (E. P.)
June IT, 1899, Edward E. Shirley made homestead entry of the
E. i of the SW. J, the SE. J of the NW. J, and the SW. \ of the
SE. i of Sec. 4, T. 17 N., R. 21 W., Kingfisher land district, Okla-
homa, against which entry Walter S. Ray, on June 1, 1903, filed an
affidavit of contest; charging that the entryman
—
for on or about two years last past and next prior to this date has not resided
upon said land, but has made his home in the town of Grand, O. T., with his
family ; that he has abandoned residence on said land for on or about two years
last past, and has offered to sell to divers parties and is now holding it for sale
and offering it on the market ; that he has not made his home on the land for
about 2 years last past, but lived with his family elsewhere, and that said
alleged absence from the said land was not due to his employment in the Army,
Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States, etc.
Notice issued June 1, 1903, citing the parties to appear before the
local officers September 8, 1903, and submit testimony, which notice
was, on July 12, 1903, duly served upon the defendant at the town of
Grand, Oklahoma. After various proceedings not necessary to be
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here set forth, the testimony on behalf of the plaintiff was submitted
before the local officers November 20, 1903, and that on behalf of the
defendant, December 7, 1903, before the clerk of the District Court of
Day County, Oklahoma, the respective parties being represented at
both places by attorney.
The local officers found that the defendant had fully complied with
the requirements of the homestead law, from the date of his entry
until about the first of October, 1901, when, having been asked by the
sheriff of Day County, the county wherein the land involved is situ-
ated, to become a deputy or under-sheriff, the defendant removed to
the town of Grand, the county seat of Day County, and was appointed
deputy or under-sheriff, the duties of which office required him to
reside at the county seat; that he continued to hold this office from
the date of his appointment thereto until the filing of the affidavit of
contest, during which time he cultivated the land embraced in his
entry. They held that the defendant's residence in the town of
Grand, being necessary in order to enable him to perform the duties
of the office of under-sheriff, should be construed to be constructive
residence on the land, and that, therefore, his absence from the land
was, under the circumstances, excusable, citing the case of A. E. Flint
(G L. D., 668), wherein it was held (syllabus) :
When a bona fide settler has established a residence, and is afterwards called
away by official duty which requires his presence at the county scat, such
absence shall not work a forfeiture of his rights.
The local officers therefore recommended that the contest be dis-
missed.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the action of the local officers was, by
your office decision of January 24, 1905, affirmed, from which decision
the plaintiff now appeals to the Department.
The testimony in this case shows that between June 17, 189*.). the
date of his entry, and October 1, 1901, the defendant placed on the
land the following improvements: a half dugout, fourteen by six-
teen feet and about eight feet high, built of boxing lumber, and con-
taining a door, two half windows, and a " gyp " floor; an open >t raw-
covered shed, ten by twenty-eight feet, used as a stable; a storm cave
or dugout, ten by ten feet, with one door; a drilled well, something
over 100 feet deep, cased with tubing and supplied with a pump:
another drilled well about 90 feet deep, from which no water was
obtained; a piece enclosed by three-wire fence, and used as corrall;
feed racks for stock: abc .t 100 acres enclosed by two-wire U'Wi-i'i
between fifty and sixty acres of breaking; and an orchard covering
about an acre, planted in the spring of L901, but which was killed by
dry weather or by stock before the fall of that year. These improve-
ments are variously estimated by the witnesses t<> he worth from
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$300 to $1200, the preponderance of the testimony, however, being
to the effect that they are worth between $500 and $600.
In July, 1899, the defendant established his residence on the
land, and thereafter continuously resided there until October 1, 1901,
during which time he appears to have been engaged in cultivating
about fifty acres of the land, caring for his stock, consisting of about
fifty head of cattle and a pair of mules, and conducting a store in a
building on his land, wherein he sold dry goods, groceries and drugs,
and also had a postoffice, of which he wTas postmaster.
In the spring of 1901, the defendant, owing to the operation of the
" herd law," was compelled to send what is called his " stock " cattle
away from the vicinity of the land for pasturage. It further appears
that about July, 1901, he resigned the office of postmaster and dis-
posed of his stock of merchandise, and the building in which the
store and postoffice was conducted, to one Bridwell, who thereupon
removed the building from the land.
October 1, 1901, the defendant moved with his family, consisting
of his wife and two children, to the town of Grand, the county seat
of Day County, the county wherein the land is situated, and opened
a drug store. About two weeks after removing to Grand, the sheriff
of Day County appointed the defendant under-sheriff, and since
removing to Grand he has continuously resided there with his family,
conducting his drug business and performing such duties as wTere
from time to time assigned to him by the sheriff, in the meantime
making infrequent visits, each of very short duration, to the land.
During this period the land was either rented or a portion thereof
cultivated on shares. No additional improvements were placed on
the land by or for the defendant after he removed therefrom, Octo-
ber 1, 1901.
Plaintiff's witness J. D. Howard, testifies that prior to leaving the
land the defendant stated to him that he could not make any money
farming; that after the defendant had removed to Grand the witness
had a conversation with him in his drug-store during the course of
which the defendant asked the witness if he knew of anyone who
would buy his land, stating that if the witness could find, or send
him, such a purchaser, he would pay the witness for so doing.
Plaintiff's witness W. H. Clem, testifies that about a year prior to
moving away from the land the defendant had tried to sell the claim,
that he told witness to sell it for him; that he instructed witness to
sell it for $1,000, offering witness $50 if he could find a purchaser;
that the defendant appeared to be very anxious to get away ; that on
one occasion, in the spring of 1903, when the witness was in the
defendant's place of business, the defendant told the witness that
" he was deputized deputy sheriff so that he wouldn't have to stay
on his farm."
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Plaintiff's witness J. W. Brown, testifies that shortly after the
defendant moved to Grand, the defendant told the witness that " he
had been sworn in as deputy to hold his claim down, of to help him
hold his claim down, or something like that."
Plaintiff's witness W. L. Howard, testifies that the defendant has
told him several times that the land was for sale, that he wanted to
eel! it; that the defendant said he was no fanner: that early in the
spring of L903, the witness had a conversation with the defendant at
his place of business in Grand, when the defendant said that " if it
wasn't for holding his place down, he wouldn't have that office and a
dollar."
The defendant testifies that he first went to Grand about Septem-
ber 1, L901; that he was then looking round to see if he could gel
something to do, and had previously had some conversation about the
dru<>- business; that on the occasion of this visit to Grand' he partially
engaged the room afterwards occupied by him as a residence and
drug store, and after his return home he notified the owners of the
building that he would take the room: that his commission as under-
sheriff was dated about October 10. 1901 : that during the first year'
that he was in Grand he does not know whether he spent the greater
pari of his time attending to his drug business or not; that he always
attended to the dirties of under-sheriff first; that he would not swear
that during the first ten months that he conducted the drug business
at Grand, he spent on an average two days a week in the sheriff's
office or in working under the sheriff; that he has never kept account
of the time spent by him in the performance of official duties; that
he was offered the position of under-sheriff about September 1, 1901,
when on his first visit to Grand; that his purpose in holding the
office was that he thought he could make some money out of it : that
he has never told Brown, the plaintiff's witness, that he was holding
the office of under-sheriff in order that he might be enabled to remain
off the land; that he was not holding his land for sale on June 1.
1903; he was asked if it is not true that about the time he made up
his mind to move away from the land, either before or since such
removal, he had not told someone that he wanted to sell his homestead,
and replied: " 1 might at some time when discouraged made some off
handed remark like that : I don't know."
Sheriff Smith testified on behalf of the defendant as follow-:
Q. What are the duties of under-sheriff, <>r some of them?
A. It is his duty to care for the office in my absence and do any work that I
can do as sheriff.
Q. How long has Mr. Shirley hoen under-sheriff, if you know V
\. I don't know as I know just the date: it was aboul a week, maybe two
weeks, after he moved to Grand that I put him in as under-sheriff.
r>i!)4— Vol. : ,»4—05 m 3
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Q. Had Re done any special deputy work for yon prior to that time?
A. He had.
Q. How many deputies have you working under yon or have you had for
about the last two years and prior to the first of last June?
A. Eight, I think ; that is, eight all the time.
Q. Do you divide the work equally between these deputies, or have you one
or two that does the most of the work for you?
A. Mr. Shirley does most of the work.
Q. In the last two years ean you state about the amount of fees earned by
Mr. Sbirley as under-sheriff as shown by your books?
A. He is on a salary of twenty dollars per month and he gets his fees when
bis cases is settled, and I have never run them up to see how much it is,
Q. Has he been a good, competent deputy or under-sheriff since holding that
office, under you?
A. He has.
Q. Have you ever called upon him to do any official work since he held that
office that he has refused to do?
A. I have not.*******
Q. Did Mr. Shirley solicit the commission or did you give it to him of your
own selection?
A, I gave it to him of my own selection ; when I first talked to him about
taking the commission he said lie didn't know whether he would like the work
or not, and afterwards I got him to take it.
Q. When was this talk with him that you speak of ; was it before he moved
to Grand, or after?
A. It was before he moved.
Q. Why did you want him to take a commission under you?
A. He was talking of coming to town to go into the drug business and at
that time there was no one in Grand suitable to fill that position outside of men
that was in business and none of them would accept it.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
Q. I will ask you if during the first few months, say *or a period of from four
to six months after Mr. Shirley moved to town, if Virgil Williams wasn't re-
maining in town and remaining off from his homestead on the strength of the
fact that he held a commission of deputy under you?
A. He was in town, and done some work as deputy sheriff, but wasn't re-
maining off from his place on account of holding the commission. He was on
his place part of the time and part of the time in town.*******
Q. I will ask you if during the first year or more after Mr. Shirley moved to
Grand, if Alex Hutchinson, who remained in Grand all of the time and held a
homestead ten miles or more from Grand, was not a regularly appointed
deputy sheriff under you ?
A. Mr. Hutchinson was at work for
—
part of the time he worked for Bigelow
and Hale and part of the time for Mr. Cupp and was here all of the time and I
gave him a commission as deputy sheriff in case that me and the other deputies
were out of town, there would be an officer left in town.*******
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Q. When did you commence to pay him [Shirley] twenty dollars per month?
A. Why. I commenced paying him twenty dollars a month as soon as he
commenced handling the books altogether.
Q. When did he begin handling the books altogether?
A. Along last January, I believe.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION.
Q. .Mr. Smith, at the time you appointed .Mr. Shirley as under-sheriff and since
that time, has it been necessary for him, or the party holding that office, to
reside at the county seat?
A. It is.
RECROSS-EXAM [NATION.
Q. It is true, is it not. Mr. Smith, that during the first year after Mr. Shirley
came to town that lie gave almost all of his time to the drug store or to other pri-
vate business of his own?
A. lie done considerable work for me -considerable riding.
Q. Tell what portion of his time he spent in your work during the ten months
next after his coming to Grand?
A. I couldn't give any estimate of how much, hut he went every time I asked
him to go; he was always ready and I never paid any attention to the exact
amount of time he put in : I couldn't tell how much time I put in.
Q. Will you swear positively that during the first six months after Mr. Shirley
moved to Grand, he spent in actual work under you as much as an average <>f
one day each week?
A. No; I couldn't swear that he did, and I wouldn't swear that I worked an
average of a day each week.
It thus appears that at the date of the initiation of this contest the
defendant had been living oil' the land embraced in his entry for a
period of about twenty months. He seeks to have this absence
excused solely on the ground that during said entire period he held
the office of under-sheriff of the county wherein the land is situated,
and that in order to perform the duties of the office it was necessary
for him to reside at Grand, the county seat, a town about twenty-live
miles distant from the land.
The Department has held that absences made necessary by official
duties may be excused, provided such duties devolved upon the entry-
man subsequently to the making of the entry and the establishment
of residence upon the land, but it i^ not sufficient to show that tin 4
entryman held an office the duties of which had to be performed at
some place other than the land embraced in his entry. It must
appear that his absence was due to his official position or employment,
and if this is not shown, the fact that he held such official position
constitutes no sufficient excuse for his absence from his claim. It is
material, therefore, to a proper disposition of this case i«» determine
whether the defendant's absence from the land has been shown to
have been due to his official position.
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The population of Day County in 11)00 was, as shown by the
official report of the census office, but 2,173. Considering this fact in
connection with the testimony of the sheriff to the effect that at all
times during the defendant's absence from the land there were eight
deputy sheriffs in the county, twro of whom, together with the sheriff,
were stationed at the county seat all the time and one a part of the
time; and that he could not swear that the defendant, or even he
himself (the sheriff), was engaged on an average of one day a week in
the performance of official duties, it is clear that the duties incident
to the office of under-sheriff and the prospective emoluments of the
office were not such as would induce a man of ordinary industry and
prudence to absent himself continuously from his homestead claim
merely for the purpose of holding the office. Moreover, the testi-
mony in the case shows that the office did not, as a matter of fact,
form the real inducement for the defendant's absence from his claim
;
that his true purpose in removing to Grand was that he might engage
in the drug business at that place, the acceptance and holding of the
office being but a subterfuge employed by him for the purpose of
escaping the consequences that would otherwise inevitably have re-
sulted from proof of his failure to continue to reside on the land.
An entryman's absence from his claim under such circumstances can-
not properly be said to have been due to official employment; hence
it must be held, in accordance with the views previously herein
expressed, that the fact that the defendant held the office of under-
sheriff does not constitute a sufficient excuse for his absence from the
land embraced in his entry.
The defendant's long-continued absence from the land having been
proved, and no sufficient excuse for such absence having been shown,
the entry should be canceled on the ground of abandonment. It is
accordingly so ordered.
The decision appealed from is therefore reversed.
Grindberg v. Campion.
Motion for review of departmental decision of September 17, 1904,
33 L. D., 248, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, November 15, 1904, and
petition for rereview denied by Acting Secretary Kyan, July 19,
1905,
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BOUNTY LAND WARRANT LOCATION SUBSTITUTION <>l < \sn.
William \l. Borders.
The location of a military bounty land warrant issued prior to the death of the
warrantee, by one claiming through an assignment of the wan-ant from
the widow of the warrantee, will not be confirmed in the absence of proof
showing that the widow was the sole heir, or was authorized to assign the
interests of the other heirs, if there were any.
The substitution of cash for a military bounty land warrant will not be per-
mitted where the only obstacle to confirmation of the location under the
warrant is the refusal of the locator or transferee to endeavor to procure
the necessary proof to establish the validity of the location.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of fin General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, -/"I;/ 19, 1905. (E. F. B.
)
With your letter of June 19,' 1905, you transmit the papers in the
appeal of William R. Borders from the decision of your office of
June 5, 1905, refusing to accept a substitute in cash for military
bounty land warrant No. 27606, issued in the name of John AW
Brashear, with which a location was made May 7, 1852, at the Kas-
kaskia land office, Illinois, of the SW. \ SE. J,' Sec. 13, T. 5 S., E. 5
W., 3 P. M., which was afterwards canceled. You however rein-
stated said location for the purpose of allowing Borders to furnish
evidence as to the validity of the assignment under which said
location was made.
The papers submitted with your letter show that said warrant was
assigned May 6, 1852, by Mary G. Brashear, the widow of the war-
rantee, to Francis M. Cross, who located it May 7. L852, upon the
land in question.
September L6, of that year, the entry was suspended, for the
reason, chiefly, that no evidence had been furnished of the widow's
right to assign the warrant, in this, that if the warrantee died after
the issuance of the warrant, it belonged to the heirs, and if he died
before its issuance, it should have been issued in the name of the
widow. The warrant and papers were returned to the local office
in order that the heir or heirs might be enabled to comply with the
requirements of your office.
March 11. L856, the attention of the local officers was called to the
fact that no evidence of the right of the widow to assign the warrant
had been furnished, and they were directed to cancel the location
upon the plat, but to withhold the land from entry, for the benefit
of the locator.
In 1862 a patent was applied for. In response thereto the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, under date of April 2, L862,
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after recounting the fact as to the cancellation of the entry because
of the defect in the assignment, said :
AS the cancellation in this case was based upon a mere defect in the assign-
ment of the warrant, and as the tract located is now vacant, I have this day
ordered the return of the warrant by the register at Springfield with the view
of reinstating the location, and of issning a patent therefor to the locator, if the
defect in the assignment alluded to is such as to admit of correction within a
reasonable time.
As soon as the warrant is received from the register before mentioned, you
will be further advised.
On the same day, the local officers were instructed to return the
warrant to the General Land Office and to " reserve the tract above
described, until otherwise directed, from sale or location."
So far as shown by the record, nothing further appears to have
been done with reference to said entry until December 3, 190-t, when
Messrs. Harvey Spalding & Sons, attorneys for William R. Borders,
the present owner through mesne conveyances of the right, title and
interest of Cross under said location, applied to substitute cash for
said warrant and asked that the entry be reinstated so that the tract
will not appear on the books to be vacant land.
In passing upon this application, your office, by letter of June 5,
1005, held that the warrant can not be accepted in satisfaction of this
location, under the assignment of the widow, unless it be shown that
it was issued after the death of the warrantee or that there Avere no
surviving heirs other than the widow ; or, if there are any such heirs
surviving, they must join in the assignment before its validity can
be recognized.
You reinstated the entry for the purpose of alloAving Borders to
furnish the testimony indicated.
The warrant appears to have been legally issued and the land Avas
subject to location with military bounty land warrants. It was
issued in the name of the soldier, and the reasonable presumption is
that it was issued during his life time. The only question is whether
the assignment by the widow of Brashear to Cross, the locator, was
sufficient to authorize the location in his name in the absence of proof
that the widow was the sole heir, or was authorized to assign the
interest of other heirs, if there were any.
Such evidence is required by the government, but it is for the pur-
pose of protecting the heirs, if there be any. If it should waive the
production of such proof, or should allow a location to be perfected
upon insufficient evidence of the validity of the assignment, no liability
to the heirs would be incurred by the government, but their remedy
would be against the land, as the lawful issuance of a valid warrant,
vesting in the warrantee the right to make location thereof, satisfied
the claim of the soldier, and the obligation would not again be cast
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Upon the government by allowing a location of the claim to be made
upon a defective or insufficient assignment. The purchaser must
look to every part of the title which is essential to its validity.
(Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet., 93.)
As the government is not free from fault in neglecting to take
proper action upon the location for more than fifty years, and has
silently acquiesced in the occupancy of the premises by the present
owner and his grantors under said entry by withholding it from
entry or other disposition, equity and justice would seem to require
that his title should be quieted and that a patent should issue without
further consideration.
But as he would also, for the same reason, be entitled to have entry
upon which the patent issues free from the claim of any unknown
heirs of Brashear, no valid reason can be perceived why he should
not be allowed to substitute cash for the wan-ant, so that the patent
issued thereon would issue solely to his benefit, free from other claim.
The entryman upon making such substitution would be entitled to
whatever interest the widow of Brashear had in the warrant, but as
that interest cannot be ascertained by the Department in the absence
of proof of the same character as that required to establish the valid-
ity of the warrant location, the decision of your office, reinstating the
entry and allowing Borders to furnish proof of the validity of the
assignment of the entire interest in the warrant, is affirmed, with this
condition, that if the applicant will make affidavit that he has
endeavored to obtain such proof, stating the extent and character of
his inquiry, and that it is not obtainable, you will then allow a sub-
stitute to be made of cash for the warrant, but you will not deliver
the warrant except upon the application of all parties having any
right, title or interest in it, and upon submission of satisfactory proof
that they are heirs, or representatives of the heirs, of John \Y. lira-
shear living at the time of Ids death. The substitution of cash for
the warrant should not be allowed until every effort has been made
to procure the necessary proof required to show (he validity of the
assignment and it is evident that it cannot be obtained.
In the case of Robert M. Stitt (33 L. I).. 315), cited by your office,
it was said that an entryman will not be permitted to relinquish his
entry, or allow it to be cancelled and withdraw his scrip, where the
entry can be confirmed and where the only obstacle to confirmation
is the arbitrary refusal of the entryman to supply the necessary proof.
Upon the same principle, a substitution of cash for a warrant should
not be allowed where the only obstacle to the confirmation of the loca
tion is the refusal of the locator or transferee to endeavor to procure
the necessary proof to establish the validity of the location with the
warrant.
Your decision, as thus modified, i> affirmed.
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mining claim—patent proceedings—equitable action.
Alaska Placer Claim.
Proceedings for patent to a mining claim embracing land lying partly within one
land district and partly within another, conducted wholly within one land
district, and the allowance of entry thereon covering the entire claim, are in
no wise effective as to the lands lying without such land district, and do not
constitute substantial compliance with law as to such lands, within the
meaning of sections 2450 to 2457 of the Revised Statutes, such as would
warrant confirmation of the entry in its entirety under said sections.
Acting Secretary ( 'ampbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S.V. P.) Office, July 10,1905. (G. N. B.)
July 13, 1904, you submitted, for approval by the Secretary of the
Interior and the Attorney General under section 2451 of the Revised
Statutes, your decision under section 2450 of the Revised Statutes, in
the case of suspended mineral entry No. 1670, Montrose land district,
Colorado, made October 3, 1001, by Edward Henry, for the Alaska
placer claim, survey No. 15,416, accompanied by a letter, addressed to
the Secretary of the Interior, explaining certain special features of
the case which in your judgment call for equitable consideration under
sections 2450 to 2457, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.
The record shows that while a portion of the Alaska claim lies in
the Durango land district, Colorado, entry embracing the entire claim
was made in the Montrose district, and no proceedings whatever were
had in the Durango district.
In your letter of explanation you say:
Notwithstanding the fact that notice of the application for patent in this case
was not posted in the land office 1 at Durango, Colorado, as required by law, I
recommend the confirmation of said entry No. 1676, for the following reasons:
First.—A careful examination of the entire record convinces me that the
application for patent, and the entry were allowed in good faith.
Second.-—The failure to post copy of the notice of application for patent in
tliis case, in the land office at Durango, Colorado, was not the fault of the
claimant.
Third.—The question is one solely between the government and the claimant,
as no adverse claim nor protest has been filed.
And lastly.—To cancel said entry and compel the claimant to commence
proceedings for patent de novo would be a hardship, which in my judgment
should not be imposed upon him.
Section 2457 of the Revised Statutes specifies the character of sus-
pended entries which are to be decided by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office " upon principles of equity and justice, as recog-
nized in courts of equity, and in accordance with regulations to be
settled by the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and
the Commissioner, conjointly," under section 2450, and submitted for
approval under section 2451, as those " where the law has been sub-
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stantially complied with, and the error or informality arose from
ignorance, accident, or mistake which is satisfactorily explained."
You state, in substance, that this case does not come within any of
the regulations adopted under section 2450 .(General Circular. Janu-
ary 25, 1904, pp. 245-250), and for that reason you submit the same ;i-
a special case, not covered by the rules. (General Circular, p. '2-1-7.)
Under the facts disclosed by the record, the question first presented
is, whether this is a case " where the law has been substantially com-
plied with." If not, there is nothing to justify equitable considera-
tion under the statute.
An application for patent under the mining laws is required to be
filed "in the proper land office." (Sec. 2325, Revised Statute-.)
This means that the application must be filed in the office of the land
district where the land applied for is situated. The officers of a land
district have no jurisdiction or control over lands outside the limits
of their district. They cannot allow entry for land not within the
district for which they are appointed. In other words, there is no
authority of law for the officers of one land district to dispose of land
lying in another district.
In this case the register and receiver of the Montrose land district
undertook to entertain patent proceedings and to allow entry for a
mining claim embracing land a portion of which is not within their
district, but which lies in the adjoining Durango land district. The
Department is of opinion that, with respect to the land in the
Durango district, there is no authority of law for the action taken,
and that, therefore, this is not a case "where the law has been sub
stantially complied with," as to that portion of the claim. No appli-
cation for patent was filed in the Durango office, no notice was posted
in that office or on the claim in that district, and therefore no proof
of notice was, or could have been, filed in thai office. There was no
lawful notice to adverse claimants, if any there were, as to the land
in the Durango district. As to that part of the claim there has been
no assumption under the statute "that the applicant is entitled to a
patent/' and "that no adverse claim exists," and there has been no
opportunity for conflicting claimants, if any, to file adverse claims.
In short, not only has there not been substantial compliance with the
law, but there has been no compliance with law at all. in SO far as the
portion of the claim in the Durango district is concerned. This be
ing true, it follows that the case is not one as to which equitable con
siderations under the statute may be applied. Therefore, your de
cision and recommendation cannot be accepted; and the record i-
returned to your office for further consideration, and for such action
in the premises as the facts and the law may justify.
The Department knows of no reason why the entry may not be
allowed to stand as to that portion of the claim which be- in the
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Montrose land district, should the claimant so elect, provided the
patent proceedings in that district have been regular, and the law fully
complied with. Or, should the claimant prefer, he may be allowed,
under additional patent proceedings in the Durango district, to be
conducted in all respects in conformity to law, to make supplemental
entry for the portion of the claim in that district, and thus obtain
patent for the entire claim. In that event, the proof of expenditure
in labor and improvements on the claim, which accompanied the pro-
ceedings in the Montrose district, if found sufficient and regular,
should be accepted in the proceedings in the Durango district.
mining claim—placer location-conformity to system of pub-
lic land surveys.
Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining Claims.
The fact that a placer mining location, if made to conform as nearly as prac-
ticable to the system of public-land surveys and the rectangular subdivi-
sions of such surveys, as required by section 2331 of the Revised Statutes,
would embrace sinall portions of land not valuable for placer mining, con-
stitutes no reason for failure to conform the location to such system and
legal subdivisions, where, if so conformed, the land embraced in the location
would be as a whole more valuable for placer mining than for agricultural
purposes.
It is no objection to the validity of a placer location that it embraces veins or
lodes as well as placer deposits.
Acting /Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. l! C.) Office, July 19, 1905. (A. B. P.)
September 11, 1903, the Crooked River Mining and Milling Com-
pany made entry for the Hogan and Idaho placer claims and eight
lode claims known as the Orion, the Pineapple, the Buffalo Queen, the
Little Fritz Fraction, the Alaska No. 3, the Alaska No. 4, the Friday,
and the Friday Fraction, all included in survey No. 1834, Lewiston,
Idaho.
June 7, 1904, your office directed the local officers to notify the
company that it would be allowed sixty days within which to show
cause why the placer claims should not be made to conform to the
United States system of public-land surveys, and stated that on
failure to make such showing, or to appeal, the entry, to the extent of
the placer claims, would be canceled without further notice.
The company has appealed to the Department.
Placer mining claims located after May 10, 1872, are required by
law to conform as nearly as practicable with the United States sys-
tem of public-land surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions of such
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Surveys; and this is true whether the claims be located upon sur-
veyed or unsurveyed lands. (Revised Statutes, sec 2331; Miller
Placer Claim, 30 L. 1)., 225, 227; Wood Placer Mining Company, 32
L. D., 198, 199—on review, Id., 363.)
The Hogan and Idaho claims were located in 1902 upon unsur-
veyed lands, and were surveyed for patent February 5-11, L903.
They are very irregular in form, vary in width from about 200 feel
to about 1,200 feet, adjoin each other end on end. and are so located
as to embrace within their lines the Crooked River for a distance of
about three and one-half miles. They do not even approximate con-
formity with the system of the public-land surveys, but are wholly
at variance with such system, which, as was said in the case of Miller
Placer Claim, supra, " affords no warrant for cutting the public lands
into lengthy strips of such narrow width."
In the company's appeal it is stated, in substance and effect, that
the lands adjacent to the placer claims are not valuable for placer
mining, but contain, and in part have been located for, veins or lodes
of gold and silver; and for these reasons it is contended that the
placer locations could not be conformed to the system of public-land
surveys. There is nothing in the record to show the conditions to be
as thus stated, but even if there were, the company would be in no
better situation, and its contention .could not be sustained.
In the first place, assuming that the land embraced in the Hogan
and Idaho locations are of sufficient placer value to be patentable
under the placer law. and that the adjacent lands are non-placer in
character, as stated, a rearrangement of the lines of the locations to
meet the requirements of the law in respect to conformity to the sys-
tem of public-land surveys, considering that tracts as small as ten
acres in area, in square form, are recognized as legal subdivisions
under the mining laws (sec. 2330, Revised Statutes), would not neces-
sitate the inclusion of the adjacent non-placer lands to such an extent
as to affect the validity of the locations on that account. It not
infrequently occurs that tracts of land small portions of which are
not valuable for placer mining are embraced within placer locations
where the lands as a whole are in fact more valuable for placer min-
ing that for agricultural purposes. There is. therefore, nothing in
this phase of the company's contention.
The other phase of the contention is equally untenable. It is a
well recognized fact that both classes of mineral deposits—that i-.
veins or lodes, and placer deposits—are frequently found t<> exist in
the same land, and it is no objection to the validity of a placer loca-
tion that it embraces veins or lodes as well as placer deposits.
It is usually a simple matter, in locating placer claim-. even upon
unsurveyed lands, to conform the locations to the system <d public-
land surveys. The law's requirement in this resped a- t<> unsurveyed
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lands is met by locating the claims in rectangular form with proper
dimensions and with east and west and north and south lines. (Wood
Placer Mining Company, 32 L. I)., 363, 365.)
It is also asserted in the company's appeal that the Hogan and
Idaho claims are " strictly gnlch placers." This assertion is followed
by the statement, apparently made to support it, that the land rises
from Crooked River at slopes of from twenty to thirty degrees. Even
if this be true, it needs no argument to show that lands ascending at
slopes of twenty to thirty degrees only, are not thereby rendered
impracticable of location under the placer mining laws. Upon the
company's own showing, therefore, the claims cannot be regarded as
in any sense within the category of wk gulch placers."
It follows from what has been said that the entry in question, to
the extent of the placer claims, is unlawful and must be canceled;
and your office decision, in effect holding the entry for cancellation to
such extent, is affirmed. This will leave the lode claims embraced in
the entry in noncontiguous tracts or bodies, a fact necessary to be con-
sidered in the re-adjudication of the case.
MINING CLAIM—PLACER LOCATION—LEGAL SUBDIVISIONS.
Rialto No. 2 Placer Mining Claim.
A location under the mining laws does not of itself amount to an appropriation
of land in such a sense as to preclude the inclusion of the same, or parts
thereof, within the limits of a subsequent location, subject to such existing
rights as may be thereafter maintained under the prior location; and the
fact that a placer location, if made to conform to legal subdivisions of the
public surveys, would embrace all or a portion of the land covered by a
prior location, is not a sufficient reason for failure to conform the placer
location to legal subdivisions, as required by section 2331 of the Revised
Statutes.
The fact that portions of other claims already entered may be embraced in a
placer location by conforming the same to legal subdivisions, does not make
such conformity impracticable, within the meaning of section 2331 of the
Revised Statutes, inasmuch as under the law such entered claims may be
excluded from patent proceedings involving the placer.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, July 19, 1905. (A. B. P.)
July 7, 1902, Julius Nelson was permitted to make entry for the
Eialto No. 2 Placer Mining Claim, survey No. 15,053, Leadville, Col-
orado, situated upon surveyed lands, in Sec. 21, T. 9 S., K. 78 W.,
6th P. M. September 12, 1903, your office directed the local officers
to allow the claimant sixty days from notice within which to show
cause why his entry should not be canceled for the reason that the
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claim docs not conform to the Legal subdivisions of the public Lands,
as required by sections 2330 and 2331 of the Revised Statutes.
November 8, L903, the claimant, in response to notice Prom the local
officers, filed liis corroborated affidavit, wherein he states, in substance
and effect, that at the time the claim was located it was surrounded
by " valid lode and placer claims; " that all the public lands so sur-
rounded were embraced in the location: that " it would have been
impossible to have conformed any more nearly to the Lines of the
Legal subdivisions without embracing non-contiguous tracts: " that,
as surveyed and entered, the west line of the claim is the section line
between sections 20 and 21, and at other places where possible the
section lines have been followed: and that the irregular lines on the
north, the east, and the southeast were so run "to exclude the valid
existing claims Lying along those sides/' as shown by a diagram
attached to and made a part of the affidavit.
By decision of December 28, L903, your office held, in effect, that a
mineral location is not, of itself, such an appropriation of the land
included in it as to prevent the inclusion of the same land in another
location, and. therefore, that the evidence submitted is insufficient to
show that the claim here in question could not have been located and
entered in accordance with the Legal subdivisions of the public lands;
and Nelson's entry was held for cancellation. He thereupon ap-
pealed to the Department.
Upon the official plat of the survey of the claim, approved April
5, L902, several adjoining surveyed claims are protracted. It is upon
the unofficial diagram attached to claimant's affidavit, however, that
the conditions stated and relied on by him are made more fully to
appear. The diagram and official plat agree as far as the latter
goes, except that the claims protracted on the plat are designated on
the diagram as entered claims, while not so designated on the plat.
Under the law (Sec. 2331 of the Revised Statute-) placer claims
located after May 10, L872, are required to " conform as near as prac-
ticable with the United States system of public-land surveys, and the
rectangular subdivisions of such surveys; " and it is only when Mich
claims ww cannot be conformed to legal subdivisions " that entry thereof
may be made' otherwise than in accordance with legal subdivisions.
The claim here in question was located long after L872.
Hie appellant raises no question as to the law, but contends that his
claim is one which "cannot be conformed to legal subdivisions,"
because of prior mineral locations surrounding it. as represented in
pari on the official plat, and more fully on the -aid diagram.
The Department i^ not favorably impressed by this content ion.
r
Idie surrounding prior Locations, in so far a-- unentered, even M their
existence and validity were admitted, as alleged, could not, and del
not, of themselves, amount to appropriations of the land- embraced
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in them in such a sense as to preclude the inclusion of such lands, or
parts thereof, within the limits of the Rialto No. 2 location, subject
to such rights as then existed and were afterwards maintained under
such prior locations. Their existence, therefore, if such were the
fact, would not prove that the Rialto No. 2 claim could not have been
conformed to the legal subdivisions of the public survey. Such
prior locations, of themselves, could not and did not have the effect
to separate the lands into non-contiguous tracts, as contended, within
the meaning of the term non-contiguous as understood and used in
connection with the administration of the public land laws.
If it be true that some of the surrounding claims were entered prior
to the Rialto No. 2 location, as would appear to be the case from the
diagram referred to, that fact could not have made it impracticable,
in locating the Rialto No. 2 placer, to describe it by legal subdivisions.
Under the settled law and practice, such entered claims could and
must have been excluded from patent proceedings involving the
placer. (Mary Darling Placer Claim, 31 L. D., 64.)
The conclusion reached by your office is accordingly affirmed, but
without prejudice to the right of appellant to. begin patent proceed-
ings anew, provided he shall amend his location to conform to legal
subdivisions as required by law.
homestead-heirs—cultivation—final proof—alienation.
Prosser v. Heirs of Gilley.
The heirs of a deceased homestead entryman may delegate to another the power
to perform for their henefit the cultivation on the entry required by law,
and such cultivation, if actually carried on in good faith for the required
period, constitutes compliance with the homestead law the same as though
performed by the heirs themselves.
The right conferred by law upon the heirs of a deceased homestead entryman
to submit final proof on the entry can not be delegated to another.
Where a homestead claimant, by contract to convey the land embraced in his
entry after the submission of final proof, puts it beyond his power to acquire
title under the entry except by perjury, he thereby forfeits his rights, and
upon proof of such fact the entry will be canceled.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, July 19, 1905. (E. O. P.)
The Department has before it the appeal of C. W. Prosser from
your office decision of December 4, 1904, reversing that of the local
officers and dismissing his contest against the homestead entry of
William T. Gilley, deceased, for the S.
-J SW. i, Sec. 22, T. 28 N., R.
1 W., Guthrie land district, Oklahoma.
The basis of the contest is the alleged alienation, by the heirs, of
the land covered by the entry, and in support thereof contestant
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offered in evidence certain powers of attorney executed on behalf of
said heirs, to one Ed. L. Peckham. Said powers of attorney are, in
all essential particulars, the same, except as to the amount- named
therein to be paid to the different parties executing them, in full for
their interest in the land. As it is upon the construction of the said
instruments that the decision of the Department herein must neces
sarily rest, and as they are similar, only the joint power executed by
Frank Gilley and J. L. McLearen, is set out herein, as follow-:
Know all men by these presents, Thai we. Frank M. Gilley and J. L. Mc-
Learen, heirs ,-it law of William Gilley, deceased, do hereby make, constitute
and appoint Ed L. Peckham, Attorney al Law. of Blackwell, Oklahoma, our
true, snllirient and lawful attorney, for US and in our name, to make final proof
of the South half of the South-West Quarter (J) in Section Twenty-Two (22),
in Township Twenty-Eight (28), North of Range one i 1 » West of the Indian
Meridian, in Kay County. Oklahoma Territory; and for such purpose to take
entire charge of the same and to borrow the funds with which to pay for said
land to the government of the United States and all expenses of making such
proof. And when so proven up. to sell our interests in said land to whatever
person or persons said Peckham thinks best, and to make and execute a deed
of conveyance therefor. Said Peckham to retain for his services herein all he
may receive for our interests in said land over the sum of one hundred and
twenty-five dollars ($125.00) and to do and perform all necessary ads in the
execution of the aforesaid business in as full and ample a manner as we might
do if we were personally present. Hereby making this power of attorney
irrevocable, and hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall
do by virtue hereof.
In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands this 19th day of April,
A. I).. ISPS.
Crank M. Gtt.t.ei
J. L. McLeaui \
The instrument was duly acknowledged.
There is also with the record the joint receipt of said Gilley and
McLearen, bearing the same date as the power of attorney executed
by them, for the amount named therein as due for their interest in
the land. Similar receipts were executed by each of the other heirs.
bearing the same date as the powers of attorney executed by them,
except in case of James Gilley, whose receipt hears no date.
In the decision appealed from your office denied the validity of
said instruments and held them to he without force and effect for any
purpose
—
other than perhaps as evidence of the immaterial fact that the heirs did. prior
to proof, have an intent to make the proof for the purpose of selling and dis
posing of the land after the issuance of final certificate
for the reason that the power attempted to he conferred upon the
attorney-in-fact to make final proof was void. While it is not to he
denied that the power to submit final proof cannot be delegated, yet
unless it is clear that such was the plain intent of the instrument, Mich
effect should not he given thereto, as all rules of construction require
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that, if possible, the language used should be so construed as to give
legal effect to the instrument.
The widow, heirs or devisees of a deceased entryman are not re-
quired to continue the actual residence necessary on the part of the
original entryman, but may either reside upon or cultivate the land
for the required period. It. has also been repeatedly held that culti-
vation of the land by another inures to the benefit of the heirs, and such
acts need not be performed in person. Following this rule, it is clear
that the heirs may delegate the power to perforin the required serv-
ices for their benefit, and such cultivation and improvement, if actu-
ally carried on in good faith for the required period, constitutes
compliance with the homestead law. The law casting the right
initiated b}^ the original claimant upon his widow, heirs or devisees,
intended to confer upon them all the advantages and benefits which
would have accrued to their deceased ancestor or devisor, and the
Department in construing it has uniformly sought to fully protect
the right in the hands of the beneficiaries without restricting its
enjoyment by imposing conditions not warranted by a liberal con-
struction of the statute. Personal residence or cultivation by the
heirs might greatly limit or entirely defeat the benefit conferred, and
for that reason such requirement has never been enforced as against
them. In the case at bar it was necessary that cultivation be main-
tained after the death of William T. Gilley, the entryman, and it
appears that the heirs were residents of distant states. Under these
circumstances, it was not only reasonable, but highly probable, the
heirs, in conferring upon their attorney-in-fact the power to make
final proof, only attempted to delegate a legal power, namely, the
power to perform, or secure performance of, the necessary acts of
cultivation required of them in lieu of residence. The ministerial act
of submitting final proof could not be delegated, and as the language
conferring the power will admit of two constructions, one legal and
the other void, the former will be adopted as the one intended by the
parties.
This construction of the language conferring the power to make
final proof leaves for consideration the effect of the granting of the
power to sell the land after final proof. It is not to be denied that
the heirs might, after acquiring title to the land, deal with it as they
deemed best, but any attempted conveyance or contract to convey,
executed prior thereto, will, when shown, defeat the right to complete
the entry. The beneficiaries named take the right initiated by the
deceased subject to all the conditions imposed by section 2291, Revised
Statutes. By this section they are required, on making final proof,
to take oath " that no part of such land has been alienated, except as
provided in section twenty-two hundred and eighty-eight." While
actual alienation of the land is impossible prior to submission of
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final proof, yet the Department lias hold that any attempted aliena-
tion, which but for the inhibition of the law would have been effec-
tual, is such a violation of the statute as warrants a cancellation of
the entry. No other construction can he adopted and give effect to
the language used. In the case of Anderson /•. Carkins ( L35 Q. S..
1:83, ls7), the entryman made no attempted actual conveyance of the
land. His only act of alienation was a contract to convey after the
submission of final proof. The court held that such a contract.
though incapable of enforcement in a court of equity, would prevent
the homestead right being perfected "without perjury by the home-
steader." The departmental decisions now in force governing such
cases hold that where a claimant has put it beyond his power to
acquire title except by perjury, he has forfeited his rights. The
power to sell, conferred by this instrument under consideration,
coupled with the agreement therein contained as to the amount to be
paid for the interests of the different heirs, acting as principal-,
clearly constitutes a contract to convey the land and places the present
claimants under the ban of the statute. Not only was the price to
be paid definitely fixed, but. as appears from the receipts introduced
in evidence, the stipulated amounts were actually paid to the different
heirs at the time said powers of attorney were given.
Though fraud in obtaining the said powers of attorney was alleged
as a defense, no evidence was introduced by the defendants to sustain
the allegation, and while the Tacts set forth in your said decision
might be sufficient to raise a presumption of imposition upon the
heirs or question the honesty of the transaction, yet it is a universal
rule that fraud, when relied upon as a defense, must be strictly
proved. The Department cannot abrogate the rule and entertain a
bare presumption or accept an unsupported allegation of fraud, to
controvert the record facts before it.
For the reasons herein stated your said decision is hereby reversed.
The entry in question will be canceled.
COAX I.AM) AFFIDAVIT PARAGRAPH 33 OF (OAF LAND REGULA-
TIONS.
W. I). Keen.
The affidavit prescribed by paragraph :\2 of the coal-land regulations must be
made by the claimant himself.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of fl>< General L<ni<I
(F. L. C.) Office, July .!<>. 1905. ( V. 11. B.)
March 11. L902, W. I). Keen filed in the local office at Santa Fe,
New Mexico, his coal declaratory statement, covering the SW. 1 of
Sec. 32, T. II X.. R. 6 K.. N. M. P. M.
5194—Vol. 34—05 m I
50 DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
May 4, 1903, application was made to purchase the tract, and was
accompanied by the necessary proofs, except that in lieu of the affi-
davit required by paragraph 32 of the coal-land regulations, approved
July 31, 1882, to be made by the claimant (otherwise than so far as
it refers to the character of the land), there was submitted the affida-
vit of Willard S. Hopewell, as attorney in fact for Keen. The pur-
chase price was paid, and final certificate of entry issued June 26,
1903.
In due course, your office, by decision of September 21, 1903, held
the affidavit of the attorney in fact to be insufficient ; and directed the
local officers to call upon the entryman to submit his personal affidavit
substantially in the form set forth in paragraph 32 of the coal-land
regulations, except as to the character of the land, unless personally
acquainted therewith. Motion for review was denied December 2,
1903 ; and the pending appeal was thereupon taken.
A petition has since been filed here, in which it is prayecj that,
should the Department feel unauthorized to direct that the entry be
passed to patent, steps be taken for the submission of the case to the
Board of Equitable Adjudication for consideration and action.
Accompanying the petition is an affidavit by the attorney in fact, in
which it is alleged, among other things, in substance, that affiant
made the final affidavit submitted at the time of purchase, believing
himself authorized, as the claimant's attorney in fact, so to do; that
at that time affiant was informed and believed, and that he now
understands, that the claimant had not had the benefits of the coal-
laud laws, or held or purchased, as an individual or as a member of
an association, any coal lands under those laws; that since called upon
by your office decision of September 21, 1903, to furnish the affidavit
of the claimant affiant has made diligent effort so to do, but has been
unable to procure such affidavit, the present whereabouts of the claim-
ant being unknown to affiant; and that affiant believes it will be im-
possible for him to procure the claimant's affidavit. It is urged, to
support the petition, that the entry is within the class contemplated
by section 2457, Revised Statutes, and entitled to equitable considera-
tion, and may be submitted under the provision of the regulation of
April 25, 1877 (General Circular, issued January 25, 1904, p. 247),
for the submission of special cases not covered by the general rules:
that the local officers permitted the attorney in fact to file the affidavit
to which objection is made, accepted the purchase price, and allowed
entry ; that the affidavit prescribed by paragraph 32 of the coal-land
regulations does not embody a statutory requirement; that when
claimant filed his declaratory statement he personally made oath sub-
stantially to all the essential averments set forth in the affidavit pre-
scribed by the regulations; and that there is no adverse claim to the
land and no right in another to be j^rejudiced.
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Answering first the appeal, it may be said thai the Department has
expressly recognized and reaffirmed, in the case of Elwood R. Staf-
ford et al. (21 L. I)., 300), which was cited by your office, the re-
quirement, under paragraph 32 of the regulations, that the affidavit
therein* prescribed must be made by the claimant himself, although
the ease went off on another point. In respect of several of it-
features the affidavit is one which could not he made by another with
certainty of its truth. Nor is the requirement in this behalf answered
by the fact that the claimant personally made oath to his declara-
tory statement, for the Latter does not in fact contain all the essential
averments of the affidavit prescribed by paragraph 32; and even
were it otherwise, the allegations contained in the declaratory state-
ment could not relate to and cover the ensuing interval to the date
of entry. The Department would not. therefore, he warranted in
reversing the decision of your office and directing that the entry he
allowed to pass to patent.
It i> a sufficient answer to the petition to say that the relied' thereby
sought could he secured by the claimant's own act. viz., by the sub-
mission of his personal affidavit as prescribed by the regulations, if
no other objection were to appear. The fact that the claimant him-
self can not he found and that the petition is really preferred by the
attorney in fact, can not be taken, into account: the latter can he
recognized only in his representative capacity. There is nothing in
the case to entitle it to equitable consideration, and the prayer of
the petition must he denied.
The decision of your office is affirmed, and the entry will he
canceled.
HOMESTEAD BNTRI ALIEN II Kins.
Major v. Heirs of Hartnett.
A homestead entrynian who at the time of his death had not acquired the legal
title to the land embraced in his entry, was not ;it such time, by reason of
his claim under the entry, ;i person "holding real property," within the
meaning of article 1 of the treaty of March 2, L899, between the United
States and Greal Britain, and his alien heirs, subjects of the latter country,
have therefore no such claim or righl to the lands embraced in the entry ;is
is entitled to protection under the provisions of said treaty.
There is no provision of the homestead law by which any rights or claims to
public lands, prior to the issuance of patent, can he devised or succeeded I..
and perfected by, or on behalf of, other than citizens of the United States.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commisisoner of ih< General hand
( F. L. C.) Office, July .!'h 1905. ( P. E. VV.)
August 28, L894, Patrick Hartnett made homestead entry, No. -» s ^T.
for the SE. |. Sec. : ,»:». T. 22 X.. Iv. 11 \\\. Alva. Oklahoma, and on
May 1. L901, he submitted filial proof- therefor, on which final oertifi
cate No. 2859 issued on August 22, L901. August 11. L902, John C.
52 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
Major filed protest against the issuance of patent for said land on the
ground that said Hartnett died on October 14, 1901, leaving no wife
and no heirs, native born or naturalized, capable of inheriting the
said homestead and that Hartnett was not himself a naturalized
citizen of the United States, never having taken out his final papers.
After service by publication had been had in due form, a hearing
was had on July 14, 1903, upon which the local officers found that the
entryman had died and left no heirs, and recommended cancellation
of the entry.
February 12, 1904, they transmitted the record to your office and
reported no appeal.
November 23, 1904, your office held their findings of fact final, con-
curred in their conclusions of law and held the entry for cancellation.
In connection with this case, your office in said decision considered
the contest affidavit of Earl R. Stults, filed February 27, 1904, against
the same entry, in which charges similar to the foregoing were made
against Hartnett, and it is further alleged that Major is disqualified
as contestant against said entry by the fact that he is, and has since
December 18, 1901, been, the administrator of the estate of said Hart-
nett. Thereupon your office held that the right to contest an entry
does not depend on the right to enter the land, and that in considera-
tion of the circumstances disclosed by the record in the case brought
by Major, he is not disqualified to bring contest. Stults's affidavit
of contest was rejected and he has appealed to the Department, con-
tending that it was error to reject his contest and error not to dismiss
Major's contest.
Prior to your said decision there was also filed in your office, on
November 3, 1904—
objections to the contest of John C. Major, at the request of James Hartnett,
one of the brothers and heirs at law of Patrick Hartnett, deceased, and at the
request of His Majesty's Consul, Alexander Finn, under the treaty existing be-
tween Great Britain and the United States, proclaimed August Gth, 1900.
Subsequently to your said decision, on January 14, 1905, resident
counsel, as "Attorney for the heirs-at-law of Patrick Hartnett, de-
ceased, and acting for Hon. Alex. Finn, His Majesty's consul, near
Oklahoma Territory, representing the foreign-born heirs of said
Patrick Hartnett," filed his motion that your said office decision
—
be vacated and set aside, and that said entry be submitted to the Board of
Equitable Adjudication, under Rule 31.
In support of this motion it is contended: (1) that at the date of
final entry, August 22, 1901, there were no adverse claims of record;
(2) that where certain legal requirements appear not to have been
met because of the neglect or inattention of the local officers the entry
may go to said Board; (3) that claimant and his witnesses swore
that he was a naturalized citizen at that date; (4) that Hartnett may
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have taken out his final papers in Kingfisher County, Oklahoma,
where the records were burned in August L900, or may have taken
out such papers in an adjoining State: (5) that Hartnetl placed
valuable improvements on -aid tract, made the same his home for
more than six years and cultivated sixty acres for six seasons i> an
unusually good showing; and ( 6) that the heirs of the deceased home-
stead claimant are entitled to consideration and their rights in this
matter should he carefully guarded. This motion and the -aid objec-
tions are not supported by any showing of facts.
With the record is a joint affidavit, executed by John Ilartnett.
James Ilartnett and Anne Kiely, all born and >l\\\ residing in Ire-
land, in which they state, under date of May 6, L903, that they arc
the surviving brothers and sister of the said Patrick Ilartnett, their
two other brothers. Maurice and Thomas, being dead: and that
excepting said Patrick. Maurice and Thomas, no other brother or
sister of affiants ever went to America. Also a certified copy of
another affidavit by the same parties, dated September 28, L903, and
filed in the office of the probate judge of Woods County, Oklahoma
Territory, in the matter of the estate of said Patrick Ilartnett. stat-
ing that the affiants are his sole surviving heirs. It is not claimed
or shown that other heirs exist.
Article 1 of said treaty (81 Stat.. 1939) provides that—
Where on the death of any person holding real property (or property not per-
sonal), within the territories of one of the Contracting Parties, such real prop
erty would, by the laws of the land, pass to a citizen or subject of the other,
were he not disqualified by the laws of the country where such real property is
situated, such citizen or subject shall he allowed a term of three years in which
to sell the same, this term to he reasonably prolonged if circumstances render
it necessary, and to withdraw the proceeds thereof, without restraint or inter-
ference, and exempt from any succession, probate or administrative duties or
Charges other than those which may he imposed in like cases upon the citizens
or subjects of the country from which such proceeds may be drawn.
Article 3 provides in effect that in case of the death of a British
subject in the United States without having any known heirs in this
country or testamentary executors by him appointed, the nearest
British consular officer shall at once he notified so that the necessary
information may he forwarded to all persons interested; and that
such consular officer shall have the right to appear personally or by
delegate in all proceedings on behalf of the absent heir- or creditors,
until they are otherwise represented.
In the case of Patten v. Katx. on review (26 L. D., 317), the
Department said, with reference to a like provision in a treaty with
another country :
Prerequisite to an appropriation of the privilege conferred, there must have
died a person "holding real property." "Holding/' relating to ownership in
property, embraces two ideas: actual possession of some subject of property,
and being invested with the legal title.
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The terms of the said treaty do not apply to the case before us.
Hartnett had not obtained, and was not holding, the legal title to the
Land involved. It is only by and upon the issuance of patent, that the
government parts with the title to the public lands.
There i> no provision of the homestead laws by which any rights or
claims to land before patent can be devised or succeeded to and per-
fected by, or on behalf of, other than citizens of the United States.
The application on behalf of Hartnett "s heirs is accordingly dis-
missed.
The contention of appellant Stults is without merit and his appeal
is dismissed, your said decision being hereby in all respects affirmed.
oklahoma laxds-school sectioxs-mining laws.
Gyfsite Placer Mining Claim.
Sections sixteen, thirty-six, thirteen and thirty-three of the lands ceded by the
Comanche. Kiowa and Apache Indians under agreement ratified by the act
of June 6, 1900, reserved for school and other purposes, are not subject to
the operation of the mining laws.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, July 2-',, 1905. (A. B. P.)
October 24, 1003. L. G. Hamilton. Sam Lazarus and Leo Jacobs
offered for filing- their application for patent to the Gypsite placer
mining claim, embracing lands in sections 13 and 2-t of T. X., R. 10
W., El Reno, Oklahoma. November 5, 1903, the local officers rejected
the application as to the lands in section 13 on the stated ground that
section 13 is one of the specified sections of each township reserved
to the Territory and future State of Oklahoma, for school and other
purposes, by the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat.. 672, 676-680), and are
not subject to the United States mining laws as extended by that act.
On appeal by the applicants, your office, by decision of May 9, 1903,
affirmed the action below. The applicants have further appealed
here.
By the act of June 6, 1900. the agreement whereby the lands of the
Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians were ceded to the
United State- was ratified and confirmed. Among other things, the
agreement provided that out of the ceded lands allotments should be
made to the Indians, and that there should be set aside by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, for the use in common of the several tribes of
Indians, four hundred and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands.
The act ratifying the agreement, among other things, provides:
That the lands acquired by this agreement shall he opened to settlement by
proclamation of the President within six months after allotments are made and
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be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and town-site
laws of the United Stales: ....
That sections sixteen and thirty-six. thirteen and thirty-three, of the lands
hereby acquired in each township shall not be subjeel to entry, but shall be
reserved, sections sixteen and thirty-six, for the use of the common schools,
;iikI sections thirteen and thirty three for university, agricultural colleges, uor
mal schools, and public buildings of the Territory and future State of Okla-
homa ; and in case either of said sections, or parts thereof, is lost to said
Territory by reason of allotments under this act or otherwise, the governor
thereof is hereby authorized to locate other lands not occupied in quantity equal
to the loss.*******
That should any of said lands allotted to said Indians, or opened to settlement
under this act, contain valuable mineral deposits, such mineral deposits shall
be open to location and entry, under the existing mining laws of the United
States, upon the passage of this act, and the mineral laws of the United states
are hereby extended over said lands.
Numerous errors arc assigned in the appeal but it is unnecessary
to set them out here in detail. They present, though in various
forms, but one proposition, namely: that the lands in question are
within the category of hinds subject to the operation of the mining
laws, and. consequently, your office decision is wrong and should be
reversed.
This question has been heretofore considered and passed upon by
the Department, by decision of April 9, L903 (32 L. I).. 95). There
the question involved lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita
and affiliated bands of Indians, under an agreement ratified by act
of Congress of March 2, L895 (28 Stat.. 876, 894 899), as well as
lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribe-, under the
agreement above referred to. The provision of the act ratifying the
Wichita agreement, relative to the extension of the mining laws to
lands vi^U^\ by that agreement, was as follows:
That the laws relating to the mineral lands of the United States are hereby
extended over the lands ceded by the foregoing agreement.
In passing upon the question, the Department, among other thing-.
said (pp. 96-97) :
By the aet ratifying the Wichita agreement the mining laws of the United
States were expressly extended over the hinds ceded by that agreement. There
would seem to lie no room for serious question, therefore, that by that ad sec
tions It; and :;»'>. 1.", and '>''>, reserved therein for school and other purposes, wen-
made subjeel to the operation of the mining laws in the same manner and witli
like effect as are sections of land similarly reserved elsewhere, and no! yet
granted, as to which the mining laws are applicable.
With respect to the act ratifying the Comanche. Kiowa, and Apache agree
men! the situation is different. By that act only the lands which were to be
allotted to the Indians or to he opened to settlement thereunder i \' !!" Ce nl
and Plaster Co., .".l L. D., 125; Instructions, Id., 154) were made subject to the
mining laws and to mineral exploration and entry. The acl did nol extend the
mining laws generally to the lands i-^Un] by that agreement, as was done bj the
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earlier act with respect to the lands ceded by the Wichita agreement, but only
to the lands which were to be allotted to the Indians or to be opened to settle-
ment under the act. Sections Id and .'id, 13 and :v.\, reserved for school and
other purposes for the benefit of the Territory and future State of Oklahoma,
were not lands to be allotted to Indians or to be opened to settlement any more
than were the four hundred and eighty thousand acres set aside for the common
use of the Indians as grazing lands.
The Department is of the opinion that sections 16 and 36, 13 and 33, of the
lands ceded by the Wichita agreement are. subject to the operation of the min-
ing laws, and that the like numbered sections of the lands ceded by the Co-
manche, Kiowa, and Apache agreement are not subject to the operation of such
laws.*******
It is not intended to hold or to intimate that the Territory of Oklahoma is
entitled, or that said Territory or the future State of Oklahoma may in any
event be entitled, to minerals, if any, now known to exist in sections 16 and 36,
13 and 33, of the lands ceded by the last-mentioned agreement, or which may be
hereafter found to exist in said sections, prior to the time when the same shall
be granted to such Territory or State. It is simply held, as to said sections,
that under existing legislation the lands therein are not subject to the operation
of the mining laws.
The conclusion thus reached was followed in the case of Okla-
homa v. L. G. Hamilton (unreported), decided April 6, 1904; and
after carefully considering the various phases of the question as now
again presented, the Department sees no reason to disturb its former
ruling.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
mining claim—placer location—conformity- judicial
proceedings.
Laughing Water Plvcer.
The mining laws contemplate that in all cases, except in instances where im-
practicable so to do, placer mining locations must be made in conformity
with the system of public-land surveys, that is, rectangular in form and of
dimensions corresponding to appropriate legal subdivisions, and with east-
and-west and north-and-south boundary lines.
The only judicial proceedings in which a claim may become involved, resulting
in delay which would otherwise be fatal to entry, and which will protect
the rights of the applicant for patent during their pendency, are those
arising under the mining laws themselves, whereby the applicant is pre-
vented from completing his patent proceedings prior to final determination
of the litigation.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. K C.) Office, July 27, 1905. (G. N. B.)
March 19, 1902, the Harney Peak Tin Mining, Milling and Manu-
facturing Company, by Albert E. Ledoux, receiver, made entry for
the Laughing Water placer mining claim, survey No. 807, Rapid
City
?
South Dakota, land district.
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August 11. L903, your office directed the local officers to notify the
claimant that it would !>c allowed sixty days within which to -how
cause why the entry should not be canceled because, among other
things not necessary to be here considered. ( 1) there had been a delay
of over nine years in perfecting entry under the application, tiled
December 30, L892, and (2) the claim as located does not conform as
near as practicable to the United State- system of public-land sur-
veys and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys. It was stated
that on failure to make the required showing and in the absence of
appeal the entry would be canceled without further notice.
In response to the forego mo-, and on October 25, l <.>(): ,). a number
of affidavits were filed by the claimant, in which, taken together, it
is alleged, among other things, in substance and effect, that the
receiver, who was appointed in L894, was unable to make entry earlier
because of inability to procure money to pay for the land; that it
is impracticable to conform the claim to the system of the public-
land surveys and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys be-
cause of adjoining valid and subsisting lode and placer mining
claims; that where this is not the case only land valuable for its
placer deposits is embraced in the claim; and that the location con-
sists with a general practice in vogue in the mining district in which
it is situated.
December D, 1903, your office held the showing with respect to the
non-conformity of the claim to be insufficient. The entry was held
for cancellation accordingly, but, with reference to the delay in mak-
ing entry under the application, it was stated that under all the
circumstances of the case the objection on that score would be
removed.
The applicant has appealed to the Department.
It is shown by the record that the placer claim was located by eight
persons, July 1, 1886, and that, among other incident-, the present
claimant, as successor in interest, made an amended location Decem-
ber 31, L891, with which tin 4 pending entry coincides.
The township in which the claim is situated was surveyed in Oc-
tober, L898, and the plat of survey was filed in the local office April
K), 11)00.
By the official plat the claim is shown to pursue a zig-zag course
and to trend generally north and south, it> entire length being more
thaw one and one-half mile-. It varies in width from what would
appear to be about 250 to about COO feet, is bounded by twenty-nine
courses, and embrace- 54.11 acre-. Laughing Water Creek, from
which the claim evidently takes its name, flows almost entirely
throughout the claim from end to end. No attempt was made even
to approximate the location, or any portion of it. to the system oi
the public-land surveys, eit her in form or position.
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It is contended by the appellant that the claim was located upon
faith of the uniform practice of the land department, prior to de-
partmental decision of August 15, 1900 (Miller Placer Claim, 30
L. D., 225). to pass to patent placer mining claims located on unsur-
veyed land without regard to their form and position. While the
Department recognizes the fact to be that, in the past, under the
more or less general practice of your office, claims on unsurveyed
lands were permitted to pass to patent without regard to their form,
no case is cited by counsel, and a most diligent search has failed to
discover a decision by the Department, which directly authorizes such
indiscriminate locations. The decisions cited by counsel to justify
this location are without application, as the locations there under
consideration were of a wholly different class and character. Even
were it not a question of statutory requirement, the frequently fan-
tastic outlines of numbers of placer locations which have of late
years come to the attention of the Department would manifest the
unwisdom of the recognition formerly accorded such non-conforming
claims. With the gradual diminution of the public domain this
question presents itself as one of increasing importance, and the ille-
gality of locations of such elongated, narrow character as that here
in question, often following the course of and embracing streams of
water which the claimants seek to control, is made the more apparent.
This claim, situate in the Black Hills region, lies along a valley
enclosed by hills of moderate inclination, broken on either side by
frequent draws and flats. The topography of the adjacent ground
is not such as to have made it impracticable to define the location in
conformity with the system of the public land surveys, that is, rec-
tangular in form and of dimensions corresponding to appropriate
legal subdivisions, and with east-and-west and north-and-south
boundary lines. Such conformity the statute contemplates and the
Department must require. (Wood Placer Mining Co., on review,
32 L. D., 363.)
It is urged by claimant that it is impracticable now to reform the
location because of surrounding valid and subsisting lode and placer
claims. Assuming the conditions to be as alleged (for the official
plat does not indicate- the claim to be so surrounded), interference
with unentered claims affords no justification for non-conformity of
location. This is discussed in the recent case of Rialto No. 2 Placer,
decided July 19, 1905 (34 L. D., 44), dealing with a placer location
upon surveyed land but upon this point controlling here, in which it
is said
:
The surrounding prior locations, in so far as unentered, even if their exist-
ence and validity were admitted, as alleged, could not, and did not, of themselves,
amount to appropriations of the lands emhraeed in them in such a sense as to
preclude the inclusion of such lands or parts thereof within the limits of the
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Rialto No. 2 location, subject to such rights ;is then existed and were afterwards
maintained under such prior locations. Their existence, therefore, if such were
the fact, would not prove that the Rialto No. '_' claim could not have been
conformed to the legal subdivisions of the public survey. Such prior locations,
of themselves, could not and did not have the effect to separate the lands into
non-contiguous tracts, as contended, within the meaning of the term nun-con-
tiguous as understood and used in connection with the administration of the
public land laws.
It is contended that the Miller decision, supra^ was, in effect, a new
construction of the law, which should not be applied retroactively.
Upon this point it may be said that had the Department previously
construed the law7 to contemplate such a location as that here in ques-
tion the contention might be of force. The Department's apparent
acquiescence in what seems to have been a more or les- common prac-
tice, however misleading it may have been in its results, can not be
given the weight of direct authority, and is to be accounted for by
the prominence of other and decisive questions presented in such cases
as have been brought here. It is not clear how an interpretation of a
law is to be given except the question is practically presented in a
case. Whilst fully appreciating the situation, the Department be-
lieves its construction of the law to be correct and that it must there-
fore adhere to it.
Finally, counsel for claimant cite two unreported cases (Guyette
Consolidated Placer, decided May 10, 1904, and Kirk Placer, decided
June 30, 1904) in which, in view of the equities there apparent, the
Department specially excepted the non-conforming placer claims of
those names from the requirement under the later decisions. It is
contended, in effect, that no difference in principle exists between the
circumstances in those cases and the present, and that like consider-
ation should be accorded the latter. It is, however, plainly disclosed
by the record that such compliance with the requirements of the min-
ing laws as has been had in this case has been of the most perfunctory
character, and that the only basis for an appeal to special considera-
tion is the claimant's reliance upon the former practice observed with
respect to non-conforming locations. Indeed, upon further consid-
eration, in the light of this and other like cases which have since been
presented, the Department is of opinion that the bounds of strictly
statutory authority were passed in the cases cited, and that they can-
not therefore be regarded as precedents. No sufficient reason has
been assigned for the non-con fortuity of this claim, and such rights
as the claimant may seek to acquire in the premises must be ami are
subject to its observance of the statutory requirement. A- the lands
of the vicinity are now surveyed the task is an easy one.
In conclusion, the Department i- con-trained to say thai it is
unable to concur in that portion of your office decision winch holds
that, under the circumstance- of the case, the objection to the delay
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in perfecting entry under the application for patent would be waived.
The only judicial proceedings in which a claim may become involved,
resulting in delay which would otherwise he fatal to entry, under the
doctrine of Cain et al. v. Addenda Mining Co. (29 L. D., 62) and
like cases, and which are held to protect the rights of the applicant
for patent during their pendency, are those arising under the mining
laws themselves, whereby the applicant is prevented from complet-
ing his patent proceedings prior to final determination of the litiga-
tion. (Marburg Lode Mining Claim, 80 L. D., 202.)
The decision of your office is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-SECOND-ADDITIONAL-ACT OE APRIL 28, 1904.
David H. Briggs.
A homestead entryman is not entitled to make a second entry under the provi-
sions of the act of April 28, 1004, 33 Stat., 527, upon a showing that he
relinquished his original entry for the reason that the land embraced therein
was unsuitable for farming purposes and was not of sufficient acreage to
enable him to support himself and family by using the land for grazing
purposes.
The right of additional entry provided for by section 2 of the act of April 28,
1004, 33 Stat., 547, is limited to persons who theretofore had entered under
the homestead laws lands within the territory described in the act. and who
own and occupy such lands, and can only be exercised upon lands contiguous
to the original entry.
The right of additional entry accorded by the proviso to section 3 of the act of
April 28, 1004, 33 Stat., 547, extends to all persons who prior to application
to exercise said privilege had made homestead entry, and there is no war-
rant in the act for further limiting the right, as is done in the instructions
of May 31, 1004, issued under said act, to a homesteader who had resided
upon and cultivated the land embraced in his original entry for the period
required by law.
Directions given that the instructions of May 31, 1004. 32 L. D., 670, be amended
to accord with the views herein expressed.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, July '28, 1905. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by David H. Briggs from the decision of
your office of March 23, 1905, rejecting his application to make second
homestead entry under the acts of April 28, 1904 (33* Stat, 527. 547),
for the W. i SE. J, E. -} SW. J, Sec. 33, T. 26 N., R. 45 W., NE.J,
E. 1 NW. }, SW. J NW."i, NW. i SW. J, E. J SW. i, NW. J SE. J,
Sec. 4, NE. J- SE. J, Sec. 5, T. 25 N., R. 45 W., containing 640 acres,
Alliance, Nebraska.
It appears that applicant made homestead entry, March 25, 1899,
for the S. I SE. J, Sec. 10. and E. J NE. -J, Sec. 15, T. 24 N., R. 44 W.,
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which was canceled on relinquishment July 21, L904. He claims that
he is entitled to make the entry now applied for under section 1 of
the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat.. 527), which provides:
That any person who has heretofore made entry under the homestead laws.
hut who shall show to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the General
Laml Office thai lie was unable to perfect the entry on account of some oaavoid
able complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of as honesl
mistake as to the character of the land : that he math' a bona fide effort to com
ply with the homestead law and that lie did not relinquish his entry or abandon
his claim for a consideration, shall be entitled to the benefit of the homestead
laws as though such former entry had not been made.
In support of'his claim applicant alleges that during the month of
April. 1899, he established residence on the land embraced in the
former entry, built a comfortable house fenced the entire tract and
due- a well: that he has since maintained residence upon the land.
which not being of acreage sufficient to support himself and family
by means of raising cattle and being unsuited for farming purposes,
he was compelled part of the time to seek employment elsewhere for
earning additional support for himself and family: that since the
enactment of the act of April 28, 1904, he believes that with sufficient
acreage for grazing purposes he will he enabled to establish for him-
self and family a home upon a ranch and to raise cattle in numbers
sufficient to justify him in making it a home; that there being no
available vacant land adjoining his homestead he relinquished the
same, for which he received no consideration.
The land applied for is subject to disposal under the act of April
28, L904 (33 Stat.. :>17). entitled, -An act to amend the homestead
laws as to certain unappropriated and unreserved lands in Nebraska."
It is provided in section 1 of said act
—
That from and after sixty days after the approval of this act entries made
under the homestead laws in the State of Nebraska west and north of the fol
lowing line, to wit: .... shall not exceed in area six hundred and fortj
acres, and shall he as nearly in compact form as possible, and in m> event over
two miles in extreme length: Provided, That there shall he excluded from the
provisions of this act such lands within the territory herein described as in the
opinion of the Secretary of the Interior it may he reasonably practicable to irri-
gate under the national irrigation law. or by private enterprise.
Section w
_! reads as follows:
That entrymen under the homestead laws of the United states within the
territory above described who own and occupy the land heretofore entered by
them. may. under the provisions of this act and subject to its conditions, enter
ether lands contiguous to their said homestead entry, which shall not. with the
land so already entered, owned, and occupied, exceed in the aggregate six
hundred and forty acres; and residence upon the original homestead shall be
accepted as equivalent to residence upon the additional land so entered, but
final entry shall not be allowed 'of such additional land until Ave years after
first entering the same.
62 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
And the iirst proviso to section 3 of said act is:
That a former homestead entry shall not he a bar to the entry under the pro-
visions of this act of a tract which, together with the former entry, shall not
exceed six hundred and forty acres.
The circular of instructions issued under said act May 31, 1904 (32
L. D., (>70), contains this paragraph:
Under said act no bar is interposed to the making of second homesteads for the
full area of 640 acres by parties entitled thereto under existing laws, and appli-
cations therefor will be considered under the instructions of the respective laws
under which they are made.
The Department concurs in the opinion of your office that appli-
cant's showing is not sufficient to bring him within the act of April
28, 1901 (33 Stat,, 527), and therefore he is not entitled to make
second entry for 640 acres under section 1 of the act of April 28,
1904 (33 Stat., 547), as applied for. He is clearly not entitled to
the provisions of section 2 of said act, for it contemplates the entry
of additional lands contiguous to lands within the territory described
in the act, entered, owned and occupied by the applicant, conditions
that are absent under the present application. With respect to the
first proviso to section 3 of said act, the instructions thereunder,
supra, declare:
By the first proviso of section 3, any person who made a homsetead entry
prior to his application for entry under this act, and has resided upon and
cultivated the same for the period required by law, will be allowed to make
additional entry for a quantity of land, which added to the area of the land
embraced in the former entry shall not exceed 640 acres, but residence and
cultivation of the additional land will be required to be made and proved as
in ordinary homestead entries.
This paragraph of the instructions, wherein it is declared with
reference to the former homestead entry of an applicant under the
act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), "and has resided upon and
cultivated the same for the period required by law," prescribes a
limitation not warranted by the purview of said act. The only pro-
vision in the first proviso to section 3 of said act, to which said para-
graph is directed, is that the tract applied for shall not, with the
tract embraced in the former entry, exceed six hundred and forty
acres. This being true, the regulation embodied in the foregoing
quotation will no longer be followed, and your office will take the
necessary steps to correct said instructions in the manner indicated.
In view of the above, while Briggs can not be permitted to enter
under said act six hundred and forty acres as applied for by him,
he may enter, subject to compliance with the requirements of the
homestead law, four hundred and eighty acres, if he so desires, and
upon showing proper qualification, his former entry being for one
hundred and sixty acres. His application will therefore be approved
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for that number of acre-, the decision of your office being hereby
reversed accordingly.
This decision is substituted for that of the Department in this
case dated June 17. L905, which is hereby recalled and vacated.
final i'hoof on claims within forest reserves,
circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, I). C, August /. 1905.
Registers and Receivers,
United States Land Offices.
Gentlemen : Attention is called to the following reissue of the cir-
cular of April 8, L905, with additions thereto suggested by the Fores-
try Bureau, Department of Agriculture. The original circular is in
full force and effect, the reissue being deemed necessary to more fully
emphasize the purpose of the original circular.
(1) Hereafter you will, when issuing notice of intention to make
final proof upon claims, either mineral or non-mineral, within an
established forest reserve, furnish a'copy thereof to the Forest Super-
visor in charge of such reserve, in order that he may he enabled to hi'
present at the taking of final proof to examine and cross-examine
claimant and his witnesses, or may protest the passage of the mineral
application to entry, as the case may be. In the former case, when-
ever the Supervisor may deem it necessary, the examination may he
reduced to writing at the cost of the claimant, and made a part of the
final proof in that case. You will request the Forest Supervisor to
make proper return of the proof notice, to be made a part of the case,
with such notations thereon as he may consider best.
('2) You will carefully examine any proofs for claims within
forest reserves, whether mineral or non-mineral, together with any
evidence furnished by the Forest Supervisor or brought out by his
examination, and either reject, suspend, or approve the same according
to the following directions:
(3) If sufficient facts appear upon (he face of the record, you will
reject the final proof, advising claimant of your reasons therefor, with
the right of appeal. No flirt her act ion thereon will be required from
the Forest Supervisor.
( I ) If you believe the proof to be fraudulent, or doubt ful, but do
not have sufficient reasons to justify it> rejection, or if the Forest
Supervisor has returned the notice with a definite protest against the
claim, you will suspend the proof and submit a brief statement of the
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facts in the case to the special agent in charge of the district in which
said proof is made, such statement to include the names and addresses
of claimants and witnesses, and your reasons for the suspension of the
proof. You will forward the proof to this office with a copy of your
Letter to the special agent. The special agent will then proceed to
make such investigation as he may deem necessary, and to submit his
report on the approved form. Upon the receipt of his report, appro-
priate action will be taken upon the entire record as then made up.
(5) If you believe the proof to have been made in good faith and
that the law has been in all respects complied with, you will pass
such proof to entry in the regular order, upon compliance by the
claimant with all the requirements therein and on the payment of fees
and commissions, but you will in no case issue final certificate or pass
a mineral application to entry when any definite protest by a forest
officer has been made against the claim.
(6) You will promptly notify the Forest Supervisor of whatever
action you take in every case.
(7) The names and addresses of Forest Supervisors will be fur-
nished you by this office. Notices of claims in forest reserves in which
there is no forest officer in charge should be forwarded to the Forester,
Agricultural Department, Washington, D. C.
Very respectfully, J. H. Fimple,
Acting Commissioner.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
right of way-forest reserves—jurisdiction
,
Instructions.
Directions given that all applications for rights of way or other privileges over or
upon public lands in forest reserves, now pending before the General Land
Office and falling wholly within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agri-
culture, as defined in departmental letter of June 8, 1005 (concurred in by
the Secretary of Agriculture in letter of June 13, 1005), he transmitted to
the Department of Agriculture for consideration and disposition.
Where applications for rights of way or other privileges affect lands lying partly
within and partly without forest reserves, and involve questions within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and also questions within the
jurisdiction of the land department, separate applications will not he re-
quired, hut in such cases the application will he examined, and, if found
regular, approved hy the land department in so far as it affects lands with-
out the reserve, and then transmitted to the Department of Agriculture for
consideration and such action as may he proper relative to the lands within
the reserve; hut in the event it appear that the right to use lands without
the reserve is subordinate to permission to use lands within the reserve, the
application should first he passed upon by the Secretary of Agriculture.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General La mi
(F. L. ( J.
)
Office, , 1 ugust 0, 1905. (G. B. G.)
Your office letter ,w F" of July 15, 1905, acknowledges the receipt
of departmental letter of June 29, 1905, which defined the divided
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of the Interior in the matter of applications for rights of way and
privileges in forest reserves, and requests that instructions be given
by this Department for the disposition of pending applications the
consideration of which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture as so defined.
It is also suggested that some of these applications may involve
rights and privileges upon public lands partly within and partly
without forest reserves, and requested that your office be instructed
in the premises.
Upon consideration of the matter, it is directed that all applica-
tions pending before your office, in whatever state of preparation, for
permission to occupy and use public lands wholly within forest re-
serves, and questions relative to their allowance wholly within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, as defined by said
departmental letter of June 29, 1905 [see letter of June 8, 1905, 33
L. D., G09], be transmitted by your office to said Department for con-
sideration and disposition, and that the applicant in each instance
he duly advised of such action.
As to applications affecting lands partly within and partly with-
out forest reserves, involving questions within the cognizance of the
Department of Agriculture, it is not believed that the public interests
require that the applicant should, as suggested by your office, be put
to the trouble and expense of separate applications, but that the ap-
plications should be examined and. if found regular, should be ap-
proved by this Department as to such part as falls without the foresi
reserves, and then transmitted to the Department of Agriculture for
its consideration and approval, in so far as it affects the reserve. In
the event it appear that the right to use lands without the reserve is
subordinate to permission to use lands within the reserve, the appli-
cation should first be passed upon by the Secretary of Agriculture.
ARID LAND-H1K LAM A I ION PROJECT—IRRIGABIiE AREA-LEGAL
SUBDIVISIONS.
I NSTKl < TIONS.
Public lands lying within the irrigable area of a reclamation projed constructed
under the provisions of the act of June IT. 1002, can be disposed of only
under the homestead law and in conformity with the legal subdivisions,
defined by the public land surveys.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Director of the Geological Survey,
(F. L. C.) August 0, 1905. (E. F. B.)
The Department is in receipt of your letter of July 24, 1905,
requesting a reconsideration and modification of the " Instructions '"
of August 21, 1903 (32 L. D., 237, 239), so far as it was therein held
that—
As the Secretary has no authority to allow an entry for less than 40 acres,
there is also no authority to subdivide a 40-acre tract for combination with
other subdivisions. The provision that the lands shall be subject to entry only
44
under the provisions of the homestead laws in tracts of not less than forty
nor more than one hundred and sixty acres " does not imply a power to allow an
entry of any amount between said minimum and maximum area, but contem-
plates that all entries must be made according to the ordinary legal subdivisions.
The Secretary may limit the area per entry to the smallest legal subdivision, or
may combine with it one or more legal subdivisions, provided the entry will not
exceed 160 acres; but he has no power to subdivide or change the ordinary
subdivisions fixed by law.
You cite no authority for the modification of this ruling, but base
your request solely upon the ground that your office " has been unable
to find any positive provision prohibiting the disposal of the public
lands in tracts of less than 40-acre subdivisions."
It is a fundamental principle that the public lands can be disposed
of under the general land laws only in conformity with the legal
subdivisions as defined by the public land surveys. It is to be found
throughout the entire public land system from the foundation to the
present time.
Lands lying in the irrigable area of every project constructed under
the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), can be disposed of under the
homestead law only. Section 2289, Revised Statutes, as amended by
the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), contains the positive
requirement that land entered under the homestead law shall " be
located in a body in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the public
lands." The same provision was also contained in the original act of
May 20, 18G2 (12 Stat., 392).
If the conditions referred to in your letter exist to any great extent,
which the Department is not prepared to accept, although it does not
reject your view, the remedy must be provided by the legislative
branch of the government.
Marvin Hughitt.
Motion for review of departmental decision of May 8, 1905, 33
L. D., 544, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, August 4, 1905.
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PRIVATE CliAIM—RIGHT OF PURCHASE UNDER SECTION 7, ACT OF
July ;>.;, !*(><;—LOCI'S OF CLAIM.
COUTS V. StRICKLEK ET AIj.
(Rancho Buena Vista.)
Under the provisions of section 7 of the act of July 23, 1866, persons who in
good faith and for a valuable consideration purchased lands from those who
claimed and wore thought to be Mexican grantees or assigns, arc entitled,
provided they fulfil the other conditions of the act, to purchase such of
said lands found not to he included in the grant as finally surveyed, regard-
less of what other lands, not within the lines of their original purchase,
were finally found to he the lands granted.
Where the tie line purporting to connect the survey of a private land claim
with the public-land surveys is shown to be erroneous, the actual locus of
the claim as defined and surveyed on the ground must prevail.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, August 10, 1905. (J. R. W.)
J. W. Strickler and others, protestants in Couts v. Strickler et al.
(31 L. I)., 446), appealed from your decision of April 5, L905,
approving the resurveys in connection with the boundaries of the
Buena Vista Rancho and plats thereof, executed by Deputy Surveyor
W. A. Sickler under contract No. 226, dated November 21, 1903.
The appeal seeks to open and again agitate the points in contro-
versy, heard and determined in Couts v. Strickler, supra, to which
reference is here made, without here again discussing at length the
matters attempted to be raised by the appeal that are there discussed.
That decision is adhered to. This disposes of all assignments of
error, except as hereinafter discussed.
The seventh assignment is that the present survey contains 565.45
acres more than the Hays survey purported to contain, or than the
applicant claimed to purchase. The distances on the right, northerly
and southerly lines, as run by Sickler, are respectively 134.50 and
134.49 chains, and of the westerly and easterly boundaries L65 chain-,
giving a product or contents of 2211) 27/40 acres, which is sub-
stantially the area of half of a square league and substantially that
surveyed by Hays (2211).OS). It may, however, have been intended
by the assignment to allege as error thai the area of Lands patented
under the grant with those within the I lavs survey not patented.
taken together, exceed the original claim under the grant by the
amount, substantially, stated in the assignment. This occurs from
an error of Hays in his field-notes connecting the westerly line of his
survey of the rancho with the range line between range- lour west
and three west. Instead of with the section line a mile west thereof.
That this section line was the one intended bv him is shown by the
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other calls of his survey and by the possession and asserted dominion
of Couts and his predecessors in estate prior to any survey of the
lands west of the ranch house to the road from Milpitas to Guajome.
The Treadwell survey adhered to the erroneous connection of the
westerly boundary to the range line and about the area of 565.45
acres of the 1109.67 (one quarter of a square league) patented under
the grant lay outside and east of the half of a square league as sur-
veyed by Hays. But this fact does not affect the grant claimant's
right to purchase the land which, at the time of his purchase, was
thought to be within the lines of the grant. In Beley v. Naphtaly
(169 U. S., 353, 362), after giving reasons for the construction
adhered to, the court held that
:
For the reasons thus given we think that this act includes those persons who
in good faith for a valuable consideration have purchased land from those who
claimed and who were thought to be Mexican grantees or assigns, provided
they fulfil the other conditions named in the act.
In Watriss v. Keed (99 CaL, 134; 33 Pac, 775, 776), the court held
that
:
The object of the act was to give to the purchaser from the Mexican grantee
the right of purchase from the government. He was assured by the act that if
he made his purchase in good faith, took actual possession, and continued the
same, and paid a valuable consideration, and the land was believed to be within
the grant, he would be treated as a preferred purchaser of the land, and, upon
paying for the same, would be entitled to a patent. If respondent's land was
not within the lines of the grant, it was supposed to be, and the evidence shows
that she honestly believed it to be within such lines, and this entitles her to the
protection of the act.
These principles are as applicable to the present case as to that in
which they were originally applied, as Couts purchased in November,
1866, when the Hays survey had stood for eight years approved by
the surveyor-general, and express reference was made to it in the deed
by the grant claimant to him. The lines so fixed were " the lines of "
bis " original purchase." So much of those lands as was not included
in the grant as finally surveyed the act permits him to purchase
regardless of what other lands not within those lines, were finally
found to be the lands granted.
The eighth assignment is, in substance, that Surveyor Sickler has
not in fact retraced Hays's survey, but has made an original one,
shifted about a mile west from that of Hays. This, if true, would
be fatal to the present survey, and decisive of the case. This assign-
ment is supported by what purports to be copies of the field-notes
and plat of a survey made February 27, 1904, by S. L. Ward, county
surveyor of San Diego county, California, as " Being a retracing
of the Hays survey of 1858," of the Buena Vista Rancho. The
purported copies are without certification or authentication of any
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kind, and for that reason alone are not evidence or entitled to be
received. But were these documents unobjectionable in thai respect,
the field-notes bear on their face evidence destructive of their credit.
They show
:
As there seems to be much uncertainty regarding the starting point, i. e., the
X. W. corner of the Indian (Felipe's) Garden, I went to the range Line, :'.::
chains north of the corner to Sees. 30-31-25 & 30, Twps. 11 south. Ranges 3
and 4 west, S. B. M., as referred to in Hays' field notes of his survey and ran
thence
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
While very much of the topography as I find it, fails to agree with that given
in Hays' field-notes, yet the tract surveyed by his courses and distances includes
the land described in Felipe's original claim and checks all right with the range
line.
After spending nearly a week on the ground and carefully studying the situa-
tion, I am convinced that the Hays survey never was made in the field, but
simply projected on paper and the topography written up at random.
It thus appears affirmatively that the controlling question was
merely assumed, viz: that Hays was not in error in connecting his
survey to the range line, instead of to the section line, a mile west of
it. This fatal assumption, or begging of the whole question in con-
troversy, is adhered to, although on the lines run " very much of the
topography .... fails to agree with that given in Hays' field notes,"
in explanation of which the opinion is advanced " that Hays' survey
was never made in the field, but was simply projected on paper and
written up at random." It is clear that what the county surveyor se<
out to do, and what he in his opinion accomplished, was not to ascer-
tain where Hays's lines and monuments lay and to retrace and relo-
cate them, but, first determining where Felipe's garden was, to lay
on the ground Hays's courses and distances so as to include the land
described in Felipe's original claim and to make an original survey
of that tract, irrespective of where Hays may have laid the lines
including it—-to make a survey as Hays ought to have made it regard-
less of where he did make it. As the topography of Hays's lines can
not be made to conform, the opinion is advanced that Hays's survey
was never made in the field.
At conclusion of his field-notes Sickler observes:
'he regularity with which this resurvey checks off the topography and other
objects noted in the original survey makes it certain that these lines are ;ii
least approximately the same, but there is a great discrepancy in connection
with the public land survey.
It will be noticed that Hays makes connection with hut one public land corner,
which he calls the Cor. to Sees. 25, 30, 31, and :;<;. and that ii proves by this
survey to be within a few links of the present location of the ! Sec. Cor. bet
Sees. 25 and 2(5.
If the subdivision lines had been established at the time Hays made his sur-
vey, the error could easily be accounted for. However, tin' < !or. maj have been
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set in some private survey, or the deputy who established the range line may
have erroneously started from a corner on the Tp. line, a mile too far west, in
which case it would be set for the i Sec. Cor. bet. Sees. 25 and 30. At any
rate it seems certain that this Cor. was in existence at the time Hays made his
survey and that when it was pointed out to him he failed to properly identify it.
The survey was carefully examined, and, as to Hays's tie to the
range line, the examiner says:
I am firmly of the opinion after careful investigation, that the tie to the range
line should be set aside as erroneous for nearly all the topographical features
point that way, and there seems to be a persistent and lively tradition in this
locality that Hays's No. 1 Cor. is in the vicinity of the Oak stump so often
referred to herein.
Again, he says
:
At the Cor. point for No. 1 Cor. as fixed by the examiner from Hays's tie to
the range line, there is nothing at all in the way of oak trees or shrubbery, the
growth being almost entirely sage and sumach. I was unable also to find any
other oak trees in the vicinity of the alleged Hays bearing tree stump. That
old tree seems to be the only live oak in that locality.
There are then under these two professed retracings of the Hays
survey two sets of four lines each, aggregating 598.99 chains in each
case, or 7.465 miles. In one, taking as an initial point the stump of
a live oak, noted by Hays as standing in 1858, all the topographical
features noted by him in the way of water courses, ravines, valleys,
and ridges, in a mountainous country, and their respective courses
and distances, closely agree. That stump is the only live oak dis-
coverable anywhere in the locality. The only real objection to the
survey is that it can not be harmonized to Hays's tie to the range line.
The Ward survey, blindly adhering to Hays's tie to the range line
and ignoring the live oak, starting from a point where nothing but
sage and sumac seem ever to have grown, so disagrees with all topo-
graphic features that to sustain it it must be assumed that Hays in
fact never made any survey in the field.
Such contention is not founded in sound reason. A tie to the range
line, while presumed to be carefully made and accurate, is but one
of the calls given by the surveyor to aid in fixing the location of his
work upon the face of the earth and its relation to the surveys of the
public lands. Such call is but human work and like all works of
man subject to liability to mistake. No call of a survey can be infal-
lible, and Avhen all the calls in about seven and a half miles of lines,
over ridges, valleys, and streams, substantially agree in one set of
lines to show that the survey was in fact made, that it can be laid
again upon the surface of the earth, agreeing in every particular
save that of its tie to the range line, the proof becomes not merely
persuasive, but so clear, cogent, and convincing as irrefutably and
conclusively to establish that the tie to the range line was erroneous
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and must be rejected. The facts show conclusively that Hays in fad
made his survey, that he accurately measured and noted topo-
graphical features, but that he erred in connecting his work to the
system of public land surveys, and that his survey has been accu-
rately retraced and is now properly connected to the public surveys.
Where the tie to the surveys of public lands is shown to be erroneous,
the actual locus of the claim as defined and surveyed on the ground
must prevail. Sinnott v. Jewett (33 L. I)., 01).
Your approval of the survey here in question is affirmed.
Snow v. Dicken.
Motion for review of departmental decision of March 22, 1905. 33
L. D., 477, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, August 10, 1905.
TOWNSITES IN ALASKA-PARAGRAPH 13 OF REGULATIONS OF AUGUST
1, 1904, AMENDED.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington^ I). C, August 12, 1905.
Section 13 of the regulations concerning the manner of acquiring
title to townsites on public lands in the District of Alaska (33 L. D.,
163, 170) is hereby amended by inserting after the first paragraph
therein the following additional paragraph thereto, to-wit:
In addition to the method prescribed by the Rules of Practice for
taking depositions hereinbefore made applicable to town lot contests,
depositions of witnesses to be used in such contests may be taken in
the District of Alaska on notice, within the same time, under like
conditions, in the same manner and form, and before the same officers,
to be certified and transmitted to the trustee in like manner and form,
to be used in such contest cases with like effect, with all the privi-
leges and under all the restrictions, as provided in chapter sixty-
three of the act of June G, 11)00 (31 U. S. Stat., 321, 436) : and the
trustee is hereby clothed with all the power in issuing orders in
reference to taking such depositions and admitting them in evidence
in such contest cases, as is conferred by said chapter upon the court
or judge of the district court.
J. H. Fimple, Acting Commission* r.
Approved
:
Tiios. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
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mining claim-lode within placer—application for patent.
Jaw Bone Lode v. Damon Placer.
Whenever proceedings under an application for mineral patent have failed, hy
reason of a default incurable as to them, the application stands rejected,
but may, if not in itself or for any extrinsic reason fatally defective, be
made the instrument of renewed proceedings. It is not, however, in the
interval a pending application, and can be considered as renewed, and as
again taking effect, only as of the date proceedings under it are actively
resumed.
An application for patent embracing a lode within the limits of a placer claim
for which patent application is pending can not be permitted to proceed
beyond the point of filing in the absence of a determination by the land
department that the lode was known to exist at the date of the filing of the
placer application ; and the law does not contemplate a proceeding to that
end before the land department, or the acceptance by the letter of such
lode application, when an adverse suit against the placer applicant has
been begun by the lode claimant, during the pendency of which all proceed-
ings in that department must be stayed.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, August U, 1905. (F. H. B.)
May 23, 1895, the F. F. V. Placer and Mining Company filed appli-
cation for patent to the Damon placer mining claim, survey No.
9295, Pueblo, Colorado, land district. During the period of publica-
tion of notice thereof, which expired August 28, 1895, various adverse
claims were filed and suits commenced thereunder, which remained
pending for several years.
February 19, 1896, C. A. Johnson et al., claiming as owners of a
lode mining claim, called Jaw Bone, in conflict with the placer claim,
filed protest against the application, in which it was alleged, in sub-
stance and effect, that five hundred dollars, in labor or improvements,
had not been expended on the claim; that not to exceed two and a
half acres of the land embraced in the application is placer in char-
acter; that lodes or mineral deposits in place were known by the
placer locators to exist at the time of the location of the placer claim
;
and that, February 2, 1896, protestants discovered a vein or lode
within the placer limits and made lode location thereon.
A hearing followed, at which the several parties appeared and
submitted testimony. In due course the local officers returned their
joint finding, substantially, (1) that the land embraced in the Damon
application is placer in character; (2) that it has not been shown that
any lodes were known to exist in the ground at the date of the placer
patent application; and (3) that it is shown that more than $500, in
labor and improvements, were expended on the claim prior to August
28, 1895 : wherefore, the protest was dismissed.
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Upon appeal by protestants, your office, by decision of May L5,
1903, sustained the findings and action of the local officers; and pro-
tectants thereupon appealed to the Department.
By decision of January 16, 1004 (unreported), the Department,
affirming your office decision in other respects, found from the evi-
dence submitted at the hearing that the statutory requirement of an
expenditure of $500, in labor or improvements, prior to the expira-
tion of the period of publication of notice of the placer patent appli-
cation, had not been satisfied, and reversed the decision of your office
to that extent, " without prejudice to the right of the " placer " claim-
ant to commence patent proceedings anew, if it so desires."
March 7, 1904 (decision unreported), the Department denied mo-
tion for review of its decision, and declined to pass upon a request
preferred in connection with the motion that, should the latter be de-
nied, the applicant company be permitted to publish and post new
notices of its pending application, without filing new application,
and to submit in that connection further showing of compliance with
the law in the matter of expenditures.
March 15, 1904, your office formally notified the local officers that,
pursuant to the departmental decisions, the application for placer
patent was " accordingly canceled."
By copies of papers transmitted to the Department December 9,
1901, by resident counsel for protestants, it was disclosed that, fol-
lowing the denial of the motion for review, as above, resident coun-
sel for the placer claimant, under his construction of the expres-
sion " pending application," used in that decision with reference to
the request preferred in connection with the motion for review, and
without notice to protestants, filed in your office a " motion to return
application papers to local land office, and for leave to republish notice
thereof," which he urged as sanctioned by the Department's expres-
sion. Upon receipt and consideration of the motion, it also appears,
your office had, on April 6, 1904, revoked "the cancellation of said
mineral application " and authorized the republication and reposting
of notice thereof, citing the case of Highland Marie and Manilla
Lode Mining (Maims (31 L. D., 37, 39) as authority for Mich new
notice. Against that action, as in disregard of the judgment ren-
dered by the Department, and as prejudicial "to the rights of the
contestants in and to their known lodes within the limits of the
placer," they protested, and asked "thai instructions be given t<>
prevent any action under said decision/' Denying, by unreported
decision of December 30, L904, this request, which in effect, equally
witli the earlier request of the placer claimant in connection with
its motion for review, raised the question of the effect to be accorded
the placer application under which proceedings had been renewed.
and regarding it as an improper time and occasion f<»r. and therefore
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avoiding, any expression of opinion in that behalf, the Department
added
:
However, the lode claimants are not hereby precluded from pressing their
asserted rights before the land department in an appropriate manner, bringing
forward all the facts and circumstances upon which they rely and thus raising
an issue which may be determined after all those concerned have had full oppor-
tunity to be heard.
January 7, 1905, counsel for the lode claimants presented to your
office a formal request that the order (April 6, 1904) reinstating the
rejected placer application and authorizing republication and repost-
ing of notice thereof be vacated, and urged that the departmental
refusal to instruct to that effect proceeded upon the ground that " the
action to bring about a correction of the erroneous decision of your
office should not have been commenced in the Department." In oppo-
sition, it was stated on behalf of the placer claimant that new notice
of the application in question had already been given, during the
period of publication of which an adverse claim had been filed and
the jurisdiction of the land department in the premises thus tem-
porarily suspended.
By decision of January 31, 1905, your office denied the request for
vacation of its order of April G, 1904, saying
:
The records of this office show that on June 6, 1904, Thera II. Satterlee et al.,
as owners of the Jaw Bone lode (presumably the same Jaw Bone lode claimed
by Johnson et al. and concerning which testimony was submitted at the original
hearing in this case) filed adverse claim No. 2158 against the Damon placer.
It would appear therefrom that the owners of said Jaw Bone lode have asserted
their adverse claim in the manner prescribed by statute and that all proceedings
in the land department concerning said application other than filing proof of
publication, posting, etc., must be stayed to await the termination of said
adverse.
In the names of Johnson et al., the former protestants and then
lode owners, in whose names the proceedings on behalf of the lode
claim and above detailed had been conducted, an appeal from that
decision has been taken to the Department. These parties had, how-
ever, it would appear, a considerable time prior thereto been suc-
ceeded in interest by Thera H. Satterlee and two others; but as the
appeal may be effectually disposed of on another ground, the cessa-
tion of appellants' interest need not be here considered but merely
noted in explanation of the proceedings hereinafter mentioned.
It also appears that in the meantime, during the period of repub-
lication of notice of the Damon application for patent, and on June 6,
1904, Satterlee et al., as the then claimants of the Jaw Bone lode
claim, filed in the local office their adverse claim and seasonably
commenced suit thereunder.
December 16, 1904, the adverse claimants also filed in the local office
their application for patent to the Jaw Bone claim. This applica-
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tion the local officers rejected on the same day. because of its conflict
with the placer application and also because of the pendency of the
adverse suit involving the ground thus in conflict between the two
claims. From this action the lode claimants appealed to your office,
upon the ground, in substance and effect, that it was error to reject
their application because of conflict with a placer application which
had been "duly canceled on a judgment of the Secretary of the
Interior," and to hold that because an adverse claim had been filed
as against the "erroneously pending application" and suit com-
menced thereon, all proceedings before the land department must be
stayed.
By decision of February 23, 1905, your office sustained the action
of the local officers, for reasons substantially as follows: Thai by it
the placer application in question had been reinstated and permission
given for republication and reposting of notice, and submission of
proofs thereunder; that an application for lode patent, in conflict
with a pending application for placer patent, can not be allowed to
proceed in the absence of a determination by the land department or
a court of competent jurisdiction that the lode was known to exist at
the date the placer application was filed, and no such determination
had been had in the present case; that it appears from the record that
these lode claimants had seasonably filed their adverse claim as
against the placer application and instituted suit thereon in a court
of competent jurisdiction; that if claimants of lodes within placer
limits elect to file adverse claims, pursuant to section 2326, Revised
Statutes, and submit their claims to adjudication by the court, the
law does not contemplate that they may at the same time assert
before the land department their claims of rights under the general
exception and reservation created by section 2333, Revised Statutes:
and that, haying elected to institute adverse proceedings, and until
the final determination thereof, these lode claimants are precluded
from prosecuting further proceedings before the land department.
From this decision, also, the lode claimants have appealed to the
Department. Their assignments of error are found, upon analysis,
to amount practically to those set out in their appeal to your office.
Although the later of the appeals taken here is broader in its scope,
each is closely related to the other in that it challenges the action of
your office in reinstating the rejected application for placer patent
and authorizing republication and reposting of notice thereof. The
effect of that action determined, the situation will be found to be
relieved of difficulty.
It is true that departmental decision of January L6, L904, supra,
held the original placer patent proceeding- to have failed, by reason
of a default which could not be cured under those proceedings; and
the expressed recognition of the right of the applicant " to commence
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patent proceedings anew " implied the course necessary to be pursued
to secure the desired patent. The application for patent being the
means whereby the orderly course of the patent proceedings proper
is actively entered upon before the local office, the failure of those
proceedings is the failure of the application, which necessarily stands
rejected. Therefore, the nature of the default considered, the placer
applicant here was obliged to retrace its steps, and renew its appli-
cation for patent. To have required, however, the filing of a new
formal instrument for that purpose, a duplicate of the original " ap-
plication " save as to its date, would have been uselessly to encumber
the record. In the case cited by your office (Highland Marie and
Manilla Lode Mining Claims, supra) the Department authorized the
renewal of patent proceedings, following a default like the present,
under a formal application for patent already on file. It was not
there held, however, and it is not to be understood, that in that or
the present, or in any such, case the application took, or could take,
effect as of the date originally filed. Once rejected, it can again take
effect only as of the date it is renewed. In the interval, though
present in the files, it can not be considered a " pending application,"
despite any inadvertent expression to the contrary, and constitutes no
barrier to an application by another within the meaning of paragraph
44 of the mining regulations (31 L. D., 474, 482). Stemmons et al.
v. Hess (32 L. D., 220). It is renewed, and again becomes effective,
only when proceedings under it are actively renewed. As this case
conspicuously illustrates, it is not within the contemplation of the law
that an application for placer patent, proceedings under which have
failed and are subsequently renewed, is to be treated as continuously
of effect from the date on which it was originally filed, and as having
fixed that as the date relative to which the question of the known
existence of lodes within the placer limits is to be determined. If
for no other reason, the contrary construction should be rejected as
tending to invite the institution of defective patent proceedings, and
upon their failure the dilatory renewal thereof, the application thus
continuing to stand as a barrier to the acquisition by others of such
rights as they might otherwise enjoy.
An application for mineral patent which has thus been rejected
may, then, unless in itself or for any extrinsic reason fatally defect-
ive, be made the instrument of renewed patent proceedings. In
any such case, however, it must be treated as re-filed (and should be
so endorsed by the register), and as again taking effect, as of the
date formal application is made to that officer for republication of
notice thereof, which must in all cases be promptly had. Where in
any case that date can not afterwards be ascertained the application
must of necessity be held to have taken renewed effect as of the date
of the first publication of the new notice.
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In view of the foregoing it follows that the action of your office
in reinstating the placer application and authorizing republication
and reposting of notice thereof, was not and could not have been
prejudicial to any rights of the lode claimants in the premises. By
way of emphasis of this it appears, by a certificate of the clerk of the
district court of Teller county, Colorado, that since these appeals
were taken the jury, sitting in the before-mentioned adverse suit
between the parties here, found the issues joined therein for the lode
claimants and that they "are entitled to the possession and occu-
pancy of all the ground in conflict between the Jaw Bone lode
mining claim and the Damon placer mining claim," and that judg-
ment has been entered accordingly. If the facts were presented to
the court as they have been presented here, the court must necessarily
have taken the view hereinabove expressed.
So far as the appeal from your office decision of February 23,
L905, questions the reinstatement of the placer application, it is fully
answered by what has been said above. In addition it may he said
that your office committed no error in rejecting the application for
lode patent, because of the pendency of the adverse suit between the
parties. Although in such a case as this the remedies open to the
lode claimant present possibilities of difference in scope, in that under
an adverse suit pursuant to section 2326, Revised Statutes, his claim
may be sustained in his behalf to its full extent as located, whilst in
a proceeding before the land department, and in reliance upon the
reservation under section 2333, there can thereby be awarded to him
only his lode and twenty-five feet of territory on each side of its
center ( Daphne Lode Claim, 32 L. D., 513), the essential issue of the
latter proceeding, the known existence of the lode, is presumed to he
raised in the former, as it must be if the case is truly presented, and
can he fully determined. It is clear that an application for patent
embracing a lode within the limits of a placer claim for which patent
application is pending can not be permitted to proceed beyond tin-
point of filing in the absence of a determination by the land depart
ment that the lode was known to exist at the date of the filing of the
placer application (in this case, the date the latter was renewed);
and the law does not contemplate a proceeding to that end before the
land department, or the acceptance by the latter of such lode appli-
cation, when an adverse suit againsl the placer applicant has been
begun by the lode claimant, pending final determination of which.
under the stay commanded by the statute (Sec. 2326, R. S.). the ad-
verse claimant could not be permitted to prosecute independent
patent proceedings as to the land in controversy ( Long John Lode
(Maim, 30 L. I)., 298).
The decisions of your office from which the pending appeal- are
taken are affirmed;
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arid land-payment for use of water-act of june 17, 1903.
Instructions.
There is nothing in the act of June 17, 1902, to prohibit a graduated scale of the
annual payments required of users of water from reclamation projects con-
structed under said act, and in all cases where it is deemed advisable this
plan of payment may be adopted.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Director of the Geological Survey,
(F. L. C.) August 16, 1905. (E. F. B.)
In your letter of June 6, 1905, you enclose a letter from the Malheur
Water Users Association, stating that if the users of water within
the Malheur project are required to pay the contemplated cost of
construction, forty dollars per acre, in ten equal annual payments,
the cost of the project will be prohibitive. They ask that a gradu-
ated payment of one dollar for the first year, two dollars for the
second year, three dollars for the third year, four dollars for the
fourth year, and five dollars per annum for the remaining six years,
be permitted.
You state that the Board of Engineers recommend that the first
annual payment be small and that successive payments increase grad-
ually, in which you concur, for the reason that the conditions for
developing the project would be best subserved by such an arrange-
ment.
There is nothing in the act to prohibit a graduated scale of pay-
ments, and in all such cases where it is advisable to do so, it will be
adopted.
TIMBER CUTTING-SMELTING PURPOSES-SECTION 8, ACT OF MARCH 3,
1891.
Bert D. White.
The provisions of section 8 of the act of March 3, 1891, as amended by act of
the same date, conferring upon the residents of certain States and Terri-
tories authority to cut timber on the public lands for agricultural, mining,
manufacturing or domestic purposes, contemplate the cutting and use of
timber for smelting purposes.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
August 18, 1905. (E.F.B.)
A letter from the Commissioner of the General Land Office of July
27, 1905, resubmitting an application by Bert D. White for permit to
cut lumber on the public lands under authority of section 8 of the
act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), has been referred to me for
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opinion as to whether or not the application can be granted as to
that portion of the timber desired for smelting purposes.
Said section as amended (26 Stat., L093) provides that in Montana
and other States and Territories named therein—
in any criminal prosecution or civil action by the United States for a trespass
upon such public timber lands or to recover timber or lumber cul thereon, it
shall be a defense if the defendant shall show that the said timber was so cut
or removed from the timber lands for use in such State or Territory by a resi-
dent thereof, for agricultural, mining, manufacturing or domestic purposes
under rules and regulations made and prescribed by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and has not been transported out of the same; hut nothing herein con-
tained shall operate to enlarge the rights of any railway company to cut timber
on the public domain: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may make
suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act. ami lie
may designate the sections or tracts of land where timber may be cut, and it
shall not be lawful to cut or remove any timber except as may be prescribed by
such rules and regulations; but this act shall not operate to repeal the act of
June third, eighteen hundred and seventy eight, providing for cutting of timber
on mineral lands.
The regulations prescribed by the Secretary for carrying into effect
the provisions of the act declare that its operation shall he confined
to non-mineral lands, as the act specifically provides that it shall not
operate as a repeal of the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat.. 88), " which
makes provision in said States and Territories for the free cutting of
timber on the public lands that are known to be of a strictly mineral
character for the uses named in said act."
In the instructions governing the granting of permits for the cut-
ting of timber from the mineral lands under the act of June 3, 1878
(29 L. I)., 571), " no timber is permitted to be used for smelting pur-
poses, smelting being a separate and distinct industry from that of
mining."
In the instructions for carrying into effect the provisions of the act
of March 3, 1891 (29 L. D., 572), the uses for which timber may be
taken by settlers and other residents of the State or Territory ate
defined in section 3 to be "strictly for their own use for firewood,
fencing, building; or other agricultural, mining, manufacturing or
domestic purposes," and in section 5 it is stated that " the u>es speci-
fied in section 3 .... constitute the only purposes for which
timber may be taken from the public lands in said States and Territo-
ries, under this act."
While there is no specific prohibition against the use of timber for
smelting purposes in the instructions last referred to, the two acts
have been administered by the land department as conferring the
same benefits and privileges and containing the same Limitations and
restrictions as to use, differing only in this, that one is confined to
mineral, and the other to non-mineral, lands, hence by necessary im-
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plication the regulations of the Department forbid the taking of tim-
ber from non-mineral lands for smelting purposes.
The question as to whether a permit can be given for the taking and
use of timber from non-mineral lands under authority of the act
of March 3, 1891, is submitted for opinion in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court in United States v. United Verde Copper Co.
(196 U. S., 207), which holds that smelting is a domestic industry
contemplated by the terms of the act of June 3, 1878, and that the
Secretary of the Interior cannot, by regulation, abridge the per-
mission given by Congress so as to deprive a domestic industry from
the use of timber as authorized by said act.
The decision involved a construction of the act of June 3, 1878,
authorizing the free use of timber from mineral lands, and as the
Department has construed and administered the acts as having
practically the same scope and purpose, and containing the same
limitations and restrictions, that decision would seem to control as to
this application, unless there is a material distinction in the two acts.
In the act of June 3, 1878, the language is " for building, agricul-
tural, mining, or other domestic purposes," whereas the language in
the act of March 3, 1891, is for agricultural, mining, manufacturing,
or domestic purposes,'* the word " other " being omitted in the later
act.
This omission would seem to be of minor importance, especially in
view of the fact that the two acts have been construed as having the
same purpose, differing only as to the character of the lands from
which the timber may be taken, were it not for the fact that the court
gave to the word " other " material weight as an important factor
in the interpretation of the statute.
After observing that the permission given by the statute is not
confined to the special enumeration of industries, but extends to
" other domestic purposes," the court says
—
Counsel for the Government recognizes this, and substitutes for " domestic "
the word " household," and contends that the word " other " should be treated
as an intruder and eliminated from the statute, and making the latter read that
timber may be felled for " building, agricultural, mining or domestic purposes."
But we are not permitted to take such liberty with the statute, if " domestic "
has a meaning consistent with the intentional use of the word " other." It has
such meaning. It may relate, it is true, to the household. But, keeping its idea
of locality, it may relate to a broader entity than the household. We may
properly and accurately speak of domestic manufactures, meaning not those of
the house but those of a county, state or nation, according to the object in con-
templation. So in the state the word " domestic " applies to the locality to
which the statute is directed, and gives permission to the industries there prac-
ticed to use the public timber. This definition of " domestic " gives the word an
apt and sensible meaning, and we must regard the association of the word
" other " with it as designed, not as accidental,
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So that although smelting may be a separate industry from mining,
it is not deprived of the license given by the statute, as the general
clause ,w other domestic purposes " is as much a grant of permission to
the industries designated by it to use timber as though they had been
especially enumerated, and their rights are as inviolable as the rights
of the industries which are enumerated."
The im poll ant significance given by the majority of the court to
the word ••other." as used in the statute, is further illustrated by the
views expressed in the dissenting opinion that the word "other" can
not be used as an enlargement of the word ••domestic," "and thai it
should be confined, as are the preceding words, to timber used for
ether analogous structural purposes and for household consumption
—
in short, to other purposes domestic in their character."
Construing the two acts in the light of that decision alone, the
omission of the word "other" from the act of March 3, 1891, must
be regarded "as designed, not as accidental," and that it was the
intention of the legislature to limit the free use of timber taken from
non-mineral public lands, to the industries specifically enumerated
and for household consumption, or uses strictly domestic in their
character, as the absence of the enlarging word "other" associated
with the word " domestic " limits the operation of the general clause.
Bui the several acts authorizing the free use of timber from the
public lands, having application respectively to particular localities or
the character of the lands, have the same general scope, purpose and
limitation and must be construed in pari materia.
Substantially the same right that is given by the act of March 3,
1891, to the free use of timber from the unreserved public lands for
domestic purposes, is by the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11,36),
extended to forest reservations. That act provides
—
The Secretary of the Interior may permit, under regulations to be prescribed
by him, the use of timber and stone round upon such reservations, free of charge,
by bona fide settlers* minors, residents and prospectors for minerals, for fire
wood, fencing, buildings, mining, prospecting, and other domestic purposes, as
may be needed by such persons for such purposes; such timber to be used in
the State or Territory, respectively, Where such reservation may he located.
The act of July 1. L898 (30 Stat.. 597,618), authorizes the Secre-
tary of the Interior
—
to granl permits under the provisions of the 8th section of the act March .".. 1891,
to citizens of Idaho and Wyoming to cut timber in the State of Wyoming wesl
of the Continental Divide on the Snake River and its tributaries to the boundary
line of Idaho, for agricultural, mining, or other domestic purpose-, and i"
remove the timber so cut to the State of Idaho.
The question as to whether this act authorized the cutting and
removal of timber from foresl reservations within the locality nieii-
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tioned by the act, was considered by the Department in its letter of
September 19, 1902 (31 L. D., 412-415), and it was held that " these
several acts must be construed in pari materia and such effect must
be given to the act of June 4, 1897, as if the act of July 1, 1898, was
in terms incorporated therein."
In both of these acts, which merely extended the provisions of
the section of the act of March 3, 1891, to certain reservations and
enlarged the territory from which certain citizens could procure tim-
ber for the uses and purposes contemplated by said act, the word
" other " occurs, which the court, in the case cited, construed as en-
larging the operation of the term " domestic " as associated in the
general clause.
Giving to the words " or other domestic purposes," as they occur in
the one case, " and other domestic purposes," as they occur in the
other, the same significance and operation that was given to those
words by the court in the interpretation of the act of June 3, 1878,
it is manifest that the omission of the word " other " from the act
of March 3, 1891, was not intended to make any distinction in the
different acts as to the purposes for which the free use of timber
upon the public lands may be permitted.
Considering that it was not intended by the act of June 4, 1897,
and July 1, 1898, to extend the uses for which timber may be taken
beyond that contemplated by the act of March 3, 1891, and that any
domestic industry having relation to the industries specifically enu-
merated, may come within the meaning of the general clause " other
domestic purposes," as held by the court in the case cited in constru-
ing the act of June 3, 1878, I am of the opinion that the permit in
this case may be granted as to that portion of the timber desired for
smelting purposes.
Approved :
Thos. Ryan,
Acting Secretary.
practice—reopening oe closed case—supervisory power.
Doll v. Jones.
After a case involving conflicting claims to a tract of public land has been
closed in the land department, the Secretary of the Interior, in the exercise
of his supervisory power, will, upon reopening the case for further consid-
eration, be governed by the same rule, in determining the rights of the
parties, as is observed by the courts in a proceeding to charge the holder
of a patent from the United States as trustee ; that is, it must not only be
shown that the party to whom the land has been awarded is not entitled
to it, but that the party attacking his claim has the better right thereto,
and that if the law had been properly administered, the land would have
been awarded to him.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, August 19, 1905. < K. V. B.)
This petition is filed by Osceola Jones praying for the exercise of
the supervisory authority of the Secretary of the Interior in the
matter of his homes! end entry, made October 8, L901, for the X\Y. \.
Sec. 3, T. ('» X.. R. 15 W., Elreno, Oklahoma, which was held for can-
cellation by decision of your office of August 25, 1904, for conflict
with the application of John Doll to make homestead entry of said
tract, and was finally canceled November 26, L904. The petition has
been served upon John Doll, who has filed his answer thereto, and it
will therefore be considered upon the facts alleged, which are either
not denied or are admitted in the answer.
John Doll filed a sailor's declaratory statement for a trad of land
in the territory opened to settlement and entry by the proclamation
of the President of July 4. 1901, and on September 4. L901, tendered
a relinquishment of his filing for said land, and applied to make
another declaratory statement to embrace the land in controversy
which is also within the same territory. I lis application was trans-
mitted to the Department, and by decision of September 30, 1001
(not reported), it was held that Doll was not entitled to file a sail-
or's declaratory statement, as his naval service covered only a period
of six weeks, hut in view of the erroneous action of the local officers
in allowing him to file such statement, and of the peculiar circum-
stances disclosed by the record, it was held that his right to make
homestead entry under his drawing should not he lost. It was
ordered that his relinquishment of the then existing filing be accepted
and that upon presenting formal application to enter the land applied
for and showing his qualification, his application he accepted subject
to any prior adverse claim.
October 8, L901, Osceola Jones was allowed to make homestead
entry of the tract in question "subject to John Doll's application to
make a second S. I). S."
Subsequent to Jones's entry, the letter of the Department was
received at the local office with instructions to allow Doll to file
formal application to make homestead entry of the tract, which he
did within the time required. His application was rejected by the
local officers because of the entry of Jones and was transmitted t<>
your office December II. L901. Jones was then required to -how
cause why his entry should not he cancelled for conflict with the
application of Doll, to which he responded by alleging that Doll was
not qualified to file a sailor's declaratory statement : that lie \\ a - spec
ulating on his second filing, Inning listed it for sale; and thai re
spondent was the prior settler. Inning mad'' valuable improvements
on the land in which he was living with his family. He asked for
a hearing.
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The matter was referred to a special agent of your office to exam-
ine the land originally applied for by Doll and also the land in
controversy. He reported that the tract first selected by Doll was
a valuable claim ; that Doll had offered to sell the land embraced in
his second application and had not acted in good faith ; that Jones
had resided on the land with his wife and children and in law and
equity has the better right to the claim. After the report of the
special agent was received you ordered a hearing, which was had
September 8, 1903.
The land having been entered by Jones, the burden of proof was
upon Doll, who offered testimony to the effect that the land he first
applied for was worthless; that he never offered to sell his relinquish-
ment of the second tract; and stated that he listed the land for sale
" under pretensions and with reason " which he explained as follows
:
It was in my mind that after I learned that Jones's filing was on record as a
subject for filing, that it was put on for the sole purpose of trying to defraud me
out of my homestead right wherein I tried to learn or discover the true facts
of the case some way or other. Finally I dropped it altogether and paid no
more attention to it.
Jones demurred to the evidence and moved to dismiss the contest,
substantially upon the following grounds: (1) That the evidence does
not show that Doll was entitled to make a second filing; (2) because
the evidence does not warrant the cancellation of Jones's entry, but
on the contrary shows that it should remain intact; and (3) that Doll
was not entitled to file a sailor's declaratory statement. The local
officers sustained the motion and dismissed the contest.
When the case came before your office on the appeal of Doll you
held that the question as to the right of Doll to make a sailor's declar-
atory statement was determined by the decision of the Department
of September 30, 1901, which allowed him to make homestead entry
of the land applied for, subject to any prior adverse right; that
there was no adverse claim until October 8, 1901, when Jones made
entry of the tract subject to the prior application of Doll to file his
sailor's declaratory statement. You found that Doll had not offered
the tract for sale and that as he had not been allowed to make entry
he was not bound to improve the land. You reversed the local offi-
cers, but instead of remanding the case to allow Jones to submit his
testimony, his entry was held for cancellation, subject to the right
of appeal, which he failed to file in time, and the entry was can-
celled November 26, 1904.
Subsequently, Jones filed his appeal, which you refused to trans-
mit, and the Department, by decision of January 19, 1905 (not
reported), denied his petition for certiorari because of his failure to
file a copy of the decision of your office with his petition and because
it did not present such a case as to invoke the supervisory power of
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the Secretary. The case was finally closed by your office February
2, 1905.
The principal around upon which the claim of Jones rests is that
the entire record upon its face shows that Jones's entry was subsist-
ing as a valid adverse claim at the date when Doll made his formal
application to make homestead entry of the tract and that said right
has not by any act of Jones been forfeited or subjected to the right
or claim of Doll.
A determination of that question involves a construction of the
decision of the Department of September 30, 1901, upon the applica-
tion of Doll to make a second sailor's declaratory statement to
embrace the land in controversy. It held that Doll was not entitled
to file a sailor's declaratory statement, but in view of the erroneous
action of the local officers in allowing him to make such filing, and of
the circumstances disclosed by the record, referring evidently to
Doll's allegation as to the character of the land first filed upon, it
was determined that he should not be held to have lost his right to
make homestead entry under his drawing, and the local officers were
thereupon directed to accept his relinquishment of his then existing
filing and to allow him to make homestead entry of the tract em-
braced in his second application upon presenting a formal applica-
tion therefor, subject to any prior valid adverse claim.
When Doll presented his formal application to make homestead
entry of the land November 15, 1901. it was rejected by the local
officers because it conflicted with Jones's entry, which had been
allowed October 8, 1001, " subject to John Doll's application to make
a second S. I). S."
Your office in reversing their action construed the decision of the
Department to mean that the application of Doll to make homestead
entry related back to the filing of the second sailor's declaratory state-
ment and defeated the intervening claim of Jones.
In view of the fact that Doll had no right to file a sailor's declara-
tory statement, which was directly decided by the Department, and
initiated no right whatever by such filing, it is an erroneous construc-
tion to hold that the Department intended to recognize such filing
as conferring an incipient or initial right to which the formal appli-
cation to make homestead entry would relate as of that date, and cut
<>ll all intervening claims, unless such intention were clearly or nec-
essarily implied. When the Department said that "he should not be
held to have lost his right to make homestead entry under the draw
ing." it meant that his right to make entry within the preferred
period of sixty days allowed to regular applicants under their draw-
ings before the lands were opened to entry by the public generally
should not be lost by reason of his effort to obtain lands under a right
(hat he did not possess. As that period might expire before he could
86 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
be served with notice of the decision, he was allowed additional time
(thirty days after notice) in which to make formal homestead appli-
cation for the land, " subject to any prior valid adverse claim/ 1 His
application was not presented until after the sixty days' period had
expired, and when presented the land had been entered by Jones, sub-
ject only to whatever right Doll had under his second sailor's declara-
tory statement. As he acquired no right under that declaratory state-
ment, Jones's entry constituted a " prior valid adverse claim," which
was subsisting when Doll's relinquishment of his former filing was
accepted and his formal application to make entry of the tract was
tendered, so that the only benefit conferred by the decision of the
Department was the restoration of his homestead privilege. It was
not intended that such privilege when formally exercised should
relate back to the filing of the declaratory statement so as to validate
that filing as the initial claim of Doll to the tract. If such had been
the purpose of the Department, or if it had intended to recognize any
right in Doll under such filing, it would have allowed him to make
entry of the tract applied for subject only to " any prior valid adverse
claim " existing at the date of such filing. The fact that it did not
so protect his " formal application " to make entry thereof is evidence
that it did not intend to recognize any right in Doll under such filing.
In your decision of August 5, 1904, you stated that the point raised
by Jones, " that Doll had no right to make a soldier's or sailor's
declaratory statement, was fully passed upon by the Department
September 30, 1901, and is res adjudicata" That is true, but the
decision was not favorable to Doll. On the contrary, it was directly
adverse to him upon that contention and was in favor of the conten-
tion of Jones before the local officers.
It is true in this case Jones failed to appeal from the decision of
your office within the time allowed by the rules, and his petition for
certiorari was dismissed because of a technical non-compliance with
a rule of practice. For that reason the Department has not consid-
ered any of the charges as to the failure of Doll to comply with the
law, and the alleged errors and irregularities in the proceedings in
failing to remand the case to the local officers to allow Jones to sub-
mit his testimony, and in deciding the issue alone upon the testimony
submitted by Doll.
If the only question presented by this petition were the failure of
Doll to comply with the law, it would not be entertained. Jones's
claim rests not upon the default of Doll, but upon a superior, prior
right to the land which has been denied him by an erroneous inter-
pretation of the decision of the Department, and the mere failure to
observe and comply with rules of procedure should not bar his right
to relief.
Where a party seeks to charge the holder of a patent from the
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United States as trustee, he must not only show thai the patentee is
not entitled to the land, but that the claimant has the better right to
the land, and that if the law had been properly administered, the
title would have been awarded to him. Bohall v. Dilla (111 \\ S.,
17); Sparks v. Pierce (115 U. S., 408); Lee v. Johnson (116 U.
S.,48).
The same rule will ordinarily control the decision of the Secretary
of the Interior in determining as to the rights of parties to a tract
of public land at any time before the issuance of the patent, where
the case has been closed. In such cases he will exercise the supervis-
ory power conferred by law to see that justice i> done to all parties,
and that the public land is disposed of only to the party entitled to
it. Knight v. Land Association (142 U. S., 161).
Your decision, so far as it disregarded the prior right of done- by
reason of his existing entry, which constituted a valid adverse claim
to the land at the date of Doll's application to make homestead entry
thereof, was error, and upon that ground it is reversed.
Inasmuch as Jones's entry has been canceled and Doll has been
allowed to make entry of the tract, you will require him to show
cause why his entry should not be canceled and the entry of Jones
reinstated, and if he fail to show cause, upon sufficient ground other
than that herein decided adversely to him, within a time to be fixed
by your office, his entry will be canceled and the entry of Jones will
be reinstated.
HOMESTEAD ENTRIES IN NEBRASKA UNDER SECTION 3, ACT OF APRIL
28, 1904.
Circular.
Department of tin: Enterior,
General Land Office,
Washington, I>. ('.. August J I. 1905.
Registers <in<l Receivers,
United states Land Offices, Nebraska.
Gentlemen: The circular of instructions, dated May 31, L904 (32
I,. I)., 670), under the act of April 28, L904 (33 Stat.. 547), known
as the Kinkaid Act. which permits entries of certain lands in
Nebraska to embrace 640 acres, provides as follows with regard to
additional entries under the first proviso to section 3 of the act :
By the first proviso of section 3, any person who has made ;i homestead
entry prior to his application tor entry under this not. and has resided upon
and cultivated the same for the period required by law. will he allowed to make
an additional entry for a quantity of land, which added to the area of the land
embraced in the former entry shall not exceed 640 acres, bu1 residence and culti-
vation of the additional hind will he required to he made and proved as iii ordi-
nary homestead entries.
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On July 28, 1905, in the David H. Briggs case (34 L. D., 60), the
Acting Secretary of the Interior held that said paragraph
—
wherein it is declared with reference to the former homestead entry of an appli-
cant under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), "and has resided upon and
cultivated the same for the period required by law," prescribes a limitation not
warranted by the purview of said act. The only provision in the first proviso
to section 3 of said act, to which said paragraph is directed, is that the tract
applied for shall not, with the tract embraced in the former entry, exceed six
hundred and forty acres. This being true, the regulation embodied in the fore-
going quotation will no longer be followed.
In view thereof, said paragraph of the instructions is amended to
read as follows:
By the first proviso of section 3, any person who made a home-
stead entry prior to his application for entry under this act, will be
allowed to make an additional entry for a quantity of land which,
added to the area of the land embraced in the former entry, shall not
exceed 640 acres, but residence and cultivation of the additional land
will be required to be made and proved as in ordinary homestead
entries.
Very respectfully, J. H. Fimple,
Acting Commissioner.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
FOREST RESERVE-SEJLECTION UNDER ACT OF MARCH 2, 1899-ACT OF
JUNE 6, 1900.
Comstock v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
The provision of the act of June 6, 1900, which declares that subsequently to
October 1, 1900, " all selections of land made in lieu of a tract covered by
an unperfected bona fide claim, or by a patent, included within a public
forest reservation, : . . . shall be confined to vacant surveyed non-mineral
public lands which are subject to homestead entry." applies only to selec-
tions made under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897, and has no
application to selections made by the Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1899.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, August M, 1905. (E. J. II.)
The above entitled case is before the Department upon the appeal
of Charles L. Comstock from your office decision of February 11,
1905, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting his home-
stead application, tendered February 24, 1904, for the SW. \ of
NW. i and NW. J of SW. J of Sec. 29, and the SE. J of N.E. j
and NE. \ of SE. J of Sec. 30, T. 39 N., R. 5 E., Lewiston, Idaho,
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land district, for conflict with the prior selection thereof by the
Northern Pacific Railway Company, in lieu of land relinquished
within the Limits of the Pacific Forest Reserve, under the act of
March 2, L899 (30 Stat., 993).
It appears that the relinquishment by the railway company of its
lands within the limits of said forest reserve, was accepted by
departmental letter. of July 26, 1S (.) (.), in which it was said that the
railway company was authorized to select other lands in lien thereof
and that acting thereon the company, on April 24, 1901, prior to
survey, made selection of the above described tracts, with others, per
list No. 30.
February 24, U>04. the township plat of survey was hied in the
local office and on the same day Comstock tendered the homestead
application in question, alleging settlement on the land April 19,
L902. I lis application was rejected for conflict with the railway
selection, and he appealed.
March 21, 1904, the railway company filed a new list of selections,
embracing the tracts in question, describing the same according to
the plat of survey, as required by said act of 1899.
The questions at issue in this case were mainly considered in the
case of Ferguson /'. Northern Pacific -Railway Company (33 L. D.,
634), wherein departmental decision was rendered in favor of the
railway company. The further claim is, however, made in this case
that under the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat., 014), selections of land
in lieu of land relinquished within the limits of a forest reserve
could, after October 1, 1900. only be made from surveyed land, and
in support thereof paragraph 4 of Circular of Instructions of July
7. L902 (31 L. I).. 372). is cited.
The act of June 6, 1900, supra, declares
—
that all selections of land made in lieu of a tract covered by an unperfected
bona fide claim, or by a patent, included within a public forest reservation, as
provided in the ad of June 4, 1807 shall be confined to vacant sur-
veyed non-mineral public lands which are subject to homestead entry, not ex-
ceeding in area the tract covered by such claim or patent: Provided, That
ootbing herein contained shall be construed to affect the rights of those who.
previous to October 1. 1900, shall have delivered to the United States deeds for
lands within foresl reservations and make application for specific tracts of
lands in lieu thereof.
It will l)e noted that by the terms of said act. it applies only to
selections made under the provisions of the act of June I. L897 (30
Stat.. 3C>), and not to those made under the act of March 2. 1899, in
question. The latter is a special act which dedicated and set apart a
portion of the lands in the Pacific Forest Reserve, in the State of
Washington, as a public park, to he known as the Mount Ranier
National Park, and made provision for the relinquishment by the
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Northern Pacific Railway Company of its lands therein, and for the
selection of other lands in lien thereof. Said railway company, there-
fore, was not confined in making selections after October 1, 1900,
under the act of March 2, 1899, to surveyed lands.
It is not claimed that Comstock made settlement on the land in
controversy until a year after the railway company's original selec-
tion thereof. Such settlement was, therefore, subject to the com-
pany's right to perfect its selection after survey, which it did by
filing a new list of selections, embracing said tracts, within the pre-
scribed period.
Your office decision is affirmed.
settlement—notice-timber land application.
Deuel v. Borseth.
Notice of a settlement claim, posted conspicuously on the land, is sufficient to
protect the claim against one who subsequently makes application for a
portion thereof under the timber and stone act, whether the timber-land
applicant has actual notice of the settlement claim or not, provided the
posted notice was of such character that it might have been seen by a
reasonable exercise of diligence.
Notice of a settlement claim, posted on a subdivision thereof outside of the
technical quarter-section on which the improvements are located, will pro-
tect the settler's claim to such subdivision as against the claim of one who
subsequently makes application therefor under the timber and stone act.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C) ' Office, August 23, 1905. (J. L. McC.)
Henry Borseth, on September 19, 1902, filed timber-land applica-
tion for the NE. i of the SW.-J of Sec. 3, T. 30 N., K. 15 W., Seattle
land district, Washington, and published notice of his intention to
make proof upon said entry on March 16, 1903.
On December 2, 1902, John N. Deuel filed protest against the allow-
ance of proof by Borseth, alleging that he had settled upon said land,
together with other land, described as the NW. J of the SE. ^, the
NW. \ of the SW. I and the SW. J of the NW. J of the same section,
on August 3, 1901, and that he was so residing at the time Borseth
made his filing.
Borseth offered proof as advertised, showing clearly that the land
was of the character that could properly be entered as timber-land.
A hearing on Deuel's protest was set for January 7, 1904. On
January 2, 1904, Borseth wrote to the local officers : " I will not be
at the land office, to the hearing on the protest against my timber-
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claim: I leave the matter for the land office to docido.*' In fact he
did not appear. Deuel did; and his attorney moved that default be
entered against Borseth, which was done. Testimony was submitted
by Deuel and several witnesses in his behalf.
As the result of said hearing, the local officers found that the
contestant had shown his superior right, by virtue of improvement,
cultivation, and residence, and recommended that Borseth's timber-
land application and the proof submitted thereunder be rejected.
Borseth appealed. Your office, on February 24. L905, rendered a
decision reversing the judgment of the local officers, and finding and
holding that the plaintiff had not made such a showing as to resi-
dence, improvements, and cultivation as would defeat the Borseth
claim under the timber-land law.
From this action counsel for the contestant has filed an appeal.
Before dealing with the questions raised by the appeal, it is indis-
pensable to a correct understanding of the case to set forth the stain-
of the several forty-acre tracts embraced in Deuel's homestead claim.
The tract in controversy—the XF. j of the SW. j of said Sec. li
—
was in no way encumbered prior to Borseth's application to enter
the same under the timber-land act.
The remaining tracts were covered by- the Olympia Forest Keserva-
tion, State of Washington, by proclamation of February 22. L897,
act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 34, 36). These three " forties," how-
ever, were eliminated from said reservation April 7, 1900; but. Inn-
ing been sold and patented, were reconveyed to the government.
The XW. 1 of the SF. J was reconveyed by Charles Wright, on
November 22, 1899, and lieu land selected, which selection was ap-
proved by your office April 20, 1904. On this date it became subject
to entry.
The NW. | of the SW. | and the SW. i of the NW. | were recon-
veyed by Jennie Y. Hayes, on January 22, 1900, and lieu land-
selected, which selections were approved May 23, 1903. On this date
they became subjed to entry.
Deuel alleges that he was residing upon and cultivating "said
lands" since August 3, 1901, with the intention of entering the same;
that he might at any time have made entry of the "' forty" here in
controversy, but by so doing would have exhausted his homestead
right ; and he points out that in case he is debarred from entering
said land in controversy the remainder of his claim will be left non-
contiguous, >o that the most he can enter would be eighty acre-.
The appeal alleges that it was error on the pari of your office, " not
to find that said Deuel was a homestead claimant to the land herein,
together with other land-, and at the time of the timber-land applica-
tion of Borseth was occupying, cultivating, and improving the same."
Here we strike an ambiguity: doe- "the same" refer to the fortj
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acres in controversy, or to that, "'together with other lands?" A
similar ambiguity appears in the finding of the local officers:
A careful consideration of the testimony herein submitted shows that, long
prior to the filing of the timber-land application of said Borseth, the homestead
claimant herein established an actual, bona fide residence on the land claimed
by him under the homestead laws—to wit, the NW. i of the SE. i, the N. \ of
the SW. h and the SW. i of the NW. i, of above said section.
There is abundant evidence to prove that there are improvements,
consisting of a house, etc., to the value of at- least a thousand dollars,
" on the land." But the evidence does not show on which of the
" forties " the house and other improvements are. It is certainly
not shown that any of them are upon the " forty " here in contro-
versy. Borseth's timber-land proof says there are no improvements
thereon.
The appeal alleges that notice of Deuel's claim had been given by
notices posted on the tract in controversy; and that his claim to the
land involved " was open and notorious, and known to said Borseth
at the time he made his timber-land application."
There is abundant evidence that notice of Deuel's claim was posted
conspicuously on the land in controversy. Witness Wischmeyer
testifies
:
There was a notice on the northwest corner of this disputed forty, on a hem-
lock tree, right close to the road or trail ; the hemlock tree was cut out, may be
five feet or more from the ground, and there was a paper notice on it : "I
hereby claim as a soldier's homestead." It was signed by Mr. Deuel, and by
Krull and Smith. It was written on the tree also. I have seen it a hundred
times, I guess Yes, you couldn't help seeing the notice, unless you would
look the other way. You have got to make a turn right there, at the creek,
and have got to cross the creek, and you can't help seeing it.
E. W. Shattuck's testimony- concludes as follows:
Q. Isn't it a matter of fact, Mr. Shattuck, that any one making a careful
examination of this especial forty must have seen Mr. Deuel's notice?—A.
Couldn't help it.
%
F. H. Krull's testimony runs thus
:
Q. As to the forty in dispute, on what part of it did Mr. Deuel post notice?
—
A. The northeast part, right in plain view of the county road; right oh the road.
Q. Did you witness that notice also?—A. Yes, sir.
Q. What kind of a tree was that notice put on?—A. It was about ten inches
in diameter, hewed off smooth on one side, and a notice tacked up there : and
also written on the wood itself with an indelible pencil.
Q. State whether or not that notice was in plain view of any one passing on
this county road or trail?—A. Yes, sir, it was.
Other witnesses testify to the same effect.
The testimony (as hereinbefore stated) fails to show on which par-
ticular forty Deuel's house and improvements were. If they had
been shown to be upon the NW. \ of the NW. \—in the same quarter-
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section with the forty in controversy—the question here in issue
might easily have been settled, inasmuch a> notice given by residence
and improvements upon one portion of a quarter-section extends to
the entire quarter-section as defined by the public survey. Bui in
view of the uncertainty upon this point, it becomes necessary to
inquire further.
While there is no positive testimony bringing home to Borseth
individually a knowledge that Deuel was claiming the forty acres in
controversy, there is a vwy strong probability that such was the
fact. Witness Byron testifies:
(l Did you ever have a talk with Mr. Borseth about his claim to this forty?
—
A. I had a talk with Mr. Burton, who located trim.
(j. Was it in reference to this particular forty?—A. In reference to this
forty: ho told me—Burton did—that he was going to get Borseth to Lake that
forty, if he could: he didn't want the old man in there next to him.
Q. Who did he mean by the old man?—A. Mr. Deuel.
Q. Mr. Byron, is it not the fact that Mr. Deuel's homestead claim to this
forty .... has been open, notorious, and well recognized by settlers in that
county since 1901?—A. It was, certainly; I think it is considered the best
residence in there.
This testimony does not prove conclusively that Borseth knew of
Doners claim, though it indicates that such was very probably the
fact. It will not be necessary, however, to bring such knowledge
home to Borseth with absolute certainty, in order to arrive at a con-
clusion.
In the case of Smith /'. Johnson et al. (17 L. D., 454). Smith made
application to enter the S. \ of the NE. j and the S. i of the MY. 1
of a certain section 7, in the Ashland land district. Wisconsin. His
application was denied because of Johnson's prior homestead entry
of the entire NW. \ of Sec. 7. Smith proved prior settlement on the
S.
J
of the XE. j. lie had made no settlement on the S. \ of the NW.
j. He proved, however, that he had placed written notices conspicu-
ously on said S. \ of the NW.
.[. Thereupon the Department held
(see syllabus) :
Notices defining the extent of a sett lenient claim, posted in conspicuous places
thereon, are sufficient to protect such claim as against subsequent settlers; and
it is immaterial in such case whether the later sett lei- has actual notice or not.
If the posted notices are of such character that they might have been seen by a
reasonable exercise of diligence.
The Department again held, in very clear and emphatic language,
in the case of Driscoll ei al. v. Doherty et al. (25 L. D., 420, syllabus) :
Notices defining the extent of a settlement claim, posted on subdivisions
thereof outside of the technical quarter section on which the improvements are
placed, will protect SUCh claim as against subsequent settlers.
The cases above quoted from (i. e., Smith /•. Johnson et <>'.. and
Driscoll t t nl. r. Doherty et a I.) are cited with approval in the depart-
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mental decision in the case of Warren v. Gibson (29 L. I)., 197). In
each of the cases named the opposing parties were claimants under
the homestead law ; but the ruling enunciated is equally applicable in
the case here under consideration, where one of the parties is a claim-
ant under the timber-land law. The case must be decided in accord-
ance with the principles hereinbefore set forth.
The action of your office in awarding to Borseth the right to make
timber-land entry of the tract in controversy is reversed ; and Deuel
will be allowed to make homestead entry of the entire one hundred
and sixty acre tract described in his application, unless some other
reason to the contrary shall appear.
INDIAN LANDS-SELECTION-TOWNSITE.
Turnbull v. Roosevelt Townsite.
No rights could be acquired by settlement upon lands within the ceded limits of
the Red Lake Indian reservation, with a view to making homestead entry
thereof, prior to the opening of said lands to settlement and entry.
In view of the provisions of the act of February i), 11)03, which extended the
townsite laws to the lands within the ceded limits of the Red Lake Indian
reservation and authorized their occupation for townsite purposes prior to
formal opening thereof to disposition under the homestead laws, the occu-
pation of a portion of said lands as a townsite prior to and on the date they
were opened to settlement and entry, prevented the attachment of any rights
on that date under a settlement with a view to acquiring title under the
homestead laws, covering the same land, initiated prior to occupation of
the land for townsite purposes.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, August 28, 1905. (E. P.)
The land involved herein", namely, the SE. i of the SE. J of Sec. 36.
T. 162 K, R. 35 W., Crookston land district, Minnesota, is within the
ceded limits of the Red Lake Indian Reservation, and, together with
other tracts, was opened to settlement? and entry November 10, 1903,
under the provisions of the act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 642),
and pursuant to the notice issued by the Department September 22,
1903.
November 9, 1903, there was filed in the local office a paper in the
nature of a townsite declaratory statement, signed by A. J. Hamilton.
Elof Swanson, John Butterfield, John Carlson, G. Myers and T.
Knutson, and verified under oath by all of the persons named except
Carlson. Said informal townsite declaratory statement reads as fol-
lows :
NOTICE.
To the Register and Receiver of the U. S. Office. Crookston. Minn.
The undersigned represent that they are now occupying tor business and resi-
dence purposes certain tracts of land within the SE. i, SE. } of Section 36,
Township 162 N., Range 35 W., as shown by a plat of the same hereto attached.
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That on or about October, 1900, the .Minnesota and Manitoba Railway Com
pany located a station, named Roosevelt, on said land: tbat a commodious sta
tion building, side track, post office, hotel, store buildings, warehouses and resi
deuces have been erected on said land and it is a prospective centre of popu-
lation.
The undersigned give notice of their intention to gain title under the CJ. s.
townsite laws to the several tracts of land shown on said plat, as provided in
sections 2382, 2383, 2384 and 2385 of the Revised Statutes of the 1'. S.. and re-
quest that the said SE. | SB. 1. Section .">»'>. T. 102, R. 35, a government sub
division of forty acres, be reserved for townsite purposes, and that homestead
entries on said land be rejected.
Attached to said paper was an informal plat showing the approxi-
mate location of a railroad station, a post office building and six other
buildings used for townsite purposes.
Said townsite declaratory statement was in due time transmitted
by the local officers to your office for consideration, and. by letter of
January 14. 11)04. your office advised the local officers that the paper
filed by the townsite claimants was not in the required form for the
entry of land for townsite purposes under sections 2382 to 2386, in-
clusive, of the Revised Statutes, and the regulations issued there-
under, and directed them to notify the applicants that they must
proceed in accordance with the laws and regulations set forth in the
departmental townsite circular. Although duly served with notice
of your said office decision, nothing further appears to have been
done by the townsite claimants towards acquiring title to said land
tinder the townsite laws, other than to file in your office. March 15,
11)05, a petition, praying that the tract he platted and disposed of
under the provisions of sections 2382 and 2384 of the Revised
Statutes.
November 10. L903, Peter Turnbull presented at the local office an
application to make homestead entry of the land above described,
toe-ether with other land, upon which application action was sus-
pended by the local officers pending disposition of the townsite appli-
cation. June 1. 1D04. he filed in the local office an affidavit and peti-
tion, executed by himself, which reads as follows:
That he is the identical person who. on November 10. 1903, presented to the
Register and Receiver of the Crookston land office, Minnesota, his application
to make homestead entry for the E. J SE. |. See. 36, T. 162 X.. R. 35 \V.. 5th
V. M. ; that he was informed at that time by the Register of said land office
that a petition of townsite entry for a pari of said tract, viz : SE. I SE. |.
bad been filed on the day before, but tbat said petition was in some resped
defective and bad been or would be forwarded to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office for bis consideration: tbat bis (affiant's) entry applica-
tion would be received, held and suspended at said Crookston land office,
without detriment to bis interests or prejudice to bis rights, pending the con-
sideration of said townsite petition; tbat he is informed, though be has not
been formally or officially notified of the fact, thai by letter of January 13,
10(t4. the Commissioner of the General Land Office notified the said Crookston
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land office that said townsite petition was not in such form as to constitute a
legal application for townsite filing or entry, but would be treated as notice
that the land embraced or described therein was claimed for townsite purposes
and, as such, reserved from homestead entry, reasonable time being allowed
for the perfectment of townsite application ; that, although more than four
months have passed since the date of the said General Land Office letter, no
legal or formal townsite filing or entry application has been presented. Affiant
asks, therefore, that there shall be no further delay in the matter of his home-
stead entry application, and that said application may be immediately allowed,
and he hereby asserts a right to said land superior to any that might or could
be lawfully claimed under the townsite or other laws, which right he acquired
by actual settlement upon and improvement of the tract prior to the coming
thereon of any other person or persons, especially those in whose behalf the
said townsite petition has been presented. He alleges, in support of his claim
to priority and superiority of right, that said land is a part of the former Red
Lake Indian Reservation the title to which became fully vested in the United
States by virtue of treaty made pursuant to the act of Congress approved
January 14, 1889 (commonly called the Nelson Act) ; that, inasmuch as it is
agricultural land within the meaning of said act, it has been lawfully subject
to settlement ever since the consummation of said treaty ; that because of the
claim of the State of Minnesota, under its school grant, which has been de-
clared invalid by the United States Supreme Court, said tract was not pro-
claimed as open to actual entry and so opened until November 10, 1903, but
there was not, at the date of affiant's settlement thereon, and never has
been any lawful inhibition against settlement upon and acquirement of right
thereto under the settlement laws of the United States; that he made actual
bona fide settlement upon the said tract in May, 1901, and established residence
thereon with his family, in good faith, with the intention of making his per-
manent future home thereon, and that, there was at that time no other person
or persons residing upon said land, or any part thereof, claiming a right
thereto under the settlement laws or otherwise; that he has continuously
resided upon and improved said land ever since the date of his original settle-
ment and made it his home to the exclusion of a home elsewhere, and has
always intended to enter it as a homestead whenever he might be lawfully
permitted so to do; that he presented his entry application as soon as it was
possible to do so after the land was officially declared to be subject to disposal;
that he acquired' a lawful right to and interest in said land, by virtue of the
settlement laws, iminediately upon making settlement thereon, which right
is superior to any that might or could be asserted under any law by any one
who may have subsequently gone upon said tract. Affiant further states
that when said land was declared to be subject to entry and disposal there
were residing upon the same, temporarily and otherwise, seventeen persons
exclusive of himself and family, viz:—Elof Swanson and family, 3 persons;
John Carlson and wife, 2 persons; A. J. Hamilton and son, 2 persons, John
Butterfield and family, 10 persons, all of whom came to reside there subse-
quent to the settlement upon the land by this affiant; that affiant, although
then claiming the land, having no actual entry of record, was powerless to
prevent the intrusion of others upon the premises, and, as a right of way under
special act of Congress had been granted across said land to the Minnesota
and Manitoba (now Canadian Northern) Railway, be deemed it useless to
make effort to do so. Affiant believed himself to be lawfully entitled to said
described land under the provisions of the homestead laws, and, therefore, he
presents his petition praying for the protection of his rights and property, and
the immediate allowance of his pending homestead entry application.
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December L5, 11)01. Turnbull filed in the local office a petition pray-
ing thai the notice of intention to make application for townsite
entry be rejected and that the petitioner's application to make home-
stead entry be allowed, for the following reasons:
1. They have not filed, nor caused to be filed with the register of deeds
l recorder i for the county within which the land is situated any plat, map or
diagram of the alleged townsite with statement of facts, as required by Section
2382 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
2. They have not tiled in the General Land Office a verified transcript of any
such plat, map or diagram and statement, with testimony of witnesses relative
to the establishment of the alleged town in good faith, as the law requires; nor
have they tiled such plat, map or diagram, statement and testimony in the dis-
trict land office having jurisdiction over the land applied for.
::. Within less than three months from the date of the filing of the so-called
declaration, that is to say. on January 13, 11)04, the Commissioner of the General
Land Office decided that the papers then presented were not such as the law
requires in townsite applications and that they were insufficient for the purposes
intended and required the parties to comply with legal requirements within a
reasonable time. The parties were duly notified January 20, 11)04, of the said
decision and requirement made by the Commissioner, hut they have never made
any attempt to comply with the requirement or to cure the defects in said
papers. On November 7, 1904, one A. J. Harwood, a United States Commis-
sioner for the District of .Minnesota, through whom all the correspondence
relating to the alleged townsite claim has been conducted, forwarded a letter
to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, calling attention to the fact
that more than a year had elapsed since the alleged founding of the town and
thai the law had not been complied with by the parties in respect to the filing
of map, statement, testimony, etc.. and requesting, in view of such failure, that
the Secretary of the Interior shall proceed with respect to said town as provided
by Section 2384 of the United States Revised Statutes, thus waiving, in hehalf
of said parties to said so-called declaration any right which might have been
acquired thereunder, and any and all claim to intention to make townsite entry
as alleged therein.
4. To refuse to grant the request and prayer of this petitioner will unneces-
sarily impose upon the petitioner the hardship and burden of expense and
trouble of a contest, and longer deprive him of the rights and privileges to
which he is entitled under his settlement made in May. 1901, and his homestead
entry application presented November 1<>. 1903, the day the lands were opened
to disposal under the act of January, 1889 (the Nelson law) and acts amenda-
tory thereto.
The petition was denied by your office decision of January 11.
l'.'Oo, it being held ( 1 ) that public hind that is used and occupied
for purposes of trade and business, whether application to make
townsite entry of the same he made or not. is not subject to home-
stead entry; ( '2 ) that the said townsite declaratory statement, while
informal, was nevertheless sufficient in form and substance t<> -core
gate the land until canceled upon a contest or other proper proceed-
ing; (3) that the failure of the townsite claimants to proceed under
sections 2382 to 2386, inclusive, of the Revised Statute-, did not
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amount to a waiver or relinquishment by them of any rights they
might have acquired, and that while the said claimants had been
notified that they must proceed in accordance with the laws and reg-
ulations, no penalty, other than that prescribed by section 2384,
could properly be imposed as a consequence of their failure to so
proceed within a given time; and (4) that the question as to whether
Turnbull acquired any rights superior to those of the townsite claim-
ants by virtue of his alleged prior settlement was one that could be
determined after a hearing.
March 21, 1905, Turnbull filed in your office a petition, based on
the allegations contained in the affidavit filed by him in the local
office June 1, 1904, and the petition filed by him in your office Decem-
ber 15, 1904, both hereinabove set forth, it being contended by him
that he is entitled to make homestead entry of the land because of
his alleged prior homestead settlement, notwithstanding the alleged
occupancy thereof for townsite purposes at the time his application
to enter was presented.
In passing upon said petition for a hearing your office, by decision
of April 13, 1905, held (1) that, in view of the departmental order
of August 1, 1899, prohibiting all persons from going upon any of
the ceded Chippewa lands, except those within the Red Lake reser-
vation that had been theretofore opened to settlement or offered for
sale, Turnbull acquired no rights whatever by virtue of his alleged
settlement made upon the land in question prior to November 10,
1903; (2) that under the provisions of the act of February 9, 1903
(32 Stat., 820), said land became subject to townsite settlement and
entry from and after the date of the approval of said act; (3) that
in view of the fact that Turnbull fails to allege in his affidavit that
on November 10, 1903, the land was unoccupied by anyone save him-
self, but, on the contrary, admits that it was in fact at that time oc-
cupied by seventeen persons, exclusive of himself and family, and
does not attempt to dispute the sworn statement of the townsite
claimants to the effect that on November 10, 1903, the land was oc-
cupied for townsite purposes, his affidavit fails to state a cause of
action; and (4) that inasmuch as said land was segregated by the
townsite declaratory statement or notice filed in the local office No-
vember 9, 1903, the local officers should have rejected Turnbull's
application at the time it was presented, so far as it embraced the
land in question, instead of suspending it. The petition for a hearing
was therefore denied, and Turnbull's application to make homestead
entry of the tract in controversy was rejected.
From this decision Turnbull has appealed to the Department.
The act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat,, 642), after providing for the
cession, survey and classification of lands within the Red Lake and
other Chippewa Indian reservations in the State of Minnesota, and
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the allotment of certain lands in said reservations to Indians, read- as
follows
:
Sec. G. That when any of the agricultural lands . on said reservation not
allotted under this act nor reserved for the future use of said Indians have been
surveyed, the Secretary of the Interior shall give thirty days' notice through at
least one newspaper published at St. Paul and Crookston, in the State of Min-
nesota, and at the expiration of thirty days the said agricultural lands so
surveyed shall be disposed of by the United States to actual settlers only under
the provisions of the homestead law.
Under the provisions of said act certain tracts within the ceded
portion of the Red Lake reservation; the same having been previously
surveyed, examined and ascertained to be agricultural lands, were on
October 5, 1898, by departmental notice of August 1*2. 1808, opened
to settlement and entry under the homestead laws. Included in the
list of lands so opened was all of township 162 north, range 35 west,
with the exception of sections 16 and 36 thereof, the tract herein
involved being within the section last named. These sections, al-
though they appear to have been at that time surveyed and examined,
were not included in said list, for the reason that the State of
Minnesota was then claiming them under the school land grant, which
claim was not finally disposed of until the Supreme Court rendered
its decision of May '2. 1902, in the case of State of Minnesota v. Hitch-
cock (185 U. S., 173), declaring that no land in the Red Lake reserva-
tion passed to the State under the school land grant.
August 1, 1899, the Department issued a circular or order which
reads in part as follows
:
The said act of January 14, 1880, provides for the disposal, after notice by
advertisement for thirty days in the manner indicated therein, to actual settlers
only, under the provisions of the homestead laws at the price and on the terms
as to payment provided in the act of such lands as may have been determined in
the manner indicated in the act to be agricultural. No lands in the .... Red
Lake .... Reservation have ever been or will be open to sale or settlement
by the United States under the homestead law or any other laws of the United
States, until advertisement to that effect, as required by said act
Excepting the lands heretofore offered for sale or open to sett lenient upon the
\U'(\ Lake Reservation and excepting those in said section 15 so as aforesaid
ordered to be sold, there has been no appraisal or order for sale or for the open-
ing to settlement, or for the advertisement of any lands whatever within any of
said reservations.
All persons are, therefore, hereby warned not to go upon any of the lands
within the limits of said reservations, except upon the lands within the Red Lake
Reservation heretofore opened to settlement or offered for sale, for any purpose
Or with any intent whatsoever. No settlement or other rights can be secured
upon said lands and all persons found unlawfully thereon will be dealt with as
trespassers and intruders.
A copy of this order was, on August 2, L899, forwarded by your
office to the local officers at Crookston, Minnesota, with Instructions
to post the same in a conspicuous place in their office.
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This order was, in effect, an executive order of withdrawal, and, if
authorized, operated to prevent any person from acquiring any rights
whatever, by virtue of attempted homestead settlement, in or to any
of the lands covered by the order, that is to say, such of said ceded
lands as had not been theretofore declared to be open to settlement
and entry, until they should, by duly advertised notice, be opened to
homestead settlement and entry. Said order was, however, in the
opinion of the Department, modified by the act of February 9, 1903
(32 Stat., 820), which extended the townsite laws to the ceded Indian
lands in Minnesota, the said act, by the express terms thereof, becom-
ing effective from and after its passage.
Turnbull admits that the alleged acts of settlement relied upon by
him were performed in direct violation and disregard of said order
of August 1, 1899, but contends in his appeal that the land in ques-
tion having then been surveyed, examined, and found to be agricul-
tural land, the Department was without authority, under the act of
January 14, 1889, supra, or any other law, to reserve it from settle-
ment; he therefore insists that by his alleged settlement, although
the same was made at a time when the land was not subject to entry,
he acquired rights that were good as against all the world save the
government, the State of Minnesota's claim to the land having been
eliminated by the said decision of the Supreme Court, citing the
case of Kinman v. Appleby (32 L. D., 526), and the cases therein
cited.
In the case of Wolsey v. Chapman (101 U. S., 755, 768), the
Supreme Court, referring to a withdrawal, by order of the Depart-
ment, of certain lands in the State of Iowa, said
:
The proper executive department of the government had determined that,
because of doubts about the extent and operation of that act [of August 8,
1846], nothing should be done to impair the rights of the State above the
Raccoon Fork until the differences were settled, either by Congress or judicial
decision. For that purpose an authoritative order was issued, directing the
local land officers to withhold all the disputed lands from sale. This withdrew
the lands from private entry, and, as we held in the case of Riley v. Wells, was
sufficient to defeat a settlement for the purpose of pre-emption while the order
was in force, notwithstanding it was afterwards found that the law, by reason
of which this action was taken, did not contemplate such a withdrawal.
In the case of Riley v. Welles (154 U. S., 578), the Supreme Court
held that a certain settlement upon and possession of a tract within
the limits of the executive withdrawal referred to in the case of
Wolsey v. Chapman, supra, were " without right," and that the sub-
sequent recognition by the land officers of such settlement and pos-
session and the permission accorded the settler to make proof and
entry under the pre-emption law " were acts in violation of law and
void, as was also the issuing of the patent."
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In view of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the two cases last
above cited, the Department is of opinion that the order of Angus!
1, 1899, was, as to the tract involved herein, an authoritative order
of withdrawal, and that Turnbull acquired no rights whatever under
the homestead law by virtue of any act of settlement that may have
been performed by him prior to the time the said order was revoked
by the advertisement of the notice of September 22, 1903, opening
said tract to settlement and entry under the homestead laws. The
Department has, it is true, held that although as against the govern-
ment no rights can be acquired by virtue of a settlement made upon
land while it is in a state of withdrawal or reservation, yet, where
such tract subsequently becomes subject to entry and is claimed by
two or more persons, each relying upon a settlement made during
the period covered by the withdrawal or reservation, the question as
to priority of settlement may be properly considered in determining
the respective rights of the conflicting claimants. No orders, how-
ever, had ever been issued forbidding such settlement on the lands
involved in those cases, whereas such settlement was specifically pro-
hibited on the land here in question. Hence said cases have no
application to a case like the one at bar.
Turnbull's right to make homestead entry of the land in question
must therefore depend upon some act of settlement performed after
9 o'clock, a. m., of November 10, 1903, the hour that the same first
became subject to homestead settlement and entry, or upon his appli-
cation to enter, presented on that date. At that time, however, the
land appears to have been occupied for townsite purposes, and a
declaratory statement or notice showing such occupancy and evidenc-
ing an intent on the part of the occupants to claim the same under
the townsite laws was then on file. This tract was, as hereinbefore
stated, subject to townsite settlement and entry from and after the
passage of the act of February 9, 1903, and said informal townsite
declaratory statement or notice, while insufficient as an application
to enter the land under the townsite laws, was, in the opinion of the
Department, j>r'nn<i facie evidence that the land was appropriated.
The Department therefore holds that the same was not subject to
homestead entry at the time Turnbull applied to enter it. and that
his application was properly rejected by your office.
Turnbull, therefore, having acquired no right to the land either
l>\ virtue of his alleged settlement or his application to enter, is not
entitled to a hearing for any purpose, except upon a contest regularly
initiated.
The action appealed from is affirmed.
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TOWNSITE ENTRY—MINERAL LAND—SECTION 16, ACT OF MARCH
3, 1891.
Nome and Sinook Company et al. v. Townsite of Nome.
Under the provisions of section 16 of the act of March 3, 1891, townsite entries
may be made by incorporated towns and cities on the mineral lands of the
United States, subject to existing rights under any valid mining claim or
possession, lode or placer, held under existing law.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, August 29, 1905. (G. N. B.)
August 5, 1904, Porter J. Coston, trustee for the townsite of Nome,
Alaska, made entry for the townsite of Nome, amended survey No.
451, embracing 452.83 acres, Juneau, Alaska, land district, under the
provisions of the act approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1099).
The record showT s that July 2, 1904, the day set therefor in the pub-
lished and posted notice, townsite final proof was submitted. On
that day the Nome and Sinook Company and K. T. Lyng filed sep-
arate and substantially similar protests, in which irregularities in
the proceedings leading up to the entry are alleged, together with
allegations to the effect that the land embraced in the townsite is
mineral in character, and that the protestants are the owners of
certain valid placer mining claims situated within the townsite.
Counsel for the protestants cross-examined the final-proof witnesses
but did not introduce evidence. On the day the entry was allowed,
and without notice to^the protestants, it appears, the protests wTere
dismissed. The papers were forwarded by the local officers and con-
sidered by your office September 17, 1904. In your office decision
it is stated that
—
Inasmuch as this office cannot determine from the record whether notices of
the dismissal of the original protests were regularly served upon the parties
filing them, and whether they have acquiesced in that action, the allegations
of all the papers will be here considered and disposition be made thereof.
Five protests were disposed of by your office decision, but only twTo
are here on appeal. The allegations of the protests under considera-
tion are fully stated in your office decision and need not be restated
in detail. Your office held the protests for dismissal.
The protestants, the Nome and Sinook Company and R. T. Lyng,
have appealed to the Department.
A careful examination of the record shows that the proceedings
prior to entry were in substantial compliance with law, and in no
wTay prejudicial to whatever rights the protestants may have in and
to the land in controversy. The technical objections to the pro-
ceedings raised by the protests present no sufficient ground for
rejecting the entry. It is further contended that the allegations that
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the land embraced in the townsite is mineral in character, and that
protestants are the owners of valid placer mining claims therein,
located and held prior to the proceedings for townsite patent, are
sufficient to warrant the Department in directing a hearing now to
determine the facts. The action of the local officers in dismissing
the protests without notice to protestants was irregular, hut the alle-
gations of the protest were considered by your office and have been
again considered here.
The record and the records of your office show that October 3, 1900,
a townsite committee filed with the surveyor-general of Alaska an
application for the survey of the out-boundaries of the town of Nome,
formerly called Anvil City. The application was dated June *28, 1899.
At that time a population of 1,500 was claimed and improvements
worth $100,000 alleged. Beyond riling in the Surveyor-General's
office a blue-print copy of a survey of the townsite, showing streets
and alleys, blocks and lots, nothing was done toward securing a town-
site patent at that time. The town was incorporated April 9, 1901.
The town now has a population of about 5,000 during the open season,
and about 3,000 throughout the year. The value of the improvements
is now about $800,000. The streets are graded, the business streets
being planked; there are sidewalks and graded alleys; there is a Hue
water system, an electric light plant, a telephone system, and a fully-
equipped fire department. The mining claims, for the most part,
were located in January, 1899, and have not been systematically
worked since that time.
Section 16 of the act of March 3, 1891, supra, provides:
That town-site entries may be made by incorporated towns and cities on the
mineral lands of the United States, hut no title shall he acquired by such towns
or cities to any vein of gold, silver, cinnabar, copper, or lead, or to any valid
mining claim or possession held under existing law. When mineral veins are
possessed within the limits of an incorporated town or city, and such possession
is recognized by local authority or by the laws of the United States, the title
to town lots shall be subject to such recognized possession and the necessary use
thereof and when entry has been made or patent issued for such town sites to
such incorporated town or city, the possessor of such mineral vein may enter
and receive patent for such mineral vein, and the surface ground appertaining
thereto: Provided, That no entry shall be made by such mineral-vein claimant
for surface ground where the owner or occupier of the surface ground shall
have had possession of the same before the inception of the title of the mineral-
vein applicant.
In the case of Hillings y. Ward Townsite (29 L. I)., 21, 23), the
! )epartment said
:
The townsite patent when issued will not. therefore, deprive the protectant
oi any other person, of any rights existing at the date of the townsite entry
under any valid mining claim, or possession so recognized as aforesaid, within
the patented area. All such rights are protected hy the statute in terms. Nor
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will the townsite patent deprive the Department of jurisdiction to issue patent
for any such mining claim upon application therefor supported by proper proofs,
for the reason that the statute also provides that patent may he issued to the
possessor of any such mining claim after the townsite patent has been issued.
All rights of mineral claimants existing at the date of the townsite entry being
thus reserved and fully protected by the statute, there would seem to be no
necessity for the segregation, prior to the issuance of the townsite patent, for
the purpose of excluding the same from the patent, of any mining claims, sur-
veyed or unsurveyed, for which applications had not been filed at the date of
the townsite entry. All such claims, if subsisting and valid at the date afore-
said, may be carried to entry and patent, upon proper proofs showing that the
mining laws have been complied with and that the claims are within the pro-
tection of the statute, notwithstanding the townsite entry and patent, provided
only that such mineral entry and patent shall not embrace surface ground
** where the owner or occupier of the surface ground shall have had possession
of the same before the inception of title of the mineral-vein claimant."
See also Lalande et al. v. Townsite of Saltese (32 L. D., 211).
The law provides that under a townsite entry no title shall be
acquired by the town or city to any valid mining claim- or possession
held under existing law, and is applicable to placer as well as to lode
mining claims. (Telluride Additional Townsite, 33 L. D., 542.)
There is no right that the protestants have in the land embraced in
the townsite entry that can be affected by the issuance of townsite
patent. A patent may be obtained by them for lands claimed, upon
proper proceedings, and a showing that at the date of the townsite
entry the lands were known to be valuable for minerals, and that
such lands were possessed by them by virtue of a compliance Avith
law, notwithstanding The issuance of townsite patent. The protes-
tants, although they have seen the town grow upon lands claimed b/^
them, have taken no steps to secure the paramount title. Until this
is done, the Department does not feel justified in directing that a
hearing now be had to determine questions that may in such event
arise, especially as the law preserves to the protestants all rights
they may have acquired under the mining laws prior to the townsite
entry.
Since the date of your office decision protests have been filed by
J. M. Bartholomew and J. S. Watts, in each of which the known
mineral character of the land at the date of the townsite entry is
alleged, and in which it is alleged the protestants are in possession of
valid placer mining claims located within the out-boundaries of the
townsite. These protests should be dismissed. Whatever rights the
protestants have in and to the land in controversy are fully protected
by law, and may be asserted and secured by proper proceedings.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
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railroad grant—indemnity—adjustment—act of july 1, 1898.
Jones v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
The Northern Pacific Railway Company is the lawful successor in interest to
the land-grant rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.
The Northern Pacific Railway Company is entitled to indemnity for lands lost
to the grant made by the act of July 2. 1NC>4. to the Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company, on account of the prior grant of May 5, 1864, to the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, between Thomson's Junction
and Dnluth.
A railroad indemnity selection, valid when made, under departmental order
relieving the Northern Pacific Railroad Company from the designation of a
particular loss as a basis for the selection, will not be avoided upon an
allegation that a loss subsequently designated, in obedience to departmental
order of Augusl 1. 1885, was not the nearest available loss. Any require-
ment for the specification of a loss as a basis for an indemnity selection is
only for departmental information and as an aid in the adjustment of the
grant.
An application to purchase under the provisions of the act of June 3, 1878, pre-
sented prior to, but upon which proof and payment were not made until
after, January 1, ISPS, does not present a claim for adjustment under the
provisions of the net of .Inly 1. 1898.
Where an applicant to purchase under the provisions of the act of June .">, 1878,
is allowed to make proof and payment in violation of an order withdrawing
the land from entry, no claim is thereby initiated falling within the reme-
dial provisions of the act of July 1, 1898.
Act i n g Secretary R>/<ih to the Commissioner of the General Land
( F. L. C. ) Office, August 30, 1905. (G. B. (J.)
This is the appeal of Richard B. Jones from your office decision of
December 2, L901, holding for cancellation his cash entry allowed
under the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), as amended by the act of
August 1. L892 (27 Stat, 348), for the SW. J of the SE. \ of Sec. 7.
T. :>l X.. R. L4 W., Duluth land district, Minnesota.
The land in controversy lies within the second indemnity limits of
the grant made in aid of the construction of the Northern Pacific
railroad east of the city of Duluth. provision for which is found in
the joint resolution of May 31, L870 (10 Stat., 378), and was selected
by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company October 17, L883. This
-election remained of record until March '2 %2, 1S (.>7. when it was can-
celed, pursuant to departmental decision in the case of Northern
Pacific Railroad Company (23 L. D.. 204), holding Duluth to be the
eastern terminus of the company's grant, but was reinstated by your
office letter of May 26, L900, under the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Doherty /'. Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company (177 U. S., 121), holding the eastern terminus of the
grant to be at Ashland. Wisconsin. Between the date of cancellation
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of the selection and before it had been reinstated, to wit, on December
17, 1897, the said Richard B. Jones applied to purchase the tract
under the timber and stone acts, supra, and after due publication and
proof made entry thereof, December 10, 1898. At the date of the
purchase, but not at the date of the application, the tract in contro-
versy, with others, was withdrawn from entry by virtue of depart-
mental order of February 28, 1898 (26 L. D., 265), but there was a
provision in the order permitting the completion of all entries there-
tofore allowed.
It is contended upon the appeal, in substance:
1. That the Northern Pacific Railway Company has no legal or
equitable claim upon the United States to be considered the successor
in interest to the land-grant rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, and that, there is therefore no authority of law for the
patenting of lands to the first-named company.
2. That the company's selection was and is void, because no valid
basis is assigned.
3. That the selection is irregular and void, because the selected
land was not at date of selection the nearest available public land to
the section alleged to have been lost in place.
4. That the timber and stone application of Jones having been pre-
sented at a time when the tract in controversy was unappropriated
public domain, his application was the equivalent of an entry, and
that he thereafter, in accordance with the terms of the order of sus-
pension of February 28, 1898, supra, had the right to complete the
same by making proof and payment thereon.
5. That such application having been presented, and such proof and
payment having been made, he had prior to January 1, 1898, in con-
templation of law and within the meaning of the act of July 1, 1898
(30 Stat,, 597, 620), purchased the land directly from the United
States, that he had an entry prior to January 1, 1898, within the
meaning of departmental instructions of February 14, 1899 (28 L. D.,
103), and that therefore he is entitled to an adjustment of his claim
under said act.
The question of the successorship of the Northern Pacific Railway
Company to the land-grant rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company was considered by Attorney-General Harmon, February 6,
1897 (21 Opinions, 486), and, referring to certain mortgage foreclos-
ure proceedings, this Department was then advised that it should
act upon applications for patents by the railway company upon the
same considerations which should govern it in case there had been no
foreclosure and the applications had been made by the old company.
It was but recently urged before this Department that said opinion
was ill-advised and unsound, both in law and fact. The matter was
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again submitted to the Attorney-General, and April L2, L905, Attor-
ney-General Moody considered the question, concluding as follow-:
It seems to me that the decision of my predecessor was correct, and accord-
ingly have to advise you [the Secretary of the Interior | that, in my opinion, you
should continue to be governed by the rule there laid down.
This question is not therefore open for further consideration by
this Department. Hugh R. Ferguson /\ Northern Pacific Railway
Company (33 L. D., 634).
Appellant's second contention, that the company's selection herein
Is void because of invalid basis, rests upon the allegation that the basis
assigned lies within the overlapping limits of the grant to the State
of Minnesota to aid in the construction of a railroad from St. Paul
to Lake Superior, made by the acts of May 5, L864 (13 Stat.. 64),
and July 13, 1866 (14 Stat, 93), afterwards conferred by the State
upon the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, and the
grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, made by the act of
July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), that Congress did not make a double
grant within these overlapping limits, and that the date of the grant
to the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company being prior
to the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company's road oppo-
site the tract, and the tract having been approved to the former com-
pany prior to the definite location of the last-named company's road,
it was not granted to it, and therefore not lost to that company's
grant.
This contention is unsound. This base land is not within the limits
of the withdrawal of May 26, 1864, made on account of the grant of
May 5, L864, and the case does not therefore fall within the ruling of
this Department in the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Company v.
Rooney (30 L. I)., 403). It is true the base land was certified under
the grant of May 5, 18(>4, but it was because of the fact that it fell
within the indemnity limits of that grant as adjusted to the line of
definite location, and was selected after the date of the Northern
Pacific land grant, but prior to the definite location of that line of
road. Xo question arises therefore in this case of the right of the
Northern Pacific company to satisfy its loss from its second indem-
nity-belt where the base land was in law and fact lost prior to its
grant of July 2. 1864. In the case of Northern Pacific Railroad
Company (23 L. I).. 204) it was held that because of a proviso in the
act of July •_!. L864, supra, said company would not be entitled to
receive indemnity for any of the losses sustained on account of the
grant to the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company,
made by the act of May 5, 1864, between Thomson's Junction and
Duluth. This decision was fundamentally wrong. It held that,
because of an agreement, amounting to a consolidation between the
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two companies, whereby the Northern Pacific Company was author-
ized to use the other company's tracks between Thomson's Junction
and Duluth, it thereby adopted this as its line of road between these
points, that Duluth being on Lake Superior, the eastern point named
in the company's charter, that point was therefore the eastern termi-
nus of its grant, and that it therefore, between these points, being
" upon the line of another railroad route to aid in the construction of
which lands " had been theretofore granted by the United States, was,
because of the proviso above referred to, not entitled to indemnity
for lands lost because of the prior grant. This view was declared
erroneous by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Doherty
case, supra, which recognized the extension of the road eastward from
Thomson's Junction to Ashland, Wisconsin, as part of the land-grant
load, and it follows that, as the route of the Northern Pacific railroad
is in no sense upon the same general line as that of the Lake Superior
and Mississippi railroad, the proviso in question is without applica-
tion, and the contention that the Northern Pacific company is not
entitled to indemnity for this tract must fail.
With regard to the regularity of the indemnity selection of this
land there can be no question but that, as originally presented, it
was a proper selection under existing departmental regulations, the
company at that time being relieved from the specification of a basis
for its selections. It is claimed, however, that this selection should
not receive departmental approval because there are, or were, at the
time said selection was perfected by the assigning of a basis in 1893,
available lands nearer to the. loss then specified ; and the question is
therefore presented, whether, admitting the same to be true, the
selection is a proper one under the terms of the granting act.
The third, or granting, section of the act of July 2, 18G4, supra,
grants to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company
—
every alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers,
to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile, on each side of said rail-
road line, as said company may adopt, through the Territories of the United
States, and ten alternate sections of land per mile on each side of said railroad
whenever it passes through any State, and whenever on the line thereof the
United States have full title, not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appro
priated, and free from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the
line of said road is definitely fixed, and a plat thereof filed in the office of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office; and whenever, prior to said time,
any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved,
occupied by homestead settlers, or pre-empted or otherwise disposed of, other
lands shall be selected by said company in lieu thereof, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, in alternate sections, and designated by odd
numbers, not more than ten miles beyond the limits of said alternate sections.
December 7, 1887, the question as to whether selections could be
made within the first indemnity belt of the Northern Pacific land-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 109
grant for losses outside the particular State or Territory in which
the same occurred, was submitted to the Attorney-General for opin-
ion, and in consideration thereof Mr. Attorney-General Garland, in
his opinion dated January IT. L888 (8 L. 1)., 14. 17). after referring
to the clause of the section above ({noted providing for indemnity,
says
:
The conditions of this indemnity, set forth in detail, under which the right
or privileges of selection rests in the company, are. lands shall have been lost
out of the amount granted; selections must be made by the company of other
lands in lieu of them; those selections must he made under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior ; selections shall only he of alternate odd-numbered
sections, and they must not he more than ten miles beyond the limits of the
granted sections. These are all the limitations or conditions provided for by
the act of 1864, subject to which the right to select is granted. Interpretation
will not warrant the adding of another limitation that the lieu lands must be
selected in the sumo State or Territory in which the lands were lost. To annex
such an additional limitation to the words of the grant would he legislation
and not construction.
It is further provided by said section 3 of the act of L864 :
That all mineral lands be. and the same are hereby, excluded from the opera-
tions of this act. and in lieu thereof a like quantity of unoccupied and unappro-
priated agricultural lands, in odd numbered sections, nearest to the line of said
road may he selected as above provided.
It will be noted that this provision limits the selection of indem-
nity for losses to the grant on account of mineral lands, to "odd
numbered sections, nearest to the line of said road," etc.
There could he no good reason for attaching an additional condition
upon selections made in lieu of lands lost to the grant because mineral
in character, and it might therefore be urged that it was intended to
enlarge the limits within which such selections could bo made.
Thus, for general indemnity, selections were to be made from " alter-
nate sections, and designated by odd numbers, not more than ten miles
beyond the limits of said alternate sections." being the granted sec-
tions, and for losses on account of mineral lands, to " odd numbered
sections, nearest to the Line of said road."
Be this as it may. the lands made the basis for the selection in
question were not lost to the grant because mineral in character, and
the limitation " nearest to the line of said road." differs widely from
a requirement that the selection must be nearest the tract losl and
made the basis for the selection.
In the case of the United States /'. Colton Marble and Lime Coin
pany (146 U. S., 615, 618) it was said by the court
:
it mighl well he assumed ihat very likely the Atlantic and Pacific Company
would he called upon to select from the indemnity lands ;i portion sufficient t"
make good the deficiency, in the granted limits. That rigm" of selection was a
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prospective right, and if it was to be fully exercised, no adverse title could be
created to any lands within the indemnity Hunts. Suppose, for instance, it
should turn out that only half of the indemnity lands were necessary to make
good the deficiency, and that one-half of such lands were well watered and
valuable, while the remainder were arid and comparatively valueless, obviously
the right of selection would be seriously impaired if it were limited to only the
arid and valueless tracts.
Iii that case the court had under consideration the prospective
right of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company to odd numbered
sections within the indemnity limits of its grant, made by act of
July 27, 1806 (14 Stat,, 292), which grant has the same indemnity
provisions as the Northern Pacific act of 1864, with the exception that
indemnity for losses to the grant on account of mineral lands is lim-
ited to " odd numbered sections nearest to the line of said road and
within twenty miles thereof." With regard to this latter provision
it will be noticed that the selection is limited to odd numbered sec-
tions within the primary limits of the grant, as those limits are
twenty miles on each side of the road in States and forty miles on
each side of the road in Territories, thus, in effect, nullifying the
provision, because the sections from which selections are to be made
were specifically granted in place.
The resolution of May 31, 1870, supra, providing for a second
indemnity belt to the Northern Pacific grant, before quoted from,
merely limits the place of selection to a belt " ten miles on each side
of said road, beyond the limits prescribed in said charter," etc.
The act of 1864 and the resolution of 1870 each therefore estab-
lished a limit beyond which* the company can not go in making its
general indemnity selections, but in neither is there any requirement
limiting such selections to the lands nearest the sections in which
the losses to the grant occur, and to so limit such selections would
attach a condition or limitation upon the right of selection not found
in the granting acts.
That the right of selection conferred by these acts can not be
restricted by the Secretary of the Interior seems clear. His duty in
the premises is to supervise the administration of the grant, but this
authority does not permit him to abridge or enlarge the laws of
Congress. He should see that the selections made in satisfaction of
the grant are confined to the lands described in the granting act, but
as between different sections, equally within the descriptions contained
therein, he can not say which may or which may not be selected, for
in so doing he would be denying the railroad company the right to
make the selection. See Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain
AVagon Road Co. v. Bruner (26 L. D., 357).
Attention has been called to the circular of August 4, 1885 (4 L. D.,
90), relaxing to railroad indemnity selections and requiring a designa-
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tion of a loss as a basis for all indemnity select ions, in which circular
it is said that
:
Where deficiencies exist, for which indemnity is allowed by law, the lieu selec-
tions must he made from vacant unappropriated land within proper sections and
limits nearest the granted section in which the loss occurred.
This circular was issued before the opinion of the Attorney-General
or the decision of the court referred to. Its main purpose was to
require the specification of a loss as a basis for the selection, thereby
aiding the adjustment of the grant, for it required the designation
of a loss as a basis for all selections previously approved and certified
as well as for those then pending or thereafter to be made.
In respect to the portion of said circular above quoted, in the matter
of proximity between loss and selected tract, in view of what has
been said, it can not be considered as a limitation upon the right of
selection, but rather as suggesting a manner of designating the losses
so as to aid in adjusting the grant. It might also be stated that it is
learned upon inquiry at your office that, at least as to lands within
the second indemnity belt, a strict adherence thereto has not been
enforced.
In the case of William Ilickey (26 L. I)., 621) it was held (syl-
labus) :
Indemnity selections are made under the direction of the Secretary <>!' the
Interior, and the enforcement of any requirement in the matter of a specifica-
tion of a loss is only for his information, and as a liar to the enlargement of
the grant, and may he waived whenever he deems such course advisable.
The conclusions hereinbefore reached answer appellant's fourth
contention. The railway company's selection was improperly can-
celed: the application of Jones initiated no right as against the
company, and his purchase no claim which can be recognized by the
land department, unless it is protected by the provisions of the act of
July 1, 181)8. supra, and this question involves consideration of the
fifth and last specification of error on appeal.
If Jones had purchased this land from the United State- prior
to January 1, L898, or if he had prior to that time made an entry
(hereof within the meaning of the act of July 1. L898, he is entitled
to an adjustment thereunder. It is believed that he had done neither
of these things. While the application to purchase was presented
prior to the date named, proof and payment were not made until after
that date. There was no purchase until the money was paid. There
was therefore no purchase prior to January 1. L898. Bui it i> con-
tended that the application of Jones was the equivalent of an entry.
No vested righl is acquired by a timber and stone application. While
such an application, if presented in accordance with law and for land
subject thereto, reserves the land from other disposition by the land
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department, no right is initiated as against the government, and prior
to the submission and acceptance of final proof and the payment of
the purchase price, the Secretary of the Interior may suspend the
same from disposition and sale under the public land laws. Board
of Control, Canal No. 3, State of Colorado, v. Torrence (32 L. D.,
472). This is precisely what was done in this case. The tract was
withdrawn from entry by the order of February 28, 1898, and the
purchase by Jones, allowed in violation of that order, initiated no
right falling within the remedial provisions of the act of July 1,
1898. F. W. Eaton and A. F. Huntoon v. Northern Pacific Kail-
way Company (33 L. D., 426).
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
TIMBER CUTTING—RESIDENTS-DOMESTIC PURPOSES—SECTION 8, ACT
OF MARCH 3, 1891.
City and County or Beaver.
Cities and counties are " residents " of the State in which they are located,
within the meaning of that term as used in section 8 of the act of March .">,
1891, as amended, conferring upon the residents of certain States and Terri-
tories authority to cut timber on the public lands for agricultural, mining,
manufacturing, or domestic purposes.
Timber used by cities tfor constructing electric-light plants and building hridges,
and by counties for building bridges and constructing flumes across the
county roads, is used for " domestic purposes " within the meaning of sec-
tion 8 of the act of March 3, 1891, as amended.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
August 31, 1905. (E. F. B.)
A letter from the Commissioner of the General Land Office recom-
mending that an application filed by Beaver City, the County of
Beaver, and others residing in the State of Utah, for permit to cut
and remove timber from the public lands under the 8th section of the
act of March 3, 1891, as amended (26 Stat., 1093), has been referred
to me for opinion " as to whether or not the within application can
be granted as to the thirty thousand feet and four thousand feet of
timber desired by the City and County of Beaver, Utah, respectively."
Said section, as amended, permits the cutting of timber from the
non-mineral public lands in the States of Utah and other States and
Territories named therein, " by a resident thereof for agricultural,
mining, manufacturing, or domestic purposes, under rules and regu-
lations made and prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior," for use
in such State.
The only question involved in this reference is whether the City of
Beaver and the County of Beaver are residents of said State within
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the moaning of the act and whether the timber is to be used for the
purposes contemplated by the act.
The City of Beaver and the County of Beaver are aggregations of
residents of said State and a permit for the taking of timber from
the public lands to be used by such residents collectively for their
common benefit comes as well within the purview of the act as a
permit to such residents as individuals. The applicants are there-
fore within the meaning of the act " residents" of said State and as
such are entitled to the benefits of the act.
The uses for which the timber is to be applied by the City of Bea-
ver are for an electric-light plant and for bridges. The timber
applied for by the County of Beaver is to be used for building
bridges, and constructing flumes across the county road-.
In an opinion submitted August L8, L905 (34 L. IX, 78), as to
whether a permit can be granted under the act of March 3, 1891, for
smelting purposes, it was said that this act must be construed in pari
materia with the act of June 3. L878 (20 Stat., 88), and the acts of
June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11, 36), and July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 618).
authorizing the free use of timber on public lands, Avhich have the
same general scope, purpose and limitation, differing only as to the
character and locality of the land from which the timber is taken.
The specific uses enumerated in the several acts may be considered
as a whole to aid in interpreting the full scope and meaning of the
words "or domestic purposes " as they occur in one. and "other
domestic purposes" as they occur in the other acts. Besides, the act
of June 3, L8T8, has received an interpretation by the Supreme Court
in the case of United States v. United Verde Copper Co. ( 190 U. S.,
'201). as to the uses for which timber may be taken, giving to the gen-
eral clause "other domestic purposes" such operation as to include
uses relating to those specifically designated. Speaking of the opera-
tion of the word " domestic " in its association with the word " other"
the court says:
It may relate, it is true, to the household. But, keeping its idea of locality,
it may relate to a broader entity than the household. We may properly and
accurately speak of domestic manufactures, meaning no1 those of the household,
hut those of a county, state or nation, according to the object in contemplation.
So in the statute the word ••domestic" applies to the locality in which the st.it
ute is directed, and gives permission to the industries there practiced to use the
public timber.
The regulation governing the granting of permits under the ad
of March 3, L891, specify the purpose- for which the timber may be
used. They are, " firewood, fencing, building, or other agricultural,
mining, manufacturing or dome-tic purposes."
The use of timber for the building of an electric power plant is
expressly authorized by the regulations and i- such a use a- conies
5194. vol. 34—05 m 8
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clearly within the purview of the statute. The building of bridges
and the construction of flumes across the public roads is a use equally
contemplated under the general clause " other domestic purposes."
I have therefore to advise you that the permit may be granted to
these applicants for the uses specified in their applications.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
second homestead entries—section 3, act of june 5, 1900, and
section 1, act op april 28, 1904.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, September 7, 1905.
Registers and Receivers,
United States Land Offices.
Gentlemen: Section 3 of the act of June 5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267),
provides, in part
:
That any person who prior to the passage of this act has made entry under
the homestead laws, but from any cause has lost or forfeited the same, shall be
entitled to the benefits of the homestead laws, as though such former entry had
not been made.
Section 1 of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 527), provides as
follows
:
That any person whov has heretofore made entry under the homestead laws,
but who shall show to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office that he was unable to perfect the entry on account of some unavoidable
complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of an honest
mistake as to the character of the land ; that he made a bona fide effort to com-
ply with the homestead law and that he did not relinquish his entry or abandon
his claim for a consideration, shall be entitled to the benefit of the homestead
law as though such former entry had not been made.
On June 26, 1905, in the case of Peter G. Cox v. Levi F. Wells (33
L. D., 657), the Secretary of the Interior held as follows:
That portion of the act of April 28, 1904, above set forth, like the third section
of the act of June 5, 1900, relates to persons who had, prior to its passage, lost
or forfeited their homestead entries, and were for either of said reasons unable
to perfect the same. The act of 1904, however, imposes conditions or restric-
tions that were not imposed by the act of 1900. the earlier act providing merely
that any person who bad from any cause theretofore lost or forfeited his home-
stead entry, should be entitled to the benefits of the homestead law, as though
such former entry had not been made, while the latter act requires such a
person, in order to entitle himself to the benefit of the homestead law, regard-
less, of his former entry, to show to the satisfaction of your office that he was
unable to perfect such former entry on account of some unavoidable complica-
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tion of his personal or business affairs or a mistake as to the character of the
land; that ho made a bona fide effort to comply with the homestead law. and
that he did not relinquish such entry or abandon the claim for a consideration.
The Department is of the opinion that the effect of the act of April 28, 1904,
is to modify the act of June 5, 1900, or place a limitation upon the operation
thereof: and that all applications to make second homestead entry, filed sub-
sequently to approval of the act of April 28, l'.NM. should be disposed of there-
under so far as the provisions of the same are applicable.
In view thereof, you will no longer allow entries to go of record
as made under the third section of said act of June 5, 1900, but will
transmit all applications for second entries to this office, together
with the affidavit of the party, duly corroborated, showing his quali-
fications to make entry under the first section of the act of April 28,
1904, above cited.
The instructions issued under date of June 27, 1900 (30 L. D.,
371), are modified accordingly.
Very respectfully,
J. H. Fimple, Acting Commissioner.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
contest-charge—timber and stone act-mineral land-seeec-
tion under act of june 4, 1897.
Jones v. Aztec Land and Cattle Company.
The fact that land is more valuable for the timber and stone thereon than for
agricultural purposes does not exclude it from appropriation under the
homestead laws, if not mineral in character, nor bar selection thereof
under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897.
The allegation in an affidavit of contest that land " is more valuable for the
timber and stone." does not by necessary implication charge that the land
is mineral in character and does not constitute a sufficient basis for a
contest.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General La nil
( S. V. P.) Office, September 6, 1905. (J. R. \Y. |
Harry T. Jones appealed from your decision of March 11. L905,
denying a hearing and dismissing his affidavit to contest the -elec-
tion under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat, 36), of the Aztec Land
and Cattle Company. Limited (hereinafter termed the company).
for the XW. J, Sec. 34, T. 3 X., R. 83 W., Glenwood Springs,
Colorado.
The company having theretofore filed its application under the
act of 18i)T, supra, at a time not shown in the record. October 7.
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1904, Harry T. Jones filed in the local office his duly corroborated
affidavit for contest of the selection, alleging:
That the NW. i of section 34 in township 3 N., R. 83 W. of the Oth P. M.v is
more valuable for the timber or stone contained thereon or therein than for
agricultural purposes, and that such was the fact at the time that the con-
testee above named filed its lieu selection No. 9043 thereon, and that such was
the fact at all times prior and subsequent hereto, and that the fact of said land
being more valuable for the timber contained thereon or the stone contained
therein than for agricultural purposes, was a thing notorious and patent and
well known at the time of the filing of said lieu selection thereon and at all
other times herein mentioned or referred to ; and all of which this contestant
now and here offers to prove at his own expense if he be accorded a hearing
for that purpose, which he now prays.
This was transmitted by the local office, without action, to your
office, which March 1-1, 1905, held that:
When the selection was filed there was no law or regulation which prohibited
the selection of timber or stone land under the aforesaid act, and your action in
allowing the lieu selection of the Aztec Land and Cattle Company, Limited, to
be placed of record was proper and is affirmed. Jones's application for a hearing
is denied and his affidavit of contest is dismissed, subject to his right of appeal.
The appeal alleges error in holding that land more valuable for its
timber and stone than for agricultural purposes is not excluded from
selection under the acts of June 4, 1897, supra, and June 6, 1900 (31
Stat., 614), and from settlement, entry, and patent under the home-
stead laws.
The record does not show when the selection was made, but by the
reference to the act of June 6, 1900, it is implied that it was made
after that date. By that act selections under the act of 1897, supra,
Avere limited, or, in words of the statute, " confined to vacant, sur-
veyed, non-mineral public lands which are subject to homestead
entry." No question is made in the brief and argument but that the
lands in question were vacant, were surveyed, and were non-mineral,
so that the only questions presented are, whether they were " public
lands which are subject to homestead entry," and whether the act of
June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), excludes land of the character therein
described from settlement or homestead entry, and made them sub-
ject to private appropriation only under the act of 1878.
Prior to the act of 1878 any public lands not excepted by law
because of their valuable mineral deposits, salt, etc., in general were
not subject to disposal otherwise than under the pre-emption and
homestead (or settlement) laAvs until after a public cash offering.
The settlement laws imposed conditions of residence, improvement,
and cultivation, compliance with which involved considerable expense
and lapse of time before a title could be obtained. There were also
many tracts that because of their rocky or heavily forested condition
were left unentered under the settlement laws because unsuitable for
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the homos of an agricultural resident population. In view of such
facts, the law of 1878 (20 Stat,, 89), applicable only to certain moun-
tain State-, afterward. August 4. 1892 (27 Stat., 348), made appli-
cable to all the public land States, provided that lands
—
valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for cultivation, and which have not been
offered at public sale, according to law, may be sold .... at the minimum
price of two dollars and fifty cents per acre, and lands chiefly valuable for
stone may be sold on the same terms.
This act merely opened unoffered lands of this general description
to private cash purchase in limited quantity, at an enhanced price.
prior to its public ottering. It was not the making of a new classifi-
cation of lands that could be sold only under the act and only at the
price fixed. Such lands, if not purchased under this act in advance
of their public offering, upon being offered were subject to private
cash entry or warrant location like any other public lands, not
reserved from sale or entry. They became subject to settlement entry
under the homestead law. the timbered or stony character and unfit-
ness for cultivation being regarded merely as a circumstance to be
considered in passing on the good faith of the settlement entryman.
John A. McKay (8 L. IX. 526); Porter v. Throop (6 L. D.. 691);
Wright v. Larson (7 L. I).. 555); Keller v. Bullington (11 L. D.,
140) : Harper v. Eiene (26 L. I)., 151).
It is thus clear that the mere fact that the land is more valuable
for the timber or the stone therein does not exclude 1 it from appro-
priation under lieu selection or homestead entry, if not of mineral
character.
The affidavit does not directly nor by necessary implication charge
that the land is mineral in character, but alleges in the alternative
thai it " is more valuable for the lumber or stone" than for agricul-
tural purposes. It is entirely component with the truth of this aver-
ment that the stone adds nothing to its value and that it is desirable
for its timber alone. A great variety of substances, valuable clay-.
gypsum, lime, stone, phosphate, guano, marble and slate, building
-tone, petroleum, etc.. may render land of mineral character if the
quality and market conditions make the land chiefly valuable for
working such deposits with profit. Dobbs Placer. 1 L. D., 565, 567;
Phifer v. Heaton, 27 L. I).. 57: Morrill v. Northern Pacific R. K. Co.,
30 P. I).. 175; Florida Central etc.. R. R. Co., 26 L. D., 600; Richter
v. Utah, 27 L. I).. 95; Schrimpf et al v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co.,
29 L. I).. 327; Beaudette v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co.. 29 L. I).. 248;
Tulare Oil & Refining Co. v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., -J (.» L. D., 269.
But to a mineral character the deposits must be workable at a profil
above that for other purposes.' South Dakota Mining Co. v. McDon
aid, 30 P. I)., :>57. It is " valuable" mineral deposits thai give the
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mineral character excepting land from homestead entry. Land not
valuable for its mineral deposit is not excepted from homestead
entry. The affidavit therefore was insufficient for the basis of a con-
test, as to the mineral character of the land, and it was subject to
selection under the exchange provisions of the acts of 1897 and 1900,
supra.
Your decision is affirmed.
FINAL PROOF-RESIDENCE—SECTION 2307 OF THE REVISED STATUTES.
Mary E. Hahn.
Where the final proof submitted on an entry made under section 2307 of the
Revised Statutes shows that the entrywoman never established actual resi-
dence upon the land, although notified in accordance with the directions
contained in departmental decision in the Anna Bowes case that if she
desired to retain her entry she would be required to begin actual residence
upon the land within six months from notice, such proof is insufficient and
will be rejected ; but where it appears that the proof was offered prior to
the expiration of six months from the date of such notice, the entry should
not be canceled unless it be first ascertained that she did not begin actual
residence upon the land within the prescribed period.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) . Office, September 7, 1905. (F. W. C.)
Mary E. Hahn has appealed from your office decision of August
5th, last, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting her
proof proffered under her homestead entry made September 19, 1902,
covering the S. ± of SW. J of Sec. 22, NE. i NW. \ and NW. \ NE. J,
Sec. 27, T. 25 N~, R. 42 W., Alliance land district, Nebraska.
The decision of your office, as well as the action of the local officers,
was based upon the fact that claimant had never established an
actual residence upon the land included in her homestead entr}7 .
In the case of Anna Bowes (32 L. D., 331) it was held that the widow7
or minor orphan children of a deceased soldier or sailor making
homestead entry under section 2307 of the Revised Statutes must
comply with the provisions of the homestead law as to residence and
cultivation to the same extent as a soldier or sailor making entry
under section 2301 of the Revised Statutes. The entry in question
was made under the provisions of section 2307 of the Revised Stat-
utes, claimant showing that she is the widow of Joseph Hahn,
deceased, who w7as on the 20th of April, 1861, enlisted as a private in
Company H, Sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and was
mustered into the United States service as such for the period of
three months on the 10th of May, 1861 ; that he Avas appointed a
sergeant on the last named date and mustered out June 16, 1861, to
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reenlist for a period of three years; that he was enlisted as a private
of Company H of the Sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteer Infantry
on the 18th day of June, 1861, for a period of three years; and that
lie was transferred to the Veteran Reserve Corps November 15, 1861,
by order of the War Department. In her proof claimant admits
that she never established actual residence on the land covered by
her entry and never built a habitable house thereon, that the only
improvements made thereon consisted of about three-quarters of a
mile of fencing, valued at $75, and that she did no cultivation on
the land, but gave parties the right to use it for grazing cattle, which
seems to have been the only use made of the land since her entry.
Departmental decision in the Bowes case, supra, directed that per-
sons having uncompleted entries made under section 2307 be notified
that if they desired to retain such entries they would be required to
begin actual residence upon the land within six months from the
issuance of such notice, or, if they so elected, they would be permitted
to relinquish their entries without prejudice to their homestead rights,
by giving notice of such election within the same time. From the
report of the local officers, dated April 5, 1905, it appears that on
November 30, 1901, claimant was advised that actual residence on her
homestead entry was required, and also of her option to relinquish
her land without prejudice to her homestead right, if she desired, and
that registry return receipt, signed by her December 5, 1901, of such
notice, is among the papers. She does not appear to have elected to
relinquish her entry without prejudice to her homestead right, and
does not appear to have begun actual residence upon the land, as
required. Her proof was offered, however, March 11, 1905. before
the expiration of six months from the date of the notice given her
as required by the decision in the Bowes case. For the reason^
given in the decision in the Bowes case, your office decision, rejecting
the proof proffered by Mrs. Hahn, is affirmed. You will advise her
hereof and institute inquiry to learn whether she has begun actual
residence upon the land within the period prescribed in the depart-
mental regulation heretofore referred to. and in event she has not.
her entry will be cancelled.
LIEl SELECTION INDKK A( I OF .JINK 1, 1897 I'KNDIN*. M IIOOL
indkmmtv selection.
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company.
Pending disposition of ;i school-land indemnity selection, even though erro
neonsly received, selection of the same land in lion of a tract in a forest
reserve relinquished under fehe exchange provisions <>r the act "f June l.
1897, Should not ho allowed.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) ' Office, September 8, 1905. ' (F. W. C.)
The Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company has appealed from your
office decision of December 13, 1904, rejecting its application, prof-
fered under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), to select lots 1 and
2 and the S. \ of NE. J, Sec. 3, T. 28 N., R. 6 E., M. D. M., Susan-
ville land district, California, in lieu of an equal quantity of land
relinquished to the United States in the San Francisco Mountains
forest reserve, because of certain prior school indemnity selections
made of said lands; also, its application to contest the State's selec-
tion.
The selection in question was presented and rejected February IT,
1904. In the report of the local officers, dated June 8, 1904, it is
stated that on March 16, 1904, H. D. Burroughs, as attorney in fact,
filed a motion asking that the application be placed on file and held
subject to any rights the State of California might have under its
school land indemnity selection, and that on the same da}^ the local
officers notified him that the rejection of his application was " sus-
pended and revoked pending consideration of the motion," and that
on March 23, 1904, the local officers denied the motion and held " said
application as rejected," from which action an appeal was taken upon
the grounds: (1*) in holding that the lands applied for were segre-
gated by the State indemnity selection, and (2) that said indemnity
selection was invalid and void for the reason that the lands used as
a basis therefor " are not within a forest reserve, but are within
temporary withdrawals and therefore do not constitute a lawful
basis for State and indemnity selections."
At the time of the filing of this appeal there was also filed an affi-
davit, made by H. D. Burroughs, to contest the State's selection,
alleging that the lands made the basis therefor " are not within a
forest reserve, and are not such lands as entitle the said State to
selection of other lands in lieu thereof, and do not constitute a law-
ful basis for the selection of public lands for said school lands."
Long prior to the filing of the application in question, to wit, on
August 20, 1903, an application to select the lands here applied for,
as school indemnity, had been filed in the local land office and accepted
by the local officers on a base of the W. ^ of NW. \ of Sec. 36, T. 23
N., R, 16 E., and lot 4 and part of lot 3, Sec. 36, T. 22 N., R. 17 E.,
M. D. M., alleged to have been lost to the school grant by reason of
inclusion in a forest reserve.
With regard to said base lands, the facts appear to-be as follows:
They were placed within a temporary withdrawal December 24, 1902,
for examination and investigation with a view to their inclusion
within a forest reserve, but on January 20, 1904, Sec. 36, T. 23 N., R.
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L6 E., was released from reservation and Sec. 36, T. 22 N., R. IT E.,
was also released September 20, 1904.
By departmenta] decision of December 10, 1903, ex parti Stat< n\'
California (32 L. I).. 346), it was held that the mere inclusion of
sections 1<> and 36, granted for school purposes, within a withdrawal
made for the purpose of permitting investigation and examination
of the Lands with a view to their possible inclusion within a forest
reservation does not place them within a "reservation" within the
meaning of that term as employed in the act of February 28, 1891
(26 Stat.. 796), and therefore does not afford a base for selection of
indemnity lands. Thereafter the State filed a motion for review.
asking that, should the motion he denied, the selections theretofore
made on account of such bases might he permitted to stand until the
question as to whether reserves should be created of the land- there-
tofore withdrawn, and. if so. to what extent, i- determined, and
February 13, 1904, the Department, in denying the motion for review,
granted the State's request. This action was just four days prior to
the presentation of the application here in question \)\ the Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Company, and although, as before stated, it had
been determined as early as January 20, 1904. that section 36, town-
ship 23 north, range L6 east, would not he included within a foresl
reserve, and on September 20. 1 (.X)4. that the remaining tract made
the basis of the selection in question would not be included within a
forest reserve, final order was not made for the cancellation of the
selection until March is. L905.
In the case of Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company v. State of Cali-
fornia, decided July 3, 1005 (84 L. D., 1^). considering a similar
application to select, filed Uy the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company,
it was held that
—
Good administration requires that pending the disposition of n selection, even
though erroneously received, no other application including any portion of the
land embraced in said selection should be accepted nor should any rights be
considered ;is initiated by Hie tender Of any such application.
This rule of administration has been followed for many years and
the applicant was undoubtedly fully apprised thereof when tendering
the application here in question. His motion, following the first
rejection of his application, asking for suspension of action upon his
application, or that the same he permitted to remain subject to rights
under the State's selection, tends to establish such a knowledge on his
part, and while it is true that your office should have canceled the
State's selection as soon as it was determined that the base land-
would not he needed, yet it must he held that the local officers correctly
rejected the application here under consideration, when presented,
because of the pending indemnity -election by the State. The appeal
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by the applicant from such rejection entitled it onty to a judgment
as to the correctness of the action when taken.
With regard to the application to contest, nothing was alleged
therein but what was fully disclosed by the records of your office and
which had been fully considered and passed upon in the decisions
hereinbefore referred to. There was no necessity for a hearing to de-
velop these facts nor could any rights be considered as initiated by
the filing of such application.
The action of your office in rejecting this application to contest,
as well as that affirming the local officers in rejecting the application
to select, is affirmed.
lieu selection under act of june 4, 1897—conflict with prior
application.
Aztec Land and Cattle Company.
Where a selection tendered under the exchange provisions of the act of June 4,
1897, is in conflict with a prior pending application, the selector should be
apprised of the conflict and given opportunity to protect his rights by
proper proceedings.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( S. V. P.
)
Office, September 11, 1905. (J. R. W.
)
The Aztec Land and Cattle Company, Limited (hereinafter styled
the company), appealed from your decision of March 9, 1905, reject-
ing its selection under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), for
1,201.77 acres of land, including the SE. \ of the SW. \, Sec. 5, the
E. i of the NW. I, and the NE. J of the SW. J, Sec. 8, T. 17 N., R. 4
E., B. M., Boise, Idaho, in lieu of 1,200 acres of land relinquished to
the United States in the San Francisco Mountains forest reserve,
Arizona.
March 10, 1904, at 9 A. M., William G. Cadby presented his timber
and stone application to purchase the tracts above described under
the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89). On the same day, at 3:15 P.
M., the company presented its application, not knowing, as it is
said, anything of Cadby's application. The company's applica-
tion was apparently in all respects regular, except that the affidavit
that the base assigned had not been used for any prior selection bore
date some months prior thereto. The local office rejected the com-
pany's application for that sole reason, not for conflict with Cadby's
application. The company promptly, but after March 10, 1904, ob-
tained and filed other affidavits to the fact required to be shown.
Your office held that these proofs were not of the substance of the
application and might be furnished later, but rejected the company's
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selection because of the conflict with Cadby's application as to one
hundred and sixty acres of the land embraced therein. This ruling
is assigned for error. It is claimed that the. applicant should have
been informed of the conflict and have been given opportunity to
eliminate such land and to substitute other, so as to fill its selection
and exhaust the base assigned.
The papers on their face show that no conflict of claims was
intended by either of the parties, as Cadby's declaratory papers were
dated at Meadows, Idaho, March 7, 190-L, and were transmitted by
mail. The company's selection was made and dated by its attorney
in fact, March 9, 1904, and the accompanying affidavits as to the
character and condition of the land selected are dated at Boise, Idaho,
March )*, 1904. Each party was proceeding independently, Cadby
presenting the first application. The selection, without fault or intent
of the selector, was practically a partial one. The proper course in
such case, in the interest of economical administration and just regard
to the evident good faith of the second applicant, was that he should
be informed of the conflict as to part of the land he selected and be
given opportunity to eliminate such tracts. The local office erred in
not so doing. Upon being advised of it, he was entitled to an election
of three courses for protection of his rights: (1) He might abide his
application and contest the right of the prior applicant. (2) He
might ask to amend by eliminating the land in conflict, waiving the
excess of base, and so save the remainder of his selection, if he deemed
that to his advantage; (3) or eliminate the excess and so exhaust the
base by selecting other land subject to such appropriation. William
A. Orser, 33 L. I).. 352. Your office erred in peremptorily rejecting
the selection. Your decision is vacated, so far as it rejects the selec-
tion, and the case is remanded to your office for further proceedings
appropriate thereto.
timbek am) stone act—"lands chiefly valuable for stone."
Xakvek v. Eastman.
"Lands chiefly valuable for stone" are subject to entry under the net of June :'».
lsis. regardless of whether or not the stone can, under existing conditions,
considering the cost of quarrying and transportation, be marketed at a
profit.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) Office, September //. 1906. (D. C. EL)
The record shows that on May 25, L903, George Eastman made his
sworn statement under the aet of dune 3, L878 (20 Stat, s '.n. for the
purchase of the E. \ of tlie NE. \ of Sec. It, T. L9 N.. K. -".7 E.,
Spokane Falls, Washington, land district, alleging the land to be
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unfit for cultivation and chiefly valuable for its stone, and that on the
same day notice of intention to submit proof in support of his said
statement and application was issued and duly published. On June
2, 1903, Andrew F. Narver filed protest against the allowance of
Eastman's said application setting forth " that at least one half of
said tract is good agricultural land and good for grazing purposes
and not such land as would be considered stone land," and on June
16, 1903, said Narver, as assignee of Harriet Jefferson, widow of
Thomas Jefferson, filed soldiers' additional homestead application
for the above described land, which said application was suspended
and held to await action on the final proof of said Eastman, to be
submitted in support of his aforesaid application for said land.
On the day fixed for the making of final proof, August 15, 1903.
Eastman appeared and submitted proof. Narver also appeared and
cross-examined Eastman and his witnesses and further testimony as
to the character of the land was introduced by both parties.
The local officers found that the land is chiefly valuable for the
stone therein contained and recommended that Narver's protest be
dismissed and his application to make soldiers' additional homestead
entry be rejected and that Eastman's final proof upon his timber and
stone application be approved and cash certificate issued to him for
said land.
Narver appealed to your office, where, on October 8, 1904, a de-
cision was rendered reversing the action of the local officers and
rejecting Eastman's application and final proof. The case is before
the Department on the appeal of Eastman from your said decision.
The concurrent findings of the local office and of your office, to the
effect that the land is unfit for agricultural or grazing purposes and
that it contains large quantities of stone suitable for building culverts
and for the foundations of houses, appear to be sustained by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in the case.
The testimony shows that there are three large ledges of rock run-
ning through the land and a great deal of loose rock scattered over the
tract, that the quantity of stone in the land is estimated at over two
hundred and thirty four thousand perches, which in its present state
is valued by a stone mason (the only witness who attempts to fix its
value) at fifteen cents per perch, and that if the stone is taken from
the land and sold in the nearest market, about 12 miles distant, it will
bring from seventy five cents to one dollar per perch, and that the
cost of transporting the stone to market will be $4.00 or $5.00 per
perch. And it further appears from the testimony of one witness
(the only one who fixes the price) that the cost of quarrying the stone
will be about fifteen cents per perch.
The local officers and your office, while concurring in opinions as to
the material facts in the case, differ in the conclusions arrived at, said
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officers holding that the land is chiefly valuable for its stone and your
office holding that, although the land contains large quantities of
stone which may be utilized for building culverts and for the founda-
tions of houses, yet the cost of quarrying the stone and putting it in
market would so far exceed the price for which it could be sold as to
leave the stone without any commercial value whatever. In other
words, your decision seems to be based upon the theory that the com-
mercial value of an article is the net profit it will yield over and above
all costs of production and transportation to market.
The Department does not concur in this view. It does not follow
that because there is no clear profit arising from the sale of an article
that has been manufactured or produced that it therefore has no
commercial value. Take for example the farmer. In the course of
husbandry, it frequently happens that different crops raised by the
farmer when put in market do not sell for enough to pay the costs of
their production and transportation, but can it be truly said that said
crops have no commercial value simply because after the same have
been sold and all expenses incident to their production and shipment
deducted, there is no clear gain to the farmer, and therefore, as a
corollary, that the lands are not valuable for agricultural purposes?
And the same may be said as to the entry under this act of land valu-
able " chiefly for stone." Could not the land be valuable chiefly for
stone even though, because of its remoteness from market of other
causes, the stone could not then be sold for a remunerative price?
The statute does not say that the stone must be of a commercial
value, or, as you construe that term, can be sold at a profit. The
statute says. " lands chiefly valuable for stone." To adopt the con-
struction you place upon the act requires the interpolation therein of
a word so as to make it read as though Congress had said, "lands
commercially valuable chiefly for stone," a thing not justified in view
of the plain language used.
In the case of Smith v. Buckley (IT) L. I).. 821), the Department in
effect held that, in determining whether land is subject to entry under
the coal land law. the costs of transportation can not be taken into
consideration as affecting the value of the coal shown to exist in the
land; and no reason is seen why the same principle should not hold
good and be applied in this case.
The real question to be determined in the case at bar is, whether the
land involved herein is of such character that it can be entered under
the act of June 3, 1878, known as the timber and stone act.
Evidently the statute has reference to the intrinsic value of the land
because of its stone, and if the land be found to be thus valuable and
the applicant be willing to invest his money therein, he should !>«'
allowed to make entry thereof, regardless of the question a- to whether
the investment will prove to be profitable <>r n<>t.
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In the case of the United States v. Budd (144 U. S., 154, 167), it
was held that the said statute' of June 3, 1878, does not refer to the
probabilities of the future, but deals with the facts as they exist at
the time the application to purchase the land is made and the proof
in support thereof is submitted. See also Gilmore v. Simpson (16
L. D., 546).
In the case at bar, under the statute and Eastman's application, the
chief value of the land must be the stone contained therein, and if the
stone has a distinct value and is found in large ledges running through
the land and is scattered over it in such quantities and in such manner
as to render the tract in its present state unfit for cultivation, the land
belongs to the class contemplated by the statute and should be en-
tered thereunder.
The evidence in this case showing by a clear preponderance that the
land in question is unfit for cultivation, and that the stone in its pres-
ent state has a specific value, the said land is of the character con-
templated by the act of June 3, 1878, supra, and comes within its
scope and meaning.
The decision appealed from is accordingly reversed, Narver's pro-
test will be dimissed and Eastman's application and final proof ap-
proved. Since the case has been pending here on appeal, Narver has
filed a virtual withdrawal of his protest against the application of
Eastman to purchase the land in question and has asked that his ap-
peal to your office from the action of the local office rejecting his said
protest be dismissed, but, as the appeal has already been considered
and passed upon by your office, the said request can have no effect or
bearing upon the case.
v
Narver has also, since the case has been here
on appeal, requested that he be allowed to withdraw his soldiers' ad-
ditional homestead application for the said land and also the sol-
diers' additional homestead scrip filed therewith, which said applica-
tion is returned to your office for appropriate action.
FOREST RESERVE—SELECTION UNDER EXCHANGE PROVISIONS OF ACT
OF JUNE 4, 1897.
Frank F. McCain.
Two distinct classes of exchanges are authorized by the act of June 4, 1897
:
first, perfected titles, where title is given and title is received, in which case
nothing is required to be done by the selector but to vest the United States
with good title to the land relinquished in a forest reserve and to select the
land taken in lieu thereof in accordance with the law and regulations gov-
erning such exchanges ; and second, unperfected claims, wherein the lands
taken in exchange are taken by the selector with credit for his previous
partial compliance with the law governing his entry, settlement, or claim
upon the relinquished land, but with obligation under such law to do such
acts as he had, prior to his relinquishment, not yet performed.
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The provision in the act of July 4, 1884, that the lands in the former Columbia
Indian reservation by said act restored to the public domain should he dis-
posed el' "to actual settlers under the homestead laws only," is no bar to
the selection of portions of said lands in lieu of. an unperfected claim to
lands in a forest reserve, based upon homestead settlement, and relinquished
under the exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 1897.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Lund
( S. V. P.) Office, September 12, 1905. (J. E. W.)
The heirs of Frank F. McCain appealed from your decision of
March 9, 1905, denying their homestead entry for the XE. ] NE. j.
Sec. 10, E. J SE. 1 and SE. \ XE. J, Sec. 3, T. 36 X., R. 21 E., W. M.,
Waterville, Washington, selected under the act of June 4. 1897 (30
Stat., 36), in lieu of the unperfected claim of their father, Frank F.
McCain, as a settler upon the unsurveyed W. ^ NW. ^, Sec. 31, T. 36
X.. R. 20 W., and E. ± NE. J, Sec. 36, T. 36 N., R. 19 E., in the
Washington forest reserve, established by executive proclamation of
February 22, 1897 (29 Stat, 904).
The land selected and that relinquished is within the former Colum-
bia Indian reservation and was restored to the public domain by
Executive order of May 1, 1886, under the act of July 4, 1S84 (23
Stat, 76, 79), which provided that after allotments to Indians
—
the remainder of said reservation to be thereupon restored to the public domain
and shall be disposed of to actual settlers under the homestead laws only,
except such portion thereof as may be subject to sale under the laws relating
to the entry of timber lands and of mineral lands, the entry of which shall
be governed by the laws now in force concerning the entry of such lands.
June 18, 1904, Florence M. Green, describing herself as " one of the
heirs [and] for all of the heirs of Frank F. McCain, deceased,'' filed
an application to make homestead entry for the lands selected herein
above first described. Therewith she hied an affidavit that she is
the daughter of Frank F. McCain, who died March 21, 1902, then
unmarried. Leaving the affiant, another daughter and a son ol' full
age, and four other children now minors; that May 10, 1895, McCain
made homestead settlement on lands above last described, which are
non-mineral, agricultural and unsurveyed, and resided thereon and
cultivated the same until his death, having made certain described
buildings and other improvements of the value ol' $800; that the
land was after his settlement and improvement included in the
forest reserve; and that the heirs desire to change their settlement
to land outside the reserve and to -elect in lien thereof the land
herein first described. This is corroborated by two witnesses of
their personal knowledge. McCain having made no entry, -he ten-
dered the \'w> therefor.
The local office rejected the application upon authority of William
C. Quinlan, 30 I,. D.. 268, and upon her appeal to your office that
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action was affirmed upon authority of departmental decision of Au-
gust 8, 1902 (unreported), in the case of Jesse H. Sherman.
The act of June 4, 1807 (30 Stat., 36), provides—
that in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected bona fide claim ....
is included within the limits of a forest reserve, the settler .... may, if he
desires to do so, relinquish the tract to the government and may select in
lieu thereof a tract of vacant land open to settlement . . . . : Provided further.
That in cases of unperfected claims the requirements of the laws respecting
settlement, residence, improvement, and so forth, are complied with on the
new claims, credit being allowed for the time spent on the relinquished claims.
An entry in lieu of an unperfected claim is of the same character
as the claim relinquished and the law governing the original claim
applies thereto. The entry applied for in the present instance was
a homestead and permissible under the act of 1884, supra, governing
disposal of the lands here involved. In the cases of Quinlan, supra,
cited by the local office, and Sherman, cited by your office, the land
relinquished and assigned as base for the selection was held in fee sim-
ple title by patent from the United States. The selector had nothing
to do in the way of compliance with the homestead law or of proof of
such compliance. Those decisions are not applicable to the case
here, wherein the application in its terms was not an exchange of
title given for 'title relinquished, but is for a " transfer of settle-
ment," as stated in the application.
There are two distinct "classes of exchanges authorized by the act
of June 4, 1897. First, perfected titles, where title is given for title
received. They partake of the nature of private entries, warrant
and scrip locations. Nothing is required to be done by the selector
but to vest the United States with good title to the land relinquished
in a forest reserve and to select the land taken in Heu of it in accord-
ance with the law and regulations for making of such exchanges.
Second, unperfected claims, wherein the lands taken in exchange
are taken by the selector with credit for his previous partial com-
pliance with the law governing his entry, settlement or claim upon
the relinquished land, but with obligation under such law to do
such acts as he had, prior to his relinquishment, not yet performed.
To such cases the decisions in Quinlan and Sherman, supra, are not
applicable. The present application ' was of this class and was to
make a homestead entry of land subject thereto in lieu of a right to
make a homestead entry of the relinquished land for which no
entry had been made for the sole reason that the land settled upon
and improved had not been surveyed.
Technically speaking, the entry was properly denied for insuf-
ficiency of the relinquishment. Upon McCain's death the homestead
settlement right under the law, there being no widow (Revised
Statutes, Sec. 2291), descended to his children in equal shares.
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( Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S., 242.) Three of his seven children
are alleged to be of full age and four to be minors. Florence M.
Green, only one of those of full age, has relinquished. Though she
professes to relinquish on behalf of all she does not show a power to
act on behalf of the other two of full age or as guardian for the
minors. The relinquishment should be executed by all the children
of full age and by a guardian for the minors duly appointed and
authorized by the court so to do for the purpose of effecting a trans-
fer of the settlement to the land selected.
The action of the local office and of your office in rejecting the
application was therefore the necessary result of the insufficiency
of the relinquishment, but of this defect the applicant was not ad-
vised and had no opportunity to remove it. The decision is therefore
vacated and the heirs will be given reasonable time to cure the
application made for all the heirs by filing a full and complete
relinquishment of and on behalf of all of them.
TIMJtEU AND STONE ACT—PURCHASE BY MARRIED WOMAN—PROOF.
Minnie J. McAtee.
In case of nn application by a married woman to purchase under the timber and
stone act, it is immaterial whether the proof that she proposes to make the
purchase with her separate money and for her own use and benefit be shown
by the particular specified affidavits in the regulations, or in some other
manner, so long as the facts required to he shown are proved by competent
evidence in some portion of the record.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) Office, September 13, 1905. (J. R. W.
)
Minnie J. McAtee appealed from your decision of January 13,
L905, rejecting her proof made October 6, L903, upon an application
under the act of dune 3, L878 (20 Stat., 89), to purchase the SAY. j
of the X \Y. |. the X\V. { of the SW. '. Sec. L3, and lots 1 and 8, Sec.
14. T. 3 X.. R. 5 E., II. M., Eureka. California.
May 6, L903, Mrs. McAtee filed at the local office her application, on
form 4-001 : her affidavit, in duplicate, on form 4r-537 ; her affidavit
of not having previously exhausted her rights, on form 4-102 I>: and
her non-mineral affidavit, on form 4-062. The register thereupon
issued notice for publication for proof to be made October 6, L903,
and notice was duly given and proof thereof filed. On the day fixed
Mrs. McAtee appeared at the local office and submitted proof. The
government was represented by a special agent of your office, who
cross-examined the applicant and her witnesses at considerable length.
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In her direct testimony, on the regular blanks, to questions 11 to 15,
inclusive, reduced to narrative, she testified
:
I am not a practical lumberman ; I expect to keep this land and lumber on it
when I get title to it ; I do not know of any capitalist or company which is
offering to purchase timber land in the vicinity of this entry ; no person has
offered to purchase this land after I acquire title to it; there is no nearest or
best market for the timber on this land at the present time.
Cross-examination. I visited the land for two hours May 4, with Mr. Garrett,
Dr. Perott, and Mrs. Garrett ; all my information as to corners. &c, was from
Mr. Garrett ; neither he nor any other person has any interest in my claim, nor
has offered to purchase or to find a purchaser for it or the timber thereon when I
shall have acquired title ; I do not know and have not heard that my locator is
working for or in the interest of or has any connection with any person or firm
operating, investing, or speculating in timber or timber lands ; my locator is a
proof witness ; he has just proved up on his claim and his wife is to today ; Dr.
Perott and Mrs. Garrett also located adjoining me ; I had no conversation with
them as to what they intended to do with their claims ; I know of no person,
firm, or corporation, or agent of such, operating in or purchasing timber or
timber lands in that vicinity ; I have had no communication, verbal or written,
with any such relative to purchase or sale of my claim or the timber thereon or
its value ; and do not know and have not heard of any person securing or
procuring timber or timber lands by inducing people to make timber land
entries ; I have not solicited any person to make such entries in order to enable
other persons to procure the timber from me ; I know of no persons or firms
who have recently!1 purchased timber lands or timber in the locality; I expect to
keep the land and timber when I have acquired title ; I do not know how long I
will keep it ; I don't expect to sell it, have not made any plans to sell it ; I
purchase this tract for my own use, for my own benefit ; I have no personal use
for the timber ; I expect to keep it until I get old and educate my children and
derive the benefit from purchase of this land. At the time I made application
for this claim I intended to make money from it and derive a benefit or I would
not have taken it ; the land is so situated that considering my occupation,
circumstances, and condition in life I can use the money I get for the timber for
my own exclusive use and benefit; I own no real estate in the vicinity or in the
State ; my intent as to cutting the timber myself, have some one cut it, or to
sell it, is that I will without doubt have to sell it ; I expect to keep the land
after I have acquired title; I think I can use the money for the lumber or
timber on this claim for my own exclusive use, but I can't use the timber ; when
I made the application it was my intent to sell the timber and use the proceeds.
The local office, making reference to but part of this testimony, and
not regarding its entirety, found and held :
That .... as she has no personal use for the timber only that she may sell it
at a profit ; second, that the land is inside of the reservation made by order of
the General Land Office on October 1, 1903—
rejected the proof. Your office, reviewing the case upon her appeal,
set out the requirements of sections 2 and 3 of the act of June 3, 1878,
supra, and making special reference to form 4—537, page 292, general
circular of January 25, 1904, held that
—
None of the requirements of law prescribed by sections 2 and 3 of said act
have been complied with, either in form or substance. In this connection atten-
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tioD is called to the ruling of the Department in 33 L. D., •_!<;:> I M. Edith Curtis],
and eases therein cited, in view of which the action of your [the local] office is
affirmed.
Your office in examination of the record evidently overlooked the
duplicate affidavit on form 4r-537, made before the register of the
local office. The papers transmitted to the Department -how full
compliance with all the requirements of the law in due and regular
form, and with all requirements of the regulations in such case pro-
vided, save the provision (General Circular of January 25, 11)04, page
40) respecting entries of this kind by married women, that
—
in addition to the proofs already provided for she shall make affidavit at the
time of the entry that she proposes to purchase said land with her separate
money, in which her husband has no interest or claim: that said entry is made
for her sole and separate use and benefit; that she has made no contract or
agreement whereby any interest whatever therein will inure to the benefit of her
husband or any other person; and that she has never made an entry under said
act or derived or had any interest whatever, directly or indirectly, in or from a
former entry made by any person or association of persons.
No separate affidavit under this requirement is found among the
papers, but all the matters therein required to be shown by separate
affidavit of a married woman, save the provision of the first clause,
are fully covered by the affidavit on form 4-537, and also by her
testimony, especially that upon her extended cross-examination,
above set out. In addition thereto, on cross-examination, she testi-
fied, reduced to narrative, that
:
I have heen employed by A. Brizard and I work in the post office, and my com-
pensatiOD averages during the month about $25 or $30 and my living expenses.
I have a husband and two children; I ordinarily save out of my earnings about
Sir. a month; I have kept the money which I have saved at home and then I
have cattle which I buy and sell; I got this money for paying for the land and
all expenses connected with the filing, out of my earnings; I am not borrowing
any, it is my own money.
All the elements of proof of facts required by the law or the regula-
tions thus fully appeared in the record. In judicial or administra-
tive proceedings it is generally immaterial how a fact appears, so
only it is proved by competent evidence in any part of the record. In
the Lake Superior Ship Canal. Railway and Iron Company /'. Pat-
terson (30 L. I).. L60, ITS), speaking of notice of final proof, the
Department held that :
The accomplishment of this purpose, rather than the manner in which it is
accomplished, is the matter most to he considered, and where it appears that
this purpose has been fully accomplished, the particular manner in which it was
done becomes immaterial, its efficiency is demonstrated.
In J. M. Longnecker (30 L. I).. 611, 614) it was held that " a ques-
tion of reservation and appropriation of public lands, there being
power to make it. is one of tact rather than of mere form." Where it
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is essential to allege facts taking a contract out of the bar of the
statute of limitations, the courts generally hold that the defect of alle-
gation is cured by an answer showing the fact. Where the record
must show jurisdictional facts, as, for instance, diverse citizenship of
the parties, it is sufficient if it appear in any part of the record,
though not in the complaint, petition, or bill, where it should be
alleged. It is also generally recognized that evidence given before
the tribunal where the witness is subject to cross-examination, es-
pecially where the witness is in fact cross-examined, is of greater
evidential value than the witness's ex parte affidavit.
Applying these principles, the Department is of opinion that the
regulation as to proof by married women in such cases was sub-
stantially and satisfactorily complied with in the present case. Her
ex parte affidavit as to her acquisition and ownership of the money
with which she was making the purchase could add nothing toward
establishing the fact that it was her own separate property beyond
her testimony to such fact given orally before the local office, cor-
roborated, as it was, by the other witnesses also orally examined,
that her financial standing is good.
The land was withdrawn October 1, 1903, for the proposed
Klamath Kiveif forest reserve, by an order which provided that:
Neither this temporary withdrawal, nor the .permanent reservation of the
lands which may follow will affect any bona fide settlement or claim properly
initiated prior to the date hereof, provided that the settlers or claimants con-
tinue to comply with the law under which their settlements or claims are
initiated.
The date of October 6th for taking of the proofs was fixed by the
register, presumably because of pressure of business pending before
the office, but the proceeding Avas initiated May 6th and was unaf-
fected by the express terms of the withdrawal. The applicant prose-
cuted with diligence and complied with the law on the day fixed.
The decision in M. Edith Curtis (33 L. D., 265), cited by your
decision, merely holds that a pending timber and stone application
to purchase reserves land from other disposal by a withdrawal order
no longer than the time allowed for offer or proof. As the applicant
herein offered her proofs on the day set by the register, the decision
cited is wholly irrelevant to the case.
The local office erred in holding the application to be speculative,
or for speculation, within the meaning of that term as used in the
act. In that respect the case is controlled by the decision in Annie M.
Donahue et al., 32 L. D., 349.
The decisions of your office and of the local office are reversed, and,
if no other objection appear, the proof will be approved.
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TIMBEK AND STONE ACT-FINAL PROOF—MARRIED WOMAN—PURCHASE
MONEY.
Nellie E. Garrett.
The fact that a married woman making application to purchase under the timber
and stone net proposes to pay from her separate money only the lees and
expenses of making the entry, and to borrow upon her own credit, to be
secured by mortgage on the land, the sum necessary to pay therefor, does not
of itself impugn the good faith of the applicant, in the absence of anything
tending to show that the person from whom she proposes to borrow the
purchase money is a lumberman or engaged in acquiring timbered lands, or
that under pretense of a mortgage security the entry is made or intended to
be for his benefit or that of any person other than the applicant herself.
An applicant to purchase under the timber and stone act is entitled to a copy
of the final proof submitted on his application.
Where in final proof proceedings a witness is asked to give a categorical answer
to an interrogatory, he should be permitted, in connection therewith, to
state such facts and circumstances in explanation thereof as in his opinion
make the categorical answer the correct one to the question he is required
to answer in such form.
Acttag Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.) * Office, September 13, 1905. (J. R. W.)
Nellie E. Garrett appealed from your decision of February 3, 1905,
rejecting her application under the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89),
to purchase the NW. i of the XW. J, Sec. 12, the X. ^ of the XK. |.
and the SW. I of the NE. J, Sec. 11, T. 3 N., R. 5 E.. H. M., Eureka.
California.
The facts in this case are in every respect but one substantially
the same as in that of Minnie J. McAtee, from the same local office,
this day decided by the Department, and reference thereto is hereby
made without repetition.
The record herein discloses that the applicant was able to pay of her
separate money only the fees and expenses of her entry, and had
prepared to borrow upon her own credit, to be secured by mortgage
of the land, the sum to be paid for its purchase. This fact does not
of itself impugn the good faith of the applicant. It is not shown
that the lender, whom she named, is a lumberman or engaged in
acquiring timbered lands, or that under pretense of a mortgage secu-
rity the entry was made or intended to be for his beneiit or that of any
one but the applicant herself. Annie M. Donahue (32 L. I).. 349,
353.
»
There is further filed in this case the allidavit of the applicant,
verified before tin' register of the local office, March 25, L905, which
states, among other things, that—
At the time of the taking <>t* said proof she asked for and offered i<« pay for or
make ;it her own expense ;i copy of said proof, but thai she was refused the righl
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and privilege of having or making a copy of the same; that affiant's appeal in
this case is thereby hampered and rendered more difficult, and she is obliged
to rely upon her memory of the contents of the same
And affiant further deposes and says that her cross-examination taken and
written by and before W. S. Wade, Esq., the Special Agent of the U. S. General
Land Office, was not in all respects in form and substance as she wished it to
be with respect to her " intent " in seeking to purchase the said land : that the
said Special Agent would not permit her answers to certain of his questions to
be written as she gave them ; that he asked questions in which he set forth
matters in a different light than she desired them to be and required her to
answer them by saying simply " yes " or " no." and refused to write down any
qualifying statements or explanations ; that she believes the purpose of the
said questions was to make her said testimony show " speculation " and an
intent to defraud the government and do something she did not wish and had
no purpose of doing, and that her said answers to said questions do not truly
show her actual " intent." and were forced out of her in the manner above set
forth ; that her " intent " in seeking to purchase the said land was to hold it as
an investment, just as she would do if she purchased property of that kind from
a private individual.
In respect to these allegations it should be said that the applicant
was entitled as a matter of right to have a copy of her final proof,
to be made by her or by the local office, as might be deemed best in
the discretion of said office : if made by the local office, the applicant
in such case to pay the ordinary fees for the transcription of the
testimony.
Referring to the statement made in the second paragraph of this
affidavit, it is only necessary to sa}T that a witness may be asked to
give a categorical answer, but in connection therewith he should be
permitted to state the facts and circumstances explanatory of it.
which, in his view, make the categorical answer the correct one to
the question he is required to answer in such form.
The decision herein is reversed, and, if no other objection appear,
the proof will be approved.
Snow v. Dickex.
Motion for re-review of departmental decision of March 22. 1905,
33 L. D.. -177, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, September 23, 1905.
additional homestead extry-sectiox 2, act of april 28, 1904.
Robert Kxoetzl.
The right to make additional homestead entry accorded by section 2 of the
act of April 28. 1904. generally known as the Kinkaid Act, is limited to per-
sons who made their original entries prior to the date of said act.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( F. L. C.
)
Office, September 25, 1905. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by Robert Knoetzl from the decision of
your office of May 1. 1905, sustaining the action of the local officers
in rejecting his application to enter under the act of April 28, 1904
(33 Stat., 547), the S. \ NE. {. SE. J, and S. J SW. J, Sec. 14, SE. J
NE. ]. NW. i SE. i and E. \ SE. J, Sec. 15, T. 25 N., R. 19 W., Val-
entine, Nebraska.
The land covered by the foregoing description is applied for as
additional to homestead entry of record made by Knoetzl April 30,
1904, for the S. \ NW. \ and N. \ SW. J, Sec. 14," T. 26 X., R. 19 W.,
and the ground for the rejection of the application to make additional
entry is that the original entry was not made until after the act of
April 28, 1904.
In a corroborated affidavit accompanying his application for addi-
tional entry Knoetzl stated ** that he would not have entered the land
described above had he not supposed that he would be permitted
to amend his entry and include other lands under what is known as
the Kinkaid law ; " while in an affidavit filed in support of his appeal
to your office, and reiterated here, he states that at the time he made
his original entry he was not aware of the provisions of the act of
April 28, 1904, and had no means of knowing what such provisions
were. But whether he has acted in good faith or not in the matter
is not of controlling moment under the circumstances, for it is clear
that his application is not within the provisions of said act.
Knoetzl's original entry being still of record, his application for addi-
tional entry is governed by section 2 of said act, which provides:
The entrymen under the homestead laws .... who own and occupy the
lands heretofore entered by them, may enter other lands contiguous to their
said homestead entry.
The act in question which confers the additional entry privilege, in
terms refers to persons who made homestead entry prior to said act.
The language employed can not be so construed as to include entry-
men who own and occupy lands entered after said act. The applica-
tion of Knoetzl being based on an entry not in existence at the date of
the act, but on one made subsequently thereto, said application was
properly rejected. This has been the uniform riding in numerous
like but unreported departmental decisions.
The decision of your office herein is affirmed.
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private land claim—survey—section 10, act oe march 3, 1891.
Arroyo Hondo Grant.
The " necessary expenses " of making survey and plat of private land grants
under the provisions of section 10 of the act of March 3, 1891, one half
of which are to be paid by the grant-claimant, embrace all the expenses
necessary to the completion of such a survey as will be entitled to approval
by the Court of Private Land Claims, including the cost of publication of
notice of the survey required by the statute and the cost of additional sur-
veys, where necessary and ordered by the court, but not including the cost
of examinations in the field made by special agents of the land department.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, September 25, 1905. (E. F. B.)
With your letter of September 1, 1905, you transmit the appeal of
the claimants of the Arroyo Hondo Grant from the decision of your
office of June 8, 1905, rejecting their application to retax the cost of
survey of said grant and to eliminate therefrom the charge for publi-
cation of notices and for examination of survey in the field.
This claim has been confirmed by the Court of Private Land Claims
and has been surveyed under authority of the tenth section of the act
of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 854, 858), which provides that where
any decision becomes final the Commissioner of the General Land
Office shall cause the tract to be surveyed at the cost of the United
States, and that notices by publication of the completion of the sur-
vey shall be given in tire- English and Spanish languages preliminary
to its approval by the court.
When any survey is finally approved by the court, it shall be returned to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, who shall as soon as may be cause a
patent to be issued thereon to the confirmee. One half of the necessary expenses
of making the survey and plat provided for in this section, and in respect to
which a patent shall be Ordered to be issued, shall be paid by the claimant or
patentee.
The cost of the survey of this claim as taxed by the Surveyor-
General amounts to $1,247.58, made up of the following items:
Cost of survey * $580. 44
Cost of platting and other work in Surveyor-General's office 75. 00
Cost of first examination in the field of the survey 334. 80
Cost of publication of notice in El Boletin Popular 62. 80
Cost of publication in the Santa Fe New Mexican 58. 80
Cost of second examination in the field of survey 135. 74
Total „__ $1, 247. 58
The claimants contend that they are not chargeable with any part
of said expense, except the cost of making the actual survey in the
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field and the plat thereof. The question therefore presented by their
appeal is. What are " the necessary expenses of making the survey and
plat provided for in this section? "
The logical and most reasonable interpretation of the section is thai
they are the expenses necessary to the completion of such a survey as
will be entitled to approval by the court. The "survey and plat
provided for in this section " is a survey of which notice by publica-
tion in the manner provided by the statute has been given, and which
must be given as a necessary step to authorize its approval by the
court. It is therefore a legitimate and necessary expense to the mak-
ing of the survey and plat, one-half of which must be paid by the
grant-claimant or patentee.
Objection is also made to what appellant contends is an excessive
charge of the cost of survey in the field, in this: It is stated in the
appeal that the cost of the survey as first returned by the deputy
surveyor was $261.80. Objection was filed by the United States to
that survey and it was returned by the court for correction. It
involved an additional cost of $318.64, making the sum total for cost
of survey in the field $580.44, which was paid to the deputy-surveyor.
Appellants insist that as the objection was filed by the United
States to the first survey and no objection was made by claimant,
if any error occurred in the first survey it was due to the fault of the
officials of the United States and claimants should not be charged for
such errors.
A deputy surveyor is an officer of the United States in a limited
sense only. He is required to take the official oath and to perform his
duties under the direction of the Surveyor-General, but his work is
by contract and when the contract is executed his relations with the
government terminate.
Furthermore, the 10th section of the act, under authority of which
this survey was made, provides that upon the return of the survey to
the Surveyor-General, it shall remain in his office open to objections
for ninety days. If no objections are filed the Surveyor-General
shall approve the same and forward it to the Commissioner. If
objections are filed, they shall be forwarded with the survey and the
Commissioner of the General Land Office shall transmit them to the
court with the survey, and w ' if found to be incorrect, the court shall
return the same for correction in such particulars as it shall direct."
It is presumed from the statement in the appellant's brief that the
additional cost of $318.64 was made pursuant to the direction of the
court given under authority of the provision above referred to
and not by any direction of the United States officials, who had no
authority to determine whether the survey was made m conformity
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with the decree. So that, if the deputy surveyor was entitled to any
pay for the extra work performed under the direction of the court
it was a legitimate charge and the United States is only liable for
one-half of the expense.
The cost of examination in the field by a special agent of your
office is not a necessary expense for obtaining such a survey and plat
as will be entitled to approval by the court and hence no part of such
cost is chargeable against the grant-claimant. Those examinations
are provided for by special appropriations and are made for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the survey complies technically
with the manual and regulations of your office. The determination
of whether the survey returned by the deputy is in accordance with
the decree rests solely within the jurisdiction of the court.
The act of July 31, 1876 (19 Stat., 121), relative to the survey of
private land claims, which was in force prior to the act of March 3,
1891, as to all claims provided for by the latter act, contained a pro-
vision " that a patent shall not issue, nor shall any copy of such sur-
vey be furnished, for any such private claim until the cost of survey
and platting shall have been paid into the Treasury of the United
States by the party or parties in interest or any other party." In
construing this act it was held that the only costs chargeable to claim-
ants are for the actual survey in the field and for making the plat
thereof and that other expenses incurred by the government in
investigating the claim preliminary to the survey are not chargeable
against the claimant/ (Rancho Santiago de Santa Ana, 2 L. D.,
371.) To the same effect is the decision in Pueblo of Monterey (13
L. D., 291).
These decisions rest upon the same principle, that there are many
expenses necessarily attendant upon the survey of such claims that
the government properly incurs in making investigations for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the validity of claims and the correctness of the
work of its officials which are for its own protection and interests
and are merely incidental to and not a necessary expense of the sur-
vey. That principle applies with equal force as to the survey pro-
vided for by the tenth section of the act of March 3, 1891, and in
determining what are the necessary expenses of making such survey
and plats.
You will therefore eliminate from such cost the charge for making
examinations in the field.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
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STATE SELECTION-PREFERENCE—ACTS <>1 MARCH :;, ls<>:}, AM)
AUGUST 18, 18!>1
.
Kay v. State of Montana.
Failure on the part of a State to publish notice of an application for the survey
of lands within thirty days from the date of such application, as provided l>y
the act of August 18, 1894, does nol affect its preference right to select such
lands, for the period of sixty days from the filing of the township plal of
survey, conferred by the ;i<-t of March ''>. L893.
The provision in the act of .March .">. 1893, according to certain states a prefer-
ence right, over all persons or corporations, except prior settlers, for a
period of sixty days from the filing of the township plat of survey, within
which to select lands under grants made by the act of February 22, 1889,
was not repealed by the provisions of the act of August 18, 1894, according
a similar right of selection for a period to extend from the date of applica-
tion by the State for the survey of the lands until the expiration of sixty
days from the date of the filing of the township plat, provided notice of the
application for survey he published within thirty days from the date of the
filing of such application.
A<tht(i Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
{ F. L. C.)
'
Office, September 27, 1005. ( E. J. H.
)
The above entitled case is before the Department upon the appeal
of Albert H. Kay from your office decisions of January 28 and March
14. L905, rejecting his application to purchase the NW. \ of Sec. 2, T.
29 X.. R. 27 W., Kalispell, Montana, land district, under the timber
and stone act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89).
On March 14, 1899, the governor of the State of Montana filed an
application for the survey of the described township, and the lands
therein were withdrawn from settlement and entry or other disposi-
tion adverse to the State, under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat..
394). Such withdrawal was to become effective on March 18, 1899,
the date of receipt of said application in your office, and publication
of notice of the application for survey and of the State's preference
right of selection was made, commencing April 27, 1899.
It appears that on October 17. 1904, the township plat of survey
was filed in the local office and on the same day Kay Hied his appli-
cation to purchase the tract in controversy under the timber and stone
act. and November 21, 1904. within sixty days from the filing of the
township plat of survey, the State of Montana presented its applica-
tion to select said tract with others, under the grant of lands for
public buildings made by the act of February 22. L889 (25 Stat..
681 ). admitting said State into the (Jnion.
The State's application was rejected for conflict with the prior
application of Kay. from which the State appealed, alleging error
in rejecting its application and in allowing adverse filings during
the time the State had a preference right under the act of L894.
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January 28. 1905, your office decision held, that as the publication
of notice by the State was not commenced within thirty days after
the filing of its application for survey, the reservation, being con-
ditioned thereon, expired upon the lapse of time, the conditions
whereby it could be prolonged in force not having been complied
with (32 L. D.. 240) : but it was held that the State had a general
preference right of selection for sixty days after the tiling of the
township plat, as against all persons not claiming settlement on the
date of such filing, under the act of March 3. 1893 (27 Stat.. 593),
and that under said act no publication was required. McFarland '•.
State of Idaho (32 L. D.. 107).
The action of the local officers in accepting applications not based
upon settlement, adverse to the rights of the State, was held to be
erroneous, and all such applications, including that of Kay under
the timber and stone act. were rejected, and the local officer- were
instructed not to allow any of said applicants to complete entry.
It appears that subsequently to the transmission to your office by
the local officers of the foregoing appeal by the State, said officer-.
on January 17. 1905. transmitted a motion filed by Kay to dismiss
said appeal, but that the same not having been filed with the record.
it was not considered in your office decision of January 2s. 1905. In
this motion to dismiss it was alleged that no notice of said appeal
was served by the State upon Kay.
It also appears that on February 11. 1005. the local officers trans-
mitted to your office the record on appeal in the matter of the proof
submitted by Kay on January 13. 1905. in support of his application
under the timber and stone act. which proof was rejected by the local
officers for the reason that the State had a preference right of selec-
tion for sixty days after the filing of the township plat as against
all who were not settlers.
March 14. 1904. in considering said matters, which had been re-
ceived from the local office and filed with the papers in the case since
the original record was acted upon by your office, it Avas held that
while there was no evidence that the State had served notice of its
appeal upon Kay. inasmuch as the motion to dismiss went into the
merits of the case, it must be denied.
In regard to the rejection by the local officers of Kay's proof, it
appears that in his appeal therefrom he alleged that the State had
made selections in excess of its grant for public buildings, and that
its application to select was not accompanied by the required cer-
tificate that said selections, together with those approved and pending,
did not exceed the grant. With reference thereto your office decision
found from the records of your office that such selections do not exceed
the grant, and held that the absence of a certificate to that effect did
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not invalidate the selection, as it might be supplied on motion: that
such certificate is only required for the guidance of the local officers,
and a> it was shown that the State had not in fact exceeded it- granl
no further consideration need be given thereto'. The action of the
local officers in said matter- was affirmed.
It is strongly urged in the appeal that as the acts of March :'.. L893,
and August 18, 1894, are both enactments upon the same subject, and
as the later act. with its enlarged scope, provides a more effective
method for securing to the State a preference right to select lands
under its grants, it was intended that such later act should supersede
and abrogate the provisions of the earlier act : that inasmuch as the
State failed to make the publication of notice required by the act of
3 81)4 it is concluded from asserting any right to the land in contro-
versy as against Kay, who tendered his timber and stone application
therefor on the day of the filing of the township plat of survey long-
prior to the proffer of the State's list of selections.
In the case of McFarland v. State of Idaho (32 L. D., 107), it was
said, on page 109. that
—
The principal difference between the acts of 1893 and 1894 is. that under the
acl of 1893 lands are reserved for the benefit of the State for a period of sixty
days from the filing of the township plat of survey, whereas, under the act of
1894, they are reserved from the date of the filing of the application for survey.
if the publication required by that act is made. There would seem to be no good
reason why the State may not apply for a survey of these lands under the act
of 1894, and waive its right to have them withdrawn from the date of the appli-
cation by failing to publish the necessary notice, inasmuch as it had a right
to rely, and did rely, upon the terms of the act of 1893, for a preference righl
for sixty days from the filing of the township plat of survey. It is not
believed that the State lost any right which it otherwise bad under the ad of
L893, by failing to comply with some of the requirements of the act of 1894.
There is no material ditl'erence in the situation in the above cited
case from that in the case under consideration, the only difference
being that in the former it does not appear that the required notice
was ever published, while in this case the notice was published hut not
within the time required in said act of 189-1, so that the withdrawal
did not become effective.
A careful examination of the cases of Thomas R. ( Jrindley < t al. ( L6
L. I).. 167) and United States v. Tynen ( 11 Wall.. 88), cited in sup-
port of the contention of Kay that the act of 1893 was repealed by
the act of 1894, discloses that -aid cases can not he considered a-
authority for such claim. In each of those cases, wherein was in-
volved this question of the repeal of a statute l>y the enactment of a
subsequent one upon the same subject, with no expressed provision
therein Tor such repeal, there are provisions in the later acts that arc
repugnant to provisions in the earlier one-. That is not true in the
case under consideration.
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Under the act of 1893 the State is given a preference right for sixty
clays after the filing of the township plat of survey within which to
make its selections as against all except settlers. The practical oper-
ations under that act undoubtedly disclosed that prior to and pending
the survey in the field, many of the best tracts were settled upon and
so were lost to the State, and it was obliged to take the inferior lands,
hence the act of 1894 was passed, to enable the State to ask for the
survey and have the lands reserved from settlement from the date of
such application, thus giving the State an enlarged opportunity to
secure the selection of lands under its grants, and that was the un-
doubted purpose Congress had in view in passing it. If it be held
that said act abrogated and repealed the act of 1893, then the State
has no preference right of sixty days after the filing of the plat of
survey within which to make its selections, in any township wherein
it has not applied for the survey, published timely notice thereof and
secured the withdrawal of the lands from settlement or other adverse
appropriation.
In the case of the United States v. Tynen, supra, cited on behalf of
Kay, it is said that " when there are two acts on the same subject the
rule is to give effect to both if possible." There appears to be no
difficulty in giving effect to both of the foregoing acts. Then the
State can apply for the survey, publish the required notice and have
the lands withdrawn with the preference right of sixty days after
survey for making selections. But if the State for any reason fails to
apply for the survey and withdrawal or to cause notice thereof to be
published, it can await the survey by the Government in the ordinary
course, and have its preference right of sixty days for making selec-
tions after the filing of the plat against all but prior settlers. Xo un-
fairness to settlers or the general public would accrue from such a
situation, as after applying for survey and withdrawal, if no timely
notice thereof was published, there would be no effective reservation,
and settlements made at any time prior to the filing of the plat would
be good.
Regarding the refusal of your office to dismiss the appeal of the
State from the action of the local officers in rejecting its selection
list, because no service of said appeal was made; and also the
failure to hold that the omission of the State to file with its selec-
tion list a certificate that the selections therein, together with those
approved and pending, did not exceed the grant, the department is
of opinion that under the circumstances your office rulings were
correct.
Your office decisions are accordingly affirmed and the application
by Kay to make purchase will stand rejected.
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new mexico—uease—section 1<>, a( t 01 june 31, 1898.
Territory op New Mexico.
All leases or "permits for right of pasturage" issued by the board of public
lands of the Territory of New Mexico under the provisions of acts of the
legislative assembly of that Territory. ;111< 1 covering any of the lands granted
to the Territory by the act of June 21, 1898, should be limited, in accordance
with the provisions of section 10 of thai act, to ao1 exceeding one section or
r»40 acres of land to any person, corporation, or association of persons.
and all such leases or permits must be submitted to the Secretary of the
Interior for his approval.
Assistant Attorney General Cain />l><n to the Secretary of the Interior,
September 28, 1905. (G. B. G.
)
By reference of the Acting Secretary, August 24, 1905. I am asked
for opinion whether " Permits for Right of Pasturage." issued by the
Board of Public Lands of the Territory of New Mexico under the
provisions of an act of the legislative assembly of said Territory,
approved March 20, 1901, should be submitted for the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior under the provisions of the act of dune
21, 1898 (30 Stat., -tS-t), and whether under the terms of said act
these permits should be limited in area to six hundred and forty
acres of land.
The lands in question were granted to said Territory by the -aid
act of June 21. 1898, and section 10 thereof authorizes the legislative
assembly to make provision for " leasing all or any pari of the lands
granted in this act," not to exceed one section to any one person,
corporation, or association of person-. " but all leases made under the
provisions of this act shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, and all investments made or securities purchased
with the proceeds of ... . leases of lands provided for by this act
shall be subject to ... . approval by the Secretary of the Interior."
It appears from certain correspondence, relative to this matter,
between the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Com-
missioner of Public Lands for the Territory, and from copies of some
of these permits submitted therewith, that grazing lands granted t<>
the Territory, as aforesaid, are being occupied in large bodies under
authority of these permits, none of which, it seems, were submitted to
the Secretary of the Interior for his approval; and it is further sug-
gested that the proceeds arising from these permits are not being
invested in securities with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, or at all. but are being used for the support of the Public
Land Board.
I am of opinion that these permits arc Leases in form and substance,
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and it seems clear that they are called permits for the purpose of
avoiding the provisions with reference to leasing these lands found in
the granting act, supra. This is substantially admitted, it being
urged that the necessities and best interests of the Territory demand
that these grazing lands be leased in large bodies. In so far as these
leases undertake to authorize the occupation and use of more than one
section, or six hundred and forty acres of land, by any one person,
corporation, or association of persons, they are in violation of both
the letter and spirit of the granting act, supra, and therefore null and
void. It is also clear that if otherwise valid they are without force
and effect, unless they have been submitted to and approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. I advise you that these permits, or leases,
should be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for his approval,
and that such approval should be withheld if they embrace more than
one section of land.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
power of secretaky to withdraw public lands for municipal
purposes.
Opinion.
The Secretary of the Interior has no power to withdraw from disposal under the
general land laws public lands occupied and improved by a town for the pur-
pose of storing and conducting a water supply to the town, pending Congres-
sional action authorizing the town authorities to make entry of the same
;
' but action upon any application to enter such lands may be suspended by the
land department until the town authorities have been afforded opportunity
to secure the contemplated legislation.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
September 30, 1905. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt of a report from the Commissioner of the General
Land Office upon the request of Hon. H. M. Hogg that certain pub-
lic lands in Colorado be withdrawn from entry pending contemplated
legislation by Congress granting the same to the town of Mancos,
Colorado.
It is stated in a certified copy of a resolution passed by the board
of trustees of said town that the tract is desired for the purpose of
storing and conducting water to supply the town; that the municipal
authorities have expended $25,000 in constructing upon the lands
described a system of water works for said town, and the Senators
and Representatives of said State are requested to procure the enact-
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nient of such legislation by Congress as will enable the town author-
ities to make entry of the same. The Commissioner report- that the
land is unappropriated and recommends that the withdrawal be
made.
The matter is referred to me for opinion as to whether the action
requested can be Lawfully taken.
The Secretary of the Interior has no authority to withdraw lands
from the operation of the general land laws except as the means to
accomplish some end in the performance of the duties enjoined upon
him in the disposal of the public lands, or to reserve them for public
uses as the exigencies of the public service may require.
The power to temporarily withhold lands from the operation of the
genera] land laws with a view to submitting to Congress any question
as to their disposal is inherent under the general authority to super-
vise and regulate the manner of acquiring public lands so that all
persons may have equal opportunities and advantages in acquiring
such Lands under the general land laws, but that powder must be exer-
cised in the interest of the public and cannot in my opinion be
extended to authorize a withdrawal or reservation of land for the
benefit of an individual or a corporation although the corporation
may be a municipality.
But while the land may not be withdrawn from entry or filing so
as to take it out of the category of public lands as that term is tech-
nically applied, it would not be an abuse of authority to suspend
temporarily all action looking to the final disposal of the land until
such time as the executive authority may consider the equities of the
case.
So far as appears from anything contained in the record, the land
may be appropriated for the purposes contemplated under the right
of way acts, and as it has already been improved by the construction
of a reservoir and pipe lines to the extent of $25,000 and the town
authorities contemplate securing Congressional action authorizing
the acquisition of the land. I can see no reason why the Commissioner
should not be instructed to suspend action upon any application to
enter such land until the town authorities have been a Horded the
opportunity of securing the contemplated Legislation.
Approved:
E. A. HitchcocKj Secretary,
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railroad grant—adjustment—act of july 1, 1898.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
Where a tract of land was inadvertently patented to the Northern Pacific
Railway Company, either prior or subsequently to the act of July 1, 1898,
during the pendency of an application to make homestead entry thereof
based upon settlement made in good faith prior to January 1, 1898, the
conflicting claims of the company and the settler are subject to adjustment
under the provisions of said act notwithstanding the issuance of such
patent.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) October 4, 1905. (F. W. C.)
Your office letter of July 29, last, forwards a request, made by
resident counsel for the Northern Pacific Railway Company, that
the approval of a certain list, May 8, 1905, known as Vancouver
list No. 71, of lands subject to relinquishment under the act of July
1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), by the Northern Pacific Railway Com-
pany, as successor to the Northern Pacific Railroad Cornpan}^, be
revoked as to the tract embraced in the individual claim of Fred-
erick Girard, namely, the S. ± of SW. J, Sec. 19, T. 3 N., R. 2 E. ? for
the reason that in the opinion of the railway company the conflict-
ing claims are not subject to adjustment under the act of 1898, the
tract having been patented to the railway company prior to the pas-
sage of said act, to wit, May 27, 1895.
So much of the act in question as is material to the question under
consideration is as follows:
That where, prior to January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the
whole or any part of an odd-numbered section, in either the granted or the
indemnity limits of the land grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, to
which the right of the grantee or its lawful successor is claimed to have
attached by definite location or selection, has been purchased directly from the
United States or settled upon or claimed in good faith by any qualified settler
under color of title or claim of right under any law of the United States or
any ruling of the Interior Department
The company's contention is that where land had been patented
prior to the passage of the act it can not be said that the claim of
the company rests upon a mere definite location or selection; in
other w7ords, that it is not land " to which the right of the grantee or
its lawful successor is claimed to have attached by definite location
or selection," the effect of the patent being to fix and determine the
right of the company thereto, and in this connection it is argued
that should it be held otherwise the necessary result would be to open
anew many controversies settled and disposed of prior to the passage
of said act, which is clearly contrary to the spirit of the act, it being
one of repose.
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The tract here in question is within the overlap of the two grants
made to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of July 2,
18G4 (18 Stat.. 365), and the resolution of May 31, 18T0 (16 Stat.,
378), where the same meet in the neighborhood of Portland. Oregon.
The line to the east of Portland down the Valley of the Columbia
river was never definitely located nor constructed; the line to the
north of Portland was constructed. Within this overlap the Depart-
ment held, July 18, 1895 (Spaulding v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, 21 L. D., 57), that (syllabus ) :
At Portland, Oregon, the Northern Pacific lias two grants, the first for the
line eastward, under the act of L864, and the second northward, under the joint
resolution of 1870. and. so far as the limits of the granl cast of said city over-
laps the subsequent grant, the latter must fail; and. as the road at such point
eastward is unconstructed, and the grant therefor forfeited by the act of Sep-
teinher I'll. 1890, the lands so released from said grant, do not inure to the later
grant, hut are subject to disposal under the provisions of said forfeiture act
The application of Spaulding in this case had been filed a number
of years prior to the departmental decision; in fact, your office deci-
sion upon his application was made May 21, 1892. It will thus be
seen that the question as to the rights of the Northern Pacific com-
pany in the overlap referred to had been an agitated question for a
number of years. It might be here stated, although not material to
this case, that in a suit subsequently brought to have judicially deter-
mined the rights of the Northern Pacific Railway Company within
the conflict referred to, the Supreme Court sustained the claim of the
railroad company.
From the proof filed by (Jirard in support of his election to retain
the tract in question as against the railway company, under the
provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, it appears that lie made
settlement upon this land as early as May. L887; that he continued
residing thereon until May, L894, making valuable improvements;
that on July L3, 1891, he tendered a homestead application for this
land, which, although rejected at the time, was decided in his favor
upon appeal. It will thus be seen that the patenting of the tract to
the railway company in L895 was a clear inadvertence, as Girard's
homestead application was at that time pending undisposed of.
What good reason can therefore be advanced for denying Girard
the benefits of the act of July 1. L898? lie had settled upon the
land believing it to be excepted from the railroad grant and resided
thereon, with his family, for more than seven years; formally ten-
dered his homestead application, and his right of claim thereto was
sustained by a decision of this Department and the i-<ue of the patent
to the railway company in the meantime was an inadvertence.
It does not appear that the railway company made any disposition
of this land prior to the passage of the act of July 1, 1898, and what-
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ever might be said in a case where the land had been in accordance
with an adjudication patented to the company prior to the passage
of said act, the Department is clearly of opinion that the conflicting
claims to the tract in question are subject to adjustment under the
provisions of said act, and the request for revocation of the depart-
mental approval of the list including this tract is denied, and you
will again invite the company to make relinquishment of the tract,
advising them of the conclusions herein reached.
It would seem that the better course to pursue, where the land has
been patented to the company, whether before or after the passage
of the act of July 1, 1898, would be to request of the company a
formal reconveyance of the land preliminary to its inclusion in a list
for relinquishment under said act.
forest reserve—railroad grant—act of march 2, 1899.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mann (On Review).
Even if it be admitted, as contended by the Nortbern Pacific Railway Com-
pany, that the Nortbern Pacific land grant can never be fully satisfied
from selections made within the limits provided for in the act of July
2, 1804, and the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, such fact furnishes no
authority for permitting the company to relinquish the lands within the
Mount Ranier National Park and the Pacific forest reserve falling within
the secondary or' indemnity limits of its grant, and to select other lands
in lieu thereof, under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1899.
Departmental decision in this case of June 19, 1905, 33 L. D., 021, adhered to.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F: L. C.) October 5, 1005. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter of July 20, last, was forwarded a motion
by the Northern Pacific Railway Company for review of depart-
mental decision of June 19, last (33 L. D., 021), in the case of the
Northern Pacific Railway Company v. William J. Mann, involving-
certain described lands in T. 42 N., R. 2 E., Coeur d'Alene land dis-
trict, Idaho, wherein it was held that section 3 of the act of March 2,
1899 (30 Stat,, 993), authorizing the Northern Pacific Railway Com-
pany, upon relinquishment of lands in the Mount Ranier National
Park and the Pacific forest reserve theretofore granted to said com-
pany, to select, in lieu thereof, an equal quantity of non-mineral
public lands, does not contemplate the relinquishment by the railway
company of the lands within the reservations falling within the sec-
ondary or indemnity limits of the grant, the same not having been
selected and not being subject to selection at the date of the passage of
said act, with the consequent right of selection of other lands in lieu
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thereof, but applies only to the lands within the primary or place
limits to which the rights under the granl had attached at that date
In the decision under review, in arriving at the conclusion above
announced, it was said:
In the firsl place, these indemnity or base lands were all unsurveyed and
had been by proclamation dated February 20, 1893 (No. 44. i>7 Stat.. 1063),
reserved from all settlement, entry or other disposition en account of the
Pacific forest reserve thereby created. No selection was possible on account of
the granl while the lands were niisiirveyed. and. as a consequence, all right of
further selection was terminated by the proclamation referred to so long as
the lands remained reserved for forestry purposes. No good purpose was there-
fore apparent for providing for a release of these indemnity lands, and while
it might be admitted that a right of selection would still exist should the reser-
vation terminate, yet this furnishes no reason for securing the company's release,
as the necessity therefor would surely cease upon the termination of the
reservation.
A more controlling reason for denying the company a rignt of selection in
lieu of these indemnity lands is. that to recognize such a right would clearly
amount to an increase in the grant in this: that it would result in extending
the granted limits to the outer indemnity limits in this locality. No such pur-
pose is indicated, and under well-known rules of construction the claim which
amounts to an addition or increase in the grant must be and is accordingly
denied.
The motion alleges that :
while the case was pending on appeal the railway company filed with the Com-
missioner of the General Land <>lii<-o a description of all lands selected by it in
lieu of tracts in its indemnity limits within the Pacific forest reserve, aggre-
gating 26,280 acres, and also a tract for tract designation of losses to the
company's grant in place by reason of mineral classifications. These losses
aggregating 26,280 acres. sb<>\\ that a quantity of land exactly equal to that
within the indemnity limits in the Pacific forest reserve has been elsewhere
lost to the grant in place. There .\v<- no other available lands from which
these losses can be s;itislicd. and it is manifest, therefore, that in recognizing
the company's right to select in lieu of Pacific forest reserve indemnity lands,
there would be no increase in the total acreage of the company's grant, but
merely a satisfaction of a portion of the acreage lost to it by reason of mineral
classifications. The company by its relinquishment of right to select indemnity
lands in the area then embraced in the Pacific forest reserve, placed itself
in the position of renouncing the righl to satisfy its large losses within the
place limits, from these lands, whenever they should become subject to indem-
nity selection. It is true, as stated in the departmental decision, that no selec-
tion was possible until survey of lands, and that the lands being withdrawn
by executive proclamation, no indemnity selection thereof has yet at any time
been possible. Nevertheless, there existed ;ii the time of the company's relin
quishment pursuant to the act of March 2, 1899, and still exists, a possibility
that the lands will be restored to the public domain, and thus rendered subject
to selection. This possibility of future selection was a valuable righl and one
which the company lost by its relinquishment. As shown in our former brief
the clear understanding at the time was that the company should, in lieu of its
relinquishment, secure an increase of indemnity area elsewhere. This does not
150 DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
mean the addition of a single acre to the grant, hut simply the opportunity of
satisfying losses in full or with some degree of approximation.
We respect fully submit that the obvious intent of the transaction, on both
sides, was that this additional field of indemnity selections should be given, in
return for the railway company's forever extinguishing its right to avail itself
of these lands. Any other construction of the agreement is at once inequitable
and unilateral.
The mere fact that the lands in the Pacific forest reserve were withdrawn
prior to the passage of the act of 1899, does not affect the case. The lands were
all unsurveyed and under departmental decisions, the company could not select
them on that account. It was and still is true, however, that the company has
lost more lands than it can ever secure indemnity for within existing limits
and to now take away its opportunity to indemnify its losses up to 26,280 acres
means a diminution of the grant to that extent. As indicated in the brief filed
on appeal, the right of indemnity is a valuable right, capable of assignment, and
there is a plainly expressed transfer of this indemnity in the company's release
filed in tins case and duly accepted by the Department. Having filed a list of
lands lost to the grant within its place limits, the increase suggested is impos-
sible. On the contrary, to adhere to the former decision will mean a reduction
in the grant of 20,280 acres.
The matters set forth in this motion and not considered in the pre-
vious decision, amount to an allegation that the Northern Pacific land-
grant can never be fully satisfied from selections made within limits
provided for in the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), and the reso-
lution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat,, 378), a claim this Department can
not accede to ; but if it be as alleged, such allegation furnishes no suffi-
cient reason for disturbing the decision heretofore rendered in this case.
That decision was made under a construction of the act of 1899 in the
light of the known conditions at the time of its passage, without con-
sideration of the question as to whether the Northern Pacific land-
grant, as a whole, could be satisfied, and from the nature of the leg-
islation it can not be seriously contended that that question could or
should control its construction. If the act of 1899 authorized the
selection of other lands in lieu of those odd-numbered sections within
the indemnity limits not previously selected, then that right exists
without regard to the question as to whether the land-grant, as a
whole, might be satisfied elsewhere within the limits prescribed by law.
With regard to the possible right or necessity to resort to these
indemnity lands in the future in partial or full satisfaction of the
grant, it may be that the release of the lands in place carried with it
the right to an indemnity limit bordering on and adjoining the lands
released; but waiving this question, it seems to the Department at
this time that in the event these indemnity lands are opened to general
disposition in the future, the relinquishment heretofore executed by
the railway company under the act of 1899 should not be construed
as preventing the company from asserting claim thereto at that time.
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As said in the decision under review:
With regard to the claim that in relinquishing under the act of 1899 all its
rights etc., in and to all lands granted by the ad of July 2, 1864, and acts
amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, "by way of indemnity or other-
wise.'* the railway company intended and did waive its indemnity privileges, it
is sutlieient to say that such fact, if understood at the time, was no cause for
rejecting the relinquishment and thai as the acceptance thereof was in the
terms of the act of L899 it can not be construed as enlarging its provisions.
After a most careful consideration of the entire matter, as pre-
sented on review, the Department adheres to its previous decision,
and the motion is accordingly denied.
SWAMP LAND—AD.ruST .\1K VI'-< HAKACTER OF LAND.
CULL1GAN V. STx\TE OF MINNESOTA (On IvK-KEVIEW) .
In the adjustment of all claims resting on a selection or exchange of lands,
presented in accordance with law for public lands in the state of Minnesota,
prior to survey thereof, the land department will, by hearing or otherwise,
determine the true character of the lands selected, if claim is presented
theret i behalf <>f the State under its swamp land grant, based upon the
field notes of survey, notwithstanding the return of the held notes of sur-
vey of the township may afford a sutlieient base for the State's claim.
Departmental decision in this case of .Inly 1.".. L905, 34 L. D., 22, modified.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) October 5, 1905. (F. W. C.)
On the 22nd instant there was tiled in this Department, on behalf
of the State of Minnesota, a motion for review in the case of Patrick
Culligan /*. State of Minnesota, involving an application to contest
the swamp land selection for the State of Minnesota for certain
lands in sections 25 and 26, T. 57 X., R. 8 W., Duluth land district.
Minnesota.
This case was f i ist considered by the Department in its decision of
April 11, L904, not reported, which affirmed your office decision of
.June 17. L903, rejecting Culligan's application to contest. A motion
was filed for a review of said decision, which was entertained Novem-
ber 2D, IDOL and in the order of entertainment, of which a copy was
required to he served on the State, it was said:
The case involves the question of an alleged right, legal or equitable, «»f a
claimant for lands in the state of Minnesota under the acts of June 1. L897
(30 Stat, .".i>. and March •_'. L899 (30 Stat, 993), and upon selections there-
under made prior t<» survey, to dispute the claim of tin- State t<> such lands
under its swamp land grant and inquire into the real character of such lands
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at a hearing before the local office, notwithstanding they may, subsequent to
such selections and prior to the final approval thereof by the Secretary of the
Interior, have been returned by the surveyor-general as swamp and overflowed
lands, and notwithstanding the regulations of March 16, 1903 (32 L. D., 05),
which seem to preclude such inquiry.
The record made on review shows that service of the motion and
order were duly made upon the State and that an argument was filed
on behalf of the State in opposition to the granting of the motion.
The motion was considered in departmental decision of July 13, 1905
(34 L. D., 22) , and granted. In said decision it was said
:
The claim of Culligan arose upon certain forest lieu selections under the
act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat, 11, 30), and a selection by the Northern Pacific
Railway Company under the act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat, 993, 994), and upon
the subsequent assignment of the claims to him. The acts in question author-
ized the selection of unsurveyed lands, and the selections in question were in
fact made prior to the survey of the township in which they are situated, and
were in fact a mere exchange of lands. At the date of the selections it was
not known, and not possible to know or surmise, that the field-notes of the sur-
vey to be thereafter made would designate these lands as swamp. The selec-
tors, therefore, were without other notice of the character of this land than such
as resulted from an examination upon the ground. It is sufficiently alleged
that such examination was made and showed the land in controversy be high
and dry, and not swamp, and movant asks that he be permitted to show this
at a hearing.
It is thought that in equity and good conscience this should be done, and it is
so ordered.
In the further adjustment of all claims heretofore or hereafter initiated in
accordance with law for public lands in the State of Minnesota, prior to the
survey thereof, in instances where a selection of such lands is made by the
State under its swamp land grant, and the field-notes of survey afford a suffi-
cient basis for such selection, your office will, by hearing, or otherwise, deter-
mine the true character of the land, notwithstanding the return in the field-
notes of survey of the township.
In the motion for re-review it is urged that the change should not
be made in the existing regulations of March 1G, 1903 (32 L. D., 65),
providing for the adjustment of the swamp land grant in the State
of Minnesota, without giving the State an opportunity to be heard
in opposition to the change.
Culligan's motion admits that the decision of April 14, 1904,
against him was in accordance with these regulations but it was
sought by his motion to have the regulations modified and the order
entertaining said motion was drawn with a view of bringing to the
attention of the State particularly this feature. From a review of
the matter it can not be said that the change was made without due
opportunity of the State to be heard in the premises. It is noted,
however, that in the final paragraph of the departmental decision
of July 13, last, on the motion for review, containing an order for the
modification of existing regulations, the language used is capable
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of a construction not intended. It is broad enough to include ;> set-
tlement claim and this would amount to a return to the departmental
decision in the La Chance case (4 L. D., 479), a purpose not intended.
The entire decision shows that its scope was intended to be limited
to protect only those eases where a selection of exchange of lands
is permitted by law to attach prior to the survey of the lands, the
claim being, when filed, a complete one. it but remaining to adjust
the boundaries thereof to the lines of the public survey when extended
over the lands selected. To this extent the decision on review is
modified and the final paragraph in the decision on the motion for
review is amended so as to read:
In the further adjustment of all claims resting on a selection of exchange of
lands heretofore or hereafter presented in accordance with law for public lands
in the State of Minnesota, prior to the survey thereof, you will, by hearing or
otherwise, determine the true character of the lands selected, if claim is pre-
sented thereto on behalf of the State under its swamp land grant, based upon
the tield notes of survey, notwithstanding the return of the field notes in the
survey of the township may afford a sufficient base for the State's claim.
California and Oregon Land Co. et at,.
Motion for review of departmental decision of June 5, 1905 (33
L. 1)., 5 (.)5), denied by Secretary Hitchcock, October 6, 1905.
RAILROAD GRANT-ADJTJSTMENT-ACT OF JULY 1, 1898.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
Under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, the Northern Pacific Railway
Company is bound to accept the list of lands subject to relinquishment
under said act prepared and submitted to it by the Secretary of the in-
terior, and can not. as a matter of fight, require of the individual claim-
ant the establishment of his claim at a hearing; but where a settlement
claim has. upon an ex parte showing by the settler, been included in snch
a list, the Department, notwithstanding the approval of the list, has the
right to inquire, by hearing or otherwise, whether the showing on which
the tract was listed represented the true condition or status of the tract
involved on January 1. 1898.
Set retary Hif<-h<<></,' f<> the Commissioner of the General I. "nil Offia .
(F. L. C.) October 6, 1905. (F. W. C.)
Your office letter of the 28th ultimo presented for departmental
consideration (lie question as,to the proper action to be taken upon
a showing filed attacking the good faith of a settlement claim which
has, upon an ex parte showing, been included in a list of Lands sub-
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ject to relinquishment by the Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620),
which list has received departmental approval.
The inquiry is made in connection with the individual claim of
James Dalglish to the SW. ± of Sec. 23, T. 11 N., R. 19 W., Missoula
land district, Montana. It seems that the tract in question was in-
cluded in what is known as Montana List No. 28, of lands subject to
relinquishment under the act of July 1, 1898, a copy of which was
furnished the railway company with request for relinquishment
under said act, and in response thereto there was filed what is known
as relinquishment No. 28, State of Montana, the tract in question
being omitted because of the reported contract for the sale thereof to
Marcus Daly, February 9, 1899, subsequently to the passage of said
act.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hum-
bird et al. v. Avery et al. (195 U. S., 480), the company was again
invited to relinquish the tract in question, and in response thereto
affidavits by three persons, are filed to the effect that they are
acquainted with the land; that careful examination was made
thereof on May 27, 1899, and again January 24, 1902, and no improve-
ments were found thereon or indications that the land had been
occupied and cultivated by James Dalglish or any other person or
persons; and that the land is mountainous in character, heavily tim-
bered, and is wholly unfit for cultivation.
The tract was listed for relinquishment by the railway company
upon the ex parte showing filed by Dalglish, which is to the effect
that he settled upon this land in December, 1899, and continually
resided thereon to the time of filing his election in April, 1903 ; that
he built a house thereon in December, 1897 ; that a portion of the land
was cleared, plowed and fenced and crops raised thereon; and that
he " improved it each year since 1897, to present time."
Under the regulations of February 14, 1899 (28 L. D., 103), issued
under the act of 1898, it was proper to list the tract in question upon
the ex parte showing of the individual claimant. The list so pre-
pared received departmental approval before the railway company
was advised of the filing of the claimant's election to retain the land.
The act of 1898 provides
:
That the railroad grantee or its successor in interest shall accept the said
list or lists so to be made by the Secretary of the Interior as conclusive with
respect to the particular lands to be relinquished by it, but it shall not be
bound to relinquish lands sold or contracted by it or lands which it uses or
needs for railroad purposes, or lands valuable for stone, iron or coal.
It seems, therefore, that under the act of 1898 the railway company
is bound to accept the list as prepared and submitted to it by this
Department. It can not therefore, as a matter of right, require of the
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individual the establishmeni of his claim at a hearing. The evident
purpose of the act of L898 was to aid a speedy adjustment of con-
flicts between individuals and the railway company and to put an
end (o the expense and delay incident to the ordinary contests. The
company can not therefore appear as a contestant in this matter. On
the. other hand, the Department should not knowingly permit itself
to he imposed upon nor should it require of the company a relinquish-
ment of land to which there was in fact no real claim on January 1,
L898. Notwithstanding the approval of the list the Department has
the right to inquire whether the showing on which the trad was Listed
represented the true condition or status of the tract involved. The
showing filed by the railway company in the case under consideration
tends to discredit the showing filed by Dalglish and upon which this
tract was listed for relinquishment, and in the opinion of this Depart-
ment the railway company should he advised that if it will serve th.e
same upon Dalglish the matter will be taken up by your office for
consideration, after the usual length of time to he allowed Dalglish
to make response thereto, when, if upon the entire record as made in
this way your office believes the showing filed in opposition sufficient
to discredit the showing filed by Dalglish. you will, by hearing or
otherwise, investigate the matter in order to arrive at the true condi-
tion of the land on January 1, 1898, the nature of the claim then being
asserted to the land by Dalglish, and whether his subsequent actions
with relation thereto tend to show that he has since maintained the
claim or abandoned the same.
arid land-withdrawal settlers—act of jine 17, 11)02.
Opinion.
The power conferred upon the Secretary of the [nterior by the act of June 17,
L902, to make the necessary withdrawals to carry into effecl the pro-
visions of the act, and to acquire rights and property for the purpose con-
templated, implies the right to appropriate for irrigation purposes public
lands to which the United States has the full legal and equitable title, but
the inchoate rights acquired by a bona fide settlement made in pursuance
of and in strict compliance with the public land laws should not be arbitra-
rily taken without compensation. In determining the compensation it
should be considered with reference to the loss sustained by the settler in
depriving him of his inchoate right by the arbitrary taking of lands which
lie had cultivated, improved and resided upon under authority of law with a
view to t he acquisiti i' the title.
The Secretary of the [nterior has no authority under the provisions of the
seventh section of the ad of .lime 17. 1902, to compensate settlers upon lands
within the limits of a withdrawal made in connection with an irrigation
project unless they have in good faith acquired an inchoate righl to the
land by complying with the requirements of law up to the date of the with-
drawal and have such a claim as oughl to he respected by I he United States.
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Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
October 12, 1905. (E.F.B.)
I am in receipt by reference of a letter from the Director of the
Geological Survey requesting to be advised whether persons occu-
pying and improving public lands but who have not taken any steps
to acquire title to the same under the public land laws have claims of
such character as are properly subject to acquisition by purchase or
condemnation under the terms of the Reclamation Act (32 Stat.,
388). The letter has been referred to me for opinion upon the ques-
tion submitted.
Reference is made in the letter to two particular claims : First, the
claim of one Pemberton, who has occupied and cultivated a tract of
land within the proposed reservoir line for fifteen years, having
placed thereon substantial improvements, but who has taken no steps
to acquire title to the same under any of the general land laws. The
other claim is that of Sulton Bros, who purchased through ar. inter-
mediate grantor the improvements of Yancy Moffatt, a settler, who
improved a tract of land within the proposed area of the reservoir,
and filed a preemption declaratory statement for the tract July 11,
1885, but who has taken no further steps to complete his filing, as
required by the provisions of the preemption act.
It is presumed that the inquiry of the Director was prompted by
the following expression in the letter of the Department of January
2Q, 1905, relative to lands in the Truckee-Carson project:
As the legal and equitable title is in the United States to all public lands
to which a mere inchoate right has attached, there is no outstanding legal or
equitable title in such lands to purchase, but, the improvements of the settlers
made upon such lands under authority of the public land laws is a property
light that can not be taken without compensation, which probably may include
the enhanced value of the land by reason of the settler's cultivation and
improvement.
That expression was made with reference to the authority con-
ferred by the 7th section of the act of June IT, 1902, upon the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire rights or property by purchase
or by condemnation under judicial process and to pay for the same
from the Reclamation Fund.
A mere entry of public lands by a qualified settler with a view to
acquiring title under the general land laws confers only an inchoate
right which, although it may be asserted against every one who has
not a prior right, is no bar to the appropriation of such land by the
United States. Ordinarily such appropriation can only be exer-
cised by Congress acting directly, but the power conferred upon the
Secretary of the Interior by the act of June IT, 1902, to make the
necessary withdrawals to carry into effect the provisions of the act
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and to acquire rights and property for the purpose contemplated,
necessarily implies the right to appropriate for irrigation purposes
public lands to which the United States has the full legal and
equitable title.
It follows from this that a mere withdrawal of lands, for use in
the construction and operation of an irrigation project, under the
provisions of that act, is of itself an appropriation of all lands within
the liniit> of Mich withdrawal except lands to which a vested right
or interest had attached at the date of the withdrawal so as to de-
prive Congress of the power of disposition and control over the same.
(Instructions, 32 L. I)., 387. Board of Control v. Torrence, II). 472.)
So that the United States may exercise ownership and control over
all lands covered by such withdrawal, irrespective of the occupancy
and improvement of such lands by settlers who have not acquired a
vested right thereto, although they may have made filings and
entries and may have complied in all respects with the laws under
which their settlements were made. In such cases there would be no
property or right necessary to be acquired by the United States, as a
condition to its right to appropriate the land, but it does not follow
that a settler who had in all respects complied with the law up to the
date of the withdrawal should be arbitrarily deprived of the fruits
of his labor without just compensation.
It is more than probable that the United States may not have any
use for the improvements of the settler in the construction and opera-
tion of any project, and would therefore have no object in acquiring
them. Hence the compensation to the settler should not be meas-
ured by that alone but should he considered with reference to the loss
sustained by the settler in depriving him of his inchoate right by the
arbitrary taking of lands which he had cultivated, improved and
resided upon under authority of law with a view to the acquisition of
the title.
The power conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior by the 7th
section of the act to acquire "rights" or property, and to pay from
the reclamation fund the sum that may be required for that purpose
evidently contemplated that the inchoate right acquired by a bona
-fide
settler upon' public lands made in pursuance of and maintained in
strict compliance with the law should not be destroyed and arbi-
trarily taken without compensation. It is not a purchase of the land
that is required, because the settler has no title to sell, nor of his im-
provements, because the United States may have no object in acquir-
ing them, but it is the acquisition of the right that a hon<t pic settler
had earned by complying with the law.
In the cases referred to the parties will he deprived of no valid
rights under the general land laws. In Pemberton's case, he is a
mere squatter who had forfeited whatever right he acquired and had
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not by any act indicated a purpose to acquire title to the land for a
home. He had not in any respect complied with the law and the
taking of the land by the United States would deprive him of no
right either legal or equitable acquired under the general land laws.
Whatever improvements he has may be removed if it can be done
without impairing the right of the United States.
In the case of Sulton Bros., the sale of the improvements by the
settler was of itself an abandonment of the filing independently of
his failure to perfect the same within the period prescribed by the
statute. The statutory life of his filing had long since expired and
whatever rights he acquired thereunder were by the express terms
of the statute forfeited. While a settler may be permitted to com-
plete his filing and acquire title to the land after the time for submit-
ting proof and making payments fixed by statute, it is merely by
grace of the government and not from any right that can be asserted
by the settler in virtue of the inchoate right conferred by the statute.
My opinion is that the Secretary of the Interior has no authority
under the 7th section of the act of June 17, 1902, to compensate
settlers upon lands within the limits of the withdrawal except such
settlers who have in good faith acquired an inchoate right by com-
plying with the law up to the date of the withdrawal and have such
a claim as ought to be respected by the United States. It is the right
that the settler has been deprived of by the government that is to be
compensated for and not merely the intrinsic value of his improve-
ments. A settler who has not complied with the law has no such
right, and as to such settlers the improvements may be removed if in
doing so it will not impair the property of the United States.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock. Secretary.
arid land-withdrawals-act of june 17, 1902.
Instructions.
Withdrawals under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, in connection
with irrigation projects, will he made as follows :
1. When a site has heen selected with a view to making an examina-
tion and survey for the purpose of determining whether the construction
of an irrigation project upon such site is practicable and advisable, a with-
drawal will immediately be made of all lands believed to be susceptible
of irrigation from such contemplated works, in accordance with the second
form of withdrawal provided for by the third section of the act of June
17, 1902, and at the same time a preliminary withdrawal will be made of
lands that may be needed for use in the construction and operation of
the works, which will reserve such lands from entry of every character
but will not affect entries previously made.
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2. As soon as it shall be determined that the project is practicable and
advisable and the construction of the same is approved and authorized
by the Secretary of the Interior, a withdrawal will be made of all public
lands shown by the examination and survey to bo required for use in
the construction and operation of the works, and all persons who may
have made entry of such lands within such withdrawal prior to the pre
liminary withdrawal and who have not acquired a vested righl thereto,
will be notified of the appropriation of their lands for irrigation purposes
and that their entries will be canceled and their improvements paid for
by the governmenl .-is provided for by the eighth and ninth sections of the
circular of June 6, 1905, unless sufficient cause be shown within sixty days
from the date of such notice.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Director of the Geological Survey,
( F. L. (
;
.
)
October 12, 1905. (E. F. B.)
Referring to your letter of August 29, 1905, to the Commissioner
of the General Laud Office, requesting that the local officers be
directed not to allow final proof to be made by Ed. Sayles upon his
homestead entry for lots 1 and 2, SE. J NW. | and XE. \ S\V. j. Sec
18, T. 35 X.. R. 25 E., Waterville, Washington, Lying within the limits
of a withdrawal made for tin 1 contemplated Okanogan irrigation
project, the Department approves of the views of the Commissioner
a- expressed in his reply thereto of September 8, L905, thai no suffi-
cient reason has been shown why said entryman should be restrained
from submitting final proof upon his entry as authorized by law, it
appearing that the practicability of the project has not yet been
determined by the Secretary of the Interior so as to authorize the
appropriation of any lands Tor such purpose.
In view of the suggestions of the Commissioner of the General
Land Office and of the recommendations contained in your reply
thereto of September L6, L905, it is deemed advisable to make a deci-
sive ruling as to the effect upon existing entries of a preliminary with-
drawal made by the Secretary of the Interior for the purpose of
ascertaining whether a contemplated irrigation project is practicable
where the lands entered may be needed for use in the construction
mikI operation of the project.
The authority of the Secretary to make withdrawals under the act
of June IT. L902 (32 Stat., 388), and the effect of such withdrawals,
was considered in the letter of the Department of February 11. L903
(32 L. I).. 6), in which, referring to the two classes <d' withdrawals
authorized by the act, it was said:
The firsl withdrawal provided for by Hie third section of the ad nm-a be
made by the Secretary of the Interior before giving notice to the public of the
lands irrigable under any project that has been determined by him to be prac-
ticable and advisable, bul nothing, in the law prohibits a withdrawal prior to
such determination, with a view to an examination of any particular locality,
to obtain information to enable the Secretary to determine whether a contem
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plated project is advisable or practicable. That both withdrawals provided for
by said section may be made preliminary to the examination and survey is
shown by the provisions for the restoration to public entry of any lands not
required for the purposes of the act, and for the restoration of the lands sup-
posed to be susceptible of irrigation from the contemplated project, if it be
determined that such project is impracticable or inadvisable.
It is obvious that the expression as to the authority of the Secretary
of the Interior to make both withdrawals preliminary to the exami-
nation and survey was not sufficiently guarded as to the effect of such
preliminary withdrawal upon lands needed for use in the construc-
tion and operation of the works.
The authority to withdraw lands for that purpose is given by the
third section of the act which fixes the time when such withdrawals
shall be made. The language is
:
That the Secretary of the Interior shall, before giving the public notice pro-
vided for in section four of this act, withdraw from public entry the lands
required for any irrigation works contemplated under the provisions of this
act, and shall restore to public entry any of the lands so withdrawn when, in
his judgment, such lands are not required for the purposes of this act.
To ascertain when this withdrawal shall be made we must look to
the fourth section of the act, which provides that after the determina-
tion by the Secretary that the project is practicable he may cause to
be let contracts for its construction and shall thereafter give public
notice of the lands irrigable under such project, the limit of area per
entry and the charges to be made per acre. This is the notice re-
ferred to in the third section and it is evident that the purpose of the
statute was not to authorize such withdrawal until after the deter-
mination of the practicability of the project and to require it to be
made before the notice is given.
Such withdrawals made under express authority of the statute
" have the force of legislative withdrawals and are therefore effective
to withdraw from other disposition all lands within the designated
limits to which a right has not vested " (Instructions, 32 L. D., 387,
388), but they must be made strictly in accordance with the legis-
lative will and the Secretary cannot enlarge the power or infringe
any provision of the act (Instructions, 33 L. D., 104). The prac-
tical effect of such withdrawals is to appropriate for use in the con-
struction and operation of the works all public lands within the
limits of the withdrawal to which the United States has the legal and
equitable title. The right is also conferred upon the Secretary by
the seventh section of the act to acquire for the United States by
purchase or condemnation private rights or property that may be
needed for the same purpose. The power and authority to appro-
priate public lands is coincident and coextensive with the power to
acquire private property. Both are to be exercised after the Secre-
tary has determined that a project is practicable.
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The other provision of the statute authorizing the Secretary to
withdraw lands "believed to be susceptible of' irrigation from said
works " also fixes the time for such withdrawal. lie is authorized
'* at or immediately prior to the time of beginning the surveys for
any contemplated irrigation works" to make a withdrawal of such
lauds from entry except under the homestead law. So that, before or
at the time the survey and examination is made with a view to de-
termining whether the project is practicable, the Secretary withdraws
from entry under authority of the statute all lands (except under
the homestead law) "believed to be susceptible of irrigation from
such works." Land required for use in the construction and operation
of the works, and not susceptible of irrigation therefrom, cannot be
withdrawn under this provision of the statute, which also requires
that the "surveys shall be prosecuted diligently to completion, and
upon the completion thereof, and of the necessary maps, plans, and
estimates of cost, the Secretary of the Interior shall determine
whether or not said project is practicable and advisable, and if deter-
mined to be impracticable or unadvisable he shall thereupon restore
said lands to entry." The lands in one class are appropriated for use.
In the other class they are withdrawn from entry under the general
land laws to be disposed of under the homestead law only, subject
to the conditions and limitations prescribed by Congress.
Where the power to withdraw lands is specially conferred by a
particular act it must be exercised in strict conformity thereto.
(Instructions, 33 L. D., 104.) The Secretary can make no with-
drawals that would affect or impair entries made in pursuance of the
general land laws except by special authority of Congress, which
alone has the power to take away inchoate rights acquired by entries
under the general land laws unless such power is specially conferred
upon the executive branch of the government as in the act of June 17,
L902. ( Instructions, 32 L. I)., 387.)
Withdrawals of lands made prior to the determination by the Secre-
tary as to the practicability of an irrigation project must be exer-
cised under a ditl'erent power. If it is made under his supervisory
authority as a means to accomplish some end in the performance of
a duty enjoined upon him, it would have the effect to withhold such
lauds from entry, but could not take away inchoate rights acquired
under entries made prior to the withdrawal. In the instruction- of
February 11, L903, supra, the power to make such withdrawals was
sustained upon the ground that there is nothing in the act prohibit-
ing it, and as the act authorizes the Secretary to make examinations
and surveys with a view to determine whether any contemplated
project is practicable and advisable, a withdrawal of Lands from all
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entries pending such examination was justified as a legitimate aid
in the performance of that duty.
This view was also presented in the instructions of July 12, 1904
(33 L. D., 104), in which it was said that "such a withdrawal is
evidently contemplated by the act, and in order to make it effect ive
it must be an absolute withdrawal from entry of every character of
all lands, whether they may be needed for construction or may be
susceptible of irrigation from the works."
The instructions of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D., 607), to which you refer
have reference only to the withdrawals specially provided for by the
act, which have the force of legislative withdrawals, and not to pre-
liminary withdrawals of lands that may be needed for use in the con-
struction and operation of the works.
The Commissioner recommends that no lands embraced in a bona
fide entry existing at date of withdrawal of lands needed for con-
struction purposes should be appropriated for such purpose without
the entryman's consent, until he has had an opportunity to have the
action of the reclamation officers approved by the Department. He
suggests that as soon as it is determined that entered lands are needed
for use in the construction and operation of the works the entryman
should be notified and advised that he will be allowed sixty days from
notice in which to show cause why his land should not be appropri-
ated for such purpose.
There is much force in this suggestion. While the only showing
that could be made would be that the land w7as not needed for the
purposes contemplated, and while the recommendation of the Reclama-
tion Service should have such weight as to be practically conclusive
of that question, the rights of a bona fide entryman are certainly
entitled to consideration and he should be given the privilege to show
that his lands should not be appropriated for such use. The special
authority conferred by the act, and the general power of the Secre-
tary to employ all the necessary means to carry the provisions of the
act in full force and effect, are ample to insure the fulfillment of the
purpose of the act without infringing upon the rights of entrymen,
which should be protected as far as possible, and no withdrawal or
use of public lands should be made without due consideration of such
rights. .
Hereafter withdrawals will be made as follows
:
1. When a site has been selected with a view to making an examina-
tion and survey for the purpose of determining whether the con-
struction of an irrigation project upon such site is practicable and
advisable, a withdrawal will immediately be made of all lands be-
lieved to be susceptible of irrigation from such contemplated works,
in accordance with the second form of withdrawal provided for by
the third section of the act of June 17, 1902. At the same time a
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 163
preliminary withdrawal will be made of lands thai may be needed
for use in the construction and operation of the works, which will
ivmtvc -iidi lands from entry of every character but will not affeel
entries previously made.
2. As soon as it shall he determined that the project is practicable
and advisable and the construction of the same is approved and au-
thorized by the Secretary of the Interior, a withdrawal will be made
of all public lands shown by the examination and survey to be re-
quired for use in the construction and operation of the works, and
all persons who may have made entry of such lands within such with
drawal prior to the preliminary withdrawal and who have not ac-
quired a vested right thereto, will be notified of the appropriation
of their lands for irrigation purposes and that their entries will be
cancelled and their improvements paid for by the government as
provided for by the 8th and 9th sections of the circular of June 6,
L905 (33 L. I)., 607), unless sufficient cause be shown within sixty
days from the date of such notice.
Care must be taken to confine such withdrawals strictly to lands of
the character and class authorized to be withdrawn and not to em-
brace land- of one class in the withdrawal of lands of the other class,
nor to make any unnecessary withdrawal of land, as far as it can be
prevented.
OKLAHOMA LANDS-SCHOOL GItANT-ACT OF .TUNE 6, 1900.
Territory or Oklahoma.
Under the provision of the ad of June *',, moo, relating to the opening to settle-
nient and entry of the ceded Kiowa. Comanche and Apache lands, authoriz-
ing qualified entrymen having hinds adjoining the lands ceded, whose
entries embrace less than L60 acres, to enter so much of the ceded lands
lying contiguous as shall, with the lands already entered, make in 11k 1
aggregate L60 acres, such entrymen may make extension of their existing
entries so as to include portions of sections thirteen and thirty-three within
the ceded country, notwithstanding the provision of said acl reserving said
sections for university, agricultural colleges, normal schools and public
buildings of the Territory and future State of Oklahoma, and for nil hinds
so lost the Territory must look to the indemnity provisions of its -rant.
- tary Hitchcock to the Commissioner <>f the General L<nt<l Offta .
JF.L.C.) October /.-', 1905. (F.W.C.)
November 6, L903, the attorney genera] for the Territory of Okla-
homa called attention of this Department to the fact (hat under the
provisions of the act of June 6, L900 (3] Stat., 679), which act pro-
vided for the opening to settlement and entry of the ceiled Kiowa.
Comanche and Apache Lands in the Territory of Oklahoma, particu-
larly that provision authorizing qualified entrymen having lands ad-
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joining the lands ceded, whose entries embrace less than 100 acres, to
enter so much of the ceded lands lying contiguous as shall, with that
already entered, make in the aggregate 100 acres, persons have been
permitted to make extension of existing entries so as to include por-
tions of sections 13 and 33 within the ceded country, which claims
were allowed in plain violation of the further provision of the act of
June 6, 1900, supra, specifically reserving sections 13 and 33 for uni-
versity, agricultural colleges, normal schools and public buildings of
the Territory and future State of Oklahoma, citing particularly the
instance of S. G. Eskew for a portion of section 33, T. 8 N., E. 17 Wj
and upon consideration of the matter this Department on December.
5, 1903, directed your office to issue a notice in each instance where an
existing entry has been permitted to be extended so as to include a
portion of a section 13 or 33 within the ceded country, citing the
cntryman to show cause within sixty days why his entry should not
be canceled, advising him that any showing filed thereunder must be
served upon the proper territorial authorities.
Acting thereunder notices were issued and with your office letters
of March 24, and April 12, 1905, there were forwarded showings
filed by Samuel G. Eskew and Max Hill, respectively, the latter hav-
ing been permitted to make an additional entry so as to extend his
former entry to include lot 4 of section 33, township 8 north, range 16
west, within the ceded country. These showings appear to have been
served upon the territorial authorities but no response thereto seems
to have been filed.
In the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat,, 876, 894), ratifying the
agreement with the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians in Indian
Territory, and providing for a cession of certain of their lands, it was
provided by article 8 of said agreement
—
that whenever any of the lands acquired by this agreement shall, by operation
of law or proclamation of the President of the United States, be open to settle-
ment, they shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead
and townsite laws of the United Slates : And provided further. That
any qualified entryman having lands adjoining the lands herein ceded, whose
original entry embraced less than one hundred and sixty acres, may take suffi-
cient land from said reservation to make his homestead entry not to exceed
one hundred and sixty acres in all, said land to be taken upon the same condi-
tions as are required of other entrymen.
By the act of June 0, 1900 (31 Stat., 672, GTG), ratifying the
agreement made with the Comanche, Kiowa and Apache tribes of
Indians in Indian Territory, it was provided by article 11
:
That the lands acquired by this agreement shall be opened to settlement by
proclamation of the President within six months after allotments are made and
be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and town-site
laws of the United States. . . . : And provided further, That any qualified
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ontryman having lands herein coded, whose original entry embraced less than
one hundred and sixty acres in all, shall have the righl to enter so much of
the lands by this agreement ceded lying contiguous to his said entry as shall,
with the land already entered, make in tlie aggregate one hundred and sixty
acres, said land to he taken upon the same conditions as are required of other
entrymen.
. In accordance with the provisions of the act of March 3, 1901 (31
Stat.. L093, L094), the lands coded by the agreements before referred
to were opened to entry by proclamation of the President dated
July 4, L901. Said proclamation provided:
that all of the lands so as aforesaid ceded by the Wichita and affiliated hands
of Indians, and the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians, respec-
tively, saving and excepting sections sixteen, thirty-six, thirteen, and thirty-
three in each township, and all lands located < r selected by the Territory of
Oklahoma as indemnity school or educational lands, and saving and excepting
all lands allotted in severalty to individual Indians, and saving and excepting
all lands allotted and confirmed to religious societies and other organizations,
and saving and excepting the lands selected and set aside as grazing lands for
the use in common for said Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians,
and saving and excepting the lands set aside and reserved at each of said county
seats for disposition as town sites, and saving and excepting the lands now
used, occupied, or set apart for military, agency, school, school farm, religious,
Indian cemetery, wood reserve, forest reserve, or other public uses, will, on
the 6th day of August, 1901, at '.) o'clock, a. m., in the manner herein prescribed
and not otherwise, he opened to entry and settlement and to disposition under
the general provisions of the homestead and town-site laws of the United States.
It was further provided:
The intended beneficiaries of the provision in the said acts of Congress,
approved, respectively, March 2, 1895, and June6, 1900, which authorizes a quali-
fied entryman having lands adjoining the ceded lands, whose original entry
embraced less than 160 acres, to enter so much of the ceded lands as will make
his homestead entry contain in the aggregate not exceeding ICO acres, may
obtain such an extension of his existing entry, without previous registration and
without regard to the drawing herein provided for, only by making appropriate
application, accompanied by the necessary proof, at the proper new land office
at some time prior to the opening herein provided for.
It seems that immediately following the issue of this proclamation,
your office prepared from the records, for the information of the
local officers, a list of the several entries adjoining the ceded lands
covering less than L60 acres where the persons were entitled to the
benefit of the special provision for extension of existing entries to
include lands within the ceded country, and in this list is found the
names of Eskew and Hill. In accordance with notices issued to them
they made extension of their existing entries through additional
entries, prior to the date set for the opening of the general body of
the r^{\v(\ lands. The question arises now whether such entries cov-
ering portions of a section 33 within the ceded country were properly
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allowed in view of that provision of the act of June 6, 1900, which
provides:
That sections sixteen and thirty-six, thirteen and thirty-three, of the lands '
hereby acquired in each township shall not be subject to entry, but shall be
reserved, sections sixteen and thirty-six for the use of the common schools, and
sections thirteen and thirty-three for university, agricultural colleges, normal
schools, and public buildings of the Territory and future State of Oklahoma ;
and in case either of said sections, or parts thereof, is lost to said Territory by
reason of allotments under this act or otherwise, the governor thereof is hereby
authorized to locate other lands not occupied in quantity equal to the loss.
A reading of the statutes above quoted shows that Congress granted
qualified entrymen having lands adjoining the lands ceded covering
less than 160 acres, the right to extend their existing entries to include
" so much of the lands by this agreement ceded lying contiguous to
his said entr}^ as shall, with the land already entered, make in the
aggregate 160 acres," and without condition otherwise than that
" said land to be taken upon the same conditions as arc required of
other entrymen." This clearly does not limit the right to any par-
ticular sections of land; that is, it did not exclude from the right any
particular sections of land. It is true that the act of June 6, 1900,
after providing for this special privilege reserved generally sections
16, 36, 13 and 33 of the lands acquired under the agreement made
with the Indians, in each township, and provides that such lands
shall not be subject to entry. This, however, under well-known rules
of construction, should not interfere with the special right previously
provided for. The reservation from entry should more properly be
construed as a reservation from the general right of entry given in
and to the reserved lands.
The proclamation reserves and excepts from the lands to be opened
to entry and settlement and disposition under the general provisions
of the homestead and town-site laws, sections 16, 36, 13 and 33 in each
township, but, as before stated, the proclamation provides for the
exercise of the special privilege granted existing entrymen on adjoin-
ing lands having entries covering less than 160 acres, to extend the
same so as to include parts of the ceded lands " without previous
registration and without regard to the drawing herein provided for
only by making appropriate applications accompanied by the neces-
sary proofs, at the proper new land office at some time prior to the
opening herein provided for," thus clearly recognizing the privilege
as a special one and not affected by the provisions relating to the
general right of homestead entry granted within the ceded country.
The entire matter considered, it is the opinion of this Department
that the extensions of existing entries so as to include a portion of
the ceded lands were properly allowed notwithstanding the fact that
they include portions of a section 33 within the ceded country. >
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There is nothing in the decision of the Department in the ease of
John W. Spain (31 L. D., 362), that makes againsi this conclusion.
The land there sought to be entered was a pail of a tract thai had
been selected by the Territory under the Indemnity provisions of
it- grant, and the right asserted thereto was the general right of
homestead entry and not the special privilege under consideration
in this case. The provision reserving sections L6, 36, 13 and 33
within the cviU'd country, provides
—
;iik1 in case either of said sections, or parts thereof, is lost to said Territory by
reason of allotment under this net or otherwise the governor thereof is hereby
authorized to locate other lands n<.t occupied in quantity equal to the loss.
This provision is broad enough to include any loss the State may
sustain by reason of the extension of existing entries made upon con-
tiguous lands so a- to include a portion of a section 33.
The entries in question will he permitted to stand subject to com-
pliance with law and the parties will he advised accordingly.
homestead—insane entryman-citizenship-act of june 8, 1880.
Eggert Martens.
It is not necessary in invoking the confirmatory provisions of the act of June
8, 1880, in instances where a homesteader has become insane, to show that
such homesteader is a citizen of the United States, it being only accessary
to show that he had complied with the provisions of the homestead law
up to the time of becoming insane.
The case of I-Ytte r. Christiansen, L".i L. I>., 710, overruled.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land office,
(F. L. C.) October 12, 1905. (G. B. G.)
This is the appeal of Eggeri Martens, by his guardian, John
Gaedke, from your office decision of November 11, L904, denying the
right to complete Martens's homestead entry for the SE. j of the
\'K. ',. the E.
I of the SE: [, and the SW. \ of the SE. ',. Sec 23,
T. K) X., R. :;i \\\. North Platte land district, Nebraska.
This entry was allowed April 22, L886, and the final proof offered
by the said guardian therein show- thai Martens fully complied with
the provisions of the homestead law in the matter of residence and
cultivation, and that he has valuable improvements upon the claim.
!t appears upon the oath of Gaedke that Martens is. and has been
lor some years past, an insane person, incompetent to understand or
attend to business affairs of any kind, and it i- shown that he
(Gaedke) was duly appointed the guardian of his person and prop-
i ft y dune 17. L903.
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Martens is an alien who has not been admitted to full- citizenship,
for reasons which more fully appear from an order entered upon
the records of the district court of Lincoln County, Nebraska. This
order is in part as follows:
Eggert Martens, a native of Germany, and at present residing within said
State, appeared in open court, by and through his legal guardian, John Gaedke,
and made application to be admitted to become a citizen of the United States.
And it appearing to the satisfaction of the court, that said Martens had de-
clared on oath before the District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska, a court
of record having common law jurisdiction and using a seal, on April 7th, 188G,
that it was bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States and
to renounce forever all allegiance to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty whatsoever, and particularly to the Emperor of Germany, of whom
he was heretofore a subject. The Court being satisfied from the certificates of
Dr. G. A. Runstrom that the said Eggert Martens is paralyzed in both lower
limbs, and by reason of which paralysis the said Martens is unable to appear in
open court, and take the oath of citizenship required by law. The Court is
further satisfied from the affidavits of William McMichael and John Gaedke,
his witnesses, on file, and which are hereby ordered to be entered of record,
and from careful inquiry of said witnesses in open court that said Eggert
Martens has resided within Lincoln County, State of Nebraska, in the United
States of America for the term of more than sixteen years, preceding this appli-
cation, without being at any time during said sixteen years out of the terri-
tory of the United States, and that he has been within this State for sixteen
years last past ; and it further appearing to the satisfaction of this court, by
the affidavit of said witnesses and by inquiries of said witnesses made in
open court that during the said sixteen years residence, of said Eggert Martens,
in this State, he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached
to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the same, and that he does not disbelieve in
and is not opposed to all organized government, and is not a member of or
affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in
or in opposition to all organized government, and does not advocate or teach
the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers, either of specific individuals or officers generally of the gov-
ernment of the United States or of any other organized government because of
his or their official character, and has not violated any of the provisions of the
act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, entitled "An act to regulate the immi-
gration of aliens into the United States." The Court is further satisfied from the
affidavit of the witnesses on trial and inquiry made in open court that during
the residence of said Eggert Martens in this County and State since the year
1886 said Martens has always been a very good man, peaceable, industrious, and
law-abiding, and by his daily walk during a residence of sixteen years he has
practically illustrated and emphasized his attachment to the principles of the
Constitution. The Court is further satisfied that for five years- or more the
said Martens has been afflicted with some character of a deranged mind, in
that he believes that it is unnecessary for him to appear in open court and take
final oath to become a full naturalized citizen of the United States. The
Court further finds as a matter of fact from inquiry of witnesses and by the
records of the county court of this, Lincoln County, that by reason of the phy-
sical and mental defects of the said Eggert Martens, John Gaedke was duly
appointed on June 17th, 1003, by the County Court of Lincoln County, Ne-
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braska, guardian of the properly and person of tin 1 said Eggerl Martens, and
that by reason of the mental and physical condition of said Martens saidGaedke
still holds and lills said office as such guardian. The Court is further satisfied
that said Martens by his daily life for ten years or more after becoming a
resident of this County and State showed by his daily life that he was attached
to the principles of the governmenl of the United States and the state of Ne-
braska, and that in equity and good conscience he has earned all rights that full
citizen is entitled to.
Whereupon it is ordered by the court that the foregoing findings he made of
record.
While the order in terms declares that Martens has in equity and
good conscience earned all the rights of a citizen, yet he is not legally
a citizen, and the question presented by this record is. whether a per-
son occupying this status may acquire title to public lands under the
homestead law.
Section 2291 of the Revised Statutes, governing generally the <pios-
tion of issuance of final certificates and patents upon homestead
entries, is as follows:
No certificate, however, shall he given, or patent issued therefor, until the
expiration of live years from the date of such entry; and if at the expiration
of such time, or at any time within two years thereafter, the person making
such entry; or if he he dead, his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs
or devisee; or in ease of a widow making such entry, her heirs or devisee, in
case of her death, proves hy two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have
resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of live years immediately
succeeding the time of filing the affidavit, and makes affidavit that no part of
such land has been alienated, except as provided in section twenty-two hundred
and eighty-eight, and thai he. she. or they will hear true allegiance to the gov-
ernment of the United States; then, in such case. he. she. or they, if at that
time citizens of the United States, shall he entitled to a patent, as in other
cases provided hy law.
In the administration of the homestead laws the land department
has uniformly held that an alien can not complete title under this
section until the disability of alienage has been removed; also that an
insane person, although a citizen, can not complete title thereunder,
because he is not capable of taking the oath of allegiance therein
required of all homesteaders
—
citizens, as well as aliens. It necessarily
results that an insane alien can not complete title thereunder because
he can neither become a citizen nor take this special oath of allegiance.
These conditions called for remedial legislation, and to that end
Congress passed the act of June 8, L880 (21 Stat., L66), which i- as
follows :
Be it enacted by the Senate <m<i House of Representatives <>f tin United States
<>l Aiiirricu in Congress assembled, Thai in all enscs in which parties who
regularly initiated claims to public lands as settlers thereon according t<> the
provisions of the preemption or homestead laws, have become insane or shall
hereafter become insane before the expiration of the time during which their
residence, cultivation, or Improvement of the land claimed by them is required
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by law to be continued in order to entitle them to make the proper proof and
perfect their claims, il shall be lawful for the required proof and payment to
be made for their benefil by any person who may be legally authorized to act
for them during their disability, and thereupon their claims shall be confirmed
and patented, provided it shall be shown by proof satisfactory to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office that the parties complied in good faith with
the legal requirements up to the time of their becoming insane, and the require-
ment in homestead entries of an affidavit of allegiance by the applicant in
certain cases as a prerequisite to the issuing of the patents shall be dispensed
with so far as regards such insane parties.
That this act was intended to provide a means whereby all insane
homesteaders, whether citizens or aliens, might acquire title to their
claims is shown by its title, The remedy according to the title is to
be applied to " cases where the settlers have become insane." An
insane alien is as much within the title as a citizen, because an alien
who has declared his intention to become a citizen may have the same
settlement rights upon public lands as a citizen. In the body of the
act the benefits conferred are conditioned only upon a showing " by
proof satisfactory to the Commissioner of the General Land Office
that the parties complied in good faith with the legal requirements up
to the time of their becoming insane," and this includes an insane alien
as surely as an insane citizen, because in the one case as well as in the
other proof may be made that up to the time of becoming insane
the alien had complied with all legal requirements. But it is mooted
that because the last clause in the act specifically relieves insane per-
sons from " the requirements in homestead entries of an affidavit of
allegiance," and fails to in terms relieve such persons from proof of
citizenship, therefore an insane alien is not within the remedial pro-
visions of the act. This reasoning is contrary to all known rules
applied in the construction of remedial statutes. The clause in ques-
tion in nowise limits or restricts what had preceded it, but out of
abundance of caution it would seem Congress endeavored to make
plain that the insane homesteader being entitled to a patent by reason
of the fact that he had up to the time of becoming insane " com-
plied in good faith with the legal requirements," should not be
required to do after that time what he manifestly on account of his
mental condition could not do. The affidavit of allegiance and proof
of citizenship required by section 2291 of the Revised Statutes are no
part of the " legal requirements " which must have been complied
with to entitle an insane person to the benefits of the act. The words
" affidavit of allegiance " were intended to include proof of citizen-
ship, as well as the special affidavit of allegiance required of all
homesteaders—citizens and aliens alike. An alien upon making the
proofs required by the naturalization laws takes an oath of allegiance*
He does not become a citizen until he takes such oath. If therefore
he be relieved from taking the oath, he is thereby relieved of a con-
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dition preeedenl to citizenship, and it is inconceivable thai Congress
intended to relieve him of a part only of the essentia] conditions.
It is true that ordinarily proof of citizenship is required of all
homesteaders, l>ut where the party making entry had nut become a
citizen at that time, he was required, when submitting final proof of
compliance with law as to residence, cultivation, or improvement, and
not before, to show that he was then a citizen, and also to make a
further affidavit of allegiance. The act of 1880 only affects cases
where the homesteader became insane before making final proof, and.
as he was not required, under the homestead laws, to become a citizen
until he was ready to submit final proof, he mighl have complied in
good faith with the Legal requirements up to the time of becoming
insane without taking out his final naturalization papers, and thus
becoming a citizen of the United States. This ad provides for the
confirming and patenting of these claims " provided it shall be shown
by proof satisfactory to the Commissioner of the General Land Office
that the parties complied in good faith with the legal requirements
up to the time of their becoming insane." This clearly establishes a
new rule governing the patenting of entries made by those becoming
insane after the making of the original entry, and relieves the insane
party from the performance of any necessary acts in further com-
pliance with the homestead laws after becoming insane. That former
provision of the act which makes it lawful for the guardian to make
"the required proof" is necessarily controlled by the provision just
above quoted, and its effeel is merely to authorize the guardian to act
for the entryman in making "the required proof" which is clearly
defined in the provision taken from the act of 1880 and first above
quoted. To hold otherwise, and to include within the " required
proof" to be made by the guardian, acts, the performance of which
in ordinary cases would ocean- after the entryman became insane,
would nullify that provision of the act of 1880 which clearly limits
the proof to a showing of compliance with the legal requirements
upon the pail of the entryman up to the time of his becoming insane.
These views of the act in question are in harmony with a circular
issued by the Commissioner of the ( reneral Land ( )ffice, July 17, 1880,
paragraph ."> of which is as follows:
Tlif final proof must be made by :i person whose authority to :i«'l tor tli«-
Insane person during such disability shall he duly certified under seal of the
proper probate court, <ni<l no proof of citizenship, except of declaration of
intention to become ;i citizen, will he required. (7 (". L. <>.. 89.)
This was a contemporaneous construction of the act. and is entitled
to greal weight, not only because of a general rule of statutory con-
struction, but because made by the officer specially charged with the
administration of the act. Moreover, the debate- upon the lull.
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which became the law in question, tend to support this construction.
The bill as introduced provided that the requirement in homestead
entries of "citizenship" should be dispensed with as to insane per-
sons. The committee on public lands in the Senate reported an
amendment, striking out the word citizenship and inserting in lieu
thereof the words " an affidavit of allegiance." The amendment
was adopted without discussion. Now, if, as hereinbefore shown,
it was the intention of Congress to relieve the insane homesteader
from those things which he could not do, the amendment was made
upon the theory that the word citizenship as used in section 2291
of the Revised Statutes did not include the affidavit of allegiance
required by the same section, but inasmuch as an oath of allegiance
is the final act in becoming citizens, it was evidently believed that to
relieve the homesteader from taking an oath of allegiance was also
to relieve him from all proof of citizenship.
The case of Fette v. Christiansen (29 L. D., 710), being not in
harmony with the conclusion herein reached, and being at variance
with the said circular of July 17, 1880, which has otherwise been
unquestioned for twenty-five years, said case will not be hereafter
followed.
The decision appealed from is reversed, your office is directed to
reinstate the entry in question, and inasmuch as more than seven
years have expired since the entry was made the same will be
referred to the Board of Equitable Adjudication for final action.
CONFIRMATION—PROTEST—PROVISO TO SECTION 7, ACT OF MARCH
3, 1891.
Clara Eckstein.
Under the proviso to section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891, the filing of a pro-
test, bringing to the notice of the government the invalidity or illegality of
an entry, within two years from the date of the issuance of the receiver's
final receipt, operates to suspend the running of the statute and will defeat
confirmation of the entry under said provision whether the land department
actually orders an investigation of the matters charged in the protest
within the two-year period or not.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) October 16, 1905. (D. C. H.)
This case involves the homestead entry of Clara Cleghorn, now
Clara Eckstein, for the SE. J of Sec. 25, T. 8 S., R. 6 E., Rapid City,
South Dakota, land district, and is before the Department on the
appeal of said Eckstein from your office decision of February 3, 1905,
denying her motion for confirmation of said entry under the proviso
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to section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., L095), which reads
us follows
:
That after the lapse of two years from the date <>i' fssuance of the receiver's
receipt upon the final entry upon any tract of land under the homestead, timber
culture, desert-land or pre-emption laws, or under this act, and where there shall
be no pending contest or protest against the validity of such entry, the entrymaB
shall be entitled to a patent conveying the land by him entered, and the same
shall be issued to him.
It appears from the record that final proof in support of the entry
in this case was made May '27. 1902, and that final certificate was
issued thereon May '2 1.), 1902; that one Charles Graves, by letter of
December 11. L902, addressed to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, called attention to said entry and asked that it be investi-
gated, stating that claimant had never resided on the land, and that,
on the day she made final proof, and several times after that date, he
called the special agent's attention to the matter and that no action
had been taken by him, which said letter bears evidence of having
been received at your office on December 20, 1902; and it further ap-
pears that on January 20, L903, said Graves, by letter, called the said
Commissioner's attention to the fact that his first letter had not been
answered, and again insisted that an investigation should be had to
the end that the entry might be canceled for failure of claimant to
reside upon the land, which said letter appears to have been received
at your office on January -J4. 1903.
No consideration seems to have been given to the subject-matter of
said letters by your office until August 8, L904, when the matter was
submitted to Special Agent Wadsworth for investigation. On Octo-
ber 29, L904, Special Agent Darby submitted his report charging that
claimant had not complied with the law in the matter of residence
and recommending that the entry be canceled, whereupon your office,
by letter "P" of November 11. J.904, suspended the entry, and
directed the local officers to allow the usual time within which to
apply for a hearing. Claimant, on January L6, 1905, filed a motion
for confirmation of the entry, alleging as grounds therefor that more
than two years from the date of the final receipt having elapsed
before the proceedings now pending against the entry were com-
menced, the entry was confirmed and that patent therefor should
issue under the proviso to section 7 of the act of March o. L891, supra.
Claimant at the same time filed an application for a hearing and
asked that same be considered without prejudice to her said motion
lor confirmation of her entry.
Your office, by decision of February 3, L905, aforesaid, denied
claimant's motion for confirmation of the entry, but granted the appli-
cation for hearing. While' no reason is given in said decision for
denying the said motion, it appears by reference t<> Letter U P" <»f
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December 10, 1904, that your office considered the action taken by
Graves in the nature of a pending protest against the entry, and held
that, as such, it was sufficient to defeat confirmation of the entry
under (he aforesaid proviso. Claimant has appealed from your deci-
sion of February 3, 1905, in so far as it denies her motion for confir-
mation of the entry, and in said appeal alleges practically the same
grounds as are set forth in her said motion.
It is clear from the record that at the time your office ordered the
investigation of the entry in question to be made (August 8, 1904)
more than two years from the date of the final certificate (May 29,
190*2) had elapsed, and the question for determination is, whether or
not the action taken by Graves in the matter, and the mere filing of
his said letters in your office, can be considered as a pending protest
against the entry in question, or is such a proceeding as will except
the entry from the confirmatory operation of the proviso to section 7
of the act of March 3, 1891. In the instructions of July 9, 1902
(31 L. D., 368), it is said that—
the purpose of this statute is to protect the entry against any adverse pro-
ceeding after the lapse of two years from the date of the receiver's receipt
upon final entry, whether such proceeding was instituted through individual
efforts, or by the government through its appointed agents.
And further on in said instructions it is held that
—
the word contest is technically applied to proceedings against entries instituted
by persons seeking to acquire a preference right of entry under the act of
May 14, 1880—
and that
—
the word protest has a broader signification and is applied indiscriminately to
every proceeding against an entry, whether initiated by an individual in defense
of his own right or as a friend of the government, or whether it is initiated by
the government through its trusted agent.
These instructions clearly recognize the right of an individual
to initiate proceedings against an entry at any time within two years
from the date of the final certificate issued thereon, and the proceed-
ings can be initiated either by regular contest, or by way of protest,
which latter mode is simply the calling of the attention of the gov-
ernment to the invalidity of the entry and asking that the matter
be investigated, with a view to the cancellation of the entry.
In the case at bar, it appears from the record that the protestant,
Graves, on the day the claimant made her final proof, and several
times thereafter, called the attention of the special agent to the entry
in question and that the said agent took no action in the matter,
and that- by letter of December 11, 1902, Graves brought the matter
to the notice of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, stat-
ing that claimant had never resided on the land covered by her entry
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and asking that an investigation he had, and that the entry be can-
celed, and that on January 20. L903, he again by Letter called the -aid
Commissioner's attention to the entry, repeating the charges made
in Ins first letter and insisting that an investigation he had and offer-
ing to furnish the necessary testimony to secure the cancellation of
the entry, and that said letters were received and filed in your office,
marked, "for investigation," within eight months from the date
of claimant's final certificate. The protestant having within the
prescribed time, done all that was in his power to do. can it he said
that he did not initiate a proceeding against the entry in question
and that there was no pending protest against its validity at the
lime the final certificate was issued, simply because your office did
not act promptly in the matter, and order the investigation of the
entry before the lapse of two years from the date of the issuance of
said certificate? The act clearly gives to the individual the right to
initiate proceedings againsl an entry by way of protest, and .after the
individual has done all he possibly can to make his protest effective,
to hold that it avails nothing because the officials of the government,
through inadvertence, or otherwise, fail to take immediate action
thereon, would rob the statute of its spirit and substance, and ren-
der it. to a certain extent, ineffectual.
The instructions of July i>. L902, hereinbefore referred to. appear
to warrant the holding that in eases of protests against entries under
the act in question, it is not absolutely essentia] that your office shall
within two years from the date of the final certificate actually order
an investigation of the matters charged in the protest, in order that
the running of the statute may be arrested, for in said instructions
(•".1 L. D., 371) it is in effect said, that a protestant may, by bringing
to the notice of the government the invalidity or illegality of an
entry, suspend the running of the statute and defeat the confirmation
of the entry.
From a careful examination of the record and the matters pre-
sented for consideration by the appeal, the Department is of the
opinion that the action taken by Graves constituted a protest against
claimant's entry and said, protest having been filed in your office
within two years from the date of the final receipt it was a pending
protest against the validity of said entry within the meaning of the
statute and when acted upon as hereinbefore stated, operated to defeat
the confirmation of the entry under the proviso to section 7 of the act
of March :'>. L891, notwithstanding the fact that no action Looking to
the suspension or cancellation of the entry was taken by your office
until after the lapse of two years from the issuance of the final re-
ceipt. The judgment of your office i> accordingly hereby affirmed.
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uintah ceded lands—disposition after expiration of "sixty-
day period."
Instruction s.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, October 16, 1905.
^Register and Receiver, Vernal, Utah.
Gentlemen : It was provided by act of Congress, approved May
27, 11)02 (32 Stat., 263), among other things, that on October 1, 11)03,
the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, " shall be
restored to the public domain: Provided, That persons entering any
of said lands under the homestead laws shall pay therefor at the rate
of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre."
By various acts of Congress the time for the opening of said unal-
lotted lands was extended from time to time, and by act of Congress
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), said time was again ex-
tended to not later than September 1, 1905, which last named act,
among other things, provided
:
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such tracts as may have heen set
aside as national forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were disposed of hy
the act of Congress of May 27, 1902, shall be disposed of under the general pro-
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States, and shall he
opened to settlement and entry hy proclamation of the President, which procla-
mation shall prescribe the manner in which these lands may be settled upon,
occupied, and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof; and no person
shall be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any of said lands, except as
prescribed in said proclamation, until after the expiration of sixty days from the
time when the same are thereby opened to settlement and entry
—
and by proclamation of the President, dated July 14, 1905, after pro-
viding for the manner in which these lands might be settled upon,
occupied, or entered during the sixty-day period, it was further
provided :
After the expiration of the said period of sixty days, but not before, as herein-
before prescribed, any of said lands remaining undisposed of may be settled
upon, occupied, and entered under the general provisions of the homestead and
townsite laws of the United States in like manner as if the manner of effecting
such settlement, occupancy and entry had not been prescribed herein in obedi-
ence to law.
According to said proclamation, this period of sixty days began on
August 28, 1905, and, as a consequence, will expire at midnight of
October 26, 1905. Thereafter all unreserved non-mineral lands which
have not been entered on the plan provided for in said proclamation
may be settled upon, occupied and entered under the general pro-
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States.
While these lands will become subject to settlement immediately
after midnight of the 26th of the month, it will not be possible to
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make entry thereof until the opening of your office on the morning of
the 27th of this October.
It may, and possibly will occur, thai on the opening of your office
on October '27. next, a number of persons will have assembled at the
office seeking to make entry for the Lands remaining undisposed of,
and the duty will devolve upon you to make and enforce such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to secure a fair and orderly
course of proceedings on the part of all concerned. The transmission
of applications by mail is permissible, but such applicants should not
be given superior rights thereby.
You will, therefore, upon opening your office on October 27, L905,
note the number of persons in line, and act upon their applications
in order of presentation. After acting upon all applications of those
who were in line at the opening of your office, you will act upon all
applications received by you by mail on that morning in the order in
which you may happen to open them, and then proceed with the
applications of those who have formed in line after the opening of
your office. Any applications received in subsequent mails should
be considered in the actual order of arrival, after all applications of
those who are in line at date of their receipt have been acted upon.
(See 27 L. I).. L13, and 33 L. I).. 582.)
Such of the persons present who may be acting as agents of ex-
soldiers under section 2309, Revised Statutes, will be allowed to make
one entry in his individual character, and to Hie one declaratory state-
ment as agent, if properly authorized, and if desiring to make other
filings you will require him to take his place at the end of the line
and await his proper turn before doing so, and he will be allowed to
file but one declaratory statement at a time.
After the disposition of applications presented by persons present
at '•> o'clock a. m., which should be proceeded with at once, all other
applications presented will be disposed of in the usual way. the time
of actual presentation being duly noted on the application.
Yon are expected to act promptly under the lawful instructions
before you as occasions arise, allowing any parties feeling aggrieved
by your action the right of appeal, under the Rules of Practice, with-
out seeking special instructions from this office in the particular
cases before acting thereon.
After said sixty-day period you will continue to number the entries
consecutively in the " Qintah Indian series."
Your attention is also called to the instructions of the Department
of June L3, L905 (33 L. I).. 610), to the effect that the provisions of
the act of May 21. L902, supra, requiring the payment by persons
entering said lands of $1.25 per acre, is not repealed by the provisions
r.i'.M
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in the act of March 3, 1905, aforesaid, " that the said unallotted lands
| with certain stated exceptions] shall be disposed of under the general
provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States ; "
but that payment should not be exacted until the offer of proof in
final consummation of the entry. You will be governed accordingly.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards,
Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining Claims.
Motion for review of departmental decision of July 19, 1905, 34
L. D., 42, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, October 17, 1905.
COAL LAND—SECTIONS 3347 TO 2352 OF THE REVISED STATUTES.
McKibben v. Gable.
A " preference right of entry " under section 2348 of the Revised Statutes
arises where any person or persons, severally
.
qualified to enter, have
opened and improved any coal mine or mines upon the public lands, and are
in actual possession of the same ; and such right accrues only to the person
or persons who have so opened and improved such mine or mines, and
have the possession thereof.
A " preference right of entry " under section 284X of the Revised Statutes is
not created, or initiated, by the filing of a declaratory statement under sec-
tion 2340. The office of the declaratory statement is to preserve the right,
not to create it. If the right does not exist, the declaratory statement has
no office to perform and is without force or effect for any purpose.
It is not in all cases essential to the validity of an application to purchase coal
lands, or to the completion of proceedings thereunder, that the applicant
show that he had actually opened and improved a mine of coal on the lands
applied for. This is necessary only where the applicant asserts a prefer-
ence right of entry under the statute and must maintain his assertion or
suffer defeat in favor of another applicant or claimant.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) October 18, 1905. (A. B. P.)
This is a controversy between S. S. McKibben and Thomas P.
Gable, each asserting claim to the SE. J of the SE. J, the W. J of
the'SE. i, and lots 3 and 4, Sec. 28, T. 13 N., R. 6 E., Santa Fe, New
Mexico, as coal lands.
The laws providing for the disposal of the coal lands of the United
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States are contained in sections 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Statutes.
July 26, 1902, Gable filed, under section 2349, a declaratory state-
ment for the lands, accompanied by certain affidavits, all of which
were in regular form except that the receiver before whom the affi-
davits were verified, had failed to enter his ollicial certificate or jurat
thereon. May 11. L903, McKibben tiled, under the same section, a
declaratory statement for the lands, also in regular form, and sworn
to by himself. August 5, L902, two other persons filed a joint de-
claratory statement for the same lands.
May ir>, 1905, Gable filed with the register his application, under
oath, dated May 11, 1903, to purchase the lands as coal lands, and
accompanied the same by the affidavits of two other persons, sworn
to May 12, L903, wherein it is set forth, amongst other things, in
substance and effect, that the lands are chiefly valuable for coal and
otherwise subject to disposal under the coal land laws. At the same
time he made tender of the purchase money at the price of twenty
dollars per acre, the lands being within fifteen miles of a completed
railroad. The local officers suspended action upon his application,
and the conflicting claimants of record were cited to appear, July
13, 1003, and show cause, if any they could, why the application
should not be allowed.
On the day named McKibben appeared, by his attorneys, and
filed what he terms a protest against Gable's application to pur-
chase, sworn to by himself and corroborated by two witnesses. The
protest is chiefly an attack upon Gable's declaratory statement. It
contains no assertion of right in McKibben himself other than as
claimant under his declaratory statement. It is charged, in sub-
stance, that the application to purchase should be rejected for the
reason that prior to its filing no coal mine, or coal of merchantable
value, or of any value, had been opened, exposed, or developed on
the lands, and no improvements had been made thereon, by Gable or
in his behalf. Gable appeared in person and by attorney. The
other claimants did not appear, and are out of the case. Both the
contending parties submitted evidence.
Presumably upon the theory'that McKibbenV protest and declara-
tory statement, taken together, were sufficient to raise the issue of the
character of the lands, evidence was introduced by both parties
relating to that quest ion. as well as to the matters specifically charged.
September 30, L903, the local officers found for Gable and recom-
mended that his application to purchase be allowed and that McKib-
benV protest be dismissed.
Upon appeal by McKibben, your office, by decision of April 19,
1904, affirmed the action below, and gave direct ion to the local officers,
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amongst other things, that before finally accepting Gable's applica-
tion and proofs, evidence of the authority of the agent who filed the
same should be furnished as required by rule 34, Rules of Practice.
McKibben filed a motion for review, which was denied May 31,
1901. and he thereupon appealed to the Department. His counsel
have filed elaborate briefs in his behalf, and, in addition, have
referred to the briefs hied when the record was before your office,
all of which have been carefully considered.
The provisions of the coal land laws that need be specially referred
to are as follows:
j
Sec. 2347. Every person above the age of twenty-one years, who is a citizen
of the United States, or who has declared his intention to become such, or any
association of persons severally qualified as above, shall, upon application to the
register of the proper land-office, have the right to enter, by legal subdivisions,
any quantity of vacant coal-lands of the United States not otherwise appropri-
ated or reserved by competent authority, not exceeding one hundred and sixty
acres to such individual person; or three hundred and twenty acres to snch asso-
ciation, upon payment to the receiver of not less than ten dollars per acre for
such lands, where the same shall be situated more than fifteen miles from any
completed railroad, and not less than twenty dollars per acre for such lands as
shall be within fifteen miles of such road.
Sec. 2348. [In part] Any person or association of persons severally qualified,
as above provided, who have opened and improved, or shall hereafter open and
improve, any coal mine or mines upon the public lands, and shall be in actual
possession of the same, shall be entitled to a preference-right of entry, under
the preceding section, of the mines so opened and improved.
Sec 2349. [In part.] All claims under the preceding section must be pre-
sented to the register of the proper land-district within sixty days after the date
of actual possession and the commencement of improvements on the land, by
the filing of a declaratory statement therefor.
I
i
It is further provided, by section 2350, that all persons claiming
under section 2348 shall prove their respective rights and pay for the
lands filed upon within one year from the time prescribed for filing
their claims, and that failure to do so shall render the lands subject
to entry by any other qualified applicant ; also, by section 2352, that
nothing in the preceding sections shall authorize the sale of lands
valuable for mines of gold, silver or copper.
By section 2348 " a preference-ri^ht of entry " is provided for.
This right arises where any person or persons, severally qualified to
enter, have opened and improved any coal mine or mines upon the
public lands, and are in actual possession of the same. The right
accrues only to the person or persons who have opened and improved
the mine or mines, and have the possession thereof. Once acquired,
the right may be preserved and continued, by filing a declaratory
statement under section 2349, until the expiration of the time within
which proof and payment must be made under section 2350. The
right is not created, or initiated, by the filing of a declaratory state-
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ment. It is acquired only by opening, improving, and having pos-
session of, a mine or mines of coal on the public lands. In the
absence of either of the required conditions, there is no preference-
right of entry under the statute. The office of the declaratory state-
ment is to preserve the right, not to create it. If the right does not
exist, the declaratory statement has no office to perform, and is with-
out force or effect for any purpose.
McKibben made oath in his declaratory statement that he had
" located and opened a valuable mine of coal on the lands." but in
this he i> not sustained by the evidence, and it is admitted in the
briefs of his counsel that such was not the fact. Through his counsel
he asserts that neither he nor Gable ever opened a mine of coal on
the lands, or discovered any coat of value thereon; and he contends
that not having himself applied to purchase, he was not required to
show at the hearing that he had opened a coal mine or discovered
valuable coal on the lands.
Under the conditions thus admitted, as well as shown by the evi-
dence, it is clear that McKibben's declaratory statement was filed
without authority of law. Inning no basis to rest upon, and can avail
him nothing in this case. He obtained no preference right of entry
and therefore his declaratory statement had no office to perform, and
was, so far as this record shows, without legal force or effect. It
follows that McKibben has no valid claim to the lands in controversy.
By section 2347 it is provided that any person possessing the neces-
sary qualifications may. upon application to the register of the proper
land-office, purchase and enter not to exceed one hundred and sixty
acres of vacant coal lands of the United States. All that is required
of an applicant to purchase is that he shall show himself qualified
to enter, shall show that the lands applied for are of the character
subject to sale, and shall pay the government price therefor.
Are the lands in controversy of the character subject to sale under
the coal land laws? If they are, McKibben's declaratory statement
being out of the way. there would appear to be no obstacle to the com-
pletion of Gable's purchase. It is not in all cases essential to the
validity of an application to purchase coal lands, or to the completion
of proceedings thereunder, as contended by counsel for McKibben.
that the applicant must show that he had actually opened and im-
proved a mine of coal on the lands applied for. This is necessary
only where the applicant asserts a preference right of entry under the
statute and must maintain his assertion or sutler defeat in favor of
another applicant or claimant. In such a case, to establish his
claimed preference right of entry, the applicant would have to show
that he had opened and improved a mine of coal on the lands, and was
in actual possession of the same.
This is not a case of that kind. To sustain his application to
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I purchase, in the absence of any lawful claim by McKibben, Gable
is not hound to rely upon his declaratory statement, and is therefore
not required to show the existence of a preference-right of entry
under it. He may rest his claim upon his application to purchase
irrespective of any question of right under his declaratory statement,
and it is therefore unnecessary here to consider whether his declara-
tory statement was a valid one or not. His application and proofs
are on their face regular, and, amongst other essential matters, show7
the lands to be chiefly valuable for coal. The evidence taken at the
hearing not only fails to overcome the showing thus made, but
tends strongly to sustain it. Upon the entire record the Department
is clearly of the opinion that the lands are shown to be of the char-
acter subject to sale under the coal land laws. The decision of your
office dismissing McKibbems protest and holding his declaratory
statement for cancellation is accordingly affirmed. Gable will be
allowed a reasonable time within which to complete his purchase in
accordance with the directions given in your said decision.
mining claim—statute of limitations—section 3.133, tj. s.
The Little Emily Mining and Milling Co.
The main purpose of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes is to declare that evi-
dence of the holding and working of a mining claim for a period equal to
the time prescribed by the local statute of limitations for mining claims
,
shall ho considered as sufficiently estahlishing the location of the claim and
the applicant's right thereunder " in the absence of any adverse claim," and
there is no authority for restricting the application of the provisions of
said section to such cases only in which the applicant for patent is unable
by reason of the lapse of time or the loss of mining records by fire or other-
wise to furnish the proof of possessory title required by the mining laws.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) October 18, 1905. (G. J. H.)
August 9, 1904, The Little Emily Mining and Milling Company
(hereinafter called the company) made mineral entry No. 311 for the
Laura and Eureka lode mining claims, Independence land district,
California.
It appears from the record that on May 13, 1904, application for
patent for the above-mentioned lode claims was filed on behalf of the
company, in support of which evidence was furnished showing that
on January 28, 1884, it acquired, through mesne conveyances, the title
of some of the original locators and had been in open, notorious, con-
tinuous and exclusive possession of said claims and worked the same
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from thai time up to the date of the filing of the application, with
the exception of a short period in L893, when certain persons (not
claiming under any of the original locators) entered upon and took
possession of a portion of the claims here in question, whereupon the
company instituted an action in ejectment against said persons, in
the Circuit Court of the United States. Ninth Circuit, Northern Dis-
trict of California, and that court, on January 23, 1896, rendered
judgment in said action awarding the exclusive right of possession
and enjoyment of the land embraced in the claims here in question to
the company. Since the termination of said suit and until the riling
of the application for patent, a period of about eight years, and more
than equal to the time prescribed by the statute of Limitations for
mining claims (real property or possession thereof) of the State of
California (five years- sees. 318 and 319, Civil ('ode of Procedure),
the company is shown to have held and worked the claims and
appeal's to have in all respects complied with the requirements of the
mining laws.
Upon consideration of the application and the showing made to
support the same, entry was allowed by the local officers. When the
matter came in due course before your office, it was found and held,
in decision of March 2, L905, among other things, as follows:
It would appear thai the applicant desires to base its possessory title to said
claims under the provisions of section '2:\:V2 of the United States Revised
Statutes
The statute of limitation provides for eases in which applicants are unable
to furnish, by reason of the lapse of time or the loss of mining records by fire
or otherwise, the proof required to support their possessory title to mining
claims under section 1, : >»L'."» of the Revised Statutes, and can not he invoked to
cure the defects in title as in this case. Applicant will therefore he allowed
sixty days from receipt of notice in which to show cause why said entry
should not he canceled by reason of failure to show complete title in applicant
at date of application for patent. See decision of the Department of December
30, 1904, Hubbard It. Sherer v. C. C. Koenneker et <//.. unreported. See also
Barklage et al. v. Russell. 29 L. D., 101.
From the decision of your office the company lias appealed.
From an examination of the record the applicant appears to have
furnished all the proof required by section 2325 of the Revised Stat-
utes, showing compliance with the mining laws, notice of the applica-
tion was posted and published, and no adverse claim or protest has
ever been filed. The only question presented by the appeal is whether
the facts shown by the record present such a case as conies within the
remedial provisions of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes.
Said section reads as follows:
Where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and
worked their claims for ;i period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations for mining claims of the state or Territory where the same may he
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situated, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period
shall he sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this chapter,
in the absence of any adverse claim ; but nothing in this chapter shall be
deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way whatever to
any mining claim or property thereto attached prior to the issuance of a patent.
The existing official regulations under said section (31 L. D., 487)
are as follows
:
74. The provisions of section 2332, Revised Statutes, will greatly lessen the
burden of proof, more especially in the case of old claims located many years
since, the records of which, in many cases, have been destroyed by fire, or lost in
other ways during the lapse of time, but concerning the possessory right to
which all controversy or litigation has long been settled.
75. When an applicant desires to make his proof of possessory right in ac-
cordance with this provision of law, he will not be required to produce evidence
of location, copies of conveyances, or abstracts of title, as in other cases, but
will be required to furnish a duly certified copy of the statute of limitation of
mining claims for the State or Territory, together with his sworn statement
giving a clear and succinct narration of the facts as to the origin of his title,
and likewise as to the continuation of his possession of the mining ground
covered by his application ; the area thereof ; the nature and extent of the
mining that has been done thereon ; whether there has been any opposition to
his possession, or litigation with regard to his claim, and, if so, when the same
ceased ; whether such cessation was caused by compromise or by judicial de-
cree, and any additional facts within the claimant's knowledge having a direct
bearing upon his possession and bona fides which he may desire to submit in
support of his claim.
7G. There should likewise be filed a certificate, under seal of the court having
jurisdiction of mining cases within the judicial district embracing the claim,
that no suit or action of any character whatever involving the right of possession
to any portion of the claim applied for is pending, and that there has been no
litigation before said court affecting the title to said claim or any part thereof
for a period equal to the time fixed by the statute of limitations for mining
claims in the State or Territory as aforesaid, other than that which has been
finally decided in favor of the claimant.
77. The claimant should support his narrative of facts relative to his posses-
sion, occupancy, and improvements by corroborative testimony of any disinter-
ested person or persons of credibility who may be cognizant of the facts in the
case and are capable of testifying understanding^ in the premises.
All the evidence required under these regulations has been fur-
nished by the applicant.
There is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that Con-
gress intended to restrict the application of its provisions to cases
where the applicant for patent is unable by reason of the lapse of time
or the loss of mining records by fire or otherwise to furnish the re-
quired proof of possessory title, nor do the regulations above quoted
so construe said section. They state merely that the provisions of
that section " will greatly lessen the burden of proof, more espe-
cially in the case of old claims located many years since," etc.
In the case of Barklage et al v. Russell (29 L. IX, 401), cited to
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support your decision, it was s;i i< 1, in reference to said section (pp.
405-406)
:
One purpose of section 2332, as indicated in paragraph 7b [now 74] of the
foregoing regulations, and clearly shown in the history of the proceedings in
Congress attending its consideration and passage there, was to lessen the burden
of proving the location and transfers of old claims concerning which the pos-
sessory right was not controverted but the record title to which had in many
instances been destroyed by fire or otherwise lost because of the insecurity and
difficulty necessarily attending its preservation during the early days of mining
operations upon the Pacific Coast and vicinity. As originally enacted, the sec-
tion was intended, primarily, if not solely to apply to placer claims, for the
patenting of which there had previously been no provision, and to which class
all, or nearly all. of the earlier claims belonged, the establishment of record title
to which under the original locations and through successive transfers was esp>>-
« ially difficult and oftentimes impossible for the reasons jnst stilted.
The section was not intended as enacted, nor as now found in the Revised
Statutes, to be a wholly separate and independent provision for the patenting
ef a mining claim. As carried forward into the Revised Statutes it relates
to both lode and placer claims, and being in pari materia with the other sec-
tions of the revision concerning such claims is to be construed together with
them, and so as, it' possible, that they may all stand together, forming a
harmonious body of mining law Properly construed with section l'.".!*.")
and other sections of the Revised Statutes upon the same subject, it is believed
thai the main purpose of section 2332 was to declare that evidence of the
bolding and working of a mining claim for a period equal to the time pre-
scribed by the local statute of limitations for mining claims shall be considered
as sufficiently establishing the location of the claim and the applicant's right
thereunder " in the absence of any adverse claim?"
Iii the present case the applicant, as before stated, appears to have
complied in every particular with the requirements of the mining
laws and the regulations issued thereunder, and has held and worked
the claims for a period equal to and exceeding the time prescribed by
the local statute of limitations for mining claims. The decision in
that case furnishes no authority for the conclusion reached by your
office in the decision appealed from.
The judgment of the court in the ejectment proceeding herein-
before mentioned awards "the exclusive right of possession and
enjoyment of all the land and surface included within the exterior
lines of said locations " to the company, and further holds that
mi the 8th day of February, 1893, and ever since said date, said plaintiff was
the owner of and entitled to the possession of and is now the owner of and
entitled to the possession of said above-described lands, mining claims and
locations and premises and of each and every portion thereof and is entitled
to recover possession thereof from said defendants.
Since the judgment of the court awarding to the company the
exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of each and every por-
tion of the mining claims in question, it has held and worked said
claims in accordance with the mining laws: no one else appear- to
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have asserted any right or attempted to exercise any claim whatever
thereto; no adverse claim was filed during the period of publication
of notice of the application for patent; and no objection, by protest
or otherwise, is being made before the land department to the issu-
ance of patent to the company as applied for.
After careful consideration of the matter, the Department is of
opinion that the company is entitled to invoke the remedial provi-
sions of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes, and, unless other
objection appear, the entry will be carried to patent.
Your office decision is reversed.
Ray v. Shirley.
Motion for review of departmental decision of July 17, 1905, 34
L. D., 30, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, October 17, 1905.
arid land-imperfect titles—act of june 17, 1902.
Opinion.
The act of June 17, 1902, contemplates that the United States shall he the full
owner of irrigation works constructed thereunder, and clearly inhibits the
acquisition of property, for use in connection with an irrigation project,
subject to servitudes or perpetual obligation to pay rents to a landlord
holding the legal title thereto.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
October 19, 1 906. (J. R. W.)
There are informally referred to me the two letters of the Director
of the Geological Survey of September 8, 1905, concerning the acqui-
sition of leasehold or possessory rights of George E. Shute, in
the SW. i of the NW. J, and the W. J of the SW. J of Sec. 36, T. 1
N., R. 13 E., G. & S. R. M., Arizona, proposed to be acquired under
the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), in connection with the Salt
River project; also of the rights of Henry E. Kester and Lawrence E.
Karr and wife to lands in section 36, township 16 south, range 21
east, S. B. M., Arizona, proposed to be acquired under the same act
in connection with the Yuma project.
The title and rights of George E. Shute were subject of depart-
mental instructions of May 10, 1901 (32 L. D., 601). The land is
reserved by section 2 of the act of February 24, 1863 (12 Stat., 664,
665), to be granted for school purposes to the future State to be
erected, including such land within its boundaries. All power of
the Territory over it is restricted by the act of April 7, 1896 (29
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Stat., 90), to temporary leasing for terms not longer than five years,
hut (o terminate in any event upon the admission of the future State
to which title shall be granted. Under this condition of title the
Director of the Geological Survey was Instructed (32 L. I).. 604) :
Your office will therefore confer with the present holder of the leasehold and
with the proper local authorities, in the event that acquisition of the possessory
right and improvements is accessary to prosecution of the irrigation project,
.-Hid will report .-it what price they can be obtained. In such ease, however,
prior to reporting the matter to the Department for approval, it will be neces-
sary that the Board of Supervisors, or other proper territorial authorities, con-
sent to the purchase, waiving further payment of rent and agreeing not in
future to make a lease of the same land during the period of territorial exist-
ence. W'lion the matter is presented in such form the Department will consider
the advisability of such purchase iii each particular case.
The Director now reports that:
A copy <>f your letter of May 10, 11)04, was sent to the Supervising Engineer
of tin- Salt River project for his guidance, and he has reported that he has
l.ecn unable to carry out your instructions as the Board of Supervisors deny
that they have the power to consent to the purchase of the lease and to waive
further payment of rent and to agree not in future to make a lease of the
same land dufing the period of territorial existence.
In the meantime Mr. Shute has sold his leasehold and some personal property
to J. E. Sturgeon for $4,000. The lease will expire next year and will probahly
he renewed from time to time, hut sooner or later this property will have to
he acquired for the Salt River project.
* * * * * * *
It is thought that possibly the requirement that the Hoard of Supervisors
should waive further payment of rent could he met by adding to the purchase
price of the leasehold the estimated rental which would have accrued to the
Territory had the United States not. purchased the rights of the lessee ; it is
not believed, however. 'that the county supervisors have power to agree not
in future to make a lease of the same land during the period of Territorial
existence
I respectfully request that I may he advised as to what action should be taken
by this office in order to secure the land for the project. Information is also
desired as to what, if anything, should he done relative to the two sections
which are unimproved and unleased and in respect to which no negotiations
have been begun, and also in regard to the two tracts adjoining the leasehold
of George E. Shute. leases on both of which expired on April 4, 1004, and pos-
session being in the United States, as stated above.
The territorial authority has control of the land until the coming
into existence of the future Slate to which Congress has declared its
intent to grant the title and for benefit of which the land is reserved.
Whether or not the law of Arizona now authorizes the State and
local authorities to waive payment of rents and to undertake not to
make further leases, such Legislation is within the power of the terri-
torial authority. It is also within power of Congress, uotwithstand-
ing its reservation of these lands, to authorize other disposal of them,
if it shall see lit so to do. It is not the intent of the irrigation act to
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authorize the acquisition of imperfect titles and to subject the public
works to be constructed to uncertain and unascertainable burdens for
rents in perpetuity, liable every five years to be increased by reap-
praisals of the land. The law contemplates that the United States
shall be full owner of the works when completed, and that the entire
cost of the work shall be imposed on the land benefited, and shall be
reimbursed to the Treasury by the future owners of the land re-
claimed, ratably to the whole area reclaimed.
I am of opinion that these plainly expressed purposes clearly
inhibit the acquisition of property subject to servitudes or perpetual
obligation to pay rents to a landlord holding legal title thereto. No
power has been delegated to the Secretary of the Interior to impose
such obligations upon the United States, or subject the United States
or an irrigation project to such liabilities.
I therefore recommend that the matter be submitted to Congress,
which has plenary power in the premises to authorize appropriation
of such lands to the purposes of an irrigation project.
The Director states that:
In the construction of the Yuma dike, contract for which has. recently heen
awarded, it will be necessary to cross section 36, T. 16 S., R. 21 E., S. B. M.,
Arizona, the same also being school land, lease for which is held by Henry E.
Kester, and Lawrence E. Karr and wife.
Whether work shall be begun or prosecuted upon any project which
requires for its completion land to which title can not be obtained
under existing law is a question which should receive consideration.
While the conditions might in some instances justify preliminary
work, yet a general disregard of such obstacles might involve great
embarrassment and possibly subject the government to large pecun-
iary loss.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
PRIVATE CLAIM-SURVEY.
Couts v. Strickler et al. (On Review).
(Rancho Buena Vista.)
It is within the power of the land department at any time to re-trace any surveys
it has made whenever it becomes necessary to the determination of a ques-
tion pending before it for its decision involving rights in public lands.
Secretary HitchSock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) October 25, 1905. (J. R. W.)
J. W. Strickler and others, protestants, in Couts v. Strickler et al.
(31 L. D., 44G), filed a motion for review of departmental decision of
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August 10. 100.") (34 L. I).. 67), approving the resurveys in connection
with the boundaries of Buena Vista Ranchoand plats thereof executed
by Deputy Surveyor W. A. Sickler under contract No. 226, of Novem-
ber 21, 1903.
It is asserted that the lands claimed by protestants were not in-
cluded in the I lavs survey. This question of fact was fully consid-
ered and the precise point decided upon consideration of the evidence
is that the lands involved were included within the lines of the Hays
survey upon the ground, referred to in the deed by which ('out- pur-
chased. The evidence of agreement of the topographical features of
the ground, as given in the field-notes of I lays and of Sickler. shows
that each traversed the same lines. It is in the highest degree improb-
able that I lays could have fabricated field-notes which would agree
with notes of the actual survey of a piece of land about a half century
afterward, hounded by lines of seven and a half miles. This agree-
ment of topographical features proves that Hays and Sickler actually
surveyed the same piece of land, or that Sickler merely copied Hays's
notes. But the inspection of Sickler's survey shows that he made his
notes from the face of the land, and necessarily proves that Hays did
also.
It is also contended that " there never was at any time any question
about the size of the grant or its boundaries." The grant and the
decree of the court confirming it were w * to the extent of one half of a
square league of land, a little more or less." followed by an act of
juridical possession giving courses, distances and monuments, describ-
ing one quarter of a square League, The words of the grant in them-
selves raised a question whether the grant was intended to he for
pne-half or for one-quarter of a square league. One can not intelli-
gently read the statements of facts in the many reported decisions
(cited in 31 L. D., 447) or consider intelligently the fact that the final
delimitation of the grant was not effected until after six different
surveys were made for that purpose, without perceiving that "the
Bize of the grant and its boundaries " were always a question until the
survey was finally approved.
Protestants present two contentions of law :
( 1 ) That the re-tracing of the Hays survey by Sickler was without
authority of law and illegal, because not made by request of the grant
claimant as required by section 6 of the act of July 1. 1864 ( 13 Stat.,
B32, 334), and that it was approved contrary to the provisions of sec-
tion 7 of that act because it does not follow the decree of confirmation
which "designates the specific boundaries of the claim."
(2) That under section 8 of the act of July 23, L866 ( 1 I Stat.. 218,
220), if a Mexican grant claimant fails within ten months from the
decree of confirmation to request the surveyor-general to survey the
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grant, he waives right to purchase land subsequently excluded from
it, and all land not included in such grant when surveyed becomes
" subject to the general land laws of the United States," open to entry
by bona fide settlers like other public lands.
It would be a novelty to hold that the land department is deprived
of authority to survey a Mexican grant claim by the act of 1804,
supra, until requested by the grant claimant. The survey of such
claims was necessary for their segregation from the body of the public
lands in order to ascertain and survey the public lands, and the power
to survey private land claims mingled and lying undefined among
public lands is incident to the general work of surveying the public
lands. The act of 1864 is to be construed in connection with other
prior legislation for surveys of public lands in California. Section
one of the act of 1864 makes reference to section 13 of the act of
March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 631, 633), which evidently contemplates a
survey of such grants as of course, in the progress of the public sur-
veys. No request of the claimant was necessary. The survey of the
public lands was directed by Congress, and the survey of the private
lands mingled among them was necessary to that end. The act of
1864, as to survey of lands granted by the former sovereign, was
merely supplementary to the act of 1851, and section 6 of the act of
1864 merely provided how a Mexican grant claimant might obtain a
survey of lands confirmed to him in advance of the survey of the
surrounding public lands, and it was by section 6 of the act of 1864
made the duty of the surveyor-general to survey a confirmed grant,
Whether the surveys had reached the surrounding public land or not,
whenever the claimant made a request therefor and deposited the cost
of a special survey.
The point made is, however, immaterial, as Sickler's survey here
in question Avas not a survey of the grant. A survey of the grant
had been made by Rice, and was finally approved. The work Sick-
ler was to do was to ascertain and fix upon the ground, and to re-trace
an erroneous survey made in 1858 by Hays, before the act of 1864
was passed, referred to in the deed under which Couts purchased
in 1866, and at that time standing in credit approved by the sur-
veyor-general, though not yet finally accepted and approved by the
land department. It is within the power of the land department
at any time to re-trace any surveys it has made whenever that becomes
necessary to determination of a question pending before it for its
decision involving rights in public lands.
This also practically disposes of the second contention. The con-
firmation of this grant was not made until April 14, 1879. At that
time Hays's survey was still in full credit and remained so uniil
May 27,1884 (31 L. D., 447-448). In L8T9 Couts had no occasion
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to request a survey of this claim, for one had been made twenty-one
years before and was yet in credit. His failure to request a survey
within ten months after the decree of confirmation could have no
further effect than to waive right to purchase any land not within
the lines of the Hays survey. But he had nothing to waive as to such
land, for his dvcd made reference to that survey and his claim was
by that reference confined to lands within those line-. When that
survey was finally rejected and another one made and finally ap-
proved against his contention, he seasonably applied to purchase
under the act of L866 the land included in the lines of his original
purchase and excluded from the survey of the grant as finally ap-
proved. The adverse claimants assert no right of earlier origin than
July 23, 1866, nor any prior to Couts's purchase, November 28, L866.
The settlers entered upon the land June 21, 188C, with prior notice
of Couts's claim, and were warned by him of it before they made
any improvements. They obtained no right adverse to his right to
purchase under the act of 1866, supra. Jacks v. Belard (30 L. 1).,
345) : Watriss v. Reed (99 Cal., 134).
The several contentions of fact and law therefore present no rea-
son to recall, vacate, or modify said decision, which is adhered to,
and the motion is denied.
TIMBER AM) STONE ACT—APPLICATION TO PURCHASE—EFFECT OF
E X ECTTTrV E WITH I > UAAVAL.
Hattie E. Bradley.
Where an applicant to purchase under the act of .tunc .".. 1878, fails to submit
proof on the day fixed therefor in the published notice, or within fen days
thereafter where prevented by accident or unavoidable delay from sub-
mitting it on the day set therefor, a withdrawal theretofore made for
forestry purposes, embracing the land, thereupon immediately attaches
and becomes effective as to such land, regardless of the fact tint the
applicant, within the ten-day period after the date fixed in the notice.
may have filed application to readvertise notice of intention to submit proof.
An executive order reserving lands for a specific public purpose has the same
effect, as againsl an application to purchase under the act of June ::,
IMS, ns an adverse claim of a private individual.
& cretary Hitchcock t<> flic Commissioner of tfu Gt neral Land Offld .
(V. L. C.) Octobers, 1905. (E. P.)
On or about November 1. L902, Hattie E. Bradley filed in the local
office an application to purchase under the timber and stone act the
E. \ SW. i, the SE. 1 WW J and the SW. \ NE. 1. Sec. 7. T. 21 S..
K. II E., Lakeview land district, Oregon, her sworn statement being
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executed before A. C. Palmer, formerly a United States Commis-
sioner, but whose term had then expired. Becoming aware that
Palmer was not qualified to act in such matters. Mrs. Bradley, on
or about February 14. 1903, filed a second application to purchase
the same land, which application was executed before A. A. Bell,
United States Commissioner, whose office, it appears, was located at
Prineville, Oregon, a town outside the limits of the land district
wherein the land applied for is situated. Thereafter notice for
jniblication was issued, fixing December 11, 1903. as the date for the
submission of proof. J. M. Lawrence. United State- Commissioner
at Bend, Oregon, being the officer designated before whom proof
should be submitted. The town of Bend, it appears, is outside the
Lakeview land district.
Before the time set for the submission of proof, to wit, July 31,
1903. the land applied for, together with other tracts, was withdrawn
for forestry purposes, said withdrawal being, by the terms thereof,
subject to claims theretofore properly initiated, provided the settlers
or claimants should continue to comply with the law under which
their settlements or claims were initiated.
Mrs. Bradley failed to appear December 14, 1903. at the place desig-
nated in the notice, and submit proof, but on December 30, 1903. filed
in the local office an affidavit, executed by herself. December '_!'_?. 1903,
at Spokane, Washington, in which said affidavit it was alleged that
owing to personal illness, she was unable to submit proof at the date
set, wherefore she asked that she be allowed to readvertise and that
her final proof be ordered to be taken before the United States Com-
missioner at Prineville, Oregon.
The application to readvertise was transmitted to your office, and
upon consideration thereof your office, by decision of August :24. 1901.
directed that in the absence of any adverse claim to the land, the
applicant be allowed to complete her purchase. Xew notice accord-
ingly issued October 5, 1901, setting December 31, 1901. as the date
for the submission of proof, and naming Prineville, Oregon, as the
place where, and the county clerk of Crook county, Oregon, as the
officer before whom, the proof should be submitted.
The proof was taken January -J. 1905. by the officer designated and
at the place named, your office having, however, in the meantime, to
wit. on November 9, 1901, instructed the local officers to " take no fur-
ther action in timber and stone cases where this office has allowed
re-advertisement on application after date of withdrawal of land
involved for forestry purposes."
By decision of March 17. 1905. your office directed the local officers
to reject Mrs. Bradley's proof, citing in support of its action the
cases of M. Edith Curtis (33 L. D., 265) and Joseph W. White
(Id.. 1285).
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On appeal by Mrs. Bradley the action of your office was affirmed
by unreported departmental decision of July 25, L905.'
The case is again before the Department on motion for review
filed by the applicant.
It is asserted in the motion that Mrs. Bradley's application to re-
advertise was filed on December 22, L903, within ten days from the
date originally set for the submission of proof, and it is contended
thai this served to keep her claim alive and to prevent the attachment
lo the land of the order of withdrawal of July 31, 1903. As to this
contention it may he said (1) that the file mark on the back of the
application to readvertise shows that the same was filed in the local
office December 30, 1903, or sixteen, instead of ten days after the date
originally set for the submission of proof: and (-2) that as to lands
covered by timber and stone filings embraced within the order of
withdrawal of July 31, 1903, and other orders similarly worded, it
i- wholly immaterial whether the application to readvertise is filed
before or after the expiration of the final proof period, for in neither
event could proof be lawfully submitted under readvertised notice.
for the reason that immediately after the expiration of the final
proof period, the applicant being then in default in the matter of
proof, the order of withdrawal attaches, and the land thereupon
becomes no longer subject to purchase tinder the timber and stone
act. See case of M. Edith Curtis, supra.
Furthermore, the local officers were instructed by your office, in
its decision of August 'id, 1904, to permit Mrs. Bradley to complete
the purchase of the land only in the event of there being no adverse
claim to the land. In the case of Joshua L. Smith (81 L. I)., 57) it is
held that an executive- order reserving lands for a specific public pur-
pose has the same effect that an adverse claim of a private individual
woidd have. In view of this ruling it is held that the withdrawal
of duly 31, L903, was an adverse claim, and that, therefore the local
officers acted without authority when they issued the notice upon
which the proof was submitted.
As to the assertion made in the motion to the effect that at the date
of the submission of proof the withdrawal had been revoked, it is
only necessary to say that the only basis therefor is the fact that a
portion of the land withdrawn by said order has been restored to
entry, but. upon informal inquiry at your office, it is learned that no
portion of the land herein involved has been so restored.
The motion under consideration presents no sufficient reason for
disturbing the decision complained of. and none appearing other-
wise, the said decision is adhered to, and the motion for review is
hereby denied.
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coal lands-character of land—evidence.
Instructions.
In determining whether a tract of public land contains coal deposits the
well known rules of evidence are as applicable as in any other case, and
whatever is relevant to and bears in any degree upon the question is ad-
missible in evidence.
In such cases the characteristics peculiar to coal deposits are to be kept in
view, and the presence of such deposits may be determined upon authen-
ticated evidence of conditions which constitute the sufficient guide of the
geologist or coal expert.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F.L. C.) October 26, 1905. (F.H. B.)
Under date of September 5, 1905, the Director of the Geological
Survey transmitted to the Department, for its consideration, copy of
a letter addressed to him from Salt Lake City by Mr. Joseph A.
Taff, a geologist of that bureau, which is as follows
:
I have been in Utah now three weeks, engaged in the investigation of coal
lands in cooperation with Mr. G. E. Hair, Special Agent of the General Land
Office, and I find the following conditions, which, without reasonable question,
are subject to and demand investigation and action by the Department of the
Interior
:
The citizens have applied to purchase the lands subject to investigation,
either as grazing or coal lands, and the sales are withheld until it is deter-
mined whether or not they contain commercially valuable coal. If these
lands do not contain coal, they are the property of the State of Utah, and are
subject to sale at not exceeding $2J50 per acre. If they contain coal, they belong
to the United States, and are valued at $15 or $2() per acre, depending upon
whether they are more or less than fifteen miles from operated railroads.
With these preliminary statements in regard to relations of State and
Government lands, I beg to inform you that there is a ruling in force in the
State, promulgated by a Commissioner of the General Land Office, that lands
cannot be classed as coal lands unless commercially valuable coal is exposed
in each legal subdivision of forty acres proposed for sale. To this ruling the
local United States Land Office and State Land Board have been and are now
subject.
Under the existing conditions of the coal deposits as I find them, such a rul-
ing prevents the proper classification of coal lands, prevents the sale of such
lands desired by honest would-be purchasers in tracts of sufficient size to war-
rant profitable exploitation, has caused large areas of very valuable coal lands
to be classed as grazing land and sold at $1.50 per acre, and will cause the con-
tinued sale of such lands if it remains in force.
Since a land sub-division may lie in any attitude with respect to a continuous
coal outcrop, a forty-acre tract or a section of land may be within a few hundred
feet of exposed coal and so situated that coal could be mined from the entire
tract, and yet it would be impossible to find coal in the area before purchase.
I respectfully suggest that the attention of the Secretary of the Interior be
brought to this matter, and most earnestly request that he cause a ruling to be
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issued permitting the classification of lands as coal lands in legal subdivisions as
established by the United States surveys to distances of one mile beneath the
surface from the known outcrops of commercially valuable beds of coal.
This correspondence was, upon receipt, referred to your office " for
early report in duplicate, and return of papers, with recommenda-
tion," all of which are now before the Department.
In the report thus submitted your office discusses at some length
certain decisions of the United States Supreme Courl and of the
Department as supporting a rule of classification which rejects evi-
dence of extrinsic conditions, standing alone, and concludes that no
such showing is made by Mr. Taff
—
as would warrant the Department in modifying the practice to the extent of
holding, as he appears to desire, thai lands may be adjudicated to be mineral
lands solely upon the geological formation thereof and of the geological forma-
tion and of the discoveries and development of mineral on adjoining lands.
In entering upon consideration here of the report and request of
the geologist it may be remarked that the question raised has of late
been suggested to the Department under circumstances which empha-
size its importance. It is believed, however, that the obstacles
opposed to its satisfactory solution, in justice to the government and
others, are more apparent than real, and are for the most part the
unsubstantial result of confusion of the admissibility and the weight
of evidence. It Avill be profitable at this point to examine, in order to
make it clear that they do not warrant the construction that evidence
exclusively of the mineral character of land- surrounding or adjoin-
ing a particular tract in controversy is incom />< tent to establish the
like character of the latter, the following decisions of the Supreme
Court, two of which are cited by your office and given that effect, in
which the question of the character of certain tracts, alleged to con-
tain known lodes or coal deposits, respectively, was determined
adversely to the alleged mineral character.
In the case of Colorado Coal and Iron Co. v. United States (123
l'. S.. 307, 327 <s ) the court, after referring to certain earlier cases
in which the mineral character of the lands therein involved had
been established by direct and positive evidence, said:
II will thus be seen that, so far as the decisions of this courl have here-
tofore gone, no lands have been held to be "known mines" unless at the time
the rights of the purchaser accrued, there was upon the ground an actual
and opened mine which had. been worked or was capable of being worked.
The circumstance that there are surface indications of the existence of
reins of coal docs not constitute a none, it does not even prove that the land
will ever be under any conditions sufficients valuable on account of its coal
deposits to be worked as a mine.
In United States v. [ron 'Silver Mining Co. (128 U. S., 673,
683) the evidence as to the existence of Lodes or veins in territory
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for which, it was alleged, placer patent had been fraudulently
obtained, was held to be insufficient, the court saying:
It appears very clearly from the evidence that no lodes or veins were dis-
covered hy the excavations of Sawyer in his prospecting work, and that his
lode locations were made upon an erroneous opinion, and not upon knowledge,
that lodes hearing metal were disclosed hy them. It is not enough that there
may have been some indications hy ontcroppings on the surface, of the exist-
ence of lodes or veins of rock in place hearing gold or silver or other metal,
to justify their designation as " known " veins or lodes. To meet that desig-
nation the lodes or veins must be clearly ascertained, and he of such extent
as to render the land more valuable on that account, and justify their
exploitation.
Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co. (143 U. S., 431) presented
the question of a known lode, within the meaning of section 2333,
Revised Statutes, within patented placer limits, and concerning the
evidence submitted to establish the existence of such a lode, the court
said (p. 435) :
Its purport was that it was commonly believed that underlying all the
country in that vicinity was a nearly horizontal vein or deposit, frequently
called a blanket vein ; and that the parties who were instrumental in securing
this placer patent shared in that belief, and obtained the patent with a view
to thereafter developing such underlying vein. But whatever beliefs may
have been entertained generally, or by the placer patentees alone, there was up
to the time the patent was obtained, no knowledge in respect thereto. It
was, so far as disclosd by this testimony, on the part of everybody, patentees
included, merely a matter of speculation and belief, based not on any dis-
coveries in the placer tract, or any tracings of a vein or lode adjacent thereto,
but on the fact that quite a number of shafts sunk elsewhere in the district
had disclosed horizontal deposits of a particular kind of ore, which it was
argued might be merely parts of a single vein of continuous extension through
all that territory. Such a belief is not the knowledge required by the section.
Dower v. Richards (151 II. S., 658) involved the question of a
vein or lode upon which active and profitable mining operations had
for many years been conducted, but which had thereafter been
abandoned and yet subsequently made the subject of a lode location,
alleged to have been such a known lode as to except it from a town-
site patent earned and issued during the period of abandonment.
Affirming the decision below, to the effect that a lode regarded as
worked out and therefore abandoned was not a " known lode," the
court added (p. 663)
:
It is established by former decisions of this court, that, under the acts of
Congress which govern this case, in order to except mines or mineral lands
from the operation of a townsite patent, it is not sufficient that the lands do in
fact contain minerals, or even valuable minerals, when the town-site patent
takes effect; but they must at that time be known to contain minerals of such
extent and value as to justify expenditures for the purpose of extracting them;
and if the lands are not known at that time to be so valuable for mining pur-
poses, the fact that they have once been valuable, or are afterwards discovered
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to be still valuable, for such purposes, does nol defeal or impair the title of per-
sons claiming under the town-site patent. Deffeback v. Harvvke, 115 U. S. 392;
Davis r. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507.
The iirst of these was a suit in equity by the United States to vacate
sixty-one patents issued for as many distinct tracts of land, under
the pre-emption act of 1841, and alleged to have been fraudulently
obtained. One ground relied upon to maintain the suit was that, as
disclosed by evidence in the record, the patented lands embraced
" known mines." of coal and were therefore excepted from disposition
under the pre-emption law. As appears from the above-quoted por-
tion of the opinion, the specific objection of the court went to the
weight of the evidence found in the record, which apparently estab-
lished mere " surface indications of the existence of veins of coal "
at the time of sale. In the first paragraph of the quotation the court
merely stated the situation in prior decided cases, and made no
attempt to outline a rule of determination.
The second case cited was also a suit in equity, begun by the
United States to vacate two placer patents. It was alleged, and at-
tempted to be proved, that the patented land was not placer in char-
acter but contained sundry veins or lodes, within the knowledge of
the patentee at the time of his application for the patent. Appar-
ently, this inference was attempted to be drawn principally from
the fact, established by the evidence adduced, that the patentee had
originally made lode locations upon the ground, which he afterwards
abandoned and substituted with placer locations. The court found
no evidence of lode discoveries of any character, but remarked
abstractly that '•some indications by outcroppings " are not enough
to establish the " known " existence of lodes.
The case of Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Company was an action
of ejectment brought by a placer patentee to recover possession of a
certain portion of the premises embraced within the patented placer
limits, upon which the defendants had entered after the issuance
of the placer patent. The defendants set up. in defense to the action,
a lode location by them of the around in controversy, and alleged
discovery of a valuable lode therein and its known existence at the
date of the placer location. Upon the question of the discovery
and known existence of a lode as alleged issue was joined. The
effort thus made to establish an exception out of the placer patent
failed for want of sufficient evidence to sustain the defendants' alle-
gations, the nature of the evidence submitted by them being dis-
cussed in the portion of the opinion above quoted and the showing
condemned as "merely a matter.of speculation and belied'."
The last case cited was also an action of ejectment, broughl by
j' claimant under a townsite patent to recover possession of two
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city lots within the patented townsite limits. The defendants,
in their answer, asserted title to the ground by virtue of a mining
location upon a lode alleged to have been known to exist and to have
been worked long prior and subsequent to the patent and therefore
to have been excepted therefrom. The facts established were that
for many years prior to the issuance of the townsite patent the lode
in question had been profitably worked, and many tons of gold
ore extracted from it, but that some months prior to patent work
en the ledge was abandoned and nothing further attempted until
many years thereafter, when the defendants' location was made, the
ledge having in the interval been regarded as worked out and as
of no further value for mining purposes. Under these facts it was
held that " known " existence of the alleged lode, so as to except it
from conveyance by the townsite patent, was not established.
In none of these cases, therefore, nor in any decision of the court of
which the Department has knowledge, is it held that evidence of
exploitation and development of the particular tract in controversy
must always be adduced to establish its mineral character. In but
one of the cited eases, the third, was anything like evidence of condi-
tions outside or surrounding the tract in controversy submitted, and
that was considered and found to fall short of establishing its mineral
character. In the last two cases the evidence touching the character
of the lands in question amounted to expressions of opinion and
belief, in the one, and to an unwarrantable inference in the other. In
the first two cases thus considered, upon evidence, though meagre, of
conditions upon the tracts themselves, patents of the government
were directly assailed, against which a mere preponderance of evi-
dence, sufficient to turn the scale in ordinary actions, would in no
event have been allowed to prevail. As said by the Court in Max-
well Land-Grant Case (121 U. S., 325, 381) :
We take the general doctrine to be, that when in a court of equity it is pro-
posed to set aside, to annul or to correct a written instrument for fraud or mis-
take in the execution of the instrument itself, the testimony on which this is
done must he clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and that it cannot he done upon
a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt. If the propo-
sition, as thus laid down in the cases cited, is sound in regard to the ordinary
contracts of private individuals, how much more should it be observed where
the attempt is to annul the grants, the patents and other solemn evidences of
title emanating from the government of the United States under its official seal.
In this class of cases, the respect due to a patent, the presumptions that all the
preceding steps required by the law bad been observed before its issue, the
immense importance and necessity of the stability of titles dependent upon these
official instruments, demand that the effort to set them aside, to annul them, or
to correct mistakes in them should only be successful when the allegations on
which this is attempted are clearly stated and fully sustained by proof.
Indeed, that from extrinsic conditions the existence of a vein
within the boundaries of a given tract might be ascertained is con-
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ceded in Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds (124 IT. 8., 374, 384)
thus:
There may be difficulty in determining whether such knowledge in a given
case was had, inn between mere belief .-Hid knowledge there is a wide difference.
The court could not make them synonymous by its charge and thus in effect
incorporate new terms into the statute
Knowledge of the existence of a lode or vein within the boundaries of a
placer claim may be obtained from its outcrop within such boundaries; or from
the developments of the placer claim previous to the application for a patent;
or by the tracing of the claim from another lode, or perhaps from the general
condition and developments of mining ground adjoining the placer claim. It
may also be obtained from the information of others who have made the neces-
sary explorations to ascertain the fact, and perhaps in other ways. We do not
speak of the sufficiency of any of these modes, but mention them merely to show
that such knowledge may be had without making hopes and beliefs on the
subject its equivalent. As well observed by the court, when the case was here
before, it is better that all questions as to what kind of evidence is necessary,
and we may add sufficient, to prove the knowledge required by the statute,
Should be settled as they arise.
The decisions of the Department, it is true, with respect to the
establishment of the coal or other mineral character of lands, have in
a number of instances tended to support the conclusion that actual
developments upon a tract in controversy are indispensable. One of
the early cases considered was Dughi v. Harkins (2 L. 1)., 7*21), in
which a homestead entry was assailed by the mineral claimants of
the tract involved, the Department saying on that occasion:
This land was returned by the surveyor-general as agricultural in character,
and hence was subject to a homestead entry. In such case the agricultural
character of the land continues until its mineral character is satisfactorily
shown; and. upon a hearing ordered to establish its true character, the home-
stead entryman may rest upon the surveyor-general's return, and is required
only to rebut proof of its mineral character. The burden of proof is therefore
on the mineral claimant and he must show, not that neighboring or adjoining
lands are mineral in character, or that that in dispute may hereafter by possi-
bility develop minerals in such quantity as will establish its mineral rather
than its agricultural character, but that, as a present fact, it is mineral in char-
acter; and this must appear from actual production of mineral, and not from
any theory that it may produce it: in other words, it is fact and not theory
which must control your office in deciding niton the character of this class of
lands.
In tin' later case of Commissioner- of King's County >•. Alexander
et al. (5 L. I).. L26), which arose upon protests against certain coal
entries, it was said :
Aside from the testimony offered by the protestants. the evidence submitted
by the counsel for the entrynieii shows thai their opinion is based upon a mere
theory thai coal will lie found, if t be shaft is sunk deep enough. Bu1 il bas
been repeatedly held by this Department thai the proof of the mineral character
of land must be specific and based upon the actual production of mineral: tint
il is not enough to show thai the neighboring or adjoining lands are mineral in
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character, and that tho lands in controversy may hereafter develop minerals to
such an extent as to show its mineral character, but it must be shown as a
present fact that the lands are mineral, and this must appear from actual pro-
duction of mineral and not from a theory that the lands may hereafter pro-
duce it. Hooper v. Ferguson (2 L. I)., 712); Dughi v. Ilarkins (Ibid., 721);
Roberts v. Jepson (-LI, D.. GO) ; Cleghorn v. Bird (Ibid., 47S) ; Lientz et al v.
Victor et al. (17 Cal., 272) ; Alford v. Barnum et al. (45 Cal., 482).
The use in those decisions, and others in which it is repeated, of the
expression " actual production," doubtless, has given rise to a rigid
rule in the determination of the character of lands not contemplated
by the Department. Taken literally, a requirement of an " actual
production " from a tract in controversy as a condition to the estab-
lishment of its mineral character would exclude from consideration
mere exposures of mineral deposits; and this certainly was not
intended. Indeed, whilst the decisions have evidently thus far been
adverse where evidence of surrounding conditions has not had the
support of discoveries or disclosures on the tracts directly involved,
it is nevertheless true that such evidence has been given consideration
and has never been held inadmissible. Thus, in Savage et al. v. Boyn-
ton (12 L. D., 012, 614), whilst citing Dughi r. Harkins and Commis-
sioners v. Alexander, supra, it was said
:
In the case at bar coal has been discovered in the vicinity of the land, and at
one place about twenty-five or thirty tons have been taken out from time to time
by the people living near by for their own use, but there is no evidence showing
that coal is being or has been mined anywhere in that immediate section for mer-
chantable purposes. Furthermore the contestants seek to establish that by
reason of the coal measures found on adjacent tracts and by the dip and angle
of inclination of said measures, that coal exists on the land in question at the
depth of from seven hundred to eight hundred feet, but I do not think a pre-
ponderance of the testimony sustains this claim.
In Scott v. Sheldon (15 L. D., 361, 362) the following comments
were made
:
There is not even expert evidence offered to show that it is probable that the
veins of coal in that vicinity extend into or underlie the land sought to be
entered as a homestead. But one witness for the defense testifies to this prob-
ability, but his testimony is not sufficient to convince me, especially in the face
of the fact that no attempt seems ever to have been made to demonstrate the
truth of this theory.
The coal-land laws, embodied in sections 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of
the Revised Statutes, do not prescribe " discovery " upon the land
sought as a condition precedent to the acquisition of title, except-
ing only as they confine the " preference right of entry." to one who
has " opened and improved "' a mine on the tract. In this they
differ from the lode and placer mining lawT s, whereunder " discovery "
within its limits is specifically an indispensable pre-requisite to the
validity of a location, together constituting the initiation of rights
under those laws. Whilst this technical "discovery" does not of
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 201
itself establish the patentably mineral character of the Land, which
may be determined in the absence of a location, it is naturally a link
in the chain of evidence; and analogy may have suggested the asso-
ciation of the same elements in respect to coal lands. But there is
no location under the coahland laws, and the analogy is imperfect.
The well known rules of evidence are as applicable here as in any
other case, and whatever is relevant to and hears in any degree upon
the question of the character of a given trad of land is admissible in
evidence to the end of its ascertainment.
The particular subject of the present consideration is coal deposits,
and the concern is of the data which may be relied upon to determine
their presence in any case. The characteristics peculiar to them,
therefore, must be taken into account and kept steadily in view.
These bedded deposits, generally of wide extent and of regular for-
mation, the result of slow accumulation at the earth's surface, follow-
ing laws of occurrence common to stratified formations and conse-
quently conforming to the lay of adjacent strata, differ radically
from most other useful mineral deposits, particularly the metallifer-
ous ores, which rarely occur in sedimentary beds, but generally in
veins and pockets, and replacement, impregnation, and contact de-
posits, and which, from the nature of their origin, present such
abrupt variations in form and character as to preclude safe predic-
tion of their underground extension or calculation of their quantity
or quality in advance of exploitation. Even where the coal beds
were deposited upon an uneven floor, and vary rapidly from place to
place, the geologist can easily ascertain the extent of variability and
from the conditions of deposit the degree of persistency of the coal
beds; and, readily determining in most fields the geologic structure,
can further determine the area of workable coal and closely approxi-
mate the depth at which an outcropping coal bed will be found in
any part of the held. It is well recognized that constancy or varia-
bility at the outcrops or other exposures are evidences of the same
conditions underground. In this connection the following extracts
from what is endorsed as a standard work, by J. P. Lesley, entitled
w
* Manual of Coal and its Topography," are of interest :
Coal is never round Issuing in veins from the interior of the planet, like sold
and silver; nor filling irregular cross crevices in limestone, like lead: nor
spread abroad in lakes of hardened lava, like basalt and greenstone; nor em-
bedded in clay, crystallizing upward from the walls and bottoms of deep wide
fissures, as bunches of grapes, or in bundles of pipes, like the hematite ores
; nor
lying exposed upon the surface in blocks, like native copper, or meteoric iron:
bid always as a thin sheet or stratum, extending through the hills as far as the
hills extend, and inclosed between similar sheets of other kinds of rock.
* • * * * * * *
Nothing is more surprising than the vast expanse of even the thinnesl of
these sheets of coal. The original deposit of carbonaceoun matter seems to
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have been in every instance almost co-extensive with the lake or sea in which it
was laid down.*******
Each sheet of coal extends for itself and by itself as far as the mountain
does in which it lies, never branching nor forking nor rolled together, but pass-
ing through the mountain from side to side, from end to end, or cleaving down
through it from summit to base, from end to end, and commonly in this latter
case passing under an adjoining valley and reascending through the length and
breadth of a mountain on the other side
The practical character of a coal bed is soon determined by a few good open-
ings upon its outcrop.*******
Under ordinary circumstances and for all practical purposes the quality, size,
#
and mining condition of a coal bed can be explored as well in two or three days
by a gangway ten or fifteen feet long, as by workings through it for a month or
a year.
The only proper method is to open the same bed at numerous places along its
outcrop, and from a comparison of these crop openings the actual average char-
acter of the bed within can be confidently predicted, and its contents calculated.
* * * * * * *
A coal bed may indeed belie itself at one point or at two where openings are
made, but not at a dozen. Veins of lead, of copper, of iron alternately increase
and diminish in size, rapidly and unexpectedly. The miner never knows until
he strikes the vein what it will be worth, nor how soon the pocket which he has
entered may close up between bare walls. Not so with coal. It varies little
and seldom disappoints. What it is at one point it is likely to be much the same
at another.
* * * * * * *
Even intervals of hundreds of miles in which it has undergone an infinite
number of slight and perhaps some striking variations, will sometimes pre-
sent it at the most distant places with strangely identical features, showing
how vast and regular has been the law of its deposit.
* * * * * * *
The great Pittsburg bed is a remarkable instance of this law, covering as it
does tens of thousands of square miles, and scarcely varying from a thickness
of eight feet, showing itself always a double bed, and yielding everywhere
both a superior quality and quantity of coal.
Upon faith of such investigations prudent men often expend large
sums of money in the purchase of lands and development of the prop-
erty. Often the depth or thickness of the overlying strata is such
as to prohibit economical exploration from above, and the distance
of many tracts from outcrops, or openings made at convenient and
accessible points, is too great to justify penetration by drifts or
slopes for purposes of preliminary investigation and ascertainment
;done. In the nature of things, therefore, reliance must frequently
be had upon such evidences as may become the guide of the geolo-
gist or coal expert.
Mere outcrops, disintegrated by action of the elements and broken
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and mixed with debris as they often arc seldom bear witness in them-
selves of the quality and quantity of the coal beds behind them.
[Jnless in such eases, therefore, they are sufficiently exploited no
determination of the coal character of the overlying lands can be
reached by the land department. Nor can opinions, unexplained or
expressed by unqualified witnesses, suffice upon any point. The char-
acter of the outcrops, or the extent and result of their exploitation,
or the nature, extent, and result of exposures of the coal bed other-
wise made, the positions of the outcrop- or openings with relation
to each other and to the tract in controversy, the thickness, merchant-
able quality, and identifying characteristics of the coal bed. the
geological formation and other data whereby the position and areal
extent of the coal bed with respect to the tract in controversy are
determined, should be fully set out in the evidence, the qualifications
of the witnesses shown, and the situation illustrated, as far as possi-
ble, by plats, charts, photographs, and other exhibits, properly
authenticated and introduced in evidence, for the guidance of the
land department. Each such case must then be adjudicated upon
it ^ individual merits, the question of depth of each ascertained
deposit, as affecting its commercial value, to be considered in that
connection, if important.
contest—motion to dismiss—rehearing.
Neilson v. Blum.
Where ;i contestant fails at the hearing to sustain the allegations in the affi-
davit of contest relative to the oonmilitary service of the homestead
entryman charged with abandonment, and the defendant thereupon moves
that the contest he for that reason dismissed, a new trial should not he
granted for the purpose of permitting the contestant to supply the proof
he neglected to produce a1 the hearing, hut the contest should he dis-
missed.
Secretary Hitchcock to flic Commission, r of tli<> General Land Office,
(V. L. C.) October 27, 1905. (E. P.)
May 21, L900, Algol Blum made homestead entry of the N"W. | of
Sec. i). T. L55 X.. K. 85 \Y., Minol land district. North Dakota,
against which entry William J. Neilson, on November L8, L901,
filed an affidavit of contest, charging abandonment and failure on
the part of the entryman to establish a residence on the land, which
default, it was alleged, was not due to service in the army or navy.
Notice issued citing the parties to appear before the local officers
February 15. L902, and submit testimony. On the day appointed
both parties appeared, and after certain motions made on behalf of
the defendant had been overruled by the local officers, the plaintiff
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submitted his testimony, which, while showing that the defendant
had never established a residence on the land, failed to show that
his absence from the land was not due to military service. When
the plaintiff had rested his case the defendant moved that the con-
test be dismissed because of the failure of the plaintiff to sustain his
allegations as to non-military service. This motion was promptly
overruled by the local officers, to which ruling the defendant noted
an exception. From the testimony submitted the local officers found
(hat the defendant had never established a residence on the land and
recommended that the entry be canceled. From the action of the
local officers the defendant appealed.
In passing upon the defendant's appeal your office, in its decision
of January 28, 11)04, after finding that the defendant had never es-
tablished a residence on the land, and that the plaintiff had failed to
prove that the defendant's absence from the land was not due to mil-
itary service, said
:
The defendant's motion to dismiss the contest for the reason that the contest-
ant had not shown that the defendant's absence from the land was not due to
his employment in the army or navy should have been dismissed conditionally;
that is, the contestant should have been given the opportunity to have pro-
duced testimony on this point, and in case of failure to make the proof re-
quired by the statute, his contest should have been dismissed.
The government is a party in interest in all contests, and in view of the un-
satisfactory condition of the record and the facts disclosed, I do not think this
case should be dismissed, but that it should be remanded for further hearing,
.and the contestant afforded an opportunity to submit testimony touching the
matter indicated and the defendant an opportunity to put in his defense on the
merits.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, filed in the local office March 2G, 1904,
the local officers, on March 29, 1904, issued neAv notice, citing (he
parties to appear before them May 20, 1904, and * w furnish evidence
touching the allegations of the contest affidavit filed in this case."
On the date set for the hearing last ordered both parties appeared,
by their respective attorneys, before the local officers. The defendant
formally objected to the jurisdiction of the local officers to take any
further testimony with reference to said charges except in a new pro-
ceeding regularly initiated, the basis of said objection being that
your office had no authority to remand the case for further hearing
for the purpose of affording the plaintiff another opportunity to
sustain his allegations, in the face of the defendant's motion to dis-
miss the contest because of the insufficiency of the showing made by
the plaintiff at the former hearing.
No oral testimony was submitted at this hearing. It appears, how-
ever, that there was then on file in the local office two depositions,
taken May 16, 1904, under the authority of a commission issued by
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the local officers upon the application of the plaintiff. These depo-
sitions, consisting of responses made to certain written interrogations,
prepared by the plaintiff's attorney, tend to show that during the
years 11)00, 1901, 1902 and 1903, the defendant was residing with his
family at Arvilla. North Dakota (a place shown by the map to be
about two hundred miles from the land), and that his absence from
the land was not due to military service. It does not appear from the
record, however, that these depositions were offered in evidence, that
they were with the record in the case at the time the second hearing
was had, or that either the defendant or his attorney had any knowl-
edge that they were then on file in the local office.
Testimony was submitted at this hearing on behalf of the defend-
ant which tends to show that in the summer of 1902, the defendant
built upon the land a one-story frame house, fourteen by sixteen feet,
and remained on the land at the time the house was built about a
week: that in February, 11)04, he, with his family, removed to the
land and thereafter continuously resided there until the date of the
hearing; and that the improvements on the land, consisting of the
house and from ten to fifteen acres of breaking, were worth from a
hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars.
Upon the conclusion of the testimony the defendant moved that the
contest be dismissed upon the grounds (1) that it was not proved
that his absence from the land was not due to military service, and
(2) that the undisputed testimony showed that prior to issuance of
the notice of the last hearing he had cured any laches that might have
theretofore existed.
August 1. L904, the local officers held as follows:
That the defendant, Algol Blum, had never established or maintained any
residence whatever <>n the land in question prior to the service of the first
notice of contest on him, or prior to the time that this office acquired jurisdic-
tion in this case.
At the conclusion of the taking of testimony the defendant moved that this
contest he dismissed for the reason that the defendant had cured any ladies
th;it might have existed prior to the service of notice of the hearing of tins con-
test. We do not think that the above motion is well taken, tor the reason that
this contest was remanded to the Commissioner for the purpose of enabling the
plaintiff to introduce testimony as to whether the defendant was employed in
the service of the l'. S. Army or Navy, and the defendant an opportunity to put
in his defense on the merits. Said motion is hereby denied.
They therefore recommended that the entry he canceled.
On appeal by the defendant, your office, by decision of March 3,
1905, held as follows:
The evidence in the ease shows that at the time the coldest was tiled the
defendant had never established his residence on the land, hnt it appears that
in January, 1904, and before this contest was remanded, the defendant had
moved his family on the land and had broken eight or ten acres.
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It is contended by the defendant that contestant's failure to prove non-military
service at tbe first hearing in the presence of defendant's objection and his
motion to dismiss on the ground of such failure entitled him to a dismissal of
the contest; that when the contest was remanded on January 28, 1904, by this
office on the status then existing as shown by the record, the defendant was
entitled to a dismissal of the contest: and. further, it appearing that the defend-
ant had cured his laches in January, 1904, before the case was remanded and
before any step was taken towards supplying the defect in the contestant's
proof as to non-military service, this contest should be dismissed ; that remand-
ing the case on January 28, 1904, was in substance equivalent to dismissing the
contest and giving the contestant a preference right to proceed de novo with his
contest.
This contention of the defendant is not supported by the practice of the
Department.
It appearing that the defendant had not established his residence on the land
at the time the contest was filed, and it further appearing from said depositions
referred to that the default of the entryman was not due to military service,
the said entry is held for cancellation.
From said last-mentioned decision of your office the defendant has
appealed to the Department, alleging error as follows:
1. The Hon. Commissioner erred in failing to pass upon the questions raised
by the motion to dismiss for the reason that there was no proof of the non-
military service of the defendant as alleged in the contest affidavit and notice.
2. The Hon. Commissioner erred in considering the depositions filed in said
cause as alleged in the opinion, said depositions having never been offered in
evidence and not being in evidence in said cause.
3. The Hon. Commissioner erred in holding said entry for cancellation.
4. The Hon. Commissioner erred in overruling the motion to dismiss made at
the close of testimony in said cause.
5. The Hon. Commissioner erred in holding that there was no curing of the
laches of the defendant prior to the service of contest notice.
At the first hearing had in this case the plaintiff wholly failed to
comply with what the Department has repeatedly held to be an
absolute requirement imposed by the act of June 16, 1898 (30 Stat.,
473), namely, that in all contests thereafter initiated against a home-
stead entry on the ground of abandonment the contestant must prove
at the hearing that the settler's alleged absence from the land was
not due to military service. On the ground of such failure on the
part of the plaintiff, the defendant, at the earliest possible moment,
moved that the contest be dismissed, which motion was overruled by
the local office, and this action of the local officers was made one of
the grounds of the defendant's appeal. Your office, however, while
finding the ground upon which this motion was based was clearly
sufficient, held, in effect, ihat the plaintiff was entitled to another
Opportunity to sustain his allegations, and for this purpose directed
that a rehearing be ordered. The Department believes that this was
error. The fact that a party neglects to so present his case as to
meet the requirements of the law is not a sufficient reason for the
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granting of a new trial. Every person is presumed to know the law,
and where, as in a ease like the one at bar. ample opportunity has
once been afforded a contestant to properly present his case, and he
fails to do so, he should abide by the consequences of his neglect.
To hold otherwise would be to encourage a laxity in the presentation
of cases that would have a tendency to lead to never-ending con-
troversies and create doubt and uncertainty as to the effect of pro-
ceedings before the land department. The Department is of opinion
that upon the defendant's motion made at the first hearing, he was
clearly entitled to a judgment of dismissal.
Under this view, the contestant's motion for the issuance of new
notice can be considered in no better light than that of the initiation
of a new contest, and as it appears from the undisputed testimony
submitted on behalf of the defendant at the second hearing that at
the date of the initiation of the second contest, if it can be called
such, the defendant was with his family residing on the land, it
must be held that he had, so far at least as the contestant was
concerned, cured any laches that might theretofore have existed.
For the reasons above stated the contest is dismissed.
The action of your office is accordingly hereby reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-ACT OF JULY 1, 1898.
Casey et al. v: (Jrignon et al.
All action looking to the disposition of lands involved in second indemnity selec-
tions made l>y the Northern Pacific Railway Company in lienor lands alleged
to have been lost to its grant within the limits of the withdrawal on general
route of the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, has been
suspended by the land department to await final determination of the
question (now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States)
whether lauds so situated furnish a sufficient basis for second indemnity
selection; but where it appears that any such lands are embraced in entries
allowed prior to selection by the company, the suspension as to such lauds
will no longer continue. Action on such entries will proceed in due course
and the selection to that extent will be canceled. In case of a decision
favorable to the company on the question pending before the court, it may
then relinquish whatever claim it may have to the lands under its selection,
with a new to selection of other lands in lieu thereof under the provisions
of the act of July 1, ISPS.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General L<in<l Office^
(F. L. C.) October ..V. 1905. (F. W. C>
The Department has considered the appeal by Sarah L. Casey
from your office decision of May L3, \ (M):>, rejecting Iter homestead
application, proffered July L6, 1896, as to the NE. 1 of the X\V. \ of
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Sec. 11, T. 54 N., R. 11 W., Duluth land district, Minnesota, for con-
flict with the allotment of Oscar F. Waggoner, and suspending action
upon her application as to the NE. J of the SW. | of said section 11.
As originally presented her application covered the E. J of the
NW. J and NE. \ of the SW. J of said section 11. The application
as to the SE.| of the NW. J of Sec. 11 was rejected for conflict with
the allotment of Henry Grignon and said rejection was sustained by
your office decision " G " of November 3, 1897, and the case closed.
Your office decision appealed from disposed of other applications
for lands in said section 11, but Case}7 seems to be the only one who
appealed.
The entire tract covered by Casey's application was included in a
list of indemnity selections filed by the Northern Pacific Railroad
(now Railway) Company, October IT, 1883, the selection being
known as second indemnity list No. 15, re-arranged list No. 15 B.
Grignon and Waggoner are Winnebago Indian allottees, their allot-
ments having been made July 8, 1873, under the ninth and tenth
sections of the act of July 15, 1870 (16 Stat., 361), and the act of
May 29, 1872 (17. Stat., 185). Said allotments were approved by
the Department Jul}7 23, 1873, and Grignon having subsequently
become a citizen of the United States, the Department, September 23,
1896, upon the recommendation of the Commisisoner of Indian
Affairs, directed that a patent in fee be issued to Grignon for the
land covered by his allotment. No further action, appears to have
.been taken upon these allotments because of undisposed of railroad
indemnity selection filed October 17, 1883, more than ten years after
the allotments to Grignon and Waggoner.
The railroad indemnity selection in question is based upon a loss
within the limits of the withdrawal on general route of the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, which the Department
has held not to furnish a sufficient base for a second indemnity selec-
tion. The question involved is pending in a case recently decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, from which
an appeal has been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Department has for several years suspended action upon lands
involved in selections of the character here in question, pending the
final determination of the case brought by the railway company, in
order to have the question involved judicially determined, and it is
believed to be in the best interests of all to continue such suspension
until the case is determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States. In cases, however, where, like the allotments here in ques-
tion, the entries were allowed prior to the railroad indemnity selec-
tion, there would seem to be no good reason for continuing the sus-
pension as to such lands, for no matter what the decision may be it
would not affect the interests of these claimants, and it would not,
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in the opinion of this Department, be to the best interests of the
Indians to permit a transfer of their claims to these allotted lands
to others under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat.,
,V.>7. 620). As a consequence, the only result of a decision favorable
to the company, in the Supreme Court, would be to afford the rail-
way company the privilege of relinquishing whatever claim it might
assert under its selection of these lands, to the end that it might
select others under the act of July 1, 1898, supra.
It is therefore directed that the suspension no longer continue but
that these allotments be proceeded with in due course, and for that
purpose the selection as to the lands involved will be finally canceled.
Your office rightly held the claims of these Indian allottees to be
superior to the right of Casey under a homestead application prof-
fered, as before stated, July 16, 1896. This reduces her application
to the XE. { of the SAW j of said section 11, which is in conflict with
the railroad indemnity selection of October 17. 1883, and the suspen-
sion will continue as to said tract until the question of the company's
rights under its selection is finally determined by the decision of the
Supreme Court.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
railroad <;hant—adjustment—purchaser—act of july 1, 1898.
Neil v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
Where al the time of the passage of the act of July 1, 1898, the conflicting claims
of a homestead settler and tin- Northern Pacific Railway Company to a
tract of land wore of a character subject to adjustment under that act, the
fad thai the settler subsequently purchased the land from the company in
order to proteci Ins improvements will not prevent him from transferring
his claim to other lands in accordance with the provisions of said act.
Secretary Hitchcock t<> the Commissioner of the General Lund Office,
( V. L. C.) October 28, 1905. (E. J. H.)
The W.
I
of SW. 1 of Sec. 1. T. 3 X.. R. 1 K.. Vancouver. Washing-
ton, land district, is situated within the primary limits of the grant
made to the Northern Pacific Railroad (now Railway) Company, by
the joint resolution of May 31, L870 ( 16 Stat., 378), and was patented
to said company May 21, l^ (.»r>.
May 2, L896, James S. Neil tendered his homestead application for
the above described land, which was rejected by the local officers
because the land had been patented to the company, and he appealed.
April 7. L905, Neil filed his election to relinquish said land and
transfer his claim to other land in lien thereof, under the provisions
5104—Vol. 34r-05 M 14
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of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat, 597, 620). In Neil's sworn state-
ment of election it is shown that in 1889 he purchased the improve-
ments then on the land of a prior settler and established residence
thereon; that in 1890 and 1891 he made further improvements and
with his family resided on the land until September, 1898, at which
time he had a house fifteen by twenty feet, a barn eighteen by twenty-
four feet, a wood-shed, two acres cleared, thirty acres slashed, one-half
mile of fencing and an orchard, and had raised crops every year, the
value of his improvements being $(>00; and that in September, 1898,
he purchased said land from the Northern Pacific Railway Company
and had since sold the same.
May 10, 1905, your office decision held that in September, 1898, Neil,
instead of seeking relief under the act of July 1, 1898, abandoned his
homestead claim and purchased the land from the company and sub-
sequently sold the same, " thus divesting himself of all right, title
and interest in and to it, and that he has now no homestead claim
thereto for adjudication under the said act of 1898. ?1 The decision
of the local officers rejecting his homestead application was affirmed,
and his election to relinquish the land under said act was held for
rejection, from which action Neil has appealed to the Department.
In the case of Newkirk v. Northern Pacific Railway Company (32
L. D., 309), it was held that—
The act of July 1, 1898, refers to conditions existing at the time of its passage,
and if the conditions were such at that time as to permit the adjustment of
the conflicting claims of the Northern Pacific Railway Company and an indi-
vidual claimant, to ;i tract selected by the company within the indemnity
limits of its grant, the fact that the land department failed to proceed under
the act until after the individual claimant had relinquished his claim in order
that his son might make entry thereof, will not prevent such adjustment heing
made, and the action of the individual whose claim was pending at the date
of the passage of the act, in so relinquishing his entry, will he considered as
equivalent to an election on his part to retain the land for the purpose of
adjustment.
At the time of the passage of the act of 1898, Neil's homestead
application for the land in controversy between him and the rail-
road company was pending in your office on appeal from its rejec-
tion by the local officers, and the conditions were such that said
conflicting claims were then adjustable under said act. Humbird
et al. v. Avery et al. (195 U. S., 480, 500). It appears that Newkirk,
in the case above cited, subsequently to the passage of the act of 1898,
relinquished his claim to the land in order that his son might make
entry thereof, while in this case Neil, in order to save his valuable
improvements, purchased the land of the company. This purchase
should not be considered as an abandonment of his claim but
rather that it supports his election to transfer his settlement claim
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to other land, the purchase from the railroad company having evi-
dently been made to protect his improvements until an advantageous
sale thereof could be made.
Four office decision rejecting Neil's election to relinquish his
claim to the land under the act of 1898, is reversed, and the case
remanded for your further consideration and action in the light of
the ruling herein made.
mineral lands-classification—act of august 5, 1892.
St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co.
The fact that a tract of land was, prior to survey, classified as mineral under
the act of February 26, 1895, can not be considered as a classification of
the land as mineral "at the time of actual government survey," within
the meaning of the act of August 5, 1892.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General L<m<I Office,
(S. V. P.) October 31, 1905. (F. W. C)
The Department has considered the appeal of the St. Paul, Minne-
apolis and Manitoba Railway Company from your office decision
of May 19, 1004. holding for cancellation the selection made August
25, 1893, by said company for lots 2 and 4, S. \ of NE. J, SE. J
of X W. J. NE. .{ of SW.* J and X. J of SE. i, Sec. 3, T. 25 X., R.
22 W., Kalispell land district, Montana.
The selection in question was made under the act of August 5,
L892 (27 Stat.. 390), by which act the said company, in lieu of its
relinquishment of certain lands to which it was entitled and which
had been disposed of by the United States without regard to the
claim of said company, was granted the right to select—
mii equal quantity of nonmineral public lands, so classified as nonmineral at
the time of actual government survey, which has been or shall he made ....
The land in question was returned in the report made by the min-
eral land commissioners appointed under the act of February 26,
L895 (28 Stat.. 683), for the month of June, 1896, as mineral land, it
being a portion of a body of land returned by said commissioners as
mineral land in their report for said month, and the classification as
made was approved by the Secretary of the Interior on December 14,
L896.
The act of February 26, 1895, under which this classification was
made, was designed to separate the mineral lands from the nonmin-
eral lands for the purpose of aiding a speedy adjustment of the
Northern Pacific land :grant. While it is true that the classification
made by said commissioners when approved was final as to the North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company, it did not prevent such disposal of
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the lands as may be proper on a subsequent showing as to their
character, the effect of the return by the mineral land commissioners
being likened to the return of mineral lands made by the govern-
ment surveyor (25 L. D., 446). A return of the lands as mineral
prior to the public survey can not, however, be considered as a classi-
fication of the lands as mineral at the time of the actual government
survey, within the meaning of the act of. August 5, 1892.
The lands here in question Avere surveyed in 1897, subsequently to
the approval of the mineral classification before referred to, and the
survey as made was approved by the surveyor general June 23, 1898.
An examination of the field notes and plat of the government survey
discloses no indication as to the presence of mineral upon any por-
tion of the section in question, it being returned generally as fourth
class soil, stony, mountainous, and well timbered. The return made
at the time of the government survey is essentially a nonmineral
classification, and, in the opinion of this Department, the previous
classification by the mineral land commissioners under the act of
February 26, 1895, can not defeat the selection in question.
Your office decision is therefore reversed, and, if the selection is
otherwise regular and proper, it should be listed for approval with
a view to the issue of patent.
rights ofwax for canals, ditches, reservoirs, telegraph and
telephone lines, electrical plants, tramroads, etc.
Regulations.
right of way for canals, ditches, and reservoirs.
Sections 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the act of Congress approved March
3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), entitled "An act to repeal timber-culture
laws, and for other purposes," grant the right of way through the
public lands and reservations of the United States for the use of
canals, ditches, reservoirs heretofore or hereafter constructed by
corporations, individuals, or associations of individuals upon the
filing and approval of the papers and maps therein provided for.
When the right of way is upon a reservation not within the juris-
diction of the Interior Department, the application must be filed in
accordance with these regulations, and will be submitted to the
Department having jurisdiction. But where the right of way is
wholly within a military reservation, the application should be filed
with the War Department, direct. A map and field notes of the
portion within any reservation must be submitted, in addition to
the duplicates required herein, except in the case of a forest or timber
land reserve. This map and field notes must conform to all the
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provisions of this circular, and the local officers will- forward them
to this office.
The word adjacent, as used in section 18 of the act, in connection
with the right to take material for construction from the public
lands, must be construed according to the conditions of each separate
case (28 L. I)., 439). The right extends only to construction, and
no public timber or material may be taken or used for repair or
improvements (14 L. I).. 566). These decisions were rendered under
the railroad right-of-way act. and are applied to this, as the words
are the same in both.
The sections above noted read as follows:
Sec. is. That the right of way through the public lands and reservations of
the United States is hereby granted to any canal or ditch company formed for
the purpose of irrigation, and duly organized under the laws of any State or
Territory, which shall have tiled, or may hereafter tile, with the Secretary of
the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation, and due proofs of its organ-
ization under the same, to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of
the reservoir and of the canal and its laterals, and fifty feet on each side of
the marginal limits thereof; also the right to take from the public lands
adjacent to the line of the canal or ditch, material, earth, and stone necessary
for the construction of such canal or ditch: Provided, That no such right of
way shall be so located as to interfere with the proper occupation by the Gov
ernmenl of any such reservation, and all mans of location shall be subject to
the approval of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction of such
reservation, and the privilege herein granted shall not be construed tojnter-
fere with the control of water for irrigation and other purposes under authority
of the respective States or Territories.
Sec. lb. That any canal or ditch company desiring to secure the benefits of
this act shall, within twelve months after the location of ten miles of this canal,
if the same be upon surveyed lands, and if upon unsurveyed lands within twelve
months after the survey thereof by the United Sates, file with the register of
the land office for the district where such land, is located a map of its canal
or ditch and reservoir: and upon the approval thereof by the Secretary of the
Interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office, and thereafter all
such lands over which such rights of way shall pass shall be disposed of subjc.i
to such right of way. Whenever any person or corporation, in the construction
of any canal, ditch, or reservoir, injures or damages the possession of any
settler on the public domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall
be liable to the party injured for such injury or damage.
SEC 20. That the provisions of this act shall apply to all canals, ditches, or
reservoirs heretofore or hereafter constructed, whether constructed by corpora-
tions, individuals, or association of individuals, on the tiling of the certificates
and maps herein provided for. If such ditch, canal, or reservoir has been
or shall l»e constructed by an individual or association of individuals, it shall
be sullieient for such individual or association of individuals to tile with the
Secretary of the Interior and with the register of the land office where said
land is located a map of the line of such canal, ditch, or reservoir, as in a case
Of a corporation, with the name of the individual owner or owners thereof,
together with the articles of association, if any there be. Plats heretofore tiled
shall have the benefits of this act from the date of their tiling, as though tiled
under it : Provided, That if any section of said canal, or ditch shall not be com-
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pleted within five years after the location of said section, the rights herein
granted shall be forfeited as to any uncompleted section of said canal, ditch,
or reservoir, to the extent that the same is not completed at the date of the
forfeiture.
Sec. 21. That nothing in this act shall authorize such canal or ditch com-
pany to occupy such right of way except for the purpose of said canal or ditch,
and then only so far as may be necessary for the construction, maintenance,
and care of said canal or ditch.
The act approved May 11, 1898 (30 Stat., 401), entitled "An act to
amend an act to permit the use of the right of way through public
lands for tramroads, canals, and reservoirs, and for other purposes,"
makes an important declaration in section 2 as to the purposes for
which the rights of way under the act of 1891 may be used, but does
not authorize the approval of any application for right of way for
purposes other than irrigation. (28 L. D., 474; 32 L. D., 452 and
461.) The language of the act of 1898 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative* of the United States
of America in Congress assembled. That the act entitled "An act to permit the
use of the right of way through the public lands for tramroads, canals, and
reservoirs, and for other purposes," approved January twenty-first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five, be, and the same is hereby, amended by adding thereto
the following
:
" That the Secretary of the Interior be, and hereby is, authorized and empow-
ered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of right
of way upon the public lands of the United States, not within limits of any
park, forest, military, or Indian reservations, for tramways, canals, or reser-
voirs, to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of the canals and
reservoirs, and fifty feet on each side of the marginal limits thereof, or fifty
feet on each side of the center line of the tramroad, by any citizen or associa-
tion of citizens of the United States, for the purposes of furnishing water for
domestic, public, and other beneficial uses.
" Sec 2. That rights of way for ditches, canals, or reservoirs heretofore or
hereafter approved under the provisions of sections eighteen, nineteen, twenty,
and twenty-one of the act entitled 'An act to repeal timber-culture laws, and for
other purposes,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, may
be used for purposes of a public nature ; and said rights of way may be used for
purposes of water transportation, for domestic purposes or for the development
of power, as subsidiary to the main purpose of irrigation."
1. These acts are evidently designed to encourage the much-needed
work of constructing ditches, canals, and reservoirs in the arid por-
tion of the country by granting right of way over the public lands
necessary to the nlaintenance and use of the same. The eighteenth
section of the act of 1891 provides that
—
The privilege herein granted shall not be construed to interfere with the con-
trol of water for irrigation and other purposes under authority of the respective
States or Territories.
The control of the flow and use of the water is therefore, so far
as this act is concerned, a matter exclusively under State or Territo-
rial control the matter of administration within the jurisdiction of
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this Department being limited to the approval of rtiaps carrying
the right of way oxer the public lands. In submitting maps for
approval under this act, however, which in any wise appropriate
natural sources of water supply, such as the damming of rivers or
the appropriation of lakes, such maps should l>e accompanied by
proof that the plans and purposes of the projectors have been regu-
larly submitted and approved in accordance with the local laws or
customs governing the use of writer in the State or Territory in
which the same is located. No general rule can he adopted in regard
to this matter. Each case must resl upon the showing filed in
support thereof.
'2. The act is not in the nature of a grant of lands; hut it is a base
or qualified fee, giving the possession and right of use of the land for
the purposes contemplated by the law. a reversionary interest remain-
ing in the United States, to he conveyed by it to the person to whom
the land may be patented, whose rights will be subject to those of the
grantee of the right of way. All persons settling on a tract of pub-
lic land, to part of which right of way has attached for a canal,
ditch, or reservoir, take the same subject to such right of way. and
at the full area of the subdivision entered, there being no authority to
make deduction in such cases. If a settler has a valid claim to land
existing at the date of the filing of the map of definite location, his
right is superior, and he is entitled to such reasonable measure of
damages for right of way as may be determined upon by agreement
or in the courts, the question being one that does not fall within the
jurisdiction of this Department. By section 21 of the act above
quoted it will be seen that the approval of a map of a canal, ditch,
or reservoir does not necessarily carry with it a right to the use of
land 50 feet on each side, the approval of the Department granting
only such right of way as the law provides. The width necessary
lor construction, maintenance, and care of a canal, ditch, or reser-
voir is not determined.
3. Whenever a right of way is located upon a forest or timber-
land reserve, the applicant must file a stipulation under seal, incor-
porating the following:
(1) Thai the proposed right of way is not so located as to inter-
fere with the proper occupation of tin 4 reservation by the ( government.
(2) Thai the applicant will cut no timber from the reserve outside
the fight of way.
(3) Thai the applicant will remove no timber within the right of
way except only such as is rendered necessary by the proper use and
enjoyment of the privilege for which application is made, and that he
will also remove from the reservation, or destroy, under proper >ale-
guards as determined by this Office, all standing, fallen, and dead
timber, as well as all tops, lops, brush, and refuse cuttings on the right
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of way, for such distance on each side of the central line as may be
determined by the General Land Office to be essential to protect the
forest from fire to the fullest extent possible.
(4) That the applicant will furnish free of charge such assistance
in men and material for fighting fires as may be spared without
serious injury to the applicant's business.
The applicant will also be required to give bond to the Government
of the United States, to be approved by the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office, such bond stipulating that the makers thereof will
pay to the United States " for any and all damage to the public lands,
timber, natural curiosities, or other public property on such reserva-
tion, or upon the lands of the United States, by reason of such use
and occupation of the reserve, regardless of the cause or circumstances
under which such damage may occur." A bond furnished by any surety
company that has complied with the provisions of the act of August
13, 1894 (28 Stat., 279), will be accepted, and must run in the terms
of the stipulation above quoted. The amount of the bond can not be
fixed until the application has been submitted to the General Land
Office, when a form of bond will be furnished and the amount thereof
fixed.
No construction can be allowed on a reservation until an applica-
tion for right of way has been regularly filed in accordance with the
laws of the United States and has been approved by the Department,
or has been considered by this Office or the Department, and permis-
sion for such construction has been specifically given.
4. Canals, ditches, or reservoirs lying partly upon unsurveyed land
can be approved if the application and accompanying maps and
papers conform to these regulations, but the approval will only relate
to that portion traversing the surveyed lands. (For right of way
wholly on unsurveyed land, see paragraphs 16 and 17.)
5. Any incorporated company desiring to obtain the benefits of
the law is required to file the following papers and maps with the
register of the land district in which the canal, ditch, or reservoir is
to be located, who will forward them to the General Land Office,
where, after
.
examination, they will be submitted to the Secretary
of the Interior with recommendation as to their approval
:
First. A copy of its articles of incorporation, duly certified to by
the proper officers of the company under its corporate seal, or by the
secretary of the State or Territory where organized.
Second. A copy of the State or Territorial law under which the
company was organized (when organized under State or Territorial
law), with certificate of the governor or secretary of the State or
Territory, under seal, that the same is the existing law. (See elev-
enth subdivision of this paragraph.)
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Third. When said law directs that the articles of- association or
other papers connected with the organization be filed with any State
or Territorial officer, the certificate of such officer that the same have
been filed according to law, with the date of the filing thereof.
Fourth. When a company is operating in a State or Territory
other than that in which it is incorporated, the certificate of the
proper officer of the State or Territory is required that it has com-
plied with the laws of thai State or Territory governing foreign cor-
porations to the extent required to entitle the company to operate
in such State or Territory.
No forms are prescribed for the above portion of the " due proofs "
required, as each case must be governed to some extent by the laws of
the State or Territory.
Fifth. The official statement, under the seal of the company, of
the proper officer that the organization has been completed, that the
company is fully authorized to proceed with construction according
to the existing law of the State or Territory, and that the copy of
the articles filed in true and correct. (See Form 1, p. 236.)
Sixth. A true list, signed by the president, under the seal of the
company, showing the names and designations of its officers at the
date of the filing of the proofs. (See Form 2, p. 2oT.)
Seventh. A copy of the company's title or right to appropriate the
water needed for its canals, ditches, and reservoirs, certified as re-
quired by the State or Territorial laws. If the miner's inch is the
unit used in such title, its equivalent in cubic feet per second must
be stated. In cases where the right to appropriate the water has not
been adjudicated under the local laws, a certified copy of the notice
of appropriation will be sufficient. In cases where the notice of
appropriation is accompanied by a map of the canal or reservoir it
will not be necessary to furnish a copy of it if the notice describes
the location sufficiently to identify it with the canal or reservoir for
which the right-of-way application is made. In cases where the
water-right claim has been transferred a number of times it is not
necessary to furnish a copy of each instrument of transfer: an ab-
stract of title will be accepted.
Eighth. A copy of the State or Territorial laws governing water
rights and irrigation, with the certificate of the governor or secretary
of the State or Territer that the same is the existing law. (See
eleventh subdivision of this paragraph.)
Ninth. A statement of the amount of water flowing in the stream
supplying the canal, ditch, or reservoir, at the point of diversion
or damming, during the preceding year or years. For this purpose
it will be necessary to give* the maximum, minimum, and average
monthly (low in cubic feet per second, and the average annual flow.
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All available data as to the flow is required. The method of meas-
urement or estimate by which these results have been obtained must
be fully stated. In case there is no well-defined flow which can be
measured, the area of the watershed, average annual rainfall, and
estimated run-off at the point of diversion or damming should be
given.
Tenth. Maps, field notes, and other papers, as hereinafter required.
Eleventh. If certified copies of the existing laws regarding cor-
porations and irrigation, and of new laws as passed from time to
time, be forwarded to this office by the governor or secretary of the
State or Territory, the applicant may file, in lieu of the requirements
of the second and eighth subdivisions of this paragraph, a certificate
of the governor or secretary of state, under seal, that no change
has been made since a given date, not later than that of the laws last
forwarded.
6. Individuals or associations of individuals making applications
for right of way are required to file the information called for in
the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth subdivisions of the preceding
paragraph. Associations .and individuals must, in addition, file
their articles of association ; if there be none, the fact must be stated
over the signature of each member of the association.
7. The maps filed must be drawn on tracing linen in duplicate, and
must be strictly conformable to the field notes of the survey thereof.
They must be filed in the land office for the district in which the right
of way is located ; but if located in more than one district, duplicate
maps and field notes need be filed in but one district, and single sets
in the others. The maps should show other canals, ditches, laterals,
or reservoirs with which connections are made, but they must be dis-
tinguished from those for which right of way is desired by ink of a
different color.
8. Field notes of the surveys must be filed in duplicate, separate
from the map, and in such form that they may be folded for filing.
Complete field notes should not be placed on the map, but only the
station numbers where deflections or changes of numbering occur,
station numbers with distances to corners where the lines of the pub
lie surveys are crossed, and the lines of reference of initial and termi-
nal points, with their courses and distances. Typewritten field notes
with clear carbon copies are preferred, as they expedite the examina-
tion of applications. The field notes should contain, in addition to
the ordinary records of surveys, the data called for in this and in the
following paragraphs. They should state which line of the canal
was run—whether middle or a specified side line. The stations or
courses should be numbered in the field notes and on the map. The
record should be so complete that from it the surveys could be accu-
rately retraced by a competent surveyor with proper instruments.
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The field notes should show whether the lines were run on the true
or the magnetic bearings, and in the Latter ease the declination of the
needle and date of determination must be stated. The kind and size
of the instrument used in running the lines and its minimum reading
on the horizontal circle should be noted. The line of survey should
be that of the actual location of the proposed ditch and, as exactly as
possible, the water line of the proposed reservoir. The method of
running the grade lines of canals and the water lines of reservoirs
must be described.
9. The scale of the map should be 2,000 feet to an inch in the case
of canals or ditches and 1,000 feel to an inch in the case of reser-
voirs. The maps may, however, be drawn to a larger scale of 1,000
feet to an inch in the case of canals or ditches and 500 feet to an inch
in the case of reservoirs when absolutely necessary to properly show
the proposed works.
10. All subdivisions of the public surveys represented on the map
should have their entire boundaries drawn, and on all lands affected
by the righl of way the smallest legal subdivisions (40-acre tracts
and lots) must be shown, and the section, township, and range must
be clearly marked on the map.
11. The termini of a canal, ditch, or lateral should be fixed by
reference of course and distance to the nearest existing corner of the
public survey. The initial point of the survey of a reservoir should
he fixed by reference of course and distance to the nearest existing
corner outside the reservoir by a line which does not cross an area
lliat will be covered with water when the reservoir is in use. The
map. field notes, engineer's affidavit, and applicant's certificate
( Forms 3 and 4) should each show these connections.
L2. A\'hen either terminal of a canal, ditch, or lateral is upon un-
surveyed land, it must be connected by traverse with an established
corner of the public survey, if not more than six miles distant from
it. and the single bearing and distance from the terminal point to
the corner computed and noted on the map. in the engineer's affidavit,
and in the applicant's certificate (Forms l\ and 4). The notes and
all data for the computation of the traverse must be given in the
Held notes.
L3. When the distance to an established corner of the public survey
is more than 6 miles, this connection will be made with a natural
object or a permanent monument which can be readily found and
recognized and which will \\\ and perpetuate the position of the termi-
nal point. The map must show the position of such mark and course
and distance to the terminus. The field notes must give an accurate
description of the mark and' full data of the traverse as required
above. The engineer's affidavit and applicant's certificate (Forms '*>
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and 4) must state the connections. These monuments are of great
importance.
14. When a canal, ditch, or lateral lies partly on nnsnrveyed land,
each portion lying within surveyed and nnsnrveyed land will be
separately stated in the field notes and in Forms 3 and 4 by connec-
tions of termini, length, and width, as though each portion were inde-
pendent. (See paragraphs 11, 12, and 13.)
15. When a reservoir lies partly on nnsnrveyed land its initial
point must be noted, as required for the termini of ditches in para-
graph 11, and so that the reference line will not cross an area that
will be covered with water when the reservoir is in use. The areas
of the several parts lying on surveyed and unsurveyed land must be
separately noted on the map, in the field notes, and in Forms 3 and 4.
1C). Maps showing canals, ditches, or reservoirs wholly upon nnsnr-
veyed lands may be received and placed on file in the General Land
Office and the local land office of the district in which the same is
located, for general information, and the date of filing will be noted
thereon ; but the same will not be submitted to nor approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, as the act makes no provision for the
approval of any but maps showing the location in connection with
the public surveys. The filing of such maps will not dispense with
the filing of maps after the survey of the lands and within the time
limited in the act granting the right of way, which map, if in all
respects regular when filed, will receive the Secretary's approval.
IT. In filing such maps the initial and terminal points will be
fixed as indicated in paragraphs 12 and 13.
18. Whenever the line of survey crosses a toAvnship or section line
of the public survey, the distance to the nearest existing corner should
be ascertained and noted. In the case of a reservoir the distance
must not be measured across an area which will be covered with
water when the reservoir is in use. The map of the canal, ditch, or
reservoir must show these distances, and the field notes must give
the points of intersection and the distances. When corners are
destroyed by the canal or reservoir, proceed as directed in paragraphs
21 and 22.
19. The map must bear a statement of the width of each canal,
ditch, or lateral at high-water line. If not of uniform width, th^
limits of the variations from it must be clearly defined on the map.
The field notes should record the changes in such a manner as to admit
of exact location on the ground. In the case of a pipe line, the diam-
eter of the pipe should be stated. The map must show the source of
water supply.
20. In applications for right of way for a reservoir, the capacity of
the reservoir must bo stated on the map in acre-feet (i. e., the number
of acres that will be covered 1 foot in depth by the water it will hold;
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1 acre-foot is t3,560 cubic feet). The map must show the source of
water supply for the reservoir and the location and height of the
dam.
21. Whenever a corner of the public survey will be covered In-
earth or water, or otherwise rendered useless, marked monuments
(one on each side of destroyed corner) must be set on each township
or section line passing through, or one on each line terminating at.
said corner. These monuments must comply with the requirements
for witness corners of the Manual of Surveying Instructions issued
by this office, and must be at such distance from the work- a- to be
safe from interference during the construction and operation of same.
In case two or more consecutive corners on the same line are de-
stroyed, the monument shall be set as required in the Manual for the
nearest corner on that line to be covered.
%2'2. The line on which such monument is set will be determined by
running a random line from the corner to be destroyed to the first
existing corner on the line to be marked by the monument, setting on
the random line a temporary mark at the distance of the proposed
monument. If the random line strikes the corner run to. the monu-
ment will be established at the place marked; if the random line
passes to one side of the corner, the north and south or east and west
distance to it will be measured and the true course calculated. The
proper correction of the temporary mark will then be computed and
a permanent monument set in the proper place. The field notes for
the surveys establishing the monuments must be in duplicate and
separate from those of the canal or reservoir, being certified by the
surveyor under oath. They must comply with the form of field notes
prescribed in the Manual of Surveying Instructions issued by this
office. When application is made for a canal or reservoir which is
constructed and in operation, the method to be adopted in setting the
monuments, being governed b}^ the special features of each case, must
be left to the judgment of the surveyor. No Held notes will be
accepted unless the lines on which the monuments are set conform
to the lines shown by the field notes of the survey as made originally
under the direction of this office, and unless the notes are in such
form that the computation can be verified and the lines retraced on
the ground.
*2o. The engineer's affidavit and applicant's certificate must both
designate by termini (as in paragraphs 11 to 17. inclusive) and
length each canal, ditch, or lateral, and by initial point and area
each reservoir shown on a map, for which right of way i- asked.
This affidavit and this certificate (changed where accessary when
an application is made by an individual or association of individ-
uals) must be written on the ma)) in duplicate. Applicant- under
the act of March 3, L891, must include in the certificate (Form h
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the statement: "And I further certify that the right of way herein
described is desired for the main purpose of irrigation." (See
Forms 3 and 4, page 237.) No changes or additions are allowable
in the substance of these forms, except when the facts differ from
those assumed therein.
24. When maps are filed, the register will note on each the name
of the land office and the date of filing, ovei' his written signature.
Notations will also be made on the records of the local land office,
as to each unpatented tract affected, that application for right of
way for a canal (or reservoir) is pending, giving date of filing and
name of applicant. The register will certify on each map, over his
written signature, that unpatented land is affected by the proposed
right of way. The maps and field notes in duplicate, and any other
papers filed in connection with the application, will then be promptly
transmitted to the General Land Office with report that the required
notations have been made on the records of the local land office.
Any valid right existing at the date of the filing of the right of way
application will not be affected by the filing or approval thereof.
(See paragraph 2.) If no unpatented land is involved in the appli-
cation, the local officers will reject it, allowing the usual right of
appeal.
25. Upon the approval of a map of location by the Secretary of
the Interior, the duplicate copy will be sent to the local officers,
who will mark upon the township plats the lines of the canals,
ditches, or reservoirs, as laid down on the map. They will also
note the approval in ink, on the tract books, opposite each tract
marked as required by paragraph 24.
26. When the canal, ditch, or reservoir is constructed, an affi-
davit of the engineer and certificate of the applicant (Forms 5
and 6) must be filed in the local office, in duplicate, for transmission
to this office. No new map will be required, except in case of devia-
tions from the right of way previously approved, whether before
or after construction, when there must be filed new maps and field
notes in full, as herein provided, bearing proper forms, changed to
agree with the facts in the case. The ma}) must show clearly the
portions amended or bear a statement describing them, and the loca-
tion must be described in the forms as the amended survey and the
amended definite location. In such cases the applicant must file a
relinquishment, under seal, of all rights under the former approval
as to the portions amended, said relinquishment to take effect when
the map of amended definite location is approved by the honorable
Secretary. If the canal or reservoir has been constructed on the
location originally approved, and is to be used until the canal or
reservoir on the amended location is ready for use, the relinquish-
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ment may be made to take effect upon the completion of the canal or
reservoir on the amended location.
27. The act approved February 2G, 1897 (29 Stat., 599), entitled
"An act to provide for the use and occupation of reservoir sites
reserved," permits the approval of applications under the above act
of 1891 for right of way upon reservoir sites reserved under authority
of the acts of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat., 505, 520), and August 30,
1890 (26 Stat., 371, 391). The text of the act is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That all reservoir sites reserved or to be
reserved shall he open to use and occupation under the right-of-way act of March
third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one. And any State is hereby authorized to
improve and occupy such reservoir sites to the same extent as an individual or
private corporation, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the
[nterior may prescribe: Provided, That the charges for water coming in whole
or part from reservoir sites used or occupied under the provisions of this act
shall always be subject to the control and regulation of the respective States and
Territories in which such reservoirs are in whole or part situate.
When an application is made under this act a reference to it should
he added to Forms 4 and 6. In other respects the application should
he prepared according to the preceding regulations.
OIL PIPE LINES.
28. The act approved May 21, 1896 (29 Stat., 127), entitled "An
act to grant right of way over the public domain for pipe lines in
the States of Colorado and Wyoming," is similar in its requirements
to the right-of-way act of March 8, 1891, and the preceding regula-
tions furnish full information as to the preparation of the maps and
papers. Applicants will he governed thereby so far as they are
applicable.
29. The text of the act is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United states
of America in Congress assembled. That the right of way through the public
lands of the United States situate in the State of Colorado and in the State of
Wyoming outside of the boundary lines of the Yellowstone National Park is
hereby granted to any pipe-line company or corporation formed for the purpose
of transporting oils, crude or refined, which shall have filed or may hereafter
file with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation, and
flue proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of the ground occu-
pied by said pipe line and twenty-five feet on each side of the center line of the
siime: also the right to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said
pipe line material, earth, and stone necessary for the construction of said pipe
line.
Sec '2. That any company or corporation desiring to secure the benefits of
this act shall within twelve months after the location of ten miles of the pipe
line if the same be upon surveyed lands; and if the same be upon nnsurveyc.l
lands, within twelve months after' the survey thereof by the United States, file
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with the register of the land office for the district where such land is located a
map of its line, and upon the approval thereof hy the Secretary of the Interior
the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office, and thereafter all such
lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to
;such right of way.
Sec. 3. That if any section of said pipe line shall not be completed within live
years after the location of said section the right herein granted shall be forfeited.
as to any incomplete section of said pipe line, to the extent that the same is not
completed at the date of the forfeiture.
Sec. 4. That nothing in this act shall authorize the use of such right of way
except for the pipe line, and then only so far as may be necessary for its con-
struction, maintenance, and care.
RESERVOIRS FOR WATERING STOCK.
30. The act approved January 13, 1897 (29 Stat., T84), entitled
"An act providing for the location and purchase of public lands for
reservoir sites," is as follows
:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the tinted states
of America in Congress assembled. That any person, live-stock company, or
transportation corporation engaged in breeding, grazing, driving, or transporting
live stock may construct reservoirs upon unoccupied public lands of the United
States, not mineral or otherwise reserved, for the purpose of furnishing water
to such live stock, and shall have control of such reservoir, under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the lands upon which the same is
constructed, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, so long as such reservoir
is maintained and water kept therein for such purposes : Provided, That such
reservoir shall not be fenced and shall be open to the free use of any person
desiring to water animals of any kind.
Sec 2. That any person, live-stock company, or corporation desiring to avail
themselves of the provisions of this act shall file a declaratory statement in the
United States land office in the district where the land is situated, which
statement shall describe the land where such reservoir is to be or has been
constructed; shall state what business such corporation is engaged in; specify
the capacity of the reservoir in gallons, and whether such company, person, or
corporation has filed upon other reservoir sites within the same county ;. and if
so, how many.
Sec. 3. That at any time after the completion of such reservoir or reservoirs
which, if not completed at the date of the passage of this act, shall be con-
structed and completed within two years after filing such declaratory state-
ment, such person, company, or corporation shall have the same accurately
surveyed, as hereinafter provided, and shall file in the United States land
office in the district in which such reservoir is located a map or plat showing
the location of such reservoir, which map or plat shall be transmitted by the
register and receiver of said United States land office to the Secretary of the
Interior and approved by him, and thereafter such land shall be reserved from
sale by the Secretary of the Interior so long as such reservoir is kept in repair
and water kept therein.
Sec 4. That Congress may at any time amend, alter, or repeal this act.
31. Although the title indicates that lands are to be sold for reser-
voir sites, the act does not provide for the sale of any lands, and
therefore no lands can be sold under its provisions. The act, how-
ever, directs the Secretary of the Interior to reserve the lands from
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sale after the approval of the map showing the location of the res-
ervoir.
32. Any person, live-stock company, or transportation corporation
engaged in breeding, grazing, driving, or transporting live stock, in
order to obtain the benefits of the act must file a declaratory state-
ment in the United States land office in the district where the land is
located.
33. When the applicant is a corporation it should file also a copy
of its articles, of incorporation and proofs of its organization, as
required in paragraph 5, subdivisions 1. -2. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 11. IT
these papers are Hied with its first declaratory statement, a reference
thereto by its number will be sufficient in any subsequent application
by the company.
34. The declaratory statement must be made under oath and should
be drawn in accordance with Form i) (page 240), and must contain
the following statements:
First. The post-office address of the applicant; the county in which
the reservoir is to be or has been constructed; the description by the
smallest Legal subdivisions (40-aere tracts or lots) of the land sought
to be reserved, under no circumstances exceeding 160 acres; that the
land is not occupied or otherwise claimed; that to the best of the ap-
plicant's knowledge and belief the land is not mineral or otherwise
reserved; the business of the applicant, including a full and minute
statement of the extent to which he is engaged in breeding, grazing.
driving, or transporting live stock, giving the number and kinds of
such stock, the place where they are being bred or grazed, and
whether within an enclosure or upon unenclosed lands, and also from
where and to where they are being driven or transported; the amount
and description of the land owned or claimed by the applicant in the
vicinity of the proposed reservoir; that no pail of the land sought to
be reserved is or will be fenced, but the same will be kept open to the
five use of any person desiring to water animals of any kind; and
that the lands so sought to be reserved are not. by reason of their
proximity to other lands reserved for reservoirs, excluded from
reservation by the regulations and rulings of the Land Department.
Second. The location of the reservoir described by the smallest
legal subdivisions ( tO-acre tracts or lots), its area in acres, its capac-
ity in gallons, the source from which water is to be obtained for such
reservoir, whether there air any streams or springs within '2 miles
of the land sought to be reserved; and if so, where.
Third. The number, location, and area of all other reservoir sites
filed upon by the applicant, especially designating those located in
the same county.
35. Upon the filing of such declaratory statements there will be
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noted thereon the date of filing over the signature of the officer re-
ceiving it, and they will be numbered in regular order, beginning
with No. 1. The register will make the usual notations on the
records, in pencil, under the designation of " Reservoir declaratory
statement, No. —," adding the date of the act. For the filing of
such reservoir declaratory statement the local officers will be author-
ized to charge the usual fees. (Sec. 2238, U. S. Rev. Stat.) The
declaratory statement will be forwarded with the regular monthly
returns, with abstracts, in the usual manner. In acting upon these
statements the following general rules will be applied
:
First. No reservation will be made for a reservior containing less
than 250,000 gallons, and for a reservior of less than 500,000 gallons
capacity not more than 40 acres can be reserved. For a reservoir
of 500,000 gallons and less than 1,000,000 gallons capacity not more
than 80 acres can be reserved. For a reservoir of 1,000,000 gallons
and less than 1,500,000 gallons capacity not more than 120 acres can
be reserved. For a reservoir of 1,500,000 gallons capacity or more
160 acres may be reserved.
Second. Not more than 160 acres shall be reserved for this purpose
in any section. '
Third. Not more than 160 acres shall be reserved for this purpose
in one group of tracts adjoining or cornering upon each other.
Fourth. A distance of one-half mile must be left between any two
groups of tracts which aggregate more than 160 acres.
Fifth. The local officers will reject any reservoir declaratory state-
ment not in conformity with these rules.
Sixth. Lands so reserved shall not be fenced, but shall be kept
open to the free use of any person desiring to water animals of any
kind. If lands so reserved are at any time fenced or otherwise
inclosed, or if they are not kept open to the free use of any person
as aforesaid desiring to water animals of any kind, or if the reservoir
applicant attempts to use them for any other purpose, or if the reser-
vation is not obtained for the bona fide and exclusive purpose of con-
structing and maintaining a reservoir thereon according to law, the
declaratory statement, upon any such matter being made to duly
appear, will be canceled and all rights thereunder be declared at aa
end.
Seventh. Notwithstanding the action of the local officers in accept
ing any such declaratory statement, the Commissioner of the General
Land Office will reject the same if upon considering the matters set
forth therein it does not appear that the declaratory statement is filed
in good faith for the sole purpose of accomplishing what the law
authorizes to be done.
36. The reservoir, if not completed at the date of the act, shall be
completed and constructed within two years after the filing of the
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declaratory statement; otherwise the declaratory statement will be
subject to cancellation.
37. After the construction and completion of the reservoir the
applicant shall have the same accurately surveyed and mapped, in
accordance with the instructions of paragraphs 7 to 24, inclusive, so
far as they are applicable. The map and Held notes, which are not
to be prepared in duplicate, must be filed in the proper local office.
The map must hear Forms 10 and 11 (pages 2 11 and 242), and the
field notes must be sworn to by the surveyor.
38. When the map. field notes, and other papers have been filed in
the local office, the date of filing will he noted thereon and the proper
notations will he made on the local office records, as in the case of the
declaratory statement. The maps and papers will then be promptly
forwarded to this office.
39. The map and papers will be examined by this office as to
their compliance with the law and the regulations, and to determine
whether the amount of land desired is warranted by the showing
made in the application. If found satisfactory they will be sub-
mitted to the honorable Secretary, and upon approval the lands
shown to be, necessary for the proper use and enjoyment of the
reservoir will be reserved from other disposition so long as the reser-
voir is maintained and water kept therein for the purposes named
in the act.
40. Upon the receipt of notice of such reservation from this office
the local officers will make the proper notations on their records and
report the making thereof promptly to this office.
41. In order that this reservation shall be continued it is necessary
that the reservoir "shall be kept in repair and water kept therein."
For this reason the owner of the reservoir will be required during the
month of January of each year to file in the local office an affidavit
to the effect that the reservoir has been kept in repair and water kept
therein during the preceding year, and that all the provisions of the
act have been complied with. Form 12 (page 242) will be used for
this affidavit. Upon failure to file such affidavit steps will be taken
looking to the revocation of the reservation of the lands.
!•_'. If the reservoir is located on unsurveyed land, the declarator)
statement may be filed, the lands being described as closely as
practicable.
h>. The duty of this office in examining the maps and papers of
all these applications is to ascertain whether the provisions of the
acts of Congress are properly complied with; whether the proposed
works are described in such a manner that the benefits to be granted
under the various acts are defined so as to' avoid future uncertainty:
and whether the rights of other grantees of the Government are
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properly protected from interference. The above regulations are
made for these purposes.
4:4:. The widely different conditions to be considered in the opera-
tions proposed by the applicants make it impossible to formulate
regulations that will furnish this office with the data necessary in
all cases. This office will therefore call for additional information
Avhenever necessary for the proper consideration of any particular
case.
PERMISSION TO USE RIGHT OF WAT FOR TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
LINES, ELECTRICAL PLANTS, CANALS, AND RESERVOIRS.
45. The act of February 15, 1901 (31 Stat., 790), entitled "An act
relating to rights of way through certain parks, reservations, and
other public lands," is as follows
:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled. That the Secretary of the Interior
be, and hereby is, authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be
fixed by him, to permit the use of rights of way through the public lands, forest
and other reservations of the United States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and
General Grant national parks. California, for electrical plants, poles, and lines
for the generation and distribution of electrical power, and for telephone and
telegraph purposes, and for canals, ditches, pipes and pipe lines, flumes, tunnels,
or other water conduits, and for water plants, dams, and reservoirs used to
promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the manufacturing or cutting of
timber or lumber, or the supplying of water for domestic, public, or any other
beneficial uses to the extent of the ground occupied by such canals, ditches,
flumes, tunnels, reservoirs, or other water conduits or water plants, or electrical
or other works permitted hereunder, and not to exceed fifty feet on each side
of the marginal limits thereof, or not to exceed fifty feet on each side of the
center line of such pipes and pipe lines, electrical, telegraph, and telephone lines
and poles, by any citizen, association, or corporation of the United States, where
it is intended by such to exercise the use permitted hereunder or any one or
more of the purposes herein named: Provided, That such permits shall be
allowed within or through any of said parks or any forest, military. Indian, or
other reservation only upon the approval of the chief officer of the Department
under whose supervision such park or reservation falls and upon a finding by
him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest: Provided fur-
ther. That all permits given hereunder for telegraph and telephone purposes
shall be subject to the provision of title sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of
the U"nited States, and amendments thereto, regulating rights of way for tele-
graph companies over the public domain: And provided further. That any per-
mission given by the Secretary of the Interior under the provisions of this act
may be revoked by him or his successor in his discretion, and shall not be held
to confer any right, or easement, or interest in, to, or over any public land,
reservation, or park.
46. This act, in general terms, authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior, under regulations to be fixed by him, to grant permission
to use rights of way through the public lands, forest and other
reservations of the United States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and
General Grant national parks in California, for every purpose con-
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templated by acts of January 21, 1895 (28 Stat.. 63£), May 14, 1896
(29 Stat., 120), and section 1 of the act of May 11. L898 (30 Stat.,
KM ). and for other purposes additional thereto, except for tramroads,
the provisions relating to tramroads, contained in the act of 1895 and
in section 1 of the act of 1898, aforesaid, remaining unmodified and
not being in any manner extended.
Although this act does not expressly repeal any provision of law
relating to the granting of permission to use rights of way. contained
in the acts referred to, yet considering the general scope and pur-
pose of the act, and Congress having, with the exception above
noted, embodied therein the main features of the former acts relative
to the granting of a mere permission or license for such use, it is
evident that, for purposes of administration, the later act should
control in so far as the same pertains to the granting of permission
to use rights of way for purposes therein specified. Accordingly
all applications for permission to use rights of way for the purposes
specified in this act must be submitted thereunder. Where, however,
it is sought to acquire a right of way for the main purpose of irri-
gation, as contemplated by sections 18 to 21 of the act of March 3,
L891 (26 Stat.. 109:)). and section 2 of the act of May 11, 1898, supra,
the application must be submitted in accordance with the regulations
issued under said acts. (See pages 215 to 223, inclusive.)
47. It is to be specially noted that this act does not make a grant
in the nature of an easement, but authorizes a mere permission in the
nature of a license, revocable at any time, and it gives no right what-
ever to take from the public lands, reservations, or parks, adjacent
to the right of way, any material, earth, or stone for construction
or other purpose.
48. By section 1 of the act of February 1, 1905 (33 Stat., 028). it
is provided:
That the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture shall, from and after
the passage of" this act, execute or cause to he executed all laws affecting public
lands heretofore or hereafter reserved under the provisions of section twenty-
four of the act entitled "An act to repeal the tinihor-culture laws, and for other
purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and acts
Supplemental to and amendatory thereof, after such lands have heen so re-
served, excepting such laws as affect the surveying, prospecting, locating, appro
priating, entering, relinquishing, reconveying, certifying, or patenting of any
such lands.
Under this provision it has been determined that the Department
of Agriculture is invested with jurisdiction to pass upon all applica-
tions under any law of the United States providing for the granting
of a permission to occupy and use lands in a forest reserve, which <><•
CUpation or use is temporary in character, and which, if granted,
will in no wise a fleet the fee or cloud the title of the United States
should the reserve be discontinued.
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.Therefore, when it is desired to obtain permission to.use a right of
way over public lands wholly within a forest reserve, an application
should be prepared in accordance with the instructions issued by the
Department of Agriculture, and the same filed with the officer in
charge of such reserve.
Where, however, permission to use a right of way over lands
wholly outside of forest reserves is desired, the application must be
prepared and filed in accordance with the regulations contained in
paragraphs 5 to 24, inclusive, appropriate changes being made in the
prescribed forms so as to specify and relate to the act under which
the application is made.
In case the application involves rights and privileges upon public
lands partly within and partly without a forest reserve, separate ap-
applications must be prepared and the one affecting lands within the
forest reserve filed with the forest officer and the other filed in the
local land office.
Application for permission to use the desired right of way through
the public lands and parks designated in the act must be filed and
permission granted, as herein provided, before any rights can be
claimed thereunder. Permission may be given under this act (Feb-
ruary 15, 1901) for rights of way upon unsurveyed lands, maps to be
prepared in accordance with the requirements of this circular.
49. An affidavit that the applicant is a citizen of the United States
must accompany the application, and if the applicant is an associa-
tion of citizens, each must make affidavit of citizenship, and a com-
plete list of the members thereof must be given in an affidavit by one
of them ; if not a native-born citizen, the applicant will be required to
file the usual proofs of naturalization. The applicant must also set
forth in the affidavit the purposes for which the right of way is to be
used, and must show that he in good faith intends to utilize the same
for such purposes in the event his application therefor is granted.
50. When application is made for right of way for electrical or
water plants, the location and extent of ground proposed to be occu-
pied by buildings or other structures necessary to be used in connec-
tion therewith must be clearly designated on the map and described
in the field notes and forms by reference to course and distance from
a corner of the public survey. In addition to being shown in con-
nection with the main drawing, the buildings or other structures must
be platted on the map in a separate drawing on a scale sufficiently large
to show clearly their dimensions and relative positions. When two
or more of such proposed structures are to be located near each other,
it will be sufficient to give the reference to a corner of the public
survey for one of them provided all the others are connected there-
with by course and distance shown on the map. The applicant must
also file an affidavit setting forth the dimensions and proposed use
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of each of the structures and must show definitely thai each one is
necessary for a proper use of the right of way for the purposes con-
templated in the act.
51. Whenever a right of way is located upon any of the national
parks designated in the act, the applicant must show to the satis-
faction of the Department that the location and use of the right of
way for the purposes contemplated will not interfere with the uses
and purposes for which the park was originally dedicated and will
not result in damage or injury to the natural conditions of property
Hi' scenery existing therein. When the right of way is located in any
of the designated national parks, the applicant must file the stipula-
tions and bond required by paragraph 3, and, in the case of a tele-
phone line, an additional stipulation incorporating the following:
(5) " That upon completion of telephone lines they shall be subject
to the free use of the park officers for all purposes incident to the
administration of the park."
52. Whenever right of way within a park is desired for operations
in connection with mining, quarrying, cutting timber, or manufac-
turing lumber, a satisfactory showing must be made of the applicant's
right to engage in such operations within the park.
53. Applications for right of way, under this act, all or any part
of which crosses or is located upon anjT Indian reservation, before
being transmitted to the Department will be submitted by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office to the Office of Indian Affairs
for such action and recommendation thereon as that office may deem
proper in so far as the same pertains to such Indian reservation.
Applicants will be required to furnish, in triplicate, so much of the
map and field notes as relate to that portion of the right of way
applied for, if any, within an Indian reservation; and in event the
application is subsequently granted, one copy of such portion of the
map and field notes as pertains to such reservation will be placed on
file in the Indian Office. In this connection, attention is directed to
the provisions of section 3 of the act of March :',. L901 (31 Stat.. 1083),
which authorizes the granting of permanent rights of way. in the
nature of easements, for telegraph and telephone purposes only,
through Indian reservations and other Indian lands upon payment of
proper compensation for the benefit of the Indians interested therein.
The provisions of the latter act and the nature and character of the
lights authorized to be secured thereunder differ materially from the
provisions contained in this act and the rights authorized to be con-
ferred thereunder. Applicants, therefore, desiring to secure per-
manent rights of way through Indian reservations or other Indian
lands for telegraph and telephone purposes will be required to submit
their applications therefor under the acl of March 3, L901, supra, in
accordance with the then current regulations issued thereunder. ( For
232 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
existing regulations under said act, see regulations approved March
26, 1901.)
54. All applications for the use of a right of way under this act,
through any lands designated therein, for telegraph and telephone
purposes, must be accompanied by an official statement from the Post-
Office Department showing that the applicant has complied with its
regulations under title sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of the
United States and amendments thereto.
55. Upon the filing of an application under this act, the register
will note the same in pencil on the tract books, opposite the tracts
traversed, giving date of filing and name of applicant, and also in-
dorse on each map the date of filing over his written signature. If
it does not appear that some portion of the public lands or parks des-
ignated in the act would.be affected by the approval of such maps,
they will be returned to the applicant with notice of that fact. If
vacant public land or lands in any park so designated are affected by
the proposed right of way, the register will so certify on the map and
duplicate over his signature, and will promptly transmit the same to
the General Land Office with report that the required notations have
been made.
56. Upon receipt of applications for right of way by the General
Land Office, the same will be examined and then submitted to the
Secretary of the Interior with recommendation as to their approval.
Permission to use rights of way through any park designated in the
•act will only be granted upon approval of the chief officer of the De-
partment under whose supervision such park falls and upon a finding
by him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest.
If the application, and the showing made in support thereof, is satis-
factory, the Secretary of the Interior will give the required permis-
sion in such form as may be deemed proper, according to the fea-
tures of each case; and it is to be expressly understood, in accordance
with the final proviso of the act, that any permission given there-
under may be modified or revoked by the Secretary or his successor,
in his discretion, at any time, and shall not be held to confer any
right, easement, or interest in, to, or over any public land or park.
The final disposal by the United States of any tract traversed by the
permitted right of way is of itself, without further act on the part of
the Department, a revocation of the permission so far as it affects
that tract, and any permission granted hereunder is also subject to
such further and future regulations as may be adopted by the De-
partment.
57. When permission to use the right of way applied for is given
by the Secretary of the Interior, a copy of the original map will be
sent to the local officers, who will mark upon the township plats the
line of the right of way and will note in pencil, opposite each tract
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of public land affected, that such permission has been given, the date
thereof, and a reference to the act.
TRAMROADS.
58. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to permit the use of
rights of way for tramroads through the public lands of the United
States, not within the limits of any park, forest, military, or Indian
reservation under the provisions of the act of Congress of January
21, L895 (28 Stat.. 635), a- amended by section 1 of the act of May 11,
L898 (30 Stat.. 404). The act of January 21, 1895, supra, entitled
"An act to permit the use of the right of way through the public
lands lor tramroads, canals, and reservoirs, and for other purposes,"
is as follows:
Be it enacted by the senate ami House of Representatives of the United states
of America in Congress assembled, Thai the Secretary of the Interior be. and
hereby is. authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by
him, to permit the use of the right of way through the public lands of the United
States, not within the limits of any park, forest, military, or Indian reservation,
for tramroads, canals, or reservoirs to the extent of the ground occupied by the
water of the canals and reservoirs and t\Uy feet on each side of the marginal
limits thereof; or fifty feet on each side of the center line of the tramroad, by
any citizen or any association of citizens of the United States engaged in the
business of mining or quarrying or of cutting timber and manufacturing
lumber.
This act was amended by section 1 of the act of May 11, 1898,
supra, as follows:
Be it (united by the senate and House of Representatives of the United states
of America in Congress assembled, That the act entitled "An act to permit the
esc of the right of way through the public lands for tramroads. canals, and
reservoirs, and for other purposes." approved January twenty-first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five. be. and the same is hereby, amended by adding thereto
the following
:
"Thai the Secretary of the Interior be. and hereby is. authorized and
empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of
right of way upon the public lands of the United States, not within limits of
any park, forest, military, or Indian reservations, for tramways, canals, or
reservoirs, to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of the canals and
reservoirs, and fifty feet on each side of the marginal limit thereof, or fifty feet
on each side of the center line of the tramroad, by any citizen or association of
citizens of the United suites. Cor the purposes of furnishing water for domestic,
public, and other beneficial uses."
59. Applications for permission to use rights of way for tramroads
should be prepared and filed in accordance with the regulations herein-
before prescribed relative to presentation of applications for rights of
way under the act of February IT), 11)01, and the then current regula-
tions issued under the general railroad right-of-way act of March 3,
l
s 7o (for existing regulations under the lattei act see 32 L. D., I s 1 ).
the prescribed forms in such regulations being so modified as to
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specify and relate to the acts under which the application is made.
It is to be specially noted that the acts relating to traniroads do not
authorize the granting of permission to use rights of way for such
purpose within the limits of any park, forest, military, or Indian
reservation, and it is to be further noted that permission to use rights
of way for tramroads over public lands, when granted, only confers
a right in the nature of a license and is subject to all the conditions
and limitations hereinbefore stated in paragraph 56 of these regula-
tions.
RIGHT OF WAY OVER FOREST RESERVES FOR DAMS, RESERVOIRS, WATER
PLANTS, DITCHES, FLUMES, PIPES, TUNNELS, AND CANALS FOR MUNICI-
PAL OR MINING PURPOSES.
60. Section 4 of the act of Congress approved February 1, 1905
(33 Stat,, 628), reads as follows:
Sec. 4. That rights of way for the construction and maintenance of dams,
reservoirs, water plants, ditches, flumes, pipes, tunnels, and canals, within and
across the forest reserves of the United States, are hereby granted to citizens
and corporations of the United States for municipal or mining purposes, and
for the purposes of the milling and reduction of ores, during the period of their
beneficial use, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior, and subject to the laws of the State or Territory in
which said reserves are respectively situated.
61. This act grants rights of way through forest reserves to citi-
zens and corporations of the United States for the objects therein
specified, during the period of their beneficial use, under rules and
regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and
subject to the laws of the State or Territory in which said reserves
are respectively situated.
All applications for the right of way for the purposes set forth
in said act, must be submitted thereunder in accordance herewith.
62. The right granted is not in the nature of a grant of lands, but
is a base or qualified fee, giving the possession and right of use of
the land for the purposes contemplated by the act, during the period
of the beneficial use. When the use ceases, the right terminates and
thereupon proper steps will be taken to revoke the grant.
No right, whatever, is given to take from any part of the reserva-
tion any material, earth, or stone for construction or other purposes,
nor does it give any right to use any land outside of what is actually
necessary for the construction and maintenance of the works.
63. Applications for right of way under this act should be made
in the form ol a map and field notes, in duplicate, and must be filed
in the local land office for the district in which the land traversed by
the right of way is situate; if in more than one district, duplicate
maps and field notes need be filed in only one district and single sets
in the others. The maps, field notes, evidence of water rights, etc.,
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and, when the applicant is a corporation, the articles. of incorpora-
tion and proofs of organization must be prepared and filed in accord-
ance with paragraphs 1 to 23, inclusive, appropriate changes being
made in the prescribed forms so as to specify and relate to the act
under which the application is made.
(54. An affidavit that the applicant is a citizen of the United States
must accompany the application, and if the applicant is an associa-
tion of citizens, each must make affidavit of citizenship, and a com-
plete list of the members thereof must be given in an affidavit of one
of them. A copy of their articles of association must also he fur-
nished, or if there he none, the fact must he stated over the signature
of each member of the association.
If the applicant is not a native-born citizen, lie must file the usual
proof of naturalization. The applicant must set forth in the affi-
davit the purposes for which the right of way is desired.
65. When application is made for right of way for water plant-,
the location and extent of ground proposed to he occupied by build-
ings, or other structures necessary to he used in connection therewith,
must he clearly designated on the map and described in the held notes
and forms by reference to course and distance from a corner of the
public survey. In addition to being shown in connection with the
main drawing, the buildings or other structures must he platted on
the map in a separate drawing on a scale sufficiently large to show
clearly their dimensions and relative positions. When two or more
of such structures are to he located near each other, it will he suffi-
cient to give the reference to a corner of the public survey for one of
them, provided all others air connected therewith by course and dis-
tance shown on the map.
The applicant must also file an affidavit setting forth the dimen-
sions and proposed use of each of the structures and must show defi-
nitely that each is necessary to a proper enjoyment of the right of
way granted by the act.
66. The applicant must file with each application under this act
a stipulation, under seal, incorporating the conditions set forth in
subdivisions 1. -2. :\. and t of paragraph 3.
The applicant will also he required to give bond to the Govern-
ment of the United States, to he approved by the Commissioner of
the Genera] Land Office, such bond stipulating that the makers
thereof will pay to the United States " for any and all damage to
the public lands, timber, natural curiosities, or other public property
on such reservation, or upon the Lands of the United States. by reason
ol Mich use and occupation of the reserve, regardless of the cause or
circumstances under which such damage may occur." A bond fur-
Dished by any surety company that has complied with the provisions
of the act of August 13, 18!) 1 (28 Stat.. 279), will he accepted, and
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must run in the terms of the stipulation above quoted. The amount
of the bond can not be fixed until the application has been submitted
to the General Land Office, when a form of the bond will be fur-
nished and the amount fixed.
No construction can be allowed on the reservation until an applica-
tion for right of way has been regularly filed in accordance here-
with and has been approved by the Department, or has been consid-
ered and permission specifically given by the Secretary of the
Interior.
07. Upon the filing of an application, under this act, the register
will note the same in pencil on the tract books, opposite the tracts
traversed, giving date of filing and name of applicant, and also
indorse on each map the name of the land office and the date of the
filing over his written signature.
If it does not appear that some portion of the public lands in
reserve would be affected by the approval of such maps, they will
be returned to the applicant with notice of that fact. If unpatented
lands are affected by the proposed right of way, the register will
so certify on the map and duplicate, over his signature, and will
promptly transmit the same to the General Land Office, with report
that the required notations have been made.
68. Upon the approval of a map of location by the Secretary of
the Interior, the duplicate copy will be sent to the local officers,
who will mark upon the township plats the lines of the right of way
as laid down on the map. They will also note the approval in ink
on the tract books, opposite each legal subdivision affected, with a
reference to the act mentioned on the map.
W. A. Richards,
Commissioner.
Approved : September 28, 1905.
Thos. Ryan,
A cting Secretary.
FORMS FOR "DUE PROOFS" AND VERIFICATION OF MAPS OF RIGHT
OF WAY FOR CANALS, DITCHES, AND RESERVOIRS.
Form 1.
I, - —
. secretary (or president) of the Company, do
hereby certify that the organization of said company has been completed; that
the company is fully authorized to proceed with construction according to the
existing laws of the State (or Territory) of , and that the copy of the
articles of association (or incorporation) of the company tiled in the Depart-
ment of the Interior is a true and correct copy of the same.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my name and the corporate seal of
the company this day of
,
in the year ID—
.
[Seal of company.]
.
— of the Company.
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Form 2.
I, , do certify that I am the president of the Com-
pany, and that the following is a true list of the officers of the said company,
With the full name and official designation of each, to wit: (Here insert the full
name and official designation of each officer.)
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my name and the corporate seal of
the company this day of , in the year 190—
.
[Seal of company.] ,
President of the Company.
Form 3.
State ok ,
Count y of , ss:
, being duly sworn, says he is the chief engineer of (or the per-
son employed to make the survey by) the - Company; that the
survey of said company's (canals, ditches, and reservoirs), described as follows:
(Here describe each canal, ditch, lateral, and reservoir for which right of way
is asked, as required by paragraph 23, being a total length of canals, ditches.
and laterals of miles, and a total area of reservoirs of - acres),
was made by him (or under his direction) as chief engineer of the company
(or as surveyor employed by the company) and under its authority, commenced
on the day of , 19
—
, and ending on the day of , 19
—
,
"land that the survey of the said (canal, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs)
accurately represents (a proper grade line for the flow of water, and accurately
represents a level line, which is the proposed water line of the said reservoir) ],
and that such survey is accurately represented upon this map and by the ac-
companying field notes, a [And no lake or lake bed, stream or stream bed. is
used for the said (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) except as shown on
this map.]
Sworn and subscribed to before me this day of - — , 19-
| SEAL. |
Notary Public.
Form 4.
I.
, do hereby certify that I am president of the
Company; that — - , who subscribed the accompanying affidavit, is
the chief engineer of (or was employed to make the survey by) the said com-
pany; thai the survey of the said (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs), as
accurately represented on this map and by the accompanying field notes, was
made under authority of the company; that the company is duly authorized
by its articles of incorporation to construct the said (canals, ditches. laterals,
and reservoirs) upon the location shown upon this map; that the said (canals.
ditches, laterals, and reservoirs), as represented on this map and by said field
"This clause to be omitted in applications for telephone and telegraph lines.
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notes, was adopted by the company, by resolution of its board of directors, on
the — — day of - — , 19
—
,
as the definite location of the said (canals, ditches,
laterals, and reservoirs) described as follows
—
(describe as in Form 3)—« [and
that no lake or lake bed, stream or stream bed is used for the said (canals,
ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) except as shown on this map] ; and that the
map has been prepared to be filed for the approval of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, in order that the company may obtain the benefits of & (sections 18 to 21,
inclusive, of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1891, entitled "An act to
repeal timber-culture laws, and for otlier purposes," and section 2 of the act
approved May 11, 1898) ; and I further certify that the right of way herein
described is desired for the main purpose of irrigation/'
President of the — Company,
Attest
:
[Seal of company.] ,
Secretary.
Form 5.
State of ,
County of , s.s:
, being duly sworn, says that he is the chief engineer of (or was
employed to construct) the (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) of the
Company; that said (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) have been
constructed under his supervision, as follows: (Describe as required in para-
graph 23) a total length of constructed (canals, ditches, and laterals) of -
miles, and a total area of constructed reservoirs of acres ; that construc-
tion was commenced on the — — day of - — , 19— , and completed on the —
clay of —
,
19
— ; that the constructed (canals, ditches, laterals, and reser-
voirs), as aforesaid, conform to the map and field notes which received the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior on the day of , 19—
.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this day of , 19-
[SEAL.]
Notary Public.
Form
I. , do certify that I am the president of the Company:
that the (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) described as follows (describe
as in Form 5) were actually constructed as set forth in the accompanying affi-
davit of , chief engineer (or the person employed by the company
in the premises), and on the exact location represented on the map and by the
field notes approved by the Secretary of the Interior, on the day of
,
19
—
; and that the company has in all things complied with the requirements
a This clause to be omitted in applications for telephone and telegraph lines.
i> Here insert the description of the act of Congress under which the applica-
tion is made when filed under some other act than that of 1801 and 1898.
cOr, where filed under other acts than that of 1891 and 1898, state the pur-
poses for which right of way is applied for.
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of the acl of Congress** (.March :*>. L891, granting right of way for canals,
ditches, and reservoirs through the public lands of the United States).
President of the Company.
Attest :
[Seal of company. | —
,
Secretary.
FOBM 7.
| Under ad February l.~>. L901.]
State of
County of
—
. being duly sworn, says he is the chief engineer of (or the
person employed by) the— company, under whose supervision the survey
was made <>f the grounds selected by the company for structures for electrical
purposes under the act of Congress approved February 15, 1901, said grounds
being situated in the — - quarter of the — — quarter of section . township
—
, range , - - principal meridian; that the accompanying drawing
correctly represents the locations of the said structures; and that in his belief
the structures represented are actually and to their entire extent required for
the necessary uses contemplated by the said act of February 15, 1901 (HI
Stat, 790).
Chief Engineer.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of — — , 19—
.
[seal.]
,
Notary Public.
Form 8.
|I nder act of February 15, 1901.]
I, , do hereby certify that I am the president of the — — com-
pany : tli.u the survey of the structures represented on the accompanying draw-
ing was made under authority and by direction of the company, and under the
supervision of — , its chief engineer (or the person employed in the prem-
ises), whose affidavit precedes this certificate; that the survey as represented on
the accompanying drawing actually represents the structures required in the
quarter of the quarter of section , of township — , of range ,
- principal meridian, for electrical purposes, under the act of Congress.
approved February 15, 1901 ; and that the company, by resolution of its board
of directors, passed on the day of
,
19
— , directed the proper officers
to present the said drawing for the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in
Order that the company may obtain the use of the grounds required for said
structures, under the provisions of said act approved February 15, 1901 (31
Stat.. 790).
President of the Company.
I Seal of the company. I
Attest :
Secretary.
"Here insert the description of the ;ict of Congress under which the appli
cation is made, when tiled under some other act than that of 1891,
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Form 9.
Reservoir declaratory statement.
[Under act of Jan. 13, 1897 (29 Stat.. 481).]
Res. D. S.
i
Land Office at ,
No. .
J"
. ,
19—.
I, - —
,
of
,
do hereby certify that I am president of the
- company, and on behalf of said company, and under its authority, do
hereby apply for the reservation of land in County, State of , for
the construction and use of a reservoir for furnishing water for live stock under
the provisions of the act of January 13, 1897 (29 Stat., 484). The location of
said reservoir and of the land necessary for its use, is as follows: of
section in township
, of range —— M., containing acres
I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the said land is
not occupied or otherwise claimed, is not mineral or otherwise reserved, and
that the said reservoir is to be used in connection with the business of the appli-
cant of
The land owned or claimed by the applicant within the vicinity of the said
reservoir (within three miles) is as follows: .
I further certify that no part of the land to be reserved under this application
is or will be fenced; that the same shall be kept open to the free use of any
person desiring to water animals of any kind ; that the land will not be used
for any purpose except the watering of stock and that the land is not, by reason
of its proximity to other lands reserved for reservoirs, excluded from reserva-
tion by the regulations and rulings of the land department.
The water of said reservoir will cover an area of acres, in of
section
,
in township , of range of said lands; the capacity of the
reservoir will be — — gallons, and the dam will be feet high. The source
of the water for said reservoir is —
and there are no streams or springs within two miles of the land to be reserved
except as follows : .
The applicant has hied no other declaratory statements under this act except
as follows
:
No. , - - land office, area to be reserved acres.
No. , - - land office, area to be reserved — - acres.
No. , - - land office, area to be reserved - - acres.
No. , - - land office, area to be reserved acres.
No. , - - land office, area to be reserved — - acres.
No. , — - land office, area to be reserved — - acres.
No. —
—
,
- land office, area to be reserved — - acres.
No. , - - land office, area to be reserved — - acres.
No. — , — - land office, area to be reserved acres.
No. — , - - land office, area to be reserved — - acres.
Total, — acres, of which Nos. are located in said county.
And I further certify that it is the bona fide purpose and intention of tbis
applicant to construct and complete said reservoir ami maintain the same in
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accordance with the provisions of said ad of Congress and such regulations us
pre or may be prescribed thereunder.
I
Seal of company. I •
Attest :
Secretary.
State oi
Co ii n ill of
being duly sworn, deposes and says thai the statements herein
made are true to the besl of his knowledge and belief.
Sworn to iiiul subscribed before me this day of . in the year 1!)—
.
[SEAL.] —
,
A otary Public.
Note. When the applicant is a corporation the form should be executed by its presi
dent, under its sent, and attested by its secretary. When the applicant is oot a cor
poration or an association < f individ als, strike out the words in italics.
Land ( >i i u i; at .
, 19—.
I. . register of the laud office, do hereby certify thai the fore-
going application is for the reservation of lands subject thereto under the pre
visions of the acl of January 13, 1897; thai there is no prior valid adverse
right to the same; and thai the land is oot, by reason of its proximity to other
lands reserved for reservoirs, excluded from reservation by the regulations and
rulings of t lie land department.
Fees. S paid. —
,
Register.
The description of the business of the .applicant should include "a full and
minute statement of the extent to which he is engaged in breeding, grazing,
driving, or transporting live stock, giving the number and kinds of such stock.
the place where they are being bred or grazed, and whether within an inclosure
or upon nninclosed lands, and also from where and to where they are being
driven or transported." Circular Juno 23, L899
Form LO.
STATE OB ,
County of , ss.
.
being duly sworn, says that he is the person who was employed
lo make the survey of a reservoir covering an area of acres, the initial
point of the survey being there describe as required by paragraph 23 > ;
Baid reservoir liaving been constructed upon the quarter of the quarter
<>f section
.
township range — , - principal meridian, as pro
posed i>y reservoir declaratory statement, No. . which was filed in the local
land office at
. under the provisions of the act of January 13, 1897 (29
stat.. 184); thai the said survey was made on the day >i , 19 ;
thai the dam and all necessary works have been constructed in a substantial
manner; thai the reservoir lias a capacity of gallons, and .-it the time of
said survey contained gallons < f water.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this ( |.-iy f
(
|« (
[SEAL.]
'
Votary Public.
oP.»l vol. ". I 05 m Hi
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Form 11.
I, , do certify that I am the president of the — - company
which filed (or that I am the person who filed) reservoir declaratory statement,
No. , in the local land office at - — ; that the reservoir proposed has heen
constructed upon the quarter of the — — quarter of section . township
, range , principal meridian, covering an area of — - acres,
the initial point of the survey heing — - (describe as in Form 10) ; that the
dam and all necessary works have been constructed in a substantial manner in
good faith in order that the reservoir may be used and maintained for the pur-
poses, and in the manner prescribed by the said act of January 13, 1897 (20
Stat, 484), the provisions of which have been and will be complied with in all
respects.
[Seal of company.] ,
President of the Company.
Attest
:
Secretary.
Form 12.
State of ,
Co it nt a of , ss:
, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the president or
the — company which filed (or that he is the person who filed) reservoir
declaratory statement. No. , in the local land office at ; that the res-
ervoir constructed in pursuance thereof, as heretofore certified, has been kept
in repair ; that water has been kept therein to the extent of not less than
—
gallons during the entire calendar year of 19
—
; that neither the reservoir
nor any part of the land reserved for use in connection therewith is or has
been fenced during said years, and that the said company has in all things com-
plied with the provisions of the act of January 13, 1897 (29 Stat . 484).
Pes idcut of Com pa n y.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this day of , 19—
.
[seal.] ,
Notary Public,
PRIVATE ENTRY—ACT OF AUGUST 30, 1890.
Lester B. Elwood.
The provision in the act of August 30, 1890, limiting the amount of land to
which title may be acquired by any one person, under the public land laws,
to 320 acres, has no application to private cash entries made under the pro-
visions of section 2354 of the Revised Statutes.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November 2, 1905. (E. F. B.)
With your letter of August 10, 1905, you transmit the appeal of
Lester B. Elwoocl from the decision of your office of May 15, 1905,
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holding for cancellation private cash entries of lands in the State of
Missouri made by sundry purchasers, whose names with a description
of the lands respectively entered arc fully described in your said
decision of May L5, L905.
These entries were made at the instance of A. R. Jackson, as agenl
for C. A. Brickman, who transmitted t<> the local officers at Booneville,
Missouri, the applications of the several entrymen in one envelope,
with one draft covering the various purchases. There was no con-
cealment of the fad that Jackson was securing the title to these lands
at private cash entry a- agent for C. A. Brickman and had the cash
certificates issued to the persons named in the several applications for
the tracts respectively applied for. They were subsequently pur-
chased by appellant, who now hold- the title to them.
You directed an investigation for the purpose of determining
whether the entrymen were seeking the land- for their own benefil
or were acting for others, either directly or indirectly. Upon being
advised of the fact- above stated, yon held the entries for cancella-
tion, for the reason that the law limits the area to 320 acres in the
aggregate which any one person may acquire of the non-mineral
public lands.
The lands in question were public lands in the State of Missouri
and at the time of the issuance of the final certificate were subject to
sale at private cash entry under section 2354, Revised Statutes, which
provides that
—
All the public lands, when offered .-it private sale, may he purchased, at the
option of the purchaser, in entire sections, half-sections, quarter-sections, half
quarter-sections, or quarter quarter-sections.
The act of March 2, L889 (25 Stat.. 854), withdrew from private
cash entry all public land- except in the State of Missouri, and !<>
further provide for the disposal of public lands in said State at pri-
vate cash entry the ad of May is. L898 (30 Stat., LI8), abolished the
distinction between offered and unoffered lands, and by the second
section of said act it provides
That all public lands within the State of .Missouri shall hereafter he subjeel
to dispnsal at private sale in the manner now provided by law for the sale of
lands which have horn publicly offered for sale, whether such lands have ever
been offered at public sale or not : Provided, That the actual settlers shall have
;' preference right, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the
Interior may prescribe.
By that provision all public land- in the State of Missouri, whether
offered or unoffered, were subjeel to sale at private cash entry under
the provisions of section 235^ in the same nianner and to the same
extent as when that section was applicable in all the public land
state>. tin 1 only restriction upon the righl being that actual settlers
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shall have a preference right under such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of the Interior may prescribe.
The instructions issued under that act are contained in the circular
of June 10, 1898 (27 L. D., 68), which provides that—
In all applications to purchase land at private sale made after the passage of"
this act, the applicant must furnish a duly corroborated affidavit showing that
there is no one other than himself claiming said land as an actual settler. In
other respects you will take action under existing regulations, treating all public
lands as unoffered.
There is nothing in the circular requiring the purchaser to show-
that he desires the lands for himself or that prevents the purchase
being made through an agent. All that he is required to show is that
there is no other than himself claiming the land as an actual settler.
If there is no settler claiming a preference right the applicant may
purchase whether lie is a settler or not.
In this case the land was not entered with a view to occupation,
entry or settlement under any of the land laws that limit the quantity
that any one person may acquire under such laws, but to purchase it
at private cash sale, and there is nothing in the act or law under which
the purchase was made that limits or restricts the purchaser to
quantity.
You held that the right of purchase at private cash entry was
restricted by the act of August 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 391), providing
that—
* No person who shall after the passage of this act, enter upon any of the
public lands with a view to occupation, entry or settlement under any of the
land laws, shall he permitted to acquire title to 'more than three hundred and
twenty acres in the aggregate, under all of said laws; hut this limitation shall
not operate to curtail the right of any person who has heretofore made entry
or settlement on the public lands, or whose occupation, entry or settlement is
validated by this act.
That act has been construed by the 17th section of the act of
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), to refer to agricultural lands and not
lands entered under the mineral law, but it is evident that the act of
August 30. 1890, and the explanatory act of March 3, 1891, had
reference to lands under the general land laws that limit the quantity
that may be taken under one entry and not to purchasers at private
cash entries under laws that contain no restriction whatever as to
quantity. That question is settled by the principle that controlled
in the decision of the Department in the case of John W. Clarkson
(31 L. D., 399) and Instructions (33 L. D., 606).
As it appears from the statement in your letter that the affidavit
required by tin' circular appears with each of the entries, your deci-
sion holding them for cancellation is reversed.
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isolated tracts containing less tiiw fort's lcres—suspen-
sion of applications.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
( General Land ( )ffice,
Washington, D. ('., Novi mber .'/, 1905.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
Sirs: Ln departmental order of September 26, L905 | not reported],
suspending certain islands from disposal, it was said:
This suspension is made with a view to submitting to Congress the question
whether some provision should not be made for the disposal of small and
isolated tracts other than is provided for by the general land laws now in force
where it is evident that such tracts are not adapted for the use and purposes
contemplated by such laws.
In compliance with this order, yon are directed to receive and sus-
pend, without further action, all applications to enter, select, pur-
chase, or locate, isolated and disconnected tracts, presented after
November L5, L905, which embrace Less than forty acres, until yon
receive further instructions from this office.
This order is not intended to affect entries made under the act of
June 17. L902, commonly known as the reclamation act.
Very respect fully,
J. H. Fimple, Acting Commissioner.
Approved :
K. A Hitchcock, St 'cretary.
SCHOOL LAND—INDEMNITY SELECTION.
State or California.
The requirement in rule 2 of the instructions of March »'». l (.»n."». that with each
list of indemnity school selections " a certificate of the proper authorities
thai the base lands have net been sold, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of.'*
shall be furnished by the State, adhered to.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of tht General Land Office,
(F. L. (\) November 'h 1905. ' (G. B. G.)
This is the appeal of the State of California from your office deci-
sion of April 17. L905, holding that, in compliance with departmental
instructions of February 21, L901 (30 L. I).. I « > 1 ). and March 6, L903
(32 L. I).. 39), the State must file with each list of indemnity school
-elections a certificate from the county recorder a- to the status of the
base lands offered in support of the -election.
Section 2 of the instructions of February 21, L901, supra, which
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relate to selections on account of losses or waivers of base lands in
forest reservations, provides:
The State will be required to tile with each list of selections a certificate by
the officer, or officers, charged with the care and disposal of such school lands,
that the State has not encumbered, sold or disposed of, nor agreed to encum-
ber, sell or dispose of, any of the said lands, used as bases, and that no part of
said lands is in the possession of any third party, under any law of permission of
the State. There must also be filed with all lists a certificate from the recorder
of deeds, or official custodian of the records of transfers of real estate in the
proper county, that no instrument purporting to convey or in any way encumber
the title to any of said lands, is on file or of record in his office.
Kule 2 of the instructions of March 6, 1903. supra, which relate
to selections based on losses because of the alleged mineral character
of the base lands, provides that the State shall furnish " a certificate
of the proper authorities that the base lands have not been sold, en-
cumbered or otherwise disposed of."
It is submitted on behalf of the State that these conditions are
unreasonably burdensome and in some instances prohibitory, and re-
quested that they be modified.
The regulations in question received most careful consideration.
It was thought then, and upon further consideration is still believed,
that nothing less than therein required would adequately safeguard
the interests of the United States in the matter of these indemnity
selections. If, as suggested on behalf of the State of California,
county recorders in that State may charge unreasonable fees for
these certificates, the situation for that State is unfortunate, but no
satisfactory relief suggests itself to this Department. Other States
are complying with these regulations, and from informal inquiry in
your office it satisfactorily appears that from the standpoint of the
interests of the United States the rule should not be relaxed in the
interests of the State of California.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
swamp (.hant-character of land-effect of patent.
State of Louisiana.
The issuance of patent upon entries embracing lands alleged by the State to
have passed to it under its swamp land grant terminates the jurisdiction of
the land department thereover: and any question as to the character of the
lands and whether the issuance of patent therefor was inadvertent will he
inquired into only for the purpose of determining whether recommendations
should he made for the institution of suit to set aside the patent. The
question as to whether the issuance of patent amounted to an adjudication
that said lands were not swamp, and therefore did not pass to the State
under its grant, is one for determination by the courts, and not by the land
department.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissiom r of the Gem ml La ml Offici
,
( V. L. (V) November 'h 1905. (G. B. G.)
This is the appeal of the Stale of Louisiana from your office deci-
sion of January 1 1. L905, holding for rejection the State's claim under
it- swamp land grant to numerous tracts of land in the New Orleans
land district, specifically described in said decision.
It appeal-- from the papers accompanying the appeal, or from the
files of your office, that all of the tracts involved have been entered.
located, or -old under the public land laws, and that patents have
issued therefor to the claimants under those law-, the Latest of which
issued more than ten years ago. It further appears that the claim of
the State under its swamp grants was made in apparent compliance
with regulations then in force, after the dates of said entries, loca-
tions, and sales, hut before the issuance of patent.
The decision of your office is put upon the ground that the issuance
of these patents under this state of facts was in law an adjudication
that said land was not swamp, and therefore did not pass under the
grants of swamp land- to the State. It is urged upon the appeal that
there was in law and fact no such adjudication ; that the State's claim
to these lands has never been considered, much less adjudicated, by the
land department : that the records and files of your office contain con-
clusive documentary evidence that said lands are, and were, swamp
and overflowed lands within the meaning of said grants: and it is
asked that your office be directed to certify to the Department the
necessary data to establish these facts, and that the Secretary of the
Interior render a decision upon the swampy or non-swampy character
of -aid land-.
It i- not believed that the land department or the Secretary of the
Interior, as the official head thereof, has jurisdiction over the land in-
volved for any purpose. The issuance of the patents aforesaid trans-
ferred that jurisdiction to the courts. The question as to the char-
acter of these land- and the inadvertent issue of patent therefor—if,
indeed, such action was inadvertent—would only be cognizable here
for the purpose of ascertaining whether recommendation should be
made to the Department of Justice for the institution of suits to set
aside the patents. ThiS question has been settled by lapse of time.
More than six years have elapsed since the last of these patents issued,
and under the limitation placed on actions of the sort suggested, by
section 8 of the act of March 3, L891 (26 Stat., L093, L095), the action
could not be maintained. The question whether the issuance of these
patents amounted to adjudications upon the character of the lands is
one for the courts, if it be made the subject of further inquiry, and
BUch inquiry can only be had upon an action or actions by the State
itself, or persons claiming through (he State. Whatever may be the
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purpose of the State in asking this Department to make a specific
finding as to the character of these lands, it will be enough to say that,
if such finding in law has not already been made, the courts offer a
forum for the adjudication of that question.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
lands in round valley indian reservation opened to settle-
ment and entry.
Instructions.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, November 7, 1905.
Registers and Receivers,
San Francisco, and Eureka, California.
Gentlemen: The act of February 8, 1905 (33 Stat., TOG), pro-
vides for the survey and reappraisement of all the lands, relinquished
from the Round Valley Indian Reservation in the State of California
under the act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat,, 058), which had not been
theretofore disposed of; and that the said lands, when surveyed and
appraised, shall be subject to settlement and entry under the pro-
visions of the homestead laws of the United States.
Said lands having been surveyed and reappraised in accordance
with the provisions of said act and said reappraisement having been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the hour of 9 o'clock a. m.,
January 15, 1906, has been fixed as the time on and after which the
lands described in the schedule hereto attached will be opened to
settlement and entry.
The lands will be subject to settlement and entry under the home-
stead laws and the right of commutation under section 2301, Revised
Statutes, is expressly, conferred by the act; they will be subject to
entry under section 2300, R, S., by those entitled to make entry there-
under, as the law does not limit entries to actual settlers, but in ease
entry is allowed under said section 2306, the entryman will be required
to make payment of the appraised price for the lands embraced
therein; and declaratory statements under section 2309 may also be
filed by those entitled under section 2304, Revised Statutes, to make
the same.
Applicants for these lands must possess the qualifications required
in the case of ordinary homestead entries, and all applications to
enter presented prior to April 16, 1906, must, in addition to the usual
affidavits required therein, be accompanied by an affidavit alleging
that there is no person having a superior right to the land desired, as
a settler thereon and an occupant thereof on January 1, 190-1.
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Persons claiming a preference right of entry by reason of settle-
ii km 1 1 and occupation of said lands on January 1. L904, must exercise
thai righl by making application to enter before April 16, L906, as the
land- to occupied will, after that dale become subject to entry by any
other qualified person. You will require of all persons claiming a
preference right of entry, by reason of such settlement and occupation,
a special affidavit, duly corroborated, setting forth all the fact- a- to
such settlement and occupation of the land- claimed by them, and
showing that their settlement and occupation has continued until the
date of their applications to enter.
Each entryman is required to pay the appraised price for the
lands entered by him, such payment to he made in live equal annual
payments, one-fifth at the time of entry and one-fifth in one. two.
three, and four years, respectively, from the date of entry, with
interest on the deferred payments at the rate of ."> per cent per
annum.
In case of commutation of an entry, the appraised price must he
paid at the time of submission of proof, the entryman receiving
credit for any payment- previously made, and, if the entryman he
an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen, such
proof will not he accepted unless accompanied by proof of full
naturalization. When parlies, who are entitled, under the pro-
visions of section 2305, Revised Statutes, to credit upon the period
of residence for military service, submit proof before the end of
the fifth year from date of entry, they will he required to make
payment in like manner of the full amount of purchase money
Remaining unpaid for the lands embraced in their entries.
The usual fee and commissions now provided by Law where the
price of the land is Kl.-_?r> per acre must he paid at the time of origi-
nal entry and when the commutation or final proof is made, but
you will not collect any payment for lands in excess of 1(J0 acres
embraced in an allowed original entry, as the payment of such
excess will he included in the whole amount required to he paid by
installments.
Cash receipts (Form 1 \\()</) in duplicate, will he issued for the
installments of (he purchase money when paid. When final proof
and payment are made, a final certificate (Form f L96) and a final
homestead receipt (Form I 110) will he issued in addition to a cash
receipt (Form 1 L40«) for the final payment. When commutation
proof and payment are made, yon will issue a cash receipt (Form
I 189) and a cash receipt (Form 4-131) for the payment of the
purchase price, noting thereon the receipt of final commissions.
All homestead entries for these lands will he indorsed " Round
Valley Reservation lands," and yon will open a new series therefor,
commencing with Number 1, and the same will he reported on sepa-
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rate abstracts. The cash certificates and receipts ^v i 1 1 be indorsed
in like manner and numbered in their proper order in the Round
Valley Reservation cash series. Von will report and account for
the money received on account thereof in separate monthly and
quarterly returns.
A separate account should also be rendered for homestead fees and
commissions as received on " Round Valley Reservation lands."
The receiver will deposit all moneys received from the sale of said
lands in the Treasury of the United States as receipts from sales of
u Round Valley Reservation lands," act of February 8, 1905; he
will also deposit all homestead fees and commissions so received as
from ' w Round Valley Reservation lands." but to the credit of the
United States the same as fees and commissions received on account
of public lands of the United States.
The lands of said reservation now to be opened are not affected
by the provisions of the act of May 17. 1900 (31 Stat.. 179), for the
reason that they were not " opened to settlement " prior to the pas-
sage of said act.
All persons who have since attempted, or who may hereafter
attempt, to make settlement on any of said lands prior to the
hour the lands are formally opened to settlement and entry, as
above set forth, will be considered and dealt with as trespassers,
and preference will be given the prior legal applicant, notwith-
standing such unlawful settlement.
It may be, and possibly will occur, that at the time of opening
a number of persons will be assembled at your office seeking to
make entry of these lands, and the duty will devolve upon you to
make and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to secure a fair and orderly course of proceedings on the part of
all concerned.
The transmission of applications by mail is permissible, but it
was not intended to confer upon such applicants a superior right.
You will, therefore, upon opening your office, note the number
of persons in line, and act upon their applications in the order of
presentation. After acting upon all applications of those who
were in line at the opening of your office, you will act upon all
applications received by you by mail on that morning in the order
in which you may happen to open them and then proceed with
the applications of those who may have formed in line after the
opening of your office. Any applications received in subsequent
mails should be considered in the actual order in which the letters
containing them are opened, after all applications of those who
are in line at time of their receipt have been* acted upon. (See 27
L. D., 113, and 33 L. D., 582.)
Such of the persons who may be acting as agents for ex-soldiers
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under section 2309, Revised Statute-, will be allowed- to make one
entry in his individual character and to lilt- one declaratory state-
ment as agent, if properly authorized, and if desiring to make
other filings, you will require him to take \\\> place at the end of
the line and await his proper time before doing so, and he will be
allowed to file but one declaratory statement at a time.
After the disposition of applications presented by persons pres-
ent at 9 o'clock a. in., all other applications presented will be dis-
posed of in the usual way. the time of actual presentation being
noted on the application.
You are expected to act promptly under the lawful instructions
before you as occasions arise, allowing any parties feeling aggrieved
by your action the right of appeal, under the rules of practice,
without seeking special instructions from this office in the particular
cases before acting thereon.
Notice- for publication have been forwarded to the newspapers
in which they are to be published.
You will at once make requisition for such blank forms as you
will need in connection with the entry of these lands. Printed
copies of these instructions for distribution will be forwarded to
you a- soon a- practicable.
Very respectfully, J. II. Fimple,
Acting Com n i iss ioner.
Approved, November 7, 1905.
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
I Schedule omitted.
J
HOMESTEAD I'.NTIiV FEES AM) COMMISSIONS.
Walter C. Frazer.
An applicanl to make homestead entry is not entitled to have the fees and
commissions paid by him upon a prior homestead entry, canceled for con-
flict, applied in payment of the fees and commissions required in connection
with his second application; but, uj proper application therefor, the fees
:iik1 commissions paid ii] the canceled entry will he repaid under the
provisions of section 2 of the ad of .(tine 1U. 1880.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office^
(V. L. ( ; .) November /. 1905. (J. L. M'C.)
Walter C. Frazer has filed a motion for review of departmental
decision (unreported) of May 24, L905, affirming that of your office,
dated December 6, l'.MU. which sustained the action of the local officers
252 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
in rejecting his application to make homestead entry for the W. I of
the XK. h the XK. | of the XK. j. ami the XE. \ of the NW. j of
Sec. lo. T. t X.. R. 23 E., Woodward land district, Oklahoma.
The ground of rejection was that Frazer failed, and still refuses,
to pay the fees and commissions (fourteen dollar-) due on -aid entry.
He had previously made 1 entry for the W. J of the XE. j and the X. .',
of the NW. ] of See. 10. same township and range; hut upon dis-
covery that such entry had been erroneously allowed, because of being
in conflict with the prior entry of another person, Frazer relinquished
it and applied to make entry of the tract in question : and he contends
that the fees and commissions paid on the first entry should apply
on hi- second entry—not being satisfied with paying the fee- and
commissions on the second entry and being repaid those erroneously
paid on the first entry. The movant says:
Not having been advised of tbe reasons of tbe recent action on tbe part of the
Honorable Secretary, or informed of tbe grounds on which the General band
Office sustained the action of the local land office, tbe appellant labors under the
disadvantage of not knowing how the Honorable Secretary can possibly reach
the conclusion he does in the premises.
Probably the several tribunals referred to considered the reasons
for the action taken to be so palpable that there 1 was no occasion for
explaining them in exU nso. It will be sufficient to say that the action
of the local officers was in strict accordance with the departmental
instructions of December 1. 1883 (2 L. I).. 660) :
The practice of allowing parties making a homestead or timber-culture entry
credit for the fee and commissions paid by them on a canceled prior entry is
discontinued. The fees and commissions paid on entries of the above men-
tioned character canceled for conflict, or because they have been erroneonsly
allowed and can not be confirmed, will be repaid to tbe proper parties upon their
making application therefor, as provided in the second section of tbe act of
Congress, approved June Id. 1880.
The preceding- instruction has been strictly followed ever since its
promulgation, and good practice requires that it should continue to
be followed.
The motion for review is overruled.
IXDIAX LAXDS-ALLOTArEXT-^rARRlEI) WOMAN.
Thompson v. Frazier.
Where an Indian woman, a member of one tribe, marries an Indian man. a
member of another tribe, but is never enrolled as a member of her hus-
band's tribe, she is entitled to an allotment in her own tribe, as the head of
a family, notwithstanding her husband; prior to Ins marriage, received an
allotment in bis tribe as a single person.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of tht Gt nerai Loud Offta .
( F. L. C.) November 7, 1905. (C. J. G.)
Miner Thompson has appealed from the decision of your office of
December 1. L904, involving charges preferred by him against Ponca
Indian allotment No. 37, made to Hannah II. Frazier, for the X. \ of
Sec. 1 I. T. 32 N.. R. 7 W., ( Weill, Nebraska.
Section I-", of the act of March 2, L889 (25 Stat.. 888, 892), provides,
among other things, an follows :
Each member of the Ponca tribe of Indians now occupying a part of the old
Ponca reservation, within the limits of the said Greal Sioux reservation, shall
he entitled to allotments upon said old Ponca reservation as follows: To each
head of ;i family, three hundred and twenty acres.
In an affidavit filed in the local land office April 1. L902, Thompson
alleged that Hannah II. Frazier, the allottee, was a Ponca Indian
married to a Santee Sioux Indian at the date her allotment was made,
and was therefore not entitled to the same as the head of a family,
under the foregoing' section. This affidavit was referred by your office
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, who returned the same under
date of July 1 I. 1902, with this statement :
The fact thai this allottee was the wife of a Santee Sioux Indian at the time
the allotment was made is not denied by this office. . . . The only question a!
issue in this case is. was this woman the wife of ;i Santee Sioux Indian, the head
*i\' ,i f'.inhh within the meaning of said section 13. This office has held in its
Instructions to allotting agents that where the husband was a white man. or not
;i member of the tribe to which his wife belonged, the wife should be regarded
and allotted as the head of n family, and this ruling was followed in making the
allotments to the Ponca 1 ndians.
As to this woman, however, the Departinenl held in ;i communication
addressed to this office December 1. is'.>7. as follows:
"These Indian women have been, through error, allotted lands which they are
net entitled to. ;iini steps should he taken t<> eaueel their allotments, if not gone
h> patent, or to obtain their relinquishment, or to set aside the patent by action
Of the courts."
In view of this proceeding, it is presumed thai you should order a hearing to
he had in the proper local land office in accordance with the rules of practice
governing proceedings of such offices.
March 2, L903, your office ordered a hearing, which was had. and as
a result thereof the local officers recommended dismissal of Thomp-
son's charges and that the allotment he held intact. Upon appeal
your office rendered the decision here complained of. in which, it was
found, in \iew of the departmental ruling referred to. that the allot
hient to Hannah II. Frazier was illegal, but held said allotment intact
owing to the provisions of the act of April 23, 1904 ( •* ,.: ,> Stat., 297),
which inhibits the cancellation of allotments upon which first or trust
patents have issued, except in certain specified instances, of which this
Case is held 1)\' VOUr office not to he one.
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The Commissioner of Indian Allans in a letter of date February
•24. 1890, addressed to the agent of Santee Agency. Nebraska, with
respect to this allottee, instructed said agent as follow-
:
Harriet [Hannah] H. Frazier married Charles Frazier, a Santee Sioux
Indian, who has had 160 acres of land patented to him at Santee Agency. They
had one child. Harriet. Would she (Harriet [Hannah] H. Frazier) be entitled
to 160 or 320 acres?
Harriet [Hannah] H. Frazier should be regarded as the head of a family and
allowed 320 acres. He husband being an Indian of another tribe has no land
rights on the old Ponca Indian reservation. Had she married a white man she
would have been regarded as the head of a family (the white father having no
rights i and the same rule should govern in view of the fact that her Indian
husband is not of her tribe and has no land rights on the old Ponca reserva-
tion. She should not be deprived of her just rights because her Indian husband
happens to own property elsewhere.
Like instructions were given in the same letter as to other Indians.
As to one. Alice Howe, who had recently married a Flandreau Sioux,
it was said that she should be regarded as the head of a family and
given 320 acre-.
In a communication to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of date
November 4, 1897, the agent of the Santee Agency stated, as set
forth in a letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of date
November 29. 1897. that-
certain Santee Indians married women belonging to the Ponca tribe before
allotments were made to the Santees in 1885: that land was allotted to these
men as heads of families, their wives being enrolled with them : that the men
have received their full share of the benefits provided by section 17 of the
Sioux Act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 888). and that in 1800 the wives of these
men were allotted 320 acres each, as members of the Ponca tribe and heads of
families.
The agent asked if these women were entitled to the benefits under
said section 17, and also stated that
—
Charles Frazier married Hannah Howe, a Ponca. about 2 years after he was
allotted land at Santee in 1885. and when land was allotted at Ponca in 1890
she was allotted 320 acres and her child an allotment of about 63 acres; that
Hannah Frazier has never been on the Santee rolls with her husband, but is
enumerated on the Ponca census roll, it being the intention of Frazier and his
wife to move on the Ponca allotment in the spring and make a home thereon.
The agent asked if he would be justified in paying Hannah Frazier
under said section 17, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in
transmitting the agent's communication to the Department, said:
So far as the first mimed cases are concerned. I have to state that where a
man and his wife are members of different tribes it has been the practice of
this office to allow each an allotment as a single person with the tribe to which
they respectively belong or to allow either of them to take an allotment as the
head of a family on the reservation to which said allottee belonged, the other
not being entitled to an allotment. Under this practice it would seem that these
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Ponca women were no1 entitled to allotments witb the Ponca tribe, as under the
Sioux Ad married women are ao1 entitled to allotments. If this be true I am
of the opinion thai they would not be entitled t,» the benefits of section IT.
From the schedule of Santee allotments approved hy the Departmenl May 1.
1885, it appears that Charles Frazier was assigned L60 acres of land under the
i;th article of the Sioux treaty of L868 (15 Stats.. 637). It is therefore doubtful
whether his wife. Hannah Howe, was entitled to an allotment as a member of
the Ponca tribe. As the decision of the Departmenl of July 21, 1896, places an
interpretation upon section 17 of the Sioux Ac1 somewhal different from that
entertained hy this office, I deem it proper to suhmit these i|uesii(»ns for your
consideration and decision before instructing A.geu1 Clements in the premises.
It was in reply to this letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
that the Department, after quoting rrom section 17 of the Sioux act,
used the language quoted by the Commissioner in his letter to your
office of date July Ik L902, hereinbefore referred to. and which led
your office to hold that the allotment in question was illegal. It will
he observed, however, that the finding of the Department that the
allotments to these Ponca women were erroneous, was made to cover
without distinction both cases mentioned by the Indian agent. The
one case included Ponca women who had married members of the
Santee tribe and had been enrolled with them, prior to the allotments
to their husbands as heads of families: and these women were 4 after-
wards allotted as members of the Ponca tribe and also as heads of
families. As to the correctness of the departmental ruling with re-
spect to this class it is unnecessary to say anything here, except to
-tale that it differs materially from the other case named by the agent,
which is that of the Ponca woman. Hannah II. Frazier. who married
a Santee Indian about two years after he had received an allotment as
a member of the Santee tribe and as a single person, and who was
never on the Santee rolls with her husband but continued to be
home on the Ponca roll, she being finally allotted hind as a member
of the Ponca tribe and as (he head of a family.
The appeal of this case here is directed solely to the holding of
your office that under the act of April 23, L904, there is no authority
to cancel the patent issued to Hannah II. Frazier. But the conten-
tion is also made, as otherwise appears from the record, that if it
be found the allottee and her husband were both citizens of the
United State- at the time the allotment was made, then she was not
the head of a family and so not entitled to an allotment. This might
be trite had the allottee married an Indian homesteader, a citizen of
the I'n it ed Slate-, and soughl an allotment out of the public domain :
but the lands involved here are tribal properties and are not governed
by the provisions of the general allotment act with respect to citi-
zenship. Besides, in section 1 1 of the Sioux act it is provided :
An. I each and every allottee under this act shall he entitled to all the rights
and privileges and he subjed to all the provisions of section six of the acl ap
proved February eighth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven.
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Said section 6 (24 Stat., 388, 390), declares, among other things,
the citizenship of allottees, " without in any manner impairing or
otherwise affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other
property." By analogy, in the case of Frank Bergeron (80 L. I).,
375), it was held that an Indian who has received an allotment of
his proportionate share of the land held in common by his tribe, is
not thereby disqualified from taking land for a homestead as a citizen
of the United States. In the decision of your office here com-
plained of it is said :
In ;i letter dated November 26, 1902, addressed to this office by the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the allotment of Julia A. (Hick, referred to
above, it was staled that Julia A. Glick, who married a white man. was. under
section thirteen of the act of March 2. 1889, entitled to an allotment, she being
a member of the Ponca tribe, and the Department having uniformly held Hint
a woman whose husband is a white man. or otherwise not entitled to an Indian
allotment, is to be regarded as the head of an Indian family. It |s further
stated that the land allotted to Mrs. (Hick was not the property of the United
States but of the tribe to which she belongs, and that her rights to tribal prop-
erty are not impaired by her marriage to a white man.
If a Ponca Indian who has married a white man is entitled to an allotment
of 320 acres on the Ponca reservation as the head of a family, it is not seen wh\
Hannah Frazier should not occupy the same position, she having married a
Santee Sioux Indian who was not allotted as the head of a family, but who
became prior to her marriage :\ citizen of the United States.
The Department is of opinion that the riding relied upon by
your office is not conclusive of nor properly applicable to the case now
under consideration, but that the former practice in regard to such
cases was the proper one and should be followed; and that on the
merits of this case alone the charges preferred against the allotment
of Hannah H. Frazier should be dismissed.
There are other reasons, however, sufficient to justify the dismissal
of these charges. In the first place no matters were alleged against
the allotment that were not already within the knowledge of the
Indian Office; hence no information was given that was not already
well known. In the second place, persons making charges against an
Indian allotment do not acquire a preference right of entry in the
event of the cancellation of the allotment. And in the third place,
since the passage of the act of April 23, L904, there is no authority to
cancel a patent issued to an Indian allottee, except in specified in-
stances, without the approval of Congress. As this case does not come
within the provisions of the act. and as it is not deemed a proper case
to submit to Congress under said act, the decision of your office
herein is modified accordingly, the charges in question will be dis-
missed and the allotment held intact.
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SETTLEMENT LANDLORD AND TENANT.
McNamara v. Morgan.
The nil*- th.it settleinenl rights can not be acquired by the tenant or employe of
another which can be set up to defeat intervening rights, is not applicable in
all cases where the relation of landlord and tenant is established, and
should never be extended to eases where the relation of tenant was as-
sumed merely for the purpose of protecting settlement rights and in fur-
therance of ;i bona fide intention on the part of n settler to assert his rights
at the first opportunity.
No rights can he acquired by acts of settlement as against an entryman claiming
under a prior record entry, hut .-is between subsequent claimants the prior
actual settler is entitled to precedence upon the cancellation of the entry or
extinguishment of the record idle.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of flic General L<m<l Office,
(V. L. C.) November 11, 19Q5. (E. O. P.)
Counsel for Leui Morgan lias tiled, and the Department has con-
sidered, motion for review of it> unreported decision of July 29, L905,
holding the homestead entry of Morgan for the XK. j SW. J and
\\V.
t SE. 1. See. 35, T. 11 X.. R. 2 K.. Oklahoma City land district.
Oklahoma, subject to the rights of McNamara by virtue of his prior
settlement on the land.
The <iuest ion of law presented and relied upon as a hasis for the
pending motion, is set forth in the fourth specification of error, as
follows:
The Hon. Secretary erred in virtually finding that the only question at issue
\v;is whether McNamara was Hie prior settler on said land, the real question at
issue being whether McNamara's tenancy did not. under all the decisions, pro-
vent him from setting up ;i settlement right upon the cancellation of said entry.
and the Hon. Secretary erred in refusing and failing to p;'^s on said question in
.•my of his decisions, and contestee asks here specifically for findings of fact as
to the tenancy of McNamara in order that if the Secretary denies this motion
for review contestee may have ;i chance to present proper findings of fact, as
sustained by the record, to a court of competent jurisdiction, in an action for
resulting trust.
The facts necessary to a decision herein are, briefly stated, as
follows:
The land involved was formerly embraced in an Indian allotment.
and prior to the filing of Morgan's application was occupied by
McNamara under an alleged lease from the Indian allottee, from
whom he had purchased and owned the improvements thereon at the
time of the cancellation of the said allotment, on January 8, L903.
Morgan's application was filed January 21. L903, alleging settlemenl
( »" the land the day previous. 'Jd'e testimony ^hows thai the lease in
question was made with a knowledge of the illegality of the allotment
5194 Vol. :'.t—or, s,— it
258 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
and defective title of the lessor, and for the sole purpose of protecting
McNamara 's claim until opportunity was afforded him to exercise
his settlement rights.
Counsel for Morgan asserts that the question now presented has
never been directly passed upon in any of the prior decisions of the
Department, yet the following language is found in the Department's |!
decision now sought to be reviewed :
The question whether McNamara's right by virtue of being upon the land,
with the intention of entering the same under the homestead law, attached
eo instanti upon the cancellation of the Indian allottee's claim, was before the
Department at the time its former decision was rendered, and was taken into
careful consideration in arriving at the conclusion therein announced.
Decision is now specially asked upon this point in order that a
resulting trust may be established in the courts in the event the same
is adverse to the claim of Morgan.
The contention of counsel for Morgan can only rest upon the theory
that the relation of McNamara as tenant under his lease prevented
the assertion of any settlement rights by him during the continuance
of the lease and that the estoppel arising by virtue of this re-
lation existed in so far as it effectually controlled the real intention of
McNamara in connection with his alleged acts of settlement until
actual knowledge of the termination of the lease had been brought
home to him.
The Department has frequently held that settlement rights cannot
be acquired by a tenant or an employe of another which can be set up
to defeat the intervening rights of another. But the application of
this rule is not general and cannot, nor has it been, adhered to in every
case where the relation of landlord and tenant has been established.
It is applied in those cases where the facts show that the tenant,
agent, or employe, had never, at any time prior to the intervention of
an adverse claim, manifested an intention to assert a settlement right
in himself. The principle thus applied is correct but it should never
\
be extended to cases wherein there was in fact a bona fide intention
on the part of such settler to assert his rights at the first opportunity
and he had assumed the relation of tenant simply to protect those
rights and in furtherance of his honest purpose to assert them.,
(Clark u. Martin, 11 L. D., 72; Hall v. Levy, ib., 284.)
In the case of Withers v. Page (28 L. D., 547, 549), the reason of
the rule requiring some overt acts of settlement is stated and a dis-
tinction is noticed between the cases where the principle heretofore
referred to will govern and where it will not be applied.
The purpose of the rule requiring some overt act of settlement in addition to
the purchase of improvements of a prior settler upon the tract of land is to give
notice to the world of the settlement right and claim of the person so purehasing.
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The same reason is equally controlling in the case of a lessee where
the relation of landlord and tenant has terminated.
While no rights can be acquired by acts of settlement as against an
entryman claiming under a prior record entry, yet as between subse-
quent claimants the prior actual settler is entitled to precedence upon
the cancellation of the entry or extinguishment of the record title.
Counsel for Morgan vigorously contends that because McNamara
had no actual knowledge of the cancellation of the record title of his
lessor, the Indian allottee, until after the entry of Morgan, his acts of
settlement and his intent were not contemporaneous and cannot be
linked or connected to defeat such intervening entry. This proposi-
tion is asserted in the face of knowledge on the part of Morgan that
McNamara was Living on the land at the time he performed his
alleged acts of settlement, and the Department is of the opinion the
testimony supports the claim of McNamara that Morgan at that time
had full knowledge of the circumstances under which he took the
lease and of his lixed intention to make homestead entry of the land
upon the extinguishment of the outstanding Indian title. The claim
of Morgan is unsound in theory and unjust in principle and cannot
he sustained. McNamara's intent had long been formed and his acts
of settlement performed in accordance therewith and both were in
existence and awaiting attachment as a settlement right eo instanti
the right of the record claimant was destroyed. At that instant the
relation of landlord and tenant ceased and the operation of the estop-
pel fell with it. and has no -application either in controlling the rights
or defeating the intention of McNamara.
The familiar doctrine of estoppel is an instrument for the preven-
tion of fraud, and will never be applied to protect or promote it. As
between landlord and tenant it arises from the obligation of the
tenant to return the possession and it exists wherever this duty exists.
The occupant in such cases is considered to have pledged his faith to
return the possession of the land at the expiration of his term and
during his tenancy the law will not permit him to deny or disparage
his landlord's title. But when the obligation to return the possession
is for any cause satisfied or becomes impossible by reason of the abso-
lute failure of title of the Lessor, the estoppel no Longer exists. It
falls with the extinguishment of the obligation. (See Washburn on
Real Property, 5th ed., vol. 3, p. 98.)
ruder the circumstances surrounding this case, the Department is
of opinion McNamara was not estopped to set up settlement rights
acquired prior to the cancellation of the Indian allotment and the
termination of the lease, as against third parties.
With exceptions or limitations of this character it will he found on examina-
tion <>t' the authorities, particularly those of modern date, that the doctrine
<>f estoppel in pais, however it may have been applied formerly, cannot now
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be asserted to preclude the grantee from denying bis grantor's title and acquir-
ing a superior one. unless there exists such a relation of the parties to each
other as would render the proceeding a breach of good faith and common
honest)/. [Robertson et al v. Pickrell el al., 109 U. S., 608, 016.]
Clearly the rights of McNamara under his settlement on the land
were superior to those of Morgan, and he having asserted them
within the required period they will he sustained, over the technical
claim of settlement asserted by Morgan.
For the reasons herein stated the motion for review is denied.
mining claim-placer-legal subdivisions.
Roman Placer Mining Claim.
Lands not embraced in the application for patent for a mining claim, and in
the published and posted notice and other proceedings, can not be embraced
in the entry.
The smallest legal subdivision of the public surveys provided for by the mining
laws is a subdivision of ten acres, in square form ; and such laws do not
contemplate that in the location and entry of placer mining claims rectangu-
lar tracts of five acres may be recognized and treated as legal subdivisions.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L/C.) No rem her 16, 1905. (A. B. P.)
February 3, 1901, the Diamond Fire Brick Company made entry
for the Roman placer mining claim, survey No. 14,524, Pueblo, Col-
orado. The claim, though located upon surveyed lands, does not
conform to the United States public-land surveys, or to the system
and rectangular subdivisions of such surveys. For this reason your
office, by decision of July 8, 1903, directed that the company be
required to conform the entry to the public surveys, on pain of the
cancellation thereof in the event of default.
The company was notified accordingly, and, in response, filed what
it terms an "amended application to purchase," wherein the claim
is attempted to be described in tracts which, with two exceptions,;,
contain only five acres each, though in rectangular form, as, for
instance, the " S. i of the NW. J of the NE. J of the NE. J,"
and so on.
By decision of February 15, 1904, your office refused to accept the
so-called amended application to purchase for the stated reasons, (1)1
that the lands are described in five-acre tracts, and not according to
legal subdivisions, and (2) that, as so described, portions of the lands
lie outside of the boundaries of the claims as located and entered.
The company has appealed to the Department.
The claim as entered is without pretense 1 to conformity with the
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public surveys. Its shape is such as finds no warrant whatever in
the mining laws: and the refusal of your office to permit the entry
to pass to patent was manifestly right. The chief contention of the
company, in its endeavor to sustain the entry as it now stands, is th tl
to have conformed the claim to the public surveys would have necessi-
tated the inclusion of lands not placer in character. There is nothing
in this contention. It' it be assumed that the adjacent lands are not
placer, as alleged, the laying of the lines of the location in conformity
with the public surveys, which may he done to embrace tracts as small
as ten acre- in area, in square form, would not require the inclusion
of adjacent non-placer lands to such extent as to affect the validity
of the location for that reason. (Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining
Claims 34 L. I). 4i>.)
Your office was also right in refusing to accept the showing made
by the company in its attempt to conform the claim to the public
surveys. Lands not included in the application for patent, the pub-
lished and posted notice and other proceedings, cannot he embraced
in the entry. This is plain, and in view thereof, and of the fact as
appears from the record that the claim cannot otherwise he conformed
to the public surveys, it is clear that the defects therein are. for this
reason, incurable.
Nor is there any authority under the mining laws for making
entry and obtaining patent for a placer claim composed of tracts as
small as five acres in area, t'hough in rectangular form. The law
(.11 this subject i^ found in section- 2329 to 2331, inclusive, of the
Revised Statutes, which sections are as follows:
Sec. 232i>. Claims usually called "placers," including nil forms of deposit,
excepting veins of quartz, or other rock in place, shall be subject to entry and
patent, under like circumstances and conditions, and upon similar proceedings,
as .-ire provided for vein or lode claims; but where the lands have been pre-
viously surveyed by the United States, the entry in its exterior limits shall con-
form to the legal subdivisions of the public lands.
2330. Legal subdivisions of forty acres may be subdivided into ten-acre
tracts; and two or more persons, or associations of persons, having contiguous
claims of any size, although such claims may be less than ten acres each, may
make joint entry thereof: luit no location of a placer claim, made after the
ninth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy, shall exceed one hundred and
sixty acres for any one person or association of persons, which location shall
conform to the United States surveys; and nothing in this section contained
shall defeat or impair any bona fide preemption or homestead claim upon agri-
cultural lands, or authorize the sale of the improvements of any bona fide
settler to any purchaser.
Sec. 2331. Where placer-claims are upon surveyed lands, and conform to legal
subdivisions, no further survey or plat shall be required, and all placer mining
claims incited after the tenth day of May. eighteen hundred and seventy-two,
shall conform as near as practicable ,with the United States system of public-
land surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys, and no such
location shall include more than twenty acres for each individual claimant : but
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where placer-claims can not l>e eonformed to legal subdivisions, survey and plat
shall he made as on unsurveyed lands; and where by the segregation of mineral
land in any legal subdivision a quantity of agricultural hind less than forty
acres remains, such fractional portion of agricultural land may be entered by
any party qualified by law, for homestead or pre-emption purposes.
That under these sections placer claims located since May 10, 1872,
whether upon surveyed or unsurveyed lands, are required to conform
as nearly as practicable to the United States system of public-land
surveys, is settled by numerous decisions of this Department. (Miller
Placer Claim, 30 L. IX, 225; Wood Placer Mining Company, 32 L. D.,
198—on review, 77/., 368; Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining- Claims,
34 L. D., 42; Rialto No. 2 Placer Mining Claim. 34 L. 1)., 44; Laugh-
ing Water Placer, 34 L. I)., 56.)
There is no difficulty in applying the principle to a claim upon un-
surveyed lands. It is done by locating the claim in rectangular form,
of lawful dimensions, and with east-and-west and north-and-south
boundary lines. (Rialto Xo. 2 Placer Mining Claim, 34 L. D., 44;
Laughing Water Placer, 34 L. D., 56; Wood Placer Mining Company,
32 L. IX. 303. 3H4-305.)
If the claim be upon surveyed lands, as is the case here, the matter
of conforming the same to the public surveys, where not for some suf-
ficient physical or other reason impracticable to do so, is accomplished
simply by locating the claim according to the legal subdivisions of
such surveys.
The smallest legal subdivision recognized by the public land laws,
other than the placer mining laws, is a tract of forty acres—that is, a
tract in square form constituting one fourth of a quarter section, or
one sixteenth of a section, of land—except where by reason of a sec-
tion being fractional its subdivision into smaller tracts may result in
the formation of lots of irregular shape and dimensions, in which
event such lots are considered legal subdivisions and are known and
described with relation to the section by the numbers they respectively
bear.
By the placer mining laws (Sec. 2330, supra) it is provided that
" legal subdivisions of forty acres may be subdivided into ten-acre
tracts; " and further, that "two or more persons, having contiguous
claims of any size, although such claims may be less than ten acres
each, may make joint entry thereof." These provisions are intended
to meet conditions, which not infrequently arise, peculiar to the asser-
tion of placer claims, where the claimed placer deposits are limited in
extent to tracts of much smaller area than forty acres. In such cases,
it is provided: (1) that a regular subdivision of forty acres may be
subdivided, that is, reduced by subdivision, according to the system of
public land surveys, to four tracts of ten acres each in square form,
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and (2) that in the evenl of contiguous claims of any size, though
less than ten acres cadi, the persons, or associations of persons,
asserting the same may make joint entry thereof.
Whether under the latter provision entry and patent may be ob-
tained for a placer claim or claims aggregating less than ten acres is
a question not now before the Department, and no opinion is ex-
pressed with respeel thereto. Tt is sufficient for the decision of this
case to say that the statute docs not contemplate that in the location
and entry of placer mining claims rectangular tracts of live acres may
he recognized and treated as Legal subdivisions of the public surveys.
The smallest legal subdivision provided for by the statute is a sub-
division of ten acres; and that must be in square form, else it would
not be a subdivision according to the system of the public-land
surveys.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
As paragraphs 22, 23 and 2-1 of the mining regulations (31 L. D.,
477—f~N) are not in entire accord with the views herein expressed,
said paragraphs are hereby severally revoked and the following sub-
stituted in lieu thereof:
22. By section 2330 authority is given for subdividing forty-acre legal sub-
divisions into ten-acre tracts. These ten-acre tracts should be considered and
dealt with as legal subdivisions, and an applicant having a placer claim which
conforms to one or more of such ten-acre tracts, contiguous in case of two or
more tracts, may make entry thereof, after the usual proceedings, without
further survey or plat.
_!.">. In subdividing forty-acre legal subdivisions, the ten-acre tracts must be
in square form, with lines at right angles with the lines of the public surveys;
and the notice given of the application must be specific and accurate in
description.
24. A ten-acre subdivision may be described, for instance, if situated in the
extreme northeast of the section, as the " NE. ! of the NE. ! of the NE. J" of
the section, or. in like manner, by appropriate terms, wherever situated: but
in addition to this description, the notice must give all the other data required
in a mineral application, by which parties may be put on inquiry as to the
land sought to be patented. The proofs submitted with applications must
show clearly the character and extent of the improvements upon the premises.
REPAYMENT—TIMBER AM) STONE ENTRY—CHARACTEB OF LAND.
Harrison \Y. ( >rmandy.
Where entry under the act of June ."». 1878, was erroneously allowed for land
chiefly valuable for its mineral deposits and upon which mining claims
had been located and improvements made prior to the timber land entry,
hut <»!' which the entrynian had no knowledge, and it appears that he
acted in good faith and did not procure the entry through misrepresenta-
tion, repayment of the purchase money paid by him may be allowed.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
No vernier 16, 1905. ( C. J.' G.
)
An appeal has been filed by Harrison W. Ormandy from the deci-
sion of your office of July 11, 1905, denying his application for repay-
ment of the purchase money paid on timber and stone entry for the
S. J NE. J and 8. \ NW. J, Sec. 24, T. 7 S., R. 13 E., La Grande.
Oregon. Said denial was for the reason that Ormandy filed with his
timber land declaration a nonmineral affidavit, when in fact the land
contained valuable mineral deposits, and thus procured his entry
through misrepresentation.
Ormandy filed the usual sworn statement for the purchase of said
land June 25, 1902, and after due notice was allowed to make entry
therefor September 18, 1902, cash certificate being issued to him
accordingly. Both his application to purchase and the non-mineral
affidavit filed at the time of submitting proof contained the statement.
in substance, that he had personally examined the land and found the
same to be chiefly valuable for its timber ; that there were not within
its limits to his knowledge any minerals of value nor any mining or
other improvements. The entry was contested by H. C. Thomas et al.\
who alleged that the land embraced therein was mineral in character
and that they were joint owners of mining claims located thereon
prior to the date of said entry ; that they were before and had been
since said entry was made, in actual and continuous possession of said
'claims; that the testimony on which Ormandy was allowed to make
entry, to the effect that the land was uninhabited, unappropriated and
unimproved, was false and fraudulent; and that the possession, occu-
pancy and improvements of H. C. Thomas et al. were at the time of
Ormandy's application open and visible, and must have been well
known to him and his witnesses if they ever inspected the premises.
A hearing was prayed for and granted, but on the date named there-
for Ormandy made default; he also made default at a postponed
hearing. The contestants submitted testimony in support of their
allegations as to the mineral character of the land and as to their
'locations and improvements; also a letter from Ormandy 's attorneys,
addressed to contestants' attorneys, as follows
:
We note that yon will withdraw the allegations of fraud. This letter may
stand as a stipulation by us on behalf of Mr. Ormandy that the protest rep-
resented by you may be sustained and his own timber^ entry canceled ; the
basis of the cancellation being prior mineral rights held by your clients, it
being stipulated and understood that the entry by Mr. Ormandy was made by
him in good faith and without any knowledge that the land contained any
mineral deposits.
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A formal stipulation signed by the respective attorneys is also in
the record and is as follows:
1. That the protestants withdraw their allegations of fraud from their pro-
tests herein. 2. That the allegations of the protest are true except as to
the matter of fraud on the part of the protestee. •".. That the protestee, Harri
son W. Ormandy, made the entry of the land covered by cash certificate No.
7522 in good faith and without any knowledge thai the said land contained
any mineral deposits or thai the protestants had prior mineral rights, 4. Thai
the protest herein may ho sustained and the timber entry canceled. 5. That
this stipulation shall apply to the protests of II. ( \ Thomas. II. \Y. Poster, and
George E. Robinson vs. Harrison YV. Ormandy. and II. C. Thomas and II. W.
Foster rs. Harrison \V. Ormandy; and the facts herein itipulated may be taken
;is true therein.
The local officers rendered decision finding that the statements
made in the stipulation were corroborated by the testimony submitted
at the hearing, and recommended cancellation of the timber land
entry. Your office canceled said entry as follows:
On consideration of the evidence submitted I find that the same shows pro-
testants to have been in possession of valid lode mining claims embracing por-
tions of each of the forty-acre suh-di visions covered by cash entry No. 7522
at date of said entry, and accept the withdrawal by the timber claimant of
his said entry. Contest No. 1856 is accordingly closed and timber cash entry
7522 canceled.
In an affidavit filed with his application for repayment. Ormandy
says:
Before making my original entry, and as I remember in June, 1002. I per-
sonally went upon the land entered by me. I went over each forty acre tract
thereof and followed.out the lines. I also went over the land itself in different
localities thereof. The land was mountainous and not agricultural; I saw no
evidence of mineral thereon and saw no mining tunnels or anything to indicate
mineral locations thereon; the land as it appeared to me was valuable only for
timber and stone and I made entry thereof under the timber and stone act in
perfect good faith and believing at the time that there was no mineral thereon.
Under date of August l">. 1904, I received Information from the Honorable
Register and Receiver of the United States Land Office at La Grande that a
contest affidavit by II. C. Thomas d ah, against my entry had been made upon
the ground that pre\ ions to the time of my entry such protestants had gone upon
a portion of said land and had made mineral locations thereon. No entries had
been made by said protestants in the United States Land Office and when I made
my entry I had no knowledge of any such locations; and although I had hen
over the land as above stated and had complied with the requirements of the
law and regulations regarding entries under the timber and stone act. I had
never seen any evidence of any appropriation of any portion thereof for mining
purposes. After such contest had been instituted evidence was submitted to my
attorney showing that upon a portion of the land the protestants had recorded
notices of mineral locations in the office of the Recorder of Conveyances of the
Comity in Oregon in which the land in question was situated. Being advised
by my attorney that if such were the fads my entry would be probably SUbjecl
I" cancellation, although it had been made by me in good faith. I executed a
stipulation relinquishing my claim and consenting that the entry be canceled.
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I live far from La Grande and am an employee of the Boston Rubber Shoe
Company at Portland, Oregon, and I had neither time nor money to make any
eontest, nor did I desire to claim the property if any one before me had in good
faith expended any money in making any mineral locations upon the property in
question. I moreover consented to the cancellation of my entry upon the under-
standing that, my entry having been made in good faith, the government would
repay me back the money which I paid it for the land in question.
One of the witnesses on behalf of Ormandy under his proof says in
a sworn statement
:
I myself knew the land before I testified as a witness, having been over the
same, and I testified that in my belief said land was valuable chiefly for timber
and stone and subject to entry under the provisions of the timber and stone act
;
such was my belief from observation thereof and the testimony was given in
good faith and without any knowledge of any mineral locations having been
made thereon.
It is well established, as stated by your office, that repayment will
not be allowed to one who procures an entry of public land through
misrepresentation. It is equally well settled that land chiefly valu-
able for its mineral deposits can not be taken under other than the
mineral laws. The testimony on behalf of contestants at the hearing
is to the effect that there were on the land at the time of Ormandy 's
timber land entry a cabin, sheds, tunnel house, blacksmith shop,
open cuts and tunnels, the combined value of which was several
thousands of dollars. If this testimony be true it seems somewhat
incredible that Ormandy failed to see these improvements. How-
ever, it was not impossible, the land being apparently inspected
merely with reference to its timber value, for him to pass over each
legal subdivision thereof without seeing said improvements. The
charge of bad faith was withdrawn, and neither the local officers
nor your office, in passing upon the contest allegations, found that he
had acted in bad faith, only deciding that the land was in fact
mineral in character. In view of the testimony to this effect, as well
as the stipulation to the effect that Ormandy made his entry in good
faith, and also in face of the positive denial of Ormandy that he had
any knowledge of the fact that the land contained mineral deposits,
and a like denial by one of his proof witnesses, it may very properly
be held that bad faith on his part has not been proven. This is the
sole point upon which the case turns, for, as was said in the case of
Hayden v. Jamison (on review7
,
26 L. D., 373), reference being made
to the rule announced in the case of Pacific Coast Marble Co. v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. et al. (25 L. D., 233)—
It having been found, and not being now questioned, that the land in con-
troversy is more valuable on account of its said stone deposit than for agri-
culture, this case comes squarely within the rule above set out, and it results
that the homestead entry of Jamison as to the land in conflict was and is unau-
thorized and can not be upheld.
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Id this view, in the absence of proof of bad faith, it may properly
be concluded that Ormandy's entry was canceled for conflict within
the meaning of the repayment statute, after a hearing had and finding
that the land was and is chiefly valuable for its mineral deposits.
Sec in this connection cases of Joseph Ilobart (12 L. I)., 431) : Nils
X. Vdsti (27 L. D., 616) ; George 1). Cloninger (28 L. D„ 21).
The decision of your office herein is reversed, and repayment will
be allowed as applied for, in the absence of other objection.
coal land-application to imim hask.
Lehmer v. Carroll et al.
It is not essential to the validity of an application by an association of four
persons to purchase six hundred (or six hundred and forty) acres of coal
lands that the applicants shall have opened and improved a mine or mines
of coal on each of the tracts embraced in the application. It is sufficient in
such case, where there are no conflicting claimants, that the applicants show
that they are severally qualified to purchase, that the lands applied for are
of the character subject to sale under the coal land laws, and that as an
association of persons the applicants have expended not less than five
thousand dollars in working and improving a mine or mines of coal on the
lands.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November 16, 1905. (A. B. P.)
October 10, 1903, Mary H. Carroll, Mariam Killom, Joseph Beadle
and James Brady filed application to purchase, under the coal land
laws (sees. 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes), the SE. |
of the NW. 1 and the SW. \ of Sec. 19, T. 5 S., R. 23 E., and the E. \
of Sec. 24, and the SE. \ of the SW. ] and the SW. J of the SE. 1
of Sec. 13, T. 5 S., R. 22 E., Bozeman, Montana, and made tender of
payment at twenty dollars per acre. The application, itself under
oath, was accompanied by the separate individual affidavits of the
applicants and two other persons. In these papers it is set forth, in
substance, that the lands applied for are of the class and character
subject to sale under the coal land laws, that the applicants are sever-
ally qualified to purchase, and apply to purchase, as an association
under section 2348, and that they have expended the sum of $8,000 in
developing and improving mines of coal on the lands.
With the application to purchase were presented what purport to
he deeds of release and quitclaim to the associated applicants, embrac-
ing, severally, portions of the lands applied for, and for which the
persons who executed the deeds had, respectively, previously filed
coal declaratory statements,' under section 2349. From the official
records it appeared thai other declaratory statements had been filed
covering portions of the lands. The local officers thereupon notified
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the coal declarants, as well as those from whom deeds of release and
quitclaim had been obtained as those who did not appear to have
released their claims, that they would be allowed until December 28,
1903, to show cause, if any they could, why the associated applicants
should not be permitted to purchase and enter the lauds applied for,
None of the parties so notified ever appeared in (he proceedings.
December 26, L903, one Frank W. Lehmer, a stranger to the record,
filed his sworn protest, corroborated by the affidavit of one II. II.
Griffith, against the application to purchase. On this protest a hear-
ing was had. at which the protestant submitted the testimony of one
witness. The applicants introduced no evidence, but rested their case
upon the proofs filed in support of their application to purchase and
the cross-examination of the witness introduced by the protestant.
The local officers recommended that the protest be dismissed and
that the application to purchase be allowed. On appeal by the pro-
testant, your office affirmed the action below with the modification
that the applicants be required to furnish certain additional proofs
before entry. The protestant thereupon appealed to the Department.
In his protest Lehmer asserts no right, or claim of right, in himself
to any of the lands embraced in the application to purchase. He does
not deny that the lands are chiefly valuable for coal and in other
respects subject to sale under the coal land laws. His charges are, in
substance and effect, (1) that no preference right of entry was
acquired by any of the parties from whom the applicants obtained
deeds of release and quitclaim to, themselves of the lands covered by
the declaratory statements filed by said parties, respectively, because
none of them ever opened and improved any coal mine or mines on the
lands, wherefore the declaratory statements were illegal and of no
effect, and consequently no rights were conveyed by such deeds, (2)
that the applicants to purchase had not themselves, either collectively
or individually, prior to the time of filing their application, or at any
time, opened and improved any coal mine upon any of the lands
applied for other than the SE. J of the SW. J and the SE. i of the
NE. J of Sec. 1-9, T. 5 S., K. 23 E., and (3) that the applicants to pur-
chase had not, either as an association or as individuals, expended
the sum of $5,000 in working and improving any mine or mines of
coal on any of the lands applied for.
Under the facts disclosed by the record it is obvious that the first
and second charges of the protest relate to immaterial matters, and
raise no question for departmental inquiry- In the first place, upon
failure of the coal declarants to appear and show cause against the
application to purchase, after being notified to do so, they ceased to be
parties to the record and were thereafter out of the case. This left
the record clear of any claim to the lands other than that asserted by
the associated applicants to purchase, and it could make no difference
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to them, or to the government, whether the coal declarafory statements
were valid when filed or not. In the second place, it Ls n<>i essential
to the validity of the application to purchase that the associated
applicants should have opened and improved a mine or mine? of coal
on the several tract- of land applied for. In this particular, aside
Prom the requirement involved in the third charge of the protest, it i-
'•nflieient that the proof- -how the lands to be of the class and char-
acter subject to disposal under the coal land law-. (McKibben r.
Gable, 34 L. I).. 178.)
The third charge of the protest doe- present a matter material for
the government to inquire into. The statute (sec. 2348) provides
that when an association of not less than four qualified persons shall
have expended not less than five thousand dollars in working and
improving any mine or mines of coal on the public lands, such asso-
ciation may enter not exceeding six hundred and forty acre- of such
land-, including the mining improvements. As touching the quan-
tity of lands applied for. the present application is based upon this
provision of the statute. The protest charges that the expenditure
in mining work and improvements required to authorize such a pur-
chase had not been made. On this question, material only to the
government, inasmuch as in his protest Lehmer asserts no claim to
the lands or any part thereof, the testimony of the one witness intro-
duced at the hearing not only does not overcome the showing made
by the application and proofs but tends to sustain such showing.
There is therefore nothing in this charge.
It is unnecessary to consider the many other matters discussed by
counsel, and in the decision appealed from, for the reason that they
have no material bearing on the case. The application to purchase
and the proofs submitted therewith show substantially all that the
law requires, and the Department sees no necessity for the additional
proofs called for by your office. Upon failure of the prior record
claimants, after notice, to appear and show cause against the appli-
cation to purchase, there remained nothing in the way of the allow-
ance of the application except the one and only material charge in
I -ehmerV protest. That charge being now disposed of the applica-
tion should be allowed to pass to entry upon payment of the purchase
price for the lands, unless other material objection shall -appear : and
the decision of vour office is modified according! v.
Auirust l'.>. L904, one B. W. Metheny offered for filing his applica-
tion to purchase a portion of the lands in question, as coal land-, and
submitted therewith his affidavit, corroborated by two witnesses,
wherein the matters set forth in Lehmer's aforesaid protest are in sub
stance repeated, with the further averment that the application by
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Carroll and others was not made for their own use and benefit, "but
indirectly, if not directly," for the use and benefit of one J. C. McCar-
thy. The local officers rejected the application because of the pend-
ing controversy upon the protest by Lehmer. Your office affirmed the
rejection of the application, but, treating' Metheny's affidavit as a
new protest or contest against the application by Carroll and others,
held that the same should be suspended to await the result of the
controversy upon Lehmer's protest. Both parties have appealed
here.
September 27, 1904, Lehmer offered for filing his own application
to purchase a portion of the lands in question, as coal lands. With
the application he submitted his affidavit, corroborated by two wit-
nesses, wherein are set forth substantially the same matters contained
in his protest aforesaid, with the additional averment, upon " infor-
mation and belief," that Carroll and others did not apply to purchase
the lands for their own use and benefit, but for the use and benefit
of J. C. McCarthy. The local officers rejected the application, and
their action was affirmed by your office. Lehmer has appealed here.
The action by the local officers was right in each case. In so far as
the decisions of your office sustain their rulings, they are hereby sev-
erally affirmed. To the extent of the holding, however, that Meth-
eny's affidavit of protest should await the result of Lehmer's protest,
with the view to a further hearing upon substantially the same
grounds, your decision in that case is reversed, and said affidavit is
rejected. The charge in each of the affidavits, intended to raise the
question of the good faith of the associated applicants, Carroll et air,
is not sufficiently clear and explicit to justify a further hearing,
under the circumstances of this case.
school grant—adjustment—indemnity selection.
State of California.
In the adjustment of school land grants, it is within the power, and is the duty,
of the land department to see that sufficient losses, or quantities of land to
which the State might have been entitled under its grant had they been in
place and not otherwise disposed of, equal in amount to previous certifica-
tions on account of the grant, approximately, are furnished as a base for
such previous approvals or certifications, before other approvals and certi-
fications are made on account of the grant.
There is nothing in the act of March 1, 1877, relating to indemnity school land
selections in the State of California, in conflict with this requirement.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November 17, 1905. (F. W. C.)
Your office letter of the 31st ultimo calls attention to certain con-
ditions made apparent after an examination of the grant to the State
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of California in aid of common schools, presenting a -seeming excess
of 50,176.76 acres in approvals or certifications heretofore made on
account of said grant.
Following the disclosure of an excess, after examination of the
grant at the instance of this Department, your office laid certain rules
upon the State requiring that other and sufficient bases be supplied
to meet the apparent excess in approvals. After a conference be-
tween your office and the State surveyor-general, that officer, under
date of July 6, last, addressed a communication to you. being in the
nature of a motion for review, in which is set up certain reasons why
the State should not comply with the demands of your office in the
particulars referred to. This communication accompanies your letter
of the 31st ultimo. In your said letter you discuss at length the dif-
ferent questions sought to he raised by the surveyor-general of the
State.
It is not the purpose of the Department at this time to assume direc-
tion of this matter further than to provide a fitting rule governing
cases of this sort, disclosed upon partial or final adjustment of the
State's grant in the State of California or elsewhere, and to consider
the effect of the act of March 1, 1877 (19 Stat., 267), in so far as it
may affect the matters presented.
The grant of lands to the several States for the support of common
schools is generally based upon the unit of a township and it is the
number of townships or fractional townships within the boundaries
of the State that determines the extent or measure of the grant ; hence,
in adjusting the grant, the main object is to determine whether the
State has received for each township the designated sections, an equal
quantity of lands in lieu thereof, or for the fractional quantity due
where such sections are wanting or the township is fractional in
quantity. When this end is reached the grant is fully satisfied and
the State fully indemnified.
In Knight v. Land Association (142 U. S., 161, 181), it was said :
The Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the
public lands. The obligations of his oath oblige him to see that the law is
carried out. and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a
party not cut it led to it. He represents the government, which is a party in
interest is every case involving the surveying and disposal of the public lands.
In the orderly process of adjustment the several States are re-
quired to s(>< forth in their indemnity lists the specified losses on
account of which the indemnity is claimed, and it is the object of
regulations issued governing such selections to make the losses and
selected lands equal, as nearly as practicable, in area. Such desig-
nation of losses i> for the information of this Department, t<> the end
that the grant be not exceeded. Without determining at this time
what will he considered as an excess iu anv given case that i-. low
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much of a variance between the selected and the lost lands will be
considered sufficient to form the basis for a demand for further
designation of losses—it is sufficient to say that where it is made
apparent from an examination that a real excess in approvals exists,
it is not only within the power of this Department, but becomes its
necessary duty, to see that sufficient losses or quantities to which
the grant might have been entitled, had they been in place and not
otherwise disposed of, equal in amount to previous certifications on
account of this grant, approximately, are furnished as a base for
such previous approvals or certifications, before other approvals and
certifications are made on account of the grant.
A demand by your office in keeping with this rule of adjustment
will stand and be respected until complied with on the part of the
State, or until, in a proper proceeding before this Department, it is
set aside.
From your office letter it appears that the greater part of the
apparent excess arises on account of approvals or certifications made
to the State prior to March 1, 1877, and on behalf of the State it is
claimed, without questioning the excess, that if it existed it was
fully settled and satisfied by the confirmatory provisions of the act
of March 1, 1877, supra, and can not, for that reason, be made the
basis for a demand for further specifications of losses in satisfaction
of such previous approvals.
,
The provisions of this act were fully discussed in Durand v. Martin
(120 U. S., 366),. and while there is much said to support a claim
that all previous certifications on account of the school grant to the
State of California were confirmed by its provisions, it is made clear
that it was not intended thereby to enlarge or make any new grant
to the State, which would be the effect of a concurrence by this
Department in the State's contention.
In said case the court said (pages 374-5) :
The statute relates only to such selections as had been certified to the state,
and, taken as a whole, it meets the requirements of all the cases of defective
selection which could be so certified. These are: I. Cases where the state wns
entitled to indemnity, but the selection was defective in form ; 2. Cases where
the original school sections were actually in place, and the state was not entitled
to indemnity on their account: and 3. Cases where the state was not entitled to
indemnity, because there never had been such a section sixteen or section thirty-
six as was represented when the selection was made and the official certificate
given. As to the first of these classes, the certificate was simply confirmed
because the state was entitled to its indemnity, and nothing was needed to per-
fect the title but a waiver by the United States of all irregularities in the time
and manner of the selections. As to the second, the selection was confirmed,
and the United States took in lieu of the selected land that which the state
would have been entitled to but for the indemnity it had claimed and got. In
its effect this was an exchange of lands between the United States and the
state. And as to the third, in lieu of confirmation, bona fide purchasers from
the state were given the privilege of perfecting their titles by paying the United
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States for the land at a specified price. Under these circumstances, it was a
matter of no moment to the United States whether the original selection was
invalid for one cause or another. If the state was actually entitled to indem-
nity, it was got. and the Tinted States only gave what it had agreed to give. If
the state claimed and got indemnity when it ought to have taken the original
school sections, the United States took the school sections and relinquished
their rights to the lands which had heen selected in lieu. And if the state had
claimed and sold land to which it had no right, and for which it could not give
school land in return, and equitable provision was made for the protection of
the purchaser by which he could keep the land, and the United States would
get its value in money i In this way all defective titles, under the government
pertificates, would he made good without loss to the United States.
It may he. as was claimed in argument, that when the hill was originally pre-
pared the framer had it in mind only to provide for selections made in lieu of
school sections within Mexican grants before the final survey of the grants, and
for selections made in lieu of sections not finally included within the survey of
a grant : hut to our minds it is clear that before the bill finally became a law.
Congress saw that, as ample provision had heen made for the protection of the
United States in all cases, it was best to include all certificates which were
defective, no matter for what cause, and so the words "or are otherwise defect-
ive or invalid" were added in what seemed to be the most appropriate place
to carry that purpose into effect. No selection was made good unless it had
heen certified, and not then unless the United States got an equivalent either in
land or in money, or in carrying out their original school-land grant. In this
way the titles of all bona fide purchasers from the state were or could be per-
fected without loss to the United States, and that, we have no doubt, was the
intention of Congress when the statute was enacted.
It is not proposed to question approvals or certifications made
many years ago on account of school grants whether before or after
March 1, 18TT. Tt is well understood that the State only makes selec-
tion of its school lands after having found a purchaser for the same.
As before stated, the losses set forth in these lists as a base for the
indemnity selections, are required primarily for the information of
this Department as a check against exceeding the grant, and to re-
quire that further losses be supplied where, through mistake, the
-elections were permitted to exceed the losses, does not affect such
previous approved selections, and to exact that losses be supplied
to meet such excess before further approvals or certifications are
made on account of the grant is the only reasonable course open to
this Department in protecting the interests of the United States in
the matter.
The matter of the further adjustment of this grant, and other
school grants to the several States in support of common schools,
is therefore remanded to the primary consideration of your office.
You will advise^ the State of California of the conclusions herein
icached, and while the State should he afforded an opportunity to
bring any matters arising in the adjustment to the attention of this
Department, by petition or appeal, it is hoped that the whole matter
may he speedily and satisfactorily adjusted.
op.» t— Vol. 34—05 m 18
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HOMESTEAD ENTRY—ADDITIONAL—ACT OF APRIL 28, 1904.
Charles E. Myers.
Where an application -to make homestead entry was pending at the date of the
act of April 28, 1904, and prior to allowance of entry thereon the applicant
presented a supplemental application to enter additional lands under the
provisions of said act, requesting that the two applications be considered
together, the fact that entry on the original application was inadvertently
allowed without considering the supplemental application, does not war-
rant rejection of the application for additional entry on the ground that the
original entry was allowed subsequently to the passage of the act.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November 18, 1905. (C. J. G.)
A motion has been filed by Charles E. Myers for review of depart-
mental decision of June 23, 1905 (not reported), sustaining the action
of your office in rejecting his application to make homestead entry
under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547) , for the E. i SE. i, Sec.
23, NE. i NE. i, SAY. \ NE. J, and W. \ SE. J, Sec. 26, T. 35 N., R. 25
W., Valentine, Nebraska.
The records of your office show that on December 21, 1903, Myers
made homestead entry for the S. \ NE. \ and E. \ SE. i, Sec. 35, T. 35
N., R. 25 W., which he relinquished April 27, 1904, and on the same
day applied to make second homestead entry for the E. \ SE. J, SE. \
NE. i, Sec. 26, and NE. J NE. J, Sec. 35, T. 35 N., R." 25 W. The
application was forwarded to your office May 13, 1904.
On July 18, 1904, while his application of April 27, 1904, was pend-
ing in your office, Myers applied for the land first described herein, '
asking that he " be granted a homestead entry upon said land in con-
nection with the land I have applied for on April 27, 1904, which
application is now on file, and I ask that the same be made and con-
sidered herewith." The following indorsement, under date of Au-
gust 9, 1904, was made on the back of said application by the local
officers
:
Charles E. Myers made application for a second homestead entry as stated in
his affidavit and on July 18 filed the within as amendment to said homestead
application, the land applied for now being vacant, and having recommended
his application for a second entry on which the applicant is now residing we
would recommend that his application be allowed for the land applied for origi-
nally and for the land applied for herein and all be treated as one application
under the act of April 28, 1904.
This paper was received in your office August 15, 1904, and October
25, 1904, your office, after stating the reasons given by Myers for re-
linquishing his entry of December 21, 1903, allowed his application
of April 27, 1904, and gave him sixty days from notice in which to
make second entry for the land embraced in said application, no ref-
erence being made to his application of July 18, 1904, nor the recom-
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mendation of the local officers. In accordance with these directions
Myers, on November 29, 1904, completed his application of April 27,
1904, and made entry for the E. J SE. J, SE. J XE. J, Sec. 26, and
NE. J XE. J, Sec. 35, T. 35 X.. R. 25 W., accompanying the papers
with the following sworn statement dated November 29, 1904:
|
Comes now the said Charles E. Myers, and. completing his entry said de-
Bcribed land by payment fees and commissions therefor, on oath states that he
is now and has been residing with his family on said land since about May 5,
and commenced making improvements preparatory to establishment of such resi-
dence on April 28, 1904 ; that he does not elect to exhaust his homestead right
by entry thereof but asks to be allowed to amend same so as to include the E. h
SE. !. Sec. 23, NE. ] NE. 1, and W. \ SE. h Sec. 20, said Tp. 35 N., in accord-
mice with an application heretofore filed by him, and the additional land applied
for being the only land contiguous to his homestead as allowed which is subject
to homestead entry and not embraced in application of any other person.
April 1, 1905. your office passed upon Myers's application of
July IS, 1904. referring to the recommendation of the local officers
thereon, and treating said application as one for additional entry
under the act of April 28, 1904. supra, and concluded as follows:
The former application having been already considered by this office and the
entry allowed of record, as above stated, the application does not come within
the provisions of section 2 of the act of April 28, 1904, supra, for the reason
that the original entry was made subsequent to the date of said act. The appli-
cation is, therefore, hereby rejected, subject to the right of appeal.
Upon appeal, departmental decision of June 23. 1905. a review of
which is now asked, was rendered, which followed and affirmed the
foregoing action of your office without discussing or referring to
Myers's application of July 18, 1904, or to his sworn statement of
November 29, 1904.
Under the provisions of section 2 of the act of April 28, 1904. supra.
known as the Kinkaid Act, and subject to its conditions, " entrymen
under the homestead laws .... who own and occupy the lands
heretofore entered by them, mav .... enter other lands contigu-
mi-." This, however, is not the provision of the act which Myers in
effect invoked. While, prior to said act he had applied to enter 160
acre-, which was all that was allowable at the time, yet his applica-
tion had not been acted upon at the passage of the act nor prior to the
time lie applied for the benefits of said act in connection with his
former application. It was manifest error to thus ignore his appli-
cation of July 18, 1904, a- the applications which he asked to be con-
sidered together were both pending at the date your office acted upon
his lirst application, and he was clearly entitled to the provisions of
the act of April 28, 1904, which in the meantime had been passed, as
the circular instructions issued under said act May 31, 1904 (32 L. 1).,
670), contains this paragraph: ,
Under said act no bar is interposed to the making of second homesteads for
the full area of (340 acres by parties entitled thereto under existing laws, and
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applications therefor \x\\\ be considered under the instructions of the respective
laws under which they are made.
If, therefore, Myers was qualified to make entry of 1G0 acres under
his application of April 27, 1904, as found, he was likewise entitled
to the benefits of the act of April 28, 1904, said act having been passed
before final action upon said application. It follows, too, that his
rights in this respect are not prejudiced by the error in failing to
consider and pass upon said rights, which were timely asserted by
the filing of his second application of July 18, 1904.
The motion for review is therefore granted, departmental decision
of June 23, 1905, is hereby vacated, the decision of your office of
April 1, 1905, is reversed, and your office will allow Myers to amend
his entry of November 29, 1904, in accordance with his application
of July 18, 1904, so as to include in addition to the land embraced in
said entry the land described in said application.
TOWNSITE ENTRY—MINERAL LAND-SECTION 16, ACT OE MARCH
3, 1891.
Nome and Sinook Company et al. v. Townsite of Nome (On
Review).
The owners of unpatented mining claims located upon the mineral lands of the
United States are entitled to the exclusive and peaceable possession of
their claims so long as they continue to comply with the requirements of the
law respecting possessory rights, and are not required to apply for patent
at any time, or ever, in order to preserve such possessory rights.
Locations upon the mineral lands of the United States, lawfully possessed and
held under the mining laws at the date of a townsite entry embracing such
locations, are within the meaning of the language of section 16 of the act of
March 3, 1891, " any valid mining claim or possession held under existing
law," and can not be injuriously affected by the allowance of such entry;
and the mineral claimant may, upon proper proceedings and proofs as In
other cases, obtain patent for his claim notwithstanding the townsite entry
or the issuance of patent thereon.
In the administration of the public land laws the land department has no
authority to determine on their behalf alleged rights of claimants there-
under except where such claimants seek to obtain the legal or paramount
title to the lands claimed; and where a claimant seeks to obtain the legal
title to a tract of public land the inquiry by the land department is directed
to questions affecting his right to have such legal title conveyed to him and
not to questions relating to possessory or other rights unrelated to and dis-
connected with his application for the legal title.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
No vernier U, 1905. ( S. V. P.
)
This is a motion by the Nome and Sinook Company and R. T. Lyng
for review7 of departmental decision of August 25, 1905, in the case of
.
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Nome and Sinook Company et cd. r. Townsite of Nome (34 L. D.,
102). The case arose upon certain protests by said company. Lyng,
and others, filed July 2, 11)04, against the application of Porter J.
Coston, trustee, to make townsite entry to embrace the incorporated
town of Nome, Alaska. Entry was allowed upon the application
August 5, 1904, at Juneau, Alaska, after the dismissal of the pro-
tests by the local officers.
The protests allege, amongst other things, the mineral character of
the lands involved in the townsite application, and that protestants
arc the owners and in possession of valid placer mining claims
embracing certain of such mineral lands.
In the decision complained of the Department held, in substance
and effect, (1) that section sixteen of the act of March 3, 1891 (26
Stat.. 1095, 1101), applies to placer mining claims, as well as to
vein or lode claims as previously held (Hidings v. Ward Townsite,
2D L. D. 21), (2) that under the provisions of said section the pro-
tectants are fully protected in whatever rights they have acquired
under the mining laws, as against claimants under the townsite
entry, or patent when issued, and (3) that in the absence of applica-
tions for patent by the protestants the Department is without au-
thority to determine any question relating to their rights as against
the townsite claimants.
The contentions urged in the motion for review relate chiefly to
the last two points of the Department's decision. They are in sul>-
stance set forth in the following extracts from the motion for review
:
Theoretically the issuance of the townsite patent would not affect the rights
of these mineral claimants, hut in fact, as the Department well knows, such
;i proceeding would he very disastrous to the mineral claimant in ninety-nine
out of every hundred cases. The Department's proposition that it is under no
obligation to order a bearing until these mineral claimants apply for patent,
is not tenable, because, under the law, mineral claimants are not compelled t<»
apply for a patent at any time, or ever. So long as the mineral claimant
complies with the law annually he is entitled to the undisturbed and peaeeahle
possession of and the right to work his property. This right, which is statu-
tory and cannot he altered or amended or revoked by executive action, will
he completely negatived if departmental decision of AugUSl 29, 1!M>:>. is per-
mitted to stand
These mineral claimants have, under the statute, the right to the undisturbed,
peaceable possession of the claims they have located and worked, so lonj: ;is they
continue annually to comply with the requirements of the law: and for the
Department to assume an attitude that will force them to apply for mineral
patents, or else lose possession of at least a material part of their property, is
to deny them a statutory right. Having complied with the provisions of the
statute, of which there has been no denial by the townsite trustee in his appli-
cation, and having made their locations upon mineral land, of which there lias
been no denial by the townsite trustee, these protestants are at liberty to
make their application for mineral patent whenever they please, or never to make
it: and, in the event they choose never to make application for patent, stili
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they have just as much right to the full and undisturbed enjoyment of their
claims as though they were patented. Any decision to the contrary is in the face
of the statute ; and we respectfully suhinit that the decision complained of is of
such character.
It is undoubtedly true that owners of unpatented mining claims
located upon the mineral lands of the United States are entitled to
the exclusive and peaceable possession of their claims so long as they
continue to comply wTith the requirements of the law respecting pos-
sessory rights, and are not required to apply for patent at any time,
or ever, in order to preserve such possessory rights. These proposi-
tions are clearly embodied in the mining laws and are wTell established
by judicial authority. Whenever occasion has arisen, they have been
recognized by the Department.
It does not follow, however, that the possessory rights of these
protestants, if any they have acquired under their mining locations,
have been or will be defeated or in anywise interfered with by any-
thing contained in the decision complained of. On the contrary,
it is expressly held in that decision that under the provisions of
section sixteen of the act of 1891 no title can or will pass by the town-
site entry or patent to "any valid mining claim or possession held
under existing law/' If, therefore, the claims of these protestants
are upon mineral lands, and were lawfully possessed and held under
the mining laws at the date of the townsite entry, they are clearly
within the meaning of the language " any valid mining claim or
possession held under existing law," and cannot be injuriously affected
by the application of the principles enunciated in the Department's
decision. And it was because of these principles that it was further
held in that decision that patents might be obtained by the protes-
tants for their claims, should they at any time in the future so desire,
upon proper proceedings and proofs as in other cases, notwithstand-
ing the townsite entry, or the issuance of patent thereon.
The further contention that in refusing to order a hearing on be-
half of these protestants the Department has assumed an " attitude
that will force them to apply for mineral patents, or else lose posses-
sion of at least a material part of their property," is equally unten-
able. In the administration of the public land laws the land depart-
ment has no authority to determine on their behalf alleged rights of
claimants thereunder except where such claimants seek to obtain the
legal or paramount title to the lands claimed. And where a claimant
seeks to obtain the legal title to a tract of public land the inquiry by
the land department is directed to questions affecting his right to
have such legal title conveyed to him and not to questions rebating to
possessory or other rights unrelated to and disconnected with his
application for the legal title. When the protestants here shall
apply for patents for their mining claims, should they ever do so, it
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will bo the duty of the land department to inquire into and determine
any and all questions which may arise under the mining laws gen-
erally, or under section sixteen of the act of 1891, touching their
rights to patents from the government for the legal title to the lands
embraced in their claims. In the absence of patent applications the
land department has no jurisdiction or authority to make such
inquiry and determination. This is in substance the holding of the
decision complained of, and the holding is clearly right.
The protestants may, if they choose, apply for patent and have all
questions touching their right to the legal title to the lands claimed
by them inquired into and determined in the manner stated, or they
may continue to rest upon their claimed possessory rights under their
locations, in which latter event, should their rights be invaded, their
remedy will be in the courts where such matters are clearly cognizable.
It is objected in the motion for review that certain statements of
fact contained in the Department's decision, assuming that they were
considered material, are unjust to the protestants. The statements
are as follows:
The town now has a population of about 5,000 during the open season, and
about 3,000 throughout the year. The value of the improvements is now about
$800,000. The streets are graded, the business streets being planked; there are
sidewalks and graded alleys: there is a tine water system, an electric-light
plant, a telephone system, and a fully equipped tire department. The mining
claims, for the most part, were located in January, IS!)!), and have not been
systematically worked since that time.
This recital of the conditions as they appeared from the record was
wholly unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the decision, and was
not intended to, and cannot in any manner, affect the rights of the
protestants, or of any other mineral claimants, in the assertion of
their claims, either in the courts or before the land department. The
recital is not to be considered as a finding of facts, and the decision
will be treated as though such recital had not been made. Aside from
this inadvertence, now rendered harmless, there is no error in the
Department's decision, and the motion for review is accordingly
denied.
DESERT-LA N I > ENTRY-ANXUAL E X PEXDITURE-PERMANENT
IMPROVEMENT.
RlGDON r. Adams.
The mere purchase by a desert-land entryman of well casing alleged to he with
a view to constructing an artesian well on the land embraced in his entry,
hut which was never used for such purpose, nor even removed to the land.
but was paid for by note and left in the warehouse of the merchant from
whom it was purchased, does, not constitute a ••permanent Improvement"
Within the meaning of the desert land act. and the value thereof cau not he
applied toward meeting the requirements of the law relating to annual
expenditure.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November 28, 1905. (J. L. McC.)
John L. Adams, on October 30, 1902, made desert-land entry for
the N. i of the NW. i of Sec. 7, and the S. J of the SW. J of Sec. 6,
T. 18 S., R. 26 E., Roswell land district, New Mexico.
He made his first yearly proof November 2, 1903, stating that he
had expended the sum of $173.60 in the " purchase of casing for an
artesian well."
On April 5, 1904, James C. Rigdon filed contest against said entry,
alleging that the entryman had " never placed the improvements
required by law on the said desert-land entry," nor " expended the
required amount of one dollar per acre in irrigating, reclaiming,
cultivating and improving the same."
A hearing was had, as the result of which the local officers found
and held that the charge had not been proved. The contestant ap-
pealed. Your office, on April 25, 1905, reversed the action of the
local officers, and held the entry for cancellation. The entryman has
appealed to the Department.
The defendant testifies that he, on October 26, 1903 (within one
year after date of his entry), purchased " casing," such as is used in
connection with artesian wells, from a firm in Roswell, New Mexico,
but that, up to the date of initiation of contest (seventeen months
after entry) he had not used it, nor even brought it to the land, but
that it was still in the care of the firm from which he had purchased
it ; and that, aside from the purchase of said casing, he had done
nothing in the way of irrigating, reclaiming, or cultivating said
land.
The appeal contends that your office erred " in not giving Adams
credit for the second year's expenditure of more than $160, same
having been performed on grubbing, clearing, making two miles of
ditches, one mile of wire fence, and plowing nineteen acres."
According to the defendant's testimony at the hearing, nothing of
all this had been done at the date of the initiation of the contest,
hence it can not be considered as having cured his laches.
The appeal contends that there was " error in ruling that the only
annual expenditure contemplated by the desert-land laws are in the
construction of canals and ditches, and in permanent improvements
upon the land." The argument in support of the appeal insists that
said ruling " is the very acme of technicality, and does not agree with
the Department's long line of decisions adjudicating .... cases
upon equitable principles, and mainly upon the question whether or
not the entryman was proceeding in good faith."
Section 5 of the desert-land act, as amended by the act of March 3,
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 281
1801 (26 Stat., 1095), provides by what means such land shall be
reclaimed, to wit
:
By means of main canals and branch ditches, and in permanent improvements
npon the land, and in the purchase of water-rights for the irrigation of the same.
It further provides that, within oik 1 year after entry:
The party so entering shall expend net less than one dollar per acre for the
purposes aforesaid.
The annual proof should show an expenditure whereby the land
it-elf is "permanently improved." It is exceedingly doubtful
whether in any case an iron or steel (or other kind of) casing, mere
portable property, unattached to any particular tract of land, dis-
connected therewith except by having been unloaded thereon, and as
easily carried away as it was brought, could be considered as a '* per-
manent improvement." In the case here under consideration, said
casing was not even taken to the land, but remained in the warehouse
where it was purchased
—
payment therefor having been made by
defendant's note.
Not infrequently it requires well-casing to the value of a thousand
dollars to encase an artesian well. If the defendant could satisfy
the demands of the desert-land law as to improvement, irrigation,
and reclamation, during the first year, b\ purchasing, or giving his
note for. a few lengths of wTell-casing, why might he not as properly
make his second and third years* annual proof in the same manner
—
leaving the casing in the care of the merchant from whom he pur-
chased it, to be delivered at some time in the future, when demanded
(if ever) ( At the end of four years he could relinquish his claim
for a valuable consideration, sell the casing for what it cost him
or omit paying the notes he had given therefor—and thus defeat the
very purpose of the desert-land act. which contemplates that at the
end of four years the land shall be reclaimed and in a state of cul-
tivation. The Department can not convince itself that it would be
proper for it to open so inviting a door to speculation and fraud.
The action of your office in rejecting said annual proof and can-
celing the entry was correct, and is herebv affirmed.
mining claim—application fob patent-publication of notic ie-
newspaper published nearest claim.
Pike's Peak and Other Looks.
By the newspaper published nearest a mining claim, within the contemplation
of section 2325, Revised Statutes, is meant the newspaper of established
character and general circulation in the vicinity of the claim which is
nearest in point of practicable accessibility: that is. nearest by the dis-
tance from the claim Involved over the most nearly direct traversable
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route, and over which the editions of the paper are or may be transported
by the usual and available means of conveyance. The distance in contem-
plation is that which must actually be traveled to bring the paper into
the neighborhood of the claim, in order that the intended office of the notice
may in that vicinity be performed.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November 28, 7 905. (F. H. B.)
January 25, 1904, The Pike's Peak Gold and Copper Mining Com-
pany filed application (No. G53) for patent to the Pike's Peak and
certain other lode mining claims, Prescott, Arizona, land district; and
the ** Phoenix Republican," published at Phoenix, Arizona, was des-
ignated by the register as the newspaper in which notice of the appli-
cation should be published.
February 8, 1904, Eli S. Perkins filed protest, alleging the current
publication of the notice in the designated newspaper at Phoenix,
distant, as further alleged, at least forty miles from the claims in an
air line and probably fifty miles by the usually traveled route ; that
for a' long time prior to the date of the patent application protestant
has published the " News-Herald," a newspaper of established char-
acter and general circulation in the vicinity of the claims and else-
where, at Martinez, about twenty-eight miles in a direct line and by
the usually traveled route from the claims in question; and that the
News-Herald is nearest the claims and is the newspaper in which the
notice should have been published. Wherefore, protestant prayed
that a hearing be ordered, to the end that he might furnish evidence
to sustain the allegations of his protest.
Hearing Avas accordingly ordered and had, at which appearance
was made and testimony submitted by and on behalf of both parties.
March 29, 1904, the local officers, finding from the evidence little dif-
ference as to distance of the two papers from the claims, the Phoenix
Republican to be a bona fide newspaper of established character and
general and the greater circulation, held that greater publicity had
been given the notice by its publication in the latter paper and that
the register had not abused his discretion in the premises. Protes-
tant thereupon appealed to your office.
In the course of its decision of September 19, 1904, your office, hav-
ing examined the evidence, found therefrom, in substance and effect,
that, geographically measured, Martinez is the nearer of the two
towns to the claims in question, by from three to six miles, depending
upon the particular points of each from which measurements are
taken ; that there are no direct routes of travel between Martinez and
the claims, to reach either of which from the other a circuitous route
must be followed ; that from Phoenix to the claims the route of travel
is comparatively direct, and, as far as accessibility is concerned, the
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latter town is nearer than Martinez: that practically all business
relations on behalf of these and other claims in the vicinity are with
Phoenix, the place of the Pike's Peak company's offices and the post-
office address of most residents of the mining district in which the
claims in question are situate; that it does not appear that either
newspaper has any considerable circulation in the immediate vicinity
r)f the claims involved, few persons probably being resident there;
that both may be called newspapers of general circulation, having
subscribers in most of the towns in that section; that both appear to
be established newspapers, and there is little choice between them in
this respect; and that, whilst it would appear that a notice published
in the Phoenix Republican would be most likely to attract the atten-
tion of persons having interests in the region of the claims involved,
it is also true that the Xews-Herald is such a newspaper as is con-
templated by the statute and mining regulations and is published
actually nearer the land embraced in the application for patent.
Wherefore, citing the cases of Tough Nut and Other Lode Claims (32
L. I).. 359) and Northern Pacific Railway Company (Ibid., 611), it
tt-as held that the designation of the Phoenix Republican was errone-
ous, the conclusion in that behalf reached b}r the local officers in the
present controversy was reversed, and it was directed that the register
designate another newspaper, for republication of the notice, falling
prithin the intendment of the statute and the official regulations.
The applicant company has appealed to the Department. Several
iissignments of error are set out, those of which it is essential to con-
sider being, in substance, that your office erred in observing geograph-
ical or direct-line measurements, instead of usually traveled routes,
us governing in the selection of a newspaper; that it erred in holding
that in designating the Phoenix Republican in this case the register
abused his discretion; and erred in deciding the case upon authority
of the two cases cited, supra.
First considering the evidence submitted in the case it may be said
that the findings of the local officers and your office are sustained by
it. It also appears, by undisputed testimony, that by the available
routes of travel between the mining claims and the respective towns
the distance to Phoenix is actually less. The general circulation of
(he Phoenix Republican is shown to be considerably greater than
that of the News-Herald, of Martinez, and it was expressly admitted
that the former is and was a newspaper "of established character
and general circulation in the vicinity of the claims in question in
Xavapai and Maricopa counties."
Upon the whole the Department is unable to agree with the conclu-
sion reached by your office, and is constrained to hold that the ap-
pellant company's assignments of error, as above, are well founded.
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The facts here disclosed are not parallel to those of either case cited
by your office, and this case is not controlled by either of them, as will
readily appear.
In the first case so cited—Tough Nut and Other Lode Claims—it
was held that the register of the Prescott, Arizona, land office had
abused his judicial discretion in the designation of the newspaper in
which the publication in that case occurred, for the reason, as the
facts were found, that two other bona fide newspapers of established
character and general circulation in the vicinity of the claims in-
volved were published at a point " at least six miles nearer " the
claims, "either by an air line or by the usually traveled route.*'
There appeared in that case to be no justification for the designation
of the more remote paper in which the notice was published ; and the
record strongly suggested that the register's judgment in that behalf
had been influenced by the receiver's ownership of that paper.
In the case of Northern Pacific Railway Company, the second case
cited by your office, notice (pursuant to section 2335, Revised Stat-
utes) of a hearing ordered to determine the character of certain
lands, theretofore classified as mineral by the commissioners appointed
under the act of February 20, 1895 (28 Stat., 683), was published in
a newspaper many miles more remote from the lands than certain
other existing and bona fide papers, in which, too, notices of the prior
classification had appeared. The latter papers were respectively
about twelve and eighteen miles nearer than the paper in which pub-
lication occurred, and the requirement of the statute had plainly not
there been met.
Notice of each application for patent to a mining claim is required
by the statute (Sec. 2325, R. S.) to be published, at the instance
of the register, " in a newspaper to be by him designated as published
nearest to such claim/ ' As has frequently been said, that officer is
thus invested with discretion in the matter, but a judicial discretion
which may be revieAved and controlled by your office and the Depart-
ment to prevent its abuse. That discretion, within prescribed limits,
is thus given him with the manifest object of carrying into effect the
purpose of the statute itself. As said in departmental instructions
of February 3, 1898 (20 L. D., 145, U0-7) :
The statute clearly seems to indicate that the register is given some discre-
tion in the selection of the newspaper. It may sometimes happen, as in the case
of Bretell v. Swift, that the newspaper nearest the land, geographically meas-
ured, is not the paper nearest to the land by the usually traveled route, and is
not the paper best calculated to secure publicity of the notice in the neighbor-
hood of the claim. The statute is not simply that the publication shall be in a
newspaper *' published nearest to such claim," but is that the publication shall be
" in a newspaper to be by him [the register] designated as published nearest to
such claim." There are three elements in this requirement : First, the publi-
cation shall be in a newspaper ; second, that newspaper shall be the one " pub-
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lished nearest to such claim; " and third, the register shall designate and deter-
mine what newspaper is "published nearest to such claim." As applied to
newspapers, printing is not the sole act of publication. To he published within
the meaning of this statute, a newspaper must he circulated, that is, it must be
distributed as a means of disseminating news. The performance of the regis-
ter's duty, under the statute, requires the exercise by him of reasonable judg-
ment and discretion, both in determining what is a newspaper and in determin-
ing which of several papers is the one published nearest to the claim. lie
should not act arbitrarily or indifferently in the matter, but should be guided by
the purpose of the statute in requiring publication, which is the diffusion of
information and notice respecting the application for patent in the vicinity of
the claim and among those whose residence or presence in that locality hespeak
their interest in the claim or their knowledge thereof.
Ill the course of those instructions the Department reaffirmed the
views expressed in the case of Condon et al. v. Mammoth Mining Co.
(on review. 15 L. I)., 330, 334), in which, discussing the provision of
the statute in question, it was held
—
that this means that the register shall publish the notice of such application in
a paper to he by him designated as being the newspaper published nearest to
such claim, not by actual measurement in a direct line between newspaper
offices in the same town or city, hut in the nearest town or city in which a
paper or papers of established character and general circulation is published.
Unquestionably, under this statute, when several newspapers are published in the
same town or city, the register may designate whichever in his judgment will
hest subserve the public interests and which will give the widest notice to the
public that the entrymen are seeking title to a mine. From these views it fol-
lows, that in this matter the register has some discretion in the designation of
the newspaper, as to its established character as a newspaper, its stability and
general circulation and the like. But it is a legal discretion and in its exercise
his act is certainly subject to review and control by your office and the Depart-
I
nient. and where it is shown that he has abused such discretion, your office, as
well as the Department, has the power to set aside his action in order to avoid
injustice or unfair discrimination, or an ignoring of the provisions of the law
and the rules and regulations of the Department.
The Department does not entertain the view that geographical or
airline measurements should he applied in determining, for the pur-
pose of the statutory notice, which of two or more newspapers pub-
lished at different points is nearest the mining claim concerned.
Under such an inflexible rule the register would have little room for
the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of that
question to the end that the statutory purpose might be best sub-
aerved. The circular of April 21, 1885, it is true, established a hard
and fast rule in that respect, afterward incorporated into paragraph
37 of the mining regulations approved December 10, 1891, whereby it
was declared that the register had " no discretion under the law to
designate any other than the newspaper .... of general circulation
that is published nearest the land, geographically measured." lint
this construction was discarded in the ensuing revision of the regula-
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tions, December 15, 1897, and supplanted by the provisions of para-
graph 52 thereof (25 L. D., 561, 578), retained in the like-numbered
paragraph of the regulations of June 24, 1899 (28 L. D., 594, 603),
and in paragraph 17 of the present regulations (31 L. D., 474, 482),
as follows
:
The register shall publish the notice of application for patent in a paper of
established character and general circulation, to be by him designated as being
the newspaper published nearest the land.
The omission, from the revision following the regulations of 1891,
of the words " geographically measured," and the judgment and dis-
cretion to be employed by the register in determining in each case
the proper newspaper, within the intent and meaning of the statute,
for publication of notice, are subjects of remark and discussion in
the departmental instructions of February 3, 1898, supra.
By the newspaper published nearest a mining claim, within the
contemplation of the statute, is meant, as the Department regards
it, the nearest in point of practicable accessibility; that is, nearest
by the distance from the claim involved over the most nearly direct
traversable route, and over which the editions of the paper are or
may be transported by the usual and available means of conveyance.
An objective, distant five miles in a straight line but distant ten
miles by the only available route, is for practical purposes the
greater distance removed. The purpose of the statute demands its
practical application, and the distance in contemplation is that which
must actually be traveled to bring the paper into the neighborhood
of the claim, in order that the intended office of the notice may in
that vicinity be performed. The use of the expression " usually
traveled route," in this connection, however, may be misleading,
inasmuch as the route " usually " traveled in a particular locality
might not be the shortest of the available and traversable routes,
within the intendment of the statute.
The register, in the exercise of the judgment and discretion lodged
in him, must determine in every instance what is a newspaper, that
is, whether of established character and general circulation, where
it is actually published, its circulation in the vicinity of the mining
claim involved and as compared with the like circulation of other
papers of equal standing in other respects, and which among all of
them is published nearest the claim according to the distance neces-
sary to be covered by each to reach the neighborhood of the latter
—
all within the intent and meaning of the statute and to promote to
the utmost its object, " which is the diffusion of information and
notice respecting the application for patent in the vicinity of the
claim and among those whose residence or presence in that locality
bespeak their interest in the claim or their knowledge thereof."
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The facts here being found to be that the Phoenix Republican,
designated for publication of notice of the Pike's Peak patent appli-
cation, is a newspaper of established character, of equal circulation
in the vicinity of the claims with the News-Herald of Martinez and
of greater general circulation, and that the place of publication of
the former is really nearer those claims than is that of the latter
paper by the respective available routes of travel, it can not be held
that the register abused his discretion in the premises or that the
requirements of the statute have not been satisfied.
For these reasons the decision of your office must be, and it is,
reversed.
townsite trustee-expenses-section 11, act of march .1. 1891.
Instructions.
Under section 11 of the act of March 3, 1891, attorney's fees may be properly
included in the account of a townsite trustee, as legitimate expenses inci-
dent to the execution of his trust, and allowed by the land department,
where necessary and not in excess of a just and reasonable amount.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C. ) No vember 29, 1905. ( C. J. G.
)
The Department is in receipt of your office letter of November 17,
1005, submitting- the correspondence of Porter J. Coston, trustee of
the townsite of Nome, Alaska, and in that connection asking for
instructions relative to the question of including certain attorney's
lees in his account as such trustee.
The appointment of said townsite trustee was made under section
11 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1099). which also
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to "provide by regulation
for the proper execution of the trust." The fund from which are
derived the expenses incident to the execution of his trust by the
trustee, is created by Levying assessments upon the townsite property.
The regulations of August 1, 1904 (33 L. D., 103), under said act,
after specifically naming certain purposes for which assessments may
!>e made by the trustee, further prescribes:
:ind nil other legitimate expenses incident to the expeditious execution of his
trust.
Thus expenditures in connection with the legitimate work of the
townsite trustee are not dependent upon prior legislative authority,
as no appropriation is made by Congress for the purpose, and the
money does not come out of the United States treasury. Hence the
assessment fund is wholly under the control of the land departmenl
and it is purely discretionary with said department as to how and for
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what purposes in connection with townsite work said fund shall be
expended. It is believed that attorney's fees constitute a proper
charge in certain cases upon said fund, and the circumstances set
forth in the correspondence submitted seem to be sufficiently excep-
tional to warrant the inclusion of said fees in the " legitimate
expenses " incident to the work of the trustee. It is not intended,
however, by this paper to approve the fees in question, whatever they
may be, the account for which has not vet been presented, but only
to express the opinion that they may properly be allowed in the event
they are found to be necessary and not in excess of a just and reason-
able sum. In this connection it may be said that the trustee should
exercise special care and judgment in the premises and be reasonably
convinced of their necessity before incurring expenses of this char-
acter, as the levying of assessments in the first instance is and should
be limited to matters necessarily attendant upon the proper execu-
tion of his trust.
RIGHT OF WAY-TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES—SECTION 3, ACT
OF MARCH 3, 1901.
Opinion.
The annual tax upon telephone and telegraph lines referred to in section 3 of the
act of March 3, 1901, is conditioned upon two things: (1) The line upon
which the tax is sought to he imposed must he upon lands such as the Sec-
retary of the Interior is authorized to subject to the terms of the act, and
(2) the line must not be subject to State or Territorial taxation. Where
the line upon which the tax is sought to be imposed runs through any of
the lands which the Secretary is authorized to subject to the terms of the
act, and is not subject to State or Territorial taxation, such line is under
the act subject to an annual tax not exceeding five dollars for each ten
miles thereof constructed and maintained, regardless of any tax which may
be levied and collected by a municipality through which the line runs.
Rights of way under the provisions of section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901, are
" in the nature of an easement," and are property rights subject to sale or
transfer without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior.
The term " line," as employed in section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901, means
the right of way granted, and each separate line of poles is held to con-
stitute an independent line, upon which the grantee may place as many
wires as he chooses, the tax to be assessed against the property only at the
rate of five dollars for each ten miles of line. In towns, where no well-
defined system of parallel wires is maintained, each wire will be regarded
as covering a separate right of way, and, if otherwise within the terms of the
act, is subject to taxation as such.
The act of March 3, 1901, specifically provides that telephone and telegraph
lines constructed under its provisions shall be operated and maintained
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior, which carries with it the power to require sworn statements from
the person, company, or corporation operating the lines, to the end that
the annual tax be properly assessed and collected ; but in the event of non-
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compliance with such requirement, it is not within the power 'of the Secre-
tary, under executive authority, to close the places of business of the offend-
ing parties, any question as to the forfeiture of the right of way being
a matter for determination by the courts.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
October 27, 1905. (G. B. Gkj
By reference of the Acting Secretary my opinion is asked as to cer-
tain legal questions arising in course of administration of the act of
March : >>. li>01 (31 Stat., 1058, 1083). and especially section 3 of that
act, which is in full as follows:
That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and empowered to
grant a right of way. in the nature of an easement, for the construction, opera-
tion, and maintenance of telephone and telegraph lines and offices for general
telephone and telegraph business through any Indian reservation, through
any lands held by an Indian tribe or nation in the Indian Territory, through any
lands reserved for an Indian agency or Indian school, or for other purpose in
connection with the Indian service, or through any lands which have been
allotted in severalty to any individual Indian under any law or treaty, but which
have not been conveyed to the allottee with full power of alienation, upon the
terms and conditions herein expressed. No such lines shall be constructed
across Indian lands, as above mentioned, until authority therefor has first been
Obtained from the Secretary of the Interior, and the maps of definite location of
the lines shall be subject to his approval. The compensation to be paid the
tribes in their tribal capacity and the individual allottees for such right of way
through their lands shall be determined in such manner as the Secretary of the
Interior may direct, and shall be subject to his final approval; and where such
lines are not subject to State or Territorial taxation the company or owner of
the line shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for the use and benefit of the
Indians, such annual tax as he may designate, not exceeding five dollars for each
ten miles of line so constructed and maintained; and all such lines shall be con-
structed and maintained under such rules and regulations as said Secretary may
prescribe. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to exempt the
owners <»f such lines from the payment of any tax that may be lawfully assessed
nuMinst them by either State, Territorial, or municipal authority; and Congress
hereby expressly reserves the right to regulate the tolls or charges for the
transmission of messages over any lines constructed under the provisions of this
a<t : Provided, That incorporated cities and towns into or through which such
telephone or telegraphic lines may be constructed shall have the power to regu-
late the manner of construction therein, and nothing herein contained shall be
so construed as to deny the right of municipal taxation in such towns and cities.
That lands allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for any public
purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the same
manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money awarded as
damages shall be paid to the allottee.
Specifically, my opinion is desired upon the following questions:
First. Does the "annual tax" referred to in the statute apply to
local exchanges within towns, or is it confined to long distance and
toll lines (
5194— Vol. : ,.4—or> m 10
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Second. Does the law contemplate and require that transfers and
sales of telephone lines shall be approved by the Department ?
Third. Does the term " line," where it occurs in the statute provid-
ing for an annual tax " not exceeding five dollars for each ten miles
of line," refer collectively to all the wires which the company may
establish upon its right of way, or does it refer to each individual
wire, particularly in towns where no well-defined system of par-
allel wires is maintained?
Fourth. Does this act authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
prescribe regulations requiring owners of lines to furnish affidavit
disclosing such information as may be necessary in order to facilitate
the assessment of damages and the levy of taxes, and may the Secre-
tary of the Interior, in the event of non-compliance with such regula-
tions or with the law, close the places of business of offending parties?
Fifth. Will the making of a false affidavit in such cases be subject
to prosecution in the Indian Territory ?
Responding to this reference categorically, I am of opinion
:
First. The annual tax referred to in the statute is conditioned upon
two things : ( 1 ) The line upon which the tax is sought to be imposed
must be upon lands such as the Secretary of the Interior is authorized
to subject to the terms of the act, and (2) the line must not be subject
to State or Territorial taxation. If, therefore, the line upon which
the tax is sought to be imposed runs " through any Indian reservation,
through any lands held by an Indian tribe or nation in the Indian
Territory, through any lands reserved for an Indian agency or Indian
school, or for other purpose in connection with the Indian service, or
through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any indi-
vidual Indian under any law or treaty, but which have not been con-
veyed to the allottee with full poAver of alienation," and is not subject
to State or Territorial taxation, such line is subject to an annual tax
not exceeding five dollars for each ten miles thereof, constructed and
maintained. It is not material to this question that the municipality
in which such line is found may levy and collect a tax thereon; it
is nevertheless subject to the special tax imposed by the act, unless
subject to Territorial taxation.
Second. Inasmuch as the right of way granted by the Secretary of
the Interior under said act is "in the nature of an easement," it
seems clear that the right granted is higher than a personal privi-
lege, and it being -a property right is subject to sale or transfer with-
out the consent of this Department.
Third. I am of opinion that the term " line," as employed in said
act, means the right of way granted; that the grantee may place as
many wires on this line as may seem desirable, and that a tax may be
assessed against the property only at the rate of five dollars for each
ten miles of line. In towns where no well-defined system of parallel
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lines is maintained, it would seem that each wire covers an independ-
ent and separate right of way, and if otherwise within the terms of
the act would be subject to taxation as such. Each independent line
of poles is manifestly an independent line.
Fourth. The act specifically provides that these lines shall be
operated and maintained under rules and regulations to be prescribed
by the Secretary of the Interior, and I think you may, and that it is
your duty to, prescribe such regulations as will secure an orderly
administration of the act. This would carry with it the power to
require sworn statements from the person, company, or corporation
operating these lines, to the end that the annual tax might be prop-
erly assessed and collected. I do not think, however, that in the
event of non-compliance with these regulations it would be within
the power of the Secretary of the Interior to close places of business
under executive authority. Whatever might be said of the power of
Congress to confer upon an executive officer such judicial functions as
would be necessary to terminate the right granted, no attempt is here
made to confer such jDOwer on the Secretary of the Interior, and it
i- clear that any question as to the forfeiture of such right of way
would only be cognizable in the courts. I am of the opinion, how-
ever, that it would be the duty of the Secretary of the. Interior in a
proper case to refer the matter to the Department of Justice for such
proceedings as seemed proper and necessary in the discharge of the
duties imposed upon him by the act.
Fifth. The question as to whether a prosecution for making a false
oath in these matters would be cognizable in the courts of the Terri-
tory has not arisen, and may never arise. I therefore beg to be
excused from answering that question at this time.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretai'ij.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL IIOMESTEAD-SERVICE-SECTION 2304, R. S.
Herbert C. Johnson.
In computing the period of service of a soldier "who lias served in the army of
the United States." within the meaning of that phrase as used in section
_.".oi of the Revised Statutes, the entrance of the soldier into the army will
he considered as dating from his muster into the service, and not from his
enrollment.
& i retary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Lund Offic< .
(F. L. C.) Dea ml,, r 6
:
1905. (E. O. P.)
Herbert C. Johnson, assignee of Philander L. Compton, has filed,
and the Department has considered, motion for review of its unre-
ported decision of December 11. L903, denying his application to
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enter, under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes,
lots 2 and 3, Sec. 1, T. 34 N., R. 110 W., Evanston land district,
Wyoming, said application being based upon Compton's service in
the army of the United States during the war of the rebellion, and
his prior homestead entry made October 1, 1872, for the S. ^ NE. J,
Sec. 34, T. 21 N., R. 10 W., Traverse City land district, Michigan.
But two questions are presented by the pending motion. It is con-
tended by counsel that the Department erred in computing the time
of service in the army of the United States from the date of muster-in
rather than from the date of enrollment of the soldier ; and that even
if such interpretation of the language of section 2304 be adopted at
this time, it should not be allowed to overturn the prior settled
decisions of the Department to the prejudice of those rights which
have been acquired thereto in reliance upon the previous construction,
by which the Department had long been governed and under which
the right now claimed was always recognized.
The questions thus raised were before the Department in the appeal
of Julian D. Whitehurst (32 L. D., 356), and at that time fully con-
sidered and determined. That no person can serve another in any
capacity and thereby create a legal obligation until the tendered
service for the particular duty is accepted, either actually or con-
structively, is self-evident. The fact that such service is solicited is
immaterial. No different rule applies when the United States is a
party. In the organization of the army of the United States the
individual presents himself in pursuance to the call for troops for
entry into such service. This is the tender for acceptance or re-
jection on the part of the United States. This tender must be pre-
sumed to have been made with full knowledge of the applicant that
he must possess certain qualifications and submit to certain conditions,
and unless these are fully met, his tender will be rejected. Among
other of those qualifications is proof that the applicant is physically
able to perform the duties of a soldier. He must also submit to the
rules and regulations of war and change his status from civilian to
soldier. It is contended that the evidence of acceptance on the part
of the United States is the enrollment of the applicant, notwithstand-
ing this may have taken place prior to a physical examination or an
inspection by the duly authorized officer of the United States. To
this the War Department was unwilling to accede. While enrollment
is evidence of the then-existing intention of the applicant to take the
necessary steps to complete his entry into the army, yet no duty is im-
posed, other than that arising from patriotic impulse, to continue the
tender, submit to medical examination and inspection and complete
the contract whereby his status is irrevocably changed, so far as any
act of his is concerned.
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But intention will not make a man a soldier, unless accompanied or followed
by the acts necessary to constitute a change of his state from civil to military.
The question before us is not what he intended to do, or how much he actually
had done, how far his intention had been carried out, when the defendants
assumed to exercise military authority over him. If he was not then a soldier,
his previous expressions of intention to become one, or even his supposition that
he was, would not make him one.
Tyler v. Pomeroy (8 Allen, 480, 504).
Therefore, enrollment alone cannot be accepted as conclusive evi-
dence that the United States has accepted the proffered services.
Muster into the service is the regular formal method of completing
the conditional contract and giving finality to the proceeding on the
part of both parties thereto. Surely no duty rests upon the United
States to accept the tendered service, regardless of failure on the part of
the applicant to meet the specified requirements. The United States
has in such cases always reserved the right of individual selection and
the general practice is to exercise it. Until this right is exercised or
waived, the proposal of the applicant can only be considered as a
continuing one, and. until acceptance, no duty is imposed upon either
party. While it is true that in many instances during the civil war,
the exigencies of the service occasioned many irregularities in the
procedure, and the acceptance of the proffered services of the volun-
teer was not always evidenced by a formal muster in, yet it is not be-
lieved that in any instance was it evidenced by enrollment alone.
When there was no formal muster in, the evidence was supplied by
such acts on the part of the government, acquiesced in by the soldier,
as compelling submission to the rules of war and military discipline,
giving and accepting pay, subsistence, etc., and such acts as clearly
evidenced a change of status from civilian to soldier. And it is not
believed that constructive muster-in is ever to be resorted to where en-
rollment was in due course followed by actual formal muster-in. To
extend it farther would be in effect to include all those who enrolled
for service whether accepted or not. The volunteer who enrolled
and was rejected occupied up to that time exactly the same position
as the ones who enrolled at the same time and were afterwards ac-
cepted, yet no one would seek to maintain that he was in the army of
the United States. It is urged that because the accepted volunteer
was paid from date of enrollment, that his position was thereby
changed; that the effect of acceptance as evidenced by a formal
muster-in, was retroactive, and that he was paid from that date by
virtue of his status as a soldier in the army of the United States.
The Department, however, is of opinion a better reason for such pay-
ment is presented, not inconsistent with the view that until acceptance
the volunteer was not in the army of the United States, namely, that
by reason of the completion of the contract on the part of the volun-
teer, a just and equitable claim was established as against the United
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States to remunerate him for the time taken from his ordinary em-
ployment and which would otherwise, so far as material gain is con-
cerned, be entirely lost to him. But the recognition of this equitable
claim by the United States could not operate to charge him with any
dereliction of duty prior to the actual change of his status from
civilian to soldier. And there appears to be ample justification for
the payment of such equitable claims in the language of the various
statutes, though the time for the commencement thereof is not
specifically fixed at date of enrollment. (See act of July 24, 1861,
12 Stat,, 274; act of August G, 1861, 12 Stat, 326.) Had the per-
son for whose benefit these acts were passed been in the army of the
United States, such additional legislation would have been un-
necessary, and it would seem, therefore, to be a legislative recognition
of the ruling of the War Department that prior to muster-in such
persons were not in the army of the United States.
After a careful consideration of all the matters presented in support
of this contention, the Department is of opinion the same was cor-
rectly decided in the case of Julian D. Whitehurst, supra, and the rule
then announced will not now be disturbed.
The plea that the right claimed is a vested one acquired under prior
rulings of the Department, and therefore cannot now be disturbed, is
not supported by the citation of authority, other than departmental
decision in the case of Elijah C. Putman (23 L. D., 152). The facts
presented and the question decided in said decision were entirely dif-
ferent from the one now involved. The language used therein in ref-
erence to the service of Putman was unnecessary to a determination of
the issue and was mere dictum. An erroneous practice of the land
department would not be binding upon the Department, however
long continued, and however loath the Department may be to disturb
a settled practice, its plain duty forbids its recognition thereof, when
contrary to the language of the statute.
For the reasons herein stated, and those set forth in the carefully
considered case of Julian D. Whitehurst, supra, the motion for review
is denied.
homestead entry—additional-section 6, act of march 3, 1889.
August Meisner.
By the exercise of the right to make additional homestead entry conferred hy
section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889, even though for a less amount of land
than might have been taken thereunder, the entryruan thereby exhausts the
privilege granted by said section.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
December 6, 190-5. ( C. J. G.
)
An appeal has been filed by August Meisner from the decision of
your office of June 6, 1905, holding for cancellation his cash entry for
the SW. | NW. h Sec. 8, T. 43 X., R. 24 W., Marquette, Michigan.
It appears that on December 24, 1898, Meisner made homestead
entry No. 9087 for the XE. J SE. J, Sec. 22, T. 42 X., R. 25 W., which
he commuted July 18, 1900, under section 2301 of the Revised Stat-
utes. He made additional homestead entry No. 10359 on October 16,
1901, under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat, 854), for
the X. I XE. i, Sec. 12, T. 42 X.. R. 25 W., which he commuted March
11, 1903. He was also allowed to make additional homestead entry
X<>. 11167 on September '•>. L903, under said section 6, for the land first
described herein, which he commuted to cash entry Xo. 20534 De-
cember 27, 1904. The latter entry is the one now in question.
The several entries of Meisner were for non-contiguous tracts of
laud. Your office correctly held that his additional entry of October
16, 1901, under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889, exhausted his
homestead right, notwithstanding he did not secure by such entnr
sufficient land to complete the maximum quantity of 160 acres. By
the terms <>f that section, even though standing alone, it is clearly
susceptible of such construction and no other. But the act of 1889 as
a whole relates to the one and common subject of the acquisition of
homestead.- on the public lands, and therefore it is to be construed in
pari materia with the original homestead law. Only one entry is
allowed under said law and if the applicant thereunder elects to enter
less than 160 acres he exhausts his homestead right, unless it is other-
wise specifically provided by law. There are numerous such special
laws and the act of 1889 is one of them. It provides in section 6
thereof, under which Meisner made his additional entries:
That every person entitled, under the provisions of the homestead laws, to
enter a homestead, who has heretofore complied with or who shall hereafter
comply with the conditions of said laws, and who shall have made his final
proof thereunder for a quantity of land less than one hundred and sixty acres
and received the receiver's final receipt therefor, shall he entitled under said
laws to enter as a personal right, and not assignable, by legal subdivisions of
the public lands of the United States subject to homestead entry, so much
additional land as added to the quantity previously so entered by him shall not
exceed one hundred and sixty acres: Provided, That in no case shall patent
issue for the land covered by such additional entry until the person making such
additional entry shall have actually and in conformity with the homestead laws
resided upon and cultivated the lands so additionally entered and otherwise
fully complied with such laws.
Following the construction placed upon the original homestead
law and the practice thereunder, when Meisner made his additional
entry of October 16, 1901, and elected to enter Less than enough to
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make np 160 acres, he exhausted his right, as he was only entitled to
the exercise of one privilege of additional entry under said section.
Nor is there any other known act allowing additional entries in
certain instances, under which the entry in question can be allowed to
remain intact.
The decision of your office herein is affirmed.
fort assinniboine military reservation-forest reserve lieu
selection—act of june 4, 1897.
Charles Ziegler.
Lands formerly embraced within the Fort Assinniboine military reservation, and
opened to entry by the act of April 18, 1896, are subject to selection in lieu
of lands within a forest reserve relinquished to the United States under the
exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 1897.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C) December 7, 1905. (J. R. W.)
Charles Ziegler, by Walter B. Sands, attorney in fact, appealed
from your decision of March 31, 1905, rejecting his selection, No.
10917, your office series, under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36),
for lot 9, Sec. 7, T. 32 N., R. 16 E., and lot 2, Sec. 10, T. 32 N., R. 15 E.,
M. M., Greatfalls, Montana (46.06 acres), in lieu of lot 1, Sec. 16, T. 1
S., R, 7 E., S. L. M., in the Uinta forest reserve, Utah (40 acres).
The land selected lies in the abandoned Fort Assinniboine military
reservation. Your decision rejected the selection because
—
the act of April 18, 189G (29 Stat, 95), and instructions thereunder of May, 1896
(unreported), provide "that all lands which have been or may hereafter be
excluded from the limits of the Fort Assinniboine military reservation in the
State of Montana shall be open to the operation of the laws regulating home-
stead entry except section twenty-three hundred and one, Revised Statutes, and
to entry under the townsite laws and the laws governing the disposal of coal
lands, desert lands and mineral lands, and shall not be subject to sale under the
provisions of any act relating to sale of abandoned military reservations." As
the disposal of said lands is restricted to the various forms of entry specially
designated in the act, they are not subject to disposal under any other law regu-
lating the disposal of public land and hence are not subject to selection under
the act of June 4, 1897.
This is claimed to be erroneous, and it is argued that
—
It is probably true that the land in this abandoned military reservation
would not be open to entry under any existing land laws except those men-
tioned but it did not exclude by implication later enacted laws that clearly
authorized the entry of lands that were then open to settlement and were of a
character contemplated by the later act.
The act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 103), and act of August 23, 1894
(28 Stat., 491), provided generally for disposal of abandoned mili-
tary reservation lands in a specific manner, after appraisal, and with
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view to obtaining for the government the enhanced value to which
such lands had appreciated during their state of reservation. The
act of April 18, 1896, as to this particular reservation provided that
the lands therein, except one mile square embracing the government
buildings
—
shall be open to the operation of the laws regulating homestead entry, except
section twenty-three hundred and one of the Revised Statutes, and to entry
under the townsite laws and the laws governing the disposal of coal lands,
desert lands, and mineral lands, and shall not he subject to sale under the pro-
visions of any act relating to the sale of abandoned military reservations.
By section '2 all entries theretofore made under " the homestead,
townsite, desert land, or mineral land laws " were validated and, if
canceled, were directed to be reinstated. Section 2301, Revised Stat-
utes, referred to in the act of April 18, 1896, was that permitting
commutation of a homestead entry by payment of the minimum price
after fourteen months from date of the entry on proof of settlement
and cultivation for that period required by the section as amended
by section 6 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat, 1095, 1098). The
policy of securing to the government an enhanced value for the lands
in this military reservation was thus abandoned and the restriction
of the classes of entries permitted was with view to securing develop-
ment of their resources by improvement, cultivation, residence, rec-
lamation from desert character, or mineral exploration, such as was
required by the several laws under which entries of them were
permitted.
By the act of June 4, 1897, the United States, in furtherance of a
public policy, sought to acquire complete title to all lands held in
private right in the forest reserves. To secure that object it proposed
to the owner of lands in a forest reserve in lieu of such lands the right
to select " a tract of vacant land open to settlement," and by the act of
June 6, 1900(31 Stat., 588, (>14), "vacant, surveyed non-mineral
public lands which are subject to homestead entry." The lands in
this abandoned military reservation are of the class thus specified.
It was within the power of Congress to offer any unappropriated
lands in such exchange, and a proper construction of the acts of June
1. L897, and June 6, 1900. later in date than the act of April is. L896,
is to extend the modes by which such lands may be appropriated, nor
does this construction interfere with any declared policy of the for-
mer act, which did not confine the modes of appropriation to those
requiring settlement, residence and cultivation, nor did it enact in
terms that such lands should be appropriated in those modes only.
That act in form and terms merely excepted them from operation of
the acts of 1884 and 1894. supra, providing generally for disposal of
abandoned military reservation lands, and provided that they should
be disposed of in other modes specified. It is not inconsistent with
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the act of 1896, nor violative of any express or implied policy of Con-
gress, to make them subject to yet other modes of appropriation, and
in offering any " vacant land open to settlement," or " vacant, sur-
veyed, non-mineral public lands which are subject to homestead
entry," it offered to the owner of lands in a forest reserve any such
described lands not in terms reserved for disposal in a specially re-
stricted manner, or for attainment of some declared public purpose.
The cases of William C, Quinlan (30 L. D., 268) ; Joseph S. White
(ib., 536); State of Utah (ib., 301); Webb McCaslin (31 L. D.,
243) ; W. D. Harrigan (29 L. D., 153) ; Hiram M. Hamilton (32
L. D., 119) ; James Page (32 L. D., 536), are not inconsistent
herewith. Examination of these cases will show that they fall into
one or more of three general classes : ( 1 ) Where by act of Congress
lands are directed to be disposed of under some specific laws only, or
(2) for discharge of specific trusts charged thereon, or (3) in a specific
manner in furtherance of an indicated policy, as to secure agricul-
tural development by resident owners.
In the act here considered no such intent, object, or policy appears.
The act of April 18, 1896, supra, merely excepted the land from oper-
ation of the acts of July 5, 1884, and August 23, 1894, and provided
for their disposal under other acts, among which were the homestead
laws without the commutation privilege. The acts to govern their
disposal were of various character, excluding the purpose of assuring
a resident agricultural holding. There was no trust requiring their
sale for raising of a fund for a particular object; there were no words
of exception or limitation to disposal under the acts named to the
exclusion of any other law. When Congress by the acts of June 4,
1897, and June 6, 1900, offered " vacant land open to settlement," and
" vacant, surveyed non-mineral public lands which are subject to
homestead entry," these lands being of such class, became subject
thereto.
Your decision is hereby reversed and the papers are remanded to
your office for adjudication upon the merits.
SUIT FOR CANCELLATION OF PATENT—PRACTICE—HEARING.
Mary E. Coffin.
As between rival applicants for the same land, the prior settler must maintain
his prior right by continued compliance wi'th the law.
Suit for the cancellation of a patent will not be advised by the land department
merely because such patent was inadvertently issued; but it must appear
that some interest of the government, or of some party to whom it is under
obligation, has suffered by such inadvertent action.
Where patent has inadvertently issued for a tract of land, the land department,
notwithstanding the title has passed out of the government, has authority
to order a hearing between claimants under the patent and persons asserting
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adverse rights to the land, with a view to determining the advisability or
necessity for bringing suit for cancellation of the patent.
Secretary Hitchcock t<> the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) December 8, 1905. (J. R. W.
)
The Department is in receipt of your letter of September 14, 1905,
transmitting exemplified records in Mary E. Coffin's selection, num-
ber 1182, your office series, under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat.,
36), and John Glode's homestead application, conflicting as to lots
i and 0, Sec. 13, T. 65 X., R. 18 \\\, 1th P. M., Duluth, Minnesota.
The record shows that Mrs. Coffin made application, in due form
and compliance with existing regulations, October 7, 1899, for these
tracts, then unsurveyed, which was found regular and approved for
patent April 20, 1902, and May 25, 1902, in inadvertent violation of
then existing regulations of December 18, 1899 (29 L. D., 391, 393),
patent issued therefor, the lands being then unsurveyed. and the regu-
lations providing that patent should not issue upon selection of unsur-
veved lands until four months after receipt at the local office of the
approved township plat of survey.
February 8, 1905, the approved township plat of survey was filed
in the local office, and on that day John Glocle filed his homestead
application for these and other tracts, alleging settlement thereon
June 13, 1898. He further filed affidavit, corroborated by two wit-
nesses, that
—
lie continued to reside on, improve and cultivate said land with the intention
<>!' entering the same as a homestead until November 15, 1899 raised two
crops on sai<l land and made Improvements thereon of the value of from $100
to $150, .... viz: a house about 12 x 14 feet in size, comfortable to live in
at all seasons, about [ an acre cleared, about two rods square in cultivation.
and about
'i of a mile of trail cut; as a settler on the land affiant was one of
the petitioners for survey of said township, but on or about the 1st day of
November, 1899, affiant learned that said land had been scripped, and was
advised that said scrip filing on said land would bar his settlement; but
affianl says that at the time said scrip application for said land was made he
Tie prayed a healing and cancellation of the selection.
June 3, 1905, your office ruled Mrs. Coffin to surrender her patent,
demanded reconveyance of the land within sixty days and an abstract
of title, showing revestiture of the United States with good title.
August 31, 1905, the local office returned proof of service, and re-
ported no action had been taken. Upon these facts your office
recommended that suit be brought to annul the patent.
September L6, 1905. counsel for Mrs. Coffin filed in the Department
a request that
—
the matter of establishing the right to the land patented be first considered and
the rights of the respective applicants considered before further action is taken :
:is the selector .... is willing to make any reconveyance possible and consist-
ent with what is lawful in the matter.
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This communication was referred to your office for recommendation
and report, and November 4, 1905, your office reported that
:
Considering all the facts and circumstances in connection with this case, this
office would not recommend that a hearing he ordered, in the ahsence of a
written pledge from the patentee, Coffin, that she will faithfully abide by the
final judgment of the Department in the premises, and deed the land to the
Government, freed from incumbrances in case it is finally held that the rights
of the homestead claimant are paramount.
Glode fails to set out facts entitling him to annulment of Mrs.
Coffin's patent. While he alleges settlement, residence, improvement
and cultivation, he fails to allege that the prior right thereby
acquired has been prosecuted and maintained. It is well settled that
between rival applicants for the same land, the prior settler must
maintain his prior right by continued compliance with the law.
Northern Pacific R, R. Company v. McCabe (29 L. D., 30) ; Mclnnes
v. Cotter (21 L. D., 97, 98) ; Meyer v. Northern Pacific Railway
Company (31 L. D., 196). This the affidavit does not assert. Its
implication is that on being advised of the selection he no longer
prosecuted and maintained his settlement. This is amendable, and
though the affidavit is clearly defective, it is assumed for purposes
of this decision that such amendment is made.
While the land department by issue of patent loses jurisdiction
to adjudicate the rights of the parties to the land, yet there remains
a duty to be performed by the Department when its aid is sought
by a request to bring suit for cancellation of a patent. It does not
follow as a matter of course that such suit should be brought merely
because patent issued inadvertently. It would be mere formalism
to obtain cancellation of the patent if the Department must on the
existing facts at once again issue patent to the same party. (See
O'Shee v. Coach, 33 L. D., 295.) It is the duty of this Department,
before asking aid of the Department of Justice for correction of its
errors, to ascertain whether the interests of the United States, or of
some party to whom it is under obligation, have suffered by its own
misprision. It is clear that no interest of the United States has
suffered because no question is raised but that the United States got
good title to the tract relinquished in the exchange, nor yet that the
land selected and patented wTas not of the kind and character offered
by the United States. The principles applicable are the same as
apply in controversies between private parties for cancellation of
conveyances, and if there be no substantial equity in the government
to demand relief, it must be defeated in such suit. East Omaha Land
Company (21 L. D., 179).
It is, moreover, one of the established powers of the land depart-
ment to order hearings in such cases for obtaining information neces-
sary for its action, as well after patent has gone out to determine the
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advisability or necessity of bringing suit for cancellation^ a> to de-
termining questions arising as to rights in public lands not patented.
Thomas J. Laney (9 L. D., 83, 85) ; Bullock v. Central Pacific Kail-
road Company (11 L. D., 590, 592).
If Glode be willing to assert and will undertake to prove the main-
tenance of his residence and due compliance with the law up to issue
of the patent, a hearing will be granted, on notice to the selector, and
the local office will find the facts as upon a contest against an existing
entry. Such finding will be examined by your office as upon an appeal
by the party whose right may be found, prior to issue of the patent,
the inferior one, and the proceeding will be transmitted to the Depart-
ment for its information in determining the advisability of institut-
ing suit for cancellation of patent. Should Glode not allege residence
in compliance with law to the time that patent issued, and renew his
request for a hearing within sixty days from service hereof, the pat-
ent, though inadvertently issued, will be allowed to stand.
STATE SELECTION-PREFERENCE RIGHT-FOREST RESERVE LIEU
SELECTION-ACT OF JUNE 4, 1897.
Cronan r. West et al.
The preference right, for a period of sixty days from the filing of the township
pi.it of survey, accorded the State by the act of March 3, 1893. within which
to make selection of lands under giants to the State, does not segregate the
lands against other applications, hut they should he received, subject to the
State's right, and, if that be not exercised, take effect, if otherwise entitled
to approval, as of the date of their presentation.
Where a selection tendered under the exchange provisions of the act of June 4,
1897, is in conflict, in part, with prior pending applications, it should not.
for that reason, be rejected in its entirety, but the selector should be afforded
opportunity to protect his rights by proper proceedings.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
December 9, 1905. (J. R. W.)
John Cronan appealed from your decision of February 8, 1905,
rejecting his application under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36),
to select lands in lieu of land relinquished to the United States in a
forest reserve, as to certain lands therein included described as the
SE. 1 SW. h Sec. 3, and W. \ NE. ], Sec. 4, T. 43 N., R. 2 E., B. M..
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
August 21, 1903, the township plat of survey was tiled in the local
office. On that day Samuel J . Gilbert presented his application for
homestead entry for the SE. \ SE. j, Sec. 5, with other land, which
was suspended pending the State's sixty days preference right under
the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 572, 592).
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October 19, 1903, John Cronan, by J. J. Skuse, attorney in fact,
filed his application (as stated in his brief) to select the W. J, Sec. 3,
W. J and NE. J, Sec. 4, and SE. J, Sec. 5, in lieu of lands relinquished
to the United States in a forest reserve. In fact no such application
is found in the papers transmitted by your office, and the only paper
of similar character is one dated October 19, 1903, marked " Copy,"
and includes only the SE. \ SW. J, Sec. 3, W. J NE. J, Sec. 4, and
SE. J SE. J, Sec. 5, which is referred to in letter of counsel addressed
to you of date April 19, 1904, wherein he describes the same lands
and says
:
I herewith file a duplicate deed of relinquishment hy John Cronan to the
United States, a duplicate of abstract of title and a duplicate affidavit of non
use of said base land, also a duplicate non-mineral and non-occupancy affidavit
as the records of your office show that the original papers connected with this
application were lost in the local land office after the same had been filed therein
October 19, 1903, by the said Cronan.
Referring to Cronan's application, the local office, February 8, 1904,
report, among other things, that
—
October 19, 1903, John Cronan made lieu selection application for the SE. \
SW. I, Sec. 3, W. I NE. \, Sec. 4, and SE. \ SE. J, Sec. 5 the plat ....
was filed .... August 21, 1903, and no applications were received therein ex-
cept those of settlers who made affidavits as to settlement, residence, etc. . . .
all including these being suspended until the expiration of sixty days allowed |
the State of Idaho for preference right of selection. The said application of
Cronan having been made two days prior to expiration of this time, on October
19, it was considered premature and of no effect. On October 21, 1903, Frei j!
made timber and stone sworn statement for the W. \ NE. \, . . . . Sec. 4
\
November 28, 1903, notice was served upon John Cronan of the rejection of his
selection for the land .... October 21, 1903, Theodore C. West applied to make
second sworn statement for the S. \ SW. \ and SW. \ SE. \ of 3, having previ-
ously made sworn statement for land in the Lewiston land district ....
Cronan's application as to SE. \ SW. \ was rejected because of said application
of West.
Your decision states that the application of Cronan for the land
first herein described and in conflict was received by the local office
October 19, 1903, and suspended until November 28, 1903, and then
rejected; that by letter of February 16, 1904, B. C. Tiffany, attorney
for Cronan, transmitted to your office affidavits of Cronan and J. J.
Skuse that applications by Cronan had been filed at the local office
October 19, 1903, " to select under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat.,
36), certain described lands,'' "all being for the land here in ques-
tion," and that attached to Cronan's affidavit a certificate by the
register of the local office states
This is to certify that John Cronan presented lieu selections for lands in
T. 43 N., R. 2 E., which wrere considered by the register and receiver as pre-
mature and he was requested to ask in writing that the same be filed on
October 19, 1903 ; that said request was made and papers received and were
being examined by the tract books when they mysteriously disappeared from
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the office and have never been seen since ; that the written descriptions of the
lands selected are the same in the written request to have them filed, and in
the list mentioned in the within affidavits of John Cronan and his attorney,
John J. Skuse, hut the basis of the selection cannot be certified by me.
The record transmitted to the Department is evidently incomplete.
Not only the original application papers are missing from the files
but also the letter of counsel B. C. Tiffany, of February 16, 1904,
both the affidavits said to have been therewith forwarded and the cer-
tificate of the register above set out in your decision. It is however
accepted by the Department that such papers as the affidavits of
Cronan and Skuse, and certificate of the register must have existed
in the record at the date of your decision February 5, 1905.
The Department therefore as basis for this decision accepts it as
(established, notwithstanding the evident defect of the record, that
October 19, 1903, Cronan. by Skuse. attorney in fact, filed application
under the act of June -1, 1897, supra, for the lands described in the
caption of this decision; that at the applicant's written request the
local office received them; that while the local officers were examining
the tract book with reference to said lands Cronan's selection papers
were abstracted from the records or were lost by the local office and
that no action Avas taken by the local officers upon Cronan's applica-
tion until November 28, 1908, when it was rejected because of three
several partial conflicts.
(1) With Gilbert's homestead application as to the SE. \ SE. \,
Sec 5, filed August 21, 1903, with an affidavit of prior settlement and
residence.
(2) With Frei's timber and stone application as to the W. \ XE. J,
Sec. 1. made October 21, 1903.
(3) With West's application to file a second timber and stone
application as to the SE. ] SW. ]. Sec. 3.
Your office held that the local office erred in evenr action rela-
tive to the case "except the action accepting the homestead appli-
cation of Gilbert and the lieu selection of Cronan and ^impend-
ing the same pending the sixty day preference right period of selec-
tion by the State." In so far your decision was correct and is
affirmed. The preference right given by the act of March 3, 1893,
supra, is analogous to the preference right of a successful contestant
ami does not segregate the land against other applications, and they
are entitled to be received, subject to the State's right, and. if that i<
not exercised, take effect from their presentation, if in form entitled
to be approved. As August had 31 days, the State's preference right
expired October 20th.
Your decision, however, rejected Cronan's entire selection, and in
80 doing was erroneous. The local office and your office should not
have rejected the selection entire. (Frederick W. Kehl. July !>,
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1903. unreported: Aztec Land and Cattle Company. 34 L. D., 122.)
In so far as Cronan's application was rejected entire because of par-
tial conflict with a prior selection it is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings appropriate thereto.
school land-indemnity selection—purchaser.
Burtis <\ State of Kansas et al.
Where public lands of the United States are in good faith purchased from a
State in the belief that the State has acquired title thereto under its school
grant, and in faith of such purchase are held and occupied for many years,
entry thereof by a third party should not be allowed without first affording
the State an opportunity to make good the title purported to be conveyed
by it. by assigning a proper and sufficient basis and .making selection of the
land under its school grant ; and in case of failure on the part of the
State to make the title good, the present claimant through purchase from
the State should be afforded opportunity to protect his rights by himself
making entry of the land under the public land laws.
Secretary Hitchcock to fix- Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.
)
December 10. WO.]. (F. W. C. |
The Department has considered the appeal by Clyde L. Burtis
from your office decision of March 22, 1905, rejecting his application
to make soldiers' additional homestead entry, as assignee of Thomas
Marsh, under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, of the SE. i of
XW. i, Sec. 34. T. 4 S.. R. 8 E., 6th P. M., Topeka land district, Kan-
sas, and affording the State of Kansas the opportunity to make selec-
tion of said tract as school indemnity land upon furnishing a proper
basis therefor, and failing therein that Williams be permitted to
complete entry of the land.
December 14. 1901, Burtis was permitted to make homestead entry
of the tract here in question, the same appearing to be public land
open to such entry. In May. following, he tendered an application,
as assignee of Thomas Marsh, to enter the same tract under the pro-
visions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes. Xo question seems to
be raised as to the validity of the right sought to be exercised. Marsh
being entitled to a soldiers* additional homestead right for eighty
acres, and Burtis was advised that he could not complete his original
entry made December 14, 1901, in this manner, but that should he
relinquish his homestead entry the additional right sought to be used
might be permitted. Before this was consummated, however, Edward
M. Williams, present claimant to the land, through the State of Kan-
sas, filed certain corroborated affidavits showing his connection with
the land and the chain of title under which he claimed, upon which
hearing was ordered.
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At the hearing the attorney-general of the State at the instance of
the Governor, over the objection of Burtis, filed a verified petition of
intervention, alleging, in substance, that the authorities of the State,
for a valuable consideration, had conveyed this tract to one William
II. Smith by patent regularly issued by the Governor of the State
and other proper authorities; that title thereto had passed by mesne
conveyance to William-, who had for years held the title in the belief
that hi- grantors were the absolute owner.- of the tract, and it was
asked that should it he held that the land was still the property of
the United State-, the State, through its proper officers, upon fur-
nishing a proper basis therefor, he permitted to make selection of the
land a- school land indemnity, in order to protect the rights of those
who had held the land through the conveyance from the State.
U.pon the conclusion of the hearing, the local officers found, among
other things, that on the 15th day of June. L871, the State of Kansas
Executed and delivered to one William H. Smith a patent for the land
in controversy and that through mesne conveyances from .-aid Smith,
all of which were warranty deeds, the land was conveyed to Edward
L. Williams; that at all time- since the issue of said patent the land
has been cultivated by its owner- and that during all of such time
the land has been enclosed by a fence; that the present claimant
through the State purchased the land for a valuable consideration
and in good faith, and that during all the time he has been the owner
of -aid land, has cultivated the same and has had it enclosed by a
fence; and that taxes have been legally assessed annually upon said
tract since 1871 and paid by the several owners of the tract up to
[902; al-o. that the tract is now worth S40 per acre.
These findings are not seriously disputed, and while it is not clearly
made to appear how the error arose that misled the State into pat-
enting this land, it is clear that it was supposed to be and was treated
a- a part of the land- granted to the State in support of common
jfchools.
Hie land is in a community which has been settled and farmed
for a number of year-, and Burtis was undoubtedly fully apprised
a- to the actual condition of the lands at the time he first sought to
make entry thereof.
Your office holds that the case falls within the category of cases
decided by the Supreme Court of the United State- beginning with
that of Atherton v. Fowler ('.><; \\ s.. 513), declaring illegal any
attempt to make entry of the public land- occupied and improved by
another honest claim and color of title, referring particularly to the
cases of Jon.- v. Arthur i -J- L. I).. 235), Butler v. State of California
(29 L. I).. 610), and Ander-on y. Roray ( :\'.\ L. I).. :Y.V.n .
In the appeal from the office decision Burtis questions the appli-
cation of tie- cases just referred to, claiming that William-, and those
5194—Vol. :'A—or, m 20
306 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
before him, were not occupying the land under color of title because
it is not shown that the State ever formally presented an application
to select this land or ever intended to make selection thereof as school
land indemnity.
The books define as color of title that which in appearance is title
but which in reality is not title. It is true that a title was not ac-
quired by prescription as against the United States by reason of the
possession gained under the deed issued by the State for this land,
but it is nevertheless believed that Smith, and those claiming under
and through him, occupied this land under a color of title. Their good
faith in the premises is in nowise questioned and the Department
fully agrees with the decision of your office and the local officers pro-
tecting such long continuous possession as against one seeking to
appropriate the lands as against such prior occupants.
It is the opinion of this Department that the State should be
permitted to make its title good, and to that end it should be afforded
a reasonable time within which to make formal selection of the land,
upon a proper and sufficient base. Should the State fail to make
selection as allowed, the present occupant through purchase from the
State should be afforded a reasonable time in which to protect his
occupancy by himself making entry under the land laws, and upon
completion of selection by the State, or entry by Williams, the appli-
cation by Burtis will stand rejected.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
uintah indian lands—mining claims—act of may 27, 1902.
Raven Mining Company.
The limit of the grant to the Raven Mining Company made by the act of May
27, 1902, was the privilege to locate, under the mining laws, one hundred
mining claims upon the unallotted lands of the Uintah and White River
tribes of Ute Indians, and neither that act nor any of the subsequent acts
extending the time of opening said unallotted lands relieved said company
from compliance with the provision of section 2325 of the Revised
Statutes requiring payment to be made for lands embraced in a mining
claim as a condition to the issuance of patent therefor under the mining
laws.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) December 19, 1905. (F. W. C.)
The act of Congress approved May 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 245, 263),
provides for the allotment of lands to the Uintah and White River
tribes of Ute Indians of eighty acres of agricultural lands which
can be irrigated, to each head of a family, and forty acres of such
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land to each other member of said tribes, and for the restoration to
the public domain of the unallotted lands on October 1. 11)03.
With reward to the unallotted lands it was provided:
That persons entering any of said land under the homestead law shall pay
therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre: And pro-
vided further, That nothing herein contained shall impair the rights of any
mineral lease which has been approved by the Secretary of the Interior, or
any permit heretofore issued by direction of the Secretary of the Interior to
negotiate with said Indians for ;i mineral lease; but any person or company
having so obtained such approved mineral lease or such permit to negotiate
with said Indians for a mineral lease on said reservation, pending such time
find up to thirty days before said lands are restored to the public domain as
aforesaid, shall have in lien of such lease or permit the preferential ri^ht to
locate under the mineral laws not to exceed six hundred and forty acres of
contiguous mineral land, except the Raven Mining Company, which may in
lien of its lease locate one hundred mining claims of the character of mineral
mentioned in its lease; and the proceeds of the sale of the lands so restored to
the public domain shall be applied, first, to the reimhursement of the United
Sfntes for any moneys advanced to said Indians to carry into effect the fore-
going provisions; and the remainder, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, shall he used for the benefit of said Indians.
The time for opening the unallotted lands in the Uintah reserva-
tion, as provided for in the act of May 27, 1902, A\as extended to
October 1, 11)04. by the act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat, 982, 998);
again to the 10th of March, 1905, by the act of April 21. 1904 (33
Stat., 189) ; and again to the 1st of September, 1905, unless the Presi-
dent should determine that the same might be opened at an earlier
date, by the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat, 1048, 1009). This latter
act provided that these lands should be opened to settlement and entry
by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall pre-
scribe the manner in which they may be settled upon, occupied and
entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof. The plan con-
templated was one that had been followed successfully in opening
the unallotted lands in other reservations and contemplated a draw-
ing which would fix the order for presentation of claims, thus avoid-
ing the difficulties and vexatious contests incident to an unrestricted
rush and settlement upon the lands.
As the act of 1902 had granted preferential rights to locate mining
claims not to exceed (>40 acres of contiguous lands generally to those
holding leases or permits to negotiate leases from the Indians, also
especial rights to the Raven Mining Company, it became necessary
to identify and separate the mineral claims located under these privi-
leges before the opening of the general body of the lands under the
plan to be prescribed in the President's proclamation. The act of
March 3, 1905, provides:
That hofore the opening of the Uintah Indian Reservation the President is
hereby authorized to set apart and reserve as an addition to the Uintah Forest
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Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and regulations governing forest reserves,
and subject to the mineral rights granted by the act of Congress of May twenty-
seventh, nineteen hundred and two, such portion of the lands within the Uintah
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and he may also set apart and
reserve any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the
water supply for the Indians or for general agricultural development, and may
confirm such rights to water thereon as have already accrued: Provided, That
the proceeds from any timber on such addition as may with safety be sold
prior to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty, shall be paid to said
Indians in accordance with the provisions of the act opening the reservation.
That the Raven Mining Company shall, within sixty days from the passage
of this act, file for record, in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county
in which its claims are located, a proper certificate of each location ; and it shall
also, within the same time, file in the office of the Secretary of the Interior, in
the city of Washington, said description and a map showing the locations made
by it on the Uintah Reservation, Utah, under the act of Congress of May
twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two (Statutes at Large, volume thirty-
two, page two-hundred and sixty-three) ; and thereupon the Secretary of the
Interior shall forthwith cause said locations to be inspected and report made,
and if found to contain the character of mineral to which said company is
entitled by the act of Congress aforesaid and that each of said claims does
not exceed the size of a regular mining claim, to wit, six hundred by fifteen
hundred feet, he shall issue a patent in fee to the Raven Mining Company for
each of said claims: Provided further. That the Florence Mining Company
entitled under the act of Congress approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hun-
dred and two, to the preferential right to locate not to exceed six hundred and
forty acres of contiguous mineral land in the Uintah Reservation, Utah, shall
within sixty days from the passage of this act file in the office of the recorder
of deeds of the county in which its location is made a proper description of its
claim, and it shall within the same time file in the office of the Secretary of the
Interior said description and a map showing the location made by it on the
Uintah Reservation, Utah, and thereupon the Secretary of the Interior shall
forthwith cause said location to be inspected and report made, and if found not
to exceed six hundred and forty acres he shall issue a patent in fee to said com-
pany, for the said land: And provided further. That the extension of time for
opening the unallotted lands to public entry herein granted shall not extend
the time to make locations to any person or company heretofore given a prefer-
ential right, but the Raven Mining Company and the Florence Mining Company
pending the time for opening to public entry the Uintah Reservation shall have
the right of ingress and egress to and from their respective properties over
and through said reservation.
In the proclamation issued by the President July 14, 1905, govern-
ing the opening of the unallotted lands in the Uintah Reservation
there was excepted from the lands to be opened " such mineral lands
as may have been disposed of under existing laws."
It will be noticed that by the act of May 27, 1902, the Raven Mining
Company was not restricted to 640 acres of contiguous mining lands,
but was authorized to " locate 100 mining claims of the character of
mineral mentioned in its lease." This act made no further provision
with regard to the completion of title to these mining claims which
the Raven Company was authorized to locate and there would seem
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to be no reasonable doubt but that, in the absence of other legislation,
title to these claims could have been obtained only in the ordinary
manner provided by the mining laws for the completion of title to
mining claims elsewhere upon the public domain, and this could
have been accomplished only by a compliance with section 2825 of the
Revised Statutes, which provides as follows:
Sec. 2325. A patent for any land claimed and located for valuable deposits
may be obtained in the following manner: Any person, association, or corpora-
tion authorized to locate a claim under this chapter, having claimed and located
B piece of land for such purposes, who has, or have, complied with the terms of
this chapter, may file in the proper land office an application for a patent, under
oath, showing such compliance, together with a plat and field notes of the claim
or claims in common, made by or under the direction of the United States
surveyor-general, showing accurately the boundaries of the claim or claims,
which shall be distinctly marked by monuments on the ground, and shall post a
copy of such plat, together with a notice of such application for a patent, in a
conspicuous place on the land embraced in such plat previous to the filing of the
application for a patent, and shall file an affidavit of at least two persons that
such notice lias been duly posted, and shall file a copy of the notice in such land
office, and shall thereupon be entitled to a patent for the land, in the manner fol-
lowing: The register of the land office, upon the filing of such application, plat,
field notes, notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such application
has been made, for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him desig-
nated as published nearest to such claim; and he shall also post such notice in
his office for the same period. The claimant at the time of filing this applica-
tion, or at any time thereafter, within the sixty days of publication, shall file
with the register a certificate of the United States Surveyor-General that five
hundred dollars' worth of labor has been expended or improvements made upon
the claim by himself or grantors; that the plat is correct, with such further
description by such reference to natural objects or permanent monuments as
shall identity the claim, and furnish an accurate description, to be incorporated
in the patent. At the expiration of the sixty days of publication the claimant
shall file his affidavit, showing that the plat and notice have been posted in a
conspicuous place on the claim during such period of publication. If no adverse
claim shall have been filed with the register and the receiver of the proper land
office at the expiration of the sixty days of publication, it shall lie assumed that
the applicant is entitled to :; patent, upon the payment to the proper officer of
five dollars per acre, and that no adverse claim exists; and thereafter no objec-
tion from third parties to the issuance of a patent shall be heard, except it be
shown that the applicant has failed to comply with the terms of this chapter.
l
T
uder the act of March 3, 1905. xtij>i-<t % the locations of the Raven
Mining Company were directed to be made, and they were made, in
the form of lode claims. The report of the inspector, appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior to inspect the claims after their location,
shows that they contain the character of mineral mentioned in the
company's lease, and to which it is entitled under the act of May 27,
1902. There would seem to he no question, therefore, as to the price
to he paid on account of these mining locations if. under the law.
any charge is required. The Raven Mining Company was. however,
by act of 1905, relieved from compliance with many of the conditions
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prescribed in section 2325 of the Revised Statutes, and the sole ques-
tion here presented for consideration is as to whether said company
has been relieved from the payment at the rate of $5.00 per acre,
generally required in completion of title to mineral lands located as
lode claims. Your office required that such payment should be made
preliminary to the issuance of the patent of the United States for
the lands located, and it is from this requirement, Avhich was con-
tained in a letter addressed to said company, dated July 3 last, that
an appeal has been taken to this Department.
The matter has been fully and thoroughly presented, both orally
and by brief. The contention of the mining company is, in effect,
that the act of 1902 made a grant in presenti of the lands to be
located as mining claims made in consideration of the surrender of
its lease on account of which large expenditures had been made upon
the lands covered thereby, which grant acquired precision by the
subsequent locations made, the title vesting thereupon by relation as of
the date of the original act; that as the act of 1905 omitted any
requirement for a payment preliminary to the issue of patent, none
can now be exacted, and, as the other conditions prescribed in the act
of 1905 have been complied with, that the patent of the United States
should forthwith issue.
It must first be remembered that under the lease with the Indians
they would presumably have been entitled to large royalties, which
are terminated at least upon the opening of the lands to entry. The
company has indeed resisted the collection of any royalties after the
passage of the act of 1902, but under date of August 3, 1903, this
Department, in a communication to Mr. Le Roy D. Thoman, repre-
senting the company, concurred in the views of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs that this company must pay the prescribed royalties
under the lease until the date of the opening of the lands to settlement
and entry. The position thus taken by the Department negatives
the idea that the privilege granted this company by the act of 1902
to make certain mining locations amounted to an unconditional grant
of the lands located, and after further and full consideration, the
Department adheres to its former ruling and holds that the limit of
the grant made by the act of 1902 was of a privilege to locate, under
the mining laws, one hundred claims.
The act of 1902 makes it plain that it was the intention of Congress
to appropriate for the benefit of the Indians, the entire proceeds de-
rived from the sale of any part of the unallotted lands, subject only to
the reimbursement of the United States for any moneys advanced to
said Indians to carry into effect the provisions of said act. Under
that act, homestead settlers upon the unallotted lands were specifically
required to make payment for the lands entered at the rate of $1.25
per acre, a condition not ordinarily exacted, and although the subse-
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quent act of 1905, relating to these lands, contained no such provi-
sions, yet, in the construction of the several acts bearing upon the
opening of these lands, it was the opinion of this Department that the
condition exacting payment of homesteaders found in the act of 1902
was not repealed by its omission from the act of 1905, thus preserving
the fund created under the act of 1902 and appropriated for the bene-
fit of the Indians. (See 33 L. 1).. 610.)
It is not doubted that Congress might have relieved this company
from the payment of any sum in the completion of title to the lands
authorized to be located, but when the whole matter is considered it
seems more reasonable that Congress meant by the act of 1905 merely
to relieve the company from making the formal proof required under
the mining laws in the completion of title to mineral lands, and not to
relieve this company from a payment of money which it would have
been required to make in completion of its title under the act of 1902
and which that act had, as before stated, specifically appropriated for
the use and benefit of the Indians.
In conclusion it may be added that the opening of the lands to entry
and location was without the formal consent of the Indians and it
seems unreasonable to assume that Congress meant to deprive them of
the benefits secured under their lease made with this company and to
grant away the lands without at least exacting the ordinary payment
required by the mining laws, a sum which is presumably but small
recompense for their right to royalties terminated by the disposition
of the lands.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
ARID LAND—WITHDRAWATr-SOUMERS' ADDITIONAL APPLICATION-
ACT OF JUNE 17, 1903.
Nancy C. Yaple.
An application to make soldiers' additional entry under section 230(3 of the
Revised Statutes, although tiled prior to the passage of the act of June 17,
1902, and pending ;it the date of an order withdrawing the lands covered
thereby under the provisions of said act. is not effective to except the lands
from such withdrawal.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land office,
(F. L. C.) December 19, 1905. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by Nancy C. Yaple, remote assignee of
Meredith M. Hackett, from the decision of your office of July 3,
L905, rejecting her application to enter, under section 2306 of the
Revised Statutes, the W. | XW. ], Sec. 10, T. 10 X., R. 31 E., Walla
Walla. Washington.
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The application in question was filed March 5, 1902, and forwarded
to your office the same date. The land covered by such application,
together with other lands, wras withdrawn for irrigation purposes
by departmental order of June 24, 1903. under the provisions of the
reclamation act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388). The application
was rejected, as stated, because of this withdrawal. It is urged in
the appeal that the application having been filed prior to the passage
of the act, as wTell as prior to the withdrawal, it was not affected
by said act nor the order of withdrawal.
In the instructions of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D., 607), it is pointed
out that there are two classes of withdrawals authorized by the act
of June 17, 1902, known as " Withdrawals under the first form,"
and " Withdrawals under the second form," but it does not appear
in the record under which form the land embraced in the present
application was withdrawn. That, however, is unimportant in the
determination of this case, as said instructions expressly prescribe,
with respect to both forms, that after the withdrawals are made all
applications for selections, locations, or entries of the lands covered
by such withdrawals, excepting applications to enter u only under the
homestead laws " lands withdrawn under the second form, shall be
rejected, regardless of whether said applications are presented before
or after the lands are withdrawn.
In the case of Cornelius J. McNamara (33 L. D., 520), it is held,
referring to the act of June 17, 1902, that " by directing withdrawal
of such lands ' from entry, except under the homestead laws, 1 Con-
gress intended to inhibit any mode of private appropriation of such
lands except by such entry under the homestead laws as requires set-
tlement, actual residence, improvement, and cultivation ; " and hence,
none of these things being required under a soldiers' additional entry
made under section 2300 of the Revised Statutes, that lands within
the exception provided for in said act of June 17, 1902, are not sub-
ject to such entry. A similar ruling was made in the case of William
M. Wooldridge (33 L. D., 525), wherein it is said
—
that it was clearly not intended to leave lands withdrawn under the act of
1902, as susceptible of irrigation, subject to be taken by one holding a right
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
Furthermore the mere filing of the application in question was not
sufficient to except the tract covered thereby from the subsequent
action of Congress which led to its withdrawal for irrigation pur-
poses. Hence, the fact that said application was filed prior to the
act of June 17, 1902, and the order of withdrawal, was not effective
to defeat said withdrawal. The most that the application can be
said to have done was to protect any claim the applicant might have
as against other applicants for the same land. It did not confer
upon the applicant any right in the land as against the government,
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or impair in any respect the power of Congress to appropriate the
land to any public use it might deem proper. It did not operate to
segregate the land so as to prevent its withdrawal by the government
for the specific purposes contemplated by the act of June 17, 1902.
In this respect a soldiers' additional application under section 2306
of the Revised Statutes is subject to the same rule applicable to any
other mere inchoate claim. The principle herein stated is well estab-
lished by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Frisbie v.
Whitney (9 Wallace, 187), and The Yosemite Valley Case (15 Wal-
lace, 77), and allied cases.
The decision of your office denying the application in question is
hereby affirmed.
MARRIED WOMAN—SETTLEMENT—BITTER ROOT VALLEY LANDS-
SECTION 2, ACT OF JUNE 5, 1872.
Matilda C. Humble.
A married woman, not the head of a family, is not qualified, under the provi-
sions of section 2 of the act of June 5, 1872, to make entry of lands in the
Bitter Root Valley opened to settlement by said act.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
December 19, 1905. ( C. J. G.
)
An appeal has been filed by Matilda C. Humble from the decision
of your office of May 2, 1905, holding for cancellation her entry,
made under the act of June 5, 1872 (17 Stat., 226), for the SW. J
NW. i, NW. \ SW. i, Sec. 14, SE. \ NE. \ and NE. J SE. J, Sec. 15,
T. 7 N., R. 20 W., Missoula, Montana, on the ground that said
Matilda C. Humble, being a married woman at date of settlement,
was not entitled to make entry under said act. The appeal argues
that she was not disqualified under said act by reason of the fact
stated.
The tract involved is part of the lands in the Bitter Root valley,
opened to settlement by the foregoing act, section 2 of vvhich provides,
among other things:
Said lauds shall he opened to settlement, and shall he sold in legal subdi-
visions to actual settlors only, the saino being citizens of the United States, or
having duly declared their intention to become such citizens, said settlers
being beads of families, or over twenty-one years of age.
The construction claimed lor this section in the appeal is that a
person is qualified thereunder if " the head of a family, whether
over the age of twenty-one years, or not, or if not the head of a
family, then the person seeking to make the entry must be over the
age of twenty-one years." And in this connection a distinction is
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also claimed between the preemption law of 1841. embodied in section
2259 of the Revised Statutes, under which married women were held
to be disqualified, and the law in question. The language of the act
of June 5, 1872, is practically the same as that in the homestead law
of 186*2, found in sections 2289 and 2290 of the Revised Statute-, in
part as follows:
Every person who is the bead of a family, or who has arrived at the age of
twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who has filed his
declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws.
shall be entitled to enter.
Thus the preemption and homestead laws contain practically the
same restrictions in the matter under consideration. The act of
February 11, 1874 (18 Stat., 15). which amended the act of June 5,
1872, made this provision in section '2 thereof:
That the benefit of the homestead act is hereby extended to all the settlers
on said lands who may desire to take advantage of the same.
In view of the legislation with respect to the lands of which the
tract in controversy is a part, there is no doubt that the entry in ques-
tion comes within the rules governing homestead entries, and it is
Avell settled under the homestead law that a married woman, in the
absence of evidence showing that she is the head of the family, is not
qualified to make entry under said law. The act of June 6, 1900 (31
Stat.. 683), removed a woman's disqualification under the homestead
law resulting from marriage, but that act is effective only in cases
where a settlement claim had been initiated prior to marriage.
The decision of your office herein is affirmed.
MINING CLAIM—ADVERSE—OATH—SECTION 2335, REVISED STATUTES.
Mattes v. Treasury Tunnel, Mixing and Reduction Co. (On
Review).
All affidavits under the mining laws are required to be verified in accordance
with the provisions of section 2335 of the Revised Statutes, except where
authority for their execution is otherwise specifically given by statute.
The oath to an adverse claim, made by the agent or attorney-in-fact of the
adverse claimant, under the act of April 2C>. 1882. must be verified before
an authorized officer within the land district where the adverse claim is
situated, in accordance with the provisions of said section 2335.
Where the oath to an adverse claim is made by the agent of the adverse claim-
ant outside of the land district, although before a notary public whose juris-
diction extends throughout a county lying partly within and partly without
the land district, such adverse claim is not properly verified within the
meaning of said section 2335.
Departmental decision in case of Lonergan v. Shockley, 33 L. D.. 238, in so far
as in conflict with this decision, overruled.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( Y. L. C.) Office, December 26, 1905. (A. B. P.)
This is a motion by the Treasury Tunnel, Mining and Reduction
Company for review of departmental decision of May 12, 1905, in
the case of William F. Mattes against said company (33 L. D., 553),
wherein it was held that an alleged adverse claim filed by the Com-
pany against the application for patent by Mattes to the Iron Side,
and seventeen other lode mining claims, survey No. 15,342, Durango,
Colorado, was not upon oath, as required by the statute, and was there-
fore invalid and without force or effect to stay the proceedings upon
the patent application. From the facts as then presented, and undis-
puted, it appeared that the agent of the Treasury Company had
pretended to make oath to the so-called adverse claim by the use of a
telephone. He was at the time twelve miles distant from the officer,
who attempted to administer the oath over the telephone. The
Department held that an oath could not be legally administered
in such manner, and that the requirement of the statute in this respect
had not been complied with.
The motion for review is accompanied by the affidavits of the agent
of the Treasury Company and twTo of its attorneys, which affidavits
are to the effect that the agent in fact made oath to the adverse claim
before the notary, in Ouray, Colorado, on the evening of August 25,
1902, and that it was after the oath had been administered and not
before, as was represented to be the fact when the decision complained
of was rendered, 'that the question arose as to the legality of an oath
taken outside of the land district in which the claim is situated, which
resulted in the agent going the next day into the land district and
there undertaking to make the oath by the use of a telephone.
The contentions of the motion for review are in substance as
follows:
1. That the Department erred in holding the adverse claim by the
Treasury Company not to have been legally verified by the proceed-
ings over the telephone.
2. That under the additional facts set forth in the affidavits now
filet 1 the adverse claim should be held to have been actually swTorn to
by the agent of the company in the presence of the notary, and thus
legally verified.
:'). Thai in any event the Department, in its discretion, should stay
the patent proceedings until the suit instituted in court by the com
panv shall be determined.
The matters involved in the firsl and third contentions were care-
fully considered when the decision complained of was rendered, and
;is to them it is sufficient to say that the Department i^ not convinced
by anything in the motion, or in the brief of counsel accompanying
the same, that its ruling or. either of the points was wrong.
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The second contention is based upon the assertion, now made for
the first time, that the agent of the Treasury Company in fact made
oath to the adverse claim in the presence of the notary. The transac-
tion is stated to have occurred outside of the land district.
Conceding that the formal proceedings usually attending the
administration of an oath were actually had, the question is presented
as to the legal sufficiency, under the mining laws, of an affidavit, by
the agent of an adverse claimant, executed before an officer outside of
the land district where the claim to which the affidavit relates is
situated.
The United States mining laws are contained in chapter six, title
thirty-two, of the Revised Statutes, embracing sections 2318 to 2352,
inclusive, and in certain acts of Congress relating to mineral iands and
mining resources passed since the enactment of the Revised Statutes.
By section 2326 it is required that " where an adverse claim is filed
.... it shall be upon oath of the person or persons making the same,,
and shall show the nature, boundaries, and extent " thereof, etc. Sec-
tion 2335 provides, among other things, that
—
All affidavits required to be made under this chapter may be verified before
any officer authorized to administer oaths within the land district where the
claims may be situated, and all testimony and proofs may be taken before any
such officer, and, when duly certified by the officer taking the same, shall have
the same force and effect as if taken before the register and receiver of the land-
office.
By act of April 26, 1882 (22 Stat., 49), it is provided
:
That the adverse claim required by section twenty-three hundred and
twenty-six of the Revised Statutes may be verified by the oath of any duly au-
thorized agent or attorney in fact of the adverse claimant cognizant of the facts
stated ; and the adverse claimant, if residing or at the time being beyond the
limits of the district wherein the claim is situated, may make oath to the ad-
verse claim before the clerk of any court of record of the United States or of the
State or Territory where the adverse claimant may then be, or before any notary
public of such State or Territory.
Sec. 2. That applicants for mineral patents, if residing beyond the limits of
the district wherein the claim is situated, may make any oath or affidavit
required for proof of citizenship before the clerk of any court of record, or
before any notary public of any State or Territory.
This act does not state where the agent of the adverse claimant
may make oath to the adverse claim, or designate any officer who
may administer it. For authority in this respect resort must be had
to the provision of section 2335 that " all affidavits required to be
made under this chapter may be verified before any officer authorized
to administer oaths within the land district where the claims may be
situated." This general provision embraces all affidavits under the
mining laws except where authority for their execution is otherwise
specifically given by statute.
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AVhile the oath of the agent of the adverse claimant in this case
was made before a notary public outside of the land district where
the claim to which the oath relates is situated, it appears that the
jurisdiction of the notary, which was coextensive with his county,
extended into and embraced a part of the land district. This, it is
contended, is sufficient to bring the execution of the oath writhin the
authority of section 2335. In other wTords, the contention is, in
effect, that under that section any officer authorized to administer
oaths, whose jurisdiction extends into and embraces any part of
a land district, may, anywhere within his jurisdiction outside of the
land district, administer oaths required under the mining laws relat-
ing to claims situated within such land district.
To support this contention the recent case of Lonergan v. Shockley
(33 L. D., 238) is cited. That was a case where an application for
patent and certain affidavits filed therewith were sworn to outside of
the land district Avhere the claims applied for were situated, before a
notary public whose jurisdiction extended into a part of the land
district. The Department, citing the case of Corning Tunnel,
Mining & Reduction Company v. Pell et al., decided February 17.
1877 (Sickels' Mining Laws and Decisions, 307, 308), and assuming
the same to be controlling authority, held, without discussion, that
the application and affidavits were properly verified. In the cited
case, the Department, speaking through Secretary Chandler, of the
above provision of section 2335, said
:
I am of the opinion that under this statute an officer authorized to admin-
fster out lis within the land district may administer the same without the district,
but within the jurisdiction.
Counsel have not referred to any other reported case of similar
import, and none has been discovered after diligent research. On the
other hand, it appears that shortly after the passage of the act of
April 26, 1882, rules and regulations for the enforcement of its pro-
visions were adopted by the Department, wherein, amongst other
things, it was provided (Circular of May 9, 1882, 1 L. D., 685) that:
The agent or attorney-in-fact must make the affidavit in verification of the
adverse claim within the land district where the claim is situated.
This rule has existed ever since its adoption without change or
modification. The Department is advised, through informal inquiry
at your office, that it has been continuously and consistently enforced,
and that, regarding it as an authoritative interpretation of section
2335, the uniform practice of your office for more than twenty years
has been to require all affidavits under the mining laws, except where
otherwise specially provided, to be verified before an authorized
officer within the land district' where the claims to which the affidavits
relate are situated.
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It needs no argument to show that the adoption of the rule involved
a consideration and construction of section 2335. No officer is desig-
nated by the act before whom affidavits of agents or attorneys-in-fact
of adverse claimants may be executed, and the verification of such
affidavits necessarily falls within the general authority of section
2335.
Nor is argument required to prove that the two constructions of
the section are inconsistent. The fact that the construction of 1877
related to affidavits by adverse claimants themselves, and that of 1882
to affidavits by agents or attorneys-in-fact of adverse claimants, can
make no difference. In both instances the affidavits are verified
under the same authority, except, as provided in the act of 1882,
where the adverse claimant resides or is at the time beyond the
limits of the district wherein the claim is situated; and it would be
manifestly inconsistent to enforce one rule as to the verification of
affidavits by adverse claimants not residing or at the time being
beyond the limits of the district, and another and different rule as
to the verification of affidavits by agents or attorneys-in-fact of
adverse claimants.
.The important question is whether the construction of 1877 or that
of 1882 shall prevail. Upon careful and mature consideration of the
Avhole subject the Department is of opinion that the latter is the
true construction. It is in harmony with the ordinary and natural
meaning of the language of the statute, and is believed to give effect
to the legislative intention. Congress evidently had in mind both the
jurisdiction within which, and the officer before whom, the affidavits
were to be verified. Naturally, the jurisdiction would be one of federal
creation and control ; and it is expressly stated to be the land-district
where the mining claims may be situated. The officer is any person
authorized to administer oaths within such district. The reasonable
and natural interpretation is that it was intended the verification
should take place within the land-district ; that is, before any officer
within the land district who has authority, under either the federal or
local laws, to administer oaths.
This was the view taken of the matter by the Department when the
statute was first enacted. It was originally a part of the act of July
9, 1870 (16 Stat., 217), was reproduced in the act of May 10, 1872 (17
Stat., 91, 95), and was thereafter incorporated in the Revised Statutes.
The language is the same throughout. The question of its construc-
tion first came before the Department, so far as the reported decisions
show, in the case of The Dardanelles Mining Company v. The Cali-
fornia Mining Company, decided October 18, 1873 (Copp's U. S.
Mining Decisions, 161-162). It was there stated and held as follows:
The instructions issued under the act of July 26, 1866, required all affidavits
to be made before the Register or Receiver.
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The acts of July 0, 1870, and May 10, 1872, authorized them to be made before
any officer within the land district who has authority to administer an oath.
This was done, doubtless, for the convenience of applicants, and the author-
ity was limited to the land district, so as to make it practicable to punish those
who might be guilty of perjury in making the oath.
As contemporaneous construction this interpretation by the Execu-
tive Department whose duty it is to administer the law is entitled to
weighty consideration; and especially so in view of the fact that
except for the short period from 1877 to 1882 such construction has
been uniformly followed. Having so long prevailed, it should not
be now departed from unless for very strong reasons, and none are
apparent.
Moreover, this view is strengthened by a consideration of the subse-
quent legislation by Congress on the subject. By the further provi-
sions of the act of 1882 it is declared
:
(1) That the adverse claimant, if residing or at the time being
"beyond the limits of the district wherein the claim is situated, may
make the required oath before the clerk of any court of record of the
United States or of the State or Territory where the adverse claimant
may then be, or before any notary public of such State or Territory
;
and
(2) That an applicant for mineral patent, if residing beyond the
limits of the district wherein the claim is situated, may make any
oath or affidavit required for proof of citizenship before the clerk of
any court of record, or before any notary public of any State or
[Territory.
From this legislation it is evident that, at the time of its enactment,
Congress entertained the view that affidavits required by the mining
laws could not be lawfully verified under section 2335, the only
authority then existing on the subject, elsewhere than within the land
district where the claims to which the affidavits related were situated.
Such is the inference to be drawn from the provisions allowing oaths
in the two specified instances to be made without the land district; in
the one instance, where the affiant resided or was at the time beyond
the limits of the district, and in the other, where the affiant resided
beyond the limits of the district.
Again, by the act of January 22, 1880 (21 Stat., 01), section 2325
of the Ivevised Statutes was amended by adding thereto the proviso:
Tbat where the claimant for a patent is not a resident of or within the land
district wherein the vein, lode, ledge, or deposit sought to be patented is located,
the application for patent and the affidavits required to be made in this section
by the claimant for such patent may be made by his. her. or its authorized
agent, where said agent is conversant with the facts sought to be established
by said affidavits.
By this act authority is given the agent of a claimant for pateitt to
make the affidavits only where the claimant is not a resident of or
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within the land district (Rico Lode, 8 L. D., 223) ; and the natural
inference is that it was in the mind of Congress when the act was
passed that affidavits by the claimant for patent were required to be
made within the land district.
From this review of the statute and its history it appears that the
construction of 1882 accords with that first given by the Department,
in 1873, and is in harmony with the ordinary and natural meaning of
the language used; that the legislation on the subject since the statute
wTas enacted is strongly indicative that such construction gives to the
law its intended effect; and that the uniform practice from 1873 to
1877 and from 1882 to the present time has been to require all affida-
vits under the mining laws, except where otherwise specially pro-
vided, to be verified within the land district where the claims to which
they relate are situated.
It is unnecessary to continue the discussion further. In view of
what has been said, even admitting the statute to be reasonably sus-
ceptible of either of the two interpretations, if it were a matter of
first impressions, it is clearly the duty of the Department now to
adhere to the construction which was first adopted, and which,
except for the brief period stated, has been uniformly followed ever
since. The motion for review is accordingly denied. The case of
Lonergan v. Shockley, in so far as in conflict with the views herein
expressed, is hereby overruled.
mill site—contiguity to vein or lode claim-section 2337, r. s.
Brick Pomeroy Mill Site.
The provision of section 2337 of the Revised Statutes that : " Where non-mineral
land not contiguous to the vein or lode is used or occupied by the proprietor
of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such non-adjacent sur-
face ground may be embraced and included in an application for a patent
for such vein or lode, and the same may be patented therewith, subject to
the same preliminary requirements as to survey and notice as are applicable
to veins or lodes," construed. Held: The words "vein or lode," in said
section, are not used in the restricted sense of indicating a body of mineral,
or mineral-bearing rock, in place, only, but are used in the larger sense of
designating a located vein or lode claim, and that only non-mineral land not
contiguous to a vein or lode claim may be appropriated for mill-site pur-
poses.
Direction given that all applications for mill-site patents which may be made
and carried to entry before July 1, 1906, or which may, by protest or other-
wise, without the fault of the applicant, be prevented from being carried to
entry before that date, where the locations of the claims were made and per-
fected under the law in all other respects prior to January 1, 1904, shall
be adjudicated, in respect to the matter of contiguity of the mill-site
claims to vein or lode claims, under the practice which prevailed in the
General Land Office prior to the departmental ruling in the case of Alaska
Copper Company.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Lund
( V. L. C.)
'
Office, Beet rriber 26, 1905. (A. B. P.)
December 23, L903, the Hehson Creek Lead Mines Company made
entry for the Brick Pomeroy, Wall Street, and Amazon lode-mining
claims, including the Brick Pomeroy mill-site, survey No. 16478 A &
B, Gunnison, Colorado. The mill-site, which is in the form of a tri-
angle, adjoins the Brick Pomeroy lode claim, its northwesterly bound-
ary line, throughout its length, being identical with the southeasterly
side line of the lode claim.
By decision of September 20, 1904, your office directed that the com-
pany he called upon to show cause why its entry should not be can-
celed as to the mill-site, because of the contiguity of such mill-site to
one of the lode claims embraced in the entry, and held that in default
of such showing and of appeal, the entry would he canceled. The
company has appealed here.
The law allowing entry and patent for mill-site claims, is contained
in section 2337 of the Revised Statutes, which provides:
Sec. 2337.- Where non-mineral land nol contiguous to the vein or lode is used
or occupied by the proprietor of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes,
such non-adjacent surface-ground may be embraced and included in an applica-
tion for a patent for such vein or lode, and the same may be patented therewith,
subject to the same preliminary requirements as to survey and notice as are
applicable to veins or lodes ; but no location hereafter made of such non-adjacent
land shall exceed live acres, and payment for the same must be made at the
same rate as fixed by this chapter for the superficies of the lode. The owner of
a quartz mill or reduction-works, not owning a mine in connection therewith,
may also receive a patent for his mill-site, as provided in this section.
In the case of Alaska Copper Company (32 L. I).. 128), this statute
wih considered, and with respect thereto the Department stated and
held as follows (p. 131) :
A further and equally fatal objection to the entry, with respect to the mill-site
Claims, lies in the fact that these claims are contiguous, as a group, to the group
Of lode claims with which they are claimed. The statute in terms permits only
"non-mineral land, not contiguous to the vein or lode." to be appropriated for
mill-site purposes, and only "such non-adjacent surface ground" to be embraced
and included in an application for patent for the lode claim, and limits the area
of "such non-adjacent land'* to live acres. These terms are too plain to invite
discussion. In this case the lode and mill-site claims form one continuous, unin-
terrupted group, in manifest contravention of the plain terms of the statute.
The contentions of the appellant are. in substance: (1) that a con-
struction of this statute was not necessary to the decision of the
Alaska Copper Company case, and what was said with respect thereto
was therefore obiter and not binding; (2) that the previous practice
of your office had been for years to allow entry and patent for mill-
sites contiguous to vein or lode claims, in view whereof and of the
rule stare decisis, the construction given in that case, even if not
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obiter, is wrong and should not be followed: and (3) that such con-
struction, as an original proposition, is contrary to the statute, and
therefore erroneous.
1. Whether a number of mill-site claims lying contiguous, as a
group, to a group of lode claims could be lawfully included in an
entry embracing the lode claim-, was one of the questions squarely
presented by the record in the Alaska Copper Company case. To
pass upon that question it was necessary to construe the statute pro-
viding for entry and patent of mill-site claims, and one of the results
of such construction is stated in that part of the decision quoted
above. The opinion expressed was in no sense an obitt r dictum, but
was a direct departmental adjudication of the question, and was
rightfully given force and effect as such, by your office.
2. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the a>sumption that
the rules of law to which it applies have been previously determined
by a tribunal having final jurisdiction of the questions involved.
While, perhaps, of doubtful application in any event to a ruling or
decision by an executive department of the government construing
an act of Congress, for the reason that the Supreme Court is the tri- I
bunal of ultimate jurisdiction in such matters, the doctrine has been
frequently recognized and applied by this Department in disposing
of cases that involved principles established by its own prior deci-
sions of long standing, where such decisions have been uniformly
followed.
But such is not the situation here. The appellant has not cited
any decision by this Department where the statute in question was
con-trued differently from the construction given in the Alaska Cop
per Company case, and no such decision has been found, reported or
unreported. The doctrine of stare decisis can therefore have no
application to this case.
3. The contention which assails the correctness of the ruling on this
question in the Alaska Copper Company case is. in substance and
effect, that there is nothing in the statute to prevent the entry and
patent, for mill-site purposes, of land lying contiguous to a vein or
lode claim, provided the land be not contiguous to the vein or lode/
that is. that the words " vt in or lode." used in the statute in this con-
nection, must be construed to mean the body of mineral, or mineral-
bearing rock, in place, as distinguished from the located claim em-
bracing it: and that only land lying contiguous to such body of
mineral, or mineral-bearing rock, may not be patented for mill-site
purposes.
It is not believed that this contention can be sustained upon any
ba>is of sound reasoning. To so interpret the statute would be. in
the opinion of the Department, to disregard its spirit and plain intent.
It is clear from the section read as a whole that the words " vein or
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lode." in this connection, arc not used in the restricted sense of indi-
cating a body of mineral, or mineral bearing rock, in place, only, but
are used and intended to be understood in the larger sense, not in-
frequently applied to them in the mining laws, of designating a
located vein or lode claim. Further on in the section these same
words arc unmistakably used in the Larger sense here stated, and in
such intimate and direct connection with their use in the earlier part
of the section as conclusively to show that their earlier use was in the
same larger sense. For instance, one of the later provisions of the
section is that the mill-site "may be embraced and included in an
application for patent for such vein or lode, and the same may be
patented therewith, subject to the same preliminary requirements as
to survey and notice as are applicable to veins or lodes:" clearly
meaning, by the words " application for patent for such vein or lode "
the same thing intended to he described by the woral " vein or lode*'
in the earlier part of the section, with respect to which it is provided
that the land in the mill-site must be " not contiguous." The portions
of the mining laws which provide for obtaining patents to vein or
lode claims upon the public mineral land- (Sees. 2325 and 2326 of the
Revised Statute-) describes what may be patented thereunder as "a
piece of land " which has been " claimed and located " for mining
purposes, and as ** the claim or claims in common." the boundaries of
which " shall be distinctly marked on the ground." etc. As to the
dimensions of vein or lode claims it is provided (Sec. 2320) that they
" may equal, hut shall not exceed, one thousand five hundred feet in
length along the vein or lode" and may extend not to exceed "three
hundred feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface."
etc. Construing section 2337 together with the other sections referred
to. all relating to the same general subject, it is clear that the words
" vein or lode." several times used in section 2337, are intended to he
understood in each instance in the larger sense indicating the location
or claim, rather than in the restricted sen^e of indicating a body of
mineral, or mineralized rock, in place, technically known as a vein or
lode.
Tin- view finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in
the recent case of Calhoun Gold Mining Company v. Ajax Gold
Mining Company (182 CJ. S., 499, 505), wherein was involved that
part of section 2336 of the Revised Statute- which provides that
'"where two or more veins intellect or cross each other, priority of
title shall govern, and such prior location -hall he entitled to all ore
or mineral contained within the -pace of intersection." The ^no-
tion was whether in a case of intersecting or cross veins located by
different parties at different times the provision giving to the prior
locator all ore or mineral within the spact of intersection constitutes
a limitation upon the provision of section 2322 which gives to
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locators of mining claims (where there are no conflicting prior loca-
tions) " the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the
surface included within the lines of their locations, and all veins,
lodes, and ledges throughout their entire length, the top or apex of
which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically."
The court held that the provisions of the two sections are not in
conflict, thus giving to the word " veins," used in section 2336, the
larger meaning of indicating vein locations or vein claims, rather
than indicating bodies of mineral, or mineral bearing rock, in place,
technically known as veins or lodes; and to the words "space of
intersection," the larger sense of indicating the conflict between the
intersecting or cross-locations, rather than indicating the point of
intersection of the bodies of mineral, or mineral bearing rock, upon
which the locations were based.
There are other considerations which support the view here taken.
Under the terms of section 2337 only non-mineral land may be em-
braced in a mill-site. In full, the descriptive terms of the statute
are, " non-mineral land not contiguous to the vien or lode," further
described as "such non-adjacent surface ground," and as "such non-
adjacent land. 1 * Under the mining laws, other than section 2337,
onl}< mineral land may be lawfully located and patented for mining
purposes. The word " adjacent," as generally defined and under-
stood, means lying near, or close, but not actually touching. " Non-
adjacent," representing the contrary or opposite situation, means not
near, not close. Considering therefore, that land, to be included in a
vein or lode location, and patented as such under the mining laws,
must be mineral land, and that land claimed for mill-site purposes,
to be lawfully " included in an application for patent for such vein
or lode,
1
' must be non-mineral land, and that the further descriptive
terms of the statute are that the " land " or " surface ground " of
the mill-site must be non adjacent, that is, not near or close, to the
" vein or lode," there would seem to be no room for reasonable ques-
tion that the words " vein or lode " in the statute, are used in the
larger sense hereinbefore indicated, rather than in their strictly
technical sense, and that mill-sites, within the meaning of the statute,
are intended to be situated some distance from, and in the manner of
their location wholly distinct from, the lines of vein or lode loca-
tions or claims. What the distance should be is a matter as to
which there can be no hard and fast rule, applicable to all cases.
The statute should be applied to cases as they arise in such reason-
able and just manner as to give effect to its spirit and intent, and so as
not to leave narrow strips of the public lands incapable of disposal
under any other of the public land laws, a result which it is not to
be presumed was within the contemplation of Congress.
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It is unnecessary to continue the discussion further. The Depart-
ment sees no reason to depart from the principle of the construction
announced in the Alaska Copper Company case, and the -ana- is ad-
hered to.
In view of the practice which obtained in your office prior to the
decision in that case, the Department, on August 17. 1 (.>04. in response
to your recommendation, directed thai in cases of mill-site claims,
where the required survey had been made before the date of said
decision, and as t<> which payment and. entry under applications for
patent were made during the year L903, the -aid prior practice, with
respect to the question of contiguity of lode and mill-site claims,
should govern. Further considering the situation, in the light of the
circumstances presented in this case, the Department is of opinion
that it would he hut just to vein or lode claimants who. before the
date of the decision aforesaid, or within such reasonable time there-
after a- would be required to give general publicity to that decision
throughout the public land states, had or have, in accordance with
and in reliance upon the -aid prior practice of your office, incurred the
expense of perfecting their mill-site location-, in a lawful manner in
all respects except a- to the contiguity thereof to vein or lode claim-.
should be afforded an opportunity to carry their said locations to
entry and patent under the said prior practice, for the reason that
otherwise they would, in most cases, if not in all. be compelled to
sutler the loss of their entile mill-site claim-. Direction is accord-
ingly hereby given that all applications for mill-site patents which
may be made and carried to entry before July 1. L906, or which may.
by protest or otherwise, without the fault of the applicant, be pre-
vented from being carried to entry before that date, where the loca-
tions of the claim- were made and perfected under the law in all
other respects prior t<> January 1. L904, shall be adjudicated, in
respect to the matter of the contiguity of the mill-site claims to vein
or lode claims, under the -aid prior practice of your office. All other
cases will be adjudicated in accordance with the ruling in the
Alaska Copper Company case; and the principles herein announced.
As the present case fall- within this direction, the decision appealed
from i- modified to allow ii^ adjudication in the manner stated.
mining claim—mill. site section \!:i:$7 of the revised statutes.
Hard ('ami and Otheb Mill Site Claims.
Section 2337 <>r the Revised Statutes contemplates that m the time application
is made lor paten.1 to a mill-site claim the land embraced therein is being
used or occupied for mining or milling purposes.
Beetion '2:\'M does not contemplate that patent may he obtained lor :i sep-
arate mill site for each of a group of Contiguous lode claims held and
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worked under a common ownership, and where more than one mill site
is applied for in connection with a group of lode claims a sufficient and
satisfactory reason therefor must he shown.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) December 27, 1905. (G. N. B.)
August 27, 1903, the Giant Ledge Gold and Copper Company made
entry for the Hard Cash, Athens, Morning Star, and Miama mill-
site claims, survey No. 4110, Independence, California, containing
19.45 acres. It appears that the mill-sites are applied for in connec-
tion with four lode mining claims of the same names, situated about a
half mile distant. The records of your office show that the four lode
claims were included in mineral entry No. 295, made by the said com-
pany August 19, 1902, patent upon which was issued May 3, 1904.
May 27, 1904, your office directed the local officers to notify the
company that it would be allowed sixty days from notice within
which to show cause why the entry for the mill-site claims should
not be canceled for the reasons, (1) that there is no evidence in the
record to show that they are used or occupied for mining or milling
purposes, and (2) that notice was posted on but one of the mill-site
claims. It was stated that on failure to make the required showing
within the time named the entry would be canceled without further
notice.
In response to the requirement respecting the use or occupation
of the mill-sites for mining or milling purposes, an affidavit executed
by the president of the company, and one executed by the deputy
surveyor who surveyed the claims, were filed, in which, taken to-
gether, among other things, it is stated, in substance and effect, that
the topography of the claims embraced in the entry is such that it is
not possible to erect a proper reduction plant on the scale contem-
plated on a less area than is contained in all of the four mill-sites,
but that all four of the mill-sites are required for the buildings and
storage necessary, and for the accumulation of water essential for the
operation of any works built under plans now formulated, and await-
ing only the question of title to the land; that there is no other tract
of land than that coATered by the mill-site claims suitable to produce
the water for a reduction works; that two of the mill-site claims are
crossed by a granite dyke which forms a natural submerged dam that
can be added to at comparatively small cost, and thereby create a
reservoir of great capacity ; that wells have been sunk on three of the
mill-sites to supply water for storage and milling purposes; and that
ore from each lode claim is being stored on the mill-site of corre-
sponding name.
The response to the requirement respecting the posting of notice,
is an argument filed by local counsel for the company, in which it is
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contended that as a matter of law posting on one only of a number of
mill-site claims, included in one application for patent, is sufficient.
November 8, 1904, your office found that the use and occupation of
the mill-sites as shown by the affidavits svas sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the statute, hut held that notice of application for
patent must be posted on each mill-site claim, and the entry was
therefore held for cancellation, except as to the Miama mill-site.
The company has appealed to the Department.
The first question presented by the record, and which should be first
determined, though not directly brought in issue by the appeal, is,
whether the use or occupation of the mill-sites for mining or milling
purposes, as shown by the affidavits, is such as to satisfy the requir< -
ments of the statute.
The portion of section 2337 of the Revised Statutes here applicable
is as follows
:
Where non-mineral land not contiguous to the vein or lode is used or occupied
by the proprietor of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such non-
tidjacenl surface-ground may he embraced and included >n an application for a
patent for such vein or lode, and the same may be patented therewith, subject
t<> the same preliminary requirements ;is t<> survey and notice as are applicable
to veins or hxles; hut no location hereafter made of such non-adjacent land
shall exceed live acres, and payment for the same must he made at the same
pate as tixed by this chapter for the superfices of the lode.
The statute clearly contemplates that at the time the application for
patent is made the land included in the mill-site claim is used or occu-
pied for mining or milling purposes. Some step in or directly con-
nected with the process of mining or some feature of milling must be
performed upon, or some recognized agency of operative mining or
milling must occupy, tin mill-site at the time application for patent
is Hied. (Alaska Topper Company, 32 L. I).. 128, 131.) So far as
the record in this case shows, aside from the digging of three wells.
nothing has been done on the mill-sites. The (lesion to Use all of
them for the purpose of a reservoir for water, and the building of a
reduction work's, is not the present active employment of any mining
agency upon the land or the direct use of it for milling purposes.
Neither is the storing of ore upon each mill-site, under the circum-
stances of this case, such a use of the land as to warrant the entry and
patent of the four mill-sites. It was stated in the Alaska Copper
Company case, supra, p. L30, that " whilst no fixed rule can well be
established, it seems plain that ordinarily one mill-site affords abun-
dant facility for the promotion of mining operations upon a single
body of lode claims." It follows that if more than one mill-site is
applied for in connection with a group of lode claims, a sufficient and
satisfactory reason therefor must be shown. The storage of a quan-
tity of ore upon each of the four mill-sites in this case, where there is
nothing to show but that the area embraced in one of them would be
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ample for such storage, is but a mere colorable use of the mill-sites,
which does not satisfy the requirements of the statute.
It thus appearing that the mill-site claims are not used or occu-
pied for mining or milling purposes in connection with the lode claim
as required by law, the entry must be cancelled. This much deter-
mined, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the question of the suffi-
ciency of the posted notice.
The decision of your office is modified to conform to the views
herein expressed.
REPAYMENT-PARAGRAPH 13, INSTRUCTIONS OP JANUARY 22, 1901.
William B. Ardouin.
While paragraph 13 of the instructions governing repayments, approved Jan-
uary 22, 1901, provides that " where there has been a conveyance of the land
and the original purchaser applies for repayment, he must show that he has
indemnified his assignee or perfected the title in him through another
source, or produce a full reconveyance to himself from the last grantee
or assignee," any successor of such original purchaser in a line of convey-
ances is equally within the reason of the rule and should be given the same
standing as his grantor.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Lund
(F. L. C) ' Office, December 28, 1905. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by William B. Ardouin, assignee of
Charles A. Nichols, from the decision of your office of January 5,
1905, denying his application for repayment of the purchase money
paid bv said Nichols on cash entry No. 7452 for the NW. J NE. J,
N. i NW. i, Sec. 34, and NE. J NE. J, Sec. 33, T. 55 N., R. 10 W.,
Duluth, Minnesota.
The entry was made December 30, 1884, and Nichols deeded the
land to Ardouin November 4, 1887, and the latter to John Daly, Henry
A. Sampson and William Scott November 11, 1887. The entry was
canceled December 21, 1888, " for failure to comply with the law as to
residence, such failure being apparent at date of entry," as stated by
your office. With his application for repayment Ardouin files a quit-
claim deed covering the land in question executed by him to the
United States; an affidavit that he has not been indemnified by his
grantor, Nichols, for the failure of title, and that title has not been
perfected in him by his said grantor or other party through other
sources ; a certificate of the register of deeds of the county where the
land is situated, stating that his records show said land to have been
deeded by Nichols to Ardouin and by him to Daly, Sampson and
Scott, and that the records do not show any other deed, either of sale
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or incumbrance, affecting the title of said parties, between the dates
of December 30, L884, and December 21, 1888; and the following in-
strument, dated June 11. 11)00:
Know all men by These presents, That John Daley, Henry A. Sampson and
William Scott parties of the firsl part in consideration of the sum of two hun-
dred fifty dollars to them in hand paid l»y William P.. Ardouin party of the
second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have remised, released
mid forever discharged and by these presents do for themselves their heirs and
legal representatives remise, release and forever discharge the said William B.
Ardouin, his heirs, executors and administrators from every liability and obliga-
tion incurred by reason of any covenants or agreements contained in that certain
warranty deed dated November 11th. 1887, made by William P.. Ardouin, single,
to the said John I>aley. Henry A. Sampson and William Scott, purporting to con-
vey the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section thirty-three, the
northwest quarter of northeast quarter and the north one-half of the northwest
quarter of section thirty-four, township fifty-five north of range ten west of the
Fourth Principal Meridian, in Lake County. Minnesota, which deed was re-
corded in the office of the Register of Deeds in and for Lake County, Minnesota,
on the 16th day of November, 1887, in book E of deeds on page 172; intending
hereby to release the s.-ud William B. Ardouin from all liability by reason of any
covenants contained in said warranty deed.
This instrument it is claimed meets the requirements of paragraph
Li. Instructions Governing- Repayments (30 L. D., 430, 434), which
provides
:
When there has been a conveyance of the land and the original purchaser
applies for repayment, he must show that he has indemnified his assignee or
perfected the title in him through another source, or produce a full reconvey-
ance to himself from the last grantee or assignee.
While the instrument presented is open to criticism on the score
that il doc- not in terms waive right to repayment and also does not
in terms reconvey the land, it may however be accepted as proof of
indemnification by Ardouin of his assignee and as sufficient compli-
ance with the rule in that respect. While the rule mentions only the
" original purchaser," any successor of such original purchaser in
B line of conveyances is equally within the reason of the rule and
should be given the same standing as his grantor. The applicant
hero having shown that he has indemnified his assignee and that he
has not been indemnified by his grantor for the failure of title, has
thereby demonstrated his right to receive the money, if it be a proper
case for repayment. Your office did not express any opinion on this
Question.
The decision appealed from is vacated and tin 4 papers are returned
for further consideration with a view to allowance of the applicaion
for repayment if the showing upon the merits bring the case within
the statute.
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homestead entry-qualifications of entryman.
De Wolf v. Moore.
In case of a contest against a homestead entry based upon the charge that the
entryman is disqualified to make entry by reason of being the owner of 160
acres of land, proof of the technical vesting in the entryman. by devise or
operation of law, of a naked legal title that is. or may he. subject to out-
standing claims against the estate of the person from whom the title moves]
will not. in itself, be held to disqualify the entryman who thus acquires the
title, but it must be further shown that the title so acquired is a bene-
ficial one.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) * Office, December 88, 1905. (E. P.)
William H. DeWolf, heir of Dawn M. DeWolf, deceased, has filed
a motion for review of departmental decision rendered May 18,
1905, in the case of Dawn M. DeWolf v. Nellie R. Moore (not re-
ported), modifying* your office decision of August 1, 1904, and holding
that the evidence submitted at the hearing had in said case was
insufficient to sustain the charge that the defendant was disqualified
by reason of being the owner of one hundred and sixty acres of land
from making entry of the NE. J of Sec. 18, T. 2 S., R. 11 W., Lawton
land district, Oklahoma, but authorizing a rehearing.
The facts in the case are sufficiently stated in the decision under
review, and will not be here repeated except incidentally in passing
upon the points raised in the motion.
In the motion it is contended that
:
The record shows a complete chain of title from the United States to J. C.
Moore for this 320 acres in California. The deed to Moore was executed by
one Harry M. Shreve and is to " J. C. Moore of Rockford. County of Floyd,
State of Iowa." The record here shows that J. C. Moore, the husband of the
defendant, lived at Rockford, Floyd Co.. Iowa, his will having been admitted
to probate in said county. This alone, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, would identify the husband of the defendant as the owner of said
land.
It appears from the record herein that the defendant's late hus-
band was named John C. Moore, and that in his will, executed June
24, 1896, he described himself as " J. C Moore, of Rockford. Floyd
County, Iowa,'' but proof that the California land was on February
24, 1888, conveyed to one " J. C Moore, County of Floyd, State of
Iowa," does not raise the presumption that said land was conveyed
to the defendant's husband, for the reasons:
(1) The fact that the family name and initials are the same raises
no presumption that the parties are the same. (Louden v. Walpole,
1 Ind., 321; Bennett v. Libhart, 27 Mich., 489; Lidclen y. Hodnett,
22 Fla., 442; Andrews v. Wynn, 4 S. D., 40, 54 N. W. Rep., 1047:
Gardiner v. McClure, G Minn., 167. 176.)
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(2) From proof of the fact that the defendant's husband was domi-
ciled at Rockford, Floyd County. Iowa, in 1896, it cannot be presumed
that he lived at that place in 1888. Presumptions are not retro-
spective. The law never raises from the proof of the existence of a
present condition or state of independent facts any presumption that
the same condition of facts existed at a prior date. (Windhaus /'.
Bootz, 92Cal., 617; State v. Hubbard, 60 Iowa, 466 ; Blank v. Livonia
Township. 7i> Mich.. 1.)
Counsel in his brief sets forth the following testimony given by
the defendant :
(}. What do you know about the land referred to in the testimony for the
contestant ;is being situated in California?—A. I don't know but very little
about it. There has never been anything done about it.
<,). Has it ever been divided between the heirs?—A. No sir.
Q. Any steps been taken to administer upon that part of the estate?—A. Xo
sir.
and says
—
There is an express admission by the defendant that the California land
was a part of her husbands estate. Reference in the first question is made
expivssly to the land referred to in the testimony for the eontestant as being
in California. The land so referred to is the 320 acres above described. If
Mrs. Moore was not the owner of one-third of that land she had the bes'1
opportunity in the world to so state in tins part of her testimony.
The testimony above set forth is the only testimony in the ease
relied upon to show that the defendant's husband ever had title to
the said tract of land in California. This testimony contains no
admission: it is merely a statement of want of knowledge, and the
Department would not he justified, in view of its indefiniteness, in
assuming or deducing therefrom anything more than ignorance of
the matters inquired about, particularly in view of the fact that no
ellort whatever was made by the contestant, by way of cross-examina-
tion, to elicit further information on this point, the only question
asked the defendant on cross-examination being one relating exclu-
sively to the land in Towa set apart to her.
Moreover, the defendant testified at the hearing that she had not,
since the death of her husband, owned in her own right, any land
except that set apart to her in Iowa, as hereinbefore stated, and the
tract involved herein. In view of this testimony, the Department
is of opinion that, if it were proved, as contended by the contestant,
that the defendant's husband died seized of the California land
referred to. there was cast upon the contestant the burden of proving
that the defendant took a beneficial interest in said California land.
that is to say. something more than a mere naked legal title thereto
that might, so far as is disclosed by the record herein, be wholly
defeated by the assertion of 'claims against her husband's estate
having priority over hers. No such showing was made on behalf
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of the contestant. The Department does not believe that proof of
the technical vesting in an entryman by devise or by operation of
law of a naked legal title that is, or may be, subject to outstanding
claims against the estate of the person from whom the title moves,
should, upon a contest, be held to disqualify the entryman who thus
acquires the title, but that it should be further shown that the title
so acquired was a beneficial one. In short, in order to work a for-
feiture of this valuable right of entry, there should be some proof
of the alleged disqualification ; not mere theories, surmises or prob-
abilities with no support other than inference dubiously drawn from a
fragment of the testimony.
It is asserted in the brief filed in support of the motion that the
land in Iowa (122^ acres) set apart to the defendant as her share of
her husband's real property situated in Iowa, passed to her under the
terms of her husband's will, and it is urged that this, together with
the established facts
t
that Moore's estate in Iowa had been fully ad-
ministered by the defendant and that the records disclosed no mort-
gage upon the California land, must be accepted as proof that all of
Moore's debts had been satisfied and that the undivided one third
interest in the California land which it is claimed vested in the
defendant by the terms of her husband's will was thus shown to be
free from any claim superior to her own.
The answer to this contention is
:
(1) Pursuant to the defendant's application the said land in Iowa
was set apart to her, not under the terms of her husband's will, but
under the law, which provides (Sec. 2366, Title XVII, ch. 4, Code of
Iowa, 1897), that-
One third in value of the legal and equitable estates in real property pos-
sessed by the husband at any time during marriage, which have not been sold
on execution or other judicial sale and to which the wife had made no relin-
quishment of her right, shall be set apart to her in fee simple if she survives
him.
And it is held that this right of the widow, called by the courts of
Iowa her " dower " right, is not subject to the debts of the husband,
as is the interest of an heir. (Mock v. Watson, 41 Iowa, 241; Ken-
dall v. Kendall, 42 Id., 464.)
(2) The defendant's power as administratrix of her husband's
estate did not extend beyond the limits of the State of Iowa. There-
fore the- administration of -such portion of her husband's estate as
was situated in Iowa had no effect on any portion of such estate as
may have been situated in California. It is therefore held that if
the defendant's husband died seized of said California land, the
record herein fails to show that any portion thereof passed to the
defendant free from any prior claim thereto.
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The motion for review presents no reason sufficient to warrant the
Department in modifying it- previous decision, and none otherwise
Appearing, the same Ls accordingly denied.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL ENTRY—SECTIONS 3306 AND 3307, R. S.
John ('. Mllllky et al.
In every case where the soldier rendered the requisite military service and made
homestead entry for less than one hundred and sixty acres prior to the
adoption of the Revised statutes, the proper foundation exists for an
additional entry under the provisions of sections 2306 and 2307 of the
Revised Statutes, notwithstanding the soldier may have died prior to the
enactment of said legislation.
Where a soldier qualified to make additional entry under the provisions of sec-
tion 2306 Of the Revised Statutes dies without having exercised or disposed
Of such right, his widow is. in the first instance, entitled thereto, by virtue
of the provisions of section 2307, but if she remarry or die without having
exercised or disposed of the right, his minor orphan Children hecorne entitled
thereto, and if not exercised or disposed of by them, through a guardian.
during their minority, the right remains an asset of the soldier's estate.
Sections 2306 and •_) ."><i7 of the Revised Statntes do not contemplate more than
one additional right of entry, founded upon one and the same military
service; and the existence of a valid additional right based upon a home-
stead entry made by the soldier, precludes an independent additional right
to his widow, or after her death to the heirs of her estate, based upon a
homestead entry made by her.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General L<m<l
(F. L. C.)
'
Office, December 29, 1905. (P. E. W.)
The Department has before it the appeal of John C. Mullery from
your office decision of October L9, L904, holding for rejection his
application, as assignee of the heirs of Harriet James, to make
soldier-" additional homestead entry for the X. \ of the NW. ]. Sec.
85, T. ->\ X.. R. K) \\\. Duluth, Minnesota, based on the military
service of John James and the homestead entry, No. 8182, of said
Harriet James, made on February 28, L872, for the W. J of the SE. |.
Sec 32, T. 6 X.. R. 26 VV., Dardanelle, Arkansas.
It appear- that the said John James who rendered the requisite
military service, made a homestead entry, No. 694, on February 10,
L868, for the SW. J of the XF. | and the NW. \ of the SE. j. Sec. 22,
T. 6 X.. R. •_>(; W., Clarksville, Arkansas; that he died "in March,
1868 " leaving a widow, the said Harriet James, and two minor
children. Frank and Neely James; that -aid Harriet James made
said homestead entry. Xo. 8182, as the head of a family, for her own
exclusive use and benefit, never made any other entry or disposed of
any eight to enter land, remained single, and died in July. L887; and
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that on August 17, 1*901, the said Frank and Neely James, the sole
surviving children of said John and Harriet James, executed and
delivered to one William L. Taylor two certain assignments, each
of which purported to convey to him a soldiers' additional homestead
right for eighty acres of land.
In one of these instruments the said Frank and Neely James, as
sole heirs of John James, deceased, sold and assigned to said Taylor
such an alleged right, based upon the military service of said John
James and said homestead entry No. 694, made by him. In the
other, they, as sole heirs of Harriet James, sold and assigned to said
Taylor such An alleged right based upon the military service of said
John James and the homestead entry No. 8182, made by said Harriet
James.
The former alleged right passed by due assignment into the hands
of John O. Hanchett and the latter into the hands of said John C.
Mullery. Both Hanchett and Mullery applied to locate their said
alleged rights, and on December 11, 1903, your office rejected Mul-
lery's application on the ground that the said homestead entry, No.
8182, made by Harriet James, did not constitute a proper basis for
an additional homestead right. Mullery appealed to the Department.
January 7, 1904, your office held, on Hanchett's said application,
that all necessary proof had been furnished, but suspended further
action thereon to await the final disposition of Mullery's application.
The Department, on May 11, 1904, decided that, owing to the
bearing of said two cases upon each other, they should be considered
together; vacated your said office decision of December 11, 1903, in
Mullery's case, and remanded the same with instructions to reconsider
both cases, upon -full argument by both parties, and then render
decisions in both cases, passing upon the following questions
:
Is either of said rights of additional entry valid? Are they both valid? If
only one of them is valid, which one is the valid one?
Thereupon your office rendered the decision from which this appeal
is taken, in which Mullery's application is rejected and Hanchett's
application is allowed, upon the ground that.
—
the assignment of said Frank James and Neely James, as heirs of Harriet
James, and based on homestead entry No. 8182 of said Harriet James, does not
constitute a proper legal basis for the additional right claimed by Mr. John C.
Mullery. for the reason that the additional right of entry predicated on the
military service of John James is properly based on the homestead entry. No.
694, of said John James and passed by assignment for value from said heirs of
John James to said John O. Hanchett, and thereafter they had no right re-
maining in them.
In general, the questions presented by this appeal and the answer
thereto, are the same as those above stated which were propounded in
the former departmental opinion. But on behalf of the appellant the
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specific inquiry is now urged, whether, m view of the fact that the
soldier. John James, died prior to the enactment of any of the legisla-
tion conferring special privileges upon soldiers and their widow- and
orphans in the matter of homestead entries and residence on the land
entered, any soldiers' additional right ever existed in favor of the
estate or the heirs of said John James other than that which is
expressly provided in said legislation for his widow and Ids minor
children.
This question involves the history, the intent and the proper con-
struction of the legislation relating to soldiers' homestead, and addi-
tional homestead, rights.
The first act of Congress in respect thereto was that of April -t, 1872
(17 Stat, 49), which was amended by the act of June 8, 1872 (17
Stat., 333), and again amended by the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat.,
605), all of which legislation was subsequently carried into the
Revised Statutes of the United States, approved June 22, 1874,
appearing in sections 2304. 2: >,o:>. 2306 and 2307.
Section 2304 provides that
:
Every private soldier and officer who has served .... for ninety days ....
shall, on compliance with the provisions of this chapter'as hereinafter modified,
he entitled to enter upon and receive patents for a quantity of public lands not
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres.
Section 2305 provides that the period of the military service ren-
dered shall be deducted from the required term of residence on the
land.
Section 2306 provides that :
Every person entitled, under the provisions of section twenty-three hundred
:iik1 four, to enter a homestead, who may have heretofore entered, under i lie
homestead laws, a quantity of land less than one hundred and sixty acres, shall
he permitted to enter so much land as. when added to the quantity previously
entered shall not exceed one hundred and sixty acres.
Section 2307 provides that :
In case of the death of any person who would he entitled to a homestead under
the provisions of section twenty-three hundred and four, his widow, if unmar-
ried, or in case of her death or marriage, then his minor orphan children, by a
guardian, shall he entitled to nil the benefits enumerated in this chapter . . . .;
but if such person died during his term of enlistment, the whole term of his
enlistment shall he deducted from the time heretofore required to perfect the
title.
That the said additional homestead right was created in the case of
each soldier who rendered the requisite military service "during the
recent rebellion" and made the previous entry of less than one hun-
dred and sixty acres of land, regardless of whether he died he fore or
after the enactment of said legislation, clearly appear- from the clos-
ing linos of said section 2307, in which a soldier who " died during his
term of enlistment " is distinctly included in the category of such per-
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sons as would have been " entitled to a homestead under the provisions
of section two thousand three hundred and four," and consequently to
an additional homestead under section 2306.
The same construction, purpose and effect was given to said legis-
lation at the time of its enactment and in the discussion thereon< in
the United States Senate, when the passage of said act of June 8,
1872, supra, was under consideration (see the case of Anna Bowes, 32
L. D., 331, 337), the particular question being the construction of the
words in section 3 of said act, now said section 2307. supra:
In case of the death of any person who would be entitled, etc.
Mr. Morton.
The explanation of the Senator from Kansas I think is not satisfactory. He
makes this section to apply to any person who, after having made his location
should then die, but that is utterly inconsistent with the- proviso in the same
section, " provided that if such person died during the term of enlistment,"
showing that it applied to those who even died during the war and before the
passage of this bill. Therefore it does not refer to those who may make location
after the passage of this bill or at any time subsequent to the war. and shows
that it refers to soldiers without reference to the time when they died.
That this view prevailed may be argued from the fact that the said
proviso was retained as a portion of said section 2307.
It is clear, therefore, that under and by virtue of the said legisla-
tion there was created an additional homestead right in the case of
said John James, who survived the requisite military service and
made a previous entry of less than one hundred and sixty acres of
land, but died before the enactment of said legislation. Predicated
upon his said service and entry, it sprang into existence upon the
passage of the law.
Once existing, the said right continues until used, forfeited or
extinguished by some process known to the law.
Of the nature of this right and the intent and purpose of the legis-
lation granting the same, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Webster v. Luther (163 U. S., 331, 340), said:
It was a mere gratuity. There was no other purpose but to give it as a sort of
compensation for the person's failure to get the full quota of one hundred and
sixty acres by his first homestead entry.
The court further quoted with approval the language of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in the case of Barnes v.
Poirier (27 U. S. App., 500) :
It was an unfettered gift in the nature of compensation for past services. It
vested a property right in the donee.
The contingency of the death of the soldier whose services had
earned such compensatory gift and property right, whether during
enlistment, or prior to the enactment of said legislation, or subse-
quently thereto without having used the said additional right, is
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recognized and provided for in the said section 2307, which neces-
sarily includes section 2306 with section 2304.
Under said section the said Harriet James became "entitled to all
the benefits enumerated in this chapter" a> the widow of said John
James and not otherwise, thus recognizing and emphasizing the com-
pensatory and existing property right as earned by the soldier, and
extended to other persons only as they stood near to and represented
hiin. This harmonizes with the line of succession established in sec-
tion ^ (.>1 of the Revised Statutes of the United State- in the matter
of perfecting title to land embraced in the entry of a deceased home-
stead claimant. Therein the widow is given the first right to perfect
the claim but in ease of her death it accrues to " his heirs or devisee."
So by said section 2307 the widow is. in the first instance, entitled to
appropriate the additional right based on the homestead entry of the
soldier, hut if she remarries or dies without having fexercised or dis-
poned of the same, it remains a part of the soldier's estate -ubject to
appropriation by " his minor orphan children.*' In the present case,
therefore, it is clear that upon the death of the widow of John James
without exercising or disposing of the additional right based on his
military service and his homestead entry, such right did not become
a part of her estate.
Not having been exercised or disposed of by his orphan children,
during their minority, through a guardian, the estate of the soldier
was not divested of said right. See the case of Allen Laughlin (31
L. I).. 256), wherein it is said that such right can be legally assigned
only by the personal representative of the deceased soldier.
In the present case the assignment by Frank and Neely James, as
heirs of .John James, is accompanied by probate evidence that the
personal representative of said John dames waived his right to sell,
and obtained the approval, by proper order of court, of the sale made
by said heirs under which Hanchett claims herein. The present case
is therefore not in conflict with the rule in the case last cited.
But it is contended by appellant that :
the right which would have inured to the soldier if he had lived until after the
date of said act. by the express ten. is of section l::;<i7 was granted to his widow.
Iii support of this contention the case of the Sierra Lumber Com-
pany (31 L. I).. 349) is cited.
In that case the soldier had not made a previous entry for less than
one hundred and sixty acres, which in said legislation is the basis for
the additional right, and the whole right under the statute devolved
first upon the widow as the " person entitled to all the benefits enu-
merated in this act." The widow Inning made a previous entry of
eighty acres, as a corollary the additional right was hers.
So in the case of Homer E. P>rayton (31 L. D., 443), where the
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deceased soldier had made no homestead entry, it was held that an
additional right arises under said section to the widow who has made
a previous entry of less than 1G0 acres.
The Department said
:
The additional right conferred by sections 2306 and 2307 may be either for the
soldier or his widow, and the circumstances of the case will control. If the
soldier made the original entry, the additional right is his, but if the original
entry was made by the widow, the additional right is hers.
In that case there were no children, and the widow having died
without exercising the right, it was held that the right became an
asset of her estate, not subject to the control of the administrator
of the soldier's estate. Again, in the unreported case of E. J. Mc-
Laughlin, dated July 25, 1902, cited by appellants, the soldier died in
service and had made no previous entry. The soldier's widow made
a homestead entry for eighty acres prior to the enactment of the
legislation here in question bat did not exercise or dispose of any
additional right of entry. There were no minor children of the
soldier.
The Department said
The children took nothing by virtue of said section 2307, and if they are
entitled to this property right, it is because of their being the heirs of their
mother and not because of any provision of said section.
But in no case has it been held, directly or by necessary implica-
tion, that where the soldier made the previous entry of less than one
hundred and sixty acres, an additional entry right accrued to the
widow otherwise than by virtue of said section 2307, which passed
it to the soldier's minor orphan children in case she remarried or
died without using or disposing of the right. Where the soldier
made no original entry which would serve as a basis, no additional
right ever existed which could inure to him, even if he lived until
after the enactment of said legislation, and where the soldier had
made an original entry, thereby providing the necessary basis, the
additional right sprang into existence upon the enactment of said
legislation, even though he had previously died, and inured under
section 2307 in succession to his widow, while living and single, to
his orphan children during their minority, and then, if still unused,
to his estate. In the former case the widow of the soldier could, upon
the basis of an original entry, made by herself, so long as she re-
mained unmarried (see John S. Maginnis, 32 L. D., 14), assert an
independent additional right, and if she died without exercising or
disposing of the same, such right became and remained a part of her
estate. The existence of a valid additional right based upon a
homestead entry made by the soldier, precludes the arising of such
an independent additional right to his widow, or after her death
to the heirs of her estate, based upon a homestead entry by her.
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There can not, in any event, be two such additional rights. Xo indi-
cation can be found, in the purpose or history of the said legislation,
or in the discussion thereon, that more than one additional right,
based upon one and the same military service, was ever contemplated.
Neither does the construction since placed thereon by the Department
and the court- warrant or admit of the conclusion asked herein that
a second additional right accrues to the widow of a soldier and to
her separate estate, in case -he. as well as the soldier, ha- made a
previous entry.
The conclusion i> inevitable that on August 17. 1001, the said Frank
and Xeelv James had no valid additional right as heirs of Harriet
James, and John C. Mullery took nothing under their assignment to
Taylor as such heir-.
As heirs of John James, the said Frank and Xeely James had a
valid additional right, which by due assignment became the property
of John (). Ilanchett. and affords a proper and sufficient basis for his
said application, which will accordingly be allowed.
Your said decision is herebv affirmed.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL ENTRY—SECTIONS t>:HM> AND 2307, R. S.
Arch Y. Alexander.
Sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes do not contemplate more than one
additional rigb.1 <>f entry, founded upon one and the same military service.
Location having been allowed of ;) portion of an additional righl based upon r
homestead entry made by the widow of a soldier, and roeortihVation made
tor the remainder of the right, it is hold, upon application being made for
the allowance of a further additional righl based upon an entry made by
the soldier himself, that no foundation therefor exists, the additional right
allowed on the homestead entry of the widow being considered as having
been based upon the homestead entry of the soldier.
Acting Secretary Ryan f<> the Commissioner of the General Land
[f.L.C.) Office, December 29, 1905. (P.E.W.)
The Department has before it the appeal of Arch V. Alexander
from your office decision of October 26, 11)04, rejecting- his application.
as assignee of ( i. \Y. Stone, administrator of the estate of William M.
Lantz, to enter, under sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, the X. \ SW. J. Sec. 20. and SE. \ NW. ',. Sec.
21, T. 5 S., R. 24 W., Camden, Arkansas.
The application i> based on the military service of said William M.
Lantz and the homestead entry, No. (',:',<.). made by him on March 19,
1867, for the W. frl. \ XW. frl. \. Sec. 2, T. 20 N., R. 10 W.
:
Little
Rock, Arkansas, containing 51.24 acres.
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Rejection was upon the ground that the soldier's additional right
based on the military service of said Lantz had previously been
fully exhausted and therefore the assignment herein does not con-
stitute a proper legal basis for the right claimed by this applicant, it
appearing from your office records that on October 13, 1883, your
office issued certificate of right for 121.78 acres to said George W.
Stone, guardian of G. X. Lantz, Lucinda Lantz and William Lantz.
minor orphan children of the soldier, and that under date of January
26, 1884, 120 acres of said right was located on the X. i NE. £, XE. J
NW. i, Sec. 27, T. 2 S.. R. -1 W., Las Cruces, New Mexico Territory,
for the said minor orphan children, and the unused portion of said
certificate, 1.78 acres, was recertified to one John H. Howell on
December 10, 1901, but does not appear to have been located.
It further appears from your office records that under date of
Febuary 23, 1872, Julia A. Lantz, the widow of the soldier, made
homestead entry, No. 5547, for the NE. | XE. J, Sec. 7, T. 20 X..
11. 15 W., Harrison, Arkansas, containing 38.22 acres, for which
patent issued on final certificate 3755, on August 13, 1883, to the said
minor children of the soldier, by said George W. Stone, their
guardian.
The contentions of this appeal are that the said additional right,
located on January 20. 1884, was based on said homestead entry of
Julip. A. Lantz, the widow, and not on that of the soldier, William
M. Lantz; that the heirs of the soldier are entitled to such an addi-
tional right, based on the homestead entry of the soldier, notwith-
standing the fact that they have received the benefit or an additional
right based on the homestead entry of their mother, the widow of
the soldier; and that if but one additional right is allowed, that
based upon the soldier's homestead entry should take precedence over
that based upon his widow's homestead entry; and that no reason
exists why the same army service may not serve as a basis for such an
additional right to both the soldier's and the widow's homestead
entries.
The questions whether there may be two such rights based on the
same military service, and, if but one is allowed, whether that based
on the soldier's homestead entry or that based on his widow's home-
stead entry, is to be allowed, were before the Department in the case
of John C. Mullery, assignee of heirs of Harriet James, and John O.
Hanchett, assignee of heirs of John James, this day decided.
Upon careful review and comparison of previous like cases, and
full consideration of the legislation in question, the Department said
:
The existence of a valid additional right based upon a homestead entry
made by the soldier, precludes the arising of such an independent additional
right to his widow based upon a homestead entry by her. There can-
not in any event be two such additional rights.
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Since there was no other valid basis therefor, it follows that the
said additional right, located January 26, L884, of which the minor
orphan children of the soldier have received the benefit, together with
the -aid recertified portion which has not been located, was based
upon the homestead entry of tin' soldier, and such location and re-
certification exhausted the additional right based on the military
service of the soldier William Lantz.
The present application will be rejected, your said decision being
herebv affirmed.
SOLDIERS9 ADDITIONAL ENTRY-WIDOW-SECTIONS ^SO<> AND ^:J07, R. S.
I X K EB M A X I LELMER.
The additional right accruing to the widow of a soldier, under sections 2306
and 'SMu <»f the Revised Statutes, by reason of an entry for less than one
hundred and sixty acres made by herself, is a property right vested in her,
and is not forfeited by her remarriage or death; but in case of her remar-
riage is held in abeyance during coverture, and in event of her death
remains an asset of her estate.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
i F. L. C.)
'
Office, December 29, 1905. (P. E. W.
)
Counsel for Inkerman Helmer lias filed a motion for review of
departmental decision of July 8, 1005 (not reported), affirming
your office decision of November 18, 1904. in which you rejected bis
application, as assignee of J. J. Foster, administrator of the estate
of Lewis W. Matthew-, deceased, and of Sarah Ann Morris, formerly
the widow of said Matthew-, to enter, under section 2306 of the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States, the SW. \ NE. \ and SE. | NW. i,
Sec. l \. T. 32 S.. R. IT E., Lakeview, Oregon.
The application is based on the military service of said Lewis W.
Matthews, and the homestead entry. No. 501, made by his widow on
January 29, L868, for eighty acres of land in the Clarksville, Arkan-
sas, land district. The grounds for rejection, as stated in your said
decision, are that the widow's said entry doe- not constitute a Legal
basis for the additional righl claimed herein because -he had remar-
ried prior to her assignmenl thereof to this applicant, and that the
assignment by the administrator of the soldier's estate is without
effect for the reason that whatever additional right existed belonged
to the widow .
It appearing that the soldier had not made a homestead entrj for
less than one hundred and sixty acre-, the right to make an additional
entry never existed in him or in his estate. Hi- widow having made
a homestead entry for eighty acres before her remarriage, and prior
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to the enactment of the legislation under consideration, the said leg-
islation bestowed upon her, as an absolute gift, the right to make an
additional entry of eighty acres, and this right she could exercise
in person or assign to others. See the cases of Sierra Lumber Com-
pany (31 L. D., 349), and Homer E. Brayton (31 L. D., 448).
The sole question to be considered upon this motion is whether her
said right of additional entry, compensatory for the failure to obtain
full one hundred and sixty acres under her said homestead entry, was
forfeited and extinguished by operation of law when she remarried on
April 21, 1889, without having previously used or disposed of the
same.
In the similar case of John S. Maginnis, (32 L. IX, 14), the Depart-
ment said
:
Section 2307 of the Revised Statutes allows the widow of a deceased soldier,
who would have been entitled to the benefits of section 2304, all the benefits
enumerated in that chapter, the right of additional entry being one of the bene-
fits, but this is allowed her on the express condition that she be unmarried.
In the case at bar the widow was entitled to an additional right of entry so
long as she remained unmarried, but having failed to exercise the right during
her widowhood, it could not be asserted by her during coverture.
Where, as in the present case, the additional right is earned by the
widow through her own previous homestead entry of less than one
hundred and sixty acres, and does not come to her through the soldier,
it is a property right vested in her and there is no forfeiture of such
right either by her remarriage or by her death, without having exer-
cised or disposed of the same. The law granting the right does not
prescribe a forfeiture and none will be presumed. But the law does
declare against the exercise of the right during coverture, and, as in
the last case cited, it must be held to be in abeyance until the disability
of coverture ceases to exist or her death occurs. In the latter event,
it remains a part of her estate.
As the record herein fails to show that such disability has been
removed, the said right could not be assigned and asserted as is herein
sought to be done, and for that reason the motion for a review cannot
be entertained. The motion is accordingly hereby overruled.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL ENTRY—WIDOW-SECTIONS 2306 AND 2307, R. S.
John M. Maher.
The additional right of entry accruing to the widow of a soldier under the pro-
visions of sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes, based upon an
entry made by herself, is not lost, forfeited or extinguished by her remar-
riage, but is merely held in abeyance during coverture, and upon removal of
such disability may be exercised or disposed of by her as though she had
remained the soldier's widow.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Co?nmisioner of the General Land
( F. L. C.
)
Office, December 29, 1905. ( P. E. W.)
The Department has before it an appeal of John M. Maher from
your office decision of April 21, L905, rejecting his application, as
assignee of Rebecca M. Day. widow, former widow of Isaac V. Herri-
ford, to enter under sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statute- of
the United States, the S. \ SW. ', and MY. \ SW. t, Sec. 17, T. 159 N.,
R. 69 W., Devils Lake. North Dakota.
The application is based on the military service of said [saac Y.
Herriford and the homestead entry. No. 5238, of his said widow, now
Rebecca M. Day, made on February 6, 1868, for the XK. | NE. !. Sec.
9, T. 64, R. 24, Boonville, Missouri.
It appears that the soldier died in service and that his widow had
not remarried when she made her said homestead entry and when the
legislation in question herein was enacted, but subsequently, on De-
cember 11. 1nn:>. without having used or disposed of any additional
right, she was married to one Leroy Day. The latter died prior to
the assignment under consideration and at date thereof she had not
remarried.
Your said decision concedes that
—
During her widowhood .-is the widow of Isaac A'. Herriford, said Rebecca M.
Herriford possessed the additional right to enter in person, or assign, 120 acres.
The single question presented by this appeal, therefore, is whether
by her remarriage the said righl was lost, forfeited or extinguished.
As decisive of this point yon cite in the decision appealed from the
unreported departmental decision of June 29, L904, which formally
affirmed your office decisions of April 4. L903, and March 21, 1904. in
the case of Robert E. Sloan, assignee of Sarah X. E. Prewitt, widow,
former widow of William Prewitt. wherein it was held that " by
remarrying she forfeited all such right."
Upon motion for review of its said decision of June 2 (.>. 1904. the
Department in its unreported decision of November 22, 1904. said:
Upon further and more mature consideration of the questions involved in this
case, this Department is <>t' the opinion that Mrs. Prewitl never became vested
with a right of additional entry.
Said statute confers the righl upon the widow upon the express condition Hint
she be unmarried. At the time of its passage, Mrs. Prewitl \wis not unmarried
. . . . Therefore she never became seized of an additional righl of entry, and
hence she conveyed no such right i>y her assignment. For this reason the
motion for review is denied.
The said case therefore differs and must be distinguished from the
presenl case on the vital point on which the Department based it-
denial of a review, for herein it is conceded that, being at the time
unmarried, the widow of the soldier became seized of such additional
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right by and upon the enactment of the legislation which conferred it.
Further inquiry into its precise nature and extent is necessary to
determine whether this right, once existing and never used, was for-
feited and extinguished by operation of said law, when the widow
contracted a second marriage.
The proper distinction is to be drawn between an additional right
which is based on a homestead entry made by the soldier and one
based on a homestead entry made by his widow. In the former case
the right is earned by the soldier and is extended by the legislation
in question to other persons only as they stood near to 'and represent
him, passing in the first instance to his widow. But if she remarries
or dies without having exercised or disposed of the same, it goes to his
minor orphan children, if any. If he has no minor children, or if
the right is not exercised or disposed of during their minority, it
reverts to his estate. Where, by reason of the widow's remarriage
the right has passed to the soldier's minor orphan children or has
reverted to his estate, it is at an end so far as the widow, as such, is
concerned.
In the latter case, however, where the soldier had made no home-
stead entry and the right is based on a homestead entry made by the
widowT after his death, a very different condition is presented. Here
the additional right is earned by the widow and is vested in her in the
first instance. Two requirements only are stated in the legislation
conferring such right and regulating its use, namely, that at date of
the enactment of said legislation and at date of the use or disposal
of the right she be unmarried, and that prior to the enactment of
said legislation she shall have made a homestead entry of less than
160 acres, whereby her own independent' homestead right has been
exhausted. Where these requirements are met. as in the present case,
the right of additional entry vested in the widow and was as abso-
lute, complete and unfettered a right as that of the soldier himself in
the former supposed case. This view is in harmony with the deci-
sions of the courts and the Department. Thus in the case of Homer
E. Brayton (31 L. D., 443, 444), the Department, after a comparison
of previous like cases, and in harmony with them, said
:
The additional right conferred by sections 2306 and 2307 may be either for the
soldier or his widow, and the circumstances of the case will control. If the
soldier made the original entry, the additional right is his, but if the original
entry was made by the widow, the additional right is hers. Upon her failure
to exercise it during her life, it becomes an asset of her estate, and as such is
not subject to the control of the administrator of the soldier's estate.
If her death can not terminate such right when it has once vested
in the widow, neither can remarriage. Xowhere in the legislation
under consideration is there a provision, express or implied, for the
termination of such right, except where it was earned by the soldier,
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nested iii him and his estate, and extended to his widow by said seel ion
2307 during her life and widowhood only. Where the soldier never
possessed the fight, and it was earned by the widow and vested in her
in the first instance, she took such right to the exclusion of the sol-
dier's heirs or estate and \'wr from any condition that she remain
hi> widow. In the language <d' the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in the case of Barnes v. Poirier (27 U. S. App.. 500) :
It was an unfettered gift .... It vested ;i property righl in the donee.
This language, defining the purpose, nature and extent of the right
in question, was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the
United State- in the case of Webster v. Luther ( L63 V. S., 331, 340),
and it was there said :
It was ;i iikmc gratuity. There was no other purpose hut to give it as a sort
of compensation tor the person's failure to get the full quota of one hundred
;iik1 sixty acres by his lirst homestead entry.
Such unfettered, compensatory gift and property right vested in
the widow on the basis of her own previous homestead entry and not
upon the homestead entry made by the soldier, is not terminated by
her remarriage, although, as held by the Department in the case of
John S. Maginnis (32 L. I)., 14), if she fails to exercise or dispose
of it before she remarries, she cannot assert the right during
coverture.
It should be observed that in the last-mentioned case the syllabus,
in the second paragraph, was inadvertently made to state that the
additional right in such case was lost by remarriage, while in the
opinion it i> held that the right is held in abeyance during coverture,
and that in the language of said section 2307, she must be unmar-
ried at the time she uses or disposes of the right.
If no other valid objection appears, the application will be allowed.
your said decision being hereby reversed.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL ENTRY—WIDOW—SECTIONS 2306 AM) ^;J07, R. S.
Charles W. Burdick.
In case a soldier's widow entitled to make additional entry under sections
2300 and 'J.'loT of the Revised Statute's, by virtue of an entry for less than
one hundred and sixty acres made by herself, remarries, without having
exercised «>r disposed of such fight, it can not be asserted during cover-
ture; nor can the fact that the only child of the soldier joined the widow
in an assignment of such righl in any wise affect the situation, in view of
the fact that the right is based upon an entry made by the widow and not
by the soldier.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.)
*
Office, December ,!<h 1905. (P. E. W.)
Charles \Y. Burdick has filed a motion for review of departmental
decision of March 9, 11)05 (not reported), formally affirming your
office decision of October 29, 1004, wherein you overruled his motion
for review and adhered to the previous action of your office rejecting
his application, as assignee of Lorinda Cross, formerly the widow
of David McManus, to enter, under section 2306 of the Revised Stat-
utes of the United States, the N. J NW. j and the NW. { NE.J, Sec. 9,
T. 16 N., R. 78 W., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
The grounds assigned for the motion are that the said decision is
contrary to the law and the evidence. The application in question
was based upon -the military service of David McManus and the
homestead entry, ~$o. 6061, made by his widow, now Lorinda Cross,
on December 2, 1868, for the SE. J NE. |, Sec. 14, T. 38 N., R. 13 W.,
Boonville, Missouri.
It appears that the soldier died on or about the 29th day of Feb-
ruary, 1864, and had not made a homestead entry, that he left only
one child, Margaret E. McManus, now Cross; and that his widow,
the said Lorinda Cross, had not remarried when she made her said
homestead entry, No. 6061, but has since remarried. The record does
not disclose the date of her remarriage or whether she was again a
widow at date of the assignment in question, but it does appear that
she had not used or disposed of any such additional right when she
contracted her second marriage.
The application herein is dated June 14, 190*2, and recites only the
assignment to the applicant of the additional right of the said widow,
Lorinda Cross, although it is accompanied by a joint assignment exe-
cuted by the widow and the daughter of the soldier.
Rejection was upon the ground :
That the original entry alleged does not constitute a proper legal basis for
the right claimed by the applicant, for the following reason: the claimant hav-
ing remarried before exercising the right, she cannot assert it during coverture.
Maginnis. assignee of Rose (32 L. D., 14). A daughter of claimant by her first
marriage joined in the assignment, but she is not named in the application.
There is also evidence in the form of affidavits tending to prove her to be the
soldier's only child. If claimant is again a widow, it does not so appear.
As it does not appear that the disability of coverture has been
removed, this case is controlled by the decision in the case of John S.
Maginnis (32 L. D., 14).
The alternative contention that the assignment of the additional
right herein by the only child of the soldier is valid and effective
because, by joining therein, the widow of the soldier waived every
possible conflicting claim, cannot be sustained, for the reason that no
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 847
additional right ever arose for the soldier, his child or estate, he
never having made the homestead entry which is essential as a base
for such right. The motion for review is denied.
FORT BUFORD ABANDONED MILITARY RESERVATION—RECLAMATK >\
A< 1 .
Opinion.
Lands formerly within the Fort Buford military reservation wore by the act of
May 19, 1900, restored to the public domain and made subjed to existing
laws relating to disposal of the public lands, except such laws as are not
specifically earned therein, and are subject to withdrawal under the reclama-
tion ad as other portions of the public domain subject to entry under the
general land laws; and a withdrawal of such lands for reclamation pur-
poses is effective as to all of the lands for which entry was not made
within three months from the filing of the township plat, and prior to the
withdrawal.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Seen tary of the Interior,
December 29, 1905. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt by reference for opinion of a letter from the Di-
rector of the Geological Survey requesting to be advised whether the
withdrawal made August 24, 1903, under the act of June IT, 1002
(32 Stat., 388), of lands within the former Fort Buford military
reservation and within the irrigable area of the Lower Yellowstone
project, will be effective as to entries of such lands made subsequent
to said withdrawal, and after three months from the filing of the
township plat, and whether such entries are subject to limitations
and restrictions of the reclamation act.
The lands in this reservation, which has been abandoned, are not
subject to disposal under the act providing for the disposal of
abandoned military reservations, but were restored to the public
domain by the act of May 19, 1900 (31 Stat., ISO), which provides
that they shall be subject to disposal under the homestead, townsite,
A\\<\ desert-land laws, with the proviso that actual occupants thereon
upon the first day of January. 1900, shall have a preference right to
make one entry not exceeding one quarter section; that land- occu-
pied for town-site purposes, and lands shown to be valuable 1'or coal
or minerals, shall be subject to entry and sale under the "townsite.
coal, or mineral-land laws, respectively."
The practical effect of the act was to restore the land to entry
under existing laws except such law- as arc qoI specifically named.
It is therefore subject to Withdrawal under the reclamation act as
other portion- of the public domain which are subject to entry under
the general land laws.
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Hence, where such lands have not been entered within three months
from the filing of the township plats in the local office and prior to
the withdrawal of the lands for reclamation purposes, the with-
drawal will be effective, as all such lands and entries thereof will be
subject to the limitations and restrictions of the reclamation act.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan,
A ding' Secretary.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDENCE-DURESS.
Cannon v. Johanson.
A homestead entryman is entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of
the land embraced in his entry, and where he in good faith builds a house
upon the land with a view to establishing residence and complying with the
law, but is prevented by the threats of a rival claimant from establishing
residence upon the particular portion of the land selected by him for that
purpose, it is not incumbent upon him to establish his residence upon
another portion of the land, and he will not be held in default for failure
to do so.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Comtnisisoner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) November U, 1905. (E. O. P.)
August W. Johanson has appealed to the Department from your
office decision of April 13, 1905, affirming that of the local officers
holding for cancellation his homestead entry for lots 1, 2, 3, T and 5,
Sec. 5, and lot 1 of Sec. 6, T. 15 S., K. 8 E., San Francisco, California,
upon the contest initiated by James Cannon, charging abandonment
and failure to cultivate and improve the land as required by law.
A very careful examination of the entire record discloses, briefly
stated, the following material facts. The entry in question was made
August 7, 1897. At that time said lot 5 was enclosed by Cannon's
fence and he was asserting a possessory claim to and a right of entry
for the tract. Within a month after making his entry, Johanson
hauled lumber to and began the erection of a house upon the dis2)uted
tract. Before the house was completed Cannon destroyed the same
and removed the lumber but notified claimant of its location and that
he would be permitted to reclaim it but ordered him not to attempt
to rebuild. Prior to filing on the land, claimant was informed by
Cannon of his claim thereto and that he proposed to file thereon and
that claimant and all others would be prevented from obtaining the
land, even though it became necessary for him to carry his dire
threats into execution. In February, 1898, Johanson again went
upon the land and, with the assistance of others, built a dugout, in
which he placed a few personal effects, and slept therein one night.
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The destruction of the dugout at the hands of Cannon shortly fol-
lowed. No further effort appears to have been made on the part of
claimant to establish his residence on the tract and no attempt was
ever made by him to reside upon or cultivate any of the land other
than said lot 5, though it is not entirely clear from the testimony
whether or not Johanson had reason to believe that his residence
on any other portion of the land would be molested or his attempts
to cultivate it interfered with. Apparently Cannon asserted no claim
to any of the land except said lot 5, but his threats were in their
nature general and the drastic measures taken by him to enforce his
claim may have given some foundation to the belief on the part of
Johanson that it would be unsafe for him to attempt residence on or
cultivation of the remainder of the land. There is some evidence in
the record to support this assumption. Though he made no attempt
to rebuild, prior to initiation of contest, Johnson testifies that he
often slept upon the land and on one occasion this action was resented
by Cannon and he viciously assaulted the party who accompanied
claimant, for which assault he wras arrested and fined. Since the
initiation of contest Johanson has erected a house and established
residence on the land, though not upon lot 5, and apparently has
not been molested.
Your office, relying upon departmental decision in the case of
Swain v. Call (9 L. D., 22), held that even though Johanson was pre-
vented by the acts of Cannon from occupying the portion of the land
entered by him and claimed by Cannon, he was not excused from
fully complying with the law as to the remainder of his entry to
which the claims and threats of Cannon did not extend.
Duress sufficient to excuse claimant from complying with the re-
quirements of law has been repeatedly defined by the Department.
(Sec Kinman /•. Appleby, on review, 32 L. D., 526, and cases therein
cited). That such duress existed as to said lot 5, through the threats
and acts of Cannon, is beyond controversy. Whether as a reasonable
man. exercising ordinary prudence, Johanson was justified in the
belief that the threats and acts of Cannon extended to the remainder
of his entry. i< not so clear. Conceding that he was not so justified,
the question is presented as to whether he was bound to establish resi-
dence at another place upon the land and cultivate and improve the
land open to him.
The object and intent of the law was to confer upon and secure to
the homestead claimant, the "exclusive benefit <>f his homestead
right " (Anderson v. Carkins, 1-".:) CJ. S., L83, 1:89). Alienation, con-
trary to the usual rule in respect to land. i> restricted as against the
policy of the statute, for to permit it might defeat the enjoyment of
the exclusive right by the persons sought to be benefitted. This right
extends to all the land covered by the homestead entr\ and the law
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has sought to protect it by suitable and effective safeguards. It
follows therefore that the entryman's absolute right to the entire
possession and enjoyment of the land carries with it the right to
build his house wherever he sees fit, and any obstruction of this right
is an interference with the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
entire tract.
The good faith of the claimant was evidenced by his attempts to
establish a residence on lot 5 of his entry, and there can be no pre-
sumption of bad faith because of his failure to maintain such
residence in the face of the unlawful interference by Cannon, which
clearly excused such failure. Your office held, in effect, that as
between claimant and contestant, the equities of claimant were
superior and that cancellation should not be ordered if by such
action Cannon would be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
But as Cannon could secure no rights by his contest, under your said
decision, the question was left solely between the government and the
entryman and as to the government Johanson was bound to evidence
his good faith by establishing residence upon and cultivating and
improving the remainder of the tract. In other words, the govern-
ment is permitted to take advantage of Cannon's wrong to the prej-
udice of the entryman. To this doctrine the Department is unwill-
ing to accede. The general and more liberal rule that where good
faith is apparent and the controversy is one solely between the gov-
ernment and the entryman, the entry should be held intact, is more
in keeping with the spirit of the homestead law. and the Department
is of opinion the rule announced in the case of Parsons v. Hughes
(8 L. D., 593, 595) is controlling in the case at bar. It wTas there
held that where the claimant had been wrongfully ejected from that
portion of the land upon which she had established residence, it was
not incumbent upon her to go upon another portion of the land and
establish another. The right of selection in such matters goes hand
in hand with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of the entire tract,
and a denial of one is an interference with the other.
In the case cited in your said decision (Swain v. Call, supra) it
was stated that "the evidence relied upon as showing duress on the
part of Swain is not by any means sufficient to sustain such finding."
That case should not therefore be allowed to control in cases similar
to the one here under consideration, where the evidence clearly
established the plea of duress.
For the reasons herein stated, the decision appealed from is
affirmed in so far as it holds for dismissal the contest of Cannon, and
modified in so far as it holds for cancellation the entry of Johanson
upon the rejection of the final proof submitted by him. The entry
will remain intact and he will be permitted to submit a supplemental
showing as to his compliance with the law during the lifetime of the
entry.
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ABTD LAND—IRRIGATION PROJECT—ACT OF JUNE 17,1903.
( )PINI0N.
The act of June IT. 1902, affords authority for the purchase by the United
States of an incomplete irrigation system to be used in connection with,
and to heroine a part of, a larger system contemplated by the government.
The provision of section 5 of the act of June 17. 1902, restricting the sale of a
right to use water for land in private ownership to not more than one hun-
dred and sixty acres, v. ill not prerenl the recognition of a vested water right
for a larger area and protection of the same by allowing the continued flow-
age of the water covered by the right through the works constructed by the
government.
The Secretary of the Interior has no authority to enter into any agreement pro-
viding that an entry of public lands may be consummated in any manner
or at any time other than as provided by the law under which such entry is
made.
'Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the In-
U rior, January 6, 1906. (W. C. P.)
In his Letter of November 8, 1905, the Director of the Geological
Survey stated that the Umatilla project, in Oregon, had been found
feasible: that it would irrigate about 20,000 acres of land east of the
Umatilla River, at an estimated cost of fifty dollars per acre, and
recommended that the stun of * 1.000,000 be set aside for the project.
With this letter he transmitted a copy of a proposed contract, by
which the Maxwell Land and Irrigation Company, which has par-
tially completed the construction of a canal system to irrigate its
lands, by which said company is to turn over to the United States its
irrigation works and water rights and to place its lands under the
project and hind itself to make sale thereof in such manner as to con-'
form to the provisions of the reclamation act. The original of this
agreement, which had been signed on behalf of the company, had been
returned for certain corrections.
This letter was returned to the Director for report on the following
propositions
:
1. Do not the provisions of paragraph 2 of the enclosed agreement con-
flict with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the reclamation act prohibiting the
light to the use of water on land in private ownership in excess of 160 acres?
l*. Are not the provisions of paragraph 11 likewise in conflict with the pro-
visions of said paragraph 5 of the reclamation act?
•"«. What authority has the Secretary of the Interior, under existing law,
to approve the provisions of paragraph 13 of said agreement which contem-
plates the extension of time for compliance with the provisions of the desert
land act V
The Director, in his report of November 16, answers that the first
and second propositions in the reference are not, in his opinion, in
conflict with the provisions of the reclamation act, and submits the
third proposition to the Department for consideration.
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opinion, first, upon the questions presented herein, and, second, as
to whether any legal objection exists to the approval of the accom-
panying c agreement to sell ' of the Maxwell Land and Irrigation
Company."
Paragraph 1 of the proposed agreement provides that the Maxwell
Land and Irrigation Company will sell and convey to the United
States for the uses and purposes contemplated by the reclamation act
of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), its main canal, laterals, diversion
works, structures for impounding or distributing water, rights of
way, and all water rights held or claimed, with all appurtenances
in any wise used in connection with the company's canal system, for
the sum of $15,000.
Paragraph 2 reads as follows:
It is further agreed that the United States shall recognize a vested water
right in the said company, or its assigns for three hundred (300) acres, to be
hereafter selected by it in tracts, not less than twenty acres conforming to the
public land subdivisions within the limits of the East Umatilla project of the
Reclamation Service, to the extent of the water supply furnished to other lands
under the said project. The water right for the said three hundred (300) acres
shall be a perpetual water right, subject to the same regulations as to quantity
and time of delivery prevailing under the said project, but shall be subject to no
other condition than the payment to the United States of an annual maintenance
charge of the same amount as that fixed for other lands under said project.
Paragraph 3 provides that the company will place under the pro-
visions of the reclamation act its lands irrigable under said project,
aggregating between 8000 and 9000 acres, excepting the tracts re-
served in paragraphs 2 and 5.
Paragraph 4 provides that the lands referred to in paragraph 3
shall be conveyed to a trustee satisfactory to both parties, that they
may be sold to parties competent to take and hold the same under the
reclamation act.
Paragraph 5 provides that there shall be excepted from the pro-
visions of paragraphs 3 and 4 a townsite of 160 acres, and in addition
thereto forty acres of land as a water-shed to protect the spring from
which water is supplied and intended to be supplied to said town-
site, and the right of way from said forty acres to the townsite.
Paragraph 6 provides that the company shall convey the premises
to the United States by a good and sufficient deed of conveyance.
Paragraph 7 provides that the United States shall purchase the
property upon the terms expressed in the previous paragraphs.
Paragraph 8 provides that existing liens or incumbrances of said
premises may be provided for by retention of a sufficient amount of
the purchase money.
Paragraph 9 provides that the officers of the United States may
have unrestricted access to said premises for the purpose of survey-
ing for the construction of reclamtaion works.
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Paragraph LO provides thai the company will sell to the United
Slate- any land- required for reservoirs, canals, or other irrigation
work-, at a consideration not to exceed six dollars per acre.
Paragraph 11 provides that the company may retain po-session of,
maintain and operate it- present water system so far as may be nec-
essary to supply water to lands now irrigable by the same and de-
pendent thereon until the government project shall replace the same
and that the company may supply to the parties named in Schedule A
water sufficient to complete their cultivation under the deserl land act
of the tracts as set forth in said schedule.
Paragraphs 12 and 13 provide that parties named in Schedule B,
being claimant- under the desert land act and dependent upon water
to be supplied them by the company under that portion of its system
not yet constructed, may complete the acquisition of said public
lands by obtaining water under the reclamation act, "and that they
-hall have such extension of time in which to conform to the require-
ments of the desert land act as may become necessary on account of
their obtaining water for such lands from the reclamation project,"
with the provision that the lands so to be furnished with water shall
not exceed 160 acres to each claimant.
Paragraph 14 provides that the agreement shall not operate to bind
the United States to purchase said premises until approval by the
Secretary of the Interior, and
Paragraph 15 provides that the provisions of the agreement shall
inure to the successors and assigns of the respective parties thereto.
The Director of the Geological Survey states that a water right
for at Least 300 acre- ha- now vested in the company and that to
eliminate this water right by purchase would require a larger ex-
penditure than would he justified. He Mates that the proposition to
leave this water right in the company and to provide for the flowage
of the water through the canal to he constructed is the course usually
pursued by individuals under like condition-.
When an abstract of title in connection with the Klamath Falls
irrigation project was under consideration in this office it disclosed
an apparent obligation upon the property perpetually to deliver
water without charge for expense of operation or maintenance, to
certain parties, and the opinion was expressed that these obligations
were of such character as to prohibit acquiring the property under
the irrigation act. At that time the agreement involved in that
matter was not before this office and its conditions were not set forth.
Reference is made to this because it is stated that the agreement there
is substantially the same as the one under consideration now. That
the act of June 17. L902, affords authority for the purchase of a
partially constructed irrigation system has heretofore been held by
5104—Vol. 34—or, m 23
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the Department. In my opinion of February 6, 1905, in the Cali-
fornia Development Company (33 L. D., 391, 404), it was said:
If this system as now constituted is to be considered as a separate, distinct
and complete project there might be very potent argument produced against
its purchase and in support of the proposition that such a purchase would not
come within the purview of the law, but when considered as only a section of
the greater system to be constructed under the general project for utilization
of the waters of this river, its purchase clearly comes within the purview of
the law and may be consummated unless some other prohibitive obstacle is
presented.
The eifect of this agreement, if it be completed, will be to transfer
to the United States the incompleted irrigation system of the com-
pany, to be used in connection with, and to become a part of, the
larger system contemplated by the government. I have no doubt
that such a transaction in well within the powers conferred by the act
of June 17, 1902.
Whether the reservations provided for in paragraph 2 of the agree-
ment may be recognized presents another question. The water right
thus reserved has become vested and the purport of the agreement
is to recognize this fact. This right is to be recognized in the con-
struction and operation of the larger system and to be protected by
allowing the continued flowage of the water covered by the right
through the works to be constructed by the United States. The plan
proposed is frequently resorted to in dealings between individuals.
The principle involved is recognized in the laws and upheld by the
courts of most, if not all, of the States in the arid region. Undoubt-
edly the sale by the United States to any one person of a right to the
use of water for more than 160 acres would be in conflict with the
provisions of section 5 of the reclamation act. The transaction in-
volved here is not a sale of the water. The United States has no
title and does not propose to take any title to the water right re-
served in paragraph 2 of the proposed agreement. The transaction
is therefore not prohibited by the provision in section 5 of the
reclamation act restricting the sale of a right to use water for land
in private ownership.
The only obligation assumed by the United States is to allow the
water covered by this reserved right to flow through the canal to be
constructed under its project, and the company in whose interest the
reservation is made assumes its share of the annual maintenance
charge. After careful consideration I am of opinion that the pro-
visions of paragraph 2 of the proposed agreement do not conflict
with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the reclamation act.
By the proposed agreement the land reserved is apparently relieved
of any liability to contribute to the cost of the irrigation project ; in
other words, it is not brought within the limits of that project. The
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burden placed upon the Lands within the project is proportionally
increased by the withdrawal of the reserved land- therefrom. It
has presumably been decided that the cost of the undertaking will
not he so great as to render the scheme impracticable, hut. at any rate,
that i- a question which this office is not in position to determine. It
is an administrative question which arises in connection with even
project and therefore one for whose >olution the officers in charge of
the work must be held responsible.
I do not find any ground for apprehension that the provisions of
paragraph 11 of the proposed agreement would he in conflict with the
provisions of section ."> of the reclamation act. That paragraph sim-
ply provides that the company may continue to operate its present
Bystem until replaced by the government project. It i- evidently in-
tended by this paragraph to protect existing rights pending the con-
struction of the government works. No legal objection to this plan
can he urged, but, on the other hand, any plan which would not pro-
vide for the protection of the people who have lands now under irri-
gation would be open to serious criticism.
By paragraph 18 of the agreement it is provided that claimants
under the desert land act who have made entries upon the theory that
they would be able to obtain water from the company's system so as
to submit proofs within the time prescribed by law. -hall be allowed
such extension of time as may be necessary because of the proposed
change of ownership of the system. There is no authority in the
Secretary of the Interior to waive the provisions of the desert land
law. This proposition i^ so plain that it seems unnecessary to dis-
cuss it at length. The Director of the Geological Survey is of opin-
ion that the authority " to allow final proof to be made at Mich time
as would be possible under the reclamation project seems to be de-
ducible from several departmental decisions, as. for instance, in the
case of Thompson i\ Bartholet (18 L. I).. 96)." That decision does
not support the proposition that the Secretary of the Interior may
enter into an agreement that the plain provisions of the law uiay be
disregarded. lie ha- no authority to make any agreement provid-
ing that an entry for the public lands may be consummated in any
manner or at any time other than as provided by the law under
which Mich entry is made, and if he should enter into such agreement
it would afford no protection to the entryman. In hi- letter of
December 1. L905, the Director of the Geological Survey, referring to
this class of entries, -aid :
It would not lie necessary for the Department t«» commit itself to an extension
of lime for the making of final proof on these entries. All parties interested
would be satisfied with a declaration by the Department that, it' final proof on
these entries can not be made within the statutory lime for reasons falling
within the rules of the Board of Equitable Adjudication they will be considered
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under such rules, good faith being shown on the part of these entrymen. An
approval of the contract with a qualification to this effect would, it is believed,
be accepted by the Maxwell Land and Irrigation Company. In the opinion
of this office such action, if deemed proper by the Department would be but fair
to these entrymen who should be informed as to the status of their entries if
they are to depend upon the project.
If, when final proof is presented on any such entry, it is found
that it conies within any rule for consideration by the Board of
Equitable Adjudication, it would be disposed of in that manner,
and there would seem to be no good, reason for refusing to make a
statement to that effect.
The general question in the note of reference as to whether any
legal objection exists to the approval of this agreement seems to
demand a consideration of the whole instrument. The various para-
graphs thereof and their effect have been set forth quite fully herein.
It is not believed that any provision thereof, excepting such as have
been pointed out in discussion of the specific questions submitted,
presents a legal objection to the approval of the agreement.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
OKLAHOMA LANDS-RESERVATION WITHIN VACATED TOWNSITE—ACT
OF MAY 11, 189<{.
City of Enid.
Where a patent has not issued for a public reservation in a townsite at the
date the townsite is vacated, and the original entryman for such reserva-
tion fails to make application therefor within six months from the vacation
of the townsite, it thereupon, under the provisions of the act of May 11,
1896, becomes subject to disposal as an isolated tract under section 2455 of
the Revised Statutes, and can not be disposed of in any other manner.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C) January 6, 1900. (E. F. B.)
By letter of September 5, 1905, you transmit the appeal of the
City of Enid from your decision of May 9, 1905, rejecting its appli-
cation for a patent to that part of the SW. i of the NW. \ of Sec. 8,
T. 22 N., K. 6 W., Kingfisher, Oklahoma, commonly known as block
1 of " McGuire's Addition to Enid,' 1 and dismissing its protest against
the sale of said land as an isolated tract.
The NW. I of said section 8 was entered by Luther M. McGuire
as a homestead in 1893. In 1895 the entryman commuted to cash
the SW. J of said NW. J under the provisions of section 22 of the
act of May 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 81, 92), which authorizes the purchase
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of the homestead, " or any part thereof for townsite purposes," upon
the condition that reservations shall be made for public purposes.
A patent thereupon issued for all the land embraced in that part
of the homestead commuted to cash, except the land reserved, which
was designated on the plat as " Public square donated for parks,,
schools, or other purposes." This was in conformity with the ex-
press provisions of the statute.
Subsequently, W. II. McNeeley, who had acquired title to said
homestead, vacated the townsite plat- under authority of an act of
the legislature of Oklahoma, approved February 27, L895, which
authorized the proprietor of such subdivision to vacate the >ame,
except the reservation for public purposes and one street leading to
any interior reservation, by a written instrument duly executed and
recorded.
The act of Congress of May 11. L896 (29 Stat.. IK'). 117), provides
that where a patent for a reservation in such vacated townsite has
not been issued, it shall be lawful for the Commissioner of the General
Land Office to issue a patent to the original entryman for such reser-
vation upon payment of the homestead price therefor (ten dollar-
per acre), and if the original entryman shall fail or neglect to make
application for the reservation within six months from the vacation
of the townsite. or from the passage of said act, it shall be subject to
disposal under the provisions of section 2455 of the Revised Statutes,
as amended by the act of February 20, 1805. (See City of Enid,
30 I,. I).. 352.)
The second section of the act of May 11. L896, provides that where
the patent has issued, or shall hereafter issue, for such reservation,
the town or municipality, upon the vacation of the townsite, may sell
the same at public or private sale and convey the lands to the pur-
chaser, and cover the proceeds of such sale into the school fund of
such town or municipality.
In this case the patent had not issued, and the original entryman
failed to make application for the purchase of the reservation within
six months from the vacation of the townsite. It therefore became
subject to disposal as an isolated tract under section 2455 of ' the
Revised Statutes, and can not be disposed of in any other manner.
The city .of Enid can not be restored to its former right to such
reservation by the action of the owner of the townsite refiling the
plats as an addition to said city.
^ our decision is affirmed.
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applications fop use of name of united states in judicial
proceedings to forfeit rights of way.
Regulations.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, I). c7., January <l. 1906.
In any case of an application for the use of the name of the United
States in a suit or suits to be instituted to secure, on account of the
nonperformance of a condition subsequent, a judicial declaration of
forfeiture of rights of way granted over the public lands and reserva-
tions of the United States, the application should be addressed to the
Secretary of the Interior and filed with the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, and if upon examination proper grounds are
shown for the institution and maintenance of such suit, said Commis-
sioner will call upon the grantee or his or their successor in interest,
as the case may be, to show cause within ninety clays why the proper
proceedings shall not be instituted. If no satisfactory showing shall
be made within the prescribed time the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, upon the execution of a good and sufficient bond to
indemnify the United States against all liability for costs, will for-
ward the application to the Secretary of the Interior with appropriate
recommendation, whereupon such action will be taken as the circum-
stances of the case seem to warrant. If the application is allowed it
will be necessary that further application be made to the Department
of Justice for a commission to the applicant's attorney as special
United States attorney, with nominal compensation, authorizing him
to represent and defend the interests of the United States in such suit
or suits as may be allowed.
A form of indemnifying bond, drawn by the Department of Jus-
tice, is printed herewith and should be strictly followed.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS : That we,
of as principal, and
a corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of
as surety, are held and firmly hound unto the United States of America in the full
and just sum of thousand dollars, lawful money of the United
States, to be paid to the United States ; for which payment, well and truly to be
made, the said
.
bind
,
heirs, executors,
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and administrators, and the said
binds itself, its successors and assigns, firmly
by these presents.
In witness whereof, the said
: as principal,
hereunto set hand__and seal__, and the said
as surety, lias caused these presents to be sealed with its corporate seal and
signed by .
this day of in the year one thousand nine
hundred and
The condition of the foregoing obligation is such that whereas the said
made and tiled applica-
tion for permission to use the name of the United States in a suit to be instituted
by for the purpose of declaring forfeited certain rights of way for
purposes, approved in favor of
which said rights of way it is claimed
by the said
have been forfeited because of
;i failure to comply with the laws relating thereto, and which said rights of way
Interfere with the right of way sought to be acquired by the said
Now. therefore, if the said application for permission to use the name of the
United States in said suit for the purpose above stated shall be granted, and the
said suit shall be instituted in the name of the United States, and the said
shall pay all costs or judgment for money that may be awarded or rendered
againsl the 1'nitod States on account of said suit, and shall in every way save
the said United States harmless in respect of any order made in such proceeding
or any judgment for money or costs rendered therein, then this obligation shall
be void; otherwise, to remain in full force and virtue.
Signed, sealed, and delivered
in the presence of
Principal.
i As to principal. > Surety.
By __.
i As i<> surety
JUSTIFICATION BY CORPORATE SURETY.
[This form is to hi- used in connection with the execution of the foregoing bond when the
surety thei u is ii guaranty Or surety company, and this affidavit must tic annexed to the
bond I
Stale Of
J
County of \
ss
Personally appeared before me,
on this day of one thousand nine
hundred and known to me to be the
of
the corporation described in and which
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executed the annexed bond of
, as surety thereon,
and who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he resides at
,
in the State of
that he is the of the said
Company, and knows the corporate seal thereof; that said company is duly and
legally incorporated under the laws of the State of ;
that said company has complied with the provisions of the act of Congress of
August 13, 1894, allowing certain corporations to be accepted as surety on bonds
;
that the seal affixed to the annexed bond of
is the corporate seal af the said
Company, and was thereto affixed by order and authority
of the board of directors of said company, and that he signed his name thereto
by like order and authority, as
of said company ; and that he is acquainted with
and knows him to be the _• of said company; and
that, the signature of said , subscribed
to said bond, is in the genuine handwriting of said
, and was thereto subscribed by order and authority of
said board of directors, and in the presence of said deponent ; and that the
assets of said company, unencumbered and liable to execution, exceed its claims,
debts, and liabilities, of every nature whatsoever, by more than the sum of
dollars ($ ).
Deponent further says that
,
residing at
,
in the State of
, has been duly appointed as the agent of said company
to accept service of process against said company in the
judicial district of
,
and is authorized to enter an
appearance in behalf of said company in any action, suit, or proceeding brought
against it in said judicial district.
Sworn to, acknowledged before me, and subscribed in my presence this,
day of , 19
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS : That we,
of
, as principal, and _.
of
,
as suret
,
are held and firmly
bound unto the United States of America in the sum of
thousand dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid to
the United States ; for which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind our-
selves, our heirs, executors, and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by
these presents. Signed with our hands and sealed with our seals this
day of , one thousand nine hundred and
The condition of the above obligation is such, that whereas the said
made and filed application
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for permission to use the name of the United States in a suit to bo instituted by
for the purpose of declaring forfeited certain rights of way for
purposes, approved 1 , in favor
of
which said rights of way it is claimed by the said
have been forfeited because of a failure to comply with the laws relating thereto.
and which said rights of way interfere with the right of way sought to be
acquired by the said
Now. therefore, if the said application for permission to use the name of the
Tinted States in said suit for the purposes above stated shall he granted, and
the said suit shall he instituted in the name of the United States, and the said
shall pay all costs or judgment for money that may he awarded or rendered
against the United States on account of said suit, and will in every way save
the said United States harmless in respect of any order made in such proceed-
ing, or any judgment for money or costs rendered therein, then this obligation
shall he void ; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.
[l. s.]
[i- s.1
[l. s.]
[l. s.]
Signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of-
(As to principal.)
(As to surety.)
State of__
County of. },,
I,
,
one of the sureties on the annexed bond,
being duly sworn, depose and say that I am worth, after paying my just debts,
the sum of thousand dollars, exclusive of property ex-
empt from execution by the laws of the State in which I reside.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, A. D. 19.
(The above statement should be sworn to by each of the sureties.)
CONTEST—SUSPENDED ENTRY—CHARGE.
PORTEK /'. CaRLILE.
A contest based solely upon the ground that the entry is invalid because the
land embraced therein is not' of the character subject to such entry, may
be allowed, notwithstanding the entry, at the date of the initiation of the
contest, was embraced in an order of suspension issued by the land depart-
ment
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In case of the suspension of an entry by order of the land department the entry-
man is not compelled to comply with the law during the period of suspen-
sion, and contest on the ground of failure to comply with the requirements
of the law during such period should not be allowed.
Where contest against a suspended entry, on the ground of failure to comply
with law, is erroneously allowed by the local officers, and hearing had
thereon, the testimony adduced at the hearing, having been taken without
jurisdiction, can not be considered upon removal of the suspension.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) January 9, 1906. (E. O. P.)
Herbert C. Porter has appealed to the Department from your
office decision of July 31, 1905, reversing that of the local officers and
dismissing his contest against the desert land entry of James M.
Carlile for lots 1, 2, 3, 4, E. \ NW. \ and E. \ SW. J, Sec. 18, T. 17
K, K. 3 E., Greatfalls land district, Montana.
In said contest affidavit two grounds were alleged as a basis there-
for, viz : that the land entered was not desert in character, and
failure to comply with the requirements of the desert land law.
The entry in question was made December 24, 1901. The land
embraced therein was covered by your office letter of October 8, 1903,
withdrawing certain lands from entry under the desert land lawTs
and suspending such entries already made, pending an investiga-
tion " by a special agent to determine their bona fides.^ Contest affi-
davit wTas filed February 17, 1904.
On February 18, 1905, your office, upon an incomplete record, ren-
dered decision sustaining the contentions of Porter and directing the
cancellation of the said entry. On appeal by Carlile, the Department,
on July 19, 1905, remanded the case to your office for further consid-
eration, in order that a decision might be rendered upon the record as
it then stood and the effect of said order of suspension upon the juris-
diction of the local officers to entertain the contest determined. It is
from the decision rendered in accordance with instructions of the
Department that the pending appeal was taken.
After alleging as error the action of your office in denying the juris-
diction of the local officers to entertain the contest of Porter, it is
contended, in the second and third specifications of error, that your
office wras without authority to take further action or render another
decision, after an appeal from the decision first rendered had been
taken. Had such action been taken by your office after appeal, upon
its own motion, this objection might be wrorthy of serious considera-
tion, but under the circumstances here presented, it is difficult to de-
termine upon what basis such contention may rest, as the authority of
the Department to direct such further consideration by you is not to
be denied. Had such action not been taken the Department would
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necessarily have been called upon to decide the case upon a different
record from that before your office, and to first con-true an order of
suspension made by you. This the Department was unwilling to do,
and the action taken was in no way prejudicial to the rights of the
parties, because they were fully protected by the right of appeal,
whereby the whole matter could be brought before the Department
upon the merits.
In passing upon the question of jurisdiction the Department is of
opinion the decision appealed from is correct. Had the basis of con-
test been only the invalidity of the entry in question by reason of the
character of the land, such contest, though filed subsequenl to the
order of suspension, might have been allowed under the rule an-
nounced in the case of A.dams v. Farrington (15 L. I).. 234, 237), but
for no other cause. By such a contest the sole purpose of the govern-
ment in directing the suspension would be carried out, and of this
the entryman could not complain. HoAvever, in view of the fact that
during the suspension of an entry by order of the land department
time does not run against the suspended entry and the entryman is
not compelled to show compliance with the law during the period of
suspension, it would be manifestly unjust to allow contest to be
brought upon that ground.
The request of appellant that the local officers be directed to con-
sider the testimony taken in the present contest when the su>pension
now in force has been removed must also be denied, for two reasons:
first. les> than half the statutory life of the entry had elapsed at the
time it was suspended, and as time does not run against the entry
while under suspension, the claimant still has the remainder of the
statutory period, after the suspension is removed, within which to
show compliance with the law. and testimony taken long prior to the
expiration of such period would not be sufficient to warrant the De-
partment in ordering a cancellation of the entry for failure to comply
with the law. and. second, the action of the local officers being a mere
nullity for want of jurisdiction, the Department is without authority
to validate that which was void from the beginning.
While the hardship complained of by appellant in prosecuting his
void contest at great expense i^ fully recognized by the Department,
yet it knows of no rule of law whereby the relief asked can be granted
without serious prejudice to the rights of the entryman. For the
reasons herein stated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
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NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD GRANT-ADJUSTMENT-ACT OF JULY 1,
1898.
Stafford v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
Directions given that in case a selection by the Northern Pacific Railway Com-
pany is canceled for conflict, and thereafter, in the adjustment of the con-
flicting claims under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, the individual
claim is canceled upon relinquishment, the selection of the company be
immediately reinstated.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C) Jan vary 9, 1906. (E. J. H.)
October 30, 1897, one Joseph F. Juza made homestead entry for
lots 2 and 3, NE. J of SE. i and SE. ^ of NE. J of Sec. 27, T. 17 N.,
R. 10 W., Olympia, Washington, land district, upon which certificate
was issued to him September 1, 1898, and patent issued thereunder
January 14, 1899.
The described tracts are within the indemnity limits of the grant
to the Northern Pacific Railroad (now Railway) Company, and lots
2 and 3 and NE. J of SE. ^ were selected by said company April 28,
1885, per list No. 5, rearranged list No. 5, filed August 20, 1892, and
supplemental list No. 5 of November 17, 1896, and canceled May 6,
1898. The SE. J of NE. ^ does not appear to have been embraced in
said selection lists, so that there was no conflict as to that tract be-
tween Juza and the railroad company. Subsequently action was
taken looking to an adjustment of said conflicting claims, under the
act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), and Juza filed relinquishment
of all of the tracts covered by his entry, accompanied by a quit-claim
deed therefor.
January 16, 1905, Juza's entry and the patent issued thereunder
were canceled under the provisions of the act of 1898. Juza was
notified of his right to make entry of other lands in lieu thereof, and
the company that the tracts involved were subject to its claim.
January 25, 1905, said company filed its selection list No. 65 for all
of the described tracts, which was on the same day approved by the
local officers.
March 14, 1905, John Stafford tendered his homestead application
for said tracts, alleging that he established residence thereon Decem-
ber 17, 1904, with his family, consisting of his wife and two children,
and had continued to reside there, and that he had' made valuable
improvements on the land. The local officers rejected said applica-
tion for conflict with the indemnity selection of the Northern Pacific
company; from which Stafford appealed.
August 4, 1905, your office decision held, that inasmuch as it ap-
peared that the company made its former selection of lots 2 and 3
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and the NE. \ of the SE. \ prior to the date of Stafford's alleged
settlement, and that the prior conflicting claims of Juza and the
company thereto had been adjudicated under the provisions of the act
of L898, the action of the local officers in rejecting Stafford's applica-
tion was correct, so far as it related to said tracts, and the same was
affirmed.
As to the SE. j of NE. \. it was held that as the company did not
select the same until January 25, 1905, the adjustment of the conflict-
ing claims of Juza and the company did not apply thereto. As
Stafford alleged settlement prior to the company's said selection of
that tract, a hearing was ordered to ascertain whether he had a bona
•fide settlement thereon prior to the date of the company's selection.
From so much of said decision as related to lots 2 and 3 and the
NE. | of SE. j. Stafford has appealed to the Department, contending
that as Stafford was an actual bona fide settler upon the land prior
to the railway company's selection of said tracts on January 25, 1905,
his claim thereto is superior to that of the company.
In disposing of this appeal it is deemed proper to say that your
office when cancelling Juza's entry under his relinquishment and elec-
tion to transfer his claim to other lands, should have reinstated the
railroad selection formerly canceled, so as to prevent a hiatus occur-
ring which might have misled some other person into making claim
for this land. In this case however, Stafford was not so misled, for
he alleges settlement prior to the cancellation of Juza's entry, and at
the time of presenting his homestead application the selection as
again presented by the railway company was of record. Under these
conditions your office decision as to said lots '1 and 3 and XE. J of
SE.
J
was correct, and the same is affirmed.
In future you will see that in disposing of like conflicts under the
act of L898, the railroad selection is reinstated at the time of cancella-
tion of the individual claim preliminary to allowing the transfer to
other lands as provided for in said act.
SCHOOL LANDS I N 1 > KM N IT Y SELECTION.
Regulations.
Department of the Interior,
( rENERAL Land ( )i tick,
Washington, />. ('.. January 10, I!""'.
The following rules and regulations governing the -election <>!'
indemnity school land- are prescribed for the purpose of preserving
a uniform method in all State- and Territories having a grant <>!'
lands for common schools prior to the passage of the act of February
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28, 1801 (26 Stat., 796), including the State of Utah, to which the
indemnity provisions of said act were made applicable by the act of
May 3, 1902 (32 Stat., 188).
The act of February 29, 1891. amending sections 2275 and 2276,
Revised Statutes, is general and provides that
:
Sec. 2275. AVhere settlements with a view to preemption or homestead have
been, or shall hereafter he made, before the survey of the lands in the field,
which are found to have been made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those sec-
tions shall be subject to the claims of such settlers; and if such sections, or
either of them, have been or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged for the nse
of schools or colleges in the State or Territory in which they lie, other lands of
equal acreage are hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected by said
State or Territory, in lieu'of such as may be thus taken by preemption or home-
stead settlers. And lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated
and granted, and may be selected by said State or Territory where sections
sixteen or thirty-six are mineral lands, or are included within any Indian, mili-
tary, or other reservation, or are otherwise disposed of by the United States:
Provided, Where any State is entitled to said sections sixteen and thirty-six,
or where said sections are reserved to any Territory, notwithstanding the same
may be mineral land or embraced within a military. Indian, or other reservation,
the selection of such lands in lieu thereof by the said State of Territory shall
be a waiver of its right to said sections. And other lands of equal acreage are
also hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected by said State or Ter-
ritory to compensate deficiencies for school purposes, where sections sixteen or
thirty-six are fractional in quantity, or one or both are wanting by rea-
son of the township being fractional, or from any natural cause whatever. And
it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, without awaiting the ex-
tension of the public surveys, to ascertain and determine, by protraction or
otherwise, the number of townships that will be included within such Indian,
military, or other reservations, and thereupon the State or Territory shall be
entitled to select indemnity land to the extent of two sections for each of said
townships, in lieu of sections sixteen and thirty-six therein ; but such selections
may not be made within the boundaries of said reservations: Provided, however,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent any State or Territory from await-
ing the extinguishment of any such military, Indian, or other reservation and
the restoration of the lands therein embraced to the public domain and then
taking the sections sixteen and thirty-six in place therein; but nothing in this
proviso shall be construed as conferring any right not now existing.
Sec. 2276. That the lands appropriated by the preceding section shall be se-
lected from any unappropriated, surveyed public lands, not mineral in charac-
ter, within the State or Territory where such losses or deficiencies of school
sections occur : and where the selections are to compensate for deficiencies of
school lands in fractional townships, such selections shall be made in accord-
ance with the following principles of adjustment, to wit : For each township, or
fractional township, containing a greater quantity of land than three-quarters
of an entire township, one section ; for a fractional township, containing a
greater quantity of land than one-half, and not more than three-quarters of
a township, three-quarters of a section ; for a fractional township, containing a
greater quantity of land than one-quarter, and not more than one-half of a
township, one-half section ; and for a fractional township containing a greater
quantity of land than one entire section, and not more than one-quarter of a
township, one-quarter section of land: Provided, That the States or Territories
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which are, or shall be entitled to both the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections
in place, shall have the right to select double the amounts named, to compensate
for deficiencies of school lands in fractional townships.
1. The selections in any one List must not in the aggregate exceed
160 acres.
'2. All lists of selections must he prepared so that each selection will
correspond, approximately, in area with the base Lands, or lands in
lieu of which the selection is made. It is preferred that a separate
base he assigned to each legal subdivision selected, hut in no instance
can any selection exceed L60 acres, nor can it consist of noncontig-
uous tracts.
3. Where the selection is based upon lands that have been disposed
of by or under authority of any act of Congress, the base tract or
tracts must be described by legal subdivisions, each in its entirety,
except as provided in paragraph 5 hereof.
4. The cause of the loss must in each case be specifically stated. If
caused by an entry based upon a settlement claim initiated prior to
survey, the number of the entry must he given.. If occasioned \)\ a
reservation of the land, entitling the States to idemnity, the date,
name, and purpose of the reservation must he stated. If the loss.
occurs by reason the fractional character of the township, or the
supposed mineral character of the land, it must he sel forth.
5. Where the selection is for a loss occasioned by the fractional con-
dition of the township from natural or other causes, or for lands
included within a perfected claim, the survey of which is not in ac-
cordance with the rectangular system, any portion of the loss, not
Less than one acre, may he assigned as a basis, and any remaining por-
tion, not Less than one acre, may he used in future selections.
(*>. Where lands are reserved for school purposes and are after sur-
vey included in any Indian, military, or other reservation, or have
heen reserved for school purposes, b * whether surveyed or unsur-
veyed,'' and are assigned as the basis for selection, the list must in
every case he accompanied by a certificate of the officer, or officers,
charged with the care and disposal of such school Lands, that the
State has not previously sold or disposed of. nor contracted to sell
or dispose of any of said lands used as bases, nor any part thereof;
that the said lands and every part thereof are free of all lien- for
taxes, costs, interest, and judgments, or any incumbrance of any
nature whatsoever, and that the said lands are not in the possession
or subject to the claim of any third party, under any law or permis-
sion of the State or Territory; and within three month- after the
tiling of any such list of -election- the State or Territory nui-t in
addition tile a certificate from the recorder of deed-, or official custo-
dian of the records of transfers of real estate in the proper county,
that no instruments, purporting to convey or in any way incumber
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the title to any of said lands, are of record, or on file in his office,
and the failure to file such certificate within the required time may,
upon the report of the local officers, result in the cancellation of the
selection without previous notice from this office.
7. The selecting- agent must file a certificate with each list showing
that indemnity has not previously been granted for the assigned base,
and that no previous selection is pending for such assigned base.
8. The lands selected must be from the unappropriated surveyed
public lands, not mineral in character, within the State or Territory
making the selection, and their nonmineral character must be shown
by the affidavit of the selecting agent, or an agent appointed by him
for that purpose, and if by the latter, evidence of his appointment
should accompany his affidavits. A nonmineral affidavit can not be
made upon information and belief, but must be upon the personal
knowledge of the affiant and apply to every smallest legal subdivision
selected; and, if the selected land is not within six miles of any min-
ing claim, entry, or location, that fact must be shown by affidavit.
9. The legal fees required by law must accompany each list of
selections.
10. No more than one number must be given to any list, notwith-
standing the fact that it may contain more than one selection.
11. When a list of selections is received by mail on the morning
that the selected lands are open to settlement, entry, and selection, it
will be considered as proffered after the claims of all persons present
at the time of opening of the office have been received (32 L. D., 648) ;
but a list received by mail prior to the day of opening will be rejected
because prematurely filed.
12. No application to select will be received for lands covered by
an existing selection or entry of record, nor will any right be -recog-
nized as initiated by the tender of such an application (29 L. D., 29).
Where the base land, or any part thereof, for an indemnity selection
fails, no amendment thereof will be permitted.
13. The local officers are not authorized to accept the relinquish-
ment of any State selection. All relinquishments will be forwarded
to the General Land Office through the local office, when, if accepted,
the local officers will be directed to cancel the same on their records,
and after such cancellation is noted, and not before, the land will be
subject to general disposition under the public-land laws.
14. The right to indemnity does not exist for the undisposed school
sections within abandoned military reservations, the lands within
which are subject to disposal underlets of July 5, 1884, and August
18, 1894, or special acts not making a specific disposition of the school
sections (29 L. D., 418, Jan. 19, 1900).
15. Selections made prior to time that decision of January 19. 1900
(29 L. D., 418), was received at the local office, in lieu of school lands
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within abandoned military reservations, or selections made in lieu of
school lands within abandoned military reservation- embraced within
entries allowed prior to time that decision of January L9, L900, was
received at the local office, will, if otherwise regular, be allowed (act
of Feb. 11. 1903,32 Stat, 822).
L6. When a school section is identified by the Government survey
and no claim is, at the date when the right of the State would attach.
if at all, asserted thereto under the mining or other public-land laws,
the presumption arises that the title to the land has passed to the
State, hut this presumption may he overcome by the submission of a
satisfactory showing to the contrary. Claims of parties based upon
mineral locations covering parts of a school section, asserting that
same were known to be chiefly valuable for their mineral deposits at
and prior to the time when the right of the State would have attached
thereto, if at all, will be disposed of when applications for patents
under the mining laws are presented. (Mahoganey No. 2 Lode
Claim. 33 L. I).. 37; State of Utah, 32 L. I).. 117.)
17. The State will not be permitted to make selection in lieu of land
within a school section alleged to be mineral in character, whether
returned by the surveyor-general as mineral or otherwise, in the
absence of satisfactory proof that the base land (designated by legal
subdivisions. Bond /'. State of California, 81 L. D., 34) is known to
he chiefly valuable for mineral. (Act of February 28, 1891, 28 Stat..
796; case of State of California, 33 L. I)., 356.) The preliminary
proof must show the kind of mineral discovered upon the land and the
extent thereof; when and by whom the discoveries were made, and, as
far as practicable, whether any claim to the land is asserted under the
mining laws, and if so. by whom; the nature and extent of the mining
improvements placed upon the land by the mineral claimant; and
what efforts have been made and are being made to develop the land
in good faith for mineral purposes.
Upon submission by the State of an ex parte showing, conforming
substantially to the foregoing requirements, a hearing will be ordered
to determine the character of the land, evidence to be submitted in
support of the allegations contained in the preliminary showing.
Notice of Mich hearing shall be given by the State by publication of
at least once a week for five successive weeks in a newspaper to be
designated by the register of the land office as published nearest to the
location of such base land, and proof that the notice has been given
must be filed in the local land office on or before the day of hearing
(Sec. 2335, Rev. Stat.). If in any case the proof submitted at the
healing does not clearly show that the base land contains valuable
mineral deposits, ami is chiefly valuable on account of such deposits,
u selection in lieu thereof will not be permitted.
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18. A determination by the land department that a portion of the
smallest legal subdivision in a school section is mineral land will
place that entire subdivision in the class of lands that may be used
as a basis for indemnity or lien selection, and in all such cases there
must also be furnished certificates of the proper State authorities,
and of the officer in charge of the records in the county where the
base lands are situated, showing that such lands have not been sold,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of, as required by paragraph 6
hereof.
19. Where the land sought to be selected in lieu of land within a
school section has been returned by the surveyor-general as mineral,
notice of the proposed selection must first be given by publication for
sixty days, with posting in the local land office and upon each legal
subdivision of land applied for, during the same period, and satisfac-
tory proof submitted as to the nonmineral character of the selected
land. Upon compliance with this requirement and in the absence of
allegation that the land is mineral, the selection may be received, if
otherwise regular, certified and forwarded, as required hereafter.
20. Where land sought to be selected in lieu of land within a school
section has not been returned by the surveyor-general as mineral, but
is alleged by way of protest to be mineral, or where application for
patent therefor is presented under the mining laws, the proceedings
in such cases will be in the nature of a contest, and will be governed
by the rules of practice in force in contest cases.
21. Where land sought to be selected has not been returned as min-
eral, but is within six miles of a mining location, claim, or entry, the
application to select must be accompanied with an application for
publication of notice of the selection, which publication will be made
at the expense of the State or Territory, and must commence Avithin
twenty days of the filing and continue for a period of sixty days, and
the notice must be posted for the same period in the register's office
and in a conspicuous place upon each legal subdivision applied for.
During such period of publication the local officers may receive pro-
tests or contests as to any of the tracts applied for, claimed to be
more valuable for mining than agricultural purposes.
22. Upon the filing of any such application for publication of
notice of selection the register will prepare the proper notice and des-
ignate the paper in which same is to be published, which paper must
be within the vicinity of the selected land. Should the State or
Territory fail to make the required publication its application to
select will be rejected, subject to the usual right of appeal to this
office within thirty days after notice of the rejection.
23. No application which requires affirmative proof of the nonmin-
eral character of the selected land, or of the known mineral character
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of the base land, will be accepted until the preliminary requirements
hereinbefore indicated have been complied with.
24. Where the State or Territory conforms to the preliminary
requirements governing -election- of land within six miles of a min-
ing location, claim, or entry, or of the selection of land- upon alleged
mineral bases, the register will certify as to the date of filing, the
status of the land- selected, as shown by the record-, and forward the
li-t. together with all showing made either for or againsl the -election.
to this office by special letter, without further action. The legal fees
payable upon such selection mu-t he tendered with the application to
selecl and will he received and held as unearned fee- and unofficial
moneys until the selection has been allowed or finally rejected by this
office, and in the meantime no action Looking to a disposal of the land
will he taken.
The foregoing regulations, with certain modifications and restric-
tions, are hut a codification of existing regulations, . and are not
designed to disturb pending selections made in accordance with pre-
vious regulations.
Indemnity -elections by the Territory of New Mexico, under act of
June 21, L898 (30. Stat., 484), must be made of lands as contiguous
as may be to the base lands. Under the practice heretofore prevail-
ing the law will be held to have been complied with where the selected
land is within the same township as the base land. In other respects
all of the foregoing regulations are applicable to the Territory of
New Mexico.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved. January L0, L906.
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary
PRACTICE—APPEAL NOTICE—CONTEST—PREFERENCE RIGHT.
Tonn v. Hays (On Review ).
The Rules of Practice require thai notice of an appeal to the Department shall
be served upon the appellee or his counsel : but where decision in a case
is inadvertantly rendered by the Departmenl in the absence of proof of
service. of the appeal, such decision will not he disturbed <>n motion for
review, in the absence of a showing of reversible error, merely because of
want of proper service of the appeal.
The mere tender, by an applicant to purchase under the timber and stone act,
of the required proof, purchase price and U'i's. which are properly refused
by the local officers, is not the equivalenl of an "entry." within the mean-
ing of the act of May 11. 1880, ' according a preference righl to one who
contests and procures the cancellation of an entry.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the Gene nil Land Office,
( F. L. C
)
January 10, WOO. ( J. L. McC.
)
Your office, on December 22, 1904, dismissed the protest of Susan
O. Todd against the allowance of the application of Charles E. Hays
to make timber-land entry for the E. J of the SW. ]. and lots 3 and
4, of Sec. 18, T. 2 N., R. 6 W., Oregon City land district, Oregon.
Hayes claimed the right to make said entry on the ground that he
had instituted contest against the application of one Eureka II. Quick
to make entry of said land, which application Quick had withdrawn,
executing a relinquishment of all right, title and interest in and to
the same, while his contest was pending.
From the action of your office in dismissing Todd's protest she
appealed. The Department, on June 26, 1905, reversed said action of
your office; held that a timber-land application "which has not
ripened into an entry does not segregate the land ; " that " a contest
against such an application, although conducted to a successful termi-
nation, does not carry with it a preference right ; " and therefore
directed the cancellation of Hays's entry. (See 33 L. D., 655.)
Hays filed a motion for review of said decision, the first assign-
ment of error being
:
That Todd's appeal from the Honorable Commissioner's decision of December
22, 1904, was never served on appellee, and that an examination of the record
will disclose tbe want of such service. Under the Rules of Practice, an appeal
without service on appellee is a nullity. The Department never acquired juris-
diction of the case. The case stands as if no appeal had been taken. The time
for filing an appeal has expired. The Honorable Commissioner's decision of
December 22, 1904, should be affirmed and the case closed.
An examination of the record shows that there is no evidence that
Todd's appeal from your office decision was ever served upon the
opposite party. This omission was overlooked when the former
departmental decisions were made.
It does not follow, however, that the Department is without juris-
diction in the matter. As was said in the case of the Pueblo of San
Francisco (5 L. D., 483, 494) :
The statutes, in placing the whole business of the Department under the
supervision of the Secretary, invest him with authority to review, reverse,
amend, annul, or affirm all proceedings in the Department having for their
ultimate object to secure the alienation of any portion of the public lands, or
tbe adjustment of private claims. . . . When proceedings affecting titles to
lands are before the Department, the power of supervision may be exer-
cised by the Secretary whether or not those proceedings are called to his atten-
tion by formal notice or by appeal. It is sufficient that they are brought to Iris
notice. The rules prescribed are designed to facilitate the Department in the
dispatch of business, not to defeat the supervision of the Secretary.
Referring more particularly to the case here under consideration.
it would be absurd indeed to hold that the for o-etfulness of an attor-
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ney to serve an appeal could place the Department in a position where
it would be compelled to allow a palpable injustice or a manifest
error in law to remain uncorrected. Rule 115 of Practice distinctly
provides:
None of these rules shall ho construed to deprive the Secretary of the Interior
of either the directory or supervisory power conferred upon him by law.
If the first specification of error is intended as :l motion to reopen
the ease and dismiss the appeal because it was not served, the Depart-
ment could with propriety refuse to consider the motion, because that
was not served on the opposite party. It will not be thus considered,
however, hut will he treated as a specification of error. Thus treated,
though the rendering of the departmental decision in the absence of
proof of service of the appeal was a manifest inadvertence, it will
not. under the well settled rulings as cited, unless reversible error is
otherwise shown, he disturbed solely because of want of proper service
of the appeal.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the Department will re-examine
and consider the case on its merits, and on the specifications of error
filed by Hays, as if in answer to the appeal of Todd, tints giving him
his day in court, which he ought to have had on appeal.
The argument in support of the motion for review, referring to
the departmental decision of June 26, 1905, concedes that, " under
the facts heretofore presented, the Honorable Secretary correctly
expounded the law;" but it contends that the facts set forth in cer-
tain documents accompanying the motion essentially change the con-
dition of affairs. Said documents consist of the application of said
Eureka II. Quick to make entry of the land in controversy, under
the timber-land law; the several affidavits and other papers usually
and properly accompanying such application; the testimony of two
witnesses as to the character of the land and the qualifications of
the applicant : the receiver's receipt for the fee ($*2.00) paid him for
taking the above-mentioned testimony; also a copy of the receiver's
endorsement upon the testimony:
Purchase price and tecs tendered this date. 23d Dec, 1890, upon the within
proof, ;ui(i the same refused by authority <>f Hon. Commissioner's telegram of
December 12, 1899.
Counsel for the movant contend-:
It is not the purpose of this paper to controvert the holding of the decision
of June 20, 1905, that a contest against a mere application to purchase hinds
under the act of June 3, IMS (20 Stat., 89 | . though such contest he conducted
to n successful termination, does not carry with it a preference righl t<> entry
under the provisions of the act of May 14, 1880.
Our contention is that at the time of the initiation of the contest of Hays
againsl Eureka II. Quick Quick had done .-ill that the law and the
regulations pursuant to it demanded, and had tiled all the proofs accessary to
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make entry and receive patent for the land ; had paid the tees to the register
and receiver for the testimony submitted in support of her right, and had ten-
dered the money in payment for the land: and hence that she, then and there,
possessed the legal equivalent of an entry, which to all intents and purposes
amounted to an entry within the meaning of the act of May 14, 1880, respect-
ing contests and preference rights .... Under the law and under the regu-
lations, said Quick, having done everything required and demanded to he
done in the premises, became thereupon instantly entitled, under the law, to
make entry. Her right to the land then vested
—
prima facie, at least ....
Quick had on the face of the record the legal equivalent of an entry. It was
that legal equivalent which Hays contested; and having done so, and succeeded
in his contest, he was clearly entitled to the preference right of an entry
awarded by the act of May 14, 1880, not as contesting a mere application to
purchase, hut as contesting an entry dc jure, if not one de facto.
Heretofore it has always been understood by the Department that
joint action of the applicant on the one hand and of the local offi-
cers on the other, was requisite in order to make an entry of a tract
of land; but if this contention of counsel be correct, any person wish-
ing to make entry of a given tract can do so unassisted—in the face
of the rightful refusal of the local officers, and in defiance of orders
of your office to the contrary. But such is most certainly not the case.
The contention of counsel regarding Quick's acts—that " these steps
taken by her segregated the land; this segregation was equivalent
to an entry "—is not well founded ; the money tendered must havl
been received, and receipt issued therefor, in order to render such
action " equivalent to an entry." As was said by the Department in
the case of Thomas y. St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad (3 C. L.
O., 197), quoted with approval in Gilbert v. Spearing (4 L. D., 463),
and again in Iddings v. Burns (8 L. D., 224) :
Each of the three elements of which this transaction is composed forms
an essential part thereof—the application, the affidavit, and the payment of
money ; and when the application is presented, the affidavit made, and the
money paid, an entry is made, a right is vested.
Even more strongly against the contention of the movant is the
language of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Wither-
spoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 210, 219) : " When the entry is made, ami
certificate give a, the particular land is segregated from the mass of
public lands, and becomes private property." Again (Hastings etc.
Railroad v. Whitney, 132 U. S., 357, 303) :
Under the homestead law three things are needed to be done in order to
constitute an entry on public lands: First, the applicant must make an affi-
davit setting forth the facts which entitle him to make entry ; second, he must
make formal application ; and, third, he must make payment of the money
required. When these three requisites are complied with, and the certificate of
entry is executed and delivered to him the entry is made—the land is entered.
The rule thus established is equally applicable to entries under the
timber and stone act.
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As recently as August 30, L905, the Department rendered a decision
in the ease of Jones v. Northern Pacific Railway Company (34 L. D.,
L05), in which " Jones applied to purchase the tract under the timber-
and-stone act, supra, and after due publication and proof, made entry
thereof, December 10, 1898. At the date of the purchase, but not at
the date of the application, the tract in controversy, with other-, was
withdrawn from entry by virtue of departmental order of February
B8, L898." The Department held (page 111):
There wns no purchase until the money was paid .... lint it is con-
tended that the application of Jones was the equivalent of an entry. While
such an application, if presented in accordance with law and for land subject
thereto, reserves the land from other disposition by the land department, no
pighl is initiated ;is against the government; and prior to the submission and
acceptance of final proof, and the payment of the purchase price, the Secretary
of the Interior may suspend the same from disposition and sale under the public
land laws. (Board of Control, ("anal No. .*'>. State of Colorado v. Torrence, 32
L. D.. I7i\ ) This is precisely what was done in this case. The trad was
withdrawn from entry by the order of February 28, L898; and the purchase of
Jones, allowed in violation of that order, initiated no right falling within the
remedial provisions of the act of July 1, 1898.
It i> not denied that, had the 1 tender of the purchase money been a
proper one. and been wrongfully refused by the register and re-
ceiver, the rights of Quick would have been as fully protected, under
the decisions of the courts and of the Department, as though the
money had been accepted and receipted for. But Quick is not here
claiming that any wrong has been done her. If she had rights in the
premises, it is more than questionable whether a mere contestant, by
virtue of his contest, i> subrogated to the equities of the contestee,
and can claim the benefit of them. However, in this case the con-
testee, Quick, acquired no such rights or equities; for the tender was
not a proper one. because made in the face of the lawful and pro-
hibitory order of your office- -made at a time when the register and
receiver could not accept the same: therefore it was properly re-
jected by them. Consequently there was no legal tender: and the
case stands, in contemplation of law. as though no tender had been
made. The facts do not bring this case within the ruling of any of
the cases cited by counsel for the movant.
It is not intended herein to decide that, tinder proper circum-
stances, a timber-land application is not contestable under Rule No.
1 of the Rules of Practice, as stated on page 42 of the General Cir-
cular. This may well he authorized to-be done by the Department.
But by Mich contest no preference right i> to be acquired, inasmuch
as Congress has thought proper to legislate on that subject, granting
a preference right as a reward, and giving it only where a party has
contested and procured the 'cancellation of an "entry," of the
classes named m the act of May II. 1880 (21 Stat.. U0). There
having been no entry by Quick, there could be no cancellation of one.
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The error thus exposed in the movant's contention invalidates his
entire argument, carefully built thereon—which therefore need not
be further discussed.
Inasmuch as the motion fails to show that the movant has been
in any manner prejudiced by the appellant's failure to serve his
appeal from your office decision (of December 22, 1904), or that the
departmental decision (of June 2G, 1005, supra), contained any
reversible error, no reason appears why said departmental decision
should be disturbed.
The motion for review is overruled, and herewith transmitted for
the files of your office.
In this connection the attention of your office is called to Rule 82
of Practice, which directs
:
When the Commissioner considers an appeal defective, he will notify the
party of the defect ; and if not amended within fifteen days from the date of
the service of such notice, the appeal may be dismissed by the Secretary of the
Interior, and the case closed.
It is obviously implied by this rule that when appeals are pre-
sented to your office they should be carefully examined, and if found
to be defective, that action should be taken as directed. If an exami-
nation of the appeal in this case had been made, it would have dis-
closed the fact that there was no evidence of service thereof in the
record, and said appeal should have been returned for evidence of
service. Such action would have prevented the complications that
have subsequently arisen. You will direct that hereafter the
requirements of this rule be observed in each case, and that none be
forwarded to the Department until the rule has been complied with
by your office.
FOREST RESERVE LIEU SELECTION—CONTESTANT—PREFERENCE
RIGHT—ACT OF JUNE 4, 1897.
Bowlby v. Hays.
The fact that a successful contestant who in the exercise of his preference right
applies to select the land under the act of June 4, 1897, did not have title to
the land assigned as base for the selection at the date of the initiation of
the contest, furnishes no ground for rejection of the application, it being
only necessary that the selector have title to the base land at the time he
initiates the proceeding for an exchange under the act by relinquishing it
to the United States.
General allegations in a protest filed with a view to defeating a successful con-
testant's preference right, tending to show a speculative intent and immonl
practice in other contests instituted by the same contestant, are not suffi-
cient to bring into question his preference right in a case wherein his
conduct is unimpeached.
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The preference right of entry accorded a successful contestanl by the act of
May 11. 1880, does not accrue to one who contests and procures the rejection
of an application to purchase under the act of June 3, 1878.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. ( \ ) January 10, 190G. (J. R. W.)
Theodore P. Bowlby appealed from your decision of April 8, L905,
rejecting his application tinder the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89),
to purchase the S. \ NE. J and lots 1 and 2, Sec. 3, T. 2 X.. R. 7 W.,
W. M-, Oregon City, Oregon.
September 20, 1899, Edith Tuttle filed a similar application,
against which. July 8, 1901, Charles E. I lavs filed a contest. Feb-
ruary 20, 1904, Bowlby filed his application, which was held sus-
pended in the local office to await final action on Hays's contest.
August 15, 1904. Hays, by G. B. McLeod, attorney in fact, filed appli-
cation tinder the act of June 4. 1897 (30 Stat.. 36), to -elect the land
in lieu of land relinquished to the United States in a forest reserve.
August 29, 190!. your office canceled Turtle's application and awarded
Hays, as successful contestant, a preference right of entry. The local
office minuted Hays's application and September 19, 1904, recom-
mended its approval. October 3, 1904, Bowlby filed a protest against
approval of Hays's selection and claimed prior right in himself as
second applicant to purchase. Hays's selection of the land tinder his
preference right i> attacked on three grounds: (1) That the base
assigned for the selection was acquired after the initiation of con-
test; ('2) that the contest was speculative; (3) that contest will not
lie against a mere application to enter and that no preference right
fcrises from such proceedings.
Your decision held that it is sufficient if a selector has title to the
base land at the time he initiates the proceeding for an exchange by
relinquishing it to the United States. There was no error in so hold-
ing. The ownership of the base is the qualification to appropriate
public lands by this form of entry. The qualification of an entry-
man must exist at the date of the entry (Gourley ''. Countryman.
28 L. I).. 198), and it is sufficient if qualification of a successful con-
testant exists at the time he exercises the preference right. (Reas
/•. Ludlow. 22 L. I).. 205.)
The allegations of the protest as to the speculative character of the
proceeding are that at about the same lime that Hays initiated his
proceeding against Tuttle's application he took similar proceedings
against thirty-five similar applications, eighteen of which resulted
successfully, and in ten others there were dismissals of the contests
accompanied by relinquishments of the original applications and of
tin 1 preference and the lands in six of them were taken under state
school land indemnity lists, one by a Northern Pacific Railway Com-
378 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
pany selection and in three cases by forest lieu selections, by persons
not named; that in the remaining seven cases the original applica-
tions were canceled or relinquished and Hays took the lands, one by
timber and stone purchase and the other six by forest lieu selections.
The charge of speculative character of the contest in the present
instance is conclusively negatived by the record itself. Hays seeks
to exercise the preference right himself and it is not alleged that he
ever offered or negotiated to waive it. The act of May 14, 1880 (21
Stat., 140), offers a preference right of entry as a reward to the in-
former who discloses to the government facts that show an entry of
public lands to be in violation of law. Eight to the reward accrues
upon the successful result of a contest, The law does not require that
the contestant shall have a certain qualification, as, for instance, that
he was never guilty of violation of the land laws, or of the immoral
practice of bringing a contest with view to selling a waiver of his
preference right which is not assignable. It would tend directly to
defeat the object of the act to hold that misconduct or immoral prac-
tice of an informer in other cases affected the rights accruing to him
in a case wherein his conduct is unimpeached. It follows that such
a charge with view to defeating a successful contestant's preference
right must state facts tending to show a speculative purpose in the
particular instance and that general allegations tending to show
speculative intent and immoral practice in other contests instituted
by the same contestant do not alone bring in question his preference
right in a case where no special allegation of fact is made tending to
show that that particular contest was instituted with speculative in-
tent. No such fact is alleged and it follows that no charge of specu-
lative intent justifying a denial of the preference right was made.
The third contention is that no preference right accrues by pro-
ceedings against a mere application when no entry has in fact been
made. Holding the contrary, your office cited and relied upon the
authority of Olmstead v. Johnston (17 L. D., 151). That decision is
not authority therefor. In that case Alice M. Milligan had made an
entry which Olmstead contested, and April 25, 1891, it was canceled
as the result of such contest. May 4, 1891, Catherine Johnston Avas
permitted to file her timber land statement, and May 16, 1891, Olm-
stead, claiming a preference right by reason of his successful contest
of Milligaivs entry, presented his timber land statement for the same
laud. Your office, April 23, 1892, held that Olmstead, by contest of
Milligaivs entry, acquired a preference right, and this was affirmed
by the Department by analogy to~the decision in Fraser v. Ringgold
(3 L. D., 69), which was a contest against a desert land entry.
Neither of these decisions recognized or was predicated upon a contest
against an application to enter.
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By the ad of May 14. L880, supra, the preference right of entry is
granted to an informer who pays the land office fees, successfully con-
tests and procures cancellation of "any preemption, homestead or
timber culture entry." By construction the word " preemption" was
held in Fraser v. Ringgold to include "desert land entry," and 1>\
parity of reasoning in ( )lmstead v. John-ton was held to include timber
and -tone entries. Bui the Department has not held in any case cited
or that search by the Department has disclosed, that an application
to enter is within the statute offering a reward for proceedings
against an entry. The contrary was held in Jacoby v. Kuhal (29
L. 1).. L68), a homestead application, and in Field v. Black (2 L. D.,
581 ). in an attempted contest against a pre-emption declaratory state-
ment. The preliminary application, or statement of intent. i>. under
the net of June 3, L878 (20 Stat.. 89), the analogue of and answers to
the declaratory statement under the pre-emption law. and i^ what
classifies a proceeding under that act as generically a pre-emption
entry. I Hughes v. Tipton. -2 L. I).. 334.)
It necessarily follow- that under the act of May 11. 1880, no pref-
erence right is obtained by such a proceeding. A timber and stone
application doe- not segregate the land (California v. Nickerson, 20
L. 1).. 391, 392), hut other applications made thereafter and received
})\ the local office must await action thereon. If one desire to acquire
lands subject to Mich an application pending, he must make applica-
tion therefor, and in connection therewith, for protection of his own
right, may protest against allowance of the application pending. He
can in that manner raise any question going to the right of the prior
applicant to make entry.
In the present case Hays made no application for the Land prior
to that of Bowlby. He got nothing by his attempted contest. (Todd
v. Hays, 33 L. I).. 655.)
It has not been overlooked that paragraph 16, page L2, General Cir-
cular of January 25, L904, states that: "Contests may hi 1 brought
against timber and stone land applications or entries in accordance
with rule 1 of Rules of Practice: " and that rule 1 of practice is that :
"Contests may he initiated by an adverse party or other person
against a party to an entry, filing, of other claim under laws of Con
Egress relating to the public land-." The land department entertains
such proceeding for its information and with view to prevent unlaw
lnl appropriation of public land-. Congress ha-, however, granted a
preference right only to those who contest an entry.
An entry i< that action of record whereby the United States by
it- proper officer recognizes that an individual right has attached to
a tract of public land, and thai the United State- i- obligated to con
vey to him the legal title. I Hastings, etc.. R. R. Co. v. Whitney, L32
T. S.. :j;,t, 363-4.)
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Courts of equity regard " an entry as the commencement of title."
(Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat., 212, 214; Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet.,
93, 110.) Upon an entry a contract arises for conveyance of the legal
title. In Parsons v. Venzke (164 TJ. S., 89, 92), the court held that:
An entry is a contract. AVhenever tbe local land officers approve the evidences
of settlement and improvement and receive the cash price, they issue a re-
ceiver's receipt. Thereby a contract is entered into between the United States
and the pre-emptor. and that contract is known as an entry. . . . The effect of
the entry is to segregate the land entered from the public domain, and while
subject to such entry it can not be appropriated to any other person or to any
other purposes.
All unreserved and unappropriated public land is subject to disposal
under the acts of Congress and in the modes thereby defined. Until
such land is entered it is subject to appropriation by the first legal
applicant, and the land department is not authorized to exclude
public land from appropriation of a legally qualified applicant by
awarding a preference right which Congress has not authorized it to
grant.
BoAvlby has therefore the clear prior right to consummate his
application by complying with the terms of the act of June 3, 1878,
supra. In case he does so, Hays's selection, which is subject to
Bowlby's right, will be rejected. If Bowlby fail to perfect his
application, Hays's selection will be permitted to stand. The papers
are herewith returned for further proceedings conformable hereto.
APPLICATION TO PURCHASE—TIMBER AND STONE ACT.
Santa Fe Pacific R. R. Co. et al v, Ranklev.
Applicants for public lands lose no rights by mistakes and laches of officers of
the land department ; but persons claiming the benefit of this rule must show
that they have an inchoate right and that they have not been so dilatory
in assertion of it as to give rival bona fide applicants a superior right.
No rights are acquired by an application to purchase under the timber and
stone act presented at a time when the land was not subject to such
appropriation.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
January 11, 1906. (J. R. W.)
David X. Winton, transferee of the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad
Company through mesne conveyances, intervener, appealed from
your decisions of June 15, 1905, and December 23, 1904, rejecting the
selection of the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, number 6448,
your office series, under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), for the
SW. J, Sec. 19, T. 156 X., R. l>7 W., 5th P. M., Cass Lake, Minnesota,
in lieu of land relinquished to the United States in a forest reserve,
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and awarding to Martin E. Ranklev the right to purchase the tract
under the acts of Juno 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), and August 4, 1892
(27 Stat., 348).
December 22, 181)4, the land, then unsurveyed, was included in
applications of E. J. Turney, under section 4 of the act of February
8, L887 (24 Stat., 388). for allotments to Indian minors. The appli-
cations were noted on the local office trad books. June 15. 1899, they
were rejected.
July 15. L895, while such allotment applications were pending, the
township plat of survey was filed in the local office. The next day
Ranklev tendered, with the legal fees, his declaratory statement
under the act of 1878, supra, which was also noted on the local office
record. Edwin T. Bigelow. also tendered his homestead application,
alleging settlement, which the local office rejected for conflict with
Turney's allotment applications, and Bigelow appealed to your office.
Soon after, the date of filing not appearing, Ranklev filed in the local
office his protest, sworn to before a notary public July IT. 1805, cor-
roborated by two witnesses, against the Indian allotment applica-
tions. The Ranklev application and protest were mislaid in the
local office and were not reported or transmitted to your office, as
should have been done. l>i<>-elow*s appeal was transmitted December
«. 1895.
June 15, 1899, when Turney 's Indian allotment applications were
rejected, your office, not having Ranklev's application and protest
before it. or any report of their existence, directed the local office to
allow Bigelowr 's entry, and he made entry July 5. 1899, which he
relinquished January 6, 1 (.)()(). and applied to enter the land, as
assignee of soldiers' additional homestead rights, under section 2306
of the Revised Statutes of the United State-.
January 20, L900, in transmitting Bigelow's latter applications,
the local office transmitted Ranklev's declaratory statement and pro-
test of July 16, and 17. 181)5. reporting that without action thereon
they were mislaid, and were finally found among the old files of the
office. August 1. L902, your office held that, as Bigelow's additional
homestead applications were clearly fraudulent, it was unnecessary
to take any action upon Ranklev's timber and stone application, and
held it suspended pending final action upon Bigelow's applications.
October
-J. 1902, the local office received the application of the Santa
Fe Pacific Railroad Company under the act of June 4. 18 (.>7. supra,
;ind transmitted it. December L6, l'.Mlij. to your office, which appeal- i<.
have received and held it without action thereon, or objection thereto,
until June 15. 1905.
December 10. L902, Bigelow's additional homestead applications
were rejected and the case was closed.
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September 29, 1904, your office took up Ranklev's application for
action and held that, as four years had passed since rejection of the
Indian allotment without Ranklev's publication of notice or any indi-
cation of his intent to pursue his application, he had abandoned it,
and it was rejected. October 8, 1904, Ranklev was served with notice
of such order, and October 22, 1904. filed affidavit that when he filed
his application he was informed that the land was covered by the
Indian allotment application, and that if that were rejected he would
be notified and be allowed to complete his application to purchase;
that he then employed an attorney, and repeatedly made inquiries of
him and was informed that the matter was yet pending without action
by your office ; that he never received notice from his attorney or the
local office, and that he made the application in good faith, and has
always been ready to take out notice, to comply with the law. and to
complete his purchase, and asked leave to do so. December 23, 1904,
your office held the affidavit sufficient, and allowed him sixty days
therefor. Notice issued February 21, 1905, was duly posted and
published, and May 18, 1905, on the day appointed, he made proof.
May 5, 1905, David N. Winton, remote transferee of the selector,
by deed of conveyance of January 31, 1903, intervened, and filed in
your office his objections to approval of Ranklev's purchase, and
prayed approval of the forest lieu selection, and June 6, 1905. he filed
a motion for reconsideration of your decision of December 23, 1904,
allowing Ranklev to purchase.
June 15, 1905, your office denied the motion and held that the
allowance of Bigelow's homestead entry and his location of soldiers'
additional rights, and the action of your office September 29, 1904,
in rejecting Ranklev's application, were all erroneous and in viola-
tion of Ranklev's right.
Error of the local office in not forwarding Ranklev's timber and
stone application can not be allowed to hold the land indefinitely
against appropriation by another proceeding in good faith under the
law to acquire it. Ranklev made his application at a time when the
land was not subject to such appropriation, being sub judice under
the allotment applications.
It is against the intent and declared policy of Congress to permit
indefinite segregation of land from other appropriation by applica-
tions for purchase under the timber and stone act that are not dili-
gently prosecuted. If he advertise, but for any reason, though not
due to his own fault, fails to consumate his purchase, he can not keep
his claim alive to the prejudice of an intervening adverse applicant.
James N. True (26 L. D., 529) ; Caleb J. Shearer (21 L. I)., 492) ;
John M. McDonald (20 L. D.. 559).
If Ranklev's application be regarded as made at the time the
allotment applications were rejected, June 15, 1899, he was bound to
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prosecute it with reasonable diligence. lie conld not await indefi-
nitely holding the land from other appropriation while others with-
out notice of his claim were proceeding to acquire a right to it. It
was held in Moran v. Horsky ( 17s U. S.. 205, 208) that:
One who. having an inchoate righl to property, abandons it for fourteen years,
permits others to acquire apparent title and deal with it ;is theirs, does not
appeal to the favorable consideration of m court of equity. We need only refer
to the many c.-ises decided in this court and elsewhere that a neglected right,
if neglected too long, must ho treated as an abandoned right winch no court
will enforce . . . There always comes a time when the host of rights will,
by reason of neglect, pass beyond the protecting reach of the hands of equity.
It i> a genera] principle that applicants for public lands lose no
rights by mistakes and laches of officers of the land department, but
persons claiming benefit of this rule must show that they have an
inchoate right, and that they have not been so dilatory in assertion
of it as to give rival bona fide applicants a superior one. Ranklev
can do neither. From June 15, 1899, to October '1'2. 1904, he made
no assertion of right or sought information from the land depart-
ment or action of any kind upon his lost and delayed application,
lie contented himself with inquiries of his attorney, and the attorney
took no action to bring his claim to the attention of the land office.
In the meantime others were expending efforts to acquire tin 1 land.
Bigelow was allowed a homestead entry June 15, 1899, and relin-
quishing that January 6, 1900, made the location of the soldiers'
additional rights, and. they being rejected, October '2. 1902, the
selector made its selection, conveyed whatever equity it had to Coffin,
who conveyed to Bigelow, who conveyed to Winton, the intervener.
In view of the Department, Ranklev acquired no right by his appli-
cation made at a time when the land was not subject to his purchase,
and had he acquired an inchoate right, he is by reason of his laches
in no position to assert it against a later applicant who has filed and
prosecuted with diligence his application for the land.
Your office decision is reversed and Ranklev's application is
rejected.
DESERT LAND ENTRY—CONTRACT TO CONVEY AFTER PATENT.
Herbert C. Oakley.
Recognition in the act of March ::. 1891, of the right of assignmenl of desert-
land entries furnishes no authority for recognizing a righl on the part of
a desert-land entryman to outer into an executory contrad to convey the
land after the issuance of patent and to thereafter proceed with the sub-
mission of final proof in furtherance of such contract.
Departmental decision in the case of Wheaton v. Wallace, ill L. l>.. loo.
modified.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) January 15, 1906. (E. (). P.)
Herbert C. Oakley has appealed to the Department from your
office decision of February 25, 1905, approving the recommendation
of the local officers and rejecting final proof offered by him in sup-
port of his desert land entry for the E. £, Sec. 13, T. 15 S., Pv. 13 E.,
S. B. M., Los Angeles land district, California, and holding said
entry for cancellation.
The entry in question was made September 12, 1900, and final proof
thereon was submitted November 4, 1903. Original and supple-
mental briefs have been filed by counsel and the questions presented
by the appeal have been orally argued before the Department. In
addition, supplemental showing in the form of various affidavits,
has been made and the record before your office for consideration and
upon which your decision is based, has been amplified and many of
the material facts, as originally presented, have been more fully set
out and explained. In the decision appealed from the facts dis-
closed by the original record are fully and correctly stated, but in
view of the supplemental showing since made, a re-statement thereof
is necessary to an orderly review thereof and a clear understanding
of the questions now presented for final determination.
At the time the entry in question was made the claimant, Herbert
C. Oakley, was a member of a partnership, the additional members
of which were J. W. Oakley and F. C. Paulin. The object of this
firm was to conduct a general real estate business, with its main offices
in Los Angeles, California. On December 4, 1901, J. W. Oakley
entered into a certain agreement, on behalf of the Oakley-Paulm
Company to transfer to the Imperial Land Company, a corporation,
all the land covered by the entry of Herbert C. Oakley, " as soon as
practicable after title has been perfected,' 1 together with certain
shares of stock in the Imperial Water Co. No. 1. The clear intent of
said contract was that it should be executory only and not operate
to pass any present interest in the entry, as in the case of an assign-
ment thereof, and the passing of the title was to depend upon the
condition precedent that Oakley submit final proof and receive
patent to the land in his own name. Your office found that the
claimant was a member of the said corporation and perhaps natu-
rally inferred from the record then before you that he was a member
thereof at the time lie made the entry in question and at the time
said contract Avas entered into by the firm of which he was also a
member. From the supplemental proof since submitted, it appears
that while claimant is now a member of said corporation, he did not
become such until February 13, 1902, subsequent to the time of mak-
ing the contract in question.
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There has also been filed with the Department a duly executed
annulment of said contract, dated March 18, 1905. Your office
found that the entry in question was fraudulent in its inception and
that the original contract to convey the land was a valid one and
enforceable at law. The many suspicious circumstances surround-
ing the transaction, as disclosed by the original record, arising out
of the apparent close relations existing between the entryman, the
partnership and the corporation, at the time the entry was made, and
the finding that the subsequent contract was a valid one, formed
the basis for the strong- presumption of fraud in the inception of the
entry. The supplemental shoAving made on behalf of the entryman.
disclosing the real facts and explaining hi- various relations with his
co-partner- and with the corporation, tends strongly to overcome the
presumption, and in view of the facts presented by the complete
record now before it, the Department i> of opinion that no fraud
can be imputed to the claimant at the time he made the entry. A
finding of fraud is only warranted by clear and convincing proof,
and upon less the Department is unwilling to question the bona fides
of the entryman.
Oakley, in an affidavit executed August 1. 1904, clearly and frankly
states his intention at and subsequent to the time of the execution of
the contract with the Imperial Land Company, on December 4, 1901,
by J. W. Oakley, on behalf of the firm of Oakley-Paulin Company.
He states:
it was not the intention at the time of the execution of the contract of Decem-
ber I. 1901, that the same should <>i><r<itc as im assignment, hut that it was
for the purpose of guaranteeing to the Imperial Land Company that it would
be safe in subdividing, platting and contracting to sell lots of this subdivision
acting as the agents and for the benefit of Herbert C. Oakley and Frederick C.
Paulin, mid in the belief thai ho had a perfect right so to contract, and in
order to meet the pressing demand for more ground for townsite purposes, and
tor guaranteeing to the prospective purchaser that he would be safe in con-
tracting t'<»r portions of the land and contributing by his efforts and improve-
ments to the building np of said town of Imperial.
In the brief of counsel it i- stoutly contended that if the good
faith of claimant at the time of entry made, be established, then the
right of claimant to enter into an executory contract to convey the
land entered, after issuance of patent to him. must, under the depart-
mental decision in the case of Wheaton v. Wallace (24 L. I).. 1<><>).
be recognized. Claimant's contention i> thus stated by counsel
(brief p. 28) :
Bui if an entryman makes entry in good faith, and for his own exclusive
use and benefit, and then one or two years after, having complied with all the
requirements of law. changes his mind and contracts to assign the entry at
thai time to another, or to convey title after securing patent, he then baving
complied with the requirements of the law ami being entitled to make final
5194 Vol. ::t—o.l m 25
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proof and receive patent, there can be no objection to this sort of an arrange- I
ment under the statute as it now reads, and under the decisions of this Depart-
ment construing that statute.
In the departmental decision relied on in support of this contention
(Wheaton v. Wallace, supra), and referring to an alleged executory
contract entered into by the entryman, the following statement
appears
:
Your office construed it, but it is harmless, since, if it were to be considered
as evidence, its terms show that it has reference to a transfer to he made after
final proof, and was entered into at a time when it would not have been unlaw-
ful to make an assignment of the entry under section seven of the desert land'
act, as amended by the act of March 8, 1891 (20 Stat, 1095).
An examination of the facts upon which the decision referred to
was based sIioavs that a construction of the contract referred to therein!
or a consideration of its eifect upon the entry in question was unnec-!
essary to a complete determination of the issue involved, inasmuch
as it was held that there was no proof of the existence of such con-
tract and the instrument purporting to be a certified copy thereof was •
not properly a part of the record. The language used is therefore
purely obiter. The effect of the rule as announced was probably not
fully considered and no more was intended than that such contract
might be upheld if limited in all respects the same as an absolute
assignment of a present interest. In any event the Department, in
the consideration of the contention of claimant, upon the facts now:
properly before it, will not be restricted by the narrow construction
urged by counsel upon the authority cited. While absolute assign-^
lnents of desert land entries are recognized as valid, it does not follow
that the language of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), allow-
ing such assignments, recognizes the right of the claimant to execute!
an executory contract to convey the land after the issuance of patent,
and thereafter proceed with the submission of final proof in further-
ance of his contract. The result of the recognition of such a right
in the claimant is clearly manifest and the eifect thereof might easily
operate to nullify that provision of the act which declares that "no
person or association of persons shall hold, by assignment or other-
\
wise, prior to the issuance of patent, more than three hundred andj
twenty acres of such arid or desert lands.''
In the case of absolute assignments of such entries, the assignee
assumes the position of an original entryman, so far as his qualifica-
tion to take is concerned, and he being the person then charged with
the submission of satisfactory proof of compliance with the law, is
before the land department in his own right and all future trasactions
respecting the entry are conducted directly with him. The land de-
partment in such case has before it the real party in interest and can
deal with him personally. By the recognition of an executory con-
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tract to convey after patent, leaving only a nominal party in interest
before the Department, who would be permitted to submit proof of
his own qualifications and compliance with the law, with no require-
ment as to proof of the right of the real beneficiary to take the land,
a far different end may be accomplished, directly contrary to the
spirit and intent of the desert land law. By proceeding under such
contracts, any person or corporation might easily acquire a quantity
of land greatly in excess of that allowed under the act. The Deparl
nient. while recognizing the validity of absolute assignments of
desert land entries, is clearly of opinion that any extension of the
privilege accorded by the plain terms of the act. especially in the
manner contended for by claimant, is entirely unwarranted, ami
proof of the existence of such contracts should prevent the acceptance
of the final proof. Otherwise the practical effect of an assignment is
realized through the medium of such contracts, without any of the
incidents thereof attaching, and an easy method of evading that por-
tion of the act which prevents a single individual, association or cor-
poration from holding by "assignment or otherwise." under the
desert land law. more than three hundred and twenty acres, is opened
to all and this positive limitation effectively nullified. The clear
intent of the desert land law forbids recognition of contracts to con-
vey after patent, and this. too. irrespective of the time the contract
was made and regardless of whether or not the original entry was
made honestly and in good faith.
Your office, in passing upon the contract entered into by the Oak-
ley-Paulin Company, signed by J. W. Oakley as a member of said
linn with the Imperial Land Company, to transfer the land entered
by Herbert C. Oakley, found that said contract was enforceable at
law. The general rule in cases of partnership is that one partner, by
virtue of his relation only, has no implied authority to transfer real
estate belonging to the firm* and the Department is of opinion that
one co-partner i> wholly without authority to convey realty owned by
another partner individually. Realty, in order to become partner-
hip property, "must have been bought with partnership funds, for
partnership purposes, though the deed may be made to the several
partners, to hold them and their heirs, and the same can only be
•onveyed by a det d < xecutt d by those having the legal title." ( Wash-
burn on Real Property, Vol. 1. 668; Devlin on Deeds. Vol. 1, Sec.
110.) If it be established that real estate is partnership property.
within the rule announced, it seems, tinder the modern doctrine, that
I a contract be entered into by one co-partner to convey, without
spress authority therefor, but with the knowledge and subsequent
issent of the other members of the firm, such subsequent assent may
>e deemed a ratification of the contract and the member- of the firm
leld to a performance thereof. (Copp v. Longstreet, "> s Pac, 601;
iibson /• YV-.irrlnn Id Wall •> 1 1 • FTairnoc Huff A'- Pn ii Soanhraci
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et '//.. 13 la., 455; Devlin on Deeds, Vol. 1, Sec. 111.) But in each
instance where the English rule was thus departed from and the doc-
trine of subsequent ratification recognized, the property sought to he
conveyed was partnership property, and the doctrine has no applica-
tion to a conveyance by one co-partner of the individual property of
his co-partner. In the case at bar it is self-evident that all the land
embraced in the contract was not and could not have been the prop-
erty of the firm of Oakley-Paulin Company. There is no evidence of
any assignment by the entrvman to the firm and in his supplemental
affidavit accompanying the appeal he expressly denies the right of
the partnership to claim any interest in the land.
In view of the doubt cast upon the validity of the original con-
tract and the further fact that there is now on tile with the Depart-
ment an absolute revocation thereof, and the further finding of good
faith on the part of the entryman at the time he initiated his claim,
the Department is of opinion the proof offered, if in other respects
satisfactory, should be accepted.
Accompanying the record on appeal i> the application of Vaclav
F. Kucera to contest the entry in question. In view of the action
taken by your office, no consideration thereof was necessary and
the same is returned herewith for such disposition as your office
may deem best, in view of the present departmental decision upon
the other questions presented by the appeal.
The decision of vour office i> modified accordingly.
settlers i'fox railkoad lands—act of april 19, 1904.
Matthew ( )'Meara.
The act of April 19, 1904, providing that settlers or entrymen upon lauds
within the indemnity limits of the grant in aid of the Chicago. St. Paul.
Minneapolis and Omaha railway, and also within the primary limits of
the grant in aid of the Wisconsin Central railroad, restored to the public
domain November 2, 1891, by order of the land department, who were pre-
vented from obtaining title under the public land laws because under the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Central Railroad
Company v. Forsythe the lands were held not to be excepted from the
granl to the Wisconsin Central company, has no application to lands
opposite the unconstrueted portion of the Wisconsin Central road, which
fall within the forfeiture provisions of the act of September iM*. 1890.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Lain] Office,
(F. L. C.) January IS, 1006. (F. W. C)
The Department has considered the appeal by Matthew (TMeara
from your office decision of September V.K 1905, rejecting the proof
offered in support of his homestead entry made October 22, 1903, for
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the W. \ of SW. |. XK. | of S\V. \ and SE. | of NW. \. Sec. 8, T. 18
V. R. 16 E., W. M., North Yakima land district, Washington, and
holding for cancellation the final certificate and receipt issued on
said entry.
The proof submitted upon the entry in question did not show
settlement, residence and cultivation upon the land included in the
said entry, but claimed the benefit of a residence of five and a half
year-, and cultivation during that time, of the SE. | of Sec 29, T. -tl)
X.. R. 10 W., Ashland land district. Wisconsin, pursuant to the act of
Congress approved April 19, 190-1 ( 33 Stat., 184). The act in ques-
tion provides
:
That all qualified homesteaders who, under an order issued hy the Land De-
partment, bearing date October twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-
one, mid taking effect November second eighteen hundred and ninety-one, made
settlement upon and improved any portion of an odd-numbered section within
the conflicting limits of the grants made in aid of the construction of the
Chicago, Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway and the Wisconsin Cen-
tral Railroad, and were thereafter prevented from completing title to the land
so settled upon and improved by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Wisconsin Central Company against Forsythe, One hundred and
fifth-ninth United States, page forty-six ; and all qualified homesteaders who
made settlement upon and improved any portion of an odd-numbered section
within the conflicting limits of the grants made in aid of the construction of
the Northern Pacific Railroad and The Dalles military wagon road, under orders
issued by the Land Department treating such lands as forfeited railroad lands.
and were thereafter prevented from completing title to the land so settled
upon and improved by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Wilcox against Eastern Oregon Land Company, one hundred and
seventy-sixth United States, page fifty-one, shall, in making final proof upon
homestead entries made for other lands, be given credit for the period of their
bona fide residence upon and the amount of their improvements made on the
lands for which they were unable to complete title: Provided, That no such
person shall be entitled to the benefits of this act who shall fail to make entry
within two years after the passage of this act: And provided further. That
this net shall not be considered :is entitling any person to make another home-
stead entry who shall have received the benefits of the homestead law since
being prevented, as aforesaid, from completing title to the lands as aforesaid
settled upon and improved by him.
The tract above described in the State of Wisconsin is within the
indemnity limits which were withdrawn on account of the grant
made by act of June :'>. L856 ( 1 1 Stat.. 20), in aid of the construction
of what was known as the Bayfield Branch of the Chicago, St. Paul.
Minneapolis and Omaha railway. By the act of May 5, L864 (13
Stat.. 66), a grant was made to the State of Wisconsin in aid of the
lonstruction of what was known as the Wisconsin Central railroad.
rod said tract fell within the primary limits of said grant as adjusted
to the line of definite location. ' At the time of the adjustment of
die Omaha grant in L891, lands within the indemnity limit- of the
Omaha grant and also within the primary limits of the Wisconsin
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Central grant were treated as excepted from the latter grant because
of the prior reservation on account of the Omaha grant, and all
such lands, not needed for the adjustment of the Omaha grant,
were restored to the public domain, after due notice, on November
2, 1891. This tract was treated as a portion of the lands included
in said restoration, and on the morning of November 2, 1891, one
John Hutchinson tendered a homestead application for said tract and,
there being no other application for the land, the same was accepted
by the local officers and permitted to go of record.
On the 25th of that month O'Meara tendered a homestead applica-
tion for the same land and in support thereof alleged that he had
made settlement thereon between 7 and 8 o'clock on the morning of
November 2, 1891, and upon this allegation of settlement, which was
prior to the time of the opening of the local land office on that morn-
ing, hearing was duly ordered and held.
At the hearing Hutchinson introduced testimony showing that he
had made settlement upon the land on October 24, 1891, by clearing
off a piece of ground upon which he built a house and that he had
since maintained his claim thereto. As to the settlement claim by
O'Meara, it was shown that on the morning of November 2, 1891, he
cut some brush and laid four poles in the form of a square, which he
stated was intended for the foundation of a house. These poles were
onty four inches in diameter at the large ends and were not used for
the purpose named at the time he built his house, which was on the
25th of that month.
Regulations prescribed by the Department governing the restora-
tion of the surplus Omaha lands refuse recognition of acts performed
prior to the day of opening, and for this reason the local officers, in
disposing of the case, held that Hutchinson acquired no right by
reason of the acts performed prior to November 2, 1891, but, upon the
record made, found in his favor because it was held that the acts per-
formed by O'Meara did not constitute a valid settlement.
Your office decision affirmed that of the local officers upon the
ground that " the contestant's case is lacking in the necessary ele-
ments requisite to constitute his said settlement rights superior to
those of the defendant." The case was further prosecuted by appeal
to this Department, but in the meantime the Supreme Court had ren-
dered decision in the case of Wisconsin Central Railway Co. v. For-
sythe (159 U. S., 46), in which it was held that reservation for
indemnity purposes on account of the Omaha grant was not sufficient
to except the land so reserved from the operation of the Wisconsin
Central grant. This particular tract was opposite the unconstructed
portion of the Wisconsin Central grant, and therefore became subject
to disposition under the provisions of the general forfeiture act of
September 29, 1890 (2G Stat., 49G).
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In view of said decision ii was said in the departmental decision
of April 28, 1896 (hot reported), thai "under the last-mentioned act
the acts performed by Hutchinson prior to November 2, 1891, must
be considered in the disposition of this case, and upon the record as
made I am of opinion that he has clearly shown a superior right to
the land even though the claimed settlement by O'Meara were recog-
nized." Your office decision was accordingly affirmed.
O'Meara now claims that hut for the intervening decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Central Ry. Co. v. Forsythe,
supra, this land would have been treated as a part of the surplus
Omaha lands and when so treated that his claim would have been
given precedence over that of Hutchinson, and that therefore he was
prevented from completing title to said land because of said deci-
sion, and. under the provisions of the act of April ID. 1904, supra.
I
should he given credit for the period of his bona ft'rfr residence upon
and the amount of his improvements made upon said land in making
proof upon the entry here in question.
From the above recitation it must be apparent that appellant's
contention can not be maintained. Both your office and the local offi-
cers in disposing of the contest between O'Meara and Hutchinson,
involving the Wisconsin lands, held that his acts performed prior
to the opening of the land to entry as a part of the surplus Omaha
land- and to the entry by Hutchinson, did not amount to a valid set-
tlement. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Wisconsin Central Ry. Co. /•. Forsythe, siij>r<t y it becomes unneces-
sary to specifically pass upon this question in disposing of O'Meara's
claim. Had it. however, been necessary, upon the recitation made in
-aid decision, the concurring decisions of your office and the local offi-
cers would have been affirmed.
A further reason tor denying the contention is that in the opinion
of this Department the act of 1904, was passed only for the protection
of those who had made settlement or entry of lands restored under the
order of November 2, 1891, as a part of the surplus Omaha Lands.
and were prevented from obtaining title under the public land Laws
because under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case referred
lo they were afterward held not to be excepted from the Wisconsin
Central grant but were embraced therein. This is made plain in the
reporl of this Department dated February IT. 1902, upon II. R. Bill
t0,515, "to provide for the relief <>!' certain settlers upon Wisconsin
Jentral railroad and The Dalles military road land grants." In this
eport it was said :
The purpose of the hill is a worthy one and should be expressed in a law
vhich will give the intended relief to all who were misled by the departmental
iction in the two instances named. The pending i>ill is imperfeel in thai it
"ily relates to those who made homestead entry and .loos not include the
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equally meritorious eases where qualified homesteaders made settlement and
improvement with a view to entry.
The bill is also limited as respects the Wisconsin Central grant to entries " of
lands appearing, on November 2, 1891, by the records of the Interior Depart-
ment, as forfeited Omaha lands." No element of forfeiture was involved.
The only question was whether the lands were excepted from the Wisconsin
Central grant by reason of their prior withdrawal for the benefit of the Omaha
grant. The Department, taking the affirmative view of this question and find-
ing that the lands were not needed to satisfy the Omaha grant, restored them
to settlement and entry by order of October 22, 1891, which took effect Novem-
ber 2, 1891. The Supreme Court. June 3, 1895, in the Forsythe case, held that
the lands were not excepted from the Wisconsin Central grant, but were
embraced therein, and thus those who had made settlement or entry under the
order of November 2, 1891, were prevented from obtaining title under the
public-land laws, and if they obtained title to the lands upon which they had
settled and erected improvements they did so by purchase from the Wisconsin
Central Company.
The lands in question were not opposite the constructed portion of
Wisconsin Central road. As a consequence, they Avere forfeited by
the act of 1890, which act made due provision for settlers upon the
forfeited lands and no further legislation wTas necessary wTith regard
to said lands.
The decision of your office is affirmed and the final certificate
issued upon O'Meara's entry will be canceled.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES—SECTION 3305, R. S.,
AS AMENDED BY THE ACT OF MARCH 1, 1901.
Peter W. Tompkins.
By virtue of the provisions of section 2305 of the Revised Statutes as amended
by the act of March 1, 1001. proof of the death of a homestead entryman
while actually engaged in the military service of the United States renders
unnecessary any showing that would have been otherwise required touching
his compliance with law in the matters of residence, cultivation and im-
provement.
The properly-constituted administrator of the estate of a deceased homestead
entryman is authorized to submit final proof under the provisions of section
2305 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of March 1, 1001. as
his " legal representative."
Upon satisfactory proof of the death of a homestead entryman while actually
engaged in the military service of the United States, leaving no widow or
minor orphan children surviving him, it is the duty of the land department,
under the provisions of section 2305 of the Revised Statutes as amended
by the act of March 1, 1001, to issue patent to his " legal representatives,"
leaving it to the courts to determine in whom the title shall vest.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) • Jan uary 16, 1906. (E. O. P.)
H. B. Grover, special administrator of the estate of Peter W.
Tompkins, deceased, has appealed from your office decision of April
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11. 1905, reject ina" final proof offered in support of the homestead
entry of* said decedent for the XK. | . See. 22, T. L59 X., R. 60 W.,
Errand Forks hind district. North Dakota.
The entry in question was made June 15, 1897. It is shown by
information furnished by the War Department that the entryman,
on April 26, 1898, enlisted in Company C, 1st Regiment, Xorth
Dakota Infantry, and was killed in action April 12, 1899. The entry-
man was unmarried at the time of his death and left as his only heirs
at law his father and mother, residents of the Province of Ontario,
and citizens of the Dominion of Canada. The entryman died intestate
after having established residence on the land.
The final proof offered was rejected for the following reasons, viz:
ii fails to show compliance with the requirements of the homestead law, either
as to residence, improvements or cultivation. Furthermore, there is no statu-
tory authority under which an administrator, as such, may suhmit final home-
stead proof. Vidal v. Bennis (22 L. D., 124). It was held, in the case of Patten
r. Katz (25 L. 1).. 453), that a homestead entry must he canceled when it is
duly shown, after the expiration of the statutory life of the entry, that the
entryman died prior to the completion of his entry, and that there are no heirs
Of the entryman who are entitled to perfect said claim. The alien heirs of a
deceased homesteader are incompetent to make proof and perfect title under
section 2291 of the Revised Statutes.
The appeal is based upon three distinct specifications of error,
which, briefly stated, are as follows:
First: Error in rejecting the final proof for failure to show com-
pliance with the law as to residence and improvement and cultivation.
Second: Error in rejecting the proof offered because there was no
statutory authority under which the administrator could submit the
same.
Third: Error in rejecting the final proof for the reason that alien
heirs are prohibited from taking title to public land.
The contentions urged by counsel will be considered in the order
stated. To this end an examination of the language of section 2305,
as amended by the act of March 1, L901 (31 Stat., 847), is essential
to determination of the questions presented. It is therein provided,
among other things, that
—
in every case in which a settler on the public lands of the United Slates under
the homestead laws died while actually engaged in the army, navy, or marine
corps of the United States as private soldier, officer, seaman or marine, during
the war with Spain or the Philippine insurrection, his widow, if unmarried, or
in case of her death or marriage, then his minor orphan children or his or their
legal representatives, may proceed forthwith to make final proof upon the hind
SO held by the deceased soldier and settler and that the death of such soldier
while so engaged in the service of the United states shall, in the administration
Of the homestead laws, he construed to he equivalent to a performance of all
requirements as to residence and cultivation for the full period of five years,
and shall entitle his widow, if unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage,
then his minor orphan children or his or their legal representatives, to make
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final proof upon and receive government patent for said land; and that upon
proof produced to the officers of the proper local land office by the widow, if
unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage, then his minor orphan children
or his or their legal representatives, that the applicant for patent is the widow,
if unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage, his orphan children or his
or their legal representatives, and that such soldier, sailor, or marine died
while in the service of the United States as hereinbefore described, the patent
for such land shall issue.
The language used clearly sustains the first contention of counsel.
By proof of the entryman's death in actual service of the United
States, any showing that would have been otherwise required touch-
ing his compliance with the law as to residence, improvement and
cultivation, is dispensed with.
Under the authority cited and relied upon by your office denying
the right of an administrator to submit final proof, it would appear
that, unless the provisions of section 2305 clearly warrant such action,
the second contention of counsel must be denied. However, an exam-
ination of the decisions announcing such a rule discloses that they
were based upon a construction of section 2291 of the Revised Stat-
utes, and involved the question of final proof submitted under the
provisions of said section. The language therein used leaves no room
for other construction or a different conclusion, for the reason that
among those specifically designated to submit final proof the " legal
representative " is not mentioned. In the case of Heirs of Isidore
Driscoll (32 L. D., 407) the Department recognized the right of the
legal representative, by virtue of the provisions of section 2305, supra,
to submit final proof, though it was also therein decided that the
Department would not undertake to determine who would be " enti-
tled to take title " as such.
By section 6461 of the Code of North Dakota (1895) the adminis-
trator is designated as the " legal representative " of the deceased. In
this respect there appears to be no material difference between a spe-
cial and general administrator under the law of that state. In the
case of Morehouse y. Phelps (21 How., 294, 304) it was held that
one acting in the capacity of an administrator was the " legal repre-
sentative." See also decision by the same court in the case of Briggs
v. Walker (171 U. S., 466 471)', wherein it was held that
:
The primary and ordinary meaning of the words " representatives " or " legal
representatives," or " personal representatives," when there is nothing in the
context to control their meaning, is " executors or administrators," they being
the representatives constituted by the proper court.
The record now before the Department furnishes ample proof
that H. B. Grover, the party who submitted the final proof rejected
by your office, was the party " constituted by the proper court
"
administrator of the estate of the deceased entryman. It would
seem clear, therefore, that he was fully qualified to submit such proof.
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This brings us to the consideration of the third specification of
error, touching the qualification of the parties who may ultimately
take title to the land. It is settled beyond controversy thai the
Department will not undertake to ascertain and identify the interests
of such persons. Should it then, having before it a person qualified
to submit the required final proof, look beyond him and seek to deter-
mine any further rights which may be involved in the distribution
of the estate represented by the legal representative thereof? Cer-
tainly this is a question for the courts alone and with which, under
the language of said section 2305, the Department has no concern.
The closing words of section 2305, supra, are mandatory and declare
" that patent shall issue." The condition determining this action
is the submission of satisfactory proof by the proper parties, of
the death of the entryman v * while in the service of the United State-
as hereinbefore described." No other condition is annexed. The
usual requirement of proof of residence, cultivation and improve-
ment of the land is specifically waived. There is no limitation to
be found in the words of this section, similar to that contained in
section 2291, supra, touching the qualifications of the persons to
whom patent shall issue.
The rule announced in departmental decision in the ease of Heirs
of Isidore Driscoll (supra, p. 410) that
—
The Department will no more undertake to decide what particular person or
persons may be entitled to take title as the "legal representatives" of a
deceased entryman, than it will undertake to ascertain the identity and inter-
ests of the " heirs " of such an entryman
—
is not inconsistent with the rule here adopted, for the reason that
the term "legal representatives" as therein used refers only to the
persons who may eventually take the absolute title to the land, and
has no application to the le<>-al representative appointed by the
court and who could not under his order of appointment, take an
absolute title to the land in his own right.
In the opinion of the Department a reasonable construction of sec-
tion 2305, under which the final proof in question was submitted,
clearly waives all requirements imposed in other cases as to residence,
cultivation and improvement of the land entered, leaving proof of the
death of the entryman in the actual service of the United State- the
only requisite to the issuance of patent, and warrants the acceptance
of such proof whenever offered by the properly-constituted legal
representative, in those cases where there i> no surviving unmarried
widow of the soldier. In other words, by his death under the condi-
tion- prescribed, the soldier has earned the patent, and the Depart-
ment has no concern, after proof thereof has been regularly sub-
mitted, as to who may ultimately enjoy the benefits that have accrued
and will not. inquire into their identity, qualifications or interests in
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the land. The adjustment of these questions is properly within the
province of the courts.
For the reasons herein stated, the decision appealed from is re-
versed. The proof offered should be accepted and final certificate
issue to the " legal representatives " of Peter TV. Tompkins, deceased,
pursuant to the provisions of said section 2305, supra.
contest—practice—residence-official employment.
Dahlquist v. Cotter.
In case a contest is erroneously dismissed upon motion of the entryman, the
General Land Office is without authority to reverse such action and then
dispose of the case on the evidence theretofore submitted by contestant,
without first affording the entryman an opportunity to present his defense.
Where the testimony in a case is authorized to be taken elsewhere than at the
local office, neither party should be permitted to submit further testimony
on the day set for the hearing at the local office, except upon due notice
to the other and proper order therefor.
Failure of a homestead entryman to reside upon his claim, necessitated by
employment in the public service, will not be construed an abandonment
thereof, where he in good faith established and maintained residence prior
to engaging in such service and has continued to comply with the require-
ments of the law in the matters of cultivation and improvement ; but such
employment will not relieve from the necessity of establishing residence nor
excuse the entryman's failure in that respect.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
January 1 7, 1906. ( A. W. P.
)
Separate appeals have been filed on behalf of Peter Dahlquist
and James Cotter from your office decision of June 23, 1905, wherein
you reverse the action of the local officers in dismissing Peter Dahl-
quist's contest against James Cotter's homestead entry No. 3432, made
January 29, 1900, for the SW. \ of Sec. 9, T. 161, R. 91, Minot, North
Dakota, land district, but, because of the evident misapprehension
under which counsel for claimant, as well as the local officers, labored
in the treatment of the case, you remanded the same to afford the
claimant opportunity to submit evidence in support of his entry,
with like opportunity to contestant to submit rebuttal evidence.
On behalf of Dahlquist it is urged, in substance, that error was
committed in ordering such further hearing, the entryman not having
requested same; while on behalf of claimant it is contended that you
erred in reversing the action of the local officers dismissing the con-
test; in ordering a further hearing; and in holding that he was called
upon under the notice of contest served therein to defend against the
charge of never having established a residence on the tract involved.
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In conclusion, it is also urged, that final judgment be rendered on the
record as presented.
Upon careful examination of the record the Department finds that
the material facts in this case, a- well as the law applicable thereto,
have been fully and very fairly stated in your office decision appealed
from, and hence need not be here repeated at Length. In view of the
manner in which the case was disposed of by the local officers in dis-
missing the content on the ex parte showing and motion of claimant,
the action of your office in remanding the case for further hearing
was clearly warranted. In fact, the Department has repeatedly held
that where a contest' has been erroneously dismissed upon motion of
the defendant, your office is without authority to reverse such action
and then dispose of the case on prior evidence submitted by the con-
testant without first affording the entryman an opportunity to pre-
sent his defense. Inasmuch, however, as claimant ieclines to avail
himself of such opportunity to offer testimony, the case will be ad-
judicated on the record as presented.
The affidavit filed by Dahlquist, upon which this proceeding was
based, charged that the entryman has wholly abandoned said tract:
that he has failed to reside thereon since making entry: and that
said tract is not settled upon and cultivated by said party as required
by law. The notice of contest issuing thereon was as follow-:
That said .entryman has wholly abandoned said tract; that he has failed to
reside therein for more than six months last past : and that said tract is not
settled upon and cultivated by said party as required by law; and that the
absence of said entryman is not due to his employment in the U. S. army, navy,
or marine corps in time of war.
While the wording of the above notice is slightly different from
thai of the original affidavit, it charges the entryman with having
wholly abandoned said tract, and was sufficient to permit the intro-
duction of contestant's testimony showing claimant's entire failure
to establish residence on the land. This testimony is in the form of
a general statement of the four witnesses for contestant, subscribed
and sworn to before the notary public authorized to take the testi-
mony. Neither claimant nor his counsel appear to have been present
at such time, and the affidavit and motion which you set out as being
filed on that date seem to have been transmitted to said notary under
date of May 2, four days prior to that set for taking the testimony,
with the request that he forward the same with his report to the local
officers.
Where, as in this case, testimony i> authorized to be taken else-
where than at the local office, neither party should be permitted on
the day of lustring to submit further testimony without due notice to
the other, and appropriate order therefor made by the local office.
Hence, the local officers should not have received and considered
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claimant's affidavit and motion thus submitted, nor should any con-
sideration have been given the subsequent ex parte affidavit filed on
behalf of the contestant.
The Department has repeatedly held that where an entryman has
in good faith established and maintained residence on his entry, en-
gagement in public service requiring residence elsewhere will not be
construed into an abandonment thereof so long as such efforts are
made to maintain improvements as manifest good faith. Such offi-
cial employment, however, does not excuse a failure to establish such
residence, or relieve from the necessity of so doing. And in the face
of a contest alleging abandonment and failure to comply with the re-
quirements of the homestead law as to residence and cultivation, such
official employment following prior residence must be established by
competent testimony, the same as any other evidence offered on be-
half of the defendant.
No such showing has been made on behalf of Cotter in this case,
though he has been given ample opportunity to present his defense,
and considering carefully the testimony regularly submitted before
the notary public authorized to receive the same, the Department
concurs in the conclusion of your office, as reached in the decision
now appealed from, that " the testimony pointedly and positively
shows that contestee had never established his residence on the land."
The finding of the local officers adverse to the plaintiff appears to
have been largely due to the erroneous consideration given the state-
ments contained in the affidavit filed by claimant, and their recom-
mendation based thereon that the contest be dismissed can not there-
fore be approved.
In view of the conclusion reached herein, your order remanding
the case for further hearing is hereby recalled and vacated, and said
decision of June 23, 1905, as thus modified is affirmed, and it is
directed that the entry be canceled.
PRACTICE—COST OF DEPOSITIONS—ACT OF JANUARY 81, 1903.
Delfelder r. Slattery.
The entire cost of depositions taken under and by virtue of the provisions of
the act of January 31, 1903, must be paid by the party in whose behalf they
are taken. •
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) January 19, 1906. (J. L. McC.)
The Department has before it for consideration the case of John
Delfelder v. Alva H. Slattery, upon appeal of the latter from your
office decision of April 3, 1905, affirming the judgment of the local
officers, and holding for cancellation his homestead entry for the E. \
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 399
of the SW. ! and the NW. \ of the SW. J of Sec. 10, T. 12 S„ K. G E.,
Rapid City land district, South Dakota.
The facts as to the defendant's acts in connection with the land
in controversy are fully set forth in your office decision appealed
from, and need not be herein repeated. They clearly sustain your
conclusion that he never established or maintained residence upon the
land.
Another question, however, is raised by the appeal. A part of the
testimony in the case is in the shape of certain depositions, taken
January 3, L904, before a United States Commissioner at Chadron,
Nebraska, upon the application of the defendant. The latter con-
tends that, under the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140). the expense
of taking all the testimony in the case should he borne by the contest-
ant. Upon this point the local officers reported to your office (May
27, 11)04), in forwarding their report and recommendation:
There was a controversy in regard to who should pay the costs of taking the
above deposition; we find that the contestant and contestee each paid for their
own testimony in said deposition, which we believe to he in harmony with and
according to the act of January 31, 1903, which reads in pari ;is follows: "The
Ices of the officer taking the deposition shall he the same as those allowed in
the State or Territorial courts, and shall be paid by the party taking the
deposition."
Before said United States Commissioner the testimony of four wit-
nesses, all introduced by and in behalf of the defendant, was taken
(orally). Under the above-quoted ruling of the local officers, "the
contestant and contestee each paid for their own testimony"—i. e.,
Tor the testimony elicited in response to questions put by the attorney
for each respectively; the contestant paid two dollars and fifty cents,
and the defendant nine dollars and fifty cents. Your office decision
appealed from holds:
Said depositions were given only by witnesses for the defendant, and included
•ill their testimony on direct and cross-examination. In view of these facts, and
of the further fact thai the proceeding in question was had under the provisions
<»f said act of January .".1. P.><>.">, the entire cost of the depositions was taxable to
the defendant. Said act expressly requires that the costs of any depositions
procured thereunder shall he paid by the party taking them. . . . The
defendant's appeal in the case effectually admits that the proceedings were
under said act. but urges that its provisions do not relieve the contestant from
ultimate payment of all the costs. Said act. in addition to its general provision
lor compulsory attendance of witnesses in matters requiring a hearing before
Iced offices, provides a special method for obtaining testimony desired for use in
Midi cases by any party litigant. This method is independent of and additional
t<> the one already afforded by Rules 23 to 27 of Practice, it is not exclusive in
its operation, and may he invoked, under proper circumstances, ;it the party's
option. It is collateral to a trial had before the local office, or under Rule 35, in
the same general sense as is the method provided by said Rules 23 to 27, though
differing therefrom in certain particulars, conspicuous among which is the fact
th.it the testimony or depositions need not be taken on written interrogatories.
That said act intended the costs of any depositions taken thereunder to he home
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by the party in whose behalf the same are taken is manifested by its express
language.
From this decision the defendant has appealed, contending that
your office erred
—
In holding that this eontestee should pay any part of the expense of the taking
of the depositions of his witnesses, it being the legal duty of said contestant to
pay all the costs of his contest.
In holding that, by the act of January 31, 1903, this eontestee was required
to pay any part or portion of the cost of his depositions, except in the first
instance, and then to be repaid by said contestant before being allowed to pro-
ceed with his contest.
There are other allegations, presenting substantially the same con-
tentions in somewhat different language.
The above ruling of your office undoubtedly expresses the meaning
and intent of said act of January 31, 1903 (32 Stat,, 790; also Circu*
lar of March 20, 1903—32 L. D., 132), wherein said act provides that
the fees of the officer before whom a deposition is taken " shall be
paid by the party taking the deposition." This conclusion is strongly
reinforced by the further language of the act—immediately following
that above quoted
:
That whenever the taking of any depositions taken in pursuance of the fore-
going provisions of this act is concluded, the opposite party may proceed at once,
at his own expense
not to cross-examine the witnesses introduced by the opposite party,
but—
to take depositions in his own behalf, at the same time and place, and before
the same officer.
As the cross-examination is an integral part of the testimony given
by a witness in his deposition, it follows that when the law requires
the cost of the deposition to be paid by the party taking the deposi-
tion, it unquestionably means the cost of the whole deposition—both
on direct and cross-examination.
The first section of said act sets forth that the same is applicable,
" in all matters requiring a hearing before " the local officers. It can
not be presumed that the legislative mind was ignorant or forgetful
of the fact that among the most important " matters requiring a
hearing" before local officers are contest cases; and if it had been
the intention that in such cases the expenses paid by the eontestee
under sections 4 and 5 of said act should be repaid to the eontestee
by the contestant before being allowed to proceed with his contest,
a provision to that effect would have been embodied in the act. The
Department has no authority to import into said act any language
or provision which it does not contain.
Said act (of January 31, 1903, supra) is to be regarded as providing
an additional and special means of procuring testimony. Its employ-
ment is entirely a matter of election on the part of either party to the
case. The party, whether contestant or eontestee, employing the means
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provided by this act to secure testimony, must of necessity observe
the requirements of the law as to payment of costs thereunder. Said
act and the act of May 14, 1880, are not necessarily inconsistent with
each other, when it is remembered that the recent law is a specific
provision left to the choice of either party, and for that reason does
not seem to have any effect upon section 2 of the act of May ^0, 1880,
in so far a- the payment of land office fees is concerned. In other
words, it may be considered as being in effect amendatory of and sup-
plemental to said act of lss(). and to that extent make- an exception
to the genera] rule that all the land office fees must be paid by the
contestant in order that he may acquire preference right under the
act of 1880.
The decision of your office was correct, and is hereby affirmed.
MIM\(; CLAIM—ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS—LODI WITHIN PLACER.
Tin: Clipper Mining Co. v. The Eli Mining and Land Co. et al.
(On Review.)
The general principle of the exclusive judicial cognizance of controversies
involving the right of possession as between rival mineral claimants and
the binding force of a court's award in such a case lias in view a possessory
right which is the essential hasis of, and which may ultimately ripen into.
the legal title obtainable from the government under the mining laws;
hut it necessarily remains for the land department, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction and in the discharge of its duty, to determine in any such case
the force and effect as against the United States of the possessory right
so awarded by the court.
Where a placer adverse claimant, on the strength of his placer location, prevails
in a suit under section '2:W>. Revised Statutes, against an applicant for
patent to lode claims within the placer limits, and the placer location should
thereafter be found by the land department, in the exercise of its juris-
diction, to embrace non-placer land, the possessory right so awarded would
fail as a hasis of title to the portion of the placer location in controversy
and equally to the lodes therein embraced, and would fall short of that
effective basic right essential to the foreclosure of any purely lode rights
in the patent applicant : and the latter would have suffered no prejudice
by reason of the judgment of the court.
Having prevailed in the adverse suit solely by virtue of his placer location, any
additional rights which the successful adverse claimant might set up under
SUDSequenl lode locations by him of the ground in controversy would he
wholly independent of the court's award.
s
i tary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the Gt neral Land Offla .
i I'. L.C.) January ,!,!, 1906. I V . U.K.)
A motion for review of departmental decision of June 27, L905 (33
L. I).. 660), in the above-entitled case, filed by The Eli Mining and
Land Company et al.
:
was entertained by the Department upon the
5194 Vol. :;»—05 m l><;
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usual conditions as to service thereof, etc., and has since matured.
The case is stated in that decision.
The motion challenges the second or concluding division of the
decision in question. Upon the merits of that portion of the case
briefs have again been filed on behalf of the contending parties, and
opposing counsel have again been heard in oral argument. For con-
venience and brevity the designation of the parties, The Clipper
Mining Company and The Eli Mining and Land Company et al., as
" petitioner " and " respondents," respectively, observed in the deci-
sion under review, will be followed here.
Complaining of that decision, counsel for respondents set out four
assignments of error, the first being in part closely allied to the
second and in part to the third and fourth, the latter two presenting
in different' aspects substantially the same question. From the
sequence and arrangement of these assignments it will be convenient
to depart somewhat.
The primary error, it is argued, lies in according any further rec-
ognition to petitioner's application for lode patent, and to petitioner
thereunder, since the final judgment in the adverse suit between the
parties. Counsel contend that by the legal effect of that judgment
the right of petitioner to press its application or to receive patent
under it has ceased; and they deny the jurisdiction of the land
department to treat that application as now in any proper or legal
sense before it.
It is conceded by them that when an adverse claimant who has
prevailed in an action pursuant to section 2326, Revised Statutes,
presents his judgment roll and asks for patent the land department
may inquire as to his compliance with the law in respect of any
matter aliunde and as to the character of the land involved, but it is
insisted that all proceedings following the judgment are ex parte and
that the defeated applicant can not thereafter properly be recog-
nized or heard as an actor upon the assumption that his former
application has any further existence in fact or law or can be made
the basis of any patent proceeding in his behalf. The basis for this
conclusion, it is argued, is that the " right of possession," thus
awarded to his adversary, is the foundation of and indispensable
prerequisite to the paramount title under the mining laws.
Concerning the judgments which may be rendered by the courts
the following extract from Lindley on Mines (2nd Ed., Vol. II, Sec.
765, p. 1376) is cited by counsel:
The trial of the action may result in one of four judgments: (a) in favor
of plaintiff, the adverse claimant; (b) in favor of the defendant, the patent
applicant; (c) adjudging that neither party has complied with the law ; and (d)
dividing the conflict area between the parties.
And with respect to the effect of a judgment in favor of the ad-
verse claimant, who thereafter presents his judgment roll, etc., and
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asks for patent to the tract in controversy, the following is cited
(Ibid., p. L373) :
The Department will thereupon proceed to investigate the character of the
land, the proofs submitted, and the compliance by the adverse claimant with the
requirements of the law. So far as the premises thus applied for arc involved.
the former patent applicant is eliminated from the proceeding, and thereafter
the matter rests between the government and the adverse claimant.
Counsel also repeat certain expressions in that treatise and in the
case of Richmond Mining Co. /'. Rose (114 U. S., 576) in recognition
of the binding force of the judgment upon the land department, as
well as an expression in the case of Alice Placer Mine (4 L. I).. 31 1.
317), that "the judgment of the court ended the contest between
the parties and determined the right of possession."
Passing to the consideration of these contention-, the Department
recognizes and reaffirms to it- fullest extent the geHeraJ principle,
so often declared by the courts and the Department, that " the ques-
tion of the right of possession " as between contending mineral
claimants is exclusively of judicial cognizance, and that the award of
that right by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding upon the
parties and the land department. In the final analysis, however.
this principle has always in view the "right of possession " which is
the essential basis of the legal title obtainable under the mining laws.
as counsel for respondents affirm it to be. That the principle con-
templates, as tin- subject of judicial disposition, a right of possession
which shall thereafter be found by the land department, in the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction, to be effective for patent purposes is manifest
from the provisions of section 2326 whereunder the adjudged right
may. upon submission of the judgment roll and " without giving fur-
ther notice/* be made the basis of the paramount title. See. in this
connection. Gwillim /'. Donnellan (115 U. S., 45, 50-1).
The court determines only the question of the right of possession
as between the litigating parties -that one has acquired by virtue of
hi- mining location a right of possession which entitles him to pre-
vail against the other, or that neither has established such right. It
can not by its judgment establish in either a right of possession of
binding force and effect as against the United States, since the gov-
ernment is not a party to the suit and a right thus effective depends
finally upon the character of the land involved. Perego /'. Dodge
(163 l : . S.. 160, L68). In a judicial controversy pursuant to section
2326 the court necessarily takes for granted the mineral character of
the land, upon which both parties rely and which is a question ulti-
mately and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the land department.
It must be considered, therefore, that the court assumes the right of
possession which it award- to be such a- may ripen into the legal
title iii accordance with the provisions of that section of the stat-
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utes—a right of possession of mineral land, lode or placer as the case
may be, within the meaning of the mining laws.
In the case at bar a lode applicant, the present petitioner, was con-
fronted by placer claimants, the respondents. Relying wholly upon
their placer location the latter prosecuted their adverse proceedings
against the lode application, averring that no lodes were known to
exist within the placer limits at the date of the placer location or
had been discovered at the time the adverse proceedings were com-
menced, and opposing their claimed placer possessory right to peti-
tioner's claimed lode possessory right. The court found " from the
evidence that the Searl placer was duly located, as required by the
law. in 1877" and that the prescribed annual labor had continuously
been performed to the time of trial. The court also found that the
lodes involved were discovered after the date of the placer location.
Because of the invasion of the placer location, as valid in its incep-
tion and uninterruptedly maintained by performance of annual
labor, the court awarded the right of possession not of the lodes or
lode claims but of the ground in controversy, as part and parcel of the
placer claim, to respondents. And only as incident to their placer
location, upon which respondents stood solely and squarely before the
court, could they take those lodes under the proceedings thus had.
With these considerations in viewr it follows that the integrity of
the general principle is not assailed in the decision under review, as
counsel contend. Under no circumstances can the land department
undertake to determine the question of the right of possession as
between opposing mineral claimants—that controversy must be heard
in the courts. As before pointed out, hoAvever, there remains in every
case for determination by the land department the force and effect of
the right of possession (awarded by the court to one or the other) as
against the United States. And in the process of this jurisdiction
this case is distinguishable from the usual cases merely in the result
which may follow the establishment of the non-placer character, for
patent purposes, of the land embraced in the placer location, if that
be the fact. This distinction, which the Department sought to make
clear in the decision under review, rests upon the difference in origin
of the possessory claims litigated before the court, arising out of
locations of wholly unlike character, and which do not present the
immediately antagonistic aspect of locations of the same species
irrespective of the actual character of the land. The placer right of
possession awarded to respondents would in the event suggested prove
to fall short of that possessory right which is the essential basis of
the legal title under the mining laws and within the court's contem-
plation in recognition of it in bar of petitioner's lode-patent applica-
tion. Failing thus as a basis of title to the portion of the placer
location in controversy, it would equally fail as a basis of title to
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the lodes therein embraced. And. failing as an available basis of title
to those lodes, it would fall short of that effective basic right essential
to the foreclosure of any purely lode rights in the petitioner. In
Mich a case, therefore, it can not be held that the unsuccessful litigant
ha- been "eliminated from the proceeding" by the judgment of the
court.
Nothing inconsistent with these view- i- contained in the ease of
Richmond Mining Co. v. Rose or of Alice Placer Mine, supra, cited
by counsel, and in both of which judicial award- of the right of
possession were considered. The first of these, pursuant to section
2326, was a controversy between lode claimants—the immediate
ell'cct of a judgment in such a case being clear—and involved prin-
cipally the question of the right of the officers of the land depart-
ment to resume active control of patent proceedings and issue patent
thereunder during the pendency of the -nit in court upon their own
determination of a waiver of the adverse claim because of delay in
the judicial proceeding.-. In the second case an applicant for placer
patent had prevailed in court against an adverse lode claimant, who
pressed no further claim, and the only question before the Depart-
ment was a- to the authority of your office to order a hearing,
following the judgment of the court in the applicant'- favor, to
determine the placer character of the land. As was pointed out in
the decision here under review, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in its decision in this case and in considering the effect of the
judgment below, had clearly in view the inseparable question of the
character of the land as affecting the ultimate result and the recog-
nition which might yet thereafter be accorded petitioner by the land
department, as the language of that decision discloses.
As conclusive upon petitioner in the premises, and to support
their contention that it was error to order a hearing upon the present
record to determine the placer patentability of the land, since re-
spondents' adverse claim had been recognized by the Department
and by the courts and " was founded upon a placer mining location
which the court- have declared was a valid location both in fact and
in law." counsel cite the following expressions in the case of Belk u.
Meagher
I 104 U. S., 279, 283,284) :
A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highesl sense of
Hint term.
. . .
•x- * •::•
-x-
-x- *
Hence a relocation on lands actually covered at the time by another valid
:iinl subsisting location is void; and this not only against the prior locator, but
all the world, because the law allows no such thing to he done.
And in ( iwillini v. Donnellan (115 U. S., t5, li>) :
A valid and subsisting location of mineral lands, made and kept up in accord-
ance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of
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;i grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of
the lands located. If, when one enters on land to make a location there is an-
other location in full force, which entitles its owner to the exclusive possession
of the land, the first location operates as bar to the second.
Coupled with a contention raised in this as in a preceding con-
nection, that petitioner's patent application became defunct by reason
of the judgment of the court and that it was error to treat it as a
basis for the order for hearing, is the contention in this same behalf
that inasmuch as the placer location has been adjudged to have been
valid and subsisting at the date of the lode locations the latter,
under the principle laid down by the Supreme Court as above, were
wholly void and no rights thereunder could accrue to petitioner.
Neither contention is tenable in the view taken by the Department.
Certainly, those judicial expressions are not susceptible of reduction
to a doctrine that a valid and subsisting mining location, however
completely within all the provisions and requirements of the mining
laws, constitutes an insuperable barrier to the acquisition by another
of rights, present or prospective, under a subsequent location upon
the same ground. If they were so susceptible, and could be taken in
the literal sense which might be attached to them apart from the
facts to which they were addressed, it would unavoidably follow that
a junior locator of land embraced in a valid and subsisting location
who should duly and regularly prosecute patent proceedings there-
for and without opposition by way of an adverse claim would never-
theless take nothing by his proceedings, notwithstanding the statutory
assumption in his behalf of the absence of an adverse claim; for it
is axiomatic that no validity can be infused into a " void " thing.
Obviously, the assumption which negatives the existence of adverse
claims has its predicate in the proceedings upon the application for
patent and is for their benefit.
The doctrine thus announced by the court, more especially in Belk
v. Meagher, seems more or less generally to have been given an ex-
treme or literal interpretation. Since its operation was not involved
in either case, the court had no occasion to consider that significant
provision of the mining laws which compels the arbitrary and indis-
putable assumption, in favor of an applicant under the requisite
proceedings to secure mineral patent, of the absence of adverse claims
when none has been filed, or its equivalent in the waiver of an adverse
claim for failure to prosecute it, and whereunder valid and vested
possessory rights under a senior location may be wholly avoided and
become as if they had never been. The court itself has made it clear
that the extreme or literal interpretation of the language quoted from
the opinions in those cases, standing alone, can not be accepted. In
the later case of Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co.
(171 U. S., 55), after referring to those cases as going no further than
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to establish the genera] doctrine that a second location is ineffectual
to appropriate land covered by a prior subsisting* and valid location.
the court held, among other tilings, that for certain essential pur-
poses the lines of a junior location may be laid within, upon or across
the surface of a valid senior location; and that, as it is not provided
by the statute or contemplated that judicial proceedings to establish
the invalidity or failure of a prior location shall precede the right to
make a later one, a junior locator i- at liberty to make his location at
once, and thereafter, in the manner provided by the statute, litigate,
if necessary, the question of the validity of the earlier as well as of
his own location.
Belk v. Meagher was a simple action in ejectment, involving no
application for patent and brought independently of section 2326,
Revised Statutes. In (iwillim v. Donnellan the junior locator and
applicant for patent prevailed against the senior locator and adverse
claimant by reason of the fact that the latter had theretofore per-
mitted a partial conflict with his location and embracing his discov-
ery shaft to pass by patent to a third person. The restricted applica-
tion of the doctrine of the Belk-Meagher case is apparent upon com-
parison with the recent case of Lavagnino v. Uhlig (198 U. S., 44o),
involving an essentially similar state of facts but which arose under
section 2326. In the latter case the claims embraced in the applica-
tion for patent had been located in pari upon what was then a valid
and subsisting location, known as the Levi P. claim, which the adverse
claimant alleged to have become afterwards forfeited and to have
been thereupon relocated by him pursuant to the appropriate pro-
visions of section '2824, Revised Statutes. The Supreme Court, con-
curring in the judgments below, sustained the applicants for patent
substantially and in effect upon the ground that, by reason of the
absence of an adverse claim on behalf of the Levi P. claim, the stat-
utory assumption effectually negatived as to it any bar to the acqui-
sition by the applicants of the rights essential to them in the premises
(and this, it was held, would undeniably have resulted had the patent
proceedings been prosecuted under like circumstances prior to forfei-
ture of the Levi P. location), and left for consideration only the re-
location by the adverse claimant, subsequent in time and therefore
of no avail as against the applicants. Indeed, a right of possession
duly awarded under a judgment pursuant to section 2326 in a suit
involving locations of any character, even such a possessory right
as would be found to l>o effective for all purposes, may equally there-
after be avoided, where upon termination of the litigation (which,
alter all, is but a step in the particular patent proceedings and i-
merely in aid of the land department -163 U. S.. L67) the successful
party fails or neglects to secure patent under his judgment roll and
patent proceedings de nor,, become the only remaining recourse. In
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that event the unsuccessful litigant in the former proceedings may
file the new application, against which his former adversary must
oppose his adverse claim and duly support it by a suit in court or
abide the indisputable assumption of the absence or waiver of an
adverse claim.
It is obvious, therefore, that a location embracing a prior valid and
subsisting location is not ipso facto void and ineffectual, but if unop-
posed may properly thereafter become the subject of mineral patent.
Thus, a valid and subsisting location will in no case avail to defeat
a junior location, as to which patent proceedings are regularly prose-
cuted, except upon the invocation of judicial intervention, and
equally a placer location, notwithstanding a favorable judgment of
a court, will not avail to defeat a lode location within the placer
limits if those limits be thereafter found by the land department to
embrace a tract which is not patentably placer in character. A loca-
tion which the courts will recognize as valid may be predicated
upon a discovery of mineral which would fall short of establishing
the mineral character of the land under the settled and approved
rule of determination; but to prevail eventually the location must
be shown to embrace mineral land of corresponding character, lode
or placer, which may become the subject of mineral patent.
Commenting upon the doctrine of rights arising under a valid
location, as applied by the several courts in this case, counsel for
respondents sum up the situation presented here, in the following-
clear and concise statement contained in their brief:
The effect of this judgment, thus affirmed, under the clear language of sec-
tion 2.">2<; leaves to the adverse claimants as the successful litigants the privi-
lege of appearing with this judgment roll in the United States land department
and making thereon the statutory proof and payment and receiving patent.
The soundness of this conclusion the Department readily affirms.
But the conclusion suggests in itself the pertinent question : What
proof would be required? And in the answer, proof of the patent-
ably placer character of respondents' claim must be included.
Should that proof fail, respondents' rights under their judgment
roll would fail.
Under the circumstances of the case and the foregoing views it
can not be held that petitioner's patent application became defunct by
reason of the judgment of the court and is an improper basis for
the order for hearing. That application was the cause of the con-
troversy which had ultimately in view the right to patent and which
now presents the question of respondents' rights under their judg-
ment roll as dependent upon the character of the land. Should the
result of the hearing be favorable to respondents it would dispose of
petitioner's application; should it be unfavorable, a new application
by it would merely invite circuity of action.
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Whilst opposing a hearing to determine this question at the
instance of -petitioner, counsel for respondents concede that, as a log-
ical result of the filing of an adverse claim and the assertion therein
of prior right of possession and consequent prior right' to acquire
the fee from the United States, the land department mighl treat the
adverse claim as an application for patent and cite the claimant to
show cause why it "should not be canceled.*" a concession which,
strangely, counsel for petitioner question. Any such connecting link
between a mining location and the land department may afford war-
rant for an investigation of any and all rights against the irovern-
nient to which claim i- therein laid, and this may always he had at
the instance of the land department itself, or of one asserting any
interest in the land, or even of an entire stranger. And if the
claimed rights be negatived as the result of the inquiry and deter-
mination, the land may thereafter be otherwise disgpsed of as tin 1
fact- are found to warrant.
As of the date of petitioner's application for lode patent, out of
which the controversy arose, and at which time the petitioner sub-
mitted to the land department its claim to the land involved, the ques-
tion of the character of the land embraced in the placer location must
he determined. Did it appear, as in Michie v. Gothberg (30 L. D.,
407). that sufficient time within which to develop the claim had not
then elapsed a further period would be afforded, hut at that date
the placer location had stood for almost sixteen years and came
wholly within the purview of the correlative case of Purtle v. Steffee
(31 L. D., 400).
But counsel for respondents cite an expression of the United States
Supreme Court in this case (104 U. S.. 220, 223) as follows:
Undoubtedly when the Department rejected the application for a patent it
could have gone further and set aside the placer location, and it can now. by
direct proceedings upon notice, sot ii aside and restore the hind to the public
domain.
Mutual reliance upon this utterance seems to be had. Counsel for
respondents interpret it to mean that the placer location, the validity
and priority of which have been adjudged, operate- to withhold the
land within its limit- from other appropriation, and that only when
the land department, upon its own initiative and independent action,
shall by direct proceedings and upon notice set the placer location
aside "and re-tore the land to the public domain" will unfettered
jurisdicton to entertain the first legal application vest. Emphasis
and stress are laid upon the concluding clause of the quotation.
The Department finds no difficulty here and no obstacle opposed
to the course outlined in the decision under review. The question of
the force and effect of a mining location of itself to preelude <>r defeat
a subsequent location by another is sufficiently discussed above, and
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do contrary opinion is expressed b}^ the court in this connection.
And whilst the court must be well aware that a mining location is not
of record before or connected with the land department, and is not
so connected or usually within the latters knowledge until applica-
tion for patent is filed or it is properly called in question by another,
the court must be equally well aware that these locations are con-
stantly in legal and practical effect set aside and annulled by the
issuance of patent to another after proper proceedings involving the
question of the character of the land or other sufficient question
within the jurisdiction of the land department, upon notice to the
locator and opportunity afforded him to be heard. Nor does the
court say that the land department must formally " restore the land
to the public domain " before other disposition can be made of it,
nor would that course be practicable or necessary: the tract is sub-
ject to other and final disposition the instant its present unavaila-
bility to the mineral locator is determined. These customary pro-
ceedings before the land department must therefore be the " direct
proceedings upon notice " which the court had in contemplation.
In connection with respondents' motion for review an additional
question is presented in the record. It is stated that since the judg-
ment of the court in the case and while respondents were in posses-
sion of the premises by virtue thereof their development of the
ground disclosed the existence of genuine lodes, which are now em-
braced in and held under lode locations by them or those in privity
with them. In fact, proof of such further locations is submitted on
behalf of petitioner, the date of discovery of the lodes and their exist-
ence within the knowledge of respondents being made a subject of
dispute. Urging that " the actual possession and right of possession
which " respondents enjoy is predicated upon the final judgment of
the court, it is contended that if they are not entitled to placer patent
at present they are clearly entitled to hold the ground under these
lode locations as against all the world, and that as against petitioner
the question of right of possession has become res adjudicata.
With these contentions the Department is unable to agree. Again
it may be pointed out that the only possessory right which the trial
court awarded, and which under the issue it could have awarded to
respondents, was a placer right of possession ; and any additional
rights which might arise under the later lode locations would be
wholly independent of the award. The only adverse claim opposed
to petitioner's patent application was the placer adverse of respond-
ents, and except as to it petitioner became entitled, upon the expira-
tion of the period of publication of notice of its application, to the
benefit of the statutory assumption that no adverse claim existed.
These lode locations thereafter made, on behalf of respondents and
their privies, could, aside from other considerations, be of no avail as
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against any claim under petitioner's patent proceedings; and the
judgment of the court could not have the effect to foreclose or defeat
any rights adverse to Mich as mighl be asserted under the recent lode
locations, now set up by respondents, apart from the placer claim.
Finally, counsel urge that the Department erred in holding that if
the land embraced in the placer location is found to be non-placer in
the patentable sense, etc., no obstruction to the completion of peti-
tioner's patent proceedings, " if in themselves regular, would then
remain." To support this assignment they now call in question any
discovery of the lodes upon which the petitioner relies until long
after its patent application was filed. Reference is made by them to
certain affidavits in respondents' behalf and to statements by peti-
tioner's witnesses and counsel, appearing in the record of the judicial
proceedings of the case, as tending to establish an absence of earlier
lode discoveries.
On the other hand, counsel for petitioner have, since the motion for
review was entertained, filed in the Department a motion to rescind
the order for hearing in the decision under review and to issue pat-
ents to petitioner under its lode application. On behalf of their
motion counsel for petitioner, in their turn, refer to what are con-
ceived to be admissions of the " known existence" of the lodes long
prior to petitioner's lode locations.
It is needless here to cite the particular matters now so pointed out
by opposing counsel as bearing upon the time at which these lodes
were discovered and their existence established. It is sufficient to say
that in the records of the several judicial proceedings heretofore had
this time is variously stated; and it may be added that the specific
admission by counsel for respondents of the lode character of the
around in controversy, referred to by opposing counsel and quoted in
the decision under review, was made at and as of a very recent time
and does not concede any lode discovery by or on behalf of petitioner
at any time. Certainly, the Department did not intend, in the deci-
sion under review, notwithstanding any apparently contrary expres-
sion, to adjudge any right in petitioner to receive patent if the placer
location should be found to embrace non-placer land, any such ques-
tion being regularly cognizable by the local officers and your office
before its consideration here. Upon the record then before it, how-
ever, the Department understood no question to be raised as to dis-
covery of these lodes by petitioner or its grantors at the time of it-
local ions, as claimed by it.
The only finding by the trial court in this behalf was that the lode-
were discovered by petitioner's grantors after the date of the placer
location. Their discovery may/have occurred, therefore, at any time
between that date and the trial of the cause: and the award of the
court, under the issues raised and findings made, leaves to the land
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department the determination of this question. See Aurora Lode y.
Bulger Hill and Nugget Gulch Placer (23 L. D., 95). Manifestly, if
these lodes were not discovered until long after petitioner's patent
application was filed, as now claimed, it can take nothing by its pro-
ceedings thereunder, and the application must in that event be re-
jected. And the controverted question can not be determined from
the records containing the evidence at various times adduced before?
the State and Federal courts, in the several controversies involving
portions of the placer location, or from ex parte affidavits or exhibits,
but only after hearing regularly had before the local office at which
full opportunity has been afforded both sides for submission of such
evidence as they may have and for cross-examination of the opposing
witnesses. Besides these considerations, no admission of the non-
placer character of the land embraced in their location has been made
by respondents; and the motion for rescission of the pending order
for hearing is denied.
Upon application by respondents to your office, within a reasonable
time, the hearing heretofore ordered will be broadened to include the
question of the date of discovery of the lodes embraced in the land in
controversy.
For the reasons above given the Department adheres to the decision
under review ; and the record is returned for such proceedings and
action in the case as may appropriately be had in accordance with the
foregoing views and directions.
indian lands-liquor clause in deeds by heirs of deceased
allottees.
Opinion.
Opinion expressed that the "liquor clause'' now inserted in deeds by heirs of
deceased Indian allottees, prohibiting the sale or storage of liquor on the
land conveyed, and providing for a reversion of title in ease of violation
of the prohibition, should be modified by a further provision " that the
rights of mortgagees in good faith, their heirs and assigns, shall not be
voided or jeopardized by such reversion.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior.
January 25, 1906. (W. C. P.)
You have referred for my consideration, in connection with a refer-
ence of December 8, 1905, a letter of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs reporting on a communication of L. W. Clapp suggesting cer-
tain modifications in the clause to be inserted in deeds by heirs of
deceased Indian allottees respecting the sale of liquor on the prem-
ises conve}^ed. In his report the Commissioner says that the clause in
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question was prepared by "the law officers of the Department " upon
Recommendation of his office.
When a deed from an heir of a Winnebago allottee for land which
the purchaser intended to use for a townsite was presented for your
approval, this office was informally asked whether a clause prohibit-
ing the sale of liquor on the land to he conveyed, could he sustained.
It was found that the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in which State
the lands affected by the proposed dml are situated, in the case of
Jetter v. Lyon, decided December 2, L903 (97 Northwestern Rep.,
59C), had held such a condition valid and enforceable. It was con-
cluded, and the question so informally answered, that such a clause
in the proposed (U^(\ would in all probability he sustained in the
State of Nebraska. It was then asked to formulate a clause, and did
so. adopting in substance the clause in the dwd that was before the
court in that case. The form as adopted reads as follows:
That no malt, spirituous, or vinous liquors shall ho kept nor disposed of oil
the premises conveyed, and that any violation of this condition, either by the
grantee or any person claiming rights under said party of the second part,
Bhall render the conveyance void and cause the premises to revert to the party
ef the firsl part, his heirs and assigns.
By letter of November 21, 1905, to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, the Department directed that this clause he inserted in all
deeds by heirs of deceased Indian allottees. Afterward the grantee
in the i\(^^\ which brought up for consideration this question, sug-
gested that the clause he modified by limiting the forfeiture to the 4
particular lot or tract upon which liquor was kept or disposed of,
and upon reference of that suggestion to this office it was advised in
opinion of November 17. L905, that the modification suggested he
not made.
It is now suggested that a proviso he added to the clause as follows:
"And provided further, That the rio-hts of mortgagees in good faith,
their heirs, and assigns, shall not he voided or jeopardized by such
reversion." It is stated that before the clause in question was in-
serted in these deeds loans could he made with the land as security,
hut that without some modification of the provision "no life insur-
ance company or other careful investor would lend a dollar at any
time in the future upon any land held under a dvr^l or title con-
taining a provision that rendered the iUn^l absolutely void as to the
grantee and all persons acquiring rights under him. in case any of
such persons should violate this liquor clause."
The Indian Office suggests that the clause, if thus modified, might
he used to defeat the object sought to he attained by the original
clause, and by way of illustration suggests, (1) that if a mortgage
should he placed on a tract held under such a deed, the mortgage
foreclosed and title acquired by virtue of the -ale thereunder, the
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purchaser under such sale might be relieved of the condition, (2)
that the purchaser from the Indian might mortgage the land for a
sum nearly equal to its full value and upon violation of the condition
the title would not revert to the Indian until he had paid and dis-
charged the incumbrance.
It is believed that the first of these suggestions is not entitled to
great consideration. A j^nrchaser at a sale under foreclosure of a
mortgage of a tract of land affected by this clause would be a person
claiming rights under the original grantee of the Indian. At any
rate, instances of sales under foreclosures would be so infrequent as
to constitute a negligible factor in determining the course to be pur-
sued. The second suggestion contemplates a condition that may be
presented at any time though not probably exactly as the Indian Office
puts it. Mortgages will be placed on these lands, at least if the pro-
posed modification be adopted, and whether the amount of such an
incumbrance be large or small the reversion of the' title, if the
amendment suggested be adopted, would become effective only upon
the payment by the Indian of the amount of the incumbrance. This
would, in most instances, constitute a barrier to the effectual and
complete reversion of title. The Indian would, as a rule, be unable
to discharge the incumbrance and the final lodgment of the title
would be largely in the control of the mortgagee. This would no
doubt open the Avay for secret dealings between the mortgagor and
mortgagee with a view to defeat of the liquor clause. It is quite
improbable that such cases will be presented so frequently as to con-
stitute a grave objection to the proposed amendment. Holders of
these lands will not generally resort to any such proceeding for the
purpose of defeating the inhibitory clause. The practical operation
of the clause will be to depreciate the price of these lands and any
modification that will remove any part of the objections thereto
will benefit the Indian holder. Whether the objections to the incor-
poration of the amendment are sufficient to cause its rejection in the
face of the assertions of disadvantage to the Indian that would grow
out of the retention of the clause in its original form, can not in the
nature of things be definitely determined. The actual results are
problematical. I am inclined to' the opinion, however, that the dis-
advantages to the individual Indian growing out of the clause in its
original form, especially where the lands affected are agricultural,
will be greater than the difficulties that will be presented if the modi-
fication be adopted.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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YANKTON INDIAN RESERVATION—LIQUOR CLiATJSE IN DEEDS—ACT OF
AUGUST 15, 1894.
Opinion.
Opinion expressed that it is inadvisable to insert in deeds by heirs of deceased
allottees in the Yankton Indian reservation the " liquor clause," prohibiting
the sale or storage of liquor on the land conveyed and providing for a
reversion of title in ease of violation of the prohibition, the agreement with
the Yankton Indians and the provisions of the act of August 15, 1894,
ratifying the same, being the proper authority which should be invoked for
the protection of the Indians in that respect.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior
January 25, 1906. ( W. C. P.
)
In his letter of December 7, 1905, the Commissioner of Indian
A flairs says that he has informally received a protest from residents
upon the Yankton Indian reservation. South Dakota, against the
clause prohibiting the sale of liquor being inserted in deeds for
lands within that reservation, made under sales by heirs of deceased
allottees, and submits the matter for instruction. This letter has been
(referred to me for opinion upon the matter therein presented.
The clause protested against is:
Provided that no malt, spirituous or vinous liquors shall be kept nor disposed
of on the premises conveyed, and that any violation of this condition, either
by the grantee or any person claiming rights under said party of the second
part, shall render the conveyance void and cause the premises to revert to the
party Of the lirst part, his heirs and assigns.
It is insisted that the provision in the agreement with the Yankton
tribe of Sioux or Dakota Indians on the Yankton reservation ceding
these lands and of the act of Congress approved Augusl 15, 1891
(28 Stat.. 286), ratifying said agreement, amply provides for the
situation so far at least as that reservation is concerned. The pro-
vision in the agreement (page 818) is as follows:
No intoxicating liquors nor other intoxicants shall ever be sold or given away
upon any of the lands by this agreement coded and sold to the United States,
nor upon any other lands within or comprising the reservations of the Yankton
Sioux or Dakota Indians as described in the treaty between the said Indians
and the United States, dated April 19th, 1858, and as afterward surveyed and
Bet off to the said Indians. The penalty for the violation of this provision shall
be such as Congress may prescribe in the act ratifying tins agreement.
The provision in the ratifying acl (page 319) is:
That every person who shall sell or give away any intoxicating liquors or
other intoxicants upon any of the lands by said agreeemenl ceded, or upon any
Of the lands included in the Yankjon Sionx Indian Reservation as created by
the treaty of April nineteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, shall be pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not more than two years and by a line of not more
than three hundred dollars.
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Submitting the matter the Commissioner says
:
I shall be glad to be instructed by an opinion from the law officers of your
Department whether, after a parcel of land had passed entirely out of Indian
ownership and become subject to taxation by, and all other jurisdiction of, the
State of South Dakota, an act of Congress providing for the punishment of an
offense committed on that land could be successfully enforced.
I am not informed whether the effectiveness of the provision
against the sale of liquor within the boundaries of the former reser-
vation has been tested in the courts.
Article 7 of the treaty with the Ked Lake and Pembina band of
Chippewa Indians of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat,, 668), provides:
The laws of the United States now in force or that may hereafter be enacted
prohibiting the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors in the Indian country,
shall be in full force and effect throughout the country hereby ceded, until
otherwise directed by Congress or the President of the United States.
The validity of this provision was before the Supreme Court in
United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey (93 U. S., 188). The power
of Congress to make this provision was fully sustained. Speaking
of it the court said (page 197) :
This stipulation was not only reasonable in itself but was justly due from a
strong government to a weak people it had engaged to protect.
It further said (page 197) :
Besides, the power to make treaties with the Indian tribes is, as we have
seen, coextensive with that to make treaties with foreign nations. In regard
to the latter, it is, beyond doubt, ample to cover all the usual subjects of
diplomacy. One of them relates to the disability of the citizens or subjects of
either contracting nation to take, by descent or devise, real property situate
in the territory of the other. If a treaty to which the United States is a party
removed such disability, and secured to them the right so to take and hold
such property, as if they were natives of this country, it might contravene
the statutes of a State ; but, in that event, the courts would disregard them,
and give to the alien the full protection conferred by its provisions. If this
result can be thus obtained, surely the Federal government may. in the exercise
of its acknowledged power to treat with Indians, make the provision in question,
coming, as it fairly does, within the clause relating to the regulation of commerce.
When the case came before the Supreme Court again (United
States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U. S., 491, 494), the authority
of the United States to make the provision there in question was more
clearly asserted, as follows:
Several important legal and constitutional questions were raised on the
argument here, and it was held that Congress, under its constitutional power
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, may not only prohibit the intro-
duction and sale of spirituous liquors in the Indian country, but extend
such prohibition to territory in proximity to that occupied by Indians ; that
it is competent for the United States, in the exercise of the treaty-making power,
to stipulate in a treaty with an Indian tribe that within the territory thereby
ceded the laws of the United States, then and thereafter enacted, prohibiting
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the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors in Indian country, shad be in
full force and effect until otherwise directed by Congress or the Presidenl
of the United States, and that a stipulation to that effect will operate />r>j/>rii>
vigore, and he binding upon the courts, although the coded territory is
situated within an organized county of a State. These conclusions are
stated in a very clear ami able opinion by Mr. Justice Davis, United States
r. i:; Gallons of Whiskey. «):'> \\ S., 188.
A question arose as to the power to prevent the sale of liquor in
the town of Odenah, Wisconsin, located within the boundaries of
Bad River Indian reservation and was submitted to this office for
opinion. The provision affecting that land, found in the treaty of
September 30, 1854 (10 Stat., 1100). is:
Xo spirituous liquors shall he made, sold, or used on any of the lands herein
set apart for the residence of the Indians and the sale of the same shall be
prohibited in the territory hereby ceded until otherwise ordered by the
President.
By the same treaty certain missionaries, teachers, and other per-
sons residing in the territory ceded or upon the reservations made
therein, were allowed to enter the land occupied by them. Certain
tracts were entered under this provision and patents issued therefor.
Some of the hinds so entered were sold and it was upon stich a
tract that the saloons complained of were being conducted, the
owner- claiming that the land was not a part of the reservation
and that the United States had no control over it. In the opinion
of August [0, 1900, it was held that the sale of liquor upon such
tracts was contrary to the law. The clause construed by the court
i- substantially the same as the provision in the Yankton agree-
ment and ratifying act and the case cited would justify the con-
clusion that the latter provision would he upheld and declared effect-
ive to prevent the sale of liquor upon any of these lands. While
in Matter of Heff (197 U. S., 488), the Supreme Court hold- that
police regulations respecting the persons of Indians who have he-
come citizens fall within the domain of state jurisdiction, uothing
said there can he held as overruling the decision in United States /•.
Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, supra, or of denying the declara-
tions there made as to the authority of Congress to make a provi-
sion prohibiting sale of liquor upon lands allotted to and ceded
by the Indians. Until the court has made some declaration to the
contrary this Department should go upon the theory that the act
of August L5, L894, was within the power of Congress and can he
enforced.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs says: " My own opinion, for
whatever il may be worth, is that no punishment byfineand imprison-
ment would have the same deterrent effect in any event asa forfeiture
<d* title." It should he remembered, however, that the clause in ques-
tion would prevent sales on only a comparatively small portion of
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the lands formerly within the Yankton reservation; that is, only on
tracts sold by heirs of deceased allottees. The allotments to Indians
cover only a portion of the reservation, the remainder being open to
settlement and entry by whites. Only a portion of the allotted lands
will be subject to sale as inherited lands under the act of May 27,
1902 (32 Stat., 245, 275). Tracts entered under the law providing
for the disposal of unallotted lands, and tracts conveyed by allottees
after removal of restrictions on alienation by issue of patents in fee
or otherwise, would not be affected by the clause in the deeds for
inherited land; in other words, the provision in the law attaches to
all the land while the clause in the deed would attach to onl}7 a com-
paratively small portion. It is doubtful whether, if the clause be
inserted in these deeds, it will of itself give any large degree of protec-
tion against the evil aimed at. To prevent sales upon one tract while
the traffic may be carried on without let or hindrance upon an adja-
cent tract, would not prove of great benefit to the body of the Indians.
Real protection to the Yanktons must be found in the law as it now
stands or in some provision to be hereafter enacted affecting the whole
body of these lands.
Any condition imposed will naturally diminish the chances of sales
and depreciate the price to be obtained by the heirs of deceased In-
dian allottees for their lands. The injury resulting to this class of
Indians from insertion of this clause in their deeds should be taken
into consideration and if it outweighs the probable benefit to the body
of Indians, the clause should be rejected. As pointed out above,
the prevention of sales upon only a small portion of the land inhab-
ited by these people would afford no effective moral protection, while
the imposition of the condition most probably would result in a
considerable financial injury to the individuals whose lands will be
affected. It would seemingly wTork clisadvantageously to them with-
out any compensating advantage to others.
For these reasons I doubt the advisability of inserting this clause
in deeds for lands formerly within the Yankton reservation, or for
lands in like condition elsewhere.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
TOWNSITES IN OSAGE INDIAN RESERVATION—SALE OE LIQUORS-ACT
OE MARCH 3, 1905.
Opinion.
There is no provision in the act of March 3, 1905, relating to townsites in the
Osage Indian reservation, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to insert
in deeds for lots in such townsites a clause prohibiting the sale or storage
of liquor on the premises conveyed and providing for a forfeiture of title
in case of violation of the prohibition.
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The general laws prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquors into the
Indian country are applicable to towns in the Osage Indian reservation.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
January 25, 1906. (W. C. P.)
You have referred i'or my opinion on the questions presented, a
letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of January 5, 1 (.»<)C.
This letter embraces two matters, the first being the question of in-
corporating in deeds for lots in the towns of Pawhuska, Bigheart,
Foraker, Fairfax and Hominy in the Osage Indian reservation, the
clause recently adopted for insertion in all conveyances of Indian
inherited lands, prohibiting the sale or storage of liquor on the prem-
ises conveyed and providing for forfeiture of title in case of violation
of the prohibition; and the second being the modification of that
clause to protect mortgagees of the land.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs says that it lias been assumed
jby his office that as these townsites are within the reservation the gen-
eral laws prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquors into
"the Indian country" were applicable and would suffice to prevent
liquor traffic there. He further says this position was taken in 1003
with reference to the townsite of Washunga in the Kaw reservation
and that so far as known no trouble has been experienced there in
preventing the sale of liquor under the general law. He evidently
now entertains a doubt as to the correctness of that position and
regards the omission of a specific inhibition against the sale of liquor
on these lots in the law authorizing the sale of the lots as a defect in
that legislation and is of opinion that the defect might be more
surely cured by including in all deeds covering lots in those townsites
a clause similar to that now inserted in deeds of inherited Indian
lands than by seeking additional legislation.
The act of March :\. 1905 (-33 Stat.. L048, 1061), designates the
lands to be reserved for these different towns and directs that they be
surveyed, appraised, and laid oil' into lot-, blocks, streets, and alleys
by the Osage townsite commission "and sold at public auction after
due advertisement to the highest bidder by said townsite commission
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Sec-
retary of the Interior." This law doe- not attach any condition
respecting the sale of liquor on the premises nor doe- it authorize
this Department to attach any such condition. Hie -ale i- to be
absolute and unconditional. It is not the province of the executive
department to remedy a supposed defect in the law in the manner
proposed here, nor has it any power to do that. The insertion of a
clause of the nature proposed here, which would amount to the impo-
sition of a condition subsequent upon the title, i- purely a legislative
function and therefore outside the -cope of the executive action. If
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it be deemed necessary to have such a condition imposed Congress
should be asked to grant authority therefor or to enact such additional
legislation as may be needed.
It is believed, however, that the position heretofore assumed in the
Indian Office is correct and that the general laws prohibiting the
introduction of intoxicating liquors into the Indian country will
prevent the introduction and sale of such liquors in these towns. The
Osage Indian reservation is Indian country beyond question, as
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bates v. Clark
(95 U. S., 204:). The sale of lots within these several townsites would
not destroy the character of the reservation as Indian country. The
Department of Justice was asked whether there was anything in
the laws of the United States in relation to the Indian territory
which would prevent the establishment of a distillery on lands
therein where the Indian title is extinct. In reply to that question
Attorney-General Griggs, after referring to the case of Bates v.
Clark, said (22 Ops., 232):
In the above decision in Bates v. Clark, all this territory remains Indian
country, except as the Indian title thereto has been extinguished, and as it
includes the place where the distillery in question is proposed to be erected, its
erection is obviously forbidden by the section above referred to, unless the
Indian title thereto has become extinct in the sense in which that expression is
used in the case above cited.
Just to what extent over this vast territory thus described as Indian country
the Indian title must be extinguished in order that, under the decision referred
to, a particular locality therein shall cease to be Indian country is not apparent.
But, in view of the evident object and purpose of Congress in this and kin-
dred legislation to prevent the introduction of intoxicating liquors among the
Indians or into localities inhabited by them, it is obvious that much more in
this direction is required than that the Indian title shall be extinct as to the
particular lot or parcel of land on which the distillery is erected or proposed
to be erected.
In view of this and of existing facts in the Indian territory, the question
submitted is somewhat indefinite. You ask in substance whether there is
anything in the laws of the United States that prevents the establishment of
a distillery in the Indian territory " on lands therein when the Indian title is
extinct."
If this means merely that the Indian title to the particular lands on which
the distillery is proposed to be erected is extinct, the first part of the question
should be answered in the affirmative, while if it means that the Indian title is
extinct there over such an extent of territory as that such territory has, under
the doctrine of Bates v. Clark (supra), ceased to be Indian country, then the
section above referred to does not itself prohibit such distillery.
The sale of lots in these townsites would surely not render the
Indian title extinct over any such extent of territory as would cause
the Osage reservation to cease to be Indian country. The laws of
the United States prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquors
into the Indian country would still remain in force as to all the
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Osage reservation and would be sufficient to prevent the sale of liquor
in these towns.
The question as to the modification of the " liquor clause " in deeds
of inherited Indian lands has been considered in another opinion of
this date to which reference is hereby made.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
ARID LAND-WITHDRAWAL-INCOMPLETE CLAIMS-ACT OF JUNE 17,
1902.
( )PINI0N.
Uncompleted claims to lands withdrawn under the provisions of the act of
June 17, 1902, and determined to he needed for construction of irrigation
works in connection with a project that has heen found practicable, should
not he allowed to lie perfected, hut should remain in the same status as
existed at the time the determination was made and the rights of the
claimants adjusted upon the hasis of that status.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
January ,!',. WOO. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt of a report from the Director of the Geological
Survey upon a letter from the Commissioner of the General Land
Office relative to proposed instruction to be given to the register and
receiver at Boise, Idaho, to " accept all final proofs offered for laud-
in Deer Flat reservoir site but issue no final certificates thereon pend-
ing further notice and forward said proofs to this office."
The Director is of the opinion that such instructions should not be
given, and the matter is referred to me for opinion "as to which,
under the law and the regulations of the Department, is the proper
action to take in this matter, that recommended by the Commissioner
of the Genera] Land Office or that recommended by the Director of
the Geological Survey."
I understand the lands in question have been withdrawn for use
in the construction and operation of the irrigation works of the
Payette-Boise project and hence have been appropriated by the
government.
The different withdrawals to be made under the reclamation act
were described and the proper course to be followed in such matters
was pointed out with considerable detail in instruction- approved
June 6, L905 (
:
,
>:
,
> L. I).. 607). It was there said that withdrawals
under either form would not defeat any valid entry, location or
selection which had the effect df segregating the Lands and that all
such entries, -election-, and location- should be permitted to proceed
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to patent or certification the same as if such withdrawals had not been
made " except as to lands needed for construction purposes." The
eighth paragraph of these instructions reads as follows
:
In the event any lands embraced in any entry under which final proof has
not been offered, or in any unapproved or uncertified selection, are needed in the
construction and maintenance of any irrigation work (other than for right of
way for ditches or canals reserved under act of August 30, 1890) under the
reclamation act, the Government may cancel such entry or selection and appro-
priate the lands embraced therein to such use, after paying the value of the im-
provements thereon and the enhanced value of such lands caused by such
improvements.
The matter of the effect of withdrawals on existing entries was
again considered in instructions of October 12, 1905 (34 L. D., 158).
The course to be pursued in respect of entries within a withdrawal for
construction purposes is set forth in paragraph 2 (page 163), as
followTs
:
As soon as it shall be determined that the project is practicable and advisable
and the construction of the same is approved and authorized by the Secretary
of the Interior, a withdrawal will be made of all public lands shown by the ex-
amination and survey to be required for use in the construction and operation
of the works, and all persons who may have made entry of such lands within
such withdrawal prior to the preliminary withdrawal and who have not ac-
quired a vested right thereto, will be notified of the appropriation of their lands
for irrigation purposes and that their entries will be cancelled and their im-
provements paid for by the government as provided for by the 8th and 9th
sections of the circular of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D., 607), unless sufficient cause
be shown within sixty days from the date of such notice.
It has been determined that the Payette-Boise project is feasible
and that certain lands will be needed for construction of the Deer
Flat reservoir in connection with that project. The instructions re-
ferred to certainly do not contemplate that claims to lands thus de-
termined to be needed for construction of irrigation works in connec-
tion with a project that has been found practicable, should thereafter
be allowed to be perfected. On the other hand, it wTas the evident
purpose to maintain a status existing at the time the determination
was made and to adjust the rights of all claimants upon the basis of
that status.
The recommendations of the Director of the Geological Survey are
in accord with said instructions and should be adopted.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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NAVlGABIiE STREAMS—ISLANDS—RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
East Kansas City Land Co. v. Heirs of Mensing et al.
Upon the admission of a State into the Union it acquires in its sovereign
capacity the right to all the soil under navigable rivers, subject to the
power <»f Congress to regulate commerce among the States and with
foreign nations, and all lands that may afterward form upon the beds of
such streams become the property of the sovereign State, or of the pro-
prietor of the shore lands, in virtue of his riparian right, according to the
law of the State in which the land is situated.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) January 27, 1906. (E. F. B.)
This motion is filed by the East Kansas Land Company and the
Guinotte Land Company for review of the decision of the Depart-
ment of June *27, 1005 (not reported), so far as it holds that the land
in controversy is public land of the United States subject to the
jurisdiction and control of the land department.
The contention of the Land Company is, first, that the land now
known as Mensing's Island was not in existence at the date of the
admission of the State of Missouri into the Union, and having been
formed since then, it inured to the State in virtue of its sovereignty;
second, that even if it existed as an island at the date of the admis-
sion of the State into the Union and at the date of the township
surveys, it passed by the original patents from the government con-
veying the surveyed lands on the opposite shores and has since
belonged to the adjacent riparian proprietors.
That was the contention of the Land Company upon the appeal
from the decision of your office and the argument in support of it was
the same as now submitted in support of this motion.
Upon the first proposition, however, they allege additional facts
bearing upon the question as to the non-existence of the island at the
• laic of survey which were not presented when the cases were consid-
ered on the appeal from your office and which it is contended over-
comes every presumption as to the existence of the island at that date
that may arise from the facts upon which tlu* decision complained of
rested, it being conceded that there is no direct proof as to the actual
existence of the land as an island at the date of the admission of the
State.
The additional allegation of the Land Company is that in the
majority of the plats of survey along the Missouri river the existence
of islands adjacent to such surveys is shown, and it must therefore
he presumed that where a plaj of survey show- no island, none
existed. Hence it is contended that the practice of noting islands
along the meander line of the surveys must have prevailed at that
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date as to surveys along the Missouri river and that abundant proof
of a prevailing practice to that effect would have been found in the
records of the General Land Office had they not been overlooked.
It is also asserted that the records of the General Land Office
evidence other facts not noticed in the decision and not considered,
which, it is contended, conclusively negative the existence of the is-
land in controversy as early as 1821. The alleged facts are that in
1819 the Government entered into a contract with David Deshler for
the survey of the islands in the Missouri river from the then Western
boundary of the State at the mouth of the Kaw river to its confluence
with the Mississippi river; that Deshler's surveys were systematic,
commencing at the Kaw river he surveyed down stream numbering
the islands as he found them in regular and consecutive order from 1
to 103 ; that some of the islands surveyed by Deshler are not shown on
the original township plats and some that are shown on the township
plats are not shown upon the plats of Deshler's surveys.
He did not survey any island between township 50 north, range 33 west and
township 50 north, range 29 west, a reach in the river from the initial point, of
24 miles. He then found and surveyed an island which he numbered 1 and then
proceeded down the river to its mouth, surveying and numbering in consecutive
order. It must be presumed that at the time there were no islands existing in
the river adjacent to township 50 north, ranges 33-32-31 and 30 west or they
would have been surveyed and numbered by him.
The other contention is that even if it be conceded that the island
existed at the date of the admission of the State into the Union the
company's right as a riparian proprietor is controlled by the rulings
of the highest court of the State at the time of the issuance of the
patent and not by the latest adjudication of that court holding that
the right of a riparian proprietor in Missouri extends only to the
waters vdge, citing in support thereof, the case of Gelpcke y. City
of Dubuque (1 Wall., 175).
A re-examination of the facts has been made and a careful consid-
eration given to the authorities cited in support of the alleged errors
of law.
While the grounds of error in the findings of fact and the rulings
of law as alleged in the motion do not appear to be sustained, there
is a well-established rule of law governing the proprietorship of the
beds and shores of rhTers, that was not given consideration in the deci-
sion complained of, which, if applied to the facts as found by the
Department, would determine this case adversely to the government.
That rule, as expounded by the Supreme Court in St. Louis y. Rutz
(138 U. S., 226, 245), is " that if an island or dry land forms upon
that part of the bed of a river which is owned in fee by the riparian
proprietor, the same is the property of such riparian proprietor. He
retains the title to the land previously owned by him with the new
deposits thereon."
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This rule grows out of the well-established doctrine that the State
upon its admission into the Union acquired in it- sovereign capacity
the absolute right to all the navigable water- and to the soil under
them subject only to the power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the State-, and with foreign .nation-, and that all land- that
afterwards formed upon such beds become the property of the sover-
eign state, or of the proprietor of the shore land- in virtue of his
riparian right according to the law of the State in which the land is
situated. (Barney v. Keokuk. 94 U. S., 324.)
The land in controversy was held to be public land upon the theory
that a part of the island as now formed existed at the date of the
admission of the State, and the United State- under its right as a
riparian proprietor, was entitled to the land that subsequently formed
thereon as accretion.
It is evident, however, from the testimony and from the facts
as found by the Department, that the greater part if not all of this
accretion is now formed upon the bed of the river south of the center
of the main channel, to which the State at the date of its admission
acquired proprietorship under its sovereign right, so that, whatever
may be the extent of the riparian right of the shore proprietor as
against the State, the United States, under the rule announced in
St. Louis v. Rutz, cannot lawfully assert any claim to that part of
the island formed upon the bed of the river south of the center of the
main channel as it existed at the date of the admission of the State
into the Union.
There is no direct proof of the existence of the island earlier than
1837 or l«s:>«s. At that time an island known as Choteau island was on
the north side of the river which some of the witnesses believed was
the same as what is now known as Mensing's Island. The main chan-
nel was then south of that island, and between the north of the
island and the mainland there was a slough about 300 yard- wide.
There i- no proof as to the width of the island. The river, between
the north and south banks of the mainland, was about forty chains
wide.
If Choteau island had any connection whatever with Mensing's
island, it is evident that after L837, and prior to L857, the river forced
a channel through the slough on the north side of the island, cutting
away a large part of it. This channel has since been the main chan-
nel of the river and the land has continued to form, filling up what
Was formerly the main channel of the river and attaching in the
Bouth shore.
It must be admitted that the evidence is not satisfactory ;i- to the
exact locus of what was known a- Choteau island, with reference to
the center of the main channel of the river in L837 or L838, or what
part of the land in controversy, if any. lies north of the center of the
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old channel. The fact, however, is well established that there was an
island on the north side of the old channel opposite the site of the
land in controversy as early as 1837 or 1838, which was well timbered,
and the land in question was identified by some of the witnesses as
that island which was formerly known as Chotean island. If that
is true, it is probable, as was found in the decision complained of,
that after the new channel was formed there was a part of the island
known as Choteau island left on the south of the new main channel
as a nucleus upon which land was formed on that part of the bed
north of the center of the old channel, but that is a mere inference
resting upon slight and uncertain testimony.
After the survey of the island in 18.57 by the United States, the
island was from time to time encroached upon by the washing of the
north shore, and a considerable part of the island at this time is
evidently on the bed of the river south of the old main channel. "What
part of the land in question is so situated can not be determined, nor
can it be determined from the testimony what part of the land as
surveyed by the United States army is now north of the center of the
old channel. It is certain that there is very little of it. if any.
In view of the uncertainty as to the existence of the land in contro-
versy at the date of the admission of the State into the Union, and of
the fact that the present value of the land is due solely to the improve-
ments placed upon it by the interveners, it is not believed that any
public interest will be subserved by attempting to dispose of any part
of said island as public lands, especially as it is not likely that any
bid will be offered because of the uncertainty and doubt as to the title
of the government.
The decision of June 27, 1905, is hereby vacated, and your decision
holding that the land in controversy is public land is reversed.
DESERT LAND ENTRY—SUSPENSION—CONTEST—HEARING.
Langer V. Wasman.
A direction by the Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office to withhold the issuance of patent on all desert-land entries
within a given land district does not amount to a suspension of such entries,
and the jurisdiction of the local officers to consider contests against the
same is in no wise affected thereby.
The authority of the local officers to order a hearing on a contest against a
desert-land entry is in no wise affected by an order of the land department
suspending all desert-land entries in the township in which the entry in
question is situated, where the order of suspension was not issued until
after the expiration of the statutory lifetime of the entry.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
.; V. L. C.) January -//. 1906. I A. W. P.)
An appeal lias been filed on behalf of Rose Wasman from your
office decision of May 2, 1905, wherein you affirm the action of the
local officers and hold for cancellation her desert-land entry No. 5015,
for the E. J of the SE. |. Sec. 33, T. 19 N., II. 4 E., and lots 1 and 2
of Sec. 4, T. 18 N., R. 4 E., Greatfalls, Montana, land district.
From an examination of the record it appears that claimant made
said entry on August 28, 1899, and submitted the required annual
proofs for the first, second, and third years, on August 22, 1900, No-
vember 11, 1901, and October 16, 1902, respectively: that prior to
the last-named date—to wit, on August 5, 1902—Agnes Langer filed
an affidavit of contest against the said entry, alleging, in substance,
that the land involved was non-desert in character, and that the re-
quired sum had not been expended in the annual improvement
thereof; that as a result of hearing regularly had the local officers,
on December 5, 1902, found that the land was desert in character, and
that claimant had substantially complied with the law in the matter
of improvements, and hence recommended that contest be dismissed;
that on December -J9. 1902, contestant appealed therefrom, and dur-
ing the pendency of the same before your office claimant, on July 13,
190)), gave notice of her intention to submit final proof in support of
s.id entry on August -JO, 1903. On August 18, 1903, contestant filed
protest and affidavit of contest against said entry and the allowance
of Mich final proof, again setting out the allegations contained in the
former contest affidavit, and. in addition thereto, charged that the
land had not been reclaimed from its desert character. Xo action
was taken thereon pending the final disposition of the former contest,
and on the date named proof was submitted by claimant, protestant
not appearing, which proof was held by the local officers to await
the outcome of the above-described proceedings.
The local officers, by letter of September 23, 1903, transmitted to
your office the application of contestant to be permitted to dismis-
her former contest and appeal then pending before your office, and to
he allowed to proceed with the later contest. Your office, by decision
of October 20, 1903, granted this request as to the dismissal of the
contest and appeal, but. considering the case as between the govern
ni'Mit and the claimant, affirmed the finding of the local officer- as to
the character of the land and sufficiency of the improvements, dis-
missed the contest, and closed the case.
[Jpon receipt of notice of -aid decision, the local officer-, on ( )ctober
26, L903, issued notice on Mrs. Langer's protest and affidavit of
contest, proper service was had. and on the day set for hearing both
parties appeared generally and submitted testimony of a large num-
ber of witnesses. On Julv l!7. l'.M)!. the local officers rendered their
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finding thereon, holding that as a result of the prior contest it had
been finally determined that the land was desert in character, and
that the required annual expenditures had been made by the claim-
ant, and that these questions would be considered as res adjudicate
leaving only for determination the question as to whether the land
had been reclaimed from its desert character. On this ground they
found against the claimant and recommended the cancellation of
said entry.
In this connection it appears that by departmental letter of July
15, 1903, your office was addressed as follows
:
You are hereby directed to withhold the issuance of patents on all entries
made or that may hereafter be made, under the desert land act, in the Great-
falls district, Montana, until further ordered by this Department.
It further appears that your office by letter " P " of October 8,
1903, addressed to the local officers of the Greatfalls district, after
reciting certain townships investigated by a special agent, embracing
the tract covered by the entry in question, concluded as follows
:
In view of the showing made by Agent Chadwick the land above described
is withdrawn from entry under the desert land law and all desert entries
covering any of said lands will stand suspended until investigated by a special
agent to determine their bona fides
You will make the necessary notes on your plats and tract books and after
• receipt hereof allow no entry to be made under said act, for any of the above-
described lands, except in cases where the application or claim was initiated
prior to receipt of this letter in your office.
From the adverse action of the local officers claimant appealed to
your office, assigning errors going to the general issue, and also
urging that they were without authority or jurisdiction to hear said
contest because of the prior order of suspension of October 8, 1903,
supra.
By decision of May 2, 1905, your office affirmed the finding of the
local officers as to failure to reclaim the land, holding, as to their
authority to hear said contest, that
:
As to the question of jurisdiction, which is raised for the first time on this
appeal, it will be observed: that Langer's second affidavit of contest and protest
against the allowance of the final proof was filed, and the final proof itself
submitted, before the order of October 8, 1903, was made, and which order of
suspension remains unrevoked. But contestant having filed her contest against
the entry, as before stated, charging facts which, if true, would necessarily call,
for its cancellation, it is competent for this office to allow the prosecution of
such contest, and to approve your action in proceeding therewith, especially as
by means thereof the result contemplated by the order of suspension, referred
to, is attained.
From that decision claimant has appealed to this Department, and
assigned errors as follows
:
1. Error to maintain that the register and receiver or the Commissioner of
the General Land Office had jurisdiction of the case or were authorized to
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consider and act upon the contest against said entry, in view of the depart-
mental order of Oct. 8, 1903, suspending action on desert land entries in said
land district, which order of suspension remains unrevoked.
2. Error to hold the contestee had qo1 acquired at the time her final proof
was submitted a sufficient water supply, permanent in character, to reclaim the
land.
:;. Error to hold the cultivation' was not sufficient under the decisions and
rule of the land department at that time, a " marked increase in the growth of
grass" being accepted as meeting the requirements of cultivation.
4. Error to hold the entry for cancellation on the record presented.
From a careful examination of the somewhat voluminous record,
the substance of which is very fully and fairly stated in your office
decision, and need not be here repeated, the Department finds that a
clear preponderance of the testimony sustains the charge and war-
raids the concurrent finding and conclusion of the local office and of
your office, in effect, that there had been no sufficient reclamation of
the tract in question from its desert character. Did the local officers
have authority to order this hearing at which Mich testimony was
submitted I
It i> now urged in support of the appeal that the departmental let-
ter of July L5, L903, sitpra, i\(\i\v(^>cd to your office, was a general
order of suspension and was in full force and effect August Is. 1903,
when the present contest affidavit was filed, and therefore the local
officers were without jurisdiction to act on the same. The Depart-
ment, however, can not concur in this contention. The letter in
question directed only that your office withhold the issuance of pat-
ents on all desert-land entries in the Greatfalls, Montana, land dis-
trict, until further ordered. There was no direction that this infor-
mation he conveyed to either the local officers or the entrymen. This
order would not prevent the former from receiving final proofs and
issuing certificates thereon, or excuse the latter from compliance with
the requirements of the desert-land law.
But it is further urged that, while the affidavit of contest in the
case now under consideration was filed with the local officers prior
to your order of suspension of October 8, 1903, supra, notice had
not issued thereon, and that subsequent thereto the local officers
were without authority to issue such notice ordering a hearing for
the purpose of submitting testimony in support of the charges
against the entry and final proof.
The Department has carefully considered this phase of the pres-
ent proceeding. Where the statutory life of an entry ha- not ex-
pired at the date of suspension, time doe- not run against it during
such suspension, but where this period ha- elapsed, a subsequent sus-
pension does not give it a new life or afford the entrynian opportunity
thereafter to comply with the law and submit final proof showing such
compliance. It will he observed that the statutory lifetime of the
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entry in question had -expired prior to the issuance of your said order
of suspension; and that shortly before such expiration claimant
gave notice of her intention to submit final proof in support thereof
showing " complete irrigation and reclamation " of the land. This
Avas an announcement to the public generally to appear and show
cause why said proof should not be accepted and final certificate
issued. Contestant herein accepted this challenge by filing protest
against the allowance of the final proof and affidavit of contest
against the entry, alleging failure to reclaim the land from its desert
character. This filing of protest, submission of final proof, and ex-
piration of the life of the entry, having antedated the order of sus-
pension, the right of the contestant to a hearing on such charge was
not thereby delayed or defeated. It does not appear, nor does the
claimant so allege, that she was in any manner injured by notice
issuing and hearing being held promptly following the final deter-
mination of the prior contest, rather than to await a time when the
order of suspension shall have been revoked. Claimant was served
personally with a notice which informed her of the charge against
her entry. At the hearing she made a general appearance, cross-
examined contestant's witnesses, testified, and introduced a number
of witnesses in her own behalf, without offering any objection what-
ever to proceeding with the hearing and determination of the contest.
For the reasons stated, and upon careful consideration of this
case, the Department is of the opinion that the judgment of your
office holding said desert-land entry for cancellation on the evidence
thus adduced, should be affirmed, and it is accordingly so directed.
desert eaxd entry—corporation—qualifications.
Silsbee Town Company.
In case of an application by a corporation to make desert-land entry, it is
within the power and it is the duty of the land department to inquire into
the qualifications of the individuals composing the corporation to make
entry in their own right under the provisions of the desert-land law.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Lund Office,
(F. L. C.) February J. 1006. (E. O. P.)
The Department has before it appeal filed on behalf of the Silsbee
Town Company, a corporation, from your office decision of April 18,
1905, calling upon the company to show the qualifications of the in-
dividuals composing it to make entry, in their own right, under the
provisions of the desert land law. in connection with the application
of the company to make such entry for the SE. ] . Sec. 8. XE. j. Sec.
17. T. 16 S., E. 13 E., S. B. M., Los Angeles land district. California.
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The only question presented by the pending appeal is as to the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior, in his administration of
the public land law, to look beyond the corporation, as a legal entity,
to determine its right to make desert land entry.
In the administration of the several statutes, under the provisions
of which title to public land is sought to be acquired by individuals,
associations or corporations, the Secretary of the Interior is charged
with the duty of requiring a strict compliance with such provisions,
in accord with their broad spirit and intent. The right of the De-
partment to call for such evidence as it deems requisite, touching the
qualification of applicants for entries under the public land laws,
follows naturally from duty resting upon the Department to in-
vestigate fully all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
proffered applications before allowing them. This right is not to
be defeated nor the performance of this duty circumvented by the
employment of a legal fiction.
The language of the act under which the application in question
was made touching the right of the applicant to take or hold land
under its provisions, is plain
:
hut no person or association of persons shall hold, by assignment or otherwise
prior t<> the issuance of patent, more than three hundred and twenty acres of
such arid or deserl land, i Sec 7, act March 3, 1891, 26 Stat., lour., i
It is contended on behalf of appellant that the holdings of an
individual, represented by shares of stock in a corporation, do not
represent a holding of any portion of the land entered by the corpo-
ration, in an individual capacity. That this is the general rule at
law is not disputed nor is it- soundness doubted. But that the courts
have power and have frequently exercised it. to go behind the cor-
porate organization and examine the acts of the individuals compos-
ing it. when to totally disregard them and look only t<> the legal
entity before them would close the door to a full investigation of the
actual facts and thereby permit the accomplishment of an end by the
body corporate when such action was forbidden to the individual
members, i> equally well settled.
The language quoted clearly discloses the legislative intent that
no person or association of persons -hall obtain (he benefit incident
to the acquisition of title to more than 320 acre- of land under (he
desert-land law. and it was not the intention to permit a person to
exercise directly, in an individual capacity, the benefit conferred,
and in addition, obtain a like benefit, by the indirect exercise of the
same right through the instrumentality of a legal fiction. With
the intent of the act clearly before u>. the solution of the question
here involved presents less difficulty, a- a sufficienl reason is at once
presented for looking beyond the -ingle qualification of tin- corpora-
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lion as such, and examining the qualifications of the respective mem-
bers who compose it.
The word " corporation " is bur a collective name for the corporators or mem-
bers who compose an incorporated association ; and where it is said that a cor-
poration is itself a person, or being, or creature, this must be understood in a
figurative sense only.
(See Morowetz on Corp., Sec. 1; also Sec. 227.)
In those cases where an observance of the rule at law that a cor-
poration is a distinct and separate entity, may operate to conceal the
real interest of the individual members, and those interests may be
contrary to the policy of the law, equity will disregard the fiction.
So the idea that a corporation may be a separate entity, in a sense that it
can act independently of the natural persons composing it, or abstain from act-
ing, where it is their will that it shall, has no foundation in reason or authority,
is contrary to the fact ; and, to base an argument upon it. where the question
is. as to whether a certain act was the act of the corporation, or of its stock-
holders, cannot be decisive of the question, and is therefore illogical ; for it
may as likely lead to a false, as to a true result.
(State ex ret. r. Standard Oil Co., 40 Ohio St., 137, 178.)
In the case at bar the question involved is one solely between the
government and the applicant, and the government has the same right
j
to inquire into all the facts as would the sovereign state which
|
brought the corporation into being, if the question were one between
it and the corporation respecting an evasion or infringement of the
policy of the law. In such cases the
—
courts are not so powerless that they may not prevent the success of ingenious
schemes to evade or violate the law. There can be no immunity for evasion of
the policy of the State by its own creations.
(Ford v. Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155 111., 10(3, 180.)
It is well established that where concerted action has been taken
by the stockholders of a corporation in their individual capacity,
tending to affect the rights, duties or obligations of the corporation
itself, and inquiry into the result of such action becomes material, the
courts will look to the acts of the individual shareholders as the acts
of the corporation.
As between the corporation and those with whom it deals, the manner of
its exercise usually is material, but as between it and the State, the substantial
inquiry is only what that collective action and agency has done, what it has,
in fact, accomplished, what is seen to be its effective work, what has been its
conduct. It ought not to be otherwise.
(People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y., 582, G22.)
In the case under consideration the question involved is the same,
viz : What has in fact been accomplished, though the positions are
reversed and the inquiry here concerns the acts of the corporation as
affecting the rights of the individual members.
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In the decision last cited the court held (p. 625) that a corporation
was not necessarily, and under all circumstances, entitled to exercise
the same rights as an individual. The Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer, has affirmed this doc-
trine in the following language:
A corporation, while by fiction of law recognized for some purposes as a person
;iik1 tor purposes of jurisdiction as a citizen, is not endowed with the inalienable
rights of a natural person.
( Nor. Sec. Co. v. U. S., 193 V. S., 197, 362.)
Neither is a corporation, when the policy of the law is involved,
to be considered, in all cases, as possessed of all the legal rights of a
natural person, especially in those cases where by combining the
rights of a person, as an individual, and his rights as a component
member of a corporation, it tends to confer a double benefit contrary
to the spirit of the law granting but one right
:
lor it is one thing for the State to respect the rights of ownership and protect
them out of regard to the husiness freedom of the citizen, and quite another
thing to add to that possibility a further extension of those consequences by
creating artificial persons to aid in producing such aggregations.
(People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., supra, p. 625.)
With this power of the courts so firmly settled, it is difficult to see
upon what grounds the contention of appellant may rest, when urged
to question this authority of the Department to inquire into the real
facts surrounding, and the direct effect of. the allowance of an appli-
cation to enter and eventually acquire title to a portion of the public
domain.
The Department is clearly of opinion, for the reasons herein stated,
that the rule announced in the case of Jacob Switzer Co. (33 L. D.,
383) should, in the interests of good administration, be adhered to.
In relation to the proof of incorporation offered by appellant, the
Department is of opinion the same is sufficient, under the provisions
of section ,_>,.>7. California Civil Code, and the same should be accepted.
In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
SURVEY—WITHDRAWAU—SCHOOL. LAND-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS—ACT OF
ATGUST 18, L894.
Ensign v. State ok Montana.
The provision of the ad of Augusl is, 1894, authorizing the survey, on applica-
tion in behalf of the State, of any unsurveyed townships of public lands
therein, and the withdrawal thereof from the date of the application until
the expiration of sixty days from the Qling of the township plat, with a
view to satisfy the public land grants to the state, authorizes and requires
the withdrawal of (ill of the lands in the townships for the survey of which
application is made on behalf of the State.
5194r- Vol. 34-ror. M 28
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The act of February 28, 1891, amending section 2275 of the Revised Statutes,
protects all rights acquired by settlements made prior to survey in the field
upon sections sixteen or thirty-six, reserved for school purposes, but where
a township is ordered surveyed on application in behalf of the State, under
the act of August 18, 1894, and the lands are withdrawn for the purposes
specified therein, such settlements only as were made prior to the with-
drawal are protected as against the State.
(Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F.L. C.) May 28, 1905. (E.J. H.)
The above entitled case is before the Department upon the appeal
of the plaintiff, Edgar S. Ensign, from your office decision of Novem-
ber 28, 1904, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting
his homestead application tendered upon the filing of the township
plat of survey, on April 26, 1903, for the NW. J of Sec. 36, T. 11 N.
R. 19 W., Missoula, Montana, land district, for conflict with the rights
of the State under its school land grant.
Ensign alleged settlement on the land March 14, or 15, 1902, and
that he had resided thereon continuously ever since. This was prior
to survey in the field, but it appears that upon application of the
Governor of the State for the survey thereof, the township was with-
drawn from settlement, entry, or other disposition adverse to the
State, on July 17, 1899, under the provisions of the act of August 18,
1894 (28 Stat., 394), and that due notice thereof was published as
required by said act.
It is claimed on behalf of Ensign that your office erred in holding
that all of the land in said towTnship was withdrawn from settlement,
entry or other disposition adverse to the State, under the act of 1894,
supra; that such attempted withdrawal is in conflict with section 2275
of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February 28, 1891
(26 Stat., 796), which amended section protects settlement rights
made prior to survey in the field upon reserved school sections 16 and
36; and that Ensign was entitled to make homestead entry of the
land applied for under said amended section 2275.
Said act of 1894, in substance, authorizes the governors of the sev-
eral States named therein, which list includes Montana, to apply to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office for the survey of any
township or townships of public lands remaining unsurveyed in said
States, and for the withdrawal of said lands, " with a view to satisfy
the public land grants made by the several acts admitting the said
States into the Union ; " and provides that upon such application
being made, the Commissioner of the General Land Office shall notify
the surveyor-general thereof, who shall proceed to have such survey
made, " and the lands that may be found to fall within the limits of
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such township or townships, as ascertained by the survey, shall be
reserved upon the filing of the application for survey, from any
adverse appropriation by settlement or otherwise except under rights
that may be found to exist of prior inception, for a period to extend
from such application for survey until the expiration of sixty da}7s
from the date of the filing of the township plat of survey in the
proper district land office, during which period of sixty days the
State may select any of such lands not embraced in any valid adverse
claim, for the satisfaction of such grants," etc.
The language of the foregoing quotation from the act of L894,
clearly authorizes and requires the withdrawal of nil of the lands in
the townships, for the survey of which application has been made,
to enable the State to satisfy the several grants of public lands made
by the act admitting said State into the Union, and in the case of all
of said States one of the grants for which the lands were to be thus
reserved " from any adverse appropriation by settlement or otherwise,
except under rights that may be found to exist of prior inception,"
was the school land grant of sections 16 and 36 in the several town-
ships.
Under the act of 1891, settlements made upon sections 1G and 30
prior to survey in the held an 1 protected, but under the subsequent
act of 1894. where a township has been ordered surveyed upon appli-
cation of the Governor of the State, and the lands therein withdrawn
for the purpose specified, such settlements only as were made prior to
the withdrawal are protected as against the State. The provisions
of the later act control, and as Ensign does not claim settlement prior
to the withdrawal, his application must be rejected.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
SECOND HOMESTEAD ENTRY—ACT OF APRIL. 28, 1904.
Cox v. Wells (Ox Review).
The act of April 28, 1904, known as the " Kinkaid Act," authorizes a second
or additional homestead entry of so much land, within the limits defined
in the act, as added to that embraced in the first entry shall not exceed
six hundred and forty acres, regardless of the fad that the entryman may
have relinquished his first entry for a valuable consideration.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the (lateral L<tn<l Office,
(V. L. C.) February ;. 1906. (E. P.)
July 29, L904, Levi P. Wells made homestead entry <>f the NE. |
of Sec. 1, T. 34 X., R. 11 W., O'Neill land district. Nebraska, againsl
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which Peter (i. Cox. on August 24. 11)04, filed affidavit of contest,
charging, in effect, that Wells had. on May 29, 1892, made homestead
entry of the SE. \ of the SW. \ of Sec. 26 and the X. \ of the XE. J
and the XE. J of the NW. \ of Sec. 35, T. 33. R. 8, O'Xeill land dis-
trict, Nebraska, which he relinquished for a consideration, and was
not therefore qualified to make another homestead entry. This affi-
davit was rejected by the local officers on the ground that it did not
state a cause of action, it being by them held, in effect, that Wells's
former entry having been lost prior to the passage of the act of
June 5, 1900 (31 Stat.. 267), the circumstances surrounding such loss
could not be inquired into. Cox appealed, and your office, by de-
cision of December 29. 1904. sustained the action of the local officers.
On further appeal by Cox. however, the Department, by decision of
June 26. 1905 (33 L. D.. 657). held that the said act of June 5, 1900,
supra, was modified by the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat.. 527).
which provides, in effect, that any person thereafter applying to
make a second homestead entry, he having failed to complete his
former entry, must show that the former entry was not relinquished
for a consideration, and that, as Wells's second entry was made after
the passage of this act. the charge was sufficient. A hearing was
therefore directed to be ordered on said charge.
The attention of the Department is now, by your office letter of
January 29, 1906, for the first time directed to the fact that the land
embraced in Wells's second entry is within the limits subject to dis-
position under the act of April 2s. 1904 (33 Stat.. 547). known as the
" Kinkaid law." which, after authorizing homestead entry by one
person of not more than six hundred and forty acres situated within
certain defined limits, provides that " a former homestead entry shall
not be a bar to the entry under the provisions of this act of a tract
which, together with the former entry, shall not exceed six hundred
and forty acres."
Considering the fact that the land in question is within the limits
described in the act last mentioned and that the combined area
embraced in Wells's first and second entries does not exceed the maxi-
mum quantity allowed to be entered under the act. in connection with
the herein quoted provisions of the act. the Department is of opinion
that it is immaterial whether Wells relinquished his first entry for a
consideration or not, and hence that the charge stated does not con-
stitute a cause of action. Therefore the order for a hearing issued
in accordance with the directions contained in departmental decision
of June 26, 1905, is hereby directed to be revoked.
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APPLICATION—ENTRY OF RECORD—PJELINQTHSHMENT—CANCELLA-
TION.
O 'Stiff, v. La Croix.
Where proceedings arc instituted on behalf of the Government solely for the
purpose <it* clearing the record of an existing entry, do question of a pref-
erence right is involved, and where a relinquishment is subsequently filed
and there are no valid adverse rights outstanding, the rule that no applica-
tion to enter shall he received until proper notation of the cancellation of
the entry is made upon the records of the local office, has no application.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L C.) February ,9, 1906. (E. ( >. P.)
James L. O'Shee has appealed to the Department from your office
decision of November 17. 1904, denying his application to locate mili-
tary bounty land warrant. No. 115,616, upon the XA\'. j. Sec. 22, T.
7 X.. R. 2 AY.. New Orleans land district. Louisiana, because of con-
flict with the prior application of John L. La Croix to locate military
bounty land warrant No. 1!).71!>. upon the same tract.
The land involved was formerly embraced in the homestead entry
of one James M. Arrington, against which entry proceedings had
been instituted on behalf of the government looking to its cancella-
tion. On February 24, 1904, subsequent u> the hearing, but prior to
final action by your office upon the testimony submitted, the relin-
quishment of Arrington and the application of La Croix to locate,
were filed in the local office, but no notation of said relinquishment
was then made upon the record. This notation was not made until
May 23, 1904, following the direction contained in your office letter
of May 19, 1904. On May 21, 1904, O'Shee filed his said application,
which was rejected by the local officers for conflict with the prior
application of La Croix. On June 3, 11)04. O'Shee again made simi-
lar application, which was likewise rejected for the same reason.
In the decision appealed from, affirming this action of the local
officers, the case of Walters /•. Northern Pacific Railroad Company
(23 L. I).. !'.>•_!). is cited, but no reference is made to the rule an-
nounced in departmental decision in the case of Stewart /•. Peterson
(28 L. I).. 515), nor to the case relied upon by appellant to sustain
(he contentions urged in his appeal, viz., Young /•. Peck (32 L. D..
102).
In the case of Stewart >'. Peterson, supra, it was held and directed
lliat-
ln order that this important matter of regulation may be perfectly clear, it
is directed that no application will he received, or any rights recognized as
initiated by the tender of an application tor a tract embraced in an entry of
record, until said entry has been canceled upon the records of the local office.
Thereafter, and until the period afforded a successful contestant has expired.
<>r he has waived his preferred right, applications may be received, entered, and
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held subject to the rights of the contestant, the same to be disposed of in the
order of filing niton the expiration of the period accorded the successful con-
testant or upon the filing of bis waiver of bis preferred right.
Circular of instructions, containing language equally broad, was
prepared in accordance with the direction contained in this decision
?29 L. D., 29).
The broad language used would appear to extend to all cases, but
an examination of these cases, out of which the necessity of the
rule seems to have arisen, discloses that it was not intended to apply
in cases where no action on the part of your office was necessary to
clear the record of an existing entry and restore the land covered
thereby to the public domain.
So long as no final action had been taken by your office upon the
proceedings had before the local officers, and there had been no
transfer of the interest in the land, the right of the entryman to
relinquish is unquestioned, and upon the filing of such relinquishment
it was the duty of the local officers to make proper notation thereof
upon the record. On the filing of such relinquishment, by operation
of law the entry was canceled and no further action was necessary to
effect that end. The making of the notation thereof was purely a
ministerial act and it was clearly the duty of the local officers to
promptly perform it. Had the proceedings here involved been
brought by a party having a potential preference right of entry, as
in the case of an ordinary contest, the benefit flowing from the filing
of the relinquishment might have inured to him, and the acceptance
of another application, pending the exercise of that right, would
cause embarrassment ; yet this would have had no bearing upon the
plain ministerial duty of the local officers to note the filing thereof
upon the record.
Clearly the rule announced in the case of Stewart v. Peterson,
6upra, was not intended to permit the local officers, in their discre-
tion, to decline to make such notation. The effect of a relinquish-
ment duly executed and filed before final cancellation of an entry is
well settled, and it attaches eo instanti the filing thereof (Walters
r. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, supra) and there is no dis-
cretion vested in the local officers relative to the action to be taken by
l hem. Final certificate had been issued in the case at bar, yet it does
not appear, nor is it contended, that there had been any transfer or
incumbrance of the equitable title of the claimant. On the contrary,
Arrington states in his affidavit of A,pril 27, 1904
—
that be has never sold, conveyed or disposed of, nor incumbered in any manner,
the bind embraced in bis relinquished homestead entry.
While it is true the government will refuse to recognize relinquish-
ments made after issuance of final certificate and in fraud upon bona
fide incumbrancers or transferees (Addison W. Hastie, 8 L. D.. 618;
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Harlan P. Allen, H L. I).. 224, Richard F. Hafeman, il>.. 644; Paul v.
Wiseman, 21 L. I).. 12; Alfred A. Anscomb, 26 L. I).. 337), it seems
clear that no such adverse claims existed in this ease nor was the
action of the local officers based upon any such claim. In any event
the local officers, upon the filing of such relinquishment, should have
accepted applications to enter, subject to any adverse claim that
might have been presented.
Where proceedings are instituted on behalf of the government
solely for the purpose of clearing the record of an existing entry,
no question of a preference right is involved, and where a relinquish-
ment is subsequently filed and there are no valid adverse rights out-
standing, the rule that no application to enter shall he received until
proper notation of the cancellation of the entry is made upon the
records of the local office, has no application.
The case under consideration is therefore not covered by depart-
mental circular of July 14, L899 (20 L. I).. 29), and the contention
of appellant, based upon departmental decision in the case of Young
r. Peck, supra, can not be sustained.
For the reasons herein stated the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed.
manner of proceeding on special agents' reports.
Instructions.
Department of the Interior.
General Land Office,
Washington, I>. ( '.. February /.£. 1906.
To Special .[(/cuts <m<I Registers <m<l Receivers,
United States Land Offices:
The following rules are prescribed for the Government of proceed-
ings had upon the reports of special agents of this office. All existing
instructions in conflict herewith are superseded.
1. The purpose hereof is to secure speedy action upon special agents'
adverse reports upon claims to the public lands, and to allow entry-
man, or other claimant of record, opportunity to file a denial of the
charges against the entry or claim, and to be heard thereon if he so
desires.
2. Upon receipt of the special agent's report this office will consider
the same and determine therefrom whether the charges, if true, would
warrant the rejection or cancellation of the entry or claim.
3. Should the charges, if not disputed, justify the rejection or
cancellation of the entry or claim the local officers will be duly noti-
fied thereof and directed to issue notice of such charges in the manner
and form hereinafter provided for. which notice must be served upon
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the entryman and other parties in interest shown to be entitled to
notice.
4. The notice must be written or printed and must state fully the
charges as contained in the letter of this office, the number of the
entry or claim, subdivision of land involved, name of entryman or
claimant or other known parties in interest.
5. The notice must also state that the charges will be accepted as
true, (a) unless the entryman or claimant files in the local office
within thirty days from receipt of notice a written denial of said
charges with an application for a hearing, (b) or if he fails to appear
at any hearing that may be ordered in the case. If the entryman or
claimant applies for a hearing he may indicate therein the time and
place for such hearing, subject to the approval of the local officers,
the time to be not less than 60 days from date of his application
therefor.
('). Notice of the charges may be personally served upon the proper
party by the local officers at their office, but if this can not be done
they will deliver the notice to the special agent for service under the
rules. If the special agent can not secure personal service, notice
may be served, upon sufficient showing by the special agent or other
qualified person, by publication. The register wT ill require such pub-
lication to be made under the rules.
7. If a hearing is asked for, the local officers will consider the same
and confer with the special agent relative thereto and fix the hearing
for the date and place stated in the application, if practicable under
the rules, due notice of which must be given entryman or claimant.
The above notice may be served by registered mail.
8. The special agent will duly submit, upon the form provided
therefor, to the Receiver of Public Moneys an estimate of the prob-
able expense required on behalf of the Government. The special
agent will also serve subpoenas upon the Government witnesses and
take such other steps as are necessary to prepare the case for prose-
cution.
9. The special agent must appear with his witnesses on the date
and at the place fixed for said hearing, unless he has reason to believe
that no appearance for the defense will be made, in which event no
appearance on behalf of the Government will be required. The
special agent must, therefore, keep advised as to whether the defend-
ant intends to appear at the hearing.
10. If the entryman or claimant fails to apply for a hearing, or
fails to appear at the hearing ordered, without showing good cause
therefor, such failure will be taken as an admission of the truth of
the charges contained in the special agent's report and will obviate
any necessity for the Government's submitting evidence in support
thereof.
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11. Upon the day set for the hearing and the day to which it may
be continued the testimony of witnesses for cither party may be sub-
mitted, and both parties, if present, may examine and cross-examine
the witnesses, under the rules, the Government to assume the burden
of proving the special agent's charges.
12. If the entryman or claimant fails to apply for a hearing or to
appear at a hearing applied for, as provided in paragraph 10, or if
a hearing is had, as provided in paragraph 11. the Local officers will
render their decision upon the record, giving due notice thereof in the
usual manner.
13. Appeals or briefs must be filed under the rules, but need not
be served upon the special agent, nor will the special agent Hie any
appeal or brief unless directed to do so by this office.
14. The above proceedings will be governed by the Rules of Prac-
tice. All notices served on claimants or entrymen must likewise be
served upon transferees or mortgagees, as provided in Rules 8-J of
Practice.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved :
E. A. Hitchcock. Seen tary.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD—APPROXIMATION.
.John S. Morton.
Only one application of the rule of approximation is allowed to each original
right of soldiers' additional entry, and where the i 'ighl is divided, the
rule may be applied only in the location of one portion thereof; but where
a portion of ;i righl is located for ;> tract of land embracing merely a
fraction of an acre excess, such small excess will not. under the rule de
minimis non <-nr<tt lex, i>e regarded as preventing the holder of the remain-
der of the right, in making location thereof, from applying the role of
approximation.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.) February 76*, 1906. ( P. E. W. |
John S. Morton has appealed to the Department from your office
decision of April 24, L905, rejecting his application, a> assignee of
Anna MeXally. widow of William MeXally. to enter, under section
2307 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, lot 7. Sec. 28,
T. 33 N.. R. 31 E., (iroat falls. Montana, containing 7.60 acres.
Said application is based on a military service of said William
MeXally and the homestead entry. No. 3281, made by him April 22,
18(31), at Omaha. Nebraska, for eighty acres of land. Ili> additional
442 DECISIONS KELATTNC TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
right for eighty acres of land was duly assigned by his widow, and
subsequently divided into two parts, each for forty acres, which were
used as bases for the following entries:
(1) The application of Oscar Keeline, transmitted June 12, 1902,
for 35.96 acres, Sundance, Wyoming, allowed March 31, 1904, final
certificate No. 668, patent issued December 2, 1904.
(2) The application of Albert L. Colthrop, transmitted March 14,
1902, for 40.43 acres. Devils Lake, North Dakota, allowed April 19,
1904, final certificate No. 9093, patent issued December 31, 1904.
The applicant herein, John S. Morton is the admitted owner of
the remaining right for 4.04 acres acquired from said Keeline, and
the only question presented by this appeal is his right to enter 7.60
acres in accordance with the rule of approximation.
In the case of William C. Carrington (32 L. D., 203) the Depart-
ment directed the preparation of a circular of instructions announcing
that in all future entries under said section
—
the rule of approximation will be applied only when the entire additional right
originally due to the soldier, his widow, or orphan children, is offered as a basis
lor the entry.
This circular was issued August 7, 1903 (32 L. D., 206), and con-
tained the following instructions additional to the foregoing:
If part of the right is located upon a tract of land agreeing in area with such
right surrendered or located, then this circular will not prevent the application
of the rule of approximation as to the remainder, if offered in its entirety as a
basis for the entry.
If the right has been divided, and a part located and entry allowed therefor,
before the date of this circular, the rule of approximation may be applied as to
the outstanding and unused portion of such right, in the manner and to the
extent above directed as to the additional right originally due.
In the case of Guy A. Eaton (32 L. D„ 644) it was held that:
One application of the rule of approximation is allowed to each original right
of soldiers' additional homestead entry, and where the right is divided, the rule
may be applied only in the location of one portion thereof.
Following the views expressed in the case of Vernon B. Matthews
(8 L. D., 79), and in the opinion of date June 30, 1900 (30 L. D.,
105), the Department is of the opinion that the allowance of Col-
throp's said application for 40.43 acres, instead of 40 acres, should
be regarded as coming within the rule de minimis non curat lex, and
not as an application of the rule of approximation, which was not
considered in connection therewith.
It thus not appearing that the rule has been heretofore invoked
in connection with this soldiers 1 additional right, and since the pres-
ent application exhausts the right, it is believed that the rule of
approximation may properly be applied herein, the right being for
4.04 acres, and the excess being only 3.56 acres.
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If no other valid objection appear the application will be allowed,
your said decision being hereby reversed.
DESERT LAND ENTRY—CORPORATION—QUALIFICATIONS OF MKMHKIJS.
J. II. McKnight Company.
It is within the power and is the duty of the land department to require a cor-
poration, seeking to acquire title to a desert land entry as assignee of the
original entryman, to show that the individual members composing the cor-
poration are not disqualified under the desert land law to hold and acquire
title to such entry.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofti<<\
( F. L. C.) February 19, 1906. (J. R. W. >
The J. H. McKnight Company, a corporation, assignee of Gus-
tavus Adolph Roensch, appealed from your decision of June 8,
1905—
to show the extent to which each individual member of said corporation has
exhausted his right under the desert land law. and that the members of said
corporation do not hold in the aggregate by assignment or otherwise more than
320 acres of such desert or arid land; .... and upon failure .
the assignment of said Roensch to said company will stand rejected.
It is argued that
:
The only " terms and limitations '* applying to or affecting such taking and
holding, can be none other than the terms and limitations of the desert-land law
itself .... that "no person or association of persons shall hold by as-
signment or otherwise, prior to the issue of patent, more than three hundred
and twenty acres of such arid or desert land." Sec. 7. act of March .'*>. 1891,
16 Stat.. 1095.
It is then argued, at great length and citation of a great mass of
authority, that a corporation is in law " a person " and " citizen " of
the State wherein it is organized, and as such is entitled to enter
such land, to the limit allowed, irrespective of the holdings of its
constituent members or stockholders.
There can be no question that the object and purpose of the limi-
tation in the act was to prevent the entry of large areas of public
lands by few or by one person. This being the purpose of the pro-
vision, it is obviously the duty of the land department so to interpret
and administer the law as to effectuate the purpose, and not to permit
the evasion and nullification of the law by mere legal fiction.
A corporation is "a person" only by legal fiction for convenient
administration of justice. It was held by Lord Mansfield in Morris
v. Pugh (3 Burr, 1243) that :
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Fictions of law bold only in respect to the ends and purposes for which they
were invented. When they are urged to an intent and purpose not within the
reason and policy of the fiction, the other party may show the truth.
A corporation is by fiction of law a citizen of the State in which
it is created for purposes of the administration of justice and the
removal of suits to or jurisdiction of the federal courts, but it is not
a citizen within the meaning of that clause of the constitution which
guarantees that " the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." Paul
v. Virginia (8 Wall., 108) ; Ducat v. Chicago (48 111., 172; 10 Wall.
410) ; Tatem v. Wright (23 N. J. L., 429). The fiction of relation
of a patent or other muniment of title to the date of the entry,
or act of inception of the proceeding out of which it resulted, is
allowed to operate only " for the security and protection ?1 of justice,
and not so as to work injustice. Gibson v. Chouteau (13 Wall., 92,
101) ; Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland (104 U. S., 1, 23) ; Huss-
man v. Durham (165 U. S., 144, 148). Legal fictions are sufficiently
transparent that they are penetrated by the light of real fact when
justice requires it, or they are seen to be invoked to defeat the policy
of the law.
A case recently came before the Department wherein one who
had exhausted his right to appropriate public lands had recourse
to the device of organizing a corporation in which he held four,
hundred and ninety-eight shares, and two other persons held one
share each. Jacob Switzer Company (33 L. D., 383). The Depart-
ment held that the real person was not well hidden behind the
fictitious one. The subject was fully considered in Silsbee Towii
Company (34 L. D., 430), and the same result was reached.
The court looked through the fiction in McKinley v. Wheeler ( 130
U. S., 030, 030), and followed its decisions in Bank of the United
States v. Devereaux (5 Cr., 01, 87), and Society for Propagation of
the Gospel v. New Haven (8 Wheat, 404, 491), in so doing. In
United States v. Trinidad Coal Company (137 U: S., 100) the court
held that a corporation is in legal fiction " a person," that it is in fact,
and when necessary to enforce the policy and purpose of a law will be
regarded as it is in fact, an aggregation and association of natural
persons, and is within the inhibition of section 2347 of the Revised
Statutes, inhibiting an association of persons from acquiring more
coal lands than therein limited. The opinion (ib., 109) holds that:
The reasons that suggested the prohibitions in respect to " associations of per-
sons " apply equally to incorporated and unincorporated associations. But the
purpose of the government would he defeated altogether, if it should he held
that corporations were not " associations of persons " within the meaning of
the statute, and subject to the restrictions imposed upon the latter by sections
2347 and 2350. It is unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended to limit
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the right of entering coal lands to one hundred and sixty acres in the case of an
individual, and to three hundred and twenty acres in the ease of an unincor-
porated association, and leave the way open for an incorporated association
.
.
. .
to acquire public coal lands without any restriction whatever as to
quantity. The language of the statute, to say nothing of the policy which under
lies it. does not require or permit any such interpretation of its provisions. The
words "association of persons" are often, and not inaptly, employed to describe
,i corporation. An incorporated company is an association of individuals acting
as a single person, and by their corporate name. As this court has said,
"private corporations are hut associations of individuals united for some com-
mon purpose, and permitted by the law to use a common name and to change
its members without a dissolution of the association." Baltimore and Potomac
R. R. Co./". Fifth Baptist Church (108 U. S., 'Ill, 330.)
It is useless further to pursue the discussion. There is no limit
to the number of corporations that may be formed by one person.
holding nearly the entire interest, associating with himself two others
having only nominal interests. If, under each of such unlimited
number of corporate organizations and adopted names a new right
i> acquired to appropriate public lands, then the policy and purpose
of the law is violated, the limitation is nullified, and no limit exists as
to the area of land that one individual can acquire, save the total area
of the public lands and the means the individual can command.
Manifestly this is urging a legal fiction, in the words of Lord Mans-
field, "to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of
the fiction." The Department will not sanction it.
Your decision is affirmed.
arid land-withdrawal- v< t of june 17, h>02.
Opinion.
All entries of lands withdrawn under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902.
are subject to the conditions imposed 5y section ."> thereof, and a revocation
of the withdrawal operates to remove those conditions and leaves the
entries in the same situation as entries made prior to the withdrawal, and
such conditions can not. by force of a second withdrawal, he reimposed
upon such of the entries made during the period of the first withdrawal
as had not been perfected at the date of the second withdrawal.
Assistant Attorney General Campb< II t<> the Secretary of the Interior,
February 20,1906. (K. F. B.)
By order of the Department, dated April 20, 1903, lands within
the irrigable area of the contemplated Okanogan irrigation project
in the State of Washington, were withdrawn from entry, except
under the homestead law. tinder authority of section 3 of the reclama-
tion act of June IT. VMY2 (32 Stat.. 388)-, which provides that all
entries made under the homestead law7 , of lands within the limits
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of such withdrawal and during such withdrawal, shall be subject to
all the provisions, limitations, charges, terms, and conditions of the
act.
While this withdrawal was in force, certain entries were allowed
of lands within its limits. Subsequently (July 8, 1904) the with-
drawal was revoked, but afterward (August 23, 1905) the lands
were again withdrawn for use in the construction and operation of
the irrigation works under what is commonly known as the first form
of withdrawal.
A letter from the Director of the Geological Survey relative to
such withdrawal, with a report from the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office thereon, has been referred to me for opinion " as to
whether the entries made while the land was withdrawn under the
second form, from April 20, 1903, to July 8, 1904, are now subject
to limitations and restrictions of the reclamation act and should be
so treated in the classification of the irrigable lands under the
project."
As long as the withdrawal continued in force, the lands covered
thereby were subject to entry only under the conditions imposed by
the reclamation act. Those conditions attached by force of the stat-
ute to each and every entry allowed during the period of the with-
drawal. The revocation of the withdrawal of its own force subjected
the lands to entry and disposal under the general land laws free from
all conditions except such as are imposed by those laws and with
equal force removed the conditions prescribed by the reclamation
act that had attached to entries made during the withdrawal.
After the revocation of the withdrawal and while the lands for-
merly covered thereby were subject to disposal under the general
land laws, all entries of such lands whether made during the period
of withdrawal or after the revocation thereof, could have been per-
fected free from the conditions and limitations prescribed by the
third section of the reclamation act. The question now presented
is whether those conditions can, by force of a second withdrawal, be
re-imposed upon such of the entries made during the period of with-
drawal as had not been perfected during the restoration of the lands
to entry and disposal under the general land laws.
That such conditions cannot be imposed upon entries that were
made after the revocation of the withdrawal, is too plain to admit of
controversy. If the revocation of the withdrawal of its own force
subjected the lands to disposal under the general land laws and with
equal force removed the conditions that had attached to the entries
made during the period of withdrawal, the logical result must be
that these entries are to be treated as having been made prior to any
withdrawal.
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The effect of withdrawals made under the reclamation act upon
entries made prior to such withdrawals is thus stated in the fifth
paragraph of the instructions of June 6, 1905 (83 L. D., 607, 008) :
Withdrawals made under either of these forms do not defeat or adversely
affect any valid entry, location, or selection which segregated and withheld the
lands embraced therein from other forms of appropriation at the date of such
withdrawal ; and all entries, selections, or locations of that character should
be permitted to proceed to patent or certification upon due proof of compliance
with the law in the same manner and to the same extent to which they would
have proceeded had such withdrawal not been made, except as to lands needed
for construction purposes.
In his letter of January 8, 1906, the Director says
:
The township in question is located in the midst of the irrigable district,
and is the center of the active operations under the project ; in view of which
and upon recommendation of this office, the township was again withdrawn
by the Department August 23, 1905, under the first form of withdrawal.
He also states that the engineers are iioav at work classifying the
lands and desire to have an authoritative opinion as to the status
of the entries in question.
The status of the lands depends upon whether in fact they are
to be appropriated for use in the construction and operation of
the works. If they are, all of such lands to which a vested right
had not attached at the date of the last withdrawal will be subject
to appropriation for such uses. If they are not, they will not be
affected by the mere technical form of withdrawal, and should be
permitted to proceed to patent or certificate upon compliance with
the law as directed in the instructions above referred to.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
McKibben e. Gable.
Motion for review of departmental decision of October 18, 1905,
34 L. D., 178, denied by Secretary Hitchcock February 20, 1906.
coal land-declaratory statement-preferexce right.
Lehmer v. Carroll et al. (On Review.)
Where an association of four persons has expended not less than five thousand
dollars in working and improving a mine or mines of coal on the public
lands such association, in the absence of any prior or superior claim,
may enter under the coal land laws not exceeding six hundred and forty
acres, including such mining improvements, even though no declaratory
statement may have been filed for the lands.
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The object and purpose of a declaratory statement under section 2349 of the
Revised Statutes are to give notice of, and to preserve for the period speci-
fied in section 2350, a preference right of entry already acquired under sec-
tion 2348 ; and such preference right of entry is not created or initiated by
the tiling of a declaratory statement.
If the privilege of postponing entry in the manner provided by sections 2341)
and 2350, after a preference right of entry shall have been acquired under
section 2348, be not desired by the claimant, the filing of a declaratory
statement before application or entry is not necessary or required ; and
in such case, even if the claimant should fail to make application to enter
and to pay for the lands within the sixty days allowed by section 2349
for filing a declaratory statement, neither the failure in this respect nor
failure to file a declaratory statement would operate to forfeit the right
to purchase and enter the lands except in favor of some other qualified
applicant.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) February 20, 1906. (A. B. P.)
This is a motion by Frank W. Lehmer for review of departmental
decision of Xovember 10, 1905, in the case of Lehmer v. Carroll
et al. (34 L. D., 207), wherein the application by Carroll et al. to
purchase under the coal land laws (sections 2347 to 2352, inclusive,
of the Kevised Statutes) certain described public lands, aggregat-
ing six hundred acres, situated in the Bozeman land district, State
of Montana, was sustained and the protest by Lehmer against said
application was dismissed. For convenience of reference the fol-
lowing extracts from said decision are here quoted
:
The application itself under oath, was accompanied by the separate indi-
vidual affidavits of the applicants and two other persons. In these papers it is
set forth in substance that the lands applied for are of the class and character
subject to sale under the coal land laws, that the applicants are severally quali-
fied to purchase, and apply to purchase, as an association under section 2348, and
that they have expended the sum of $8,000, in developing and improving mines
of coal on the lands.
With the application to purchase' were presented what purport to be deeds
of release and quitclaim to the associated applicants, embracing, severally,
portions of the lands applied for, and for which the persons who executed the
deeds had, respectively, previously filed coal declaratory statements, under sec-
tion 2349. From the official records it appeared that other declaratory state-
ments had been filed covering portions of the lands. The local officers there-
upon notified the coal declarants, as well those from whom deeds of release and
quitclaim had been obtained, as those who did not appear to have released their
claims, that they would be allowed until December 28, 1903, to show cause, if
any they could, why the associated applicants should not be permitted to pur-
chase and enter the lands applied for. None of the parties so notified ever
appeared in the proceedings.
December 26, 1903, one Frank W. Lehmer, a stranger to the record, filed
his sworn protest, corroborated by the affidavit of one H. H. Griffith against
the application to purchase. On this protest a hearing was had at which the
protestant submitted the testimony of one witness. The applicants introduced no
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evidence, but rested their ease upon the proofs filed in support of their appli-
cation to purchase and the cross-examination of the witness introduced by the
protesta nt.****** *
In his protest Lelnner asserts no right, or claim of right, in himself to any of
the binds embraced in the application to purchase. He does not deny that the
lands arc chiefly valuable for coal and in other respects subject to sale under
the coal land laws. Ilis charges are, in substance and effect, (1) that no
preference right of entry was acquired by any of the parties from whom the
applicants obtained deeds of release and quitclaim to themselves of the lands
covered by the declaratory statements filed by said parties, respectively, because
none of them ever opened and improved any coal mine or mines on the lands;
wherefore the declaratory statements were illegal and of no effect, and conse-
quently no rights were conveyed by such deeds, (2) that the applicants to pur-
chase had not themselves, either collectively or individually, prior to the time
of filing their application, or at any time, opened and improved any coal mine
upon any of the lands applied for other than the SE. i of the SYY. | and the SE. i
of the NE. i of Sec. 10, T. 5 S., R. 23 E., and (8) that the applicants to purchase
had not, either as an association or as individuals, expended the sum of $5,000
in working and improving any mine or mines of coal on any of the lands
applied for.
It is not denied that the decision correctly represents the matters
set forth in the proofs and papers submitted with the application to
purchase, the proceedings had with respect to the prior coal declara-
tory statements, and the charges contained in Lehmer's protest.
The Department held ( 1 ) that the prior coal declarants having
failed to appear as required by the notice given them were thereafter
out of the case, and, the record being thus cleared of all claims to the
lands other than that asserted by the associated applicants to pur-
chase, it could make no material difference whether the coal declara-
tory statements were valid or not; (2) that it was not essential to
the validity of the application to purchase that the associated appli-
cants should have opened and improved a mine or mines of coal on
the several tracts applied for, it appearing from the proofs that a
coal mine had been opened and improved on one of said tracts; and
(3) that on the question of the amount expended in working and
improving such coal mine the testimony at the hearing did not
weaken but tended to strengthen the showing made by the application
and proofs.
The main contention in the motion for review is that inasmuch as
the associated applicants to purchase had themselves filed no declara-
tory statement for the lands applied for, if the declaratory statements
by the prior claimants from whom deeds of release and quitclaim
had been obtained were invalid, a matter which upon the record was
held to be immaterial, said applicants had no preference right under
any declaratory statement, and' for that reason could not enter more
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than 320 acres of coal lands: wherefore the Department erred in
sustaining the application in this case.
Section 2347 of the Revised Statutes provides that
:
Every person above the age of twenty-one years, who is a citizen of the
United States, or who has declared his intention to become such, or any asso-
ciation of persons severally qualified as above, shall, upon application to the
register of the proper land office, have the right to enter, by legal subdivisions,
any quantity of vacant coal lands of the United States not otherwise appro-
priated or reserved by competent authority, not exceeding one hundred and
sixty acres to each individual person, or three hundred and twenty acres to
such association, upon payment to the receiver of not less than ten dollars per
acre for such lands, where the same shall be situated more than fifteen miles
from any completed railroad, and not less than twenty dollars per acre for such
lands as shall be within fifteen miles of such road.
By section 234S it is provided that
:
Any person or association of persons severally qualified, as above provided, who
have opened and improved, or shall hereafter open and improve, any coal mine
or mines upon the public lands, and shall be in actual possession of the same,
shall be entitled to a preference right of entry, under the preceding section, of
the mines so opened and improved: Provided, That when any association of
not less than four persons, severally qualified as above provided, shall have
expended not less than five thousand dollars in working and improving any
such mine or mines, such association may enter not exceeding six hundred
and forty acres, including such mining improvements.
It is further provided by section 2349 that all claims under the
preceding section (2348) must be presented to the register of the
proper land district within sixty days after the date of actual posses-
sion and the commencement of improvements on the land, by the
filing of a declaratory statement therefor, and by section 2350, that
all persons claiming under section 2348 shall prove their respective
rights and pay for the lands filed upon within one year from the
time prescribed for filing their claims, and that failure to do so
shall render the lands subject to entry by any other qualified appli-
cant.
It is argued that these sections of the statute furnish no authority
for the entry, by an association of four persons, of more than three
hundred and twenty acres of coal lands, notwithstanding the expendi-
ture by or on behalf of the association of the full amount required
by section 2348 in working and improving a mine or mines of coal
on the lands, unless the association shall have first filed a declaratory
statement under section 2349 for the lands sought to be entered, or
shall have acquired rights under declaratory statements filed by
others for the lands; and this, even though there be no conflicting
claim to the lands at the time the application to enter and the proofs
to support the same are filed. In other words, that before an asso-
ciation of four persons may lawfully enter six hundred acres of
coal lands, the amount involved in this case, such association must
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show a right of entry under one or several declaratory statements
under section 2349.
No authority is cited to support the contention, and the Depart-
ment knows of none; nor is there anything in the statute to warrant
the construction contended for. The provisions that bear upon the
question are very simple and present no matters of intricate or doubt-
ful solution. The persistency with which the contention is urged,
both in the motion for review and in the brief of counsel accompany-
ing it, is difficult to understand except upon the theory of a misappre-
hension of the office or function of a coal declaratory statement.
The preference right of entry provided for in section 2348 is not,
nor indeed is any right of entry, created, or initiated, by the filing of
a declaratory statement under section 2341). Such preference right
arises only where a person or association of persons, severally quali-
fied to enter under section 2347, have opened and improved a mine
or mines of coal upon the public lands, and are in actual possession
of the same. The object and purpose of the declaratory statement
are to give notice of, and to preserve for the period specified in sec-
tion 2350, a preference right of entry already acquired. In other
words, the office of a declaratory statement is to preserve the right,
not to create it. (McKibben v. Gable, 34 L. I)., ITS.)
The declaratory statement is useful and has a purpose to serve
only where time is desired within which to make payment for the
lands, as to which a preference right of entry exists, and to complete
the entry proceedings. In such a case the declaratory statement
gives notice of the right and operates to preserve it for the period
specified in section 2350. It has no other function under the statute.
Such being the only purpose of the statute in providing for the
filing of a declaratory statement it must be apparent that where there
is no such purpose to serve, no declaratory statement is required.
What would be the reason or sense of requiring a declaratory state-
ment in a case where its filing would be but a vain thing?
It can make no difference whether the application to enter be by
an individual person for one hundred and sixty acres, or by an asso-
ciation of persons for three hundred and twenty acres; or that the
application be for six hundred and forty acres by an association of
not less than four persons who have expended $5,000 or over in
working and improving a coal mine upon the lands. The principle
is the same in all cases. If the privilege of postponing entry in the
manner provided by sections 2349 and 2350, after a preference right
of entry shall have been acquired under section 2348, be not desired
by the claimants, the filing of a declaratory statement before appli-
cation or entry is not necessary and is not required. And, in such
a case, even were the claimants to fail to make application to enter
and to pay for the lands within the sixty days allowed by section
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2349 for filing the declaratory statement, neither their failure in
this respect nor their failure to Hie a declaratory statement would
operate 1 to forfeit their right to purchase and enter the lands except
in favor of some other qualified applicant. Their preference right
of entry would be gone, but the forfeiture provided by section 2350,
upon failure to file a proper declaratory statement, or to pay for the
lands within the required period, would operate only to render the
lauds subject to entry by another qualified applicant. In the absence
of any other qualified applicant there would be no forfeiture been use
there would be no one in whose favor the forfeiture could operate;
and there is nothing in the statute that would prevent the claimants,
as between themselves and the government, from paying for and
entering the lands, provided the law be complied with in other
respects. Such is in substance the holding in the decision complained
of, and the holding is clearly right. Any other construction would
not only give rise to confusion but would be contrary to the spirit
and plain intent of the statute.
It is further contended that there was error in refusing to order
another hearing in the premises upon the recent proceedings insti-
tuted by Lehmer and one B. W. Metheny, referred to and set out in
the latter part of said decision. The action in this respect was
clearly justified by the facts and circumstances disclosed by the
record, and is adhered to.
There are other minor contentions presented by the motion for
review, all relating, however, to matters heretofore fully considered
by the Department. It is unnecessary to here set them out in detail.
It is sufficient to say as to them that the Department is not convinced
of any error in its former decision. The motion for review is accord-
ingly denied.
uintah indian reservation—extension of time within which
to establish residence-act of january 27, lj)oc>.
Instructions.
Department of the Interior.
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C. February 20. 1906.
Register and Receiver.
Vernal, Utah
.
Gentlemen: Your attention is invited to the act of Congress ap-
proved January 27. 1906 (Public—Xo. 7), which provides:
That the homestead settlers on lands which were heretofore a part of the
Uinta Indian reservation, within the counties of Uinta and Wasatch, in the
State of Utah, opened under the acts of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred
and two. and March third, nineteen hundred and three, and March third, nine-
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teen hundred and five, be. and they are hereby, granted an extension of time in
which to establish their residence upon the lands so opened and filed upon until
the fifteenth day of May, anno Domini nineteen hundred and six: Provided,
however, That this act shall in no manner affect the regularity or validity of
such filings, or any of them, so made by the said settlers on the lands aforesaid ;
and it is only intended hereby to extend the time for the establishment of such
residence as herein provided, and the provisions of said acts are in no other
manner to be affected or modified.
This act is given effect as to all entries made of said lands prior to
November 15, 190;").
Soldiers and sailors who have filed declaratory statements under
section 2309 of the Revised Statutes come within the spirit of the re-
lief granted by the act, and where such declaratory statement has been
filed before November 15, 1905, are entitled to the extension, both as
to settlement and entry.
Very respectfully, W. A. Richards, commissioner.
Approved :
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
DESERT LANDS—STATE SELECTION—ACTS OF AUGUST 18, 1894, VXD
JUNE 17, 1902.
Yakima Development Co. v. State or Washington.
The Department declines to approve the application of the State of Washington
for the segregation of certain lands in that State under the provisions of the
act of August IS, 1804. known as the Carey act, and further declines to
adopt the suggestion of. the State to the effect that the government proceed
with the reclamation of the lands, which fall within the irrigable area of a
contemplated irrigation project under the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902. and, after reclamation shall have been accomplished under the pro-
posed project, to allow the State the benefits thereof as though performed
by it under the provisions of the Carey act.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
(F. L. C.) February 23, 1906. (G. B. G.)
By departmental decision of May 5, 1905 (not reported), your
office decision herein of October IT, 1904, dismissing the protest
of The Yakima Development Company against the application
made by the State of Washington, on behalf of the Washington
Irrigation Company, for the segregation of 55,584.99 acres of land,
list Xo. 7, under the provisions of the act of August 18, 1894 (28
Stat., 372, 422), known as the Carey act, and acts amendatory
thereof, was affirmed.
That decision was put upon the ground mainly that it was not
shown that the protestant company had such rights in the premises
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as called for a denial of the State's application, and your office
was directed to submit the same for departmental approval.
Your office submitted the application in accordance with this
direction, but there having in the meantime arisen certain prob-
lems affecting* the reclamation of the lower Yakima basin, in con-
nection with the administration of the act of June 17, 1902 (32
Stat., 388), known as the reclamation act, it devolves upon the
Department to consider whether the Secretary of the Interior would
be justified in entering into a contract with the State for the recla-
mation of the lands here involved under the act of August 18,
1894, supra.
In this case the State proposes to reclaim 55,584.99 acres of land.
It is asserted by the State and not disputed that the Washington
Irrigation Company has a water location or locations on the Yak-
ima River sufficient to reclaim this land, but the data collected
by the reclamation service raise grave doubts as to whether there
is sufficient water in the stream in the latter part of the summer
and early fall to satisfy its claimed appropriations. It is further
suggested that said company will not be permitted to appropriate
this water to a beneficial use, except after litigation with many
other appropriators and irrigators, and in any event, if it succeed
in this litigation, the result will be to remit large bodies of lands
now irrigated from the waters of this river to their desert condi-
tion to the irreparable injury of a large number of people. Be-
sides, it appears that a large portion of the lands covered by the
State's scheme are of the alternate even-numbered sections within
the limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
and the Department questions whether it will not be a misuse of
the AAaters of this stream to attempt to irrigate a checker-board area.
If it be suggested that the State may contract for the irrigation of
its lands, the answer is that there is not sufficient water in the
river as now conserved, or as may be conserved under the State's
scheme, to accomplish this end. Besides, the railroad company,
through its land commissioner, has expressed to this Department
the opinion that the best interests of all concerned demand that
the United States reclamation service be given full opportunity to
investigate and determine the best method of further developing
the irrigation possibilities of the valley named, and that in the
meantime the existing status of all lands, whether public or pri-
vate, falling within the government's project should be main-
tained, thus showing that the company had no intention at this
time of entering into a contract other than such as might be entered
into with the United States for the reclamation of its lands. More-
over, it is not shown that the State has an enforceable contract
with the irrigation company for the utilization of such water supply
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as the company may in law and fact own. So far as appears from
this record, or so far as the Department has been able to ascer-
tain, the company has merely agreed to enter into a contract with
the State to reclaim these lands, and the agreement provides for
a nominal forfeit of $'250 in case the company " fails to so con-
tract." It thus appears that the damages which might grow out
of the failure of the company to execute the contract in question
have been definitely ascertained by agreement of the parties, and
it seems clear that upon such failure the company's liability could
be satisfied by the payment of the sum named, and it appearing
that said company has agreed to sell its properties, including the
water rights in question, to the United States, the conclusion seems
justified that said company considers its agreement with the State
at an end, and that it does not intend to enter into a formal contract
for the reclamation of these lands.
Upon the other hand, the United States reclamation service pur-
poses, if it be given full opportunity in this valley, to reclaim, by
impounding the flood waters in certain natural basins, a much larger
area than is possible by the State under its proposed scheme. The
government's engineers report that this project is feasible, that suffi-
cient funds are available for its accomplishment, and the reclamation
service assures the Department that it will be undertaken at an early
date, unless the proposed contract be made with the State, in which
event it is said with considerable reason that the government's project
must be abandoned.
The preliminary surveys for the government's project have been
executed and a withdrawal of the lands necessary in the maintenance
of the proposed storage reservoirs was made more than a year ago.
But it is now contended on behalf of the State, though it was not
so urged or said in the earlier presentation of this matter, that the
State's scheme for the reclamation of these lands under the Carey act,
and the government's Yakima Valley project, which includes them,
may stand together; that a segregation thereof may be made under
the Carey act, and the contract therein authorized between the State
and the Secretary of the Interior executed, and that the reclamation
service may still proceed to reclaim the lands for the State, and thus
give the State the benefit of certain charges which may be assessed
against them under the Carey act, to be used by the State in the
reclamation of other lands.
This contention has been most carefully considered, not only
because it is novel, but because it was earnestly hoped that the Depart-
ment might see a way to allow it. But it is not believed that this
can be done. Not only are grave doubts entertained as to the legality
of such procedure, but it is not thought as a matter of administrative
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policy that this Department would be justified in approving this very
complicated, questionable, and perhaps impracticable scheme, which
in the end would necessarily result in the patenting to the State of a
large body of lands which will not have been reclaimed by the State,
but which in fact will have been reclaimed by the United States.
The difficulties presented upon the whole case are believed to be
insuperable, and therefore fatal to the State's contention.
The Secretary of the Interior is charged by section 441 of the
Revised Statutes with the supervision of the public business relating
to the public lands. This means, as said by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Knight v. Land Association ( 112
U. S., 161, ITT), that in the administration of the trusts devolving
upon the government, by reason of the laws of Congress, that officer
" is the supervising agent of the Government to do justice to all
claimants and preserve the rights of the people of the United States."
Under all the circumstances of this case, looking to what is con-
ceived to be the best interests of the whole people, and in the exer-
cise of the discretion thus vested in the Secretary of the Interior, I
must decline to enter into the proposed contract with the State,
and the State's list is hereAvith returned without my approval.
desert land entry-suspension—contest.
Whitman v. Hume.
A contest against a desert-land entry, based solely upon the ground that the
land is non-desert in character, may properly be entertained during sus-
pension of the entry ; but a contest charging that the entryman has failed
to comply with the requirements of the law should not be entertained
during such period where the suspension becomes effective prior to the
expiration of the statutory life of the entry.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) February 23, 1906. (E. O. P.)
Dalton Whitman has appealed to the Department from your office
decision of November 10, 1905, dismissing his contest against the
desert land entry of Sadie A. Hume for the E. J NE. J, SW. \ NE. J,
Sec. 23, T. 19 N., R. 3 E., Greatfalls land district, Montana.
The entry in question was made March 2, 1901, and by direction of
your office suspended October 8, 1903, which suspension remains un-
revoked. Contest affidavit was filed February 7, 1905, and notice
issued, service of which was made, as shown by the return, February
11, 1905. At the final hearing, April 6, 1905, claimant asked that the
contest be dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the part of the local
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officers to entertain a contest initiated during the term of suspension.
The motion was overruled and testimony was submitted on behalf
of the parties.
As a basis of the contest it is charged in the affidavit filed that
claimant
—
has not complied with the desert land law : there is no water on the land, no
ditches built, no system of irrigation to reclaim the same ; that said land is not
desert in character hut will raise good crops without irrigation; that claimant
has not expended the sum of $1.00 per acre each year for three years.
Your office found that the action of the local officers in denying
the motion to dismiss the contest was correct, and considered all the
testimony introduced touching the contest charges.
The manifest object of the suspension of the entry in question was
to ascertain the character of the land in order to determine whether
it was properly subject to entry under the desert-land law. This
question is one going directly to the validity of the entry in its incep-
tion, and one which, in the interest of both the government and the
claimant, should be determined with as little delay as possible.
Especially does the interest of a claimant demand an early determi-
nation of this question that his rights may be definitely fixed and his
subsequent expenditure of labor and money in the required improve-
ment of the land protected. Improvements made upon land after-
wards declared to be non-desert in character, though ample under the
requirements of the desert land law, would not render an entry made
under that law valid, for if such entry was invalid because of the
non-desert character of the land, no act of the claimant performed in
an attempted compliance with the law would prevent cancellation, as
an entry of land not desert in character is unauthorized by the
desert-land law and is not merely voidable but absolutely void.
Therefore justice demands the speedy ascertainment of the character
of the land, and the rights of a claimant are not prejudiced by per-
mitting, at any time, the initiation of a contest for that purpose, as
his rights remain the same whether the object of the suspension be
accomplished either by contest or hearing ordered on behalf of the
government. It is clear, therefore, as announced in departmental
decision in the case of Porter v. Carlile, dated January !), 1906 (34
L. D., 361), that contest based solely upon the ground that the land
is non-desert in character may properly be entertained during the
suspension of the entry.
As time does not run against an entry during its suspension, the
rule cannot be intended to permit contests against entries suspended
prior to the expiration of the statutory life thereof, based upon alle-
gations of non-compliance with the law. (See departmental de-
cision of January 31, 1906, in the case of Langer v. Wasman, 34 L. D.,
426.)
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It is clear, therefore, your office and the local office erred in consid-
ering any testimony offered in support of the allegations charging
failure on the part of claimant to comply with the provisions of the
desert-land law, but properly passed upon the testimony touching
the character of the land. In the case of Porter v. Carlile, supra, two
grounds of contest were joined in the affidavit and the Department,
without specifically finding that one of the grounds alleged was suf-
ficient basis for contest, denied the jurisdiction of the local officers.
However, in that case the local officers found that the land was desert
in character and the only valid ground of contest was thus refuted,
and the jurisdiction of the local officers denied upon the other ground
alleged.
In cases where other counts are joined with an allegation of non-
desert character of the land, as a basis for contest against suspended
entries, the local officers in order to prevent the introduction of irrele-
vant testimony, might properly require contestants to strike from the
affidavits all allegations not going to the character of the lands.
In the case at bar the testimony tends to support the concurrent
findings of your office and the local office that the land covered b/y the
entry is desert in character, and as no other question is in issue, the
contest should be dismissed. The character of the land having been
determined favorably to the claimant, the suspension as to the land
embraced in her entry should be revoked and she permitted to pro-
ceed with the perfection of her entry.
For the reasons herein stated, the action of your office dismissing
the contest of Whitman is hereby affirmed.
A certified copy of final proof submitted by claimant since the
hearing accompanies the record transmitted, but as this is no part of
the contest proceedings and not properly before the Department at
this time, no consideration will be given thereto.
FOREST RESERVE-LIEU SELE( TION—AC TS OF MARCH 8, 1905, AND
JUNE 4, 1897.
W. E. Moses Land Scrip and Realty Company.
Where at the date of the act of March 3, 1905, repealing the exchange provi-
sions of the act of June 1, 1897, no selection had been made in lieu of lands
within n forest reserve relinquished to the United States in accordance
with the provisions of the act of 1897, the land department is without
authority to now permit such selection to he made.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) February U, 1906. (J. K. W.)
The W. E. Moses Land Scrip and Realty Company, hereinafter
styled the selector, appealed from your decision of April 18, 1905,
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rejecting its application (your office docket A., 615), under the act
of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat,, 36), to select the NW. i of the NW. J, Sec.
29, T. 25 N., R. 36 E., N. M. M., Clayton, New Mexico, in lieu of the
SE. ] of the NW. J, Sec. 32, T. 10 N., R. 13 E., N. M. M., in the Lin-
coln forest reserve, Lincoln county, New Mexico, relinquished to the
United States.
March 30, 1905, the selector filed its application, which, for pur-
poses of this decision, is assumed, but not decided, to be in strict com-
pliance with existing rules and regulations respecting the forms of
proof of the character and condition of the land selected required in
such proceedings. Therewith was filed a duly authenticated abstract
of the selector's title to the base tract, showing that patent of the
United States was issued January 18, 1896, for the base tract and
other lands to John H. Phillips, who, with his wife, conveyed that
title, December 17, 1904, to the selector, which, January 12, 1905,
filed in the proper record office its deed, in due form, relinquishing
the title to the United States, in consideration of the act of June 4,
1897, supra, and the right thereunder " to select in lieu thereof a
tract of vacant land open to settlement. " The abstract of title shows
that the land was at the time free of all other claim of title, tax, or
other incumbrance, and the recorded deed of relinquishment was
filed with the abstract of title and application for selection. You
rejected the application solely because the act of June 4, 1897. was
repealed by the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1264), which enacted:
That the acts of June fourth, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, June sixth,
nineteen hundred, and March third, nineteen hundred and one, are hereby re-
pealed so far as they provide for the relinquishment, selection, and patenting of
lands in lieu of tracts covered by an unperfected bona fide claim or patent
within a forest reserve, hut the validity of the contracts entered into by the
Secretary of the Interior prior to the passage of this act shall not be impaired
:
Provided, That selections heretofore made in lieu of lands relinquished to the
United States may be perfected and patents issue therefor the same as though
this act had not been passed, and if for any reason not the fault of the party
making the same any pending selection is held invalid another selection for a
like quantity of land may be made in lieu thereof.
The rejection of the selection is claimed to be erroneous, and the
effect of the act of March 3, 1905, is the sole question here considered.
Counsel in argument say
:
Where a base tract was reconveyed to the United States prior to March 3.
1905, the first and most essential requirement of the exchange act of June 4,
1897, has been fulfilled, in consequence of which the Government must have en-
tered into an implied contract then and there to complete the transaction when-
ever thereafter a proper lieu tract is designated and applied for ; and this par-
tial performance prior to the repeal binds the United States .... to
complete the exchange and give value received for the reconveyance; the re-
fusal to complete the exchange would be tantamount to the repudiation by the
United States of its own solemn agreement. . . . The partial performance
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and the surrender of the consideration by the selector prior to the repeal does
not bar his right to receive from the United States the equivalent guaranteed
by the act of June 4, 1807 ; in other words, that partial performance by the
moving party in the transaction entitles him to the completion of the terms of
the contract by the United States. . . . The forest lieu laws are repealed
"so far as they provide for the relinquishment, selection and patenting of lands
in lieu of tracts," &c. The relinquishment and patenting are taken in con-
junction. Palpably no lands may be relinquished after the date of the act.
But where a relinquishment had previously been made, it may be inferred that
Congress intended, notwithstanding the absence of express unambiguous terms,
to except such initiated claims against the United States from the operation of
the statute of repeal.
The act of March 3, 1905, repeals not merely the invitation to pri-
vate owners to relinquish their lands, but all the other provisions
looking to an exchange. An exchange is essentially a single con-
tract. The rights in the things exchanged mutually vest at the
same point of time. Lessieur v. Price (12 How., 59, 74). While
the regulations under the act of June L, 1897, require the private
owner of such lands to record his deed and to prepare and file an
abstract and deed at the time he makes his selection, it can not
be held that good equitable right to the land relinquished passes to
the United States by record of the d^ed, for some officer of the United
States must examine the title, pass upon its sufficiency, and accept it.
Cosmos Company v. Gray Eagle Company (190 U. S., 301, 312).
It is a general principle in the law of real estate that title does not
pass until the deed is delivered to the grantee. Though acceptance
of a title conveyed is, under some circumstances, presumed from its
being beneficial to the grantee, it will be seen from examination of
such cases that there was a lapse of time with an entry into posses-
sion by the grantee, or other evidence of circumstances raising a
presumption of the grantee's acceptance of the conveyance. Xo case
is cited, and none has been found by the Department, where accept-
ance of a conveyance of title is presumed from mere filing of the
conveyance for record by the grantor. If the grantee is bound to
render an equivalent or consideration for the conveyance, it is mani-
fest that to hold the grantee obligated to pay a consideration where
he has not received the conveyance is unsound in principle as creat-
ing a contract which the grantee never actually considered or deter-
mined to enter into.
The act of June 4, 1897, was a mere proposal for an exchange. Xo
contract arises until a selection is made and the conveyance of the
base tract is filed in the land department. Until it is so filed the
United States can know nothing of it, and no officer authorized to
act on part of the United States can determine whether such pro-
posed exchange can be approved or not. There is not only no con-
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tract, but no existent facts from which a contract of exchange can
arise. It all rests solely in the one mind of the private owner as
something he merely contemplates doing, and there can be for that
reason no concourse of two minds, which is essential to the relation
of contract. Under the act of June 1, 1897, it is the filing of the
deed in the local land office and the selection of land in lieu of that
relinquished which initiates the exchange. Until that time the
exchange is not initiated, and is merely a purpose in the private
owner's intent.
A proposal may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. That
the act of March 3, J *.)0r», was a withdrawal of the proposal of ex-
change hardly admits of question. Were it not so intended, the pro-
viso was wholly unnecessary. If it was intended that selections might
be made to satisfy all relinquishments of land made with intent in
future to make selections, then it was unnecessary to permit the per-
fecting of incomplete selections actually made, or to permit reselec-
tions upon bases assigned in previous ones that failed without the
selector's fault. The proviso necessarily implies that Congress in-
tended to withdraw its general proposal of exchange, and to limit
future selections to the specified excepted cases. Congress has plenary
power over the subject of disposals of public lands, and the land de-
partment is without authority to dispose of public lands unless
granted to it by Congress. If it assumed to do so, patents to lands
issued without authority of law would be mere nullities, conveying no
title. As held in Burfenning o. Chicago, St. Paul, &c. Railway Com-
pany (163 U. S., 321, 323) :
The action of the land department ran not override the express will of Con-
gress, or convey away public lands in disregard or defiance thereof. Smelting
Co. v. Kemp. 104 U. S., 630, 646 : Wright v. Roseberry, 121 IT. S., 488, 519 ; Doo-
lan v. Carr, 125 U. S., 618, 625; Davis's Adm'r v. Weibbold, 139 U. S., 507, 529;
Knight f. U. S. Land Association. 142 U. S., 161, 176; Morton v. Nebraska, 21
Wall., 660. 674.
The argument, based upon the supposed hardship and injustice of
withdrawing the proposal as to lands relinquished before date of the
repealing act. is one proper to be addressed to Congress, not to the
land department, which has no longer any power to allow an exchange,
nor yet power to reconvey the title to the relinquished land, if that
vested by record of the deed of relinquishment. Congress has the
matter under consideration in various bills, now pending before it.
This refutes the charge of injustice. No doubt Congress will afford a
remedy proper to the case.
Your decision is affirmed.
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mining claim-statute of limitations-section 23.32, i?. s.
Capital No. 5 Placer Mining Claim.
An applicant for patent to a mining claim who, invoking the provisions of sec-
tion 2: >>32 of the Revised Statutes, proves that he. or his grantors, has held
and worked the claim for the period of time prescribed by the local statutes
of limitation for mining claims, is not required to produce record evidence
of his location, or to give any reason for not producing such evidence.
Section 2332 simply declares what proof shall he sufficient to show possessory
title in an applicant for patent, in the absence of any adverse claim, and
does not dispense with the requirement of section 2325 of an expenditure of
five hundred dollars in labor or improvements upon the claim, as a pre-
requisite to the issuance of a patent.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Comm,issioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C. ) - February 27, 1906. ( A. B. P.
)
January 5, 1904, the Capital Mining Company made entry for the
Capital No. 5 placer mining claim, embracing the NE. \ of the NE. \,
Sec. 5, T. 15, and the SE.i of the NE. J, and E. \ of the. SE. J, Sec. 32,
T. 16, all in range 16 west, Harrison land district, Arkansas. From
the proofs upon which the entry was allowed it appears that the com-
pany, invoking the provisions of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes?
submitted evidence showing that it had held and worked the claim for
the period of three years—the time prescribed by the statute of limi-
tations for mining claims in the State of Arkansas—and had ex- i
pended the sum of $100 each year in working the claim.
By decision of November 11, 1904, your office held that the entry
was not warranted by the provisions of section 2332 of the Revised
Statutes, for the stated reasons, in substance, (1) that said section
j
applies only where the record of the mining location is imperfect, »
or has been lost, or where for some other reason possessory title
cannot be shown by record evidence, none of which conditions is
made to appear in this case; and (2) that said section does not do
away with the requirement of section 2325 of the expenditure by an
applicant for mineral patent of $500 in labor or improvements upon
the claim, which requirement has not been here met. The claimant
company was allowed sixty days from notice within which to show
cause why the entry should not be canceled, in default of which and
of appeal, it was stated the entry would be canceled without further
notice. The company has appealed.
The provisions of section 2332, here involved, are as follows:
Where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and
worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations for mining claims of the State or Territory where the same may
be situated, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such
period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this
chapter, in the absence of any adverse claim.
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1. There is nothing in this section to warrant the construction by
your office as to proof of possessory title in cases where applicants
for patent, or their grantors, have held and worked their claims for
the period of time prescribed by local statutes of limitation for
mining claims. All that is required in such a case to establish the
possessory title, in the absence of any adverse claim, is evidence
satisfactorily showing that the claim was so held and worked for
the time prescribed; and it can make no difference whether record
evidence of the location is in existence and might be furnished or
not. An applicant for patent who has made such showing is not
required to produce record evidence of his location, or to give any
reason for not producing such evidence. On this question the de-
cision of your office cannot be sustained. (Little Emily Mining
and Milling Company, 34 L. D., 182.)
2. But on the question of the amount of expenditure in labor or
improvements upon the claim, your office decision is clearly right.
Section 2332 simply declares the kind of proof that shall be sufficient,
where the stated conditions exist, to establish the possessor}' right in
an applicant for patent, in the absence of any adverse claim. The
section in no manner relates to or involves any other matter of
proof in patent proceedings, and does not dispense with the require-
ment of •action 2325 of an expenditure of $500 in labor or improve-
ments upon the claim as a prerequisite to the issuance of a patent.
(Barklage v. Russell, 29 L. D., 401; Lindley on Mines, p. 1274.)
The proofs in this case show the expenditure of only $300 upon the
claim, and for this reason the entry was improperly allowed, and
cannot be sustained. On this question the decision of your office is
affirmed. In other respects said decision is modified to conform to
the vieAvs herein expressed.
AFFIDAVIT OF CONTEST-CHARGE.
McMl LLEX V. PlRKEYPILE.
An affidavit of contest against a homestead entry, charging, in effect, that the
entrywoman had, since making entry, married and gone to reside with her
husband upon his uncompleted homestead entry, hut containing no charge
that she had abandoned her claim for more than six months prior to the
initiation of the contest, does not state facts sufficient to warrant cancella-
tion of the entry, and should not be entertained.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
(F. L. C.) February 27, 1906. (J. L. McC.)
Belle Purkeypile, on December 29, 1900, made homestead entry
for the S. i of the SE. J of Sec. 28, and the SW. J of the SW. I of
Sec. 27, T. 28 N., R. 16 W., Alva land district, Oklahoma.
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On October 5, 190;}, Burr McMullen filed affidavit of contest
against said entry, and on the next day filed an amended affidavit, the
latter of which alleged :
Said defendant since making said entry was married to one Charles M. Cline,
and is now living with him as his wife on the homestead entry of said Cline,
being homestead entry 11,374, made April 9, 1900, for lot 4 and SW. J of SW. J
of Sec. 1, and lot 1 and SE. J of NE. -| of See. 2, T. 27, R. 16, Woods County,
O. T., both of said entries being less than five years old, and both being intact
at the date of filing the original affidavit of contest herein, and are now intact.
At the hearing had in the case the defendant appeared by her attor-
ney, who demurred to said amended contest affidavit, on the ground
that it did not state facts sufficient to warrant the cancellation of the
entry. This demurrer was overruled, and testimony taken, as the
result of which the local officers found that the allegations of the
contest affidavit had been sustained, and they recommended the can-
cellation of the contested entry. The defendant offered no evidence,
but stood on her demurrer, and appealed.
Your office, by decision of May 8, 1905, sustained the action of the
local officers. Counsel for the defendant has filed an appeal to the
Department.
The appeal contends, in substance, that your office erred in not
holding that the local officers should have sustained the demurrer;
in not finding that the contest was filed prematurely ; in not holding
that the local officers erred in admitting testimony as to facts occur-
ring subsequently to the filing of the contest affidavit (to wit, that
the husband and wife, after the filing of the affidavit and up to the
hearing, continued to live together on his land) ; and in not finding
that they should be given the right to elect which of the two entries
they would hold. In his argument in support of the appeal counsel
says
:
We contend for nothing in this argument except that the contest was prema-
ture, and that the defendant and her husband have the right to elect which of
the two entries they would hold.
The basis of this contest was not the marriage of the woman, for
that is not cause for contest. But the basis was abandonment, follow-
ing the marriage. Section 2297 of the Revised Statutes authorizes
contests for abandonment only where the entryman has " abandoned
the land for more than six months." In this case it was neither al-
leged nor proven that the abandonment existed for " more than six
months," the proof showing the contrary.
The rulings of the Department on this point have been uniform and
numerous. In the case of Hay v. Yager et al. (10 L. D., 105), a con-
test affidavit was filed, alleging
:
That Yager had wholly abandoned said tract before the filing of the original
affidavit, by removing to the State of Indiana with the intention of permanently
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remaining there; that he had been residing in the State of Indiana since four
months prior to the filing of the original affidavit
:
the contention in that case being that such removal to the State of
Indiana, " with the intention of permanently remaining there." raised
a legal presumption that he had abandoned his claim in California
—
as in the case here under consideration it is contended that Mrs.
Cline's going to her husband's residence immediately upon her mar-
riage raised a legal presumption that she had abandoned her claim.
But in the Hay-Yager case the Department ruled:
Said affidavit was not sufficient. In order to sustain a contest against a home-
stead entry for abandonment it must be shown that such abandonment had con-
tinued for a period of six months; and as a consequence it must be so alleged
in the complaint.
To the same effect see Baxter v. Cross (2 L. D., 69) ; Bennett v.
Baxley (ib., 151) ; Hemsworth v. Holland (8 L. D.. 400) ; Miller v.
TTorner (27 L. D., 247) ; and many others.
In the case here under consideration, the contest affidavit did not
allege abandonment for six months, and the demurrer thereto should
have been sustained. When, upon the taking of the testimony, it was
found that it failed to show abandonment for six months prior to
the initiation of contest, said contest should have been dismissed.
The action of your office in holding the defendant's entry for can-
cellation under the circumstances set forth was erroneous, and is
herebv reversed.
desert land entry—improvements.
Instructions.
The act of March 3, 1891, contemplates that the expenditures made upon a
desert land entry in compliance with the requirements of section 5 thereof
shall be for permanent improvements necessary to the irrigation, reclama-
tion and cultivation of the land, and as residence upon a desert land entry
is not required, the erection of a dwelling-house thereon is not a permanent
improvement in contemplation of the act.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C,
)
February 27, 1906. ( A. W. P.
)
The Department is in receipt of your office letter of February 5,
190G, directing attention to the case of John W. Bill (20 L. D., 61),
wherein it is held (syllabus) that
—
The cost of fencing may be properly shown as an expenditure authorized
under section 5 of the desert land act of March 3, 1891
;
to the case of Frederick H. Weltner (Ibid., 81), holding (syllabus)
that—
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The proof of annual expenditure in permanent improvements upon the land,
required under the desert land act of March 3, 1891, may properly embrace
money expended for fencing the tract involved
;
and the case of Holcomb v. Scott (33 L. D., 287), wherein are enu-
merated, as among the improvements on claimant's desert-land entry,
a
ww
substantial two-story house " and " a stable sufficient to house
eight or ten head of stock," and in conclusion gives expression to the
opinion that the improvements placed on the land " were far above
the average."
The above reference was made preliminary to calling attention to
the departmental decision in the case of Holcomb v. Williams (33
L. D., 547), holding, inter alia, that the expenditure made in the
erection of a dwelling-house on such an entry can not properly be
considered as compliance with the requirement of the desert-land law
in the matter of permanent improvements.
Finding it difficult, as you state, to harmonize this holding in the
case of Holcomb y. Williams, supra, with the said former depart-
mental rulings and the practice of your office from and after the
passage of the act of March 3, 1891 (20 Stat,, 1095), in effect deter-
mining that, if fencing may be considered a permanent improvement,
as therein contemplated, the same status could not be denied as to a
dwelling-house, you ask to be advised as to the scope intended to be
given this latter decision, and whether it was intended to overrule
former holdings, and limit the allowance for expenditures on desert-
land entries to the necessary acts performed in the furtherance of the
scheme of contemplated irrigation of the lands so entered.
The act of March 3, 1891, supra, added five sections—numbered
from four to eight, inclusive—to the original desert-land act of
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377). Section 5 of said amendatory act
provides as follows:
That no land shall be patented to any person under this act unless he or his
assignors shall have expended in the necessary irrigation, reclamation, and cul-
tivation thereof, by means of main canals and branch ditches, and in permanent
improvements upon the land, and in the purchase of water rights for the
irrigation of the same, at least three dollars per acre of whole tract reclaimed
and patented in the manner following : Within one year after making entry
for such tract of desert land as aforesaid, the party so entering shall expend
not less than one dollar per acre for the purposes aforesaid ; and he shall in
like manner expend the sum of one dollar per acre during the second and also
during the third year thereafter, until the full sum of three dollars per acre
is so expended. Said party shall file during each year with the register, proof,
by the affidavits of two or more credible witnesses, that the full sum of one
dollar per acre has been expended in such necessary improvements during such
year, and the manner in which expended, and at the expiration of the third
year a map or plan showing the character and extent of such improvements.
If any party who has made such application shall fail during any year to file
the testimony aforesaid, the lands shall revert to the United States, and the
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twenty-five cents advanced payment shall be forfeited to the United States,
and the entry shall be canceled. Nothing herein contained shall prevent a
claimant from making his final entry and receiving his patent at an earlier
date than hereinbefore prescribed, provided that he then makes the required
proof of reclamation to the aggregate extent ol three dollars per acre : Provided,
That proof be further required of the cultivation of one-eighth of the land.
It is to be observed that the object of this law is to provide a
method for reclaiming unappropriated, non-segregated public land,
arid or desert in character. The above section in part provides that,
in order to secure patent therefor, at least three dollars per acre must
be expended in the purchase of water rights, necessary irrigation by
means of canals and ditches, in permanent improvements thereon,
and in the required cultivation of such an entry; and that within
three years the entryman must submit annual proofs showing that
the full sum of one dollar per acre has been expended in such
necessary improvements during each of said years.
Thus it appears that this expenditure must be for purposes neces-
sary to the irrigation, reclamation and required cultivation of the
land. To this end, water-rights must be secured, and canals, branch
and lateral ditches constructed sufficient to distribute the water to
the several minor legal subdivisions. In order to protect this work
of construction and subsequent cultivation, as has been uniformly
held by this Department, fencing is a permanent, and presumably a
necessary, improvement. The same may also be said of a barn and
well, sufficient to house and care for stock needed in the accomplish-
ment of such an undertaking.
Residence on such an entry, however, is not required by the desert-
land law, and it would not seem, therefore, nor has the Department
ever so held, that the erection of a dwelling-house theron would be
considered as a necessary permanent improvement in contemplation
of this act. In the case of Holcomb v. Scott, supra, the only material
question presented for consideration was as to whether such an entry-
man, who became the owner of improvements placed upon the land
by a prior entryman in compliance with the requirements of the
desert-land law, was entitled to credit for such improvement the same
as if placed thereon by himself. The character or sufficiency of the
improvements was in no way questioned. It is true that the house
was enumerated with other improvements, consisting of a twenty-
eight foot well, curbed up and supplied with a windlass: a stable
sufficient to house eight to ten head of stock; tract fenced on one
side, with posts supplied in part for the other sides; that about twenty
acres of the land had been thoroughly cleared of sage brush and about
fifteen acres leveled ; that water had been secured from a company op-
erating and maintaining a large canal, and ten acres irrigated and
cultivated to crop one season. In view of the fact that the entry was
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but for forty acres, it was found that these necessary improvements
were far above the average, and that good faith was manifest.
In the case of Holcomb v. Williams. .suj>r<{. proof was offered, and
by your office approved, setting forth that claimant had, during the
first, second, and third years, made the improvements required by the
desert-land law, specifying in each case a house only, which he had
built on the land during the time lie had held the. same under the
homestead law. As a result of evidence adduced at the hearing
held on Holcomb 's contest, however, it was disclosed that other
and necessary improvements had been made on the tract sufficient to
meet the requirement as to annual expenditures, aside from the
dwelling-house, which, it was directly held, could not in this respect
properly be considered as compliance with the desert-land act.
While it is not disclosed from an examination of the reported de-
cisions that this question had ever been before the Department for
consideration prior thereto, yet, in so holding, it was not intended,
nor does it appear, as herein indicated, to in any way modify the
former decisions allowing the enumeration of the cost of fencing, as
well as any other necessary permanent improvements, in the proof
of annual expenditures required by the said act contemplating the
irrigation and reclamation of vacant public arid or desert lands,
and which improvements are in promotion of the purposes of the
law.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ADDITIOXAL-KINKAID ACT.
James W. Luton.
The act of April 28, 1904, commonly known as the Kinkaid act, contemplates
only one additional entry under its provisions ; and where such entry is
made, even though for an amount of land less than authorized by the act,
the right is thereby exhausted.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) February 28, 1906. (J. L. McC.)
James W. Luton, on September 8, 1902, made homestead entry for
the NE. i of Sec. 6, T. 34 N., R. 23 W., Valentine land district,
Nebraska.
On July 26, 1901, he made additional entry under the act of April
28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547—commonly known as the "Kinkaid act"),
for the SE. i of the NW. J, and the E. | of the SW. i of said sec-
tion 0.
On December 2, 1904, he applied to be allowed to " amend " his
additional entry, so as to include also the NW. ^ of Sec. 5, T. 24 N.,
R. 23 W., same land district.
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This last application was rejected by your office letter of July 18,
1905. From this action the applicant has appealed to the Depart-
ment,
The use of the word " amend," taken by itself, would indicate that
the applicant wished to substitute the land last-described in place of
that first applied for under the Kinkaid act. But an examination
of the record shows that he desires to enter it in addition to that en-
tered by him September 8, 1902, and July 20, 1904. The appeal
states
:
At the time the entryman made his additional filing he was informed that he
could make a filing for the land that was then subject to entry, and later amend
his application to include other land that might become subject to entry, if it
lay adjoining his entry; that at the time he made said additional filing he had
bargained for a relinquishment covering the NW. i of Sec. 5, T. 34, R. 23, but
the relinquishment had not been executed, and affiant was unable to secure the
relinquishment at that time; that at the time of making said additional entry
he had no thought of exhausting his homestead right, but fully intended to
secure the relinquishment and make application to amend his filing, as he has
since done.
The act referred to provides, among other things
—
That from and after sixty days after the approval of this act. entries made
under the homestead laws in the State of Nebraska, west and north of the fol-
lowing line .... shall not exceed in area six hundred and forty acres.
Lands within the limits named are to be entered " under the home-
stead laws." This language clearly implies that, except as the act
itself shall distinctly provide, the provisions of the homestead laws
then in existence shall apply. Among these is one to the effect that
by making one entry thereunder the right is exhausted. The second
section of the act provides that its provisions shall be applicable to
persons owning and occupying land " heretofore "—that is, prior to
April 28, 1904—entered by them. The third section contains a pro-
viso to the effect that any former homestead entryman who shall be
entitled to " an " additional entry shall have, etc.
If the contention of this applicant were correct, a person who had
already entered one hundred and sixty acres of land would be author-
ized to make twelve other entries, of forty acres each, at irregular
intervals, as he might secure relinquishments. The undoubted inten-
tion of Congress was to permit a person who had already made entry
of one hundred and sixty acres (or less) to make " an " additional
entry—not a series of entries—of land sufficient to aggregate six
hundred and forty acres.
The Department is of opinion that by making one entry under said
act of April 28, 1904, the entryman exhausted his right under said
act. Your office decision in rejecting his second application under
said act was therefore correct, and is herebv affirmed.
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mining claim—blanket lode—end lines.
Jack Pot Lode Mixing Claim.
In case of a mining location upon a blanket lode or vein, the lode line may not
be extended in zigzag form so as to make the distance between the side
lines of the claim exceed the width of six hundred feet allowed by law in
the location of vein or lode claims.
The mining laws contemplate that the end lines of a lode claim shall have sub-
stantial existence in fact, and in length shall reasonably comport with the
width of the claim as located.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C) February 28, 1006. (A. B. P.)
December 28, 1903, E. M. Thompson made entry for the Jack Pot
Lode Mining Claim, survey No. 1779, Huron land district. South
Dakota. By decision of January 13, 1905, your office required an
amended survey of the claim, and directed that the entryman be
allowed sixty days from notice within which to apply for such sur-
vey or to appeal ; in default whereof it was stated the entry would be
canceled without further notice. Thompson has appealed.
As described in the plat and field notes upon which the entry is
based the claim is of very irregular shape. One end line is over eight
hundred feet in length, while the other is only two-tenths of a foot
in length, and a large part of the claim is over six hundred feet in
width, the distance between the side lines at the widest point being
over nine hundred feet.
It appears from the record that the mineral deposit on account of
which the claim was located is of horizontal or blanket formation and
is probably co-extensive with the limits of the location. An assumed
lode line of three courses and of zigzag form is represented on the
official plat, so extended apparently on the theory that a greater width
than six hundred feet might be thus embraced within the side lines
of the claim.
The purpose of the amended survey required by your office was to
bring the claim within the limits as to width provided by statute for
the location of lode mining claims.
The appellant contends, in substance, that the present survey ac-
cords in principle with the doctrine of the case of Homestake Min-
ing Compairy (29 L. D., 689), and therefore should be accepted. In
that case there were a number of exclusions from the claim applied
for, leaving two small tracts widely separated from each other, for
which entry had been allowed, though it appeared that the point of
principal discovery had gone with the exclusions. It was shown that
the claim was located upon a horizontal or blanket lode which covered
the entire area within the limits of the side and end lines, as well the
said two small tracts as the point of principal discovery and other
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excluded portions of the claim. One of the questions was whether
the location could be sustained notwithstanding the loss of the point
of original discovery. As the ore body was shown to extend uninter-
ruptedly over the entire claim, including the two small tracts, the
Department considered the apex of the lode as co-extensive with the
distance between the side lines of the location, and held that the loss
of the original or principal discovery by its inclusion in some other
mineral claim did not affect the validity of the location. The case
goes no further, and is in no sense authority for the proceeding at-
tempted in the case at bar. There is nothing in the principle to jus-
tify the extension of a lode line in the zigzag form here presented,
whereby the distance between the side lines of the claim is made to
exceed the maximum width of six hundred feet allowed by law in the
location of vein or lode claims. (Sec. 2320, Revised Statutes.) On
this question the decision of your office is manifestly right, and is
hereby affirmed.
There is another equally fatal objection to the entry, not mentioned
by your office. It has been stated already that one of the end lines
of the claim is only two-tenths of a foot in length, while the other is
over eight hundred feet in length. Neither of these lines can be con-
sidered an end line within the meaning of the statute. As vein or
lode claims may not be located to exceed six hundred feet in width, it
is manifestly not within the contemplation of the statute that an end
line in case of a blanket vein, such as here involved, may exceed that
distance in length. Certainly not, unless there be some justifiable
reason for it, which does not appear in this case. And while there
is no express provision to govern the length of an end line where
within the general limitation of six hundred feet the Department is
of opinion that a line less than three inches in length is not within
the spirit or intent of the statute. The end lines, required in all
cases to be parallel to each other, are important features of a vein or
lode location (The Hidee Gold Mining Company, 30 L. D., 420), and
the statute (Sec. 2320) clearly contemplates that such lines shall have
substantial existence in fact and, in length, shall reasonably comport
with the width of the claim as located.
The order of your office for an amended survey will therefore be
enlarged so as to require end lines of the claim to be established and
shown according to law.
repayment—overcharge—non-alienation affidavit.
Pablo Baldez.
An applicant for repayment of mon,ey paid by reason of an overcharge for area
in excess of that actually embraced in the entry, will be required to furnish
non-alienation affidavit or to show fully the nature, terms and conditions
of any sale and conveyance of the land.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office!
(F. L. C.) March 1, 1906. (C. J. G.)
A motion has been filed by Pablo Baldez for review of depart-
mental decision of November 17, 1905 (not reported), affirming the
action of your office requiring him to furnish additional evidence
in support of his claim for repayment of the overcharge paid by him
on preemption cash entry No. 1743, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
In passing upon this case on appeal, following the description in
the letters of your office, Baldez's claim was treated as an application
for repayment of excess purchase money, that is, money paid for a
number of acres embraced in an entry over and above the area
allowable' under the preemption law. But his claim for repayment
is in fact for an overcharge, that is, he was charged and he paid for
a greater number of acres than was actually contained in the entry.
The tract purchased by Baldez was represented in his cash certificate
as containing 167.44 acres, whereas the true area was 147.48 acres.
In such a case it has been held that " repayment may be allowed of
money paid for land in excess of the area actually embraced within
the entry." W. J. Chambers (7 L. D., 32). However, as a pre-
requisite to repayment your office called upon Baldez to furnish
evidence showing that he had not alienated the land under his entry.
This requirement was undoubtedly on the theory that if he sold the
land embraced in his entry the assignee might be the proper party
to whom repayment of the overcharge should be made. The re-
quired evidence Avas not furnished, but it is urged that the claim
arising as it does " from an overcharge and not from the cancella-
tion of an entry," the assignee of the land would have no right to
repayment but that the right would remain in the original entryman.
It is not believed the distinction contended for warrants the
waiving of a requirement of a non-alienation affidavit or in the event
of sale, of a disclosure of the nature, terms and conditions of such
sale, for as said in the decision complained of, " it is exclusively
the province of the land department to determine, in case of aliena-
tion, whether the claim for repayment passes with the land to the
assignee, and said department is therefore entitled to all the facts
in each case." The proper course in this case would have been to
require either a non-alienation affidavit or full showing as to the
nature, terms, and conditions of any sale of the land and conveyance
thereunder. You Avill make this requirement giving a reasonable
time for compliance therewith.
The departmental decision of November 17, 1905, and the decision
of your office are accordingly modified.
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Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co.
By opinion of March 3, 1906, approved by Secretary Hitchcock,
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell, upon reconsideration of the
matters involved in his opinion of March 14, 1905, 33 L. D., 470,
reaffirms and adheres to the views therein expressed.
CONTEST—NOTICE—PUBLICATION-AFFIDAVIT.
Krawl v. Pettengill.
Where the affidavit filed as a basis for an order of publication of notice of con-
test against an entry does not specifically allege that the entryman is a
nonresident of the State or Territory in which the land is located, it should
show the date or dates upon which inquiries as to the entryman's where-
abouts were made, that they were made with a view to obtaining personal
service of the notice, and that at that time the contestant was prepared
to make personal service of the notice if the entryman were found within
the State or Territory wherein the land is situated.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office*
(F.L.C.) March 8, 1906. . (D. C.H.)
On October 10, 1901, Charles Z. Pettengill made homestead entry
for lots 1 and 2 and the S. ± of the NE. J of Sec. 6, T. 25 N., E. 20
W., Woodward, Oklahoma, land district, against which William
Krawl on April 11, 1903, filed affidavit of contest alleging abandon-
ment and failure to establish residence upon the land, and that the
entryman's absence from the land was not clue to service in the army
or navy of the United States. Notice of contest was issued on the
same day, and July 14, 1903, was fixed as the day for the taking of
the testimony before the local officers. On June 30, 1903, con-
testant's attorney filed his affidavit to procure an order for service of
notice by publication, in which he alleged that
—
he has made diligent search and inquiry for the defendant; that he has made
personal inquiry of the postmaster at Ellendale, O. T. ; also of the postmaster
at Lathrop, a postoffice near the land, that being the nearest postoffice to the
land involved, as to the place of residence or whereabouts of said and
that he made the like inquiry of Hayden Parsons, Hayes, also at Wood-
ward, O. T. record address of contestee, who reside in the immediate neighbor-
hood of said land, and from his own personal knowledge as well as the infor-
mation acquired from said parties, states that the said Charles Z. Pettengill
abandoned said land and went to parts unknown in the state of unknown oh or
about day of August, 1002; that he has since that time been absent from
said land and that his place of residence is unknown and on account thereof a
personal service of the notice of said contest cannot be made, wherefore affiant
asks for an order to serve said notice by publication.
Xotice by publication issued on the same day, June 30, 1903, and
appears to have been duly given as required by the Rules of Practice.
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On the clay fixed for trial the contestant appeared in person and by
attorney. The defendant specially appeared by attorney and moved
to dismiss the contest for want of jurisdiction for the reason that
the service of the notice by publication had not been made in
accordance with the Rules of Practice, which motion was overruled
by the local officers and the defendant excepted to said ruling. The
defendant's attorney again stated that he appeared specially and
moved that the contest be dismissed on the ground that the defend-
ant was in the military service of the United States at the time the
affidavit of contest was made and filed with said motion the unsworn
statement of the officer in command of defendant's company to that
effect, which said motion was also overruled by the local officers, and
exceptions thereto reserved by the defendant. The plaintiff then
introduced testimon}^ in support of the allegations in the contest
affidavit, at the close of which the attorney for the defendant again
moved that the contest be dismissed for the reason that the evidence
submitted by the contestant was not sufficient to prove the allegations
of the contest.
The local officers found that while it appeared that the defendant
had abandoned the land and failed to improve and cultivate same
as required by law, the testimony failed to show that the alleged
absence of the entryman from the land was not due to his employment
in the military service of the United States and they therefore recom-
mended that the contest be dismissed. Contestant appealed to your
office, which, by decision of April 27, 1905, sustained the action of
the local officers in overruling defendant's motions to dismiss the con-
test as hereinbefore stated, but reversed their action in recommending
that the contest be dismissed for want of proof as to the non-military
service of the entryman and held that the evidence sustained all the
allegations set forth in the affidavit of contest and that the entry
should be canceled.
The defendant has appealed to the Department, and assigned errors
in substance as follows
:
(1) Error in holding that the service of the notice of contest was
sufficient and in accordance with law.
(2) Error in finding and holding that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the charges of the contest affidavit and to warrant the can-
cellation of the entry.
The first question to be considered is whether or not the service of
the notice of the contest was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the law, or, in other words, was the affidavit filed by contestant as
the basis for the order of publication sufficient to warrant such service.
Rule 9 of practice requires that " Personal service shall be made in all
cases where possible if the party to be served is resident in the state or
territory in which the land is situated," and rule 11 authorizes service
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of notice by publication only when it is shown after the exercise of
due diligence that personal service cannot be made. The affidavit
upon which the order of publication in this case was made does not
state when, or for what purpose, the inquiries as to the whereabouts
of the defendant were made, or that contestant was prepared to make
personal service upon the defendant could he have been found in the
Territory of Oklahoma, where the land is situated.
In the case of E. E. Duff v. Edmonia Dautel, decided by the
Department on April 18, 1905 (unreported), it was held that the
affidavit filed as the basis for an order of publication " should show,
among other things, the date or dates upon which inquiries as to the
contestee
?
s whereabouts were made, that they were made with a view
to obtaining personal service of the notice, and that at that time the
contestant wTas prepared to make personal service of the notice upon
the contestee, if he could have been found within the State or Terri-
tory wherein the land lay." The reason for the ruling that the affi-
davit should show the date or dates upon which the inquiries as to the
whereabouts of the contestee were made is clear and apparent. The
jaw recognizes the fact that although the defendant may be once
absent from the jurisdiction he may return thereto, and his absence
cease to be an existing fact. It should therefore appear from the
affidavit that the endeavor to ascertain the whereabouts of the defend-
ant, as required by rule 11 of practice, was made at a time so reason-
ably near the date of the filing of said affidavit as to satisfy the local
officers of the absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction at the
time when they are called upon to act judicially in the matter, and
when the order of publication is to take effect. The affidavit in ques-
tion clearly did not meet the requirements of the law ; therefore did
not furnish a good and sufficient basis for the order of publication.
It is stated in your said decision that inasmuch as the record
shows that at the time service was made in this case, the defendant
was a non-resident of the State, he therefore should not be heard to
question the sufficiency of the affidavit used as a basis for publication
in so far as it relates to the degree of diligence exercised in attempt-
ing to secure personal service, citing as authority for such holding,
5 L. D., 456.
It will be noted that the facts in the case at bar and the one cited
by your office are materially different. In that case the affidavit of
diligence was adjudged sufficient and it was alleged in said affidavit,
among other things, that the defendant was not a resident of the
State of Nebraska, where the land was situated, and that personal
service could not be had upon him in that State, and the defendant
having admitted that at the time the said affidavit was filed and the
order for service by publication was issued, he wTas actually residing
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in the State of Illinois, it was held that under such circumstances he
should not be allowed to question the truthfulness of the affidavit.
In the case at bar there is no averment in the affidavit filed as the
foundation for the order for service of notice by publication that
the defendant was a non-resident, and no admission by him to that
effect, and as the said affidavit does not conform to the requirements
of rule 11 of practice as interpreted by the Department in the unre-
ported case of Duff v. Dautel, hereinbefore quoted, it was not suf-
ficient to authorize service by publication, and the fact that your
office finds from the record of the testimony that the defendant was
a non-resident does not cure the error, for, as has been repeatedly
held by the Department, the affidavit must show upon its face all
the facts necessary to. authorize service by publication, or no juris-
diction will be conferred upon the local officers.
Apart from the question of the insufficiency of the affidavit as a
basis for the order for service by publication, it is found upon care-
ful examination of the record that the proof submitted at the hearing
is not sufficient, in the opinion of the Department, to show that the
entryman's absence from the claim was not due to his employment in
the army, navy or marine corps of the United States, as charged in
the affidavit of contest, and for this reason also the contest should
not be sustained.
This leaves the matter between the entryman and the government,,
and in view of the long military service of the entryman as shown
by the record, the Department is unwilling to cancel the entry in his
absence. The decision of your office is reversed. The contest will be
dismissed and the entry will remain intact. (Sec. 2308, Revised
Statutes.)
TIMBER AND STONE ACT-NON-AEIENATION AFFIDAVIT.
John C. Long.
An applicant to purchase under the timber and stone act does not become the
owner of the land applied, for, with legal right to sell, mortgage, or other-
wise encumber the same, until the required proof has been furnished, the
purchase price tendered and received, receipt given therefor, and final cer-
tificate issued, and at any time prior thereto the land department may
require the applicant to furnish an affidavit of non-alienation.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) March 8, 1906. (J. L. McC.j
John C. Long, on September 15, 1902, applied to purchase, under
the timber-land act, lots 1, 2, and ('», and the W. h of lot 7, Sec. 2,
T. 28 N., E. 10 E., Susanville land district, California.
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It appearing from the record that said lands were included in a
temporary withdrawal for forestry purposes, by departmental order
of October 15, 1902, your office, on August 15, 1903, rendered a
decision rejecting said application. Long appealed, and the Depart-
ment, on October 7, 1903, reversed said decision, and directed that
the applicant " be allowed to complete his purchase in accordance
with the terms prescribed by the statute."
The application was accordingly allowed, November 3, 1903; and
on January 16, 1904, Long submitted final-proof testimony. On
that day a special agent of your office appeared at the local office,
and cross-examined the entryman and his witnesses. This led to a
delay in action upon said proof; and it was not until January 24,
1905, that the claimant was notified by the local officers that upon
receipt of $406.50, and a non-alienation affidavit, his case would be
taken up with a view to issuing final receipt.
From this action of the local officers Long appealed ; and your
office, on July 6, 1905, affirmed the action of the local officers.
Long has appealed to the Department. The gist of his contention
is to be found in the following extracts from his appeal
:
Appellant showed that he was duly qualified ; made legal proof that the land
was such as the act provides for the sale of; tendered his money and asked
to be permitted to pay for and enter the land ; in short, did all he possibly
could to perfect his claim. He was, however, denied the right to make pay-
ment for and enter the land, which the act awards him ; his proof was held up
and not examined for a year ; all contrary to his wishes, as well as contrary
to the terms of the act, and not by reason or in consequence of the least fault,
failure, or neglect on his part ; and now a demand is made that he furnish an
affidavit for which there is no requirement of law whatever. . . . When he
made his proof (which is admitted to be perfect), and tendered the coin to
pay for his land, he had done everything in his power to perfect his entry; he
thereby acquired a perfect and complete equity to have, and was entitled to
have, the land patented to him at any time upon payment of the purchase price
;
and if at any time after making his proof he had seen fit to sell, or bargain
to sell, or to mortgage or otherwise encumber the land, he would have been
legally entitled to do so ; and whether he did or did not so sell, bargain to sell,
or encumber, the land, is a question in which the government has not the
slightest interest.
It appears from the record, and, indeed, is clearly indicated by
the language of the appellant (supra)—that he "tendered his
money," but was " denied the right to make payment for and enter
the land "—that the purchase price tendered was not accepted. His
proof was not, by the local officers, admitted to be perfect; nor has
it been so admitted by your office, or it would not have rendered the
adverse opinion from which he has appealed.
The contention of the appellant that his presentation of final proof
(since held to be sufficient), arid his tender of payment (which was
rejected), entitled him to patent, is substantially the same as that
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made by defendant Hays in the case of Todd v. Hays, in which the
Department exposed the fallacy of said contention thus (34 L. D.,
371, 374) :
Heretofore it has always been understood by the Department that joint action
of the applicant on the one hand, and of the local officers on the other, was
requisite to make an entry of a tract of land; but if this contention be correct,
any person wishing to make entry of a given tract can do so unassisted. .
. .
The money tendered must have been received, and receipt issued therefor, in
order to render such action "equivalent to an entry." As was said by the
Department in the case of Thomas v. St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad (3
C. L. O., 197), quoted with approval in Gilbert v. Spearing (4 L. D., 463), and
again in Iddings r. Burns (8 L. D., 224) :
" Each of the three elements of which this transaction is composed forms
an essential part thereof—the application, the affidavit, and the payment of the
money; and when the application is presented, the affidavit made, and the
money paid, an entry is made—a right is vested."
Further in support of the same ruling the Department (in said
Todd-Hays case) cited Witherspoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 210, 219)
;
Bastings, etc. R. R. Co. y. Whitney (132 U. S., 357, 363) ; Jones v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co (34 L. D., 105, 111).
A similar conclusion is reached by the Department in the case
of Bowlby v. Hays (34 L. D., 376), which cited in support of the
same ruling, Hoofnagie 'v. Anderson (7 Wheat., 212, 214) ; Brush vl
Ware (15 Pet., 93, 110) ; Parsons y. Venzke (164 U. S., 89, 92)—the
last of which says:
Whenever the local land officers approve the evidences of settlement and
improvement, and receive the cash price, they issue a receiver's receipt.
Thereby a contract is entered into between the United States and the pre-emptor,
and the contract is known as an " entry." The effect of the entry is to segre-
gate the land entered from the public domain.
Until this appellant had not only tendered the purchase money,
but until it had been received, and receipt given therefor, and final
certificate issued, had he become owner of the land, with legal right
to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the same. The action of
your office in requiring a non-alienation affidavit before issuing final
certificate was therefore correct, and is hereby affirmed.
reclamation act—settlement rights-improvements.
George Anderson.
No such rights are acquired by settlement upon lands embraced in the entry
of another as will attach upon cancellation of such entry, where at that time
the lands are withdrawn for use in connection with an irrigation project
under the act of June 17. 1902; nor is tbere any authority in said act for
purchase by the government of the settler's claim or of the improvements
placed upon the land by him.
DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 479
Secretary Hitchcock to the Director of the Geological Survey, March
(F.L. C.) 10,1906. (J. LP.)
I am in receipt of your communication of the 5th instant, submit-
ting for my consideration an agreement by Mr. David C. Henny, on
behalf of the United States, with Mr. George Anderson, whereby
the latter agrees to sell to the United States, for the sum of $3,000,
the improvements on lots 8 and 9 in section 7, and the NE. \ of the
NW. J, and the NW. \ of the NE. \ of section 18, T. 35 N., R. 25 E.,
W. M., and -all his right, title and interest therein, and all claim to
said lands, for use in connection with the Okanogan project, in Wash-
ington. The agreement is accompanied by an affidavit of disinter-
estedness executed by the engineer.
The facts in this case, as disclosed by the correspondence, appear
to be as follows
:
Mr. Anderson, who, at the time, was qualified to make entry under
the homestead law, settled on this land in 1892, the land at that time
being covered by a homestead entry. Anderson subsequently con-
tested the entry, which contest was decided adversely to him. Later
he filed a relinquishment obtained from the mother of the minor
heir who had succeeded to the entry. He then made homestead
entry of the land, which was accepted by the local office but was
rejected by the General Land Office and the prior entry permitted
to remain intact. The prior entry was canceled, however, by the
General Land Office on January 13, 1906, and Anderson advised that
he had thirty days' preference right to make entry of the land.
When he submitted his application, however, it was rejected by the
local land office for the reason that the land had been withdrawn
from all forms of entry (first form of withdrawal), under the recla-
mation act, on July 30, 1904.
Since Anderson settled on the land he has placed improvements
thereon, the reasonable value of which is now placed at $3,000, and you
have submitted this agreement, entered into between the engineer
and Anderson, with the recommendation that if in the opinion of
the Department there is authority of law for the purchase of the
rights of Mr. Anderson, and his improvements upon this land, the
agreement be approved by the Secretary and returned to your office.
After careful consideration of this matter, I have to advise you
that in the opinion of the Department there is no authority of law for
the purchase of the so-called rights of Mr. Anderson, or of the
improvements he has placed upon this land.
At the time Anderson settled upon this land it was covered by a
homestead entry, and by that settlement he acquired no rights what-
ever against either the entryman or the government. See McMichael
v. Murphy et al., 20 L. D., 147, and authorities there cited.
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It is true that the Department has held that where a settler is
residing on a tract covered by an entry at the date of cancellation
thereof, his rights as a settler attach eo instantly without any specific
act of settlement on his part, where he is in possession of the tract
when the entry is canceled. See authorities above cited and Pool v.
Moloughney, 11 L. D., 197, and authorities there cited. But that
rule does not apply in this case, for the reason that in paragraph 7
of the circular approved by the Department June G, 1005, it is held:
When an entry for lands embraced within a withdrawal under the first form
is canceled by reason of contest or for any other reason, sneh lands become sub-
ject immediately to sueh withdrawal, and cannot thereafter, so long as they
remain so withdrawn, be entered or otherwise appropriated either by a suc-
cessful contestant or any other person.
The only rule for the purchase of improvements is found in para-
graph 8 in said circular approved June 6, 1905, which provides
:
In the event any lands embraced in an entry under which final proof has not
been offered, or in any unapproved or uncertified selection, are needed in the
construction and maintenance of any irrigation work (other than for right' of
way for ditches or canals reserved under act of August 30, 1890), under the
reclamation act, the Government may cancel such entry or selection and
appropriate the lands embraced therein to such use, after paying the value of
the improvements thereon and the enhanced value of such lands caused by such
Improvements.
Paragraph 9 provides a method for determining the value of such
improvements.
As Anderson never had any entry, the rule above quoted, as to the
purchase of improvements, does not apply to his case.
It will be seen, therefore, that this Department is without any
authority to authorize the payment from the reclamation fund of
$3,000, or any other sum, for Anderson's so-called rights and improve-
ments.
The agreement enclosed with your letter of the 5th instant is re-
turned herewith, not approved.
reclamation act—lease of reserved or purchased lands.
Opinion.
The Secretary of the Interior has authority to make temporary leases of lands
reserved or acquired by purchase for use in connection with an irrigation
project contemplated under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902,
where use under the proposed lease will not interfere with the use and
control of the lands when needed for the purposes contemplated by the
reservation or purchase.
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Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
March 10, 1906. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt, by reference, of a letter from the Director of the
Geological Survey re-submitting to the Department the question
whether lands purchased for reclamation purposes may be leased for
one or more years pending construction, or until such lands are
needed. The letter is referred to me for opinion upon the question
submitted in said letter.
This question was first submitted to the Department by the Director
of the Geological Survey in his letter dated August 31, 1903, stating
that the reclamation service was about to acquire lands that will be
flooded by the Salt river reservoir, and as it wrill take several years
to construct the dam and flood the lands, the government wTill be in
possession of several tracts of good farming lands for two or three
years. He stated that if it were possible to lease the lands it would
afford a great saving to the government, and he requested " the views
of the Department upon the proposition to purchase these lands on
terms involving leases as indicated, for one or more years, until the
lands shall be needed for the use of the reservoirs. Also whether
lands so purchased could be leased to others than the former owners
under like conditions."
In replying to this request the Department, in its letter of January
28, 1904 (32 L. D., 416), said that, as a general rule, an executive
officer has no authority to use property of the United States for any
purpose other than that for wdiich it wTas acquired. That as there is
no authority to use property acquired under the provisions of the
reclamation act except for the purpose of constructing and maintain-
ing reservoirs, he cannot use such property in any manner not di-
rectly involved in the construction of them.
It was said, however, that " if in any case it be found that land can
be purchased for a less price if arrangements can be made to allow
the vendor to retain possession until the time when the land is actually
needed for use by the government, there is full authority under the
act to make such arrangements."
This viewT contemplates that the consideration to be paid by the
vendor for the use and occupation of the land until it is needed by the
government is the diminished price to be paid by the government for
the land.
There does not seem to be any difference in principle in acquiring
property under an agreement to allow the vendor to retain the use
and occupancy of it after the purchase and in acquiring such property
by purchase without condition and afterward leasing it to the ven-
dor or to another. In either case it is a lease or permission to use and
occupy property of the United States.
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It may be stated as a cardinal principle that the Secretary of the
Interior has no authority, under his general power of supervision and
control over the public lands, to lease them, unless expressly author-
ized by Congress. The disposal of the public lands having been
specially provided for, any other mode or manner of disposition is
excluded, being impliedly prohibited.
But while the lands acquired for the construction and operation of
reservoirs are lands belonging to the United States, they are not public
lands within the technical meaning of that term and are not con-
trolled by the laws governing the disposition of public lands. Hence,
the fundamental proposition involved in this inquiry is whether
property of the United States acquired for particular uses may be
temporarily leased by executive authority for other uses, where such
use and occupancy will not interfere with the use of the property for
the purpose contemplated by its acquisition, whenever it is needed
for that purpose.
There does not appear to be any constitutional or statutory inhibi-
tion against the exercise of such power, and in the absence of an
express prohibition as to the particular property it may be safely
asserted that where public property is placed in the custody and care
of any of the executive departments to be appropriated and used for
a particular purpose the head of such department may, until the
property is actually needed for the purpose intended, exercise his
judgment and discretion as to the proper care and disposition of such
property, and any use of it not incompatible with the purpose in-
tended is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of the supervisory
authority and discretion reposed in the executive department over
matters confided to its care.
There can be no dissent from the proposition that property of the
United States can not be taken or employed by executive authority
for any purpose other than that for which it was acquired, but the
proposition must be taken in its proper sense to mean that the prop-
erty can not be diverted to other uses. A temporary use or disposi-
tion of the property that will not interfere with the proper use and
control of the lands when needed for the purpose contemplated is not
a diversion of it to other use, but may be in furtherance of the object
for which the property Avas acquired. This would seem to be espe-
cially so with reference to lands acquired under the reclamation act.
The third section of the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 288) , author-
izes the withdrawal of lands required for the construction of irriga-
tion works under said act. The lands withdrawn for such purpose
are permanently appropriated for a specific purpose. The seventh
section of the act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire
rights or property, by purchase or by condemnation, under judicial
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process, whenever the acquirement of such right or property becomes
necessary in carrying out the provisions of the reclamation act, and
to pay from the reclamation fund sums which may be needed for that
purpose. The property so acquired, either by purchase or reserva-
tion, is public property placed by the act under the control of the
Secretary of the Interior, for use in the construction of irrigation
works for the storage, development and diversion of waters. He is
required by the act to make examinations and surveys, to estimate,
the cost of construction of all contemplated works, the quantity and
location of land which can be irrigated therefrom, and " all facts
relative to the practicability of each irrigation project." The cost
of construction is an important factor in determining the practica-
bility of an irrigation project. Therefore any economical use of the
property by which such cost can be diminished, or the fund increased,
not inconsistent with the purpose of the irrigation act, is a material
fact that may be considered in determining the question. The power
to determine whether an irrigation project is practicable as a finan-
cial scheme, necessarily implies the right to so use and control the
property, while the work is in progress, as to secure the construction
of the works at the lowest cost. If the land needed for the construc-
tion of the works can be made productive by any practical use not
inconsistent with the object to be attained in the construction of the
works, but in furtherance of it, no reason appears why it may not be
so used, there being no express prohibition against it.
In the letter of January 28, 1904, supra, it was suggested that if a
plan for the leasing of such lands was determined upon it would be
necessary to designate some officer to execute the leases, to receive the
rental accruing thereunder, to deposit the same in the United States
treasury or some other depositary of government money, and to de-
vise some plan by which the money could be withdrawn and applied
to the work of construction.
The act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1032), to which attention has
been called by the Director in his letter and which has received a lib-
eral interpretation by the Comptroller of the Treasury, obviates these
difficulties. That act provides
:
That there shall he covered into the reclamation fund established under the
act of June seventeenth, nineteen hundred and two, known as the reclamation
act, the proceeds of the sales of material utilized for temporary work and
structures in connection with the operations under the said act. as well as of
the sales of all other condemned property which had been purchased under the
provisions thereof, and also any moneys refunded in connection with the opera-
tions under said reclamation act.
I am of the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior has authority
to make a temporary lease of any of the lands acquired for any irri-
gation project, provided the use of the land under the proposed lease
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will not interfere with the use and control of the lands when they are
needed for the purposes contemplated by the purchase or reservation
of such lands.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
11AILROAD GRANT—PATENTED LANDS—NORTHERN PACIFIC ADJUST-
MENT.
Northern Pacific Railway Company.
The provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, are applicable to patented lands,
whether patented before or after the passage of the act, if such lands are
in dispute between the company and the individual claimant and belong to
either of the classes described therein, and where patents issued to indi-
vidual claimants prior to the passage of the act, under rulings then in force,
which under rulings now governing would have to be held to have been
improperly issued, the conflicting claims to such lands are subject to ad-
justment under the provisions of said act, provided the company has not,
by the selection of other lands in lieu of those in controversy, or otherwise,
abandoned its claim thereto.
'Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) March U, 1906. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter of the 7th instant was transmitted, in dupli-
cate, what is denominated as list No. 52, State of Montana, embracing
certain lands included in individual claims within the limits of the
Northern Pacific land-grant in the State of Montana, the same being
submitted for approval under the provisions of the act of July 1,
1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), preliminary to inviting- the Northern
Pacific Railway Company, successor in interest to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, to make relinquishment thereof under the
provisions of said act, the individual claimants having elected to
retain the lands included in their several claims.
It is gathered from your said letter of transmittal and from infor-
mal inquiry of your office that the several individual claims included
in said list were all patented prior to the passage of the act of July 1,
1898, under rulings then in force, which held the lands involved to
have been excepted from the operation of the Northern Pacific land-
grant, but that under present rulings of the courts the departmental
action was improper, there being no such claims as served to defeat
the operation of said grant, so that, unless barred by the statute of
limitations, the individual claimants would be likely to lose the lands
upon the suit instituted by the railroad grantee for possession of the
lands under the grant. It is learned that the lands were only pat-
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ented after contest before this Department and that the railroad
grantee has not, by the selection of other lands in lien of those here
in question, which are within the primary limits of its land-grant,
abandoned its claim to the lands involved.
By the decision of the supreme court in the case of Humbird et al.
t\ Avery et al. { L95 U. S., 480, 506), it is held, in effect, that the act
of 1898 is applicable to lands patented both before and after the
passage of the act, if such lands are in dispute and belong to either
of the classes described in said act. Under the circumstances herein
detailed it can be safely said, although these lands were patented to
the individuals prior to the passage of the act of July 1, 1898, they
nevertheless remained in dispute, as a case involving the principle
which was determinative of the contests between these several indi-
vidual claimants and the railroad company was prosecuted to the
Supreme Court of the United States, resulting in a decision in favor
of the company (Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. De Lacey,
174 U. S., 622), and it is by reason of said decision that it is now held
that these patents were improperly issued upon these individual
claims. They are otherwise in the classes described in the act of
1898. and the entire matter considered, the Department herewith
returns the list, approved, with instructions that one copy be retained
in your office and the other transmitted to the Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company with an appropriate request for relinquishment of the
land therein described under said act.
SCHOOL LANDS-MINING CLAIM-UNSURVEYED LAND-ACT OF FEBRU-
ARY 22, 1889.
State of South Dakota v. Trinity Gold Mining Company.
The grant of sections. sixteen and thirty-six made to the State of South Dakota
for school purposes by the act of February 22, 1889, took effect on the
admission of the State into the Union, as to lands at that date identified
by the government survey, but as to such of the indicated sections as had
not been surveyed at the date of the admission of the State, the right of
the State does not attach unless and until identified by survey, and if at
the time of survey they are known to be mineral in character, they are
excepted from the grant.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) March 16, 1906. (G. J. II.)
December 28, 1903, the Trinity Gold Mining Company made entry
No. 1466 for the Llewellen and seven other lode mining claims, in
T. 5 N., R. 2 E., Rapid City, South Dakota.
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The records of your office show that the exterior boundaries of the
township in which these claims are situated were established by
official survey in November, 1899, but that the section lines have not
yet been run. It appearing, however, that the larger part of this
group of claims is located in what, when surveyed, will be section 36,
the State was notified of the allowance of the entry in question and
afforded opportunity to show cause, if any, why the entry should not
be permitted to stand, sections 36 being included in the grant to the
State for school purposes made by the act of February 22, 1889 (25
Stat., 676).
December 24, 1904, the State filed a protest against the entry,
alleging, in substance and effect, that the land had passed to the State
under its school grant.
January 13, 1905, your office dismissed the protest, on the ground,
in substance and effect, that the public surveys have not been extended
over the lands in question, and until it is definitely ascertained by
government survey what particular lands will be embraced in the
sections granted to the State for school purposes, no rights attach
under the grant to any specific lands.
The State has appealed to the Department.
It is contended to support the appeal that the grant of school
lands made by the act of February 22, 1889, supra, is a grant in
praesenti; that the right of the State thereunder attached upon its
admission into the Union, whether at that date the granted sections
were surveyed or unsurveyed; and that lands containing valuable
deposits of mineral were not excepted from the grant unless known
to be mineral in character at the time of the State's admission.
The State does not allege that the particular lands here in contro-
versy are nonmineral, or that they were not known to be mineral at
the date of the State's admission, but is apparently proceeding upon
the assumption that they were not known to be mineral on that date.
The provisions of the school grant to the State of Utah (sections
6 and 10, act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat., 107), are in all essential
respects identical with those of the grant here in question. In con-
struing the Utah grant the Department has uniformly held that it
took effect on the admission of the State into the Union, as to lands
at that date identified by the government survey (State of Utah in
Allen et at, 27 L. D., 53 ; State of Utah, 29 L. D., 418, 419 ; Law u\
State of Utah, 29 L. D., 623; State of Utah, 32 L. D., 117; Helen
Tibbals, 33 L. D., 223) ; but as to such of the indicated sections as
had not been surveyed at the date of the admission of the State, the
Department held, in the case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim (33
L. D., 37), that—
the right of the State to the lands mentioned does not attach unless and until
identified by the government survey (State of Colorado, G L. D., 412; Barnhurst
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V. State of Utah, 30 L. D., 314) ; and if at that time they are of known mineral
character they are reserved from the grant to the State. (See State of Utah r.
Allen et ah, 27 L. D., 53 ; State of Utah, 32 L. D., 117.)
This decision is in harmony with decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States. (See Cooper v. Boberts, 18 How., 173, 179;
Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold and Silver Mining Co., 93 U. S., 634.)
The States of South Dakota and Montana (with others) were
admitted under the same enabling act (supra) and the grant for
school purposes made by said act is the same as to both of said States.
In instructions to the Director of the Geological Survey, August 9,
1904 (33 L. D., 181), the Department, construing the school grant to
the latter State, said
:
The people of Montana by adoption of a constitution accepted the grant,
which became operative by executive proclamation of November 8, 1889 (26
Stat., 1551), and title as of present grant for the specific sections vested in the
State subject to their future identification by the public land surveys. The
later act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat., 796), amending sections 2275 and 2276,
Revised Statutes, saves the rights of settlers before survey, but, otherwise than
for protection of settlers, the grant of the specific sections is not affected.
(Noyes v. State of Montana, 29 L. D., 695.)
It is urged on behalf of the State that this construction of the
school grant by the Department amounted to a determination that
the grant was one in praesenti, and that, therefore, mineral lands are
not excepted therefrom unless known to be mineral at the date of the
State's admission into the Union.
The question involved and considered by the Department in those
instructions was whether or not the State wTas entitled to the school
sections in certain townships formerly embraced within an Indian
reservation, and it was held that the State is " entitled to claim the
specific sections in place within the boundaries of the former reserva-
tion where they have not been appropriated by a bona fide settler
prior to their identification by survey." No question touching the
rights of the State as between it and mineral claimants was involved
or discussed, and it was not intended by the language there employed
to overrule or in anywise modify the decision in the case of Mahoganey
No. 2 Lode Claim, supra, rendered but two months before. The
decision in that case is controlling here.
It is further urged on behalf of the State, in substance and effect,
that as the exterior lines of the township in which the land in question
is situated have been established by government survey, thus fixing
the south and east lines of what when surveyed Avill be section 36, the
section is " as definitely designated as if the township had been fully
surveyed," and the mineral claimant could therefore have ascertained
that the land was within a school section and should not have made
location thereof unless the lands were known to be mineral at the date
of the State's admission.
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It appears from the abstract of title in the record that seven of the
eight claims embraced in the entry in question were located prior to
the survey of the township lines, and also prior to the admission of
the State into the Union. It can not be said, therefore, that the
claims were located with knowledge that the land was embraced in a
school section. But in any event, the Department has held (Barn-
hurst v. State of Utah, 30 L. D., 314), that " the survey of the town-
ship lines is not a survey of a section within that township, two sides
of which are described and fixed by the township lines." (See also
Bullock v. Rouse, 81 Cal., 590.)
Your office decision dismissing the protest is affirmed.
desert land entry-reclamation—cultivation.
Brandon v. Costley.
The desert-land act of March 3, 1877, as amended by the act of March 3, 1891,
requires that sufficient water be conducted upon the land embraced in the
entry to reclaim it from its desert character and render it suitable for
agricultural purposes, and that one-eighth of the land be placed under
cultivation.
As proof of cultivation within contemplation of the desert-land act actual
tillage must as a rule be shown.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) March 19, 1906. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by Thomas J. Brandon from the decision
of your office of May 31, 1905, dismissing his contest against the
desert land entry of Rebecca Costley for the NW. J NW. \ and lots
5 and 0, Sec. 23, and NE. J NE. ±, Sec. 22, T. 8 X., R. 41 E., Blackfoot,
Idaho, and holding said entry intact.
The entry was made July 25, 1902, final proof was submitted
thereon December 21, 1903, and final certificate issued January 5.
1904. Brandon's affidavit of contest was filed January 9, 1904, in
which he alleged that
—
the said Rebecca Costley has failed to comply with the law in that she has not
cultivated or caused to be cultivated £ of the land and has not conducted water
upon the land embraced in said entry so as to irrigate and reclaim the same
from its former condition to such extent that it will produce an agricultural
crop, and that water has not been distributed through and by means of ditches
over all the lands in each legal subdivision of said entry and that said defaults
continue down to this date.
A hearing was ordered and had before the local officers, who ren-
dered decision recommending cancellation of the entry. Upon ap-
peal your office reversed their action, dismissed the contest, and held
the entry intact, as stated.
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It appears that R. J. Costley, husband of contestee, made desert
land entry for this same land in 1898, but, as testified to by him, at
the expiration of four years, thinking he did not have sufficient water
to irrigate the land, he relinquished the same and his wife made the
entry in question. He turned his improvements over to her and had
his water stock in what is known as the Dewey canal transferred on
the books of the company to her in her name. This is said to have
been done in July, 1903, but the certificate <>1 water stock—thirty-
four shares—was not actually issued to her until December 21, 1903,
the date of final proof. She also held certificate for three shares of
water stock in the Last Chance canal.
In her final proof Mrs. Costley stated, among other things:
Water lias been conducted upon said land during the fall of 1903, said land
lias been reclaimed to such extent that it will now produce an agricultural
crop. Two main ditches, dimensions 3 feet wide, capacity about 200 inches^
two laterals about same size and capacity, $1035.00 expended in the aggregate
which equals more than $3.00 per acre of the entire area thereof. Water has
been distributed upon each legal subdivision with a view to the proper reclama-
tion thereof, during October of 1903, about one inch per acre used, for a few
days at each time, on part of it during the entire season of 1003. No agricul-
tural crop has been raised as the water was too late for a crop in 1903, except
on a portion of the land used for pasture the growth of grass has been con-
siderably increased. 21 acres under plow and about ten acres of meadow,
made as a result of the irrigation.
She also stated that there are no high points or uneven surfaces
which are not practically susceptible of irrigation.
The source of the claimed water supply for the irrigation of the
Costley tract is the North Fork of Snake river, through the Dewey
canal, the construction of which Avas begun in 1898. The point of
diversion from the river is a mile or more above the land. Accord-
ing to a plat filed in the case, which is recognized by the parties as
being practically correct, the Dewey canal enters the east side of the
XE. } of the SW. J of Sec. 14, and extends in a general soutliAvest-
erly direction through the X. J of said SW. J. The SW. i of 14,
which adjoins the Costley claim on the north, Avas entered under
the desert law June 6, 1902, by one Samuel M. Maupin, upon relin-
quishment of L. C. Rice ayIio made desert entry for the land in 1898
and who Avas at one time Secretary of the DeAvey Canal Company.
Maupin assigned his entry, June 12, 1902, to Alice T. Rice, wife of
said L. C. Rice, and it is stated the laterals from the DeAvey canal
were built to water both the Rice and Costley tracts. A large por-
tion of the expenditure credited to Mrs. Costley in her proof Avas
undoubtedly made in the construction of said canal while the land
in question Avas embraced in <R. J. Costley's entry. Two laterals
were taken out from the DeAA'ey canal, one, the west lateral, on the
west side of the SW. I of Sec. 14, and extending practically on the
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line between the NE. J of the NE. J of Sec. 22 and the NW. J of
the NW | of Sec. 23 ; the other, the east lateral, running in a south-
easterly direction across the E. J of the SW. J of Sec. 14. These
laterals, as stated, were intended to water both the Rice and Costley
claims. At date of hearing it had not yet been estimated how much
water Mrs. Costley was entitled to on account of her stock in the
Dewey canal. It was testified that she owns one-sixth of all the
water stock and one-ninth of the land controlled by the Dewey
canal stockholders, which it is claimed entitles her to more than
enough water to irrigate and reclaim this land.
The Last Chance canal, which one of contestee's witnesses says
was completed in 1902, and another that it has been constructed
'" five or six years any way ; may be more," enters the NE. J and
goes diagonally and southwesterly across lots 5 and 6 of the Costley
tract. No laterals were taken out from the Last Chance canal, it
being claimed on behalf of contestee that it was unnecessary owing
to the fact of sufficient sub-irrigation from said canal.
The " main ditches " mentioned in Mrs. Costley's proof undoubt-
edly refer to the Dewey and Last Chance canals. The testimony on
behalf of contestant is to the effect that prior to proof and contest the
land was in its native state except three small pieces of plowing and
one canal, the Last Chance, running through it. This plowing was
on the southern portion of the entry, one piece being between the
Last Chance and North Fork of Snake River. The pieces of plow-
ing were measured with a fifty-foot tape line and found to aggregate
13.07 acres. The sage brush had not been cleared therefrom. The
west lateral from the Dewey canal wTas made by plowing two furrows
each way and cleaning them out. It would carry a very small stream
of water and was not in condition to carry it all the way through,
as there were low places where it would have to be banked up. The
lateral did not reach the plowed ground; it went to a swale which
was three or three and a half feet lower than the plowed ground, and
if water had gone in that direction it would have run into this swale.
This was the only ditch on the land in the fall of 1903 and water did
not at that time flow in that. It crossed two legal subdivisions and
was about one-half mile long. There was no water being conducted
upon the land at time of contest except through a waste ditch from
the Last Chance canal ; there were no laterals from said canal except
this waste ditch and it did not irrigate any of the ploAved ground.
After contest some plowing and clearing were done, more ditches
made and portions of the land put in crop. But there was not suffi-
cient water on the land in the fall of 1903 to produce a growth of
grass, and the only vegetation was sage brush and some grass along
the river. At no time during the fall of 1903 was there any irriga-
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ting* ditch upon lots 5 and 6 of Sec. 23. Water flowed in the Dewey
canal for three days in October, 1903, but it backed up and over-
flowed the banks. The place of overflow was above point where the
west lateral diverted its waters from the canal, and there was no
water in said lateral during the season of 1903. No water was being-
distributed on the land on December 21, 1903, date of proof, except
through the waste ditch from the Last Chance canal. All of the
Costley claim is susceptible of irrigation from the Dewey canal
except five or ten acres. Prior to final proof no agricultural crop
had been raised on said claim, there was not an increased growth of
grass thereon, due to irrigation, and one-eighth of the land had not
been cultivated. Some of the land lying southeast of the Last
Chance could be irrigated therefrom if laterals were carried out, but
very little to the northwest. There were two laterals leading from
the Dewey canal prior to December 21, 1903, the west one already
referred to, and the east one which was only three hundred yards
long and on the SW. J of Sec. 14, the Rice tract, a quarter to a half
mile from the Costley claim. The east lateral extended in the direc-
tion of said claim but it also ran into a sag or swale—against a knoll
4 feet higher than the ditch. The land in question would produce
crops of more value than grass, as the climatic conditions are not
such as to render it valuable solely for hay. But it would not in the
condition it was in prior to contest produce sufficient to support stock.
There were not enough laterals or ditches nor were they large enough
to make grass, wheat, oats or anything else grow. And even if crops
had been put out, or stock kept off, the same could not have been har-
vested because of the sage brush which was left on the plowed ground.
The testimony on behalf of contestee shows that prior to December
21, 1903, something like $900 had been expended in securing a wTater
supply and about twenty acres had been plowed. One witness esti-
mated the acreage of the plowed ground by guessing and another by
stepping. One witness saw water in the west lateral going past the
southwest corner of the Rice tract in the fall of 1903 but he did not
follow it down and thinks the time was after final proof advertise-
ment. He saw water on the Costley claim prior to December 21,
1903, but it wTas from the Last Chance. The east lateral only ex-
tended part way across the Rice claim in the fall of 1903, but there
was water in it. At date of proof there was a pond of water at the
terminus of this lateral on the Rice claim, there being at that point
quite a little rise. The lateral was constructed in the same manner
as the west one, it was partly built in the fall of 1903 and completed
in the spring of 1904. It was intended to go through to the Costley
claim but the water froze up in the canal and the contractor had other
work to do. It is claimed that no laterals are needed on the land
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south of the Last Chance, being an increased growth of grass there
due to sub-irrigation. It is said the land sub-irrigates very easily on
account of the substratum of lava rock being so near the surface. It
is admitted the plowed ground was not prior to contest cleared of
brush, leveled nor harrowed, as the custom is not to do these things
until crops are put in. On cross-examination of contestee's witnesses
it was testified that water was turned into the laterals solely for the
purpose of enabling her to make final proof, but on re-direct that
testimony is explained by saying it was for the purpose of testing the
efficiency of the irrigation system. A witness said that water was not
upon every legal subdivision prior to or at date of proof, but still
the land had been reclaimed at that time sufficient to produce an
agricultural crop " a good many times over/' It is difficult to under-
stand to what particular part of the claim this statement refers, or
to reconcile it with the other testimony in the case. One of contestee's
witnesses said it was practicable to irrigate the east part of the NE.
^
of the NE. ^ of Sec. 22 from the west lateral but that a good deal of
the land has a ridge running through it and it would require another
lateral to water the northwest corner of said tract. Another witness
who did the plowing on this claim in the fall of 1903 testified there
were fourteen and one half acres of it, in addition to the piece of
plowing under the Last Chance canal, which contained six or seven
acres. Nothing was done except the plowing, in doing which, when
large sage brush was struck they plowed it right up or " would dodge
around " it. The ground was not harrowed nor was the sage brush
cleared up. He saw water going the entire length of the west lateral
the first of November, 1903, and thinks half of the claim could be
irrigated from it, if necessary. This lateral was the only one that
conducted water to the Costley claim in the fall of 1903. Prior to
December 21, 1903, water ran past the terminus of this lateral—it was
turned off because they " got it down to where we wanted to go "
—
turned' it in next evening and it ran all one night—not certain whether
these two times were the only times water was in that lateral prior
to December 21, 1903. The lateral terminates in a low gulley but it
can be conducted around.
Q. Was there any lateral upon the XE. } of the NW. i of See. 23, at that
time?—A. No sir.
Q. State whether or not on December 21, 1903, water had been distributed
through or by means of ditches over all of this land on each legal subdivision
thereof.—A. No, it had not ; these two fractions, this fraction you are speaking
of in here there is not any lateral except the Last Chance canal.
Witness said the tract southeast of the Last Chance sub-irrigated in
1902—could not say just as much as it does now but greater portion
of the tract that sub-irrigates now sub-irrigated then. The testimony
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on behalf of contestee likewise shows that the land in controversy
would produce paying crops of grain, the character of the land and
climatic conditions not being such as to prevent the raising of such
crops. At time of hearing water was flowing in both laterals and
forty or fifty acres were plowed, cleared and in cultivation.
The first section of the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377), entitled
"An act to provide for the sale of desert lands in certain States and
Territories," provides for the reclamation of such lands by " conduct-
ing water upon the same." The second section provides " that all
lands exclusive of timber lands and mineral lands which will not,
without irrigation, produce some agricultural crop, shall be deemed
desert lands within the meaning of this act."
The act did not specify how or to what extent land was to be
reclaimed thereunder, except " by conducting water upon the same,"
nor did it contain any penalty or forfeiture clause for failure to
properly reclaim the land. In this respect the instructions of March
12, 1877 (2 C. L. L., 1375), merely followed the language of the act.
The entryman was required, as an assurance of good faith, to advance
twenty-five cents per acre of the price fixed for the land at the time
of filing his declaration, and he was given three years in which to sub-
mit proof of the reclamation of the land " in the manner aforesaid."
and upon payment of an additional sum of one dollar per acre a patent
Avas to be issued to him. The act granted 640 acres of desert lands,
an area larger than under the pre-emption and homestead laws,
because it was deemed that a lesser area would not justify the outlay
of capital and labor necessary to procure a water supply, the subject
of reclamation being at the time more or less problematical. The
instructions of March 12, 1877, supra, were supplemented by those of
September 3, 1880 (2 C, L. L., 1382), wherein it was said:
I am of the opinion that it* it be shown that a sufficient quantity of water
has been brought upon the land to irrigate the irltolc thereof, and the water is
properly distributed, so that the entire tract is, in fact, irrigated in a manner
suitable for cultivation, and the whole thereof is in good condition for agri-
cultural purposes, as a practical cultivator would be likely to use the land, and
in a manner that evinces the good faith of the claimant and the actual and
practical reclamation of the irltolc of the land, and that an agricultural crop
has been raised on some portions thereof, the proof should be deemed sufficient.
In preparing the blank forms for final proof under the act of 1877
it was deemed proper to insert questions as to the cultivation and
growing of agricultural crops upon the lands entered, and upon the
suggestion of your office "that there is nothing in the language of
the statute requiring proof of cultivation or of the growing of agri-
cultural crops upon the land entered as a prerequisite to the issuance
of patent therefor," it was held in the case of Wallace v. Boyce
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(1 L. D., 26), August 2, 1882, after stating that the blank forms of
proof were not in contravention of the act, and that they were drawn
" with direct reference to the proof of such facts as will show com-
pliance by showing results :"
The primal question to be determined is the signification of the word " re-
claim," as the same is used in the statute. It is presumable that Congress
used this word in its ordinary acceptation, which, according to Webster, is
:
"To reduce by discipline, labor, cultivation, or the like, to a desired state;
to rescue from being wild, desert, waste, submerged, or the like; as to reclaim
wild land, overflowed land, etc."
Hence, I am of the opinion that the intendment of the statute is to provide
for the reclamation of such lands from their desert condition to an agricultural
state. Congress specified water as the means to that end, but the mere con-
veying of water upon the land is not a fulfillment of the law, unless in suffi-
cient quantity to prepare such land for cultivation. It would be imputing a
vain intent to the statute to interpret the same as requiring a mere occasional
seepage of water upon such land, which in itself would not materially change
the original status of the same so far as agricultural purposes are concerned.
In the case of Babcock v. Watson et al. (2 L. D., 19), August 7,
1883, it was said:
The expression " some agricultural crop " does not refer solely to the amount
of the crop : it also refers to kind. It may be grass, it may be wheat or barley,
or some other crop to which the country and climate in the region of the land
are generally adapted.
And in Miller v. Noble (3 L. D., 9), under date of July 14, 1884:
In Wallace v. Boyce (1 L. D., 54), this Department held substantially that
final proof must show that the land from a desert condition has been reduced
to an agricultural state. But in the case of Babcock v. Watson (2 L. D., 19), it
was said, in referring to the phrase "some agricultural crop," that it meant
not only the amount of the crop, but also the kind, and that it might include
grass, wheat, or barley, or such other crop as the country and climate were
adapted to. Hence it would seem that " results " might be shown after a suffi-
cient lapse of time, even though no attempt was made to cultivate the land by
plowing and sowing seed.
In departmental circular of February 9, 1885 (3 L. D., 385). it
was said, referring among other things to the questions in the printed
form for taking proof and the case of Wallace v. Boyce, supra:
There is nothing in the act that requires such proof be furnished, and in the
case referred to, I said I did not think a regulation of the office that such proof
be furnished can be said to be in contravention of the act. I am disposed to
modify the views thus expressed as it may be a hardship in many cases to
require proof of this character. The fact to be ascertained is, has the claimant
of desert lands reclaimed the lands within the meaning of the act He has
three years to make such reclamation which can only be done in one way, and
that is with water. It is true that evidence that such reclamation is perfect
and complete will be by proof of an agricultural crop raised on such land by
the aid of the water so brought on the land .... But it is not the only proof,
and might not be at all times the best proof .... The act very clearly contem-
plates that the reclamation must be from a desert state to an agricultural one,
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and that is proved where it shows that the claimant is the owner of a sufficient
quantity of water to irrigate the land claimed, sufficiently for agricultural pur-
poses and has conveyed such water on the lands in such manner that he can use
it for the purpose of irrigating his crop. The mere carrying of water on the
land is not sufficient : it must he in sufficient quantities that a crop can be raised
by the aid of the water so conveyed on the land. I do not think it is necessary
to distribute the water over the land as is done in the course of irrigation.
That would be to require a useless thing of the claimant, but the water must be.
conveyed to the highest portions of the land.
* * * * * * *
Your regulations should therefore be so amended as to allow other evidence
of the reclamation of land besides that of a growing crop. The raising of an
agricultural crop may be evidence of reclamation, but is not the only evidence
that ought to be received, and ought not at any time to dispense with actual
proof as to the character of the ditch, quantity of water, etc., owned by the
claimant.
i
In instructions of your office of July 23, 1885 (4 L. D., 51), it was
said
:
The raising of a crop without irrigation is not evidence of reclamation. But
where land would not, without artificial irrigation, produce any agricultural
crop, it must be reclaimed by conducting water upon it and upon every sub-
division of it. There must be a proprietorship of sufficient water to continue
the irrigation and make the reclamation perpetual. And the reclamation must
be proven by evidence showing its manner and extent, and the results attained,
as indicated in the forms of proof prescribed by official regulations.
I shall require evidence that the law has been complied with in form and
spirit I do not think the fact that crops can be raised is established until it
is shown that crops liarc been raised, and it must also be shown that the raising
of the crop is the result of a reclamation without which the crop could not have
been raised.
The purpose of the desert land act is not to enable persons to acquire title
to six hundred and forty acre tracts of public land by mere formalities and
constructive compliance with law. The purpose is to secure the actual and per-
manent reclamation of land which in a natural state is unproductive.
The decision of date September 1, 1886, in the case of George
Ramsey (5 L. D., 120), after referring to 3 L. D., 385, contains this
statement
:
But I will go one step further than my predecessor, and hold that the whole
tract for which proof is offered (unless it be possibly some high points or
uneven surfaces which are practically not susceptible of irrigation) must be
actually irrigated in a manner indicative of the good faith of the claimant. In
this connection the right to the water used, the quantity of it, the manner of
its distribution, and the permanency of the supply are all to be taken into
consideration.
In the case of Charles H. Schick (5 L. D., 151), September 14,
188C), it was held that proof of crops raised may be regarded as sup-
plementing proof of irrigation, but should not be held as an essential
requirement in final proof.
496 DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
In the circular of June 27, 1887 (5 L. D., 708), it was stated that a
person who makes a desert land entry before he has secured a water
right does so at his own risk, and that the whole tract and each legal
subdivision for which proof is offered must be actually irrigated.
In ex parte William G. Eudd (7 L. D., 167), August 8, 1888, it
was held
:
In his appeal he admits that he had not reclaimed the land nor conducted
water thereon as required by law, but avers that as the proof shows that a
large amount of work had heen done with a view to reclamation of the land by
conducting water thereon, and since the failure to conduct water upon said land
within the time required by law was owing to no fault of his, but was caused
by matters over which he had no control, therefore said proof should have been
accepted as satisfactory and as evincing his good faith. The contention of
appellant cannot be sustained. A showing of his intentions, however good they
may have been, cannot avail in the absence of proof showing that what the law
requires to be done in the matter of reclamation has been done.
It appears from the proof which was offered and which the local office and
your office rejected, that ditches had been dug to conduct water upon the land
but that no water had been so conducted.
Iii ex parte Adam Schindler (7 L. D., 253), August 22, 1888,
although the proof showed that a large portion of the land had been
cultivated to wheat, barley and vegetables, supplemental proof was
required because the original proof failed to show what proportion of
each legal subdivision had been irrigated.
The following is an extract from the decision in ex parte Emma J.
Warren (8 L. D., 113), January 22, 1889:
Upon the other point appealed from, your decision is also affirmed in requir-
ing additional proof, showing a satisfactory reclamation of the land by such
means as will give reasonable promise of permanence. It must be qualified,
however, so far as it insists upon an actual raising of crops as an absolute con-
dition or evidence of reclamation. See George Ramsey (5 L. D., 120) ; Charles
H. Schick (ibidem, 151). The raising of crop is not made by law a necessary
fact ; the reclamation may be established without it ; yet, as the object of
reclamation is to raise crops—among which I would include crops of grasses
that would not otherwise grow upon the land—it is one evidence of reclamation
usually to be expected as an accompanying fact. When, therefore, the proof
fails to show that any crops have been produced upon the land, it ought to be
required of the entryman to give satisfactory and trustworthy testimony of
other facts which will satisfy the mind that the reclamation has in fact been
made.
See also case of Vibrans v. Langtree (9 L. D., 419), of date Sep-
tember 26, 1889.
In the case of Gilkison v. Coughanhour (11 L. D., 246), September
5. 1890, a contest charging the non-desert character of the land Avas
dismissed, but as the proof failed to show definitely what proportion
of each legal subdivision had been irrigated, claimant was required to
furnish supplementary proof, although " the water may have been
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 497
brought to the land in sufficient quantities to reclaim it. Possibly,
but for the freezing weather . . . the water would have been
running over and through each subdivision of the land ; but the inci-
dent of the freezing weather and the consequent failure to irrigate the
land, can not excuse claimant from showing its reclamation."
From the foregoing a fair conception may be had as to how the
desert land act of 1877 was construed up to the passage of the
act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095). While it can not be said
that such construction has been entirely uniform, yet force must
be given the fact that an act was being construed which only requires
reclamation of desert lands " by conducting water upon the same."
The act of March 3, 1877, was amended by the act of March 3, 1891,
supra, and the significance of this new legislation can very well be
determined by reference to the limited provisions of the act of 1877
and the constructions placed thereon by the land department, as it
must be presumed such provisions and constructions were fully in the
mind of Congress when the act of 1891 was framed. The distinguish-
ing features of said act necessary to be stated here are : Proof of the
cultivation of one-eighth of the land is required ; the quantity of land
that may be entered is reduced to 320 acres; and the time within
which the land is to be reclaimed is extended to four years. It is also
provided in said act
—
That this act shall not affect any valid rights heretofore accrued under said
act of March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-seven, but all bona fide claims
heretofore lawfully initiated may be perfected, upon due compliance with the
provisions of said act, in the same manner, upon the same terms and conditions,
and subject to the same limitations, forfeitures, and contests as if this act had
not been passed.
Explanation is found in the foregoing for the fact that depart-
mental decisions, to which reference is made in attorneys' briefs,
have been rendered since the act of 1891, which follow the rules and
decisions under the act of 1877, with no reference to the new legis-
lation. But in those cases the entries were made prior to the amend-
atory act of 1891 and were therefore not necessarily controlled by
the stricter provisions of said act. In this connection see William
Skeen (14 L. D., 270); John H. Kirk (15 L. D., 535); Meads v.
Geiger (16 L. D., 366); Dickinson v. Auerbach (18 L. D., 16);
Thompson v. Bartholet (18 L. D., 96) ; Rider v. Atwater (20 L. D.,
449) ; Gage v. Atwater (21 L. D., 211) ; and United States v. Mc-
Kinney (27 L. D., 516).
The act of March 3, 1891, in addition to its other requirements
also provided " that proof be further required of the cultivation of
one-eighth of the land." Therefore, as to one-eighth of the land at
least, the proviso clearly contemplates something more than, some-
thing distinct from, reclaiming said land " by conducting water upon
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the same." During the course of the debates in Congress upon this
legislation it was said
:
Under this bill public lands that are susceptible of cultivation can not be
acquired except in one of two ways : either under the homestead law by an
actual settler, or under the modified desert-land law upon actual reclamation.
There must be either actual reclamation or actual settlement by a homesteader
upon the public land.
Water is the means of reclamation under the desert land law, and
to secure actual reclamation even under the act of 1877, water must
be conveyed in sufficient quantities upon each legal subdivision and
so distributed as to thoroughly irrigate the land. But this is not
the sole requirement under the act of 1891 ; in addition a specified
portion of the land must be cultivated. There is nothing from which
it can be inferred that the word " cultivation " was employed in the :
act in any different sense from what is ordinarily understood by that
term, namely, tillage, which, as defined by Webster, is " the operation,
practice, or act of tilling or preparing land for seed, and keeping the
ground in a state favorable for the growth of crops." The evident
purpose of the additional requirement of proof as to cultivation
of one-eighth of the land was to show the sufficiency of the irrigation
system. The primary object of the act of 1877 was the change of
lands from a desert to an agricultural state, " to secure the actual
and permanent reclamation of land which in a natural state is unpro-
ductive," and that title might not pass upon a mere constructive com-
pliance with the law, the additional requirement of cultivation was
put in the amendatory act of 1891. The definition of " reclaim " as
|
given by Webster, is : " To reduce to a desired state by discipline,
labor, cultivation, or the like; to rescue from being wild, desert,
waste, submerged, or the like; as, to reclaim wild land, overflowed
land, etc." The act of 1877 designates desert lands to be lands
" which will not, without irrigation, produce some agricultural crop."
In construing said act it is held by the Department that the term
" crop " means such an agricultural production as would be a fair
reward for the expense of producing it, and within that term may
be included grass, wheat or barley, or " some other crop to which the
country and climate in the region of the land are generally adapted."
Therefore it would seem that the necessary corollary would be, even
under the act of 1877, that reclamation of an arid, unproductive
tract is not an accomplished fact until it is at least in condition to
produce an agricultural crop, notwithstanding it has been held under
said act of 1877 that " the fact of reclamation may be established
without showing crops as the result of irrigation."
The desert land law has undoubtedly been construed along the same
lines as other laws having reference to agricultural lands, as the
primary object of said law is to change desert lands as such to an
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agricultural state. Under exceptional circumstances acts performed
in good faith which do not come strictly within the ordinary mean-
ing of the term " cultivation " are sometimes accepted in lieu of the
actual tillage of the soil. Thus, clearing the land of timber for the
purpose of planting it, is cultivation within the meaning of section
2301 of the Revised Statutes. John E. Tyrl (3 L. D., 49). " There
was some planting done for three years, and some little stirring of
the ground every year since the date of entry. This is not sufficient
of itself. He should have shown that this breaking and cultivating
was done in a proper manner at the proper season of the year, and
that the planting was also done in that manner." Taylor v. Huffman
(5 L. D., 40). The cultivation contemplated by the homestead law
is undoubtedly the preparation and use of the soil for agricultural
purposes, whereby the land is reclaimed from its wild state and made
productive. John T. Wooten (5 L. D., 389). Proof of the requisite
improvements to secure pasturage and the production of grass, may be
properly accepted in lieu of the usual proof of cultivation, where it
appears that the land is better adapted to grazing purposes than to
the cultivation of crops that require tillage of the soil. Mary A.
Taylor (7 L. D., 200); Michael McKillip (7 L. D., 455). While
cultivation ultimately includes the planting and raising of crops,
there may be cultivation without this ; one definition of the word being
"improvement for agricultural purposes." George W. Johnson (7
L. D., 439). In this case claimant used the land principally for
pasturage. This, with the value and permanent character of his
buildings and the fact that he had broken between two and three
acres, was considered sufficient cultivation. In the commutation of
homestead entries breaking may be accepted as satisfactory proof of
cultivation if good faith appears and the proof is satisfactory in
other respects. T. H. Quigley (8 L. D., 551) ; Caroline Welo (8 L. D.,
612) ; Thomas C. Burns (9 L. D., 432) ; Rosa B. Riggs (10 L. D.,
526). In the case of timber-culture entries made prior to the regula-
tions of June 27, 1887, the preparation of the land and planting of
trees are acts of cultivation. Christian Isaak (9 L. D., 624). But
no fixed rule can be laid down as to what shall constitute satisfactory
cultivation under the timber-culture law. Costello v. Jansen ( 10
L. D., 10). Planting a crop with no expectation or intention of
securing a return therefrom is not compliance with the homestead law
in the matter of cultivation. Reas v. Ludlow (22 L. D., 205). Resi-
dence alone will not be held sufficient compliance with the law and
is not considered by decisions of the department to be so. Settlement
and cultivation are both required by section 2290 of the Revised
Statutes, and cultivation is required by section 2291 of the Revised
Statutes, as construed by decisions. Norton v. Ackley (29 L. D., 561).
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In the case of John Cunningham (32 L. D., 207), referring to the
case of George W. Johnson, supra, it was held, syllabus
:
A showing on the part of a desert-land entryman that as a result of irrigation
of the land there is a marked increase in the growth of the native grasses
thereon, sufficient to support stock, is sufficient proof of cultivation.
The instructions of February 17, 1904 (32 L. D., 456), in which
reference is made to the Cunningham decision, were issued for the
reason, as stated therein, that possibly some expressions in said de-
cision might " be taken as indicating a purpose to encourage the offer
and sanction the acceptance of final proofs in desert land entries that
do not clearly establish a strict compliance with all the requirements
of law." These instructions do not, and were not designed to, as has
been contended, enunciate any additional or more rigid rule than pre-
viously existed. On the contrary, they expressly state that they were
prepared " for the purpose of laying down with greater exactness the
proper rule to be observed in passing upon final proofs in desert land
entries." Not a new rule, but the rule already in existence, the en-
forcement of which had in some cases become unduly lax. From
what is hereinbefore set forth it can readily be seen that these in-
structions not only do not constitute a new rule but are fully justified
by the amendatory act of 1891, which expressly imposes an additional
requirement over the act of 1877 and at the same time gives an addi-
tional year in which to comply with said requirement. While the
mere conducting of water to or upon the land so as to render it avail-
able for distribution when needed, may have satisfied the act of 1877,
it plainly does not fulfill all the requirements of the act of 1891.
As to the material points in this controversy the evidence as a whole
is entirely reconcilable. By a preponderance of said evidence it is
shown that prior to final proof and contest only one lateral, that on
the west, from the main Dewey canal, was constructed to this land.
Whether the carrying capacity of said canal was sufficient, and the
quantity of water therein at the time was sufficient, and whether
contestee by reason of her alleged ownership of water stock entitled
her to an adequate supply for her claim, or not, the fact remains that
at time of proof water was not, and could not be in the nature of
things, as shown by the evidence, distributed over the whole suscepti-
ble area of said claim so as to actually irrigate and reclaim it. The
east lateral, which it is said was also for the purpose of conveying
water to this land, was not constructed to said land at date of proof.
It is admitted on behalf of contestee that only half of the claim could
be watered from the west lateral. Only a small portion of the claim
could have been irrigated from the Last Chance canal even though
laterals had been taken out. The mere fact that this canal traversed
this claim is not sufficient in itself to constitute reclamation of the
territory traversed. Nilson v. Anderson (23 L. D., 138), There was
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an area in the northeast of the claim in section 23, dependent upon
the east lateral, which, as stated, was not completed until the spring
of 1904, and not all of the land in section 22 could have been watered
from the west lateral. But under the act of 1891 no amount of water
stock nor available water can take the place of the work required to be
done in the way of cultivation. It is doubtful whether the requisite
number of acres had been plowed even. Other things being equal, the
testimony of persons who actually measure a tract of land with a
measuring instrument would ordinarily be accepted in preference to
an estimate by those who merely view or step the premises. But
whether the required acreage had been plowed or not is immaterial in
this instance because the manner in which the plowing was done could
in no sense be accepted as a compliance with law in the matter of
cultivation, even if plowing might possibly in proper instance be
accepted as cultivation. Desert land can not be said to be changed
to an agricultural state—to a condition suitable for agricultural pur-
poses—if there be left upon it, for instance, a growth of sage brush
that not only seriously interferes with the plowing itself, but would
render the harvesting of crops well-nigh impossible in the event they
were planted.
Applying the instructions of February 17, 1901, the evidence here
shows there was not even a marked increase in the growth of grass
on one-eighth of the land, clue to irrigation, and that grass sufficient
to support stock had not been produced by reason of the irrigation
system proper and probably not otherwise. It was shown that
climatic conditions are not such as to prevent the raising of good
and paying crops of both hay and grain and that tillage of the soil
would not injure its productive qualities. While contestee may have
an absolute right to sufficient water to irrigate the land, it conclu-
sively appears that at time of proof the system of ditches was
entirely inadequate to conduct water to and distribute it over the land.
In fact, no ditches had at that time been taken out from the laterals.
Certainly the turning of water once or twice into an inadequate
lateral does not satisfactorily demonstrate the sufficiency of the water
supply nor the effectiveness of the irrigation system. It is true
the proof was prematurely made, in the sense that it was made prior
to the expiration of the statutory period, that at time of hearing the
irrigation system was in working condition ; and that a large number
of acres were broken, cleared and in cultivation. These considera-
tions might possibly be given weight were the case one between the
entryman and the government, but as contestee saw fit to submit
proof at the time she did, and in the presence of a successful con-
testant whose rights in the premises can not justly be ignored, they
can not avail.
The decision of your office herein is reversed, and the entry in
question will be canceled.
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nOMESTEAD ENTRY-QUALFFICATIOXS—KINKAID ACT.
Arthur J. Abbott.
The act of April 28, 1004, known as the " Kinkaid Act," does not repeal any of
the provisions of the homestead laws, but merely amends said laws by
allowing entry of a greater number of acres, within the limits designated,
than is permitted thereunder, and one disqualified to make entry under
the general homestead laws, by reason of being the owner of more than
one hundred and sixty acres of land, is therefore likewise disqualified to
make entry under said act.
The qualifications of an applicant to make additional entry under the act of
April 28, 1904, must be determined as of the date of the presentation of the
application and not as of the date when his original entry was made.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 23, 1906. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by Arthur J. Abbott from the decision of
your office of November 18, 1905, approving the action of the local
officers in rejecting his homestead application under the act of April
28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), for the W. J, NW. J NE. J, S. J SE. J, lots 1
and 4, Sec. 11, T. 24 N., R. 38 W., containing 478.1G acres, Broken
Bow, Nebraska.
In said application, which was filed November 21, 1904, Abbott
stated that he made homestead entry for a quarter section of land at
Oberlin, Kansas, upon which proof was made in 1889 after five years'
residence. In an affidavit accompanying said application, he stated
that he " at this time is the owner of more than one hundred and sixty
acres of land the title to which is vested in affiant by purchase. That
the land so owned by affiant is located in the townships and ranges in
or near which the lands herein applied for are located. That said
lands are used for pasture and grazing purposes and are of no value
for agricultural purposes. That the lands herein applied for are
valuable only for grazing and pasture and that affiant desires to enter
the same for that purpose and no other." The rejection of Abbott's
application to ener the land in question is on the ground that he is
disqualified by reason of the ownership of more than 160 acres of
land. It is urged, however, that he is qualified to enter said land
regardless of the fact that he has acquired other lands by purchase
since his original homestead entry.
The act of April 28, 1904, supra, entitled " An act to amend the
homestead laws as to certain unappropriated and unreserved lands in
Nebraska," provides in part
:
That from and after sixty days after the approval of this act entries made
under the homestead laws in the State of Nebraska west and north of the follow-
ing line, to wit . . . shall not exceed in area six hundred and forty acres. . . .
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Sec 2. That entryrnen under the homestead laws of the United States within
the territory above described who own and occupy the land heretofore entered
by them, may, under the provisions of this act and subject to its conditions,
enter other lands contiguous to their said homestead entry, which shall not,
with the land so already entered, owned and occupied, exceed in the aggregate
six hundred and forty acres ; and residence upon the original homestead shall
be accepted as equivalent to residence upon the additional land so entered, but
final entry shall not be allowed of such additional land, until five years after
entering the same.
Sec. 3. . . . That the commutation provisions of the homestead law shall not
apply to entries under this act, and at time of making final proof the entryman
must prove affirmatively that he has placed upon the lands entered permanent
improvements of the value of not less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre for each acre included in his entry : Provided, That a former homestead
shall not be a bar to the entry under the provisions of this act of a tract which
together with the former entry, shall not exceed six hundred and forty acres.
It is under this last provision (first proviso) that the application
here in question is made. The circular of instructions under said
act, dated May 31, 1904 (32 L. D., 670), as amended by circular of
August 21, 1005 (34 L. D., 87), provides:
By the first proviso of section 3, any person who made a homestead entry
prior to his application for entry under this act, will be allowed to make an
additional entry for a quantity of land which, added to the area of the land
embraced in the former entry, shall not exceed 640 acres, but residence and cul-
tivation of the additional land will be required to be made and proved as in
ordinary homestead entries.
The circular also provides:
Under said act no bar is interposed to the making of second homesteads for
the full area of G40 acres by parties entitled thereto under existing laws, and
applications therefor will be considered under the instructions of the respective
laws under which they are made.
It was evidently not the intention of Congress by this act of April
28, 1904, to repeal any of the provisions of the homestead laws, but
merely to amend said laws, as shown by the title of said act, and only
in the manner specifically indicated therein, namely, to allow a
greater number of acres over what could ordinarily be entered under
said laws, owing to the character of the lands, and upon final proof
to require a showing of a certain expenditure per acre, also due to
the character of said lands which are not susceptible of cultivation
but fit only for grazing purposes. Beyond this the existing laws are
to remain in full force and they prohibit homestead entry to one who
is owner of more than 160 acres. This is clearly indicated by the
language of the act and the purpose for which it was passed, as well
as by the circular instructions thereunder. In this case the former
homestead entry of Abbott was no bar under said act to his making
additional entry of enough of' these lands to equal 640 acres, provided
he was otherwise qualified under the homestead lawr s. Not being so
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qualified by reason of His ownership of more than 160 acres, his appli-
cation was properly rejected. The disqualification so resulting is
operative regardless of the manner in which title to the other hind
wTas obtained, and there can be no exception on account of the owner-
ship being of lands fit only for grazing purposes. Then too, also
following the general rule, Abbott's qualification to enter these lands
must be determined at date of his present application and not as of
the date when his former entry was made.
The foregoing is on the assumption that Abbott, in saying he de-
sired to enter these lands only for grazing purposes, did not also
mean to say that it was not his intention to reside on said lands ; but
that although making his home theron he expected to use the lands
only for grazing purposes.
The decision of your office herein is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT—RIGHT OFWAY—SECTION 13, ACT OF FEBRUARY 28,
1902.
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co.
The right of way granted by section 13 of the act of February 28, 1902, is a
mere easement, for " depot grounds, terminals, and other railway purposes,"
and the grantee has no authority to extract oil from the grounds embraced
in a right of way acquired under said act.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
March 23, 1906. (G. B. G.)
By reference of the 3d instant I am requested " to consider and
report as to the proper course to be pursued " in the matter of the
alleged extraction of mineral oils by one J. B. Showalter, of Butler,
Pennsylvania, from the right of way of the Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Railway Company, near the town of Cleveland, Oklahoma.
It seems that Mr. Showalter is operating under a lease from said
company several oil-bearing wells upon a portion of the right of way
near said town, acquired by said company under section 13 of the act
of February 28, 1902 (32 Stat., 43).
In my opinion of March 14, 1905 (33 L. D., 470), I advised you that
the grant of the right of way to said company, found in the act of
July 26, 1866 (14 Stat., 289), is similar to the grant of right of way
made to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of July 2,
1864, and, upon authority of the case of the Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company v. Townsend (190 U. S., 267, 271), said that the Mis-
souri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company is not authorized to use
or permit the use of its right of way for a purpose not contemplated
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by the granting act, and that although said company took a base fee
under its grant of right of way, yet it did not acquire the right to
take mineral oils therefrom.
The opinion referred to would be conclusive of the question here
presented except for the fact, above stated, that the matters involved
in this reference relate to a portion of the company's right of way
acquired under the act of February 28, 1902, instead of under the
act of July 2G, 1866.
Section 13 of the act of February 28, 1902, is as follows:
That the right to locate, construct, own, equip, operate, use, and maintain a
railway and telegraph and telephone line or lines into, in, or through the
Indian Territory, together with the right to take and condemn lands for right
of way, depot grounds, terminals, and other railway purposes, in or through any
lands held by any Indian tribe or nation, person, individual, or municipality in
said Territory, or in or through any lands in said Territory which have been or
may hereafter be allotted in severalty to any individual Indian or other person
under any law or treaty, whether the same have or have not been conveyed to
the allottee, with full power of alienation, is hereby granted to any railway
company organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State or
Territory, which shall comply with this act.
I do not think there can be any doubt that a right of way acquired
under this statute is a mere easement—a title of even less dignity
than that given by the granting act of 1866—and therefore with
better reason it follows that the company is not authorized to use it
except for " depot grounds, terminals, and other railway purposes."
The mineral oils underneath this right of way are part of the
realty, do not appear to be needed for any railway purpose, and are
clearly not within the privilege granted by the act of February 28,
1902. The appropriation thereof is a manifest invasion of rights
belonging to the owner of the fee. I advise you that such owner,
whether it be an individual Indian, or an Indian tribe or nation, is
entitled to the protection of the United States government, and that
the matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for the
institution of such proceedings in that behalf as it is thought may be
successfully maintained.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
Burtis v. State of Kansas et al.
Motion for review of departmental decision of December 16, 1905,
U L. D., 304, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, March 23, 1906.
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PRIVATE LAND CLAIM—CONFIRMATION OF TITLE—ACT OF MARCH 3,
1891.
Ely's Administrator v. Magee et al. (Rancho de San Jose de
SONOITA.)
There is no provision in the act of March 3, 1891, requiring one claiming a com-
plete and perfect title through the Spanish or Mexican government to
lands situated within the territory embraced in the Gadsden Purchase,
who does not come into court voluntarily for the purpose of having his
title confirmed under section 8 of said act, but is brought into court by
the United States without his consent, to except from his claim, and, as a
condition to the confirmation of his title, to recognize the title of the United
States to. such portions of the lands claimed by him as may have been sold
or disposed of by the United States.
The United States may, under the provisions of said act, bring the grant claim-
ant into court without his consent, for the purpose of determining whether
he has any title to the lands claimed, and, if so, the extent of such title,
but not for the purpose of confirming the title to portions of said lands sold
or disposed of by the United States.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office is without authority or discretion
to adjudge and determine whether the survey of a private land grant con-
forms to the decree of the court confirming the grant, but has simply to
perform the ministerial duty of issuing patent for the land according to the
lines of the survey as approved by the court and in accordance with tbe
terms of the decree.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 26, 1906. (E. F. B.)
This case comes before the Department upon the appeal of Santiago
Ainsa, administrator of the estate of Frank Ely, from the decision of
your office of November 9, 1904, requiring him to show cause why all
the lands within the limits of the private land claim known as the
Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita that were disposed of and patented
by the United States prior to the decree of confirmation by the Court
of Private Land Claims " should not be specifically excepted from the
patent proposed to be issued in favor of said grant."
Appellant insists that the confirmation of said claim was for the
entire tract embraced in the survey, free from all claim of the
patentees under the United States; and, further, that the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office has no office to perform except
the simple and purely ministerial duty of issuing a patent in con-
formity with the approved survey made in pursuance of the decree.
The private land claim known as the Rancho de San Jose de So-
noita is in that part of the Territory of Arizona acquired by the
United States under the Gadsden purchase and is one of the claims
recognized and protected by the stipulations in Articles 8 and 9 of
the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, which were reaffirmed in Article
5 of the Gadsden Treaty.
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Provision was made for the adjustment of these claims by the
act of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308), which made it the duty of the
Surveyor-General of New Mexico (which then included what is
now the Territory of Arizona) to ascertain, under instructions from
the Secretary of the Interior, the origin, nature, character and
extent of all claims to lands under laws, usages and customs of Spain
and Mexico originating before the cession of the territory to the
United States, and the same powers and duties were conferred upon
the Surveyor-General of Arizona by the act of July 15, 1870 (16
Stat, 304).
A petition for the confirmation of this grant under said acts was
filed with the Surveyor-General, but it had never been acted upon
by Congress and the claim had never been surveyed by authority
of the United States until the survey made in accordance with the
decree of the Court of Private Land Claims. Prior to that decree
the United States had extended the public-land surveys over a por-
tion of the claim, as defined by the survey made in conformity with
said decree, and had disposed of and patented a number of claims
within said limits to pre-emption settlers as public lands of the
United States.
Such was the status of the claim and of the lands in controversy
at the date of the passage of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 854),
establishing a Court of Private Land Claims for the adjustment and
confirmation of claims under grants from the Mexican government
to lands in Arizona and the other States and Territories named
therein. That act repealed section 8 of the act of July 22, 1854,
and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with its provisions.
Under a provision of section 8 of said act of March 3, 1891, the
United States filed a petition in the Court of Private Land Claims
against Ainsa, as administrator of Ely and others, alleging that
' said administrator claimed to be the owner through mesne convey-
i ances of a tract of land known as the Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita
under a complete and perfect title, emanating from the Mexican
government prior to the date when the United States acquired
sovereignty over said territory; that said claimant had not volun-
tarily come into court seeking a confirmation of his title under the
provisions of said section 8; that his title was open to question, was
invalid and void, and the land had never been segregated and located.
It was also alleged that the United States had, many years prior to
the filing of said petition, surveyed a portion of the land so claimed
and had disposed of and patented the same to the other defendants
named in the petition, as public lands of the United States. The
prayer of the petition Avas that all of said defendants should be
required to answer, and that defendant Ainsa be required to product'
his title papers, for adjudication, and if it be adjudged to be valid,
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that the extent and boundaries of the claim may be settled and
determined " excepting any part of such lands that should be found
to have been disposed of by the United States."
The answer of the administrator admitted that he was holding
under a complete and perfect title and had not voluntarily come into
court for a consideration of such title. It denied every allegation as
to the invalidity of the title and that it had not been located, and
averred that if any patents had been issued by the United States for
any of said lands, they were wholly invalid and void. No answer
wTas filed by the defendants holding the patents of the United States.
In an amended answer he set out his title and averred that the pos-
session of the defendants holding under patents from the United
States was entirely without his permission and that said patents con-
veyed no title whatever, as the complete and perfect title in fee was
in the owner of the grant at the time of the Gadsden purchase and
the United States never had any title to the same.
The United States denied all matters and things set up in the
answer except so far as they were admissions of the allegations in
the petition and upon the issue thus made the court decided that " the
entire proceedings set forth in the expediente of this title and the
final title issued thereon were without warrant of law and invalid."
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that this grant was one
which, at the time of the cession in 1853, was recognized by the gov-
ernment of Mexico as valid, and therefore one which it was the duty
of the government to respect and enforce. Ely's Adm'r v. United
States (171 U. S., 220, 234).
The judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims was reversed
and the case was remanded with directions to the court " to examine
and decide whether there be sufficient facts to enable it to determine
the true boundaries of the one and three-fourths sitios," the extent of
the grant as found by the Supreme Court.
The final decree made in obedience to the mandate of the Supreme
Court adjudged that the title to said claim was perfect and complete
at the date the United States acquired sovereignty over the territory
and was such a valid title as the United States are bound upon prin-
ciples of the public law and by the provisions of the treaty of cession
to respect as a valid, complete and perfect title at said date. It there-
fore decreed that the title be confirmed in said grantee, his heirs,
successors in interest and assigns, to the extent defined by the
boundaries therein described," subject to such of the limitations and
terms of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1891, as are ap-
plicable hereto." From this there was no appeal.
A survey of the grant was made accordingly and was returned to
the court for its approval in compliance with the statute when a
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petition was presented by the defendants who claimed under patents
from the United States as public lands, asking that the lands so
patented and claimed be expressly excepted from the decree or order
approving the survey. The court overruled and dismissed the peti-
tion, found that the survey conformed with the decree, and directed
that it be approved and returned to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office. No appeal was taken from this ruling.
As to the effect and scope of the decree, an important and decisive
question is whether the act of March 3, 1891, imposes as a condition
to the confirmation of every Mexican grant, the recognition of the
title of the United States to such portions of the grant as it may have
disposed of as public lands, irrespective of the manner in which the
claim came before the court ; in other words, whether the condition
that attaches to confirmation by force of the statute, in cases where
the claimant invokes the aid of the court to confirm his title, applies
with equal force and effect in cases where he does not voluntarily
come into court, but is brought in by the United States to have his
title settled and adjudicated.
Another material and controlling question is whether the duty of
the Commissioner in issuing the patent is not purely ministerial,
without any authority or discretion to adjudge and determine, and,
if this should be answered affirmatively, it may at least be questioned
whether the claimant has selected the proper forum to enforce his
right.
The 6th section of the act provides for the confirmation of such in-
complete and equitable claims to lands as the United States were
bound to recognize and confirm by the treaties of cession. Under
those treaties the United States were invested with the full legal title,
burdened only with the treaty obligation that such claimants shall be
allowed to perfect their titles to the same extent that they would
have been allowed if the land had remained under the jurisdiction
and sovereignty of the foreign government. As the legal title to
the lands so claimed would not be perfected until confirmation, the
United States could convey, at any time prior to such confirmation,
a valid title to the lands, notwithstanding the treaty obligations,
and could therefore add any condition to such confirmation that the
political department of the government chose to impose. One of the
conditions prescribed by the 13th section of the act is that it shall be
obligatory upon such claimants to seek confirmation of the claims
within the time limited by the act or to be forever barred from assert-
ing any claim to such lands.
Section 8 of the act, under which the petition in this case was filed,
provides for the confirmation <and adjustment of claims to lands
where the legal title was acquired by the claimant from the foreign
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government prior to the treaty of cession and where the United. States
never acquired or held any title to such lands. As every part of that
section has a material bearing upon the question at issue, it will be
given in full.
Sec. 8. That any person or corporation claiming lands in any of the States
or Territories mentioned in this act under a title derived from the Spanish or
Mexican government that was complete and perfect at the date when the
United States acquired sovereignty therein, shall have the right (but shall not
be bound) to apply to said court in the manner in this act provided for other
cases for a confirmation of such title ; and on such application said court shall
proceed to hear, try, and determine the validity of the same and the right of
the claimant thereto, its extent, location and boundaries, in the same manner
and with the same powers as in other cases in this act mentioned.
If in any such case, a title so claimed to be perfect shall be established and
confirmed, such confirmation shall be for so much land only as such perfect
title shall be found to cover, always excepting any part of such land that shall
have been disposed of by the United States, and always subject to and not to
affect any conflicting private interests, rights, or claims held or claimed
adversely to any such claim or title, or adversely to the holder of any such
claim or title. And no confirmation of claims or titles in this section mentioned
shall have any effect other or further than as a release of all claim of title
by the United States ; and no private right of any person as between himself and
other claimants or persons, in respect of any such lands, shall be in any manner
affected thereby.
It shall be lawful for and the duty of the head of the Department of Justice,
whenever in his opinion the public interest or the rights of any claimant shall
require it, to cause the attorney of the United States in said court to file in
said court a petition against the holder or possessor of any claim or land in
any of the States or Territories mentioned in this act who shall not have
voluntarily come in under the provisions of this act, stating in substance that
the title of such holder or possessor is open to question, or stating in substance
that the boundaries of any such land, the claimant or possessor to or of which
has not brought the matter into court, are open to question, and praying that
the title to any such land, or the boundaries thereof, if the title be admitted,
be settled and adjudicated; and thereupon the court shall, on such notice to
such claimant or possessor as it shall deem reasonable, proceed to hear, try, and
determine the questions stated in such petition or arising in the matter, and
determine the matter according to law, justice, and the provisions of this act.
but subject to all lawful rights adverse to such claimant or possessor, as
between such claimant and possessor and any other claimant or possessor, and
subject in this respect to all the provisions of this section applicable thereto.
It is a proposition too well settled to be controverted that the United
States never acquired by treaty of cession the title to any land which
at the date of the cession was not in the foreign government. "A
cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property
belonging to its inhabitants. The King cedes that only which be-
longed to him : lands which he had previously granted were not his
to cede." United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 51, 87.
The case cited involved the validity of a grant in the territory
acquired by the Florida cession of February 22, 1819. Perfect and
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complete titles to lands in that territory made by Spain prior to
January 24, 1818, were confirmed by the treaty. They needed no con-
firmation by Congress but could be asserted in the courts upon the
documents under which they were issued. See also United States v.
Wiggins, 14 Pet., 334; United States v. Arredondo, G Pet., 691.
The principle, however, applies with equal force as to lands ac-
quired under every treaty, for the reason that private rights of prop-
erty within the ceded territory are not affected by the change of
jurisdiction and sovereignty and are protected by the usages and
laws of nations independently of the treaty stipulations. Ainsa v.
United States, 161 U. S., 208, 220; Ainsa v. New Mexico and Arizona
R. R. Co., 175 U. S., 76.
But the duty of securing such rights, and of fulfilling treaty obli-
gations imposed upon the United States by the treaty, belongs to
the political department of the government. It may prescribe the
forms and manner of proceeding in order to obtain confirmation, and
may establish tribunals to investigate and pronounce upon their
fairness and validity. De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 12 Wheaton, 599,
601. " Even grants which were complete at the time of the cession
may be required by Congress to have their genuineness and their
extent established by proceedings in a particular manner before they
can be held to be valid." Ainsa v. Railroad Company, 175 U. S., 76,
79. And, although the treaty provisions may be violated, the courts
will follow the statutory enactments of its own government, as they
have no power to enforce the provisions of a treaty with a foreign
nation which the government of the United States, as a sovereign
power, chooses to disregard. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S., 238,
247. Florida v. Furman, 180 U. S., 402. " But where no such pro-
ceedings are expressly required by Congress, the recognition of grants
of this class in the treaty itself is sufficient to give them full effect."
Ainsa v. Railroad Company, 175 U. S., 76, 80.
The opinion of the court in the case last cited is an elaborate review
of the decisions of that court upon the different treaties under which
foreign territory has been acquired by the United States, and of the
legislation by Congress securing rights and fulfilling obligations
under such treaties, showing in what respect the recognition of the
validity of a grant is affected by such legislation.
As shown by the court in that opinion, the effect of the repeal of
the act of July 22, 1854, " and all acts amendatory or in extension
thereof, or supplementary thereto, and all acts or parts of acts incon-
sistent with the provisions of this act " (March 3, 1891), was to give
full effect to complete and perfect grants of lands in the States or
Territories mentioned in said act by reason of the recognition given
to the grant in the treaty itself and to leave them free to be asserted
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in the ordinary courts of justice upon their title papers in the same
manner as grants to lands in Florida and Louisiana could be asserted.
Speaking- of the effect of said repeal the court said:
The result is that the United States, by the act of 1891, have prescribed and
defined the only method by which grants incomplete before the cession can
be completed and made binding upon the United States : but have neither made
it obligatory upon the owner of a title complete and perfect before the cession
to resort to this method, nor declared that his title shall not be valid if he does
not do so.
A grant of land in New Mexico, which was complete and perfect before the
cession of New Mexico to the United States, is in the same position as was a
like grant in Louisiana or in Florida, and is not in the position of one under the
peculiar acts of Congress in relation to California : and may be asserted, as
against any adverse private claimant, in the ordinary courts of justice.
(Page 90.)
From the well-established principles so lucidly stated and applied
in that case we are led to the inquiry whether there is any provision
in the act of March 3, 1891. that requires the owner of a complete
and perfect title to recognize, without his consent, the title of the
United States to any part of "his lands, as a condition to the recog-
nition by the United States of the validity of his title to the full
extent acquired by him from the foreign government.
There is no doubt that while the act was in force the United States
could have invoked the aid of the court to have the validity of any
Mexican grant in said States and Territories adjudicated and deter-
mined, and a decision of the court upon such proceedings adverse to
the claimant would be final unless reversed by the supreme court,
and no court could thereafter recognize such title for any purpose.
In short, the United States, at their election, may have the validity of any
Mexican grant, whether complete or incomplete, determined by the Court of Pri-
vate Land Claims, so far as concerns the interest of the United States ; and pro-
ceedings to establish against the United States private titles claimed under
incomplete Mexican grants are within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court;
but the private holder of any complete and perfect Mexican grant may. but is
not obliged to. have its validity as against the United States determined by that
court; and no rights of private persons, as. between themselves, can be deter-
mined by proceedings under this act. (Page 89.)
The purpose of the act is very plain and the scope and effect of the
decree in a case where confirmation by the court is voluntarily sought,
is easily distinguished from a case where the claimant is involun-
tarily brought before the court, in order that the United States may
have it determined by the court whether he has any title or not.
A decree of confirmation being final and conclusive as to the valid-
ity of the title, so far as the interest of the United States is concerned,
would avoid the.neces-ity thereafter of having to assert and defend
such title upon the documents under which it was issued and it was
therefore a valuable right. The act did not require a claimant who
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had a complete title to go before the court to test its validity, but per-
mitted him to do so upon the condition that " such confirmation shall
be for so much land only as such perfect title shall be fo*md to cover,
always excepting any part of such land that shall have been disposed
of by the United States," and by the 14th section of the act it was
provided
—
That if in any case it shall appear that the lands or any part thereof decreed
to any claimant under the provisions of this act shall have been sold or granted
by the United States to any other person, such title from the United States to
such other person shall remain valid, notwithstanding such decree, and upon
proof being made to the satisfaction of said court of such sale or grant, and the
value of the lands so sold or granted, such court shall render judgment in favor
of such claimant against the United States for the reasonable value of said
lands so sold or granted, exclusive of betterments, not exceeding one dollar and
twenty- rive cents per acre for such lands, and such judgment, when found, shall
be a charge on the Treasury of the United States.
In such cases lands lying within the limits of the grant that had
been disposed of by the United States wTere expressly excepted from
confirmation by force of the statute and were confirmed to the patent-
ees not by virtue of any title possessed by the United States but solely
by consent of the grant claimants. Having invoked the aid of the
court for confirmation, they wTere bound by all the conditions of the
act, and having accepted its benefits they also accepted the conditions
imposed. Juan de la Cruz Trujillo, 28 L. D., 541.
How then can the title to such lands as the United States may have
sold be confirmed in any case where the claimant did not voluntarily
come into court, if he was not bound to invoke the aid of the court to
test the validity of his title. It may be urged that the United States
had the right to bring him before the court without his consent, but
that was to determine whether he had any title as against the United
States, and if so, what was the extent of the title he acquired. It was
not intended as a means of enforcing an arbitrary right to confiscate
the claim or any portion thereof against the consent of the claimant.
If the United States never acquired any title to this land by the
treaty of cession and the absolute fee at that time Avas in the grant
claimant as determined by the court, and if after the passage of the
act of March 3, 1891, it was not obligatory upon such claimant to go
before the tribunal created by that act to have his title recognized
and its validity determined, and such title could be asserted before
the ordinary courts of justice, it is utterly inconsistent to hold that
such rights could be invaded or impaired by being brought into court
involuntarily upon the petition of the United States.
Besides a statute prescribing a mode by which a party may be
divested of his property for the benefit of another without his con-
sent is in derogation of common right and must be strictly construed.
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Nothing can be taken by intendment, it must clearly appear from the
statute.
It was hc;yev(T contended in this case that the claimant voluntarily
consented to the conditions imposed by the statute when he filed his
amended answer to the petition " praying that the validity of his
title may be inquired into and decided, and that his title to said lands
be declared valid." It is insisted that this was in effect an original
bill under the provisions of the act, and having sought the confirma-
tion of his grant, he could only do so upon the terms prescribed in
the act.
There is no substantial ground upon which this contention can be
sustained. The prayer of the government's petition was strictly in
conformity with the express direction contained in the act, " that the
title to said lands be settled and adjudicated, and if the title be ad-
judged to be valid, that the extent and boundaries thereof be then
settled and adjudicated." Whether the amended answer had or had
not been filed, the decree would have been the same, for the reason
that the very object of the proceedings filed on behalf of the gov-
ernment was to test the validity of the title, and if adjudged to be
valid, that the boundaries be determined. There was nothing in the
amended answer either in the nature of an original bill or of a cross-
bill or that converted the proceeding into a suit in behalf of claimant,
or that sought to enlarge or extend the decree in his favor beyond
what would have been decreed under the prayer of the petition with-
|
out the amended answer.
Nor was there anything in the answer from which the slightest
inference could be drawn that he consented to such proceedings or
recognized the title of the United States or the legality of the pos-
session of the defendants claiming under it. On the contrary, the
titles of the United States were denounced as wholly null and void;
that the possession of the defendants holding under such titles was
j
unlawful and without permission of claimant and that he (claim-
ant) was entitled to confirmation of the whole grant in accordance
with the metes and bounds set forth in the original survey and grant.
The answer set up no new matter, nor required a response from the
United States, but on the contrary it was strictly responsive to the
prayer of the petition.
But if it be conceded that lands within the limits of the survey,
which had been disposed of by the United States prior to the decree
of confirmation, were excepted from such decree, it does not appear
that any jurisdiction or authority was conferred upon the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office to adjudicate and determine what
lands should be patented and what should be excepted and specific-
ally excluded from the patent.
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The act of March 3, 1891, repealed all prior acts of Congress and
laws providing for the investigation and adjudication of claims and
titles to lands in said States and Territories protected by said
treaties, and conferred upon the Court of Private Land Claims
exclusive jurisdiction in such matters. Whatever jurisdiction or
power the Commissioner of the General Land Office has therein is
expressly conferred by the act and he cannot assume or exercise any
authority in such matters by virtue of the general authority conferred
upon him in disposing of the public lands, but must look strictly
to the act for the source of his authority.
His duties in this behalf are defined in the tenth section of the
act. After the final decree of the court, it is made the duty of the
clerk of said court to " certify that fact to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, with a copy of the decree of confirmation,
which shall plainly state the location, boundaries and area of the
tract confirmed." The Commissioner " shall thereupon without delay
cause the tract so confirmed to be surveyed at the cost of the United
States."
It is provided that after the survey shall have been made, notice
shall be given thereof, and it shall remain in the office of the Sur-
veyor-General for ninety days. If, at the expiration of such period,
no objections are filed, the Surveyor-General " shall approve the
same and forward it to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office." If objections are filed " by any party claiming an interest
in its confirmation, or by any party claiming an interest in the tract
embraced in the survey or any portion thereof," the Surveyor-
General shall, at the expiration of the ninety days, " forward such
survey, with the objections and proofs filed in support of or in oppo-
sition to such objections, and his report thereon, to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office."
Immediately upon receipt of any such survey, with or without objections
thereto, the said Commissioner shall transmit the same, with all accompanying
papers, to the court in which the final decision was made for its examination of
the survey and of any objections and proofs that may have been filed, or shall
be furnished ; and the said court shall thereupon determine if the said survey
is in substantial accordance with the decree of confirmation. If found to be
correct, the court shall direct its clerk to indorse upon the face of the plat its
approval. If found to be incorrect, the court shall return the same for correction
in such particulars as it shall direct. When any survey is finally approved by
the court, it shall be returned to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
who shall as soon as may be cause a patent to be issued thereon to the
confirmee.
The specific duty of the Commissioner is so clearly defined and
limited by the act as to impliedly prohibit the exercise of any discre-
tion or authority to adjudicate and determine. Even in the matter
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of the field work of the survey, it is the approval of the Surveyor-
General that is required, whose report is to be forwarded, but none
from the Commissioner is required. See Maese v. Hermann, 183
IT. S., 572.
Furthermore, the very question that your office assumed to deter-
mine had already been determined by the court. If the court had
the power to determine whether the survey was in conformity with
its decree and that the patent should issue according to the boundaries
defined by said survey, notwithstanding- the objection to its approval,
without first eliminating the lands claimed under the patents of the
United States, how can the Commissioner pass upon that question
without infringing upon the prerogatives and jurisdiction of the
court ?
If the lands within the surveyed limits of the grant which have
been patented to the United States are excepted from the operation
of the decree of confirmation, as claimed, it is by force of the statute
itself and not by virtue of any authority in the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to determine, nor upon any adjudication of the
Court of Private Land Claims. If such is the case, the patent of the
United States antedating the decree would be the source of title con-
firmed by force of the statute, and could be asserted in the ordinary
courts of justice as fully as if the land covered thereby had been
expressly excluded from the patent to the claimants of the grant.
The issuance of the patent according to the boundaries defined by
the survey without excluding any lands therefrom will no more
determine or affect the rights of these patentees than would the issu-
ance of a patent for a townsite of lands known to be mineral at that
date affect or determine the rights of mineral claimants. In both
cases the operation of the patent is limited and restricted by the
statute.
If there is no power to adjudge, or discretion to exercise, the duty
would seem to be purely ministerial and your refusal to act would
be a personal matter, not strictly subject to be controlled and
reviewed by the supervisory authority.
When a mere ministerial duty is imposed upon an executive officer,
which duty he is obliged to perform without any further question,
a writ of mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his duty.
Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S., 221, 230.
In this view it may be questioned whether this is such an appeal
as the Department should entertain. It may however always advise
and where the good order and conduct of the business of the Depart-
ment is involved, it should exercise this privilege.
Entertaining the views herein expressed, the Department- is of the
opinion that your duties under the act of March 3, 1891, require the
issuance of this patent in accordance with the decree of the court,
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leaving the question as to the rights of the parties to be determined
by the courts.
As this survey was approved by the Commissioner prior to June
ftO, 1904, no reference has been made in this decision to the provision
of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat, 452, 485)—
That all the powers now exercised by the Court of Private Land Claims in
the approval of surveys executed under its decrees of confirmation shall he con-
ferred upon and exercised by the Commissioner of the General Land Office from
and after the thirtieth day of June, nineteen hundred and four.
MOBILE AND GIRABD GRANT—HOMESTEAD ENTRY—ACT OF FEB-
RUARY 24, 1905.
James A. Bryars.
The act of February 24, 1905, relating to lands within the Mobile and Girard
railroad grant, according to a homestead entryman coming within its pro-
visions the privilege to transfer his claim to other lands, does not contem-
plate that an entryman who has completed his entry under the commutation
provisions of the homestead law and received final certificate thereon
shall, in the exercise of the privilege accorded by said act, make a second
homestead entry and submit proof thereon, after due notice, as required in
making an original homestead entry, nor that the lands applied for shall be
a compact body of contiguous land, but where not contiguous all the land
must be within the same land district, and where the aggregate of the legal
subdivisions applied for exceeds the acreage embraced in the original entry,
the entryman will be required to pay for such excess.
An application to exercise the privilege of transfer accorded by the act of Feb-
ruary 24, 1905, is not required to be made by the entryman in person ; nor
is he required to furnish an affidavit under the act of August 30, 1890, to
the effect that he has not since that date made entry of or acquired title to
a quantity of land under the agricultural land laws, which, with the land
now applied for, will exceed three hundred and twenty acres.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 26, 1906. (F. W. C.)
The Department has considered the appeal by James A. Bryars
from your office decision of February 16, last, affirming the action of
the local officers at Miles City, Montana, in rejecting his application
filed by James Deering, as attorney-in-fact, to transfer, under the
provisions of the act of February 24, 1905 (33 Stat,, 813), his home-
stead claim upon the S. \ of NE. J and S. \ of NW. £, Sec. 5, T. 1 S.,
R. 4 E., St. Stephens Meridian, Alabama, covering 134.84 acres, to lot
1 and the SE. \ of SE. \ of Sec. 10, lot 3, Sec. 11, and SE. \ of NE. J,
Sec. 9, T. 27 N., R. 5G E., Montana Meridian, Montana.
Said application was on November 28, 1905, presented at the local
land office at Miles City, Montana, by James Deering, as attorney-in-
518 DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
fact for James A. Bryars, and was rejected by the local officers for the
following reasons
:
(1) That the application is not offered and a new entry sought to he made
by the original entryman in person.
(2) That the application is made for a non-contiguous tract made up of four
separate subdivisions in three different sections, and is therefore not in compli-
ance with the provisions of the homestead law.
(3) That the application is for an excess of 14.82 acres over the entry relin-
quished, and that no tender of payment for such excess acreage has been made
by the applicant.
(4) That the applicant has not furnished with his application an affidavit
that he has not since August 30th, 1900 (1890), filed upon or acquired title
to, under the agricultural land laws of the United States, such a quantity of
land which would, with the entry now applied for, amount to more than 320
acres.
From such rejection appeal was taken to your office, the same being
considered in your office decision of February 16, last, appealed from.
In said decision your office held that the fact that Bryars proffered
his entry by an attorney instead of appearing in person was not a
sufficient reason for rejecting the application, neither was it neces-
sary for the applicant to furnish an affidavit under the act of August
30, 1890 (26 Stat., 391), to the effect that the entryman has not since
that date made entry of or acquired title to a quantity of land under
the agricultural land laws, which, with the land now applied for, will
exceed 320 acres, for the reason that such an affidavit was made by
Bryars at the time of making his entry of land in Alabama, which
was sought to be transferred to the land here in question.
The rejection of the application was, however, sustained upon the
ground that no two of the tracts applied for are contiguous, lot 1 of
Sec. 10, and lot 3 of Sec. 11, cornering the SE. i of SE. i of Sec. 10,
being one-half mile distant from that lot, and the SE. ^ of NE. J of
Sec. 9, being a mile or more distant from the other lands included in
the application, and, consequently, did not constitute a compact body
of land subject to entry under the homestead laws. Also, that as
the aggregate area included in the present application, as shown by
the official plat of survey, is 119.66 acres, being an excess over the
former entry of 11.82 acres, it should be paid for.
The theory of the decision appealed from is that the right accord-
ing the transfer of a homestead claim under the act of February 24,
1905, supra, is but the equivalent of the right to make a second home-
stead entry, and that as a consequence the applicant should be re-
quired to make a formal application under the homestead laws and
publish notice of his intention to submit proof thereunder, being
entitled when making such proof to credit upon the second entry for
such compliance with law as was made under the first entry.
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So much of the act of February 24, 1905, as is material to the ques-
tions raised by the appeal now considered is as follows
:
That where any homestead entry heretofore allowed under ruling of the Land
Department, for lands within the limits of the grant made by act of Congress
approved June third, eighteen hundred and fifty-six (Eleventh Statutes, page
eighteen), to the State of Alabama in aid of the construction of the railroad
known as the Mobile and Girard Railroad has been canceled because of a
superior claim to the land through purchase from the railroad company, which
claim has been held to have been confirmed and a confirmatory patent issued
for the land under the provisions of section four of the act of March third,
eighteen hundred and eighty-seven (Twenty-fourth Statutes, page five hundred
and fifty-six), such homesteader is hereby accorded the privilege of trans-
ferring his claim thus initiated under the homestead laws to any other non-
mineral unappropriated public land subject to homestead entry, with full credit
for the period of residence and for the improvements made upon his homestead
hereinbefore first described prior to the order of its cancellation, provided he
has not forfeited or voluntarily abandoned his homestead claim and that his
application for transfer is presented within one year from the date of the
passage of this act.
The facts with regard to Bryars's original homestead entry made
for lands in the State of Alabama, as gathered from your office deci-
sion, are as follows : September 13, 1897, James A. Bryars made home-
stead entry, No. 31686, at the Montgomery, Alabama, land office, for
the S. i of NE. i and S. i of NW. i, Sec. 5, T. 1 S., R. 4 E., St.
Stephens Meridian, Alabama, containing, according to the approved
plat of survey of said township, 134.81 acres, which entry he com-
muted to cash, after the submission of commutation proof and pay-
ment, on June 19, 1899. By your office decision of December 2, 1899,
said entry was canceled for conflict with the claim of Louisa A.
Carney, administratrix of the estate of James A. Carney, deceased,
under the provisions of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat.,
556), and thereafter Mrs. Carney was permitted to make entry of the
land under the act of 1887, upon which the patent of the United
States issued for said land February 2, 1900.
Following the passage of the act of February 24, 1905, to wit,
August 27, 1905, Bryars filed in your office his election to transfer
his claim under the provisions of said act, at the same time relinquish-
ing all right, title and interest in and to the tracts embraced in his
former homestead entry. This relinquishment was accepted by your
office and thereupon Bryars became entitled to transfer his claim
initiated to the land in the State of Alabama, under the homestead
laws, " to any other nonmineral, unappropriated public land subject
to homestead entry, with full credit for the period of residence and
for the improvements made upon his homestead."
Where the homestead made for land in the State of Alabama had
been completed by the offer of satisfactory proof of compliance with
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the homestead laws, upon which final certificate for patent had been
issued, there was, in the opinion of this Department, no necessity in
transferring such claim under the provisions of the act of February
24, 1905, to make a second homestead entry upon which proof was to
be submitted after due publication of notice, the law having been
fully satisfied by the compliance shown and the proof submitted upon
the tract in Alabama. The right to transfer was a completed right.
and this being- so there can be no good reason for restricting the
applicant to a compact body of contiguous land such as he would be
required to enter in making an original homestead entry. In the
making of soldiers' additional homestead entry under the provisions
of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, it is not required that the
tracts entered be contiguous or compact in form. See case of Edgar
Boice (29 L. D., 599). Again, in the exchange of lands provided for
in the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11, 36), where the title to the
land relinquished has passed out of the United States, or where cer-
tificate for patent thereto has issued, the selection is permitted to
embrace contiguous or noncontiguous tracts if in the same land dis-
trict. See Emil S. Wangenheim (28 L. D., 291).
The Department is of opinion, as there is nothing in the statute
specifically limiting the transfer authorized under the act of Febru-
ary 24, 1905, to contiguous lands in compact form, in view of the lib-
eral construction heretofore placed upon statutes of a somewhat simi-
lar nature so far as applied to the transfer of completed claims, that
no good reason exists for restricting or limiting the right of transfer
authorized under this act, so far as applies to the transfer of com-
pleted claims, to contiguous lands compact in form. The rule estab-
lished under the act of 1897, above referred to, limiting the selection
to lands in the same land district, should, however, be applied, and
the transfer limited to one entry. In so far therefore as your office
rejected the application under consideration because of the fact that
the lands applied for wrere non-contiguous and not compact in form,
the same is reversed.
It will be remembered from the foregoing recitation, that Bryars
commuted the entry made for lands in the Montgomery land district,
Alabama, and in making such commutation his payment was limited
to the acreage included in that entry. While no question seems to be
raised as to his right to the transfer applied for because of the excess
in area, it is required that he should make payment to the United
States for such excess. In the opinion of this Department such
requirement is but reasonable and fair. Had Bryars entered the
same amount of land here applied for at the time of his original entry
he would have been required Avhen making commutation proof to pay
for the same because the payment under the commutation clause of
the homestead law is according to acreage. No hardship is therefore
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visited upon him when making his transfer to require the additional
payment for the excess over the amount included in his original entry
where, as in this case, the original entry was perfected under the com-
mutation provisions of the homestead law. The requirement made
by your office and the local officers for such payment is sustained and
to this extent your office decision is affirmed. Bryars should be
advised hereof and afforded a reasonable time within which to make
payment as demanded. Should he make the payment within the
time allowed and no other sufficient reason appears for denying the
transfer, the same should be accepted; otherwise, his application for
transfer will stand rejected.
desert-land entry—suspension—contest—charge.
Porter c. Carlile (On Review).
Where a desert-land entry is suspended by the land department prior to the
expiration of the statutory life of the entry, for the purpose of investigating
the character of the land, a contest against the same, charging that the land
is non-desert in character, and also that the entryman has failed to comply
with the law in the matter of reclamation, may be entertained in so far as it
charges the non-desert character of the land, but should be dismissed as to
the charge relating to non-compliance with law ; and if as a result of the
contest it be determined that the land is of a character subject to entry
under the desert-land law, the suspension should be removed.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( F. L. C.
)
Office, March 28, 1906. ( J. L. McC.
)
Herbert C. Porter has filed a motion for review of departmental
decision of January 9, 1906 (34 L. D., 3G1), affirming the action of
your office, dated July 31, 1905, in the matter of his contest against
the desert-land entry of James M. Carlile for lots 1, 2, 3, 4, the E. ^
of the NW. i and the E. J of the SW. J, of Sec. 18, T. 17 N., K. 3 E.,
Greatfalls land district, Montana.
This entry is one of a number that were investigated by Special
Agent Chadwick, and upon his report were suspended by your office
letter of October 8, 1903. Porter filed contest affidavit February 17,
1904, charging that the land was non-desert in character: that one
dollar per acre each year had not been expended on the land: that
it was not susceptible of irrigation for the reason that there was no
means by which it could be irrigated.
A hearing was had, as the result of which the local officers found
that the land was desert in character; but that the entryman had
not complied with the law as' to irrigation, reclamation, and culti-
vation: that there were two small reservoirs on the land, but that
' ;
neither of them is of sufficient size to hold water enough, if filled,
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to properly irrigate one-half acre of ground; 11 that "no ditches ex-
tend from either of them, 1 ' and that if there did they would be " of
no practical use for irrigating purposes," inasmuch as the land em-
braced in the entry is nearly all higher than the reservoirs; and
that the total value of the improvements was about $300. Therefore
they recommended that the entry be canceled.
Your office, on February 18, 1905, sustained the judgment of the
local officers. An appeal was taken to the Department. Subse-
quently it was discovered that the action of your office had been
taken upon an incomplete record, it not having been observed at
the time it was taken that the entry had been suspended prior to
the initiation of contest. Thereupon the Department, on July 19,
1905, returned the record to your office for readjudication. Your
office, on July 31, 1905, supra, readjudicated the case, instructing the
local officers as follows
;
The suspension of this entry, with the others, is parallel to the action taken
concerning a large number of entries made in the Visalia, California, land dis-
trict, by departmental order of September 12, 1877, in order to investigate the
character of the land covered by such entries. Where a contest was filed
against the Visalia entries during the period of suspension, it was held that
there was no jurisdiction to entertain the contest until after the revocation of
the order of suspension. (See 15 L. D., 234, and 1G L. D., 35.) Under the doc-
trine announced in the cases above referred to it is accordingly held that you
were without authority to entertain this contest, which, when filed, should have
been suspended and held subject to the result of the proceedings instituted by
the government. Therefore the decision of this office, of February 18, 11)05,
is hereby vacated, there being no jurisdiction to entertain the contest ; and in
the event of this decision becoming final the contest will stand suspended pend-
ing the result of the investigation ordered by the government.
This is the action of your office that was affirmed by the Department
in its decision of January 9, 1906, of which the contestant has now
filed a motion for review.
The errors alleged are, in substance, that the departmental decision
heretofore rendered erred in not holding that " all contests, though
filed during the suspension of desert-land entries, stand as initiated,
and will entitle the contestant to a hearing upon the withdrawal of
the order of suspension ; " in dismissing the contest, " for the reason
that the testimony fully showed, and was satisfactory and conclu-
sive, that the land in controversy was non-desert in character, that the
entryman was not acting in good faith, and that there was no method
by which the land could be reclaimed, or water placed thereon arti-
ficially ; " and in not passing upon the question as to whether the
land in controversy was non-desert in character.
The movant—and for that matter, the local officers, your office,
and the Department in its decisions heretofore rendered—appear to
have confused the issues in this case, to some extent, because of
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contestant's having embraced in his affidavit of contest two diverse
charges, which must receive different treatment at the hands of the
land department : (1) the charge that the land is non-desert in charac-
ter; (2) the charge that the defendant has not complied with the law
as to reclamation.
Regarding the first charge the Department, in the very similar
case of Whitman v. Hume, held as follows (34 L. D., 456, 457) :
This question is one going directly to the validity of the entry in its inception,
and one which, in the interest of both the government and the claimant, should
be determined with as little delay as possible. Especially does the interest of
a claimant demand an early determination of this question, that his rights may
be definitely fixed, and his subsequent expenditure of labor and money in the
required improvement of the land protected. Improvements made upon lands
afterward declared to be non-desert in character, though ample under the re-
quirements of the desert-land law, would not render an entry under that law
valid, for if such entry was invalid because of the non-desert character of
the land, no act of the claimant performed in an attempted compliance with
the law would prevent cancellation, as an entry of land not desert in character
is unauthorized by the desert-land law, and is not merely voidable, but abso-
lutely void. Therefore justice demands the speedy ascertainment of the char-
acter of the land ; and the rights of a claimant are not prejudiced by permitting,
at any time, the initiation of a contest for that purpose, as his rights remain
the same whether the object of the suspension be accomplished by contest, or
by hearing ordered on behalf of the government.
The departmental decision heretofore rendered (January 9, 1906,
supra) made no finding as to the character of the land involved in
the case here under consideration. In view of the ruling in the
Whitman-Hume case, above quoted, it would have been proper that
such finding should have been made. The record has been inform-
ally withdrawn from your office, and carefully examined with refer-
ence to this question. It is found that the preponderance of evidence
clearly shows that the local office and your office committed no error
in finding that the land here in controvesy was desert in character.
With reference to the second charge of the affidavit of contest
—
that the entryman has not complied with the law as to reclamation
attention is directed to the fact that Carlile made his entry on
December 24, 1901, and that the same was suspended on October 8,
1908—one year, nine and one-half months after entry. This fact
brings the case within the ruling in the case of Whitman v. Hume,
syllabus (supra) :
A contest charging that the entryman has failed to comply with the require-
ments of the law should not be entertained during such period, where the
suspension becomes effective prior to the expiration of the statutory life of
the entry.
It is clear, therefore, that the local officers and your office erred in
considering any testimony offered in support of the allegation charg-
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ing failure on the part of the claimant to comply with the require-
ments of the desert-land law. They were (as was held by your
office and by the Department in its decision heretofore rendered)
without jurisdiction to try that question.
Inasmuch as the testimony supports the concurrent findings of
your office and the local office that the land covered by the entry is
desert in character, and as no other question is in issue, the contest
should be dismissed. The character of the land having been deter-
mined favorably to the claimant, the suspension as to the land em-
braced in his entry should be revoked, and he permitted to proceed
with the perfection of his entry.
This is, not only in effect, but in fact, the substance of the decision
heretofore rendered. The language in the last line thereof, stating
that your decision was affirmed, when in fact it was affirmed only
in part, and in part reversed, is evidently an inadvertence; it should
have said, the contest is dismissed. This is what the movant clearly
understands to be the meaning and intent of said decision, as is
shown by his first allegation of error, which begins by saying, " The
decision is erroneous in dismissing the contest,'' etc.
With the verbal correction above indicated, the departmental de-
cision heretofore rendered is adhered to. The motion for review
is dismissed.
settlement prior to opening of land to entry.
Hanson v. Gammanche.
Settlement upon lands in advance of the hour of opening, in violation of an order
of the land department prohibiting such settlement, confers no rights upon
the settler as against the first legal applicant to enter the land after the
hour of opening, and such settler can not, by virtue of his mere presence
upon and occupancy of the land after the hour of opening, with the improve-
ments made prior to that time, secure a settlement right.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( F L. C,
)
Office, March 28, 1006. ( E. F. B.
)
This appeal involves the right to the E. \ SE. J, Sec. 5, T. 145, R.
31 (Chippewa series), Cass Lake, Minnesota, embraced in the home-
stead entry of Dolphus Gammanche, made June 15, 1904, and claimed
by George Hanson, who alleges priority of right in virtue of settle-
ment upon the tract prior to the allowance of the homestead entry.
The land in question is part of the Chippewa lands that were
opened to settlement and entry at 9 A. M. June 15, 1904. A notice
was issued by the Department warning all persons not to go upon
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said lands with a view to settlement thereon " until such lands have
been formally opened to settlement and entry," and declaring that-
All such persons will be considered and dealt with as trespassers, and when
the lands are actually opened, preference will be given the prior legal applicant,
notwithstanding such unlawful settlement.
Upon the filing of an affidavit by Hanson alleging priority of right,
a hearing was ordered, and upon the testimony taken at such hear-
ing, the local officers found that Hanson, having gone upon the land
prior to the hour of opening in violation of the order of the Depart-
ment, could not acquire by his illegal settlement superior right as
against the first legal applicant, to whom the preference right was
given by the express terms of the order of the Department. They
recommended that Gammanche's entry remain intact and that Han-
son's application be rejected.
Your office reversed their decision and held that as Hanson was
a settler upon the land at 9 A. M., when the inhibition ceased, his
occupancy of the land prior to the date of the opening did not affect
his right as a settler, which attached from that moment. Gam-
manche's entry was held for cancellation and Hanson's application
was allowed.
It has been held by the Department, in construing similar orders
prohibiting settlement upon lands in advance of the hour of opening,
where no statutory penalty is attached, that the premature occupancy
of the land in violation of the order will not affect the right of the
settler except so far as to preclude him from deriving any benefit
from an illegal settlement; but if he is on the land at the hour of
opening, he may, from that moment, secure a right by settlement,
if he perform some personal act of settlement at that time or there-
after, by making a substantial improvement upon the land, and
his right as a settler will commence from the making of such
improvement.
He cannot, however, by his mere presence upon the land, with the
improvements made prior to the hour of opening, secure a settle-
ment right by virtue of mere occupancy alone, as that would be allow-
ing a settlement commenced as a trespass and in violation of the
order, to be perfected merely by lapse of time.
The testimony of Hanson is to the effect that he went upon the land
at 2 A. M. the morning of the 15th of June, 1904, and moved in a
house that he placed on the land in March previous and had fur-
nished. He left the claim at 8 : 80 A. M. and did not return until
dinner, but he left his family on the land and two men to put up
notices and commence digging a well. On direct examination he
testified that he commenced digging the well on the 15th, "right
after dinner—one o'clock." On cross-examination he testified that he
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commenced the addition to his improvements after he got through
with the well, and when asked if it was the same day, said
:
A. Well, my memory isn't very good. On June 17th, I commenced the well,
mid digging cellar. I had one man at the well and they dug the cellar under
the addition that I
Q. Did you commence digging your well on the 17th?
A. On the 16th, I commenced.
Q. Digging your well?
A. But we didn't finish it—it was incomplete. I had one man on the 17th ou
the well, and one man on the cellar under the addition.
Q. You commenced digging your well on the 17th?
A. On the 16th—or on the 15th I commenced.
P. H. Larson, a witness for Hanson, testified that he went to Han-
son's claim on the morning of the 15th, reaching there about a quarter
to nine. No one was in the house at that time, but Mrs. Hanson and
Miss Hanson came there about 9 o'clock. He went there for the pur-
pose of witnessing Hanson's settlement and posted notices. He also
testified that he was on the land with Hanson at 9 o'clock A. M., and
took dinner with him that day, but he makes no mention of the dig-
ging of a well, or the commencement of any other improvement that
day, after 9 o'clock. He was asked when Hanson made his additional
improvements, and answered that he did not know the exact date;
that he would notice them when he would go upon the land from time
to time. When he was on the land on the 26th of June, he noticed
that Hanson had started work on the addition to his house by dig-
ging the cellar.
Helga Hanson, a daughter of contestant, who was claiming land
in the adjoining section, testified that she was not on her father's
claim at 9 o'clock ; but at that hour she was on her own claim. She
said she could not tell the day the well was commenced.
Gammanche testified that he first went upon the land at 1 o'clock
P. M., the 15th of June, 1904, and made his entry at 3 o'clock that
day. This is all that is material in his testimony, except his statement
that Hanson did not commence the addition to his house until about
lour weeks prior to the date of hearing, and that he (Gammanche)
had continued to reside on the land with his family since the first
week in July, after the entry.
The contestant went upon the land in violation of the order of the
Department with the evident purpose of placing himself in such
situation as to acquire an advantage over others who had complied
with the order when the hour of opening arrived. At 9 o'clock he
was upon the land in a continued occupancy that was commenced in
violation of the express order of the Department. As he could
acquire no advantage by his occupation of the land at the hour of
opening that was commenced in violation of the order, and could
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derive no benefit from the improvements placed upon the land
prior to the hour of opening, he could only initiate a settlement right
after that hour by making some substantial improvement, inde-
pendent of the improvements he had already placed on the land ; and
that must be shown by clear and satisfactory proof in order to defeat
the entry made by the prior legal applicant. The removal of the
inhibition by the arrival of the hour of opening did not convert
unlawful occupancy into a valid settlement.
There is no clear and convincing testimony that Hanson performed
any substantial act of settlement on the land the 15th day of June,
1904, after the hour of opening, independent of his previous acts.
His testimony as to the day the digging of the well was commenced,
is so indefinite that it can not be determined with any degree of cer-
tainty when it was commenced. He testified that on the morning
of the 15th he left two men on the land to post notices and commence
digging a well. Larson testified that when he went on the land,
just before 9 o'clock, no one was there; but at 9 o'clock he was on
the land with Hanson and his wife and daughter. He testified that
he posted the notices. If he was one of the men to dig the well,
he certainly could have testified as to the time it was commenced, and
as he went there to witness the settlement of Hanson, it is hardly
probable that such an important act as the digging of a well could
have been performed that day without his attention being called
to it and he surely would have known of the presence of the men
who were to do the work if they were on the land on the morning
of the 15th.
Your decision is reversed, and the entry of Gammanche will remain
intact.
homestead entry—additional—kinkaid act.
Graves v. McDonald.
Residence upon the land embraced in the original homestead entry is an indis-
pensable prerequisite to the preference right to enter additional contiguous
land accorded by the act of April 28, 1904.
An additional entry under the act of April 28, 1904, even though for a less
amount of land than authorized by the act, exhausts the right ; but where
at the time the entryman sought to exercise his additional right, part of the
lands contiguous to his original entry and subject to his preference right
and desired to be entered by him, were found to be embraced within an
existing though invalid additional entry made by another under said act,
and he thereupon made entry for a less amount of land than he was entitled
to enter, and thereafter by means of a contest procured the cancellation of
the invalid entry covering the 'remainder of the lands desired by him, he
may, upon the cancellation of such invalid entry, be permitted to enter
such lands in accordance with his original intention.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 28, 1900. (G. C. R.)
May 25, 1901, Henry E. McDonald made homestead entry for the
E. J NE. i, SW. i NE. J, SE. J NAY. J, Sec. 10, T. 24 N., R. 11 W.j
O'Neill, Nebraska.
July 1, 1904, he made an additional and preferential entry under
section 2. act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), for the SW. J, Sec. 2j
the SE. i SW. J, S. J SE. J, Sec. 3, the NW. J NE. J, the NE. i
NW. J ? Sec. 10, the N. J NW. J, SE. J NW. J, Sec. 11, all in said
township.
Walter O. Graves, who entered the NE. J of Sec. 11 of said town-
ship January 30, 1900, and who claimed as a preferential right under
the act of 1904, supra, nearly all the land entered by said McDonald
July 1, 1904, filed a contest against McDonald's additional entry July
18, 1904, alleging, among other things, that McDonald was not en-
titled to exercise a preferential right of entry for said lands for the
reason that he had never established an actual bona fide residence on
the land embraced in his original entry made in 1901.
Hearing was duly had and the register and receiver, December 12,
1904, found that McDonald, the contestee, was not residing on his
original homestead on April 28, 1904, and therefore had no preferen-
tial right to the land in question. Upon this finding, the register and
receiver held for cancelation McDonald's said preferential entry of
the land and awarded to contestant the right to make entry thereof
as additional.
On appeal, your office, June 22, 1905, affirmed the action of the
register and receiver. Your office also held for cancelation contestee's
original entry made as aforesaid, May 25, 1901.
From that action contestee has appealed to this Department, alleg-
ing error both of law and fact and especially contending that it was
error to hold for cancelation contestee's original entry.
The second section of the act of April 28, 1904, supra, reads as
follows
:
That entrymen under the homestead laws of the United States within the
territory above described who own and occupy the land heretofore entered by
them, may, under the provisions of this act and subject to its conditions, enter
other lands contiguous to their said homestead entry, which shall not, with the
land so already entered, owned, and occupied, exceed in the aggregate six hun-
dred and forty acres; and residence upon the original homestead shad be
accepted as equivalent to residence upon the additional land so entered, but final
entry shall not be allowed of such additional land until five years after first
entering the same.
It is obvious from a careful reading of this section that residence
upon an original entry is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of con-
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tiguous lands under the preference right awarded thereby to those
who seek to avail themselves of that privilege.
The testimony has been carefully examined. Without setting forth
the same in detail, it is sufficient to say that it appears from a pre-
ponderance thereof that the defendant-entryman up to the time of
the initiation of this contest had not established and maintained a
bona fide residence upon the tract originally entered by him, nor
sufficiently improved the same. On the other hand, it clearly appeal's
that Graves, the contestant, has resided with his family upon, and
improved his original homestead entry from March, 1901, his im-
provements thereon being of considerable value.
It follows from the finding, which is in harmony with that of the
local office and your office, that Graves has the better right in the
premises.
This is not an ordinary contest as provided for in the act of May 14,
1880 (21 Stat., 140), where the contestant on securing the cancelation
of an entry has a preference right to enter the land covered thereby.
The contestant does not seek to enter the land covered by McDonald's
original entry, but desires to enter other lands under the act of 1904,
which are contiguous to those embraced in bis original entry and
which are not embraced in any original entry.
The lands embraced in McDonald's (contestee's) original entry,
Eire not involved in this contest except in respect to the question as to
whether lie was such a resident thereon as is contemplated in the said
act of 1904, and on this proposition it is seen that he has failed to make
a satisfactory showing, yet, inasmuch as the matter is wholly between
him and the government, there being no adverse claim, and as he may
yet be able to make a better showing of compliance with the law, his
original entry may remain intact.
Another question, not raised by the appeal or referred to by you,
presents itself. It appears that Graves, the contestant, on July 19,
1904, entered the SW. ] SE. J, Sec. 2, of said township, as additional
under the said act of April 28, 1904. Having made that entry, the
question arises as to his right to make another additional entry under
said act.
The Department has repeatedly held, notably in the recent case
ex parte James W. Luton (34 L. D., 468), that one who has made 1
entry under the act of April 28, 1904, has exhausted his right, and
will not be permitted to make a second entry.
Your office states that the contestant, July 19, 1904, applied at the
local office to make additional entry under said act of April 28, 1904,
for the lands claimed by the defendant under his additional entry
(or portions thereof). Finding the lands desired by him covered
by the additional entry of the defendant, and believing the latter was
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not qualified to make the entry because he had abandoned his origi-
nal entry, he immediately sought to remove the barrier by bringing
the contest, charging that default. One of the forty-acre tracts
desired by him as additional was not embraced in the defendant's
additional entry, and contestant entered it and immediately sought
to remove the barrier which prevented his entry of the balance of
the contiguous lands.
Under these circumstances, his entry of the rest of the desired
lands under said act of 1904 can hardly be regarded as a second entry,
as such proposed entry is in accordance with his clearly expressed
purpose when he first appeared at the local office to make the addi-
tional entry.
Under the facts disclosed, his right to make the additional entry
finds support in the case of Daniel L. Hartley (26 L. D., 663;
Joseph Heisel, idem., 69; Hadley v. Walter, 25 L. D., 276; and Ella
Pollard, 33 L. D., 110).
Graves will be allowed to enter such of the tracts in controversy
as will comply with the requirements of both compactness and
contiguity.
With the above noted modifications, the action appealed from is
affirmed.
oklahoma townsite-keservation of lot for public pur-
pose-section 4, act of may 14, 1890.
Opinion.
The reservation of a lot in a townsite in the Territory of Oklahoma for the pur-
pose of erecting thereon an armory for use of a company of the Oklahoma
National Guard, constitutes a reservation for " the public interest " within
the meaning of section 4 of the act of May 14, 1890, authorizing the Secre-
tary of the Interior to reserve any undisposed-of lots in townsites in said
Territory for " public use as sites for public buildings " if in his judgment
" such reservation would be for the public interest."
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, March 28, 1906. ( G. B. G.
)
By your reference of the 26th ultimo, I am asked for opinion upon
the question presented by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office in a communication addressed to you February 19, 1906.
It appears from said communication and from other papers accom-
panying the reference that lot 19, in block 41, of the townsite of Alva,
Oklahoma, is desirable for the purpose of erecting an armory thereon
for the uses of Company I, Oklahoma National Guard, and it is
claimed that a dedication of the lot to such use would save the expense
to the United States government of the rent of a building for that
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 531
purpose, it being suggested that sufficient funds will be raised by
private subscription to erect a suitable building on said lot.
The lot in question has heretofore been the subject of contest
between two claimants, which contest resulted in it being held as
an unclaimed lot, the claims of both contestants thereto having been
rejected
The land embraced in said townsite was entered under the act of
May 14, 1890 (20 Stat., 109), as extended to the Cherokee Outlet
September 1, 1893 (28 Stat., 11). Section 4 of said act of May 14,
1890, provides
:
That all lots not disposed of as hereinbefore provided for shall be sold under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the municipal
government of any such town, or the same or any part thereof may be reserved
for public use as sites for public buildings, or for the purpose of parks, if in
the judgment of the Secretary such reservation would be for the public interest,
and the Secretary shall execute proper conveyances to carry out the provisions
of this section.
The act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat., 674), abolished boards of trustees
for townsites in Oklahoma, and vested in the Commissioner of the
General Land Office authority to complete the trust with reference
thereto. The title to the lot in question is in the United States for
the use of said town, and the Secretary of the Interior, being the
supervisory officer of the land department, is charged with the ulti-
mate execution of that trust ; and the question submitted is, " whether
under the provisions of section four of said act of May 14, it would
be proper to reserve said lot for the purpose mentioned."
I am of opinion that the reservation in question may be made.
The legislation above quoted directs the sale " for the benefit of the
municipal government " of all lots not disposed of as thereinbefore
provided, but in terms also provides that " any part thereof may be
reserved for public use, as sites for public buildings."
Inasmuch as the Oklahoma National Guard is established and
maintained for the preservation of the public peace, and inasmuch
as its maintenance in the town of Alva would contribute directly
to the well-being of the inhabitants of that town, there would seem
to be no doubt, and I advise you, that the reservation of the lot in
question for the uses of said company would constitute a reservation
for " the public interest " within the meaning of the statute, and
therefore within the powers of the Secretary of the Interior.
The question which arises incidentally in the consideration of this
matter, whether the United States may permit the erection of a
public building upon its property by private subscription, is not
within the reference, and is one upon which I express no opinion.
Approved
:
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
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Bowlby v. Hays.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 10, 1006, 34
L. D., 376, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan March 28, 1906.
RECLAMATION ACT—HOMESTEAD ENTRY—AGREEMENT TO CONVEY
LAND.
Opinion.
A homesteader whose entry is within the irrigable area of an irrigation project
under the act of June 17, 1902, but not subject to the restrictions, limita-
tions and conditions of said act. can not, under the law, prior to the acquisi-
tion of title to the land, enter into an agreement to convey to a water-users
association any portion of the land embraced in his entry, to be held in
trust by such association and sold for the benefit of the homesteader to
persons competent to make entry of such lands.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
March '20, 1006. (E. F. B.)
A letter from the Director of the Geological Survey relative to the
disposal of excess holdings of lands •within the limits of the Okanogan
irrigation project, has been referred to me for opinion upon the ques-
tion presented therein.
The question submitted by the Director is whether a homesteader
whose entry is within the irrigable area of an irrigation project, but
not subject to the restrictions, limitations and conditions of the
reclamation act, may sell a relinquishment of part of his entry.
The purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain whether a homesteader,
having such entry, who has not acquired title to his land, may convey,
or agree to convey, to a water users association one or more legal sub-
divisions of his entry, to be held in trust by such association, and sold
for the benefit of the homesteader to persons competent to make entry
of such lands, under the same form and in the same manner now pro-
vided for the conveyance and sale of lands in private ownership lying
within the limits of an irrigable area.
He cannot. One of the indispensable conditions of the homestead
law is that the entry must be made for the exclusive use and benefit of
the applicant and not " either directly or indirectly for the use or
benefit of any other person." (Revised Statutes, Sec. 2290.) In
submitting final proof, the entryman is required to make oath that
" no part of such land has been alienated, except as provided in sec-
tion twenty-two hundred and eighty-eight" (Sec. 2291), which pro-
vides for alienation for church and cemetery purposes. Under such
prohibition, " a contract by a homesteader to convey a portion of the
tract when he shall acquire title from the United States is against
public policy and void." Anderson v. Carkins (syllabus), 135 U. S.,
483.
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Until the homesteader has acquired either a legal or equitable title
to the land, he cannot make an agreement to convey any portion of it
that will secure to another any right or interest therein. He may
relinquish all or parts of it, but the relinquishment must be to the
United States and the land relinquished becomes public land subject
to entry by the first legal applicant. If the land relinquished is
within the irrigable area of a reclamation project, it becomes subject
to the provisions of the reclamation act.
Approved :
Tuos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
reclamation act—authority to drill wells.
Opinion.
The drilling of wells in the vicinity of an irrigation project, for the purpose of
determining whether underground water exists that may he made available
in connection with the project, comes within the power conferred by the
second section of the act of June 17. 1902, "to make examinations and
surveys . . . for the development of waters."
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the interior,
March 30, 1906. ( E. F. B.
)
A letter from the Director of the Geological Survey, accompanied
by a contract entered into by the Reclamation Service in behalf of the
United States for the drilling of wells within the limits of the Salt
River irrigation project, has been referred to me for opinion " as
to whether or not the enclosed contract, under the facts stated in this
letter, can be lawfully approved."
It cannot be ascertained from the face of the contract whether the
work stipulated for is or is not authorized by the act, but the Director
in his letter states that
—
The proposed wells are for the purpose of determining the depths to water
and are strictly analogous to the Diamond drill work so extensively carried on
by the Reclamation Service for determining the conditions of foundations for
various structures.
The underground supply will form an important factor in the Salt River
project and will furnish irrigation for a considerable area. The wells in ques-
tion are for the purpose of determining the conditions upon which future
construction is to be based and other wells will be required before contracts
can be let for the necessary pumping plants.
It appears from the statement of the Director that the wells stip-
ulated for in the contract are not artesian wells and hence there is
nothing in the opinion of March 3, 1903 (82 L. D.. 278), referred
to by the Director, that bears directly upon the question involved in
this reference.
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The Director states that the feasibility of the method of irrigating
lands from the underground water supply has been fully demon-
strated and is not experimental. This, as I understand, is stated as
a general proposition without reference to any particular locality,
and the drilling of the wells referred to in the contract is for the
purpose of determining whether the underground water in the
locality referred to can be reached at such depth as to be made avail-
able by means of pumping and thus form an important factor in the
Salt River project. The practicability of this scheme can only be
ascertained by experimental investigation, not with reference to the
method, but whether such method is practical in the locality contem-
plated. Such investigation would seem to be authorized by the power
conferred by the second section of the act " to make examinations and
surveys. . . . for the development of waters."
The feasibility of the Salt River project has already been deter-
mained. The action now contemplated is for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether or not the water supply can be increased from the
underground flow by practical methods and thus enlarge the irrigable
area. That fact can only be properly determined in the manner
suggested by the Director.
I am of the opinion that the execution of the contract is a valid
exercise of the power and authority conferred by the act and it can
lawfully be approved.
Approved
:
T-hos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
contest—notice-charge—act oe june 16, 1898.
College v. Sutherland.
Objection to the jurisdiction of the local office, on the ground that the record
does not afford due proof of service of notice of contest, is not well
founded where the fact of legal service is not denied.
In case of a contest against a homestead entry on the ground of abandonment,
it is not essential that the charge in the affidavit of contest, required by
the act of June 16, 1898, that the entryman's absence was not due to
service in the army, navy or marine corps, shall follow the wording of the
statute, it being sufficient if the language employed in effect or by necessary
implication excludes military, naval and marine corps service as the cause
of the entryman's absence.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 30, 1906. (D. C .H.)
The record shows that on March 31, 1900, Isaac E. Sutherland made
homestead entry for the NE. J of Sec. 13, T. 154 N., R. 81 W., Minot,
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North Dakota, and that on July 11, 1004, Jesse College filed contest
against said entry, charging abandonment and failure to reside upon
and cultivate said land as required by law, and that the entryman's
absence from the claim was not due to his employment in the army
or navy of the United States in time of war. Notice issued and on
the day set for trial, September 8, 190-t, contestant appeared in person
and by attorney. The defendant appeared specially by attorney and
objected to the jurisdiction on the ground that there was no proof of
service of the notice of contest on file in the case, and offered in evi-
dence the record as it then stood, in which appeared an affidavit
made by E. W. Hockspier in which it is stated that on the third day
of August, 1904, he served the attached notice of contest on Isaac E.
Sutherland by delivering to and leaving with said Sutherland a copy
of said notice, and that he knows the person so served to be the iden-
tical person named in said notice as the contestee therein. The atten-
tion of the local officers being directed to the fact that no copy of the
notice was attached to the affidavit of service and that neither the
original notice, nor a copy thereof, appeared in the record at that
time, the case Avas then adjourned until 2 o'clock P. M. of the same
day, when the parties again appeared as before, and Hockspier, who
made the aforesaid affidavit, identified a copy of the notice, then pro-
duced, as a true copy of the notice served by him on the contestee,
which said copy was then attached to his affidavit of service. Where-
upon the contestee, still appearing specially, moved that the contest
affidavit be rejected and the contest dismissed on the ground that the
affidavit of contest was insufficient to warrant the cancellation of the
entry, which motion was sustained, and the local officers also at that
time ruled that there was no evidence of proof of service of the con-
test notice filed with the papers in the case. The local officers on
December 6, 1904, filed a formal decision in the case in which they
held that the affidavit of contest was insufficient in that it did not
allege that defendant's absence from the claim was not due to em-
ployment in the marine corps in time of war, and dismissed the con-
test on that ground alone, and held that such disposition of the matter
rendered it unnecessary to consider the question as to the proof of
service of the notice of contest.
Your office, upon appeal by contestant, on June 80, 1905, reversed
the action of the local officers, held the affidavit of contest and the
service of notice sufficient to give jurisdiction, and remanded the case
to the local officers for a hearing upon the charges set forth in the
affidavit of contest. Defendant has appealed to the Department and
has based his appeal upon the following alleged errors:
(1) Error in holding that the local officers had jurisdiction upon proof of
service made, to take testimony in the case.
(2) Error in holding that the allegations of the contest affidavit were suili-
cient to warrant a cancellation of the entry.
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First : It will be noted that the defendant does not question or deny
the fact that notice of the contest was duly served upon him, the ob-
jection being only as to the proof of the service of said notice. The
question presented and involved was well and carefully considered
by the Department in the case of Franson v. Baker, 21 L. D., 383,
and it was therein held that
—
An objection to the jurisdiction of the local office, on the ground that the
record docs not afford due proof of service of notice, is not well taken where
the fact of legal service is not denied.
See also Hansen v. Ueland, 10 L. D., 273.
Second : It not being specified in appellant's second assignment
of error in what essential particular the affidavit of contest is
insufficient, said assignment will be considered as challenging the
affidavit generally, and as intended to apply to all the allegations
contained therein. In the first place, it ma}^ be said that in order
to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit of contest as the basis
for a hearing, it is only necessary to consider whether or not, if any
one or more of the charges taken singly, or all the charges taken
together as a whole, be established, the entry should be canceled.
(Harper v. Eiene, 26 L. D., 151.) The affidavit here in question
alleges that the said entryman has not resided on said tract as
required by law ; that he has changed his residence therefrom for
more than six months since making his entry; that said tract is not
settled upon and cultivated by said party as required by law; and
that his absence from the land is not due to employment in the
United States army or navy in time of war. Considering these
allegations together as a whole, it seems clear that if a hearing be
had thereon and the truth of said allegations be established by proper
proof, defendant's entry must be canceled. (Smith v. Johnson, 9 L.
D., 255, 258.)
The act of June 16, 1898 (30 Stat., 473), provides that thereafter
no contest against a homestead entry shall be initiated on the ground
of abandonment unless it be alleged in the preliminary affidavit of
contest that the entryman's absence from the land was not due to
his employment in the army, navy or marine corps of the United
States in time of war, and as the local officers held the affidavit of
contest in the case at bar to be fatally defective in that it did not, in
express words, state that the defendant's absence from the claim
was not due to his employment in the marine corps of the United
States, and as your office in the decision appealed from, reversed
their said holding, it may be well to consider and pass upon this
matter in this appeal.
The law recognizes marines as part of the navy. In the case of
the United States v. Dunn (120 IT. S., 249,254), which involved the
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 537
question of the proper position of the marine corps in the militar}^
service, the court held that
—
The marine corps is a military body designed to perform military services.
and while they are not necessarily performed on hoard ships, their active service
in time of war is chiefly in the navy, and accompanying or aiding naval
expeditions ;
and
—
that the primary position of that body in the military service is that of a part
of the navy, and its chief control is placed under the Secretary of the Navy.
Marines being recognized and considered a part of the navy, the
affidavit in question is therefore not faulty or bad because it does not
in express words charge that the entryman's absence from the claim
was not due to his employment in the marine corps.
It may be added that while a contest against an entry involves the
forfeiture thereof, and must be sustained by full proof, yet it is not
technically such a penal proceeding as requires that the allegations
of the contest affidavit shall be set forth with the same degree of
particularity as is required in framing an indictment for a criminal
otfense.
The use of any words in the affidavit which in effect or by neces-
sary implication exclude military, naval or marine corps service as
the cause of the entryman's absence will suffice to satisfy the require-
ment of the act of June 16, 1898, supra, whether the technical words
of the act are employed or not, such words being in substance a com-
pliance with the statute.
The affidavit of contest in this case being in the opinion of the
Department sufficient in all the material allegations as a basis for a
hearing, the decision of your office is hereby affirmed.
HOMESTEAD—ADJOINING EARM—ADDITIONAL—SECTIONS 5 AND 6, ACT
OF MARCH 3, 1889.
John Denny.
One who has exercised the homestead privilege, even though for less than Kin
acres, and thereby exhausted his homestead right, is disqualified to make
an adjoining farm entry under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes.
The right to make an additional entry accorded by section 5 of the act of
March 2, 1881), arises only where the original entry was made prior to the
passage of said act, and can he exercised only upon land contiguous to
that embraced in the original entry; hut the additional entry provided for
by section 6 of said act may he allowed whether the original entry was
made prior or subsequent to, the passage of said act and for land con-
tiguous or noncontiguous to the original entry.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 30, 1906. (D. C. II.)
It appears from the record that on February 21, 1891, John Denny
made homestead entry at the Springfield, Missouri, land office for
the N. i of the NE. j- of Sec. 30, T. 28. N., R. IT W., containing eighty
acres, and that he received patent for same March 18, 1897; that on
September 10, 1898, said Denny made at the same land office an
additional homestead entry for the S. h of lot 1, SW. J of Sec. 7, T.
24 N., Iv. 14 W., containing forty acres; that proof in support of
said entry, as and for an adjoining farm entry, was made February
27, 1905, and final certificate issued thereon March 1, 1905, the entry-
man stating in his final certificate that he owned and has continued
to own and reside upon the SW. J of the SE. \ of Sec. 7, T. 24 N., 11.
14 W. (which constitutes his original farm and deeded tract), since
November 18, 1898, and it appearing from the final proof that claim-
ant has resided upon the said SW. J of the said Sec. 7 and has culti-
vated the same in connection with the tract covered by his additional
entry since the aforesaid date.
Your office, by decision of September 20, 1905, held that the ad-
ditional entry should not have been allowed, because there is no pro-
vision of law under which an additional homestead entry may be made
as an adjoining farm entry, and allowed claimant sixty days within
which to show cause why his additional entry and the final certifi-
cate issued thereon should not be canceled for illegality. Denny
has appealed from your said judgment to the Department, and in
his appeal represents that the additional entry was made as an ad-
joining farm entry and that since making said entry he has continued
to reside upon his adjoining deeded land and has improved and cul-
tivated the same in connection with the forty acres here in question
and that in making his additional entry he was misled by the local
officers, who informed him that he had a right to make the entry as
an adjoining farm entry, and claimant now asks in his appeal to
be allowed to amend the character of said entry to that of actual
residence and cultivation under such regulations as may be proper and
equitable.
From the facts disclosed it is apparent that Denny's last entry and
final certificate thereon must be canceled. It cannot be allowed to
stand under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes as an adjoining farm
entry to the land purchased by and deeded to him, because by his
original homestead entry of the now patented land, he exhausted his
homestead right under that section. It cannot be permitted to stand
under section 5 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), because
his original homestead entry was made subsequent to the passage of
that act, and also because the land now7 sought is not contiguous to
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the said original entry. Upon the cancellation of Denny's said last
entry as herein directed, no reason is seen why he may not, if he so
desires, be allowed to enter the land included therein as an additional
homestead entry under section 6 of said act of 1889, subject to full
compliance with the law under the provisions of said section.
You will so advise claimant, allowing him a reasonable time within
which to make said additional entry, if there be no other valid objec-
tion. Thus modified, your decision is affirmed.
timber and stone ac t—execution of affidavit.
Annie Davies.
The affidavit or sworn statement required of an applicant to purchase under the
timber and stone act must be sworn to in the county, parish or land district
where the land is situated; and where in such statement the land intended
to be taken is incorrectly described, and an application to amend the orig-
inal statement so as to properly describe the lands desired is filed, the
amendatory affidavit must be sworn to in the same manner as required in
east' of an original affidavit.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(¥. L. C.) Office, Manh 31, 1906. (G. C. R.)
June 30, 190-1, Annie Davies applied to purchase under the timber
and stone act, lot 1, Sec. 4, lots 3 and 4 and SE. J NW. i, Sec. 3, T. 2
N., Iv. 43 E., Lagrande land district, Oregon. Notice was duly pub-
lished fixing September 22, 1904, for offering proof before the reg-
ister and receiver.
October 3, 1904, she filed in the local office her petition to amend
her entry and re-advertise to make proof. In it she alleged that she
desired, intended to describe, and thought she had described, lot 4 and
SW. J NW. J, Sec. 3, and lots 1 and 2 of Sec. 4 of said township. She
asked to amend accordingly.
Her petition was supported by three witnesses and was sworn to
before a notary public " residing at Spokane," Washington.
The register and receiver, erroneously passing upon the merits of
the petition to amend, instead of transmitting it for your action, as
they should have done under the rule, rejected the same, atid, on
appeal, your office affirmed that action, August 21, 1905.
The application to amend the entry was rejected because the same
Avas sworn to before an officer who was not qualified, that officer not
living in the county, parish or land district in which the land is situ-
ated—not even in the same state. Claimant, through her attorney,
has appealed to the Department.
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Section 2294 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of
March 4, 1904 (33 Stat., 59), provides:
That hereafter all proofs, affidavits, and oaths of any kind whatsoever required
to be made by applicants and entryinen under the homestead, pre-emption, timber-
culture, desert-land, and timber and stone acts, may, in addition to those now
authorized to take such affidavits, proofs, and oaths, be made before any
United States commissioner or commissioner of the court exercising Federal
jurisdiction in the Territory or before the judge or clerk of any court of record
in the county, parish or land district in which the lands are situated: Provided,
That in case the affidavits, proofs, and oaths hereinbefore mentioned be taken
out of the county in which the land is located the applicant must show by affi-
davit, satisfactoy to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, that it was
taken before the nearest or most accessible officer qualified to take said affi-
davits, proofs, and oaths in the land districts in which the lands applied for are
located ; but such showing by affidavit need not be made in making final proof
it* the proof be taken in the town or city where the newspaper is published in
which the final proof notice is printed. The proof, affidavit, and oath, when
so made and duly subscribed, or which may have heretofore been so made and
duly subscribed, shall have the same force and effect as if made before the reg-
ister and receiver, when transmitted to them with the fees and commissions
allowed and required by law.
Appellant contends that a mere application to amend is not re-
quired to be sworn to in the county, parish or land district where the
land is situated; that the applicant in fact swore in her original
application that she wished to enter the land as describe^ in her
amended application : that is, she had that in mind, and her oath
referred to it, and not to the land erroneously described by the writer,
whose mistake it was.
It is insisted that the affidavit to amend merely explains the error
made in the original affidavit, and that she is not attempting to make
a new7 sworn statement, but only to explain the first one.
Practical difficulties are suggested in the statement that the cor-
roborating witnesses are now far away from the land, and their pres-
ence in the district difficult, if not impossible to procure. She adds
that she has already spent much money to secure the land and does
not wash to be burdened with the expense incident to making another
sworn statement in the county, district, etc. where the land is situated.
It is very unfortunate that the alleged error was made in the
matter of the description of the desired lands. That mistake, how-
ever, claimant, through her agent, is solely responsible for.
If these affidavits describe the Avrong lands or lands not desired by
the applicant, the essential requisite for the allowance of an entry
is wanting. An application to enter, of necessity, is addressed to a
specific tract, and to correct an error in that respect is, in effect, to
make a new application.
While the affidavit supporting the petition to amend explains the
mistake made in the first affidavit, it is nevertheless the only affidavit
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which correctly describes the lands desired. Claimant does not want
the land her original affidavit described; hence that affidavit is use-
less. Her so-called explanatory affidavit is really the only affidavit
which expresses her wishes in respect to the lands desired. To
require her to make the affidavit before a qualified officer may cause
her much inconvenience, but the law requires it and this Department
has no power to relieve her.
The action appealed from is affirmed.
rejected homestead application-notice—appeal.
Spalding v. Hake.
Where a foreign-born homestead applicant fails to file with his application
proof of naturalization, or that he has declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, it is within the discretion of the local officers
to receive and hold the application and afford the applicant an opportunity
to furnish the required proof, or to reject the application outright, in which
latter event it can have no effect to segregate the land from other appro-
priation.
An appeal from the rejection of a defective application to enter does not
operate to reserve the land and entitles the applicant only to a judgment
as to the correctness of such action at the time it was taken, and where
the application was properly rejected, it is immaterial, in the face of an
adverse appropriation of the land, whether the applicant received proper
notice of such action.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, March 31, 1006. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by Martin Hake from the decision of your
office of May 31, 1905, holding for cancellation his homestead entry
for the SW. I of Sec. 5, T. 158 N., R. 81 W., Minot, North Dakota,
and finding that Albert Spalding has the superior right to the land.
January 2, 1908, Spalding made homestead application for said
land, stating therein: "That T have declared my intention to become
a citizen of the United States. That certified copy of such declara-
tion of intention is hereto attached." The application was rejected
by the local officers February 28, 1903, " for the reason that there
are no citizenship papers accompanying same." On the same date
notice of the rejection was sent to Spalding, in care of D. C. Green-
leaf, Minot, North Dakota, although Spalding's post office address
was stated in his homestead application to be Lamberton, Minnesota.
He was allowed thirty days in which to appeal to your office. March
6, L903, Martin Hake filed homestead application for the land, which
was held in abeyance pending Spalding's exercise of his right of
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appeal, and April 11, 1903, no such appeal having been filed, Hake
was allowed to make the homestead entry in question.
September 10, 1903, Spalding filed an appeal to your office, alleg-
ing error on the part of the local officers in rejecting his application
without giving him opportunity to furnish his citizen papers; in
allowing the Hake entry in the absence of notice of the rejection of
his own application; and in not sending notice of the rejection of his
application to the record address. In an affidavit accompanying the
appeal Spalding alleged that he employed I). C. Greenleaf to act
as scrivener for the sole purpose of making out his homestead applica-
tion papers; that said Greenleaf did not at any time have authority
to further represent him in the matter ; and that he had no knowledge
until recently of the rejection of his application. With his appeal
Spalding filed a certified copy of his declaration of intention to
become a citizen of the United States.
January 13, 1904, your office called upon Hake to show cause why
his entry should not be canceled and the application of Spalding
allowed, finding that while the action of the local officers in rejecting
the application of Spalding was " undoubtedly correct," yet their
omission to properly notify him of the fact was error that should not
be allowed to defeat his rights.
Hake answered, stating that he made his entry in good faith,
having been informed and believing that Spalding's application
was properly rejected; that ever since he has been in undisputed
possession of the premises, having established residence thereon
within six months from date of entry; that he has erected thereon
a dwelling house, habitable at all seasons of the year, and broken eight
acres and put the same in condition for next season's crop; and that
Spalding has never established residence nor made any improvements
whatever on the land. Your office found, however, that while these
things show Hake's good faith, there is nothing in his answer to
controvert the claim of Spalding who under all the circumstances
has the superior right to the laud.
A foreign-born applicant is required under the homestead law to
furnish proof of naturalization, or that he has declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States, the usual method in the latter
event being to accompany his application with a certified copy of his
declaration. This proof is a condition precedent to making entry
under said law. The local officers were undoubtedly warranted, as
held by your office, in rejecting the application of Spalding for
absence of the required citizenship proof, and it is no answer to their
action to say they might have held said application and notified
Spalding with a view to his curing the defect. It is true they might,
within their discretion, have done this thing, in which event his
application would for the time have been a pending application
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barring the receipt of any other. But they did not take this course
and their action was fully justified. As said in the case of Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Company (33 L. D., 161): "Power to reject an
improper application is incident to their office under the laws for
organization of the land department." In the analogous case of
Charles H. Cobb (31 L, D., 220), it was said :
An imperfect selection, such as this, should have been rejected by the local
officers at once, upon its presentation. It was not incumbent upon them to
invite the selector to present the requisite proofs and to await his action in
that matter. Unless his selection conformed to the law and regulations, he
was not entitled to have it received by the local officers and noted upon the
records of their office.
Therefore Spalding gained nothing as against an adverse claim by
the filing of his imperfect application. It is contended on his behalf,
however, that as said application stated that he had declared his
intention to become a citizen, it was the duty of the local officers to
notify him of the failure to attach the necessary evidence thereto, so
as to afford him an opportunity to furnish the same, and for this rea-
son his application, although rejected, " in a measure -segregated said
tract." For obvious reasons this point can not be sustained. But
your office holds that because of the failure of the local officers to
properly notify Spalding of the rejection of his application, the
application of Hake was prematurely allowed, that is, before the
thirty days' right of appeal of Spalding had expired. This would
undoubtedly be true if it had been found that Spalding's application
was impropely rejected. Otherwise he could gain nothing by appeal,
and consequently he was in no way prejudiced by the alleged want of
proper notice. An appeal from the action of the local officers reject-
ing his application could have entitled him only to a judgment as to
the correctness of such action at the time it was taken. Eaton et al. v.
Northern Pacific Railway Company (33 L. D., 426) . It is well set-
tled that an appeal does not operate to save or create rights not
secured by the application itself. Maggie Laird (13 L. D., 502).
An application to enter properly rejected does not operate to reserve
the land covered thereby, even though an appeal is taken from the
order of rejection. Mclnturf v. Gladstone Townsite (20 L. D., 93).
Hence, Spalding's application having been properly rejected because
defective, and it not being incumbent upon the local officers to notify
him with a view to affording him an opportunity to cure the defect,
and especially as they did not do so in this case, an appeal by him
could not have operated to reserve the land from Hake's entry and
he could not have been allowed to complete his application in the face
of the adverse claim.
There is another cogent reason for holding intact the entry of
Hake. Granting there has been no bad faith en the part of either of
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the parties to this controversy, it is a well established theory in equity
that when one of two persons must sutler a loss it should be borne by
that one who by his conduct, acts, or omissions, has rendered the
injury possible. The error in the first instance here was clearly on
the part of Spalding, and as a result of that error Hake was per-
mitted to make entry. He has since established residence on the land
and has expended time, money and labor in its improvement. Under
the circumstances it is entirely appropriate to invoke equitable con-
sideration in behalf of his claim.
Each case of this character must be determined on its particular
facts and merits. It is not believed the conclusion reached herein
conflicts with the decision in the case of Johnston v. Bane (27 L. D.,
156), nor that in Junkin v. Nillsson (28 L. D., 333), the facts in those
cases not being identical with the facts of the one here under consid-
eration. As stated, the equities in favor of Hake constitute one of the
controlling features of this case.
The decision of your office is reversed, Spalding's application is
rejected, and Hake's entry will remain intact.
reclamation act—applications for water rights.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, April 4, 1906.
Registers <m<l Receivers, United States Land Offices.
Gentlemen : In connection with the various reclamation projects
which have been undertaken by the Government under the provisions
of the act of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), the Department has
adopted the plan of having water-users' associations organized within
such projects, the incorporators and holders of which are owners and
occupants of the land embraced therein, and when so organized the
Secretary of the Interior enters into contracts with such associations
and they become, as it were, an integral part of the project and
directly associated with the Government in carrying out the details
thereof. Upon the execution of such contracts, the relation of the
association to the 4 Government as the representative of the water users
and as the medium of communication between the water users and
the Government, is formally determined.
As a means of accomplishing this object, the Department has
adopted two forms of applications for water rights, viz., Form "A"
(4-021) for homesteaders avIio have made entries of lands withdrawn
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under the second form of withdrawal, and Form " B " (4-020) for
private owners of lands embraced within said project, and these forms
(copies of which will be furnished you) will be used in all applica-
tions for water rights in any of the reclamation projects within your
district. For the procedure contemplated in filing and acceptance
of water rights you are informed that
—
1. Upon notice authorized by the Secretary of the Interior that the
Government is ready to receive applications for water right for
described lands under a particular project, all persons who have made
entries of lands under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902 (32
Stat., 388), will be required to file application for water rights on
Form A for the number of acres of irrigable land in the farm unit
entered, as shown by the plats of farm units approved by the Secre-
tary of the Interior.
2. Upon the issuance of such notice private land owners shall, in
like manner, apply for water rights for tracts not containing more
than 160 acres of irrigable land, according to the approved plats,
unless a smaller limit has been fixed as to lands in private ownership
by the Secretary of the Interior. Form B is intended for use by such
applicants.
3. The amount of water to be furnished per annum per acre of
irrigable land will be fixed 'by the Secretary of the Interior for each
project, as it will depend upon the varying local conditions.
4. Information as to the number of annual installments required to
be paid, the amount of each, and the time when the same shall be due,
will also be furnished prior to the time Avhen water right applications
can be received.
5. If the Secretary of the Interior has made a contract with a
water-users' association organized under the project, due notice
thereof will be given to the registers and receivers, and applications
for water rights should not be accepted in such cases unless the certifi-
cate at the end thereof has been duly executed by the said association.
0. The Reclamation Act provides that a private land owner who
makes application for wTater right thereunder shall be " an actual bona
fide resident on such land, or occupant thereof residing in the neigh-
borhood of said land." Each application on Form B must contain a
statement as to the distance of the applicant's residence from the land
for which a water right is desired. The limit of distance will be fixed
by the Secretary of the Interior for each project, depending on the
local conditions. The local land officers will be notified as to this
limit when notice is given that water-right applications may be
accepted. If a greater distance is shown in any application, the case
should be reported to the Commissioner of the General Land Office
for special consideration upon the facts shown. If the applicant is
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an actual bona fide resident on the land for which water-right applica-
tion is made, the clause in parentheses of Form B, regarding resi-
dence elsewhere, must be stricken out.
7. The applicant on Form B must state accurately the nature of his
interest in the land. If this interest is such that it can not ripen into
a fee-simple title at or before the time when the last annual install-
ment for water rights is due, the register and receiver must reject
the application.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, April 4, 1906.
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
homestead-nebraska lands-act of april 28, 1904.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, April 10, 1906.
Registers and Receivers,
United States Land Offices, Nebraska.
Gentlemen: The circular of instructions relative to the act of
Congress approved April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), entitiled "An act
to amend the homestead laws as to certain unappropriated and unre-
served lands in Nebraska," which was approved May 25, 1904 (32
L. D., 670), was amended August 21, 1905 (see 34 L. D., 87), and is
hereby reissued, modified as follows:
It is directed by the law that in that portion of the State of Ne-
braska lying west and north of the line described therein, which was
marked in red ink upon maps transmitted with said circular, upon
and after June 28, 1904, except for such lands as might be thereafter
and prior to said date excluded under the proviso contained in the first
section thereof, homestead entries may be made for and not to exceed
640 acres, the same to be in as nearly a compact form as possible, and
must not in any event exceed two miles in extreme length.
Under the provisions of the second section, a person who within
the described territory has made entry prior to April 28, 1904, under
the homestead laws of the United States, and who now owns and occu-
pies the lands theretofore entered by him, and no other disqualifica-
tion to make homestead entry exists, may make an additional entry of
a quantity of land contiguous to his said homestead entry which,
added to the area of the original entry, shall make an aggregate
area not to exceed 640 acres; and he will not be required to reside
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upon tho additional land so entered, residence upon the original
homestead entry being accepted as equivalent to residence upon the
additional land so entered. But residence either upon the original
homestead or the additional land entered must be continued for the
period of five years from the date of the additional entry.
A person who has a homestead entry upon which final proof has
not been submitted and who makes additional entry under the pro-
visions of section 2 of the act, will be required to submit his final
proof on the original entry within the statutory period therefor,
and final proof upon the additional entry must also be submitted
within the statutory period from date of that entry.
Such additional entry must be for contiguous lands and the tracts
embraced therein must be in as compact a form as possible, and the
extreme length of the combined entries must not in any event exceed
two miles.
In accepting entries under this act compliance with the requirement
thereof as to compactness of form should be determined by the rela-
tive location of the vacant and unappropriated lands, rather than by
the quality and desirability of the desired tracts.
By the first proviso of section 3 any person who made a homestead
entry prior to his application for entry under this act, if no other dis-
qualification exists, will be allowed to make an additional entry for a
quantity of land which, added to the area of the land embraced in the
former entry, shall not exceed 040 acres, but residence upon and culti-
vation of the additional land will be required to be made and proved
as in ordinary homestead entries. But the application of one who has
an existing entry and seeks to make an additional entry under said
proviso, can not be allowed unless he has either abandoned his former
entry, or has so perfected his right thereto as to be under no further
obligation to reside thereon; and his qualifying status in these and
other respects should be clearly set forth in his application.
Under said act no bar is interposed to the making of second home-
steads for the full area of 040 acres by parties entitled thereto under
existing laws, and applications therefor will be considered under the
instructions of the respective laws under which they are made.
Upon final proof, which may be made after five years and within
seven years from date of entry, the entryman must prove affirmatively
that he lias placed upon the lands entered permanent improvements
of the value of not less than $1.25 per acre for each acre, and such
proof must also show residence upon and cultivation of the land for
the five-year period as in ordinary homestead entries.
In the making of final proofs (he homestead-proof form will be
used, modified when necessary in case of additional entries made
under the provisions of section 2.
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It is provided by section 3 that the fees and commissions on all
entries under the act shall be uniformly the same as those charged
under the present law for a maximum entry at the minimum price,
viz : At the time the application is made $14, and at the time of
making final proof $4, to be payable without regard to the area em-
braced in the entry.
In case the combined area of the subdivisions selected should, upon
applying the rule of approximation thereto, be found to exceed in area
the aggregate of G40 acres, the entryman will be required to pay the
minimum price per acre for the excess in area.
Entries under this act are not subject to the commutation pro-
visions of the homestead law.
In the second proviso of section 3 entrymen who had made their
entries prior to April 28, 1904, were allowed a preferential right for
ninety days thereafter to make the additional entry allowed by sec-
tion 2 of the law.
Very respectfully, W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
school land—right of way—act of june 21, 1898.
Territory of New Mexico.
The grant of sections sixteen and thirty-six made to the Territory of Neyv Mex-
ico for school purposes by the act of June 21, 1898, is a grant in praesenti,
and any question as to the authority of the Territory to grant rights of
way for railroads across any such lands is one for determination by the
officers of the Territory and not by the Secretary of the Interior.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, April 11, 1006. (G. B. G.)
In a communication of February 5, 1906, addressed to the Secre-
tary of the Interior by the Commissioner of Public Lands for the
Territory of New Mexico, it is stated that applications have been
made by railroad companies for rights of way across school sections
sixteen and thirty-six, it being contended by such companies that
these applications should be allowed in accordance with section 13,
chapter III, Territorial Laws of New Mexico, of 1905, the material
part of which is as follows:
That the Commissioner of Public Lands may grant the right of way across
or upon any portion of the territorial lands upon such terms as he may deem
for the best interests of the territory for any ditch, reservoir, railroad . . .
and sign on behalf of the territory a proper deed or instrument of writing for
such right of way or sale.
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Said Commissioner asks to be advised " with reference to the rights
of the Territory in the matter of a light of way to a railroad company
across a school section," and by your reference of the 27th ultimo I
am asked for opinion upon the question presented.
I have to advise you that in my judgment the question is not one
for the consideration of this Department, The act of June 21, 1898
(30 Stat., 484), made a grant in praesenti of the lands in question to
the Territory of New Mexico, with a restriction upon the power of
alienation, it being therein provided that these lands might be
" leased only " by the Territory. Yet, while it is true that this grant
was a present one (Territory of New Mexico, 29 L. D., 364), it is also
undoubtedly true that the Congress of the United States may still
enforce the conditions of the grant in any appropriate manner (see
Emigrant Co. v. County of Adams, 100 U. S., 01, 69) ; but I fail to
perceive that the Secretary of the Interior is charged with any duty
in the premises, advisory or otherwise. If a situation were pre-
sented which would seem to require investigation as a basis for a
report to Congress, in the discharge of general duties devolving upon
the Secretary of the Interior under section 442 of the Revised Stat-
utes, it would, I think, be your duty to direct the investigation, but
no such situation is here presented. (See my opinion of February 19,
1906, 21 Opinions Assistant Attorney-General, 890.) Here is an act
of the territorial legislature, a copy of which has presumably been
filed with the Congress of the United States, pursuant to the provi-
sions of section 1850 of the Revised Statutes, and if that body should
not choose to take action thereon, it remains for the courts eventually
to determine the legality of such legislation.
There is nothing to investigate, and I think the Commissioner of
Public Lands should look to the law officers of the Territory for
opinion as to his authority and duty in the premises.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
uintah indian lands-withdrawal fok reservoir purposes-
act of march 3, 1905—lease.
Opinion.
There is no authority for leasing lands formerly within the Uintah Indian
reservation and withdrawn generally for reservoir purposes under the act
of March 3, 1905, where such lands have not boon appropriated for any
particular purpose so as to take them out of the category of public lands.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
April 11, 1906. (E. F. B.)
A letter from the Director of the Geological Survey, dated March
17, 1<)()G, has been referred to me for opinion as to whether lands
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formerly within the Uintah Indian reservation, and now withdrawn
for reservoir purposes under authority of the act of March 3, 1905
(33 Stat., 1048, 1070), may be leased for grazing purposes until the
lands are needed for the uses contemplated by their withdrawal.
Reference is made by the Director to my opinion of March 10, 1906
(34 L. D., 480), as authority for the leasing of such lands.
That opinion was given upon the question as to the right of the
Secretary of the Interior to lease lands withdrawn or purchased for i
reclamation purposes under the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388),
but it was based upon the general principle that in the absence of any
express prohibition as to the particular property, the head of the
executive department in whose care and custody public property is
placed to be used for a particular purpose, may, until the property is
needed for the purpose intended, exercise his judgment and discretion
as to the proper care and disposition of such property and an}^ use
of it not incompatible with the purpose intended is not a diversion to
other uses and is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of the super-
visory authority and discretion reposed in him.
It was also stated that the Secretary of the Interior has no author-
ity under his general power of supervision and control over the public
lands to lease them unless expressly authorized by Congress. Special
provision having been made for the disposal of public lands, any
other manner of disposition is excluded, being impliedly prohibited.
The lands in question were withdrawn under authority of the act
of March 3, 1905, supra, which empowered the President, prior to
the opening of the Uintah Indian reservation, " to set apart and
reserve any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and
protect the water supply for the Indians or for general agricultural
development."
If these lands have been permanently appropriated to a particular
use, as in the case of lands appropriated for the construction of
irrigation works under the act of June 17, 1902, and have been dis-
|
posed of so far as to take them out of the category of public lands,
the principle announced in the opinion of March 10, 1900, would
authorize the leasing of them.
It does not appear, however, that they have been appropriated for
any purpose. They are simply reserved public lands that may, or may
not, be used for the purposes intended by their reservations, and the
vacating of the order of reservation would, of its own force, subject
them to disposal as other lands of the reservation.
As they are not a part of an irrigation project to be constructed
under the act of June 17, 1902, the rental from these lands would not
be covered into the treasury as a part of the reclamation fund—even
if there was no question as to the authority to lease.
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I advise that there is no authority to lease these lands and* the appli-
cation should be rejected.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary
\
REPAYMENT—PAYMENT IN CASH AND BY LAND WAKRANT.
Heirs of Jose G. Somavia.
A pre-emption entryman who paid double minimum price for lands supposed
to be within the limits of a railroad grant, but which were subsequently
held not to be within such limits, is entitled to repayment of the excess of
one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre paid by him ; but where payment
was made partly in cash and partly by land warrant, the Secretary of the
Interior has no authority, in making repayment, to draw his warrant for an
amount greater than the cash payment made by the entryman; and in such
case, where the amount of the cash payment is not sufficient to make the
repayment due the entryman in full, he may be permitted to make an addi-
tional cash payment of such an amount as added to the sum originally paid
by him in cash will aggregate the cost of the land at one dollar and twenty-
five cents per acre, and thereupon have the land warrant returned to him
unsatisfied.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Offices
(F. L. C.) April 12, 1906. (J. R. W.)
The heirs of Jose G. Somavia appealed from your decision of July
15, 1905, refusing to return to them military bounty land warrants
Nos. 113411 and 33104, act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat., 701), respec-
tively for one hundred and sixty and eighty acres.
November 12, 1878, Somavia made final proof of his pre-emption
claim to lots 1, 2, 3 and the SW. J of the NW. i, Sec, 2, T. 17 S., R. 4
E., M. I). M., San Francisco, California, and in payment located war-
rant 113411 for 160 acres on lots 1, 2 and the SW. \ of the NW. J, 98.82
acres, and paid $47.05 as and for an excess of 18.82 acres. In pay-
ment for lot 3, 45.47 acres, he located warrant 33104, and as and for
an excess of 5.47 acres he paid $13.08. This occurred from the fact
that the lands entered were at that time by the land department held
and supposed to be double minimum lands within the limits of the
grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, made by the
act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), but was afterward held not to be
within such limits by decision of March 23, 1886, in Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Company (4 L. D., 458). Due to the former errone-
ous holding Somavia's warrants were credited upon his entry for
half of their area, and he was required to pay and did pay two
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dollars and fifty cents per acre for the excess of 24.29 acres of his
pre-emption—144.29 acres over the area of his 240 acres of land-
warrants credited at half their area or 120 acres. April 15, 1880,
patents issued to him for the lands so entered.
June 21, 1902, application was made to your office by J. T., J. R
,
and R. M. de Somavia for return of these warrants. Therewith was
filed an affidavit by Robert A. Fatjo and Eugene M. Don that they
were personally acquainted with Jose G. Somavia, the entryman, and
know of their own knowledge that he died about May 1C>, 1900, that
the applicants are his sole heirs, and are all of full age of twenty-one
years. The applicants offer to pay the full sum of one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre of the entry, less the $60.73 paid at the
time as excess.
Your decision held that (1) the warrants were satisfied, at least in
part, by the entryman's acceptance of the patents, which would have
to be returned and canceled, and title to the land be reconveyed to the
United States before return of the warrants; (2) that while the
double minimum price should not have been exacted, and an equity to
reimbursement exists, yet your office is not authorized to return the
warrants; (3) that the proof of right in the applicants is insufficient,
in that their relation to the entryman is not stated, or facts upon
which their heirship is based are not stated, but a mere conclusion of
law only, and the application was denied.
The result is that he paid, under an erroneous ruling of the land
department, part in warrants and part in money, the double minimum
price for land that afterward Avas found not to be within the limits of
a railroad grant, and, had the entire payment been made in money, he
would be entitled under section 2 of the act of June 10, 1880 (21 Stat.,
287), to repayment of the excess above one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre. Frederick W. Frese (5 L. D., 437). But as it was a
mixed payment—only part in money
—
the Secretary of the Interior
has no authority to draw his warrant on the Treasury for repayment
of the one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre of the entry in money.
Sylvester Kipp (24 L. D.,-538) ; Albert Nelson (28 L. D., 248).
But in the latter case it was held that for such part of the excess
paid as remains in the custody of the Department, the error may be
corrected. In that case the entire payment was in surveyor's scrip,
and the excess amount was returned. In discussion of the subject the
Department held
:
It was wrong to exact this, and to retain it would be to continue the wrong.
While the consideration remains in the hands of this Department the mistake
may and should be corrected. It comes within the principle announced by
Attorney-General John Nelson, in 4th Opinions of Attorney-General, page 227,
wherein he said:
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"In reference to cases of error arising out of miscalculations of the amounts
to be paid, I have had more difficulty. Money thus paid is never properly in
the treasury of the United States. It is paid and received by mutual mistake
and as lon^; as it remains in the hands of the receiving officer I can perceive no
good reason why, upon the discovery of the error, lie should not be authorized
to correct it. After it has found its way into the treasury, however, like all
other money, it should he withdrawn in strict fulfillment of the requirements
of* the law, which the administrative power or the executive department of the
government can not control."
The certificates surrendered by the applicant as the consideration for the land
are in the custody and under the control of the Department, and justice and
equity demand that the mistake should he corrected.
The obligation to be just rests alike on governments as on persons.
In case of governments the difficulty in granting relief arises from
the peculiarity of their organization, but when brought to the bar of
the court, the same principles determine their obligation in business
transactions as apply to individuals. In the present case the land
department in disposal of public lands exacted from the pre-emption
claimant warrants for 240 acres of land and the price of 48.56 acres
more for half the quantity, 144.29 acres. This exaction was not a
voluntary payment, as, under the erroneous construction of law then
prevailing, his pre-emption would have been forfeited and his right
lost. The obligation remains to return the exaction, now that the
error is confessed. The land warrants can not be divided, but the
real transaction was a pre-emption entry for 144.29 acres, for which
he made proof and in payment located a land warrant for eighty
acres, and should have paid $80.87, but actually paid only $60.73 in
money. Adjusting the considerations that actually passed as ratably
as the indivisible character of the land warrants, permits, without
exacting more than he was required to pay, the warrant for eighty
acres can be satisfied ; the parties can complete the cash payment by
paying $19.64, and the warrant for one hundred and sixty acre's can
be returned unsatisfied. This is within the power of the land depart-
ment, and in view of the character of mixed considerations is the
equitable and nearest possible approximation to an accurate ratable
adjustment.
The objection made by your office to the sufficiency of proof of the
right of claimants to Somavia's succession is well taken and is ap-
proved. The claimant, however, should be permitted to make proper
proof.
Your decision is vacated, and your office will return the one hun-
dred and sixty acre warrant, upon the applicants making proof
satisfactory to your office that they are the sole heirs of the entry-
man and entitled by succession to him to claim the property, paying
$19.64 to complete the entry. '
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mining claim—notice of application for patent—exclusion
of conflict.
Richmond and Other Lode Claims.
A recital of exclusion of conflict in the notice of an application for patent to a
mining claim as effectually eliminates the conflict area as it" the exception
and exclusion were in terms declared in the application for patent itself.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Lund Office,
(F. L. C.) April 12, 1000. (F. H. B.)
August 25, 1904:, X. E. Bag-ley made entry (No. 1720) for the. Rich-
mond, Argonaut, and Sunny Jim lode mining claims, survey No.
16933, Durango, Colorado, land district. In the entry and in the
published and posted notice of the application for patent all conflicts
with surveys Nos. 1125, 1179, 1335. and 2183, the Bond, Wolverine.
Mountain Maid, and Cacique lode mining claims, respectively, were
expressly excluded.
It appearing, however, from the field notes of survey that the area
claimed and paid for includes two tracts, "A" and " B." described
in those notes and indicated on the official plat of survey, which are
embraced in the excluded conflicts with the first three claims above
mentioned, your office, by decision of February 28, 1905, held in sub-
stance and effect that, as it does not appear that the claimant has
been awarded the tracts by judgment of a court, if he desires to retain
any portion thereof it will be necessary regularly to republish and
repost notice of his application as to so much, and that, if no adverse
claim is filed, he may thereafter enter and pay for the additional
land. Failing such supplemental proceedings and in the absence of
appeal, it was stated, within sixty days from receipt of notice, the
entry would pass to patent exclusive of all conflicts with the surveys
mentioned. Your office also remarked an unexcluded conflict with
the Pacific lode claim, survey No. 835 A. for which, it was stated.
application for patent had been hied.
The claimant has appealed to the Department. In that behalf
he cites paragraphs 39 and 46 of the mining regulations (31 L. D.,
474. 181, 182). prescribing the data which the published and posted
notice must contain, and urges that in the present case * w all of the
data required by said paragraphs was contained in the various notices
and no question as to this has been raised by your office. ** He also
cites that portion of paragraph 52 of the regulations which provides
that upon submission of proof of publication and posting, etc., the
register will " permit the claimant to pay for the land according to
the area given in the plat and field notes of survey." which he avers
to have been done in this instance: and he concludes as follows:
All of the conflict with the conflicting surveys named is not excluded from
this entry either in statement or in fact, but patent is asked for, and payment
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was made for, a specific number of acres, to-wit, 26.035 acres, exclusive of con-
flict with certain surveys, exactly as stated in the field notes.
A comparison of the field notes and plats of the several surveys in conflict
will disclose the fact that patent is asked for in this case for such area as was
heretofore excluded from the other surveys and abandoned by claimants .,t
Sur. No. 835 A.
There can be no doubt that the two tracts in question arc not
available to the claimant under his pending patent proceedings. The
present difficulty with respect to those tracts would seem to have
arisen from a too literal regard for the general language of portions
of the mining regulations and a corresponding disregard of the
letter and purpose of the mining statutes themselves.
It is carefully provided by those statutes that of each application
for mineral patent notice shall be published and posted, whereby
all others who may have or claim adverse interests may be warned
and afforded opportunity to assert their claims in season. In other
words, precisely what is sought to be secured by the application
must be disclosed by the published notice, the notice posted in the
local office, and the notice posted upon the claim. Upon these several
elements or parts of the prescribed notice, and each of them, all
others who may have or claim conflicting interests have a full right
to rely; and any recital therein of exclusion of conflict as effectually
eliminates the conflict area as if the exception and exclusion were in
terms declared in the application for patent.
It is true that the data contained in the field notes, illustrated by
the official plat, constitute the official and controlling advice of the
locus and extent of the claim or claims for which patent is sought.
It by no means follows, however, that the claimant is entitled to
receive 1
, or may secure, patent to all the land described in the field
notes and shown upon the plat as embraced in his claim or claims.
It often happens that in the official survey of a claim a conflict with
another claim is included as part and parcel of the former and so
described in the field notes and exhibited on the plat, but that there-
after and even after his application is tiled, threatened with an
adverse claim and a suit thereunder, the claimant waives his claim
to the conflict area by an express exclusion thereof recited in his
published and posted notice.
In this case unqualified exclusions, embracing the two tracts in
question, were recited in the published and posted notice of appel-
lant's application for patent, and as such were carried into the
entry; and the contrary assertion made and conclusion expressed in
his appeal, as above quoted, are inaccurate. It is clear, in this con-
nection, that in scanning the mining regulations, whose provisions
he invokes, appellant did not give due observance to the concluding
clause of paragraph 39, whereby, speaking of the notice to be posted
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in each case in a conspicuous place on the claim concerned, the
claimant is admonished that
—
Too much care cannot he exercised in the preparation of this notice, inas-
much as the data therein are to he repeated in the other notices required by
the statute, and upon the accuracy and completeness of these notices will
depend, in a great measure, the regularity and validity of the proceedings for
patent.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
mining claim-expenditure-wagon roads.
Douglas and Other Lodes.
The cost of construction of such portions of wagon roads, used in the transpor-
tation of supplies to and ore from a mining claim or claims, as extend
beyond the boundaries of the latter can not be accepted in satisfaction of
the statutory requirement with respect to the expenditure in labor or
improvements for patent purposes, the connection between the outlying
portions of the roads and active mining operations or development being
too remote to justify their acceptance.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C) April 13, 1906. (F. H. B.)
June 24, 1903, H. E. Miller et al. made entry (No. 715) for what
is called the Douglas group, consisting of the Douglas and ten other
lode mining claims, survey No. 1990, Carson City, Nevada, land dis-
trict. The eleven claims are contiguous.
It appearing that the Douglas and Lookout were the only claims
of the group upon or for the benefit of which the requisite improve-
ments had been made, the entrymen were called upon to show, by
proper certificate of the surveyor-general, that the statutory expendi-
ture had been made upon each of the claims prior to expiration of
the period of publication, upon pain of cancellation of the entry
except as to the Douglas and Lookout claims.
In response there was submitted, on behalf of the entrymen, a sup-
plemental certificate by the surveyor-general and corroborated affi-
davit of the deputy mineral surveyor who surveyed the claims, in
which a number of buildings on the group and several miles of road
are given as additional to the improvements originally certified, and
from which it appears that subsequent to the survey and prior to the
expiration of the period of publication a tunnel improvement upon
the Douglas and Lookout claims had been extended at a cost of
$11,174.00.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 557
Upon consideration of the supplemental showing your office, by
decision of January 16, 1005, said and held as follows:
The extension of tunnel A within the Lookout and Douglas locations and the
shafts, raises, inclines and winzes in connection therewith is valued at $11,174.60.
Of the buildings mentioned only the hoarding house valued at $780, the bunk
house valued at $560, can be accepted as having been constructed in compliance
with the statute requiring certain expenditures on lode claims.
No specific showing is made as to how the roads mentioned tend to promote
the extraction of mineral from the claims except that some of them are neces-
sary for the transportation of machinery and supplies to the mines. The
other portions are used for the transportation of ores to the smelter to be
treated. The smelter is not an improvement tending to promote the extraction
of mineral from the claim (see 31 L. D., 37). A similar holding was made
by this office in letter " N " of April 15, 1904, to the local officers at La Grande,
Oregon. This being the case, the road leading thereto could not be accepted
;is an improvement tending to promote the extraction of mineral from the
claim. Only a small portion of the road was constructed except that leading
to the smelter. This portion, together with the buildings, which, as above stated,
might be accepted as proper improvements, distributed pro rata among the
claims is not sufficient to make the expenditure on any individual claim amount
to $500, excepting the Morning Star, Francis, Douglas and Lookout claims. The
tunnel above referred to, as stated in Mr. Mack's affidavit, is shown to have
been made for the benefit of the Lookout and Douglas and has been extended
toward and is shown to tend toward the development of the Francis claim also.
The Morning Star is separated from the Lookout, Douglas and Francis claims
by the Constitution and Relief locations, upon which but a small amount has
been expended, and therefore in case of cancellation of the entry as to the Con-
stitution and Relief locations, could not be embraced in the same entry with
the Lookout, Douglas and Francis claims. Aside from the Morning Star and
the three last named claims the showing made is not considered sufficient. The
entry is accordingly held for cancellation as to all of the claims except the
Lookout, Douglas and Francis locations.
From that decision the entrymen have appealed to the Department.
The expenditures upon the several claims of the group, in improve-
ments consisting of tunnels, shafts, and cuts, were originally certified
as follows
:
Morning Star claim $419.22
Azurite claim 71.96
Relief claim 27.96
Sunlight claim 256.84
Coppersmith claim 88.89
Francis claim 410.83
Douglas claim '. 7, 21:;. 37
Lookout claim 149.99
Constitution claim 13.33
Hope claim 7.50
Golden Gate claim 20.00
Total i 8, 679. 89
Of the claims of the group the Douglas alone was thus accredited
with sufficient individual improvements to sustain an entry. It was
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remarked by your office that the improvements upon that claim ap-
peared to benefit the Lookout claim.
The tunnel, referred to in the supplemental certificate as having
been extended at a cost of $11,174.60, has its .portal at or near the
northerly boundary of the Lookout and extends in a northerly direc-
tion for some distance within the boundaries of the adjoining Douglas
claim and in the direction of the next adjoining Francis' claim. It is
specifically certified, with respect to this extended tunnel, that it de-
velops the mineral deposits of the Douglas and Lookout claims, tends
to develop the deposits of the Francis claim, and will, when extended
from its face into the Francis claim, develop and be a means of work-
ing and mining the mineral-bearing rock in place in the Francis.
Under this certificate your office accepts the extended tunnel as an
improvement for the common benefit of the three claims mentioned in
that connection, and the Department sees no reason to question that
finding. This disposes of the tunnel improvement as it now stands.
Additional individual improvements upon the Douglas and Look-
out claims are given, but are of no concern here.
The buildings and structures upon the claims consist of a boarding
house, office, two bunk houses, two cellars, blacksmith shop, stable
and powder house, of the total value of $2,030. With respect to them
it is certified
—
that said structures hereinbefore mentioned are all necessary to carry on the
work of mining on said claims, as the workmen are obliged to live and eat upon
the claims, by reason of the distance between said mines and any other houses,
and that said office, blacksmith shop, cellars, stable and powder house were also
constructed for and used to carry on the business of mining upon said claims.
In the same connection, in an affidavit by H. E. Miller, one of the
entrymen, it is alleged
:
As for the house, stable, cellars, blacksmith shop, they have been in almost
constant use since construction and are now being used with material enlarge-
ments.
The long distance from supplies, such as fresh meats, milk, and vegetables,
makes the provision of store house, cellars and powder houses necessary.
If it were decisive of the question here, it being affirmatively made
to appear that these improvements are essential to mining operations
and are utilized and employed for those purposes, the Department
would be disposed to hold that they might be accepted as improve-
ments for the benefit of the claims within the requirements in that
behalf.
However, by an apportionment of the value of the structures
among the eleven claims of the group, and for which the credit is
offered, as additional to the certified individual credits set forth in
the foregoing table, the requisite amount would not be reached with
respect to others than the Francis, Douglas, Lookout (which shared
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the tunnel improvement) , and Morning Star claims, and the latter
being some distance removed from the three first mentioned, could
not be embraced in the entry. Other sufficient genera] improvements
must therefore appear.
Two of the principal roads mentioned in the supplemental certifi-
cate are shown by a blueprint diagram thereto attached to traverse
the Coppersmith, Sunlight, Lookout, Douglas, and Francis claims.
From the last mentioned claim one road extends first to the north and
then to the west, without the group, reaching and entering upon the
Azurite and cutting the northwesterly corner of the Morning Star.
Another of the roads, marked on the diagram " Road from tunnel A
to Bluestone smelter," extends from the southerly end of the group in
a northeasterly direction, cutting the southeasterly corner of the
Golden Gate claim in its course, for much the greater part outside the
group. Still another road, marked on the blueprint " road to Doug-
las office," extends from what is indicated as junction 4, a little south
of the northerly boundary of the Francis claim, in a northeasterly
direction, almost its entire length outside the group, to a junction
with the " road from tunnel A to Bluestone smelter." In addition,
two and a half miles of road, wholly outside the group and leading
" to water," extend to the south and west of the group.
These roads are stated, both by the deputy mineral surveyor and by
the affiant, Miller, to have been constructed by the entrymen and their
grantors, prior to the survey, for the purpose, and are used, for haul-
ing machinery and supplies to the claims as well as ore therefrom;
and their total value is given as $2,150. Affiant Miller alleges that
the road leading to the Bluestone smelter connects with a road lead-
ing to a near-by town and some distance further to a station on a line
of railroad.
In the view which the Department has taken of wagon roads gen-
erally as mining improvements, particularly where they are not
wholly upon the claims involved and are devoted to the transporta-
tion of supplies to and ore fromihe claims, but a fraction of the value
of those certified here, and representing such portions of the roads as
are within the boundaries of the group, could be accepted, in the most
favorable view of their serviceability in the direct promotion of the
development of this group. See Copper Glance Lode (29 L. I).. 542 )
;
Highland Marie and Manilla Lode Mining Claims (31 L. I)., 37,
38-9). The connection between the outlying portions of the roads
and active mining operations or development is too remote to justify
their acceptance as a credit. The addition of the acceptable fraction,
if it were feasible to determine the availability of the roads actually
within and upon the claims,' would still fail to satisfy the statutory
requirement so far as concerns others of the group than those last
above named. The Department fully recognizes the good faith of
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these entrymen as manifested in an expenditure of nearly $25,000 in
the various improvements ; but the bulk of this expenditure is repre-
sented in the tunnel improvement for the benefit of the Douglas,
Lookout, and Francis claims, to which it is specifically accredited in
the certificate, and is therefore unavailing as to the remainder of the
group.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL APPLICATION-WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE
ACT OF JUNE 17. 1902.
Charles A. Guernsey.
An application to enter under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised
Statutes, even though approved by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, will not, prior to the allowance of entry thereon, prevent a with-
drawal of the land covered thereby under provisions of the act of June 17,
1902.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C) April 13, 1906. (E. O. P.)
Charles A. Guernsey has appealed to the Department from your
office decision of July 13, 1905, holding for cancellation his entry,
made under the provisions of section 2306, Revised Statutes, for the
S. i SE. J, Sec. 33, T. 27 N,, R. 66 W., 6th P. M., Cheyenne land
district, Wyoming, for the reason that said entry was erroneously
alloAved by the local officers after the withdrawal of the land in
question under the provisions of the act of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat.,
388).
The claimant, claiming as assignee of Jeduthun L. Twitchell, upon
whose military service and original homestead entry his claimed
right is based, filed his application to enter the land in question with
the local officers, June 4, 1901, which application was transmitted by
them to your office and its allowance directed by your office letter of
May 27, 1902. Final certificate, however, was not issued by them
until November 11, 1904. February 14, 1903, the land in question
was withdrawn from entry under the provisions of the act of June
17, 1902, supra.
The first, second, fourth and fifth specifications of error allege,
in substance, that your office erred in holding that said land was in
any manner subject to withdrawal under departmental order of
February 11, 1903, and in the argument in support of this con-
tention it is urged by counsel that the application of Guernsey, filed
June 4, 1901, the allowance of which was directed by your office May
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27, 1902, prior to the issuance of said order of withdrawal, when
followed by the payment of the required fees and issuance of final
certificate, November 11, 1904, formed one transaction, which upon
completion took effect, by relation, from the date of the initial act,
and operated as a complete segregation of the land from that date,
June 4, 1901.
The third specification of error is believed to have reference to
cancellation of entries made necessary because the land was needed
for construction purposes. As there is nothing in the record to show
that the entry in question was canceled for the reason assigned in
the third specification of error, and as it is not necessary to a decision
of the question presented to rely upon such ground to sustain the
action of your office, it will not be further considered by the
Department.
The naked contention that an application to enter under the pro-
visions of said section 2306, supra, amounts to a segregation of the
land, sufficient to prevent a withdrawal of the land applied for under
the terms of the act of June 17, 1902, supra, finds no support in the
prior decisions of the Department. (Nancy C. Yaple, 34 L. D., 311.)
Paragraph 4, of departmental instructions of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D.,
607, 608), referring to lands which "may be irrigated" under the
contemplated project, reads as follows:
Lands withdrawn under the second form can be entered only under the
homestead laws and subject to the provisions, limitations, charges, terms, and
conditions of the reclamation act, and all applications to make selections,
locations, or entries of any other kind should be rejected whether they were
presented before or after the lands were withdrawn.
It has been decided by the Department that applications to enter
under the provisions of said section 2306 are not such applications
as may be allowed under the language used in this paragraph. (Cor-
nelius J. MacNamara, 33 L. D., 520 ; William M. Wooldridge, 33 L. D.,
525.) By the further terms of said paragraph it is wholly imma-
terial whether the applications to enter be presented " before or
after the lands were withdrawn," and the Department is firmly of
opinion this direction is fully warranted by the letter and intent
of the statute.
Applications to purchase under the provisions of the timber and
stone act are in all essential respects similar in effect to applications
made under the provisions of section 2306, supra, and it has been
repeatedly held by the Department that such applications do not
operate to segregate the land applied for nor prevent its withdrawal
under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, supra. Board of
Control, Canal No. 3, State of Colorado v. Torrence (32 L. D.. 472) ;
Jones v. Northern Pacific By. Co. (34 L. D., 105) : Todd v. Hays,
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on review (34 L. I)., 371). Applications to enter under the pro-
visions of said section 2306, and applications to purchase under the
timber and stone act, give to the applicant, as against other individ-
uals, a preference right to proceed under the application to perfect
title to the land sought to be entered, but until the entry is complete,
no rights are acquired against the government. The reason appears
from the clear language of the act authorizing a withdrawal of the
land for reclamation purposes. No specific lands are excepted from
the operation of the order of withdrawal by the terms of the act,
and in the departmental instructions prepared in accordance there-
with, the only lands specified are those covered by " any valid entry,
location, or selection which segregated and withheld the lands em-
braced therein from other forms of appropriation at the date of
such withdrawal" (33 L. D., GOT).
That an application to enter under section 2306, supra, is not an
entry of the land applied for is self evident, and that it is not a
" selection or location " which segregates or withholds the land ap-
plied for, as against the United States, is equally well settled by
departmental construction of the act in question.
Until an entry is complete there is no vested right, and until an
applicant is in position to maintain a claim to such right there is no
segregation of the land within the meaning of the act of June 17,
1902, supra.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Frisbie v.
Whitney (9 Wall., 187, 195), in defining the rights of the United
States as against a person claiming a right under the pre-emption
law, quotes with approval the language of different Attorneys-Gen-
eral, as follows:
Attorney-General dishing, in an opinion given in 1850, says : " Persons who
go upon the public land with a view to cultivate now, and to purchase hereafter,
possess no rights against the United States, except such as the acts of Congress
confer ; and these acts do not confer upon the pre-emptor, in posse, any right
or claim to be treated as the present proprietor of the land, in relation to the
government."
In the matter of the Hot Springs tract of Arkansas, Attorney-General Bates
says : "A mere entry upon land, with continued occupancy and improvement
thereof, gives no vested interest in it. It may, however, give, under our
national land system, a privilege of pre-emption. But this is only a privilege
conferred upon the settler to purchase land in preference to others ....
His settlement protects him from intrusion or purchase by others, but confers
no right against the government.
In the matter of this same Soscol Ranch, Attorney-General Speed asserts
the same principle. He says: "It is not to be doubted that settlement on the
public lands of the United States, no matter how long continued, confers no
right against the government . . . The land continues subject to the abso-
lute disposing power of Congress, until the settler has made the required proof
of settlement and improvement, and has paid the requisite purchase-money."
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The right of a pre-emptor, acquired by settlement, was essentially
similar to that secured by the filing of an application. to enter under
the provisions of said section 2306, supra, and like it can be set up
us against individuals but cannot prevail as against the government.
In neither case is the right a vested one. The right vests only when
the application is followed by actual entry, properly allowed. The
term " entry " has a definite and well-settled meaning, and in no
sense is the term " application
,?
equivalent in effect. (Hastings, etc.
Railroad Co. v. Whitney (132 U. S. 357, 363) ; Todd v. Hays, on
review (34 L. D., 371, 374). An entry can only be made of lands
subject to individual appropriation (Chotard et oil. v. Pope et al.
(12 Wheat, 586, 588). If at any time prior to completion of an
entry, the land applied for be withdrawn, it ceases to be subject to
appropriation except in accordance with the terms of the order of
withdrawal, the mere preference right gained by the filing of the
application can not be set up to defeat such withdrawal by the gov-
ernment.
The fact that the allowance of the application by the local officers
had been directed by your office prior to the passage t>f the act by
virtue of which the withdrawal was subsequently made, does not, of
itself, give any greater force and effect to the application, and if,
prior to the actual entry of the land and issuance of final certificate
thereon, in accordance with such direction, the land is withdrawn
from entry, the inchoate right conferred by the filing of the appli-
cation is, as against the government, cut off and determined, and an
allowance of such application and the issuance of final certificate
by the local officers subsequent to such withdrawal, is erroneous and
such entry should be canceled. In such case the withdrawal of the
land applied for prior to a full compliance with the directions to
the local officers to allow the application, is a revocation of such
direction and an entry thereafter allowed by them, unless in strict
accord with the order of withdrawal, is invalid. The entry in ques-
tion was not such a one as could properly be allowed under the order
of withdrawal withdrawing the tract involved, and was, therefore,
subject to cancellation.
Counsel for appellant lays much stress upon the fact that this appli-
cant had done all that he could do to make entry of the land and that
a cancellation of his entry under such circumstances involves a hard-
ship not contemplated by the statute authorizing the withdrawal
thereof. An examination of the records of your office discloses that
on May 27, 1902, you notified claimant's attorney of record of the
action taken by you directing the allowance of the entry in question,
yet no steps wrere taken to perfect the entry until November 11, 1904,
nearly two and a half years thereafter. Surely it cannot be seriously
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contended that the preference right conferred would, unless the laches
were excused, be extended over such a period even as against other
applicants, much less against the government. Yet if it be conceded
that claimant's contention is well founded, still his rights can be no
greater than those conferred by the statute granting them, and must,
as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Frisbie y. Whitney (supra, 197)—
be measured by tbe acts of Congress, and not by what be may or may not be
able to do, and if a sound construction of these acts shows that be bad acquired
no vested interest in tbe land, then, as bis rights are created by the statutes,
tbey must be governed by their provisions, whether bard or lenient.
See also Rector y. Ashley (6 Wall., 142, 151).
It having been decided that prior to the withdrawal of the land
claimant had acquired no vested interest therein, no act of his could
relieve against the application of the terms of the statute, and no
exception been found therein sufficient to protect his claimed right,
the same must be denied and his entry, erroneously allowed by the
local officers after withdrawal of the land, must be canceled.
The decision appealed from is accordingly hereby affirmed.
FOREST RESERVE-LIEF SELECTION-ACTS OF JUNE 4, 189Y, AND
MARCH 3, 1905.
Mary E. Coffin.
In case a selection under the exchange provisions of tbe act of June 4, 1897,
is canceled for conflict with a prior settlement claim, and another selection
for a like quantity of land is made in lieu thereof, under tbe proviso to
tbe act of March 8, 1905, tbe abstract of title of tbe relinquished land as-
signed as a basis for the selection must be extended to tbe date of the later
application.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General LatuJ Office,
(F. L. C) April 16, 1906. (C. J. G.)
Mary E. Coffin has appealed from the decision of your office of
August 1G, 1905, cancelling her selection No. 2164 made under the act
of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), for the E. ^ NE. J, Sec. 12, T. 65 X.,
R. 18 W., Duluth, Minnesota, in lieu of the SE. ] SW. i, Sec. 8, T.
28 N., R. 14 W. (excepting one acre in the northwest corner), and the
NW. } SE. £, Sec. 8, T. 29 N., R. 3 W., W. M., in the Olympic forest
reserve, Washington, relinquished to the United States.
There were two deeds of relinquishment covering the tracts desig-
nated as base lands, dated February 5, and March 6, 1900, recorded
March 9, and 10, 1900, respectively, and the lieu selection was made
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 565
March 16, 1900, the same being for unsurveyed land. Your office
approved the selection December 16, 1902, making the approval
thereof and the issuance of patent dependent upon the adjustment of
the selected land to the lines of public survey when the plat of survey
of said land should be filed. The official plat of survey was filed in
the local office February 8, 1905, and on that day, as reported by the
local officers, " there was filed an affidavit by the selector conforming
said selection to the plat of survey." On the same date one Polydore
Aubin filed homestead application for the land covered by the lieu
selection, alleging settlement thereon in 1898. A hearing was had in
the matter with the result that on March 28, 1905, the local officers
rendered decision in favor of Aubin. Mary E. Coffin acquiesced in
this decision and on April 11, 1905, she, by F. A. Coffin, attorney in
fact, filed application to be permitted, by reason of the conflict with
the prior settler's claim, to change her lieu selection so as to substitute
for the land embraced therein, the SW. i NE. -j- and SE. \ NW. i,
Sec. 19, T. 64 N., E, 17 W., Fourth P. M., Duluth, Minnesota, at the
same time relinquishing and releasing all her right, title and interest
in and to the land originally selected. There was also filed a non-
mineral and non-occupancy affidavit as to the land sought to be
substituted.
In the decision herein appealed from your office, in view of the
acquiescence of the selector in the decision of the local officers adverse
to her, revoked its letter of December 16, 1902, which approved selec-
tion No. 2164, and canceled said selection, concluding as follows
:
You will notify the selector that she will he permitted to tile in a reasonable
time a new application accompanied with deed, non-mineral and non-occupancy
affidavit, and abstract of title brought down to date—with usual certificates as
to title not being encumbered with judgment liens, taxes, etc. At same time
furnishing an affidavit that she is not the owner of the one (1) acre of land
situated in the northwest corner of SE. i SW. h Sec. 8, Tp. 28 N., R. 14 W.,
mentioned in deed as excepted.
The appeal alleges error (1) "in canceling said selection and
requiring an entirely new application, deed, etc., instead of regarding
applicant's affidavit of adjustment of Feb. 8, 1905, as a part and
continuation of said application ; " and (2) " in requiring the abstract
of title to be brought down to date/'
The act of June 4, 1897, supra, was repealed by the act of March 3,
1905 (33 Stat, 1264), the proviso thereto being as follows:
That selections heretofore made in lieu of lands relinquished to the United
States may be perfected and patent issue therefor the same as though this act
had not been passed, and if for any reason not the faull of the party making
the same any pending selection is hold invalid another selection for a like
quantity of land may be made in lion thereof.
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The circular instructions of May 16, 1905 (33 L. D., 558), issued
to local officers in relation to said proviso, prescribes, among other
things:
Should application be presented under this provision of the law you will be
careful to see that same is in strict compliance with the instructions of* July 7,
1902 (31 L. D., .372), except that instead of the showing specified in section 22
of such instructions the selector will be required to file his affidavit setting out
the facts as to the prior selection in lieu of the relinquished tract, including
the date when and place where such selection was made; the description of the
land selected ; the General Land Office number of such selection, and the date
when finally rejected and canceled, so that it may clearly appear therefrom
that the original selection was pending and not finally adjudicated on March 3,
.1905.
From all of which it may fairly be deduced that the language of
the act, " another selection,'' contemplates not a change or substitu-
tion of description in the pending invalid selection application but
a new application. It is not entirely clear what object the selector
can have in view in insisting that her affidavit of adjustment of
February 8, 1905, be regarded as a part and continuation of the
original application. In no event could a substitution of other land
be held to relate back and be effective from the date of the presenta-
tion of the original invalid application. Another selection whether
by way of substitution or new application could be effective only
from the date it is made, accompanied by the required proofs, espe-
cially as to the character and condition at that time of the land
applied for. Even if it were held that the original selection might
be completed by the substitution of another tract of land in place
of that covered by the invalid selection, still the proofs would have
to be brought down to date in any event. In this connection, answer-
ing appellant's second assignment of error, the rule is well estab-
lished that where an application to select lieu lands is rejected because
defective and a corrected application is subsequently filed, the
abstract of title of the relinquished land must be extended to the
date of such subsequent application. C, W. Clarke (32 L. D., 233)
;
Thomas F. Arundell (33 L. D., 76). The reasons for applying the
same rule are equally cogent in a case where another selection is
made under the proviso to the act of March- 3, 1905.
If it was intended by your office to require the selector to execute
a new deed, or deeds, of relinquishment, that was unnecessary ;?s the
deeds already furnished and on file, if in proper form, are sufficient
upon which to base the new7 selection.
With the modification indicated the decision of your office herein
is affirmed.
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reclamation act—construction of irrigation works by con-
tract or bt "force account."
Opinion.
Under the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior hy the act of
June 17, 1002, he may. in his discretion, enter into contracts for the con-
struction of irrigation works or construct such works by labor employed
and operated under the superintendence and direction of government
officials.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
April 16, 1906. (E. F. B.)
A letter from the Director of the Geological Survey of April 12,
1906, has been referred to me for opinion as to whether the Secretary
of the Interior has authority to construct irrigation works by " force
account," and if so, to what extent.
The second section of the act of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat., 388),
authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Interior to " construct,
as herein provided, irrigation works for the storage, diversion and
development of waters." He is authorized and directed to withdraw
lands for that purpose and to determine whether or not said project
is practicable, and by the fourth section of the act it is provided:
That upon the determination hy the Secretary of the Interior that any irri-
gation project is practicable, he may cause to he let contracts for the construc-
tion of the same, in such portions or sections as it may he practicable to
construct and complete as parts of the whole project, providing the necessary
funds for such portions or sections are available in the reclamation fund.
In view of the specific direction that the Secretary " may cause to
be let contracts for the construction of the same," an opinion is
requested as to whether he may also construct such works by labor
employed and operated under the superintendence and direction of
the government officials.
The solution of this question depends upon whether the power
conferred by the fourth section of the act is mandatory or directory
only, or whether it is such a specific direction as to the manner in
which the work is to be performed as to exclude all other.
The word " may " as it is ordinarily used signifies that it is author-
ization and not command, unless the power conferred is to be exercised
for the public interest, or to enforce a private right; or unless it is
evident from the plain scope and purpose of the act that it was the
intention to impose an imperative duty and not to confer a discre-
tionary power. Black on Statutory Construction, Sec. 69. United
States v. Thoman, 156 U. S., 353, 359.
Again, "when the words of a statute are affirmative, and relate to
the manner in which power or jurisdiction vested in a public officer
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or body is to be exercised, and not to the limits of the power or juris-
diction itself, they may be, and often are, construed to be directory."
Black on Construction, Sec. 1:24.
The primary power conferred by the act upon the Secretary of the
Interior is to construct irrigation works for the storage and develop-
ment of waters, when in his judgment the cost of the works, considered
with reference to the quantity and character of the lands that may be
irrigated therefrom, will justify their construction. The cost of con-
struction is therefore a controlling factor in determining whether an
irrigation project is practicable. The duty imposed upon the Secre-
tary of the Interior to estimate the cost of construction of a contem-
plated project with a view to determine whether it is practicable, of
itself implies a power to adopt the most feasible manner and means
of executing the work, and to accomplish the purpose intended by the
act, unless there is some positive limitation as to the exercise of such
power. If there is such limitation it can only be found in the fourth
section of the act, but as the language employed implies discretion
rather than command, and as nothing can be gathered from the spirit
and purpose of the act or from the context, to indicate that it was the
intention to impose an imperative duty, the word " may " as used in
that part of the section quoted from, must be taken to confer a dis-
cretionary power and not to limit or restrict the authority of the Sec-
retary of the Interior to employ such means in the construction of
works as in his judgment would be most feasible.
I am of the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior may con-
struct and fully complete irrigation works under the provisions of the
reclamation act by " force account."
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
MINING CLAIM—APPLICATION—CORPORATION—NOTICE—ADVERSE
CLAIM.
Holman v. Central Montana Mines Company.
The mining laws do not require that the notice of an application for patent to
a mining claim by a corporation shall designate the State or Territory under
the laws of which the corporation was organized.
An adverse claim under section 232(> of the Revised Statutes is required to be
filed " during the period of publication " of notice of the application for
patent, and where the last day of such period falls on Sunday, an adverse
claim filed on the following Monday can not be recognized by the land
department as an adverse claim within the meaning of said section and can
not have the effect to stay the patent proceedings upon the application.
Case of Ground Hog Lode v. Parole and Morning Star Lodes, 8 L. D., 430, over-
ruled.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) April 17\ 1906. (G. J. H.)
December 1, 1903, the Central Montana Mines Company (herein-
after called the company) made application for patent for the
Exchange and twenty-two other lode mining claims, surveys Nos.
7040 to 7062, inclusive, Lewiston, Montana, land district. With the
application was filed a certified copy of the articles of incorporation
of said company, showing that it was organized under the laws of the
Territory of Arizona. Notice of the application was posted and pub-
lished. Publication began on Wednesday. December 2, 11)03, and on
Monday, February 1, 1904, Alfred D. Holman filed an adverse claim
against the application, alleging that he is the owner of the Banner
lode claim, which conflicts with the Cliff, Hillside, Moshner and
Extra lode claims, embraced in the application. Within thirty days
from the filing of the adverse claim Holman instituted suit in the
district court, tenth judicial district, State of Montana, against the
Central Montana Mines Company of West Virginia. It appears that
there were two corporations bearing the name " Central Montana
Mines Company " doing business in the State of Montana and having
their articles of incorporation on file in the office of the recorder for
the county in which the claims in question are situated, one organized
under the laws of the State of West Virginia, and the other, the
applicant for patent herein, organized, as hereinbefore stated, under
the laws of the Territory of Arizona, and that Holman, in ignorance
of the fact that there were two corporations bearing the same name,
finding from an examination of the county records in the recorder's
office that there was a Central Montana Mines Company of West Vir-
ginia, and believing the same to be the applicant for patent, insti-
tuted suit against that corporation, as above stated. Subsequently
learning that the proper party had not been named as defendant in
such proceeding, Holman attempted to cure the defect by filing an
amended bill of complaint in which the Arizona corporation was
named as defendant. The court refused to allow such amendment,
on the ground that it would in effect be the substitution of a new
party defendant and the institution of a new suit, which, in view of
the fact that the thirty-day period fixed by statute within which
proceedings in court upon adverse claims may be commenced had
then expired, it was held could not be permitted. Holman thereupon
appealed to the supreme court of the State, which on November 23,
1904, dismissed the appeal.
April 30, 1904, Holman filed in the local office a petition praying
that the company be requirecl to republish notice of its application
for patent, contending to support the same, in substance and effect,
that the notice as originally published was insufficient, in that it <li'l
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not show under the laws of what State the company was incor-
porated, and that by reason thereof he was misled, resulting in the
institution of proceedings in court against the wrong party. May
11, 1904, the local officers overruled the petition; from which action
Holman appealed to your office, which, December 31, 1904, sustained
the action below. Holman has further appealed to this Department.
The only question directly presented by the appeal is as to the
sufficiency of the notice of the application for patent. It is, how-
ever, contended by appellant that the dismissal by the supreme
court of the State of the appeal from the action of the lower court
refusing to allow the amendment of the bill of complaint in the pro-
ceeding instituted by him in attempted compliance with the require-
ments of the statute, as hereinbefore set forth, was not a final deter-
mination of that proceeding and that the land department should
take no further action in this matter until such proceeding is finally
disposed of.
There is in the record a certificate by the clerk of the district court,
tenth judicial district, State of Montana, in and for Fergus county,
being the county in which the mining claims in question are situated,
dated March 3, 1904 (which is subsequent to the expiration of thirty
days from the filing of the adverse claim by Holman), to the effect
that no suit of any character was ever instituted in said court against
the Central Montana Mines Company, a corporation organized under
the laws of the Territory of Arizona. A certificate by the clerk of
the circuit court of the United States for the ninth circuit, district
of Montana, dated March 7, 1904, to the effect that there is no suit
or action of any character pending in that court in which the com-
pany is a party, is also with the record.
It is clear from the foregoing recital that, so far as appears from
the record, no proper proceeding in court was instituted by Holman
upon his adverse claim within the period of thirty days fixed by the
statute. The rulings of the courts in the action brought by him were
upon matters solely within their cognizance, with which the land
department has nothing to do. The dismissal of the appeal by the
supreme court of the State, as hereinbefore set forth, would seem to
be a final determination of such action; but whether it be or, not is
wholly immaterial. It is not shown, that a proceeding such as con-
templated by section 2326 of the Revised Statutes, involving the con-
flicting claims of Holman and the company to the lands in question,
is now pending in any court, and the period of thirty days within
which such proceeding might have been commenced under the statute
having long since expired, it is obvious that Holman can not be
recognized as an adverse claimant within the meaning of the statute.
His status before the land department in this proceeding is merely
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that of a protestant charging insufficiency of notice of the company's
application for patent.
Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes provides, among other things,
that a corporation may make application for patent to a mining
claim. Section 2321 provides that
:
Proof of citizenship under this chapter may consist .... in the case of
a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof by the filing of a certified copy of their charter or certificate
of incorporation.
Paragraph 44 of the mining regulations approved June 24, 1899
(28 L. D., 594, 601), in force at the time the application for patent
in question Avas filed, requires, among other things, that the notice
posted upon the claim shall give the " name of the claimant, the name
of the claim, the number of the survey, the mining district and
county, and the names of adjoining and conflicting claims as shown
by the plat of survey." Paragraph 51 of said regulations requires,
among other things, that the published notice " must embrace all the
data given in the notice posted upon the claim."
There is nothing in the mining laws or the regulations of the land
department requiring the published notice of an application for pat-
ent by a corporation to designate the State or Territory under the
laws of which the corporation was organized. It was held by the
Department in the case of Hallett and Hamburg Lodes (27 L. D.,
104, 108)—
It is believed to be the intent of the statute .... that the notice of
application for patent, both posted and published, should contain such matter as
will inform a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence having an interest in
a mining location conflicting with the one applied for, that application is made
for patent to the ground in conflict, thereby giving him an opportunity -to file
and prosecute an adverse claim and thus assert and protect his rights as pro-
vided by section 2320, Revised Statutes.
The notice in the present case was sufficient to convey information
to Ilolman that the company's application embraced ground claimed
by him, and gave him an opportunity to assert and protect his rights
to the ground in conflict, and it is immaterial that it did not show
under the laws of what State or Territory the company was incor-
porated. Had he made inquiry at the local office, where the certified
copy of the articles of incorporation was on file in compliance with
the requirement of the statute, he could readily have ascertained the
citizenship of the company. That he did not do so. and as a conse-
quence instituted his proceeding in court against the wrong party,
is not sufficient reason to warrant an order by the land department
directing republication of the notice, in view of the fact that it is not
shown that the notice as published fails to conform to the provisions
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of the statute and the requirements of the regulations. He must
suffer the consequences of his own neglect.
This disposes of the question raised by the appeal, but there is yet
another question presented by the record, not discussed or passed
upon in your office decision appealed from, namely: Was Holman's
adverse claim in time, in view of the fact that the sixtieth day fol-
lowing the date upon which publication of the notice commenced
fell on Sunday and his adverse claim was not filed until the following
Monday \
Section 2325 of the Kevised Statutes provides, among other things,
that
—
The register of the land office, upon the filing of such application, plat, field
notes, notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such application has
been made, for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him designated
as published nearest to such claim If no adverse claim shall have
been filed with the register and the receiver of the proper land office at the
expiration of the sixty days of publication, it shall be assumed that the appli-
cant is entitled to a patent, upon the payment to the proper officer of five dol-
lars per acre, and that no adverse claim exists.
The statute declares that the notice shall be published for a period
of sixty days. Xo exclusion is made of Sundays or holidays. At
the expiration of the sixtieth day. whether it fall on Sunday or any
other day of the week, the period of publication is at an end. The
only adverse claim which authorizes a stay of proceedings, and upon
which suit may be brought under the provisions of section 2320 of
the Kevised Statutes, is " an adverse claim filed during the period
of publication "—that is. during the period of sixty days. An
adverse claim filed after the sixtieth day is not filed within the period
of publication, as required by the statute, and can have no effect to
stay the patent proceedings with a view to the institution of suit.
With the very first moment of the sixty-first day following the com-
mencement of the publication of notice, the statutory assumption
arises that no adverse claim exists. The land department has no
authority to extend the period of publication beyond the sixty days
fixed by statute, or to recognize an adverse claim filed after such
period has come to an end. In the case of Gross et <il. r. Hughes
et al. (29 L. D., 4('»7. 469), the Department held:
The provisions of sections 232o and 2326 of the Revised Statutes limiting the
time within which an adverse claim may be filed to the close of the period of
publication are mandatory, the former section, indeed, providing that if no
such claim shall have been filed in the local office at the expiration of that
period, it shall be assumed that none exists. The land department is without
authority to extend that period to include a single additional day.
The case of Ground Hog Lode v. Parole and Morning Star Lodes
(8 L. D., 430), not being in harmony with that case or the views
herein expressed, is hereby overruled.
Your office decision is affirmed.
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homestead entry-addition;al-kinkaid act.
Green Piggott.
Where one entitled to make an additional entry under the act of April 28, 1904,
exercises his right for a less amount of land than he is entitled to enter,
and at the time of making such entry announces his intention to amend his
additional entry to include other lands desired by him, sufficient to aggre-
gate the quantity to which he is entitled under the act, as soon as he suc-
ceeds in clearing the records of other claims to such additional lands, and
takes prompt action to that end. he may he permitted to amend his entry
in accordance with such purpose when the additional lands desired by him
become subject to entry, provided the rule as to compactness be observed.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) April 17, WOO. (E. (). P.)
Green Piggott has appealed to the Department from your office
decision of August 14, 1905, rejecting his application to amend a
former homestead entry made October 20, 1904, for the S. ^ SE. }
and NAY. \ SE. J, Sec. 34, and SW. J SAY. J, Sec. 85, T. 27 X., R.
11 W., O'Neill land district, Nebraska, so as to include therein the
E. J NE. J, E. J SE. J, Sec. 27, NE. J SE. J, SW. J NE. J, E. J NE. J,
Sec. 34, in the same township and range.
The record discloses that Piggott's original entry for the SW. \,
Sec. 34 T. 27 N., Pv. 11 W., was made September 23, 1903, and form
the basis for his claimed right to make entry of the land embraced in
his rejected application as additional thereto, under the second sec-
tion of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547). He was therefore
clearly entitled to make his said entry of October 20, 1904, for the 100
acres entered by him, and might have, had he so desired, made entry
for 320 acres more at the same time. It appears also that at the time
lie made his second entry, he did not intend to exhaust the right
which he was entitled to exercise under the terms of the act of April
28, 1904, supra, but expected to exercise the same to its full extent by
entering the lands now covered by his amended application, which
lands were then covered by existing entries, the cancellation of which
he was endeavoring to secure by contests initiated on the same date
his second entry was allowed. While it has generally been held that a
homestead right is exhausted by one entry, though for a less quantity
of lands than is allowed by law, exception has been made where at the
time the original entry was made for less than the full amount
. . ... .•
allowed, the claimant clearly disclosed his intention to amend his
application to include additional land, when he had cleared tin 1 record
of existing entries covering it. (Joseph Heisel, 26 L. D., 69; Daniel
L. Hartley, ib., 663, 665.) Tn j.he recent departmental decision in the
case of Walter O. Graves v. Henry E. McDonald, decided March 28,
1906 (34 L. D., 527), involving the question of an amendment similar
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to the one here presented, the rule announced by the earlier depart-
mental decisions cited was adhered to and the amendment allowed.
Where there is no evidence in the record to show the fixed intention
to amend, existing at the ti?ne the original application is filed, the
right has been denied, notwithstanding the applicant subsequently
made affidavit that such was his original intention. (James W.
Luton, 31 L. I)., 468.) An intent formed subsequent to the filing of
the original application forms no ground for amendment thereof.
The doctrine of amendment is a purely equitable one and can not
be insisted upon as a matter of abstract right, and while the doctrine
is liberally applied, the prevailing equities to support it must be
clearly established. Amendment has been allowed where, through
io-norance or misinformation, an entrvman. acting in good faith,
has been misled to his prejudice. ( Josiah Cox. 27 L. I).. 389: Charles
Carson. 32 L. D.. 176.) In none of the cases where amendment
has been allowed was there any valid intervening adverse claim and
no legal objection to the allowance of the application other than that
the entryman had previously exhausted his right of entry.
The doctrine being equitable, its application necessarily rests upon
the facts and circumstances surrounding each particular case, and the
Department is unwilling to attempt to establish a hard and fast rule
by which the allowance or rejection of applications to amend shall
be determined.
In the case at bar it appears from your office decision that there
i> an additional objection to the allowance of said application, to
the effect that the lands embraced therein are not " as nearly compact
in form as possible," as required by the terms of the statute, and it
was for this reason the application was rejected.
Piggott in his affidavit filed with his application which he now
asks to amend expressly declared that
—
I reserve the right to amend this entry to include NE. SE.. E. * NE., SW. NE.,
See. 34. and E. A NE. & E. I SE. of See. 27, all in Tp. 27. R. 11, this day contested
by me.
His application clearly disclosing his intention to later claim the
tracts included in his amended application, was received by the local
officers and the entry for 100 acres allowed.
It might have been competent for the local officers, treating the
application as a conditional one. to have rejected it because of the
condition and reservation therein, and their acceptance of the same
conferred no right upon the entryman and established no contract
between him and the government, executory or potential, as they are
entirely without any contractual authority in the premises. Whilst
the right to make the second additional entry was not inherent in, or
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otherwise possessed by, the entryman, so that his declaration to the
effect that " I reserve the right " etc., was without force for that pur-
pose, as a party can not reserve a right he does not possess, yet that
declaration, made under oath, is of great value as showing his present
intention and desire to enter the described tract, and when followed
so promptly by his contests shows such good faith in his purpose and
conviction of his right as to entitle him to most favorable considera-
tion and to justify the Department, for the purposes of the case, to
treat the second application as complementary of the first, or the two
as one transaction.
With regard to your rejection of the proposed entry because of its
want of compactness, it is to be observed that whilst it reaches, it
does not exceed, the maximum length of two miles fixed by the statute.
No sufficient reason, however, is shown why it should be allowed in
its present non-compact form, as you state there is other vacant con-
tiguous land. If, however, there are no such lands which may be
entered by him, the present application should be allowed as pre-
sented.
The decision appealed from is, for the reasons stated, hereby modi-
fied and returned for appropriate action.
northern pacific grant—adjustment—act of july 1, 1898.
Northern Pacific Railway Company.
Where a tract of land falling within the Northern Pacific land grant and not
excepted therefrom was sold hy the company prior to January 1. 1898, and
the purchaser thereafter, because of the erroneous decision of the land
department holding said land to have been excepted from the railroad grant,
sought to supplement his title by purchase of the lands from the United
States under the provisions of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, these
facts alone do not present such conflicting claims to the land on January 1,
1898, between the purchaser and the company, as are subject to adjustment
under the act of July 1, 1898.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
IF. L. C.) Office, April 04, 1906. (F. W. C.)
Your office letter of the 13th instant submits for departmental con-
sideration the question as to whether the conflicting claims to the
X. i of NW. J, Sec. 1, T. 22 N., R. 4 E., Seattle land district, Wash-
ington, are subject to adjustment under the provisions of the act of
July 1, 1898 (80 Stat., 597, 020).
The tract in question is within the primary limits of the Northern
Pacific land-grant along its Cascade branch line and opposite the
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portion thereof definitely located March 26, 1884. From the presen-
tation made with regard to this tract in your said office letter, it
seems that upon the contest of one John T. Hunter this tract was
erroneously held to have been excepted from the Northern Pacific
land-grant, it having been freed from all claims at the date of the
definite location of the company's road, as above stated. Because
of such decision one Jeremiah Dwyer, who held this tract under war-
ranty deed from the company, dated October 26, 1880, made applica-
tion to purchase the land under the provisions of section 5 of the act
of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556). Upon said application a hearing
was ordered between Dwyer and Hunter which resulted in a decision
in favor of Dwyer, who was permitted to complete claim to the land
under his application to purchase on November 19, 1897, upon which
purchase the patent of the United States was issued.
In letter of July 10, 1905, resident counsel for the Northern Pacific
Railway Company requested the adjustment of the conflicting claims
to this land under the provisions of the act' of 1898, and it is upon
this application that the matter is submitted to the Department for
consideration, attention being called to departmental decision of
November 17, 1904 (unreported), in the matter of the case of the
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Victor E. Cline, involving lands
in the Bozeman land district, Montana.
It may be stated first that in the case of Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
r. Biggs et al. (31 L. D., 254), in considering the question as to
whether a purchaser of lands within the Northern Pacific land-grant,
under the provisions of section 5, act of March 3, 1887, has such a
conflicting or adverse claim as is subject to adjustment under the act
of July 1, 1898, supra, it was said, at page 256:
The claims of these purchasers under the act of 1887 do not meet the condi-
tions above described. It is clear that the purchasers do not claim adversely
to the railroad grant. It is true that they have sought to perfect title to these
lands through the United States, hut it is only because of their claim under
the railroad grant that, upon failure of the railroad title, the act of 1887
affords them upon certain conditions, a right to purchase the lands of the
United States. Further, these claims can not he held to have heen initiated
prior to January I, 1898, for it was not held until long after that date that
these lands did not pass under the railroad grant, and an application to make
purchase under section five of the act of 1887 can not he entertained until it
has heen finally determined that the land sought to he purchased is in fact
excepted from the grant. Nicholas Cochems (11 L. D., G29).
In the Cline case it was said
:
Your office decision rests upon the decision of the Department in the case
of Northern Pacific Railway Co. r. Biggs et ah (31 L. D., 2r,4). the material
points of difference, however, between that case and the one now under con-
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sideration are these: In the case under consideration it is shown that at the
time of the erroneous decision of this Department canceling the railroad listing,
to wit, April 17, 1807, (Mine was in possession of the land under a contract of
purchase with the company on account of which several payments had heen
made. Following said decision, however, he seems to have repudiated his
contract with the company and looked to the United States for title, and that
since the issuance of patent of the United States the company has brought
suit in ejectment which suit is still pending.
It thus appears that on January 1, 1898, Cline was in possession of this
land claiming adversely to the company and under a purchase made directly
from the United States. In the Biggs case the land involved was not held
to have been excepted *froni the railroad grant until September 16 and October
">, ISPS, subsequently to the passage of the act of July 1, 1898, and, as said
in the decision of the Department in that case, "these claims can not be held
to have heen initiated prior to January 1, 1898, for it was not held until long
after that date that these lands did not pass under the railroad grant, and an
application to make purchase under section 5 of the act of 1887 can not he
entertained until it has been finally determined that the land sought to be
purchased is in fact excepted from the grant."
Upon the record made in this case it is the opinion of this Department that
it is necessary to invoke the adjustment provided for in the act of 1898 for
the protection of Cline, who, as before stated, had purchased this land directly
from the United States prior to January 1, 1898. Your office decision is there-
fore reversed and the papers in the case are herewith returned for the adjust-
ment of the conflicting claims in accordance with this decision.
In the present case, upon the record now before the Department
it appears that the Northern Pacific Railway Company had no
claim to this land on January 1, 1898, nor has it had any claim
since it passed its title to Dwyer October 26, 1880. As it is admitted
the decision of this Department holding that the tract included in
Dwyer's purchase was excepted from the grant was erroneous, the
title to the land in reality passed to the company and by its deed
to Dwyer who still holds that title supplemented by the purchase
from the United States. Said purchase having been erroneously
allowed, it may be that upon proper application he could recover
his purchase money and would still be fully protected through his
purchase from the railway company. If it were shown that Dwyer
had recovered his purchase money, paid to the railway company for
its title, or the relation between himself and the company been other-
wise changed prior to January 1, 1898, a different condition would
he j) resented.
On this record the Department must hold that there does not
appear to be such adverse conflicting claims to this land on Janu-
ary 1, 1898, as are subject to adjustment under the act of July 1.
L898. The company's request must therefore be denied and you will
advise it accordingly.
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FOREST RESERVE—LIEU SELECTION—ACTS OF JUNE 4, 1897, AND
MARCH 3, 1905.
Robert Leslie.
A selection under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897, for a less area than
embraced in the relinquished land offered as a base, not the result of
mischance or misprision on the part of the local officers, is a waiver of the
excess ; and there is nothing in the act of March 3, 1905, repealing the act
of June 4, 1897, authorizing the selector to make a further selection based
upon such excess area.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, April 2JH 1906.
' (J. R. W.)
Robert Leslie appealed from your decision of August 18, 1905,
rejecting his selection, not serially numbered, under the act of June
4, 1897 (30 Stat, 30), for lot 8, Sec. 0, T. 21 N., R. 29 W., 17.22 acres,
Missoula, Montana, to satisfy the excess of land relinquished to the
United States in a forest reserve, which had been assigned as base for
selection 11,710, your office series, under the act of 1897, made at Den-
ver, Colorado, for a smaller area than that relinquished.
By deed recorded May 7, 1904, Leslie and wife relinquished to the
United States certain tracts having the aggregate area of 133.26
acres, in the Lincoln forest reserve, New Mexico, and, September 13,
1904, at Denver, Colorado, he selected in lieu thereof certain tracts
aggregating 120 acres. Your office May 15, 1905, called attention of
the local office to the excess of base, and directed the local office to
notify the selector that he " will be required to file a waiver of his
right to make a further selection in lieu of the said excess base."
August 1, 1905, the Missoula local office transmitted an application,
filed there by Leslie, to select lot 8, Sec. 6, T. 21 N., R. 29 W., M. M.
17.22 acres, in lieu of the above-mentioned 13.26 acres excess, referring
to selection 11,710 for the deed of relinquishment and abstract of
title to the base assigned, and tendering to pay for the 3.96 acres
excess of the tract so selected. Your decision rejected the latter appli-
cation, because (1) instructions of March 6, 1900 (29 L. D., 578),
required selection of a tract of equal area, and relinquishment of the
excess Was therefore implied; (2) the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat.,
1264), repealed the act of June 4, 1897, and no right of further selec-
tion exists; (3) that the selection attempted was presented at a differ-
ent local office contrary to the rules and regulations of your office, and
to good administration and orderly conduct of public business. The
appeal contends (1) that no waiver of excess was implied; (2) the
waiver of excess or selection to fill the base is at selector's option; (3)
there was a pending selection and the right is saved by the proviso of
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the act of March 3, 1905, supra; (4) the original and additional selec-
tion need not be made at the same local office.
These contentions are evidently founded upon a misconception of
the act of June 4, 1897, upon the theory that it gave to one relinquish-
ing land to the United States a right substantially like that given to
Valentine by the act of April 5, 1872, as compensation for a wrongful
disposal by the United States of lands belonging to him under a per-
fect grant of the former government, which, like that of similar
character, under, section 11, act of June 22, 1860 (12 Stat, 85), if
located upon irregular subdivisions, is not satisfied, for the law prom-
ised an equal area as compensation for a wrong done, with no other
limitation than location by entire subdivisions. Frederick W. McRey-
nolds (31 L. I)., 259).
No wrong had been done, and no taking of the land without the
owner's consent in this class of cases. By the act of June 4, 1897,
the United States merely offered to the owner an exchange, limited,
however, by the condition that area should control, and he could
select only an equal area, not more, upon a claim of greater value
of that relinquished. The full equal area was his privilege, but the
proposal was of«an exchange. The nature of the contract of exchange
is that equivalence of value is imported. No debt arises from one
party to the other by any implication. The Department in its first
construction of the act so defined it and refused to approve relin-
quishments or accept titles tendered unaccompanied by selection of
lieu land in exchange. F. A. Hyde (28 L. D., 284) ; Opinion (28
L. D., 472) ; William S. Tevis (29 L. D., 575).
There was, however, an earlier erroneous practice in the local
offices, and this the instructions of March 6, 1900, were intended
to correct. Where partial selections had been erroneously received,
the selector was permitted to perfect and fill his selection. This was
because the land department was participant in the irregular pro-
ceeding and had not warned the selector.
There is also another distinctive class arising out of accident and
mistake when a selector, through ignorance and mischance, intending
to make exchange by full equivalent areas, includes in his selection
lands not subject to his attempted appropriation. In such case the
facts in themselves negative intent to select a less area than was his
right, and show that he did not intend to exchange otherwise than by
equal area. In such case remedy for mistake is justly due him, and he
is permitted to fill what by mere mischance proved to be a partial
selection and to hold as much of what he first selected as was subject
to his appropriation. Frederick W. Kehl, July 9. L903, unreported;
William A. Orser (33 L. 1)., 352) ; Aztec Land and Cattle Company
(34 L. D., 122) ; Cronan v. West (34 L. D., 301).
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In the present case neither misprision of the local office nor mis-
chance contributed to make Leslie's selection deficient to the area
of the base assigned. The instructions of March 6, 1900, had been
promulgated and in force for over four years, and he was conclu-
sively presumed to know the established construction of the law.
He can not be heard to assert that he did not intend to satisfy the
base assigned by him in that transaction, for that is the necessary
implication of the contract of exchange, which no intent or act then
declared or manifested, afterward defeated by mischance, in any
way negatived. This disposes of the first and second contentions,
and your decision was the only proper one to be made, unless, as
contended, the act of March 3, 1905, gave him a right to make a
further selection for the base already assigned in the former one.
That act, except in specified cases, repealed the act of 1897. Three
exceptions were made as to which classes of cases the repeal was not
to operate: (1) contracts for exchanges made prior thereto by the
Secretary of the Interior; (2) selections initiated prior thereto might
be perfected; (3) new selections might be made for bases theretofore
assigned in selections held invalid for any reason not the party's
fault. It is not claimed that there was any prior contract with the
Secretary; the only selection initiated and pending was the one at
Denver. The statute was plainly not intended to give new rights of
selection, but to terminate all rights of selection, saving those ex-
cepted, because attempted in good faith to be exercised. The Denver
pending selection was imperfect in but one formal respect, that the
selector had not complied literally with the regulations of March 6,
1900, in that he did not expressly state in writing the intent to waive
the excess which was necessarily implied by his conduct in presenting
it. He can not claim that he was misled by the action of the local
office in not requiring the filing of an express written waiver, for
the deficiency of area did not result from conflict with a prior right
unknown to him. It appeared from his own act on the face of his
application. If he did not intend to wTaive the excess, he confesses to
an intent not to comply with the regulation and that his Denver
selection must be rejected as a partial and incomplete one, rejected for
his own fault, putting himself outside the proviso and not protected
by the statute.
This effectually disposes of the Ith assignment of error, for, as he
had no right, nor any equitable claim, to make an additional selection,
it is immaterial whether an additional selection may or may not be
made at another office thar that at which the original partial one was
made.
Your decision is affirmed.
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TIMBER AND STONE ACT—SPECULATIVE ENTRY.
Granville M. Boyer.
An agreement or contract entered into by a timber and stone entryman, prior to
final proof and the issuance of certificate, for the sale of the timber on the
land, is in violation of the provisions of the act of June 3, 1878, against
the speculative entry of timber lands for the benefit of another.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( F. L. C.
)
Office, April U, 1906. (RE. W.
)
October 11, 1902, Granville M. Boyer made timber and stone
sworn statement for the W. J NE. J, Sec. 29, SW. \ SE. \ and SE. J
SW. j. See. 20, T. 32 S., R. 65 W., Pueblo, Colorado, and on August
20, 1903, he made cash entry, No. 8844, for said land. Upon adverse
report by a special agent of your office said entry was suspended Feb-
ruary 29, 1904. A hearing was had on June 15, 1904, and thereupon
the local officers recommended that the entry be relieved from sus-
pension.
June 23, 1905, your office held the entry for cancellation, on the
ground that it was made under a collusive agreement for the sale
of the timber before final proof and in violation of law.
Boyer has appealed to the Department.
This case was consolidated, for trial purposes, with the similar
cases of Frank Stites, Amos F. Hollenbeck and Carl J. Kaapcke,
involving contiguous lands under a like state of facts, the testimony
submitted here to be considered in determining all four cases.
The essential facts shown by the evidence, as found by the local
officers and accepted by your office, are as follows:
The lands involved were originally well timbered, but at date of
entry fully one half of the timber had been removed by depredators;
they are non-mineral, non-agricultural, broken, rocky, arid, and prop-
erly subject to timber and stone entry; they are fit only for grazing
and for that purpose are not worth more than two cents an acre per
annum.
One day before filing his declaratory statement, the applicant,
Boyer, entered into a written agreement, and the applicants Stites.
Hollenbeck and Kaapcke at about the same time made verbal agree-
ments, with one Richard Kaapcke, the president of an incorporated
lumber company, whereby the latter purchased " all the timber stand-
ing" on said lands at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents per thou-
sand feet, the purchase money to lie used in paying the government
for the lands in each case; and the latter further agreed to loan to
the applicant for five years, at ten per cent interest, all money re-
quired for the purchase of the land from the government over and
above the amount realized from said sale of the timber thereon.
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It was further provided in said agreements that
—
It is distinctly understood between the parties hereto that this agreement
does not convey any interest in the title to said land, but is intended only to
dispose of timber growing thereon.
Pursuant to said agreement, and without waiting for final proof to
be made for these lands, the said Richard Kaapcke, in December
1903, began cutting and removing timber therefrom, and at the time
of the investigation by said special agent in March 1903, he had cut
and removed nearly all the timber, the applicants ratifying such
action and receiving payment for the timber according to the stated
agreements.
The Department is of opinion that the said agreement in this case
is such a violation of the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), as to call
for the rejection of the proof offered by Boyer and the cancellation
of his cash entry.
Under the said act the applicant must, in his sworn statement,
declare
—
that he does not apply to purchase the same on speculation but in good faith to
appropriate it to his own use and benefit : and that he has not directly or indi-
rectly made any agreement or contract in any way or manner with any person
or persons whatever, by which the title which he might acquire from the
government of the United States should inure in whole or in part, to the benefit
of any person except himself.
The said act further provides that in case of a false statement in
the application, the applicant
—
shall forfeit the money which he may have paid for said lands, and all right
and title to the same.
While Boyer did not make any contract by which the title to this
land should inure in whole or in part to any other person than him-
self, he did make this entry with money furnished him for that
purpose by another and under a collusive agreement whereby such
other obtained the substantial and practically the only benefit to be
derived from said entry, namely the timber standing on the land.
Not only was such an agreement made but it Avas consummated before
the entry was in fact made and when the applicant received his
certificate the laud had been denuded of its timber and Avas of no
benefit to him Avho is asking for title thereto for " his own use and
benefit." Clearly this is but another of the many forms and devices
under which it is sought to accomplish indirectly that which the
statute declares shall not be done, the speculative entry for such land
for another's benefit. The final proof required by the act in question
must s1ioaat that the applicant " does not apply to purchase the same
on speculation but in good faith to appropriate it to his oaatu exclusive
use and benefit," yet the facts are that the " main use and benefit " of
the land has previously, under cover of this filing, been appropriated
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by another not only with this applicant's knowledge and consent, but
upon his written agreement made prior to the filing of his sworn
statement.
It cannot be claimed that the value of the land for which the
applicant asks is in any appreciable proportion to the value of the
timber which has been removed therefrom, and the conclusion is
inevitable that this entry was speculative and not in good faith.
The entry will be canceled, your said decision being hereby affirmed.
right of way for railroads, canals, reservoirs, etc
Regulations.
In accordance with the agreement made by and between the De-
partment of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, para-
graph 2 of the circular of February 11, 1904 (32 L. D., 481), and
paragraphs 3 and 06 of the circular of September 28, 1905 (34 L. D.,
212), except the last clause in each relative to construction in advance
of approval or specific permission, which will remain as at present,
are hereby amended so as to read as follows
:
Whenever a right of way is located upon a forest or timber-land reserve, the
applicant must enter into such stipulation and execute such bond as the Secre-
tary of Agriculture may require for the protection of such reserves.
This amendment applies to forest or timber-land reserves only, not
to national parks.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, April 25, 1906
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
MINING CLAIM—PATENT PROCEEDINGS-PROOF OF POSTING OF NOTICE.
Mojave Mining and Milling Co. v. Karma Mining Co.
Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes requires that an applicant -for patent under
the mining laws shall file with his application an official plat of the claim
or claims applied for, and shall post a copy of such plat, together with a
notice of the application for patent, in a conspicuous place on the land em-
braced in the plat, previous to the filing of the application. " and shall file
an affidavit of at least two persons that such notice has been duly posted."
The words " such notice " have been uniformly construed by the land depart-
ment to embrace both the plat and notice referred to. Held: That the
requirement as to the affidavit is mandatory, and where such affidavit is not
filed all proceedings upon the application for patent are without authority
of law.
584 DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
(F. L, C.) April JO. J906. (A. B. P.)
December 6, 1902, the Karma Mining Company filed application
for patent to the Karma lode mining claim, survey No. 3957, Los
Angeles, California. Notice of the application appears to have been
published and posted for the required period and no adverse claim
was hied.
November 18, and December 2, 1903, the Mojave Mining and Mill-
ing Company, claiming to be the owner of two lode mining claims
in conflict with the Karma claim, filed its original and supplemental
protests against the application for patent, alleging amongst other
things, in substance, (1) that the applicant company failed and
neglected to post a copy of the claim applied for, together with a
notice of the application for patent, in a conspicuous place on the
land embraced in the application, as required by law, and (2) that
said company failed and neglected to file, at the time of filing the
application for patent, or at any time, an affidavit of at least two per-
sons that a copy of such plat had been posted on the claim previous
to the filing of the application for patent.
In the view the Department takes of the case it is unnecessary to
state the other matters charged in the protest.
Among the things required of an applicant for mineral patent by
section 2325 of the Eevised Statutes, are that he shall post a copy of
the plat of his claim, together with a notice of his application for
patent, in a conspicuous place on the claim previous to the filing of
the application, and shall show the fact of posting by an affidavit of
at least two persons. The posting is required to be done before the
filing of the application for patent, and the affidavit showing the fact
of posting is required to be filed before any proceedings may be had
in the land office upon the application. When all precedent condi-,
tions have been met, the section provides that the register shall pub-
lish a notice of the application for patent, for the period of sixty
days, in a newspaper to be by him designated as published nearest to
the claim, and shall post such notice in his office for the same period;
also, that if no adverse claim shall have been filed with the register
and receiver at the expiration of the sixty days of publication, it
shall be assumed, where all further requirements have been complied
with, that the applicant is entitled to a patent, and that no adverse
claim exists, and thereafter no objection to the issuance of a patent
shall be heard from third parties except it be shown that the appli-
cant has failed to comply with the terms of the statute.
The Mojave company did not file an adverse claim, but contends
through its protests that the applicant company failed, in certain
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stated particulars, to comply with the terms of the statute in its
patent proceedings, and therefore is not entitled to a patent, or to
the benefit of an assumption that no adverse claim exists. It is
denied in the protests that the required statutory proof of posting
was filed; also, that the plat and notice were in fact posted as re-
quired prior to the filing of the application for patent.
The terms of the statute are that an applicant for mineral patent
shall file with his application a plat of his claim, or claims in com-
mon, made by or under the direction of the surveyor-general, showing
accurately the boundaries of the claim or claims, etc., " and shall post
a copy of such plat, together with a notice of such application for a
patent, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in such plat
previous to the filing of the application for a patent, and shall file an
affidavit of at least two persons that such notice has been duly
posted," etc.
The requirement as to posting specifically includes both plat and
notice, and the affidavit is required to show that such notice has been
duly posted. The words such notice, used in connection with the
affidavit, were evidently intended to embrace the official plat as a
part of the notice. Obviously the proof of the posting on the claim
must have been intended to embrace all that was required to be
posted. Such has been the construction by the land department ever
since the general mining statute of May 10, 1872, was enacted. Para-
graph 30 of the general regulations under the mining laws, issued
June 10, 1872 (Copp's U. S. Mining Decisions, p. 270-282), provided
as follows
:
After posting the said plat and notice upon the premises, the claimant will
file with the proper register and receiver a copy of such plat, and the field notes
of survey of the claim, accompanied hy the affidavit of at least two credible
witnesses, that such plat and notice are posted conspicuously on the claim,
giving the date and place of such posting; a copy of the notice so posted to
ho attached to. and form a part of. said affidavit.
This regulation has continued unaltered to the present time. It
appears as paragraph 40 of the last general mining regulations,
issued July 26, 1901 (31 L. D., 474, 481).
Under the statute, thus uniformly construed from the beginning,
it was incumbent upon the applicant here to file with the register
and receiver an affidavit of at least two persons that a copy of the
official plat of the claim applied for, together with a notice of the
application for patent, had been posted in a conspicuous place on the
land embraced in such plat previous to the filing of the application.
This was not done but there was filed an affidavit of two persons
stating that each was present on a given date (which was prior to
the filing () f the application' for patent) "when the notice of the
intention of the Karma Mining Company to apply for a patent for
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the Karma mine was posted in a conspicuous place upon said mining
claim, to wit, upon Karma shaft-house, where the same could be
easily seen and examined, a copy of the notice so conspicuously
posted upon said Karma mine being attached hereto, and marked
Exhibit 'A.' r The affidavit contains no statement that the plat of
the claim was posted, nor does it in any manner mention or refer
to such plat. The ordinary and only reasonable interpretation of
the affidavit as a whole is that it was not intended to embrace posting
of the plat. The attached Exhibit "A," referred to as a copy of the
notice stated to have been posted, purports to be a notice by the
Karma Mining Company that it is about to make application to the
United States for a patent for a certain mining claim known as the
Karma mine, and to give a description by courses and distances of
such claim. The description is preceded by the statement : " Said
mining claim being designated in the field notes of survey and on the
official diagram herewith posted, as Mineral Survey No. 3957, and
more particularly described as follows:" This statement is not a
part of the affidavit, and cannot be so construed. It is merely an
unsworn statement in the posted notice, and is in no sense proof of
what is stated.
The statutory requirement that the fact of posting shall be shown
by an affidavit of at least two persons is mandatory, and one against
which the land department is without authority to grant relief.
Until such affidavit is filed the register is without authority to pro-
ceed upon the application, and should not attempt to do so in any
case. As the required affidavit was not filed in this case the proceed-
ings upon the application for patent were without authority of law.
In this particular the terms of the statute were not complied with
and there is therefore no assumption that the applicant company
is entitled to a patent and that no adverse claim exists. Such being
the state of the record, the patent proceedings must fall, and it is
not material to inquire whether the plat and notice were in fact
posted as required or not. The entry will be canceled, but without
prejudice to the renewal of patent proceedings should the applicant
company so desire.
This disposition of the case renders it unnecessary to consider
any of the other questions suggested by the record.
The decision of your office is reversed.
DESERT LAND ENTRY—CITIZENSHIP.
PETTET V. McCORMICK.
A citizen of one State or Territory who goes to another State or Territory
with the avowed intention to make his permanent home therein, and in
his sworn application to make desert land entry declares himself to be a
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resident of such State or Territory, is held to he a " resident citizen
"
thereof within the meaning of the desert land law and in that respect
qualified to make such entry therein, where in pursuance of his expressed
intention he makes his home in such State or Territory, even though he
may not, at the date of making the entry, have acquired a political resi-
dence in the State or Territory such as would entitle him to the voting
privilege.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) April SO, 1906. (P. E. W.)
April 12, 1904, Benjamin T. McCormick made desert land entry,
No. 1462, for the S. J, Sec. 15, T. 18 8., R. 25 E., Roswell, New Mexico
Territory, and on July 27, 1904, Nancy E. Pettet initiated contest
againsl said entry, alleging that at date thereof the entryman was
not a resident citizen of said territory and had not since become such.
Upon a hearing the local officers rendered dissenting opinions,
the register recommending the cancellation of the entry, the receiver
recommending that the entry be held intact. May 20, 1905, your
office affirmed the decision of the register and held the entry for can-
cellation.
McCormick has appealed to the Department.
There is no dispute as to the facts in the case. It appears that
claimant went to New Mexico in April, 1904, in company with a
brother who had previously located there, leaving his wife in Ken-
tucky, with the understanding between them that if he found the
country suitable for their future and permanent home, he would
make entry for a tract of land and then return .to Kentucky to close
his affairs and remove his family.
Having decided .to cast his lot in and with said Territory, he pur-
chased the relinquishment of the former entryman and made entry
for this land, observing, and being assured, that it was the common
and prevailing practice to make entry for lands and then return to
close up business elsewhere and within six months remove the family
to the land. Having invested his all and announced his intention of
returning with his family as soon as he could make the necessary
arrangements, he returned to Kentucky where his wife was stopping
with her parents while awaiting his return. While trading off his
effects they farmed a few acres of corn and garden truck, but did
not as theretofore put in a crop of tobacco, for the reason that it
would prevent their early removal to the land in question. While
so engaged at his former home, an election was held at which claim-
ant did not vote because of his announced change of residence in
April to New Mexico.
The claimant testified that he spent the interval in disposing of
his stuff, live stock and real estate, and returned with his family to
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New Mexico and to this land about the first of September, that being
the earliest possible date he could return without unnecessary sacri-
fice of his property.
On cross-examination the claimant testified that prior to making
the entry he made up his mind " thoroughly " to become a citizen of
said Territory and wrote his wife that they would move out there as
soon as they could get there, and then made the affidavit of residence
for filing in good faith.
The wife of claimant testified
:
My husband and myself talked it over before he came out here in April and if
he liked it out here when he came in April he would take up land and we would
come out here and make it our home. When he came back, he came to sell and
dispose of his property and to go back as quick as he could, so we came.
The two brothers of claimant who had previously located in New
Mexico testified that while claimant was there in April and prior
to this entry, they between them agreed upon and arranged for
the disposing of property in Kentucky which they owned jointly
and that claimant then stated to them that " he was going back there
and sell out everything and bring his wife and child here to live."
B. N. Bell testified that claimant in April told him that " he was
going back to straighten his affairs and bring his family here."
There is nothing in the record to contradict or impeach the testi-
mony and the good faith of the claimant. The receiver found
—
that the defendant came to New Mexico in April 1904, with the intention of tak-
ing up his residence in this territory in case he should find that the country
suited him
. . . being well pleased, he made up his mind and declared
. . .
his intention to return to Kentucky, settle up his business, bring his
family here, and make their future home. With this object in view and for this
purpose, he made entry . . . returned to Kentucky, closed up his business as
far as possible . . . and came back to New Mexico with his wife and child
in September, 1904. . . .
As there is no evidence going to show bad faith on the part of the defendant,
or that he made entry of this land for speculative purposes, I am of the opinion
that his entry should not be canceled.
The register held
:
It appears that the defendant was a resident of Kentucky at the time he made
said D. L. E. No. 1462, and that he continued to reside in Kentucky until after
he was served with notice of contest.
I am therefore of the opinion that said D. L. E. No. 1462, should be canceled.
It is clear that a change of residence was contemplated and agreed
upon by claimant and his wife before he left Kentucky in April, 1904,
subject only to his favorable impression of the country where his
brother had already located. That conclusion had been reached and
that purpose declared prior to and at the time when the entry in
question was made. It will not be questioned that, had he remained
in said Territory from that time forward and sent for his family to
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join him bis resident citizenship and his entry would be unassailable.
If the entry is to be canceled, therefore, it must be for the reason that
he again departed from said Territory. But he took his departure
with the declared purpose of disposing of his effects and returning to
this land with his family, and this purpose was carried into effect
within the six months allowed after entry, under the general
homestead law, for establishing residence on the land. Manifestly
the Territory in which he was, which he had chosen for his permanent
home, and which he left with the avowed purpose of returning thereto
and remaining permanently therein, is to be regarded as the place of
his residence and citizenship rather than the State which he left with
the avowed purpose of seeking and making his home elsewhere, to
which he returned for the sole purpose of disposing of his effects and
removing his family therefrom, and where he ceased to exercise the
voting privilege of a citizen by reason of his said announced purpose
and procedure of removal.
It it true that at date of this entry he had not become a voting
resident of that Territory. The proper distinction is to be drawn
between the political residence to be acquired before voting, and the
actual being and living in a State or Territory with the intention of
making a permanent home therein. In this latter sense the Depart-
ment is of opinion that the claimant wTas in position properly to make
the affidavit required and that the entry must be held intact. Your
said decision is therefore reversed.
desert lands—state selection—act oe august 18, 1894.
State of Oregon.
Directions given that a bearing be bad for the purpose of determining the char-
acter of certain lands in the Burns land district, Oregon, alleged to be
desert lands and selected by the State under the act of August 18, 1894.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
May 2, 1906. ( G. B. G.
)
By departmental decision of August 5, 1904, the protest of the
Pacific Live Stock Company against the application of the State of
Oregon under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372, 422), for the
segregation of 58,344.57 acres of public land in the Burns land dis-
trict, Oregon, was dismissed, but because of a suggestion in said pro-
test that some of the lands embraced in said list are non-desert in
character, your office was directed to carefully consider that phase of
the case from all available -sources of information and "if in your
judgment the great body of these lands are desert lands within the
meaning of the act of August 18, 1894, supra, to resubmit, with your
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recommendation upon this question, the State's map and tentative
contract for my approval."
Your office communication of September 30, 1905, in response to
said direction, finds from sundry ex parte affidavits executed by
numerous persons, which have been filed with the record since it was
considered by this Department, that of the lands involved 19,000
acres, or nearly one-third of the whole area, are permanently non-
desert, suggests that the fact as to this can only be determined by a
hearing ordered for that purpose, and asks to be advised " whether
the remaining 39,000 acres, which are probably desert lands, consti-
tute the great body of the land as contemplated in the instructions."
This Department has no hesitancy in saying that if there is any
considerable body of the lands involved non-desert, the list in ques-
tion as such can not be approved. But this question can not be tried
on ex parte affidavits, and as the State does not admit the truth of
the matters therein stated, I have to direct that your office order a
hearing herein, at the district land office, Burns, Oregon, after thirty
days' notice, by publication in a newspaper published nearest the
land involved, the date of the hearing to be fixed beyond such reason-
able time as will permit a thorough examination of said lands by a
special agent to be detailed by your office for that purpose, who
should be directed to appear at said hearing and testify as to the
results of his investigation.
In view of reports of engineers of the United States reclamation
service to the Director of the Geological Survey, and the recommen-
dations of that officer to this Department upon the subject of avail-
able water supplies which strongly question the feasibility of the
State's scheme for the reclamation of these lands, the State should
be advised that it will be allowed to introduce at the hearing testi-
mony upon this subject and also upon any other matter bearing upon
the feasibility of its proposed scheme.
Nancy C. Yaple.
Motion for review of departmental decision of December 19, 1905,
34 L. D., 311, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, May 2, 1906.
mining claim—application pop patent.
Extra Lode Claim.
Proceedings to secure a mineral patent by one without interest in, or control
over, the lands applied for, are without authority of law and no rights can
be acquired thereunder.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
(F. L. C.) May 4, 1906. (G. N. B.)
By decision of December 29, 1903 (unreported), the Department
directed that a hearing be had upon the protest of Fred R. Lewis
against the application, filed May 15, 1902, by M. L. Jones, for patent
to the Extra lode mining claim, survey No. 15,721, Leadville, Colo-
rado, land district, to determine whether the tie line from a corner
of the claim to a corner of the public land surveys described in the
notice, together with the other data, correctly defines the position of
the claim as located and staked upon the ground. The facts are
stated in the above mentioned decision and need not be restated here.
The hearing was duly had, June 24, 1904, at which the parties
appeared and submitted evidence. August 9, 1904, the local officers
found, in substance and effect, that corner No. 1 of the Extra lode
claim was tied to the north quarter corner of section 4, T. 10 S.,
R. 79 W., 6th P. M., which has been recognized for many years as
the true position of the north quarter corner, and to which a number
of claims are tied, and that the tie line and other data correctly define
the claim as located and staked upon the ground. They recommended
that the protest be dismissed. Upon appeal, your office, by decision
of February 25, 1905, reversed the finding of the local officers, and
held that the tie line from the claim to a corner of the public surveys
as described in the notice is materially erroneous as to both course
and distance, and stated, in effect, that if further proceedings for
patent to the Extra lode claim as located were had, an amended sur-
vey correctly to show the course and distance of a line to connect a
corner of the claim with a regularly established corner of the public
surveys would be required, and that patent could not issue for the
claim except upon republication and reposting of notice to describe
the claim and tie line as shown in the amended survey. The appli-
cation for patent was held for rejection on the further ground that
the applicant was not the owner of the claim at the date the applica-
tion was filed. Your office also held that Charles J. Moore, transferee
of the applicant for patent, and who had applied to make entry of
the claim, would not be permitted to do so because he is now. and
was at the date he sought to make entry, a deputy mineral surveyor.
Moore has appealed to the Department.
The question first to be considered is: Was Jones the owner of the
mining claim at the date he filed application for patent? If not.
the patent proceedings must be vacated from the beginning. Pro-
ceedings instituted to secure mineral patent by one who is without
interest in or control over the, lands applied for are without statutory
authority (South Carolina Lode and Other Claims, 29 L. D., 602,
604), and therefore ineffective for any purpose.
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Paragraph 42 of the Mining Regulations (31 L. I).. 474. 481), pro-
vides, amongst other things, that
—
Where the applicant claims as sole locator and does not furnish an abstract
of title, his affidavit should be furnished to the effect that he has disposed of
no interest in the land located.
Jones's application for patent was filed May 15, 1002. Under it
he claims as sole locator, but did not furnish an abstract of title nor
his affidavit as required by the above regulation.
August 22, 1902, Charles J. Moore, transferee of Jones, applied to
make entry of the claim, and at the same time filed an abstract of title
to the claim brought down to July 11, 1902. The abstract is certi-
fied by the county clerk and recorder of the county in which the min-
ing claim is situated to be true and correct, and to set forth all trans-
fers of the Extra mining location to or from the parties named in it
as appears from the records of his office. The abstract recites that
the certificate of the location of the claim made by Jones is dated
January 24, 1902, and was filed for record January 25, 1902, and
that Jones conveyed the claim to Moore by deed, upon consideration
of one dollar, dated May 12, 1902, acknowledged May 13, 1902, and
filed for record July 9, 1902. No other transfer of the claim is
shown by the abstract.
It is contended by the appellant that under the statutes of Colo-
rado deeds take effect as of the date they are recorded, and therefore
the abstract shows that the title to the mining location was in Jones
until July 9, 1902. Section 446 of Mills Annotated Statutes of Colo-
rado is cited to support the contention. The section referred to pro-
vides that
—
All deeds, conveyances, agreements in writing of, or affecting title to real
estate or any interest therein, may be recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county wherein such real estate is situate, and from and after the riling
thereof for record in such office and not before, such deeds, bonds, and agree-
ments in writing shall take effect as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and in-
cumbrances by mortgage, judgment or otherwise, not having notice thereof.
There is nothing in the statutes of Colorado which makes ineffect-
ive the transfer of a mining claim or other interest in real estate by
deed as between the parties upon delivery without reference to its
recordation. Deeds take effect from delivery, and the general pre-
sumption is that a deed was delivered at the time it bears date. It
is, however, held by some authorities that the law does not presume
delivery prior to acknowledgement. Devlin on Deeds, Vol. 1, Par.
265, and authorities there cited. Applying either rule in this case,
the presumption is that the deed wyas delivered prior to the filing by
Jones of his application for patent, There is nothing in the record
to show that the deed was not delivered on its date or on the date it
was acknowledged. On the face of the record it appears that when
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Jones filed his application for patent he had no interest in or control
over the mining claim, and the application must therefore be rejected.
The rejection of the application operates to vacate all proceedings
under it, thus leaving no further question raised by the appeal or
suggested in the record that requires to be considered to effectually
dispose of the case.
The decision of your office so far as it held the application for
patent for rejection is affirmed.
The hearing had discloses that the only controversy is as to the true
position of the north quarter-corner of the said section 4 to which
corner No. 1 of the Extra lode mining claim was tied. With the
evidence is a plat showing the Extra claim and a number of patented
mining claims adjoining and in its vicinity. This plat is certified
by the surveyor-general of Colorado. The certificate states that the
position of the north quarter-corner of section 4, T. 10 S., R. 79 W.,
as shown by the plat, and to which the Extra claim was tied, is the
original and true position of the north quarter-corner as shown by
the records of his office. If the records of your office do not agree
with those of the surveyor-general, as certified to by that officer, with
respect to the location and position of the north quarter-corner in
question, the surveyor-general should be directed to definitely fix
the true position of the corner by proper survey on the ground, and
the records of his office and of your office should be made to corres-
pond therewith.
right of way-railroad-act of march 3, 18y5.
San Antonio and Eastern Ry. Co. v. New Mexico Midland Ry. Co.
No rights can be initiated for the use or benefit of any railroad company under
the provisions of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, prior to the organi-
zation of such company under the laws of a State or Territory.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Of-
(F.'L. C.) fee, May 4, 1906. (G. B. G.)
This is the appeal of the San Antonio and Eastern Railway Com-
pany from your office decision of October 13, 1904, dismissing its
protest against the approval of the application of the New Mexico
Midland Railway Company under the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat.,
482), for right of way over the public lands of the United States from
San Antonio to Carthage, a distance of 8.76 miles.
The San Antonio and Eastern Railway Company has also pending
an application for right of way over substantially the same ground,
and its protest is based upon
-a claimed prior right to the line in dis-
pute. The decision of your office is put upon the ground that the
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application of the New Mexico Midland Railway Company is prior
in point of time to that of the San Antonio and Eastern Railway
Company, and holds, without regard to other considerations, that
such priority of application creates priority of right. It is, however,
suggested by your office that, aside from the conflict of claims, the
San Antonio and Eastern Company's application could not, under the
decisions of this Department, be approved, because of the fact that
the engineer of that company, in his affidavit on the map and dupli-
cate, states that its survey was commenced on June 9th and ended
June 11, 1904; whereas the president of the company certifies that
such survey was adopted by the board of directors of said company
June 10, 1904.
This case was heard orally by the Assistant Attorney-General for
this Department, and it developed thereat that it was the intention of
the parties to secure a decision from this Department alone upon the
protest of the San Antonio and Eastern Company against the appli-
cation of the New Mexico Midland Company, without present con-
sideration of protesting company's application on its merits. It was
therefore suggested that it was the purpose of this Department to
consider the whole case at once, and in this view of the case, both
companies desiring to file some additional showing upon the regu-
larity and sufficiency of the protesting company's application, aside
from the main question of priority, the proceedings were informally
suspended and the parties given time to make such showing. Since
that time the San Antonio and Eastern Company has filed a satisfac-
tory showing that its survey had in fact been completed in the field,
and that the result of this survey, with partially completed map
thereof, was submitted to the board of directors of that company, and
was before such board at the time of its adoption, June 10, 1904.
This, it is thought, disposes of the objection suggested by your office
against the application of the San Antonio and Eastern Company,
and inasmuch as there has not been filed since the hearing anything
in support of the New Mexico Midland Company's tentative objec-
tions to the sufficiency of the San Antonio Company's application,
although nearly six months have elapsed since said hearing, there
would seem to be no objection to now considering these respective
applications upon their merits, and the case apparently resolves itself
into a question of priority of right.
The record discloses no special equities in favor of either of these
applicants, it appearing to have been a race between them to secure
a legal right in advance of construction to appropriate this way to
the exclusion of the other, and it is quite probable that the haste
shown by each was more because of a desire to exclude the other than
from any immediate necessity for the utilization of the right. It
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therefore remains to determine which occupies the better legal posi-
tion.
The San Antonio Company was duly organized as a corporation
under the laws of New Mexico upon the filing of its articles of incor-
poration with the Secretary of the Territory, June 8, 1904. The sur-
vey of its line on the ground was, as has been seen, made on the 9th
and 10th of the same month, and on the 14th its application was
filed in the local land office.
The New Mexico Midland Company was duly organized as a corpo-
ration under said laws upon the filing of its articles of incorpora-
tion with the Secretary of the Territory, June 11, 1904. It is shown
that some party, or parties, made a survey of the line in question from
June 9th to 11th, of the same month, which was before this company
had a corporate existence. This line was afterward adopted by the
New Mexico Midland Company and its application for the right of
way in question was filed in the local land office June 13, 1904, which
was the day before the filing made by the San Antonio Company.
Under the circumstances of this case, priority of application does
not carry with it priority of right. This question was definitely
settled by this Department in the similar case of the Phoenix and
Eastern Railroad Company v. Arizona Eastern Railroad Company
(33 L. D., 617), upon authority of a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of the Washington and Idaho Rail-
road Company v. Coeur d'Alene Railway Company (160 U. S., 77),
that no rights can be initiated for the use or benefit of any railroad
company under section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, supra, prior to
the organization of such company under the laws of a State or Ter-
ritory. It appearing, therefore, that the survey upon which the
New Mexico Midland Company relies was made before the incorpora-
tion of that company, it secured no right by the adoption of that
survey as against the San Antonio and Eastern Company, which
was in law the first upon the ground, and executed and adopted a
survey of the route in question, followed immediately by the filing
of its application in the local land office, with due proofs of that com-
pany's organization. As against this company the survey, made the
basis of the New Mexico Midland Company's application, is as though
it had never been made. Washington and Idaho Railroad Company
v. Coeur d'Alene Railway Company, supra.
It results that your office decision must be, and the same is hereby,
reversed. The application of the New Mexico Midland Company i>
rejected, subject to the final approval of the San Antonio and Eastern
Company's map, which your office is directed to forward for such
approval, unless objections 'appear other than such as are herein
considered.
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Since the preparation of this paper a brief has been filed on behalf
of the New Mexico Midland Company, which has received due con-
sideration.
mining claim—townsite—character of land.
Brophy et al. v. O'Hare.
To sustain an application for mineral patent, as against persons alleging the-
land to be non-mineral, it must appear that mineral exists in the land in
quantity and of value sufficient to subject it to disposal under the mining
laws.
In determining whether an alleged mineral location is a " valid mining claim
or possession " within the meaning of the general townsite laws and section
16 of the act of March 3, 1891, relating to townsite entries by incorporated
towns and cities on the mineral lands of the United States, the question of
the character of the land is a primary one ; and if the mineral claimant has
had ample time and opportunity to show by exploration and development
whether valuable mineral deposits exist on the land, and has not done so,
and has not in any manner established that the location embraces mineral
land under the well-settled rules of determination in cases where the
character of the land is directly in issue, his location can not be held to be
a valid mining claim or possession within the meaning of the law.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) May 4, 190.6. (G. N. B.)
April 13, 1904, Martin O'Hare filed application for patent to the
Mountain View lode mining claim, survey No. 1852, Phoenix (form-
erly Tucson), Arizona, land district. June 26, 1904, W. H. Brophy
and eight other persons filed a joint corroborated protest, in which,
amongst other things, it is alleged, in substance and effect, that the
land embraced in the mining claim is within the townsite of Bisbee,
Arizona ; that the protestants are residents of Bisbee ; that the min-
eral applicant has failed to discover any vein, lode or deposit of
quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin,
copper, or other valuable deposits as required by the mining laws;
that he has failed to expend $500 in labor and improvements on the
claim ; and that the application for patent is not made in good faith
to acquire the land as a mining claim, but to secure title thereto
because of its value for building purposes, and also to secure title to
valuable improvements on the land by the protestants.
A hearing on the protest was ordered by the local officers, and had
October 26, 1904, at which the parties appeared and submitted evi-
dence. On that day John S. Taylor, mayor of the incorporated town
of Bisbee, presented his corroborated protest against the mineral
application, which protest contains substantially the same allegations
as m*de in that of Brophy et al. This protest was received by the
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local officers, but, so far as shown by the record, no action was taken
thereon by them.
It is shown by the record, that March 8, 1904, the mayor of the
town of Bisbee filed townsite declaratory statement, embracing, with
other lands, the land here involved; that entry thereof was duly
allowed, October IT, 1904; that April 10, 1905, O'Hare filed his pro-
test against the issuance of patent upon the townsite entry, in so far
as it conflicts with the land embraced in his mineral application, on
the alleged ground that prior to the townsite entry the land had been
segregated from the public domain by such application; that April
27, 1905, your office dismissed the protest on the stated ground that
the issuance of townsite patent would not injuriously affect any rights
that O'Hare might have acquired under his application for patent, or
otherwise under the mining laws; and that upon appeal the Depart-
ment by decision of July 25, 1905 (unreported), affirmed the decision
of your office.
April 2f), 1905, the local officers, after an exhaustive review of the
evidence submitted at the hearing on the protest of Brophy et al.,
found that the mineral applicant had failed to discover mineral on his
claim of quantity and value sufficient to entitle him to patent under
the mining laws, and that he had failed to make improvements or to
perform labor to the value of $500 on the claim. They recommended
that the application for patent be rejected. Upon appeal, your
office, by decision of November 20, 1905, considering the protest by
the mayor of the town of Bisbee as properly to be disposed of under
the hearing had, held, amongst other things, in substance, that the
protestants have failed to show affirmatively that the land embraced
in the mineral application is not mineral in character, and have
failed also to show that the improvements placed on the claim fall
short of the statutory requirement of $500 in value. The finding of
the local officers was reversed and the protests were held for dismissal.
Brophy et al. and the mayor of the town of Bisbee have filed
separate appeals to the Department.
The mineral applicant has made a motion to dismiss the appeal by
Brophy et al. on the ground that the protestants are without interest
in the premises, and therefore have no right of appeal. The evidence
shows that eight of the nine protestants claim lots covering portions
of the land embraced in the mineral application within the townsite
of Bisbee, and each of them owns one or more dwelling houses on the
land, and at least three of. them have been residing on the land con-
tinuously since sometime prior to the riling of the application for
mineral patent. It thus appears that the protestants are asserting an
interest in the land involved, and have therefore the right of appeal.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
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The mineral applicant contends that his mining location was valid
when made, that the required annual expenditures have been made
thereon since, and that for these reasons he is entitled to a patent for
his claim as against the protestants. The question presented is not
one simply of the validity of the location when made, or of posses-
sion thereof by means of annual expenditures. The applicant is ask-
ing for patent to the land, and the protest alleges a failure by him to
make any discovery of mineral thereon as required by the mining
laws. This raises the question of the character of the land. To sus-
tain the application for mineral patent, as against persons alleging
the land to be non-mineral, it must appear that mineral exists in the
land in quantity and of value sufficient to subject it to disposal under
the mining laws. In other words, the land applied for must be shown
to contain valuable deposits of mineral, which means more than a
mere discovery that might be sufficient to support a location in the
first instance.
It is provided by the general townsite act (Sec. 2392, E. S.), and
by section 10 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), relating to
townsite entries by incorporated towns and cities on the mineral
lands of the United States, amongst other exceptions from such
entries, that no title shall be acquired thereunder to any valid mining
claim or possession held under existing law. In construing these pro-
visions of the statute the Department has held that a townsite patent
issued under the general townsite laws, or under the provisions of
said section 16 of the act of March 16, 1891, is inoperative to convey
title to any valid mining claim or possession held under the mining
laws at the date of the townsite entry. Lalande et al v. Townsite of
Saltese (32 L. D., 211) ; Hidings v. Ward Townsite (29 L. D., 21).
The provisions of the statute are cited and relied on in the brief of
counsel for the mineral applicant. The contention is that the appli-
cant has a valid mining claim and possession within the meaning of
the law, and that the same is therefore excepted from the townsite
entry.
In determining whether the claim here involved is a valid mining
claim or possession, the question of the character of the land raised
by the proceedings is a primary one. If the applicant has had ample
time and opportunity to show by exploration and development
whether valuable mineral deposits exist on the land, and has not done
so, and has not in any manner established that the location embraces
mineral land under the well-settled rules of determination in cases
where the character of the land is directly in issue, his location can
not be held to be a valid mining claim or possession within the mean-
ing of the law. Purtle v. Steffee (31 L. D., 400, 402).
It is in view of these principles that the evidence adduced at the
hearing must be considered.
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The evidence shows that the mining claim was located January 1,
1895, nearly ten years prior to the hearing, but no systematic work
for the purpose of developing the land as a mining claim has been
done thereon. No mineral of value has ever been secured from the
claim, or from lands adjoining or in the immediate vicinity. At no
time since the location of the claim has there been more than very
slight indications of mineral veins or deposits therein. The evidence
in behalf of the mineral claimant, not considering that of the pro-
testants, fails to show that the land contains mineral in such quantity
and of such value as to justify expenditures for its extraction, nor
does it warrant the belief that further expenditures would disclose
the presence of valuable deposits of mineral. Under such circum-
stances the land must be held to be non-mineral in character, and not
subject to disposal under the mining laws.
This being determined, the question of the value of the improve-
ments, and other questions suggested by the mineral claimant's coun-
sel in a written argument, and by the record, need not be considered.
This disposition of the case also renders it unnecessary to give
separate consideration to the appeal by the mayor of the town of
Bisbee.
The decision of your office is reversed.
school lands-new mexico—forest reserve.
Territory of New Mexico.
Where the title to school sections has vested in the Territory of New Mexico
under the grant made by the act of June 21, 1808, and such sections are
subsequently embraced within a reservation created by executive order,
the Territory may, under the provisions of section 227;*) of the Revised Stat-
utes, as amended by the act of February 28, 1891, waive its right thereto
and select other lands in lieu thereof.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
May 9, 1906. (G. B. G).
By your reference of the 23d instant I am asked for opinion
whether the Territory of New Mexico may relinquish to the United
States section 36, township 16 south, range 13 west. N. M. P. M.,
within the Gila River forest reserve, granted to the Territory by the
act of June 21, 1898 (30 Stat., 484), and select other lauds in lieu
thereof.
This matter arose upon a communication from the Forester of the
Department of Agriculture to the Governor of New Mexico request-
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ing that no stock be allowed on said section, because of the fact that a
forest nursery had been established at Fort Bayard, on portions of the
Fort Bayard military reservation, it being thought that such use of
said section would be destructive to the nursery.
The Governor of New Mexico responding to this communication,
after consultation with the Commissioner of Public Lands for the
Territory, suggested that it was the desire of the territorial authori-
ties to aid the forestry service in every reasonable way, but that said
section had been leased for a term of years ending some time in the
year 1907, and that under territorial laws the Commissioner of Public
Lands would not be authorized to reject a proper proposal for the
renewal of the lease. It was further said that the authority of the
Territory to relinquish said section and take other lands in lieu
thereof involves legal questions that should be carefully considered.
Moreover, the Governor suggested that inasmuch as under the rulings
of this Department lands taken in lieu thereof must be selected within
the same township, no desirable exchange could be made so long as
this ruling obtained.
The question submitted therefore involves two propositions—first,
whether the exchange can legally be made, and, second, if it can be
legally made, and the consent of the territorial authorities secured,
whether the fact that it has been leased would prevent the exchange.
The first question has been repeatedly determined by this Depart-
ment in the affirmative. See State of California, on review (28 L. D.,
57) ; Territory of New Mexico (29 L. D.,3G-4) ; Id. (29 L.D.,399).
The two later cases involved the grant here in question, and it was
therein specifically held that where the title to school sections has
vested in said Territory under said grant and such sections are subse-
quently embraced within a reservation created by executive order, the
Territory may under the provisions of section 2275 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended by the act of February 28, 1891. waive its right
to such sections and select other lands in lieu thereof.
It is noted that the circuit court of the United States for the south-
ern district of California, in the case of Hibberd r. Slack (8-1 Fed.
Rep., 571), has held that the act of February 28, 1891, amending
sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes, does not contemplate
an exchange of lands between a State and the United States, but
only indemnity for loss to a State by reason of lands to which it is
entitled being disposed of by the United States. Said decision is
not binding upon this Department, and will not be followed.
The question of whether an exchange could not be made without the
consent of the lessee is one upon which I am not able to render an
opinion upon the record. This question would in my judgment
depend upon the terms of the lease—a copy of which is not with
the papers or in the files of this Department. There would seem to
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be, however, no immediate necessity for passing upon this question,
as other objections to the exchange suggested by the territorial
authorities make it altogether improbable that the Territory will
consent thereto in the present state of legislation. Your attention is,
however, called to the fact that there is now pending before the
Congress of the United States House Bill 11940, the purpose of
which is to place the Territory of New Mexico upon the same foot-
ing as other States and Territories in the matter- of selection of
school indemnity lands under the act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat.,
796). Should this bill become a law, it is probable that there will
be no difficulty in securing a relinquishment of this section of land to
the United States, and I think no further action should be taken pend-
ing such legislation. I suggest, however, the territorial authorities
should be advised, in event of the failure of such proposed legisla-
tion, that inasmuch as it would not be possible for the Territory
to make a lieu land selection within the township where such section
sixteen is situated, the entire township being within the reserve, this
Department will, because of the exigencies of the case, consider any
selection that may be proffered for an exchange.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
rules to be observed ix passing on einal proofs.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, May 9, 1906.
Circular of July 17, 1889 (9 L. D., 123), is hereby revoked and the
following rules substituted therefor, viz :
1. Final proofs in all cases where the same are required by the gen-
eral land laws or regulations of the Department, must be taken in
accordance with the published notice: provided, however, that such
testimony may be taken within ten days following the time advertised
in cases where accident or unavoidable delays have prevented the
applicant or his witnesses from making such proof on the day speci-
fied. Section 7 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854).
2. Where final proof or any part thereof has not been taken on the
day advertised, or within ten days thereafter under the exceptions and
as required in Kule 1, you will direct new advertisement to be made;
aud if no protest or objection is then filed the proof theretofore
submitted, if in compliance with the law in other respects, may be
accepted.
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3. If the testimony of either claimant or witness is taken at a differ-
ent place than that advertised the Commissioner may, if in his opinion
same is required, cause new advertisement for the proof to be taken at
such place as he may deem advisable, or if in his opinion new adver-
tisement is unnecessary, and no protest or objection has been filed, the
proof theretofore submitted, if regular in all other respects, may be
accepted without further testimony.
4. When a witness not named in the advertisement is substituted for
an advertised witness, unless two of the advertised witnesses testify,
require new advertisement of the names of the witnesses who do tes-
tify at such time and place as you may direct ; and if no protest or
objection is then filed, the proof theretofore submitted, if satisfactory
in all other respects, may be accepted.
5. Where final proof is taken before an officer not named in the
advertisement, it may be accepted if otherwise sufficient, provided the
proof is taken at the time and place designated in the printed notice,
or within ten days thereafter under the exceptions provided in Rule 1
;
and provided further, that both the officer advertised to take such
proof and the officer taking same shall officially certify that no protest
was at any time filed before him against the claimant's entry.
6. Evidence of declaration of intention to become a citizen of the
United States or other evidence necessary to establish citizenship of
foreign-born applicants should be received only when under the hand
and seal of the proper officer of the court in which such papers appear
of record. However, where it is shown that the judicial record has
been lost or destroyed, proof of citizenship in such cases may be
established under the rules governing the introduction of secondary
evidence.
7. When proof is made before the register or receiver and the final
certificate does not bear the date of proof, the register must indorse
on the back of the final certificate of entry, at the time of its issuance,
a brief statement of the reason for the delay in issuance of final
papers, the indorsement to be in each instance signed by the register.
If the delay was caused by failure of applicant to tender the money
or other consideration at the time of making proof, additional evi-
dence must be furnished showing that the claimant had not, at date of
certificate, transferred the land, which evidence may consist of his
affidavit taken before some officer authorized to administer oaths. In
cases where it appears that the delay in issuance of final papers was
not the fault of the claimant, the proofs being otherwise regular, the
Commissioner of the General Land Office may in his discretion pass
same to patent.
8. When proof is made before any officer other than the register or
receiver a reasonable time will be allowed for the transmission of
papers to the local office, and if a longer interval is shown between
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date of proof and date of certificate, if the proof is otherwise suffi-
cient and the record contains no reason for the delay, the register will
indorse upon the back of the final certificate the statement required
by Rule 7; and if such delay was the fault of the claimant, require
the additional evidence prescribed by Rule 7.
9. Where final proof has been accepted by the local officers prior to
promulgation of this circular, if in other respects satisfactory except
that the register and receiver have failed to submit an explanation as
to delay in issuance of final papers as required by Rule 7, the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office may, if in his opinion the facts
and circumstances so warrant, pass the cases to patent in the absence
of other objection.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
FOREST RESERVE—LIEU SELECTION—UNSURVEYED LAND-ACT OF
MARCH 3, 1905.
Gary B. Peavey.
Where prior to the repeal of the exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 1807,
by the act of March 3, 1905, Selection was made and approved for unsur-
veyed lands described in terms of legal subdivisions of the public surveys,
and upon survey some of the subdivisions were shown to be fractional and
to contain a less area than contemplated by the selection, the selector may,
under the saving provisions of the act of March 3, 1905, make additional
selection to cover such deficiency.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) May 12, 1906. (C. J.'g.)
An appeal has been filed by Gary B. Peavey from the decision of
your office of January 26, 1906, requiring him to waive his right to
excess in area of land offered as base for his selection, No. 2687,
made under the exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 189T, (30
Stat., 36).
June 2, 1900, Peavey filed application to select under said act the
NW. i NE. i, Sec. 5, and E. \ SW. J, Sec. 19, T. 25 N., Pv. 2 W.,
W. M., then unsurveyed, Seattle, Washington, in lieu of lots 9, 10, 11,
and X. \ SW. i, Bee. 5, T. 27 N., R. 12 W., W. M., containing 142.20
acres, relinquished to the United States in the Olympic forest reserve.
The recordsof your office show that 16.58 acres of the base lands above
described were tendered as'base for selection No. 3053, covering lot
12, Sec. 6, T. 36 N., R. 6 E., W. M., same land district, which was
patented July 23, 1904, leaving 125.62 acres as base for the present
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selection, No. 2687. Said selection, which was described as contain-
ing 120 acres, was approved by your office as for nnsurveyed land
July 28, 1903, and the official plat of survey of township 25 north
was filed in the local office September 21, 1905, showing said town- *
ship to be fractional. Thereupon Peavey applied to have his selec-
tion adjusted to the plat of survey, setting forth that said plat shows
the lands embraced in his selection to be more correctly described as
lot 2, Sec. 5, and NE. J SW. \ and lot 8, Sec. 19, T. 25 N., R. 2 W.,
and that the lands last described are the same as covered by his
original application. In the decision appealed from your office
stated and held
:
The plat of survey of said township was filed in your office September 21,
1905, and the records of this office show that the NW. i NE. i, Sec. 5, is desig-
nated as lot 2, area 29.68 acres, and the E. \ SW. \, Sec. 19, is designated as the
NE. \ SW. i, area 40 acres, and lot 8. area 41.85 acres, total area 111.53 acres,
accordingly, the selection is so adjusted and you will note the fact on your
records.
The area of the base land being 14.09 acres in excess of that selected, you
will require the selector to waive his right to such excess, giving him sixty
days in which to comply, or to appeal, in default of which the selection will be
rejected.
It is urged in the appeal, among other things, " there was nothing
to guide the selector in this case as to the probable amount that would
be shown in the survey to be subsequently filed ;" that " it can not be
said that due diligence was not exercised in the attempt to adjust the
base lands to the selection in order to equalize the area."
The forest lieu law of 1897 was repealed by the act of March 3,
1905 (33 Stat., 1264), the proviso thereto, which is the part material
here, being as follows:
That selections heretofore made in lieu of lands relinquished to the United
States may be perfected and patent issue therefor the same as though this act
had not been passed, and if for any reason not the fault of the party making
the same any pending selection is held invalid another selection for a like
quantity of land may be made in lieu thereof.
The application of Peavey was made prior to said act and described
legal subdivisions which if not fractional would contain the quantity
of land applied for by him, namely, 120 acres. That quantity does not
equal the right remaining to him under his assignment of base lands,
which is 125.62 acres, and while it is a reasonable implication that he
elected to take the tract applied for in full satisfaction of said right,
yet it does not necessarily follow that he intended to also waive the
excess in case the tract upon survey should be found to contain less
than 120 acres. No error can be attributed to the government for
accepting the application of Peavey for a less quantity than that
relinquished, the same being for an nnsurveyed tract which upon sur-
vey might be shown to contain more or less than the quantity esti-
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mated by him. It is also true that he had no means of knowing what
the exact area would be upon survey.. Under such circumstances the
justifiable course would be to afford the selector an opportunity either
to fill his selection or waive his right to the excess. This would have
been the selector's privilege and the proper course to pursue prior
to the repealing act of March 3, 1905. It is believed said act invests
the Department with discretionary powers in a case like this, as it is
provided therein that selections theretofore made " may be perfected
and patents issue therefor the same as though this act had not been
passed." The phrase " may be perfected " fairly includes such selec-
tions pending at the date of the act as might properly have been
completed prior to its passage.
The decision of your office herein is accordingly modified, and
Peavey will be afforded a reasonable time, to be fixed by your office,
in which to make additional selection to cover the excess in question,
or waive his right to the same.
employee of general land office-section 452, revised
statutes.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Lanh Office,
Washington, D. C, May 12, 1906.
To all Officers, Clerks, and Employees of the
United States who are in any way connected
with enforcement of the Public Land Laivs:
1. Your attention is called to section 452, United States Revised
Statutes, which reads as follows:
The officers, clerks, and employees in the General Land Office are prohibited
from directly or indirectly purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of
any of the public land; and any person who violates this section shall forthwith
be removed from his office. (See 11 L. D., 348.)
In construing this statute the Department has held (10 L. D.. 97)
that its provisions
—
extend to officers, clerks, and employees in any of the branches of the public
service under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of the General
Land Office in the discharge of his duties relating to the survey and sale of the
public lands.
2. Acting under the spirit of this law and the decisions referred to,
this office will recommend the removal or dismissal of any of the
above-named officers, clerks, or employees who shall, either for them-
selves or others, in any manner negotiate for, buy. sell, or locate, any
warrant, scrip, lieu land selection, soldiers' additional right, or any
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other negotiable right or claim under which an interest in public
lands may be asserted, as well as such officers, clerks, or employees
who shall, except in the discharge of an official duty, help or in any
manner whatever aid or assist in any such negotiations, purchases,
sales, or locations as may be made by others for speculative purposes,
or who shall in any manner whatever, except in the discharge of an
official duty, furnish any information whatever to, or in any manner
be in communication with, any person, firm, or corporation dealing
in any such rights, in relation to such rights.
3. While section 452 of the Revised Statutes does not prohibit the
acquisition of title to the public lands of the United States under ap-
propriate laws by the wives of officers, clerks, and employees of the
land department, it is not deemed advisable or proper in the interest
of good administration that they should do so. Accordingly, such
officers, clerks, and employees are advised that the application, entry,
purchase, or acquisition of title, directly or indirectly, to any of the
public lands by their wives, prior to the separation from the service
of such officers, clerks, or employees, will be deemed a sufficient cause
upon which to base a recommendation for removal or dismissal from
the service of the officer, clerk, or employee whose wife acquires or
seeks to acquire title to any of the public lands.
4. All of such officers who shall be in charge of and maintain offices
are hereby directed to bring this circular to the attention of their sub-
ordinates, and to hereafter keep the same conspicuously posted in
their respective offices.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
MILITARY BOUNTY LAND WARRANT-ASSIGNMENT.
Andrew M. Turner.
Where two military bounty land warrants are erroneously issued upon the same
military service, both can not be recognized, and where in such case the
warrantee, having both warrants in his possession, assigns one of them, he
is estopped thereafter to assert the validity of the other, and an assignee of
such invalid warrant has no higher legal right than the warrantee.
The cases of Andrew Anderson et aU 1 L. D., 1, and L. C. Black, 3 L. D., 101,
overruled.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) May 15, 1906. (J. R, W.)
Andrew M. Turner appealed from your decision of October 9, 1905,
refusing to return to him military bounty land warrant, No. 29118,
issued May 31, 1856, under the act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat, 701).
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 607
May 31, 1856, warrant 29118 issued to Joseph Chapman for service
in Captain Wright's company, 40th regiment United States infantry,
war of 1812. There is also a certificate that June 9, 1856, warrant
28014 had been issued to Joseph Chapman, a private in Captain Job
Wright's company, 46th United States infantry—each for one hun-
dred and sixty acres.
The latter warrant was not transmitted by your office with the
record, though it is included in the schedule as: "A. Warrant No.
28014, 160 acres, act of 1842, and accompanying papers." The
contents, however, of the enclosure "A." are, (1) a certificate of the
Commissioner of Pensions of June 9, 1856, that such warrant " has
been issued," upon this is an assignment of it, (2) to this is attached
the local land office certificate of location of this warrant, but no war-
rant is attached, nor do these papers indicate that any other paper has
ever been attached, nor is such warrant in the enclosure "A." or else-
where in the record. Its presence, however, is not necessary to deci-
sion of the case.
The two warrants being thus erroneously issued for the same serv-
ice, on June 20, 1856, Chapman assigned the certificate 28014 to John
Z. Smith, and the papers purport that he, July 25, 1856, assigned
29118 to William R. Turner, of Gentry county, Missouri. The hand-
writing and ink of the body of the assignments are in each different
from the assignees 1 names, which may have been left blank. Chap-
man's signature is by mark, with J. S. Warner as witness in both
assignments, joined in 28014 by E. F, Smith, and in 29118 by William
Morton. Both assignments were executed before C. M. Griswold,
justice of the peace, Steuben county, New York.
Both warrants having been assigned, 29118 was located at Platts-
burg, Missouri, February 28, 1857, upon the northwest fractional
quarter and north half of the southwest quarter, section five, town-
ship sixty-five, range thirty-one, and November 11, 1858, the Com-
missioner of Pensions filed a caveat against issue of patent on this
warrant, and the location was suspended. June 28, 1860, No. 28014
was located at Stevens Point, Wisconsin, on the SE. ^, Sec. 26, T. 28,
R. 10 E.
March 4, 1864, your office transmitted No. 29118 to the Commis-
sioner of Pensions, for examination, and April 19, 1864, he advised
you that reasonable suspicion still existed that the papers upon
which No. 29118 issued were false and forged, and that it was neces-
sary for Mr. Turner to establish by satisfactory proof the identity
of the warrantee as the man who rendered the military service and
executed the assignment, and, further, that if Mr. Turner failed to
produce the requisite proof, w*^t his request the warrant will be can-
celed and returned to your office for his use in recovery of his pur-
608 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
May 14, 1864, your office directed the local office to notify Mr.
Turner of suspension of his location, of the requirements of the Com-
missioner of Pensions, and that he might make substitution for the
warrant. He made cash substitution June 8, 1805, which the local
office reported. June 20, 18G5, your office reported to the Commis-
sioner of Pensions Mr. Turner's failure to furnish the required proof,
and November 18, 1865, the Commissioner canceled warrant 29118
and returned it to your office, which transmitted it, November 28,
1865, to the local office for delivery to Mr. Turner for use in recovery
of his purchase money. December 1, 1865, patent issued to Mr. Tur-
ner on his substituted cash entry. He never reclaimed (lie canceled
warrant, and July 8, 1885, it was returned to your office, where it has
since lain. March 8, 1904, Andrew M. Turner filed in your office a
power of attorney to counsel to reclaim the Avarrant 29118, with
affidavit of two witnesses that Andrew M. Turner died at Eureka,
Kansas, February 22, 1870, and that claimant is his son, only de-
scendant, and sole heir.
Your office held that a location of this warrant on public lands
should not be allowed; that Chapman received all he was entitled
to by issue and satisfaction of warrant 28014; that return of war-
rant 29118 would be merely to furnish a means to defraud some inno-
cent party, and declined to return it.
Claimant alleges for error that
:
It appearing .... that said warrant was properly issued and was as-
signed in due form by the warrantee, and that the said warrant was wrong-
fully canceled .... it is error to refuse to return the warrant to the
owner of the same with a certificate from the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, to the effect that the same is a valid warrant and will be recognized.
The record shows that this warrant was invalid when Chapman is
claimed to have assigned it. He had but one claim, and when two
evidences of that right were inadvertently issued to him, the right
was not doubled, as it is not in the power of the Commissioner of
Pensions to create, enlarge, or double the liability of the United
States. In this respect the case is like that of C. L. Hood, this day
decided, to which reference is made.
Also on this subject the Attorney-General (5 Op., 387, 389) held:
The power and authority of public officers are just what the law makes them.
The law is the measure of their authority and their acts. The Commissioner of
Pensions .... had authority only to issue on each claim one warrant for
the specified bounty ; that was the limit of his lawful power In issu-
ing more than one he has transcended his power, gone beyond the limits of his
special authority and jurisdiction ; and his acts, upon the clearest legal princi-
ples, are null and void The issuing more than one warrant on the
same claim was what the Commissioner had no power or discretion under any
state of the case to do. It was done, therefore, without law, and contrary to
law. My strong conviction is, that, except the first one issued, all the other
warrants that have been issued on the same claim are of no legal validity.
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The Attorney-General here speaks of the first warrant as being the
one to be regarded as valid. Granting for argument that both war-
rants were issued on one claim, and that both were duly assigned,
another principle determines this case, modifying that rule. Had
warrant 29118 been first assigned the rule stated would control. But
Chapman had both warrants in his hands at the same time. He
first assigned warrant 28014 to John Z. Smith, June 20, and July 25,
185G, held no right, for the only obligation he ever held against the
United States was then divested from him, and vested in his prior
assignee. He and his assigns are estopped to say that warrant 28014
was not validly issued. When Andrew M. Turner's location was
suspended, he was advised of the facts, and was given opportunity
to show, if he could, that the papers on which his warrant 29118
was issued were not false and forged. At that time an issue might
have been made between him and Smith as to which one held the
valid warrant. Not attempting that, he substituted cash, and thereby
in effect confessed the validity of warrant 28014 and the invalidity
of 29118. Nothing in the record impugns Chapman's good faith in
the prior assignment of June 20, 1850, but whether so or not, Turner
had opportunity to take issue and to show validity of his assign-
ment. He failed to do it. Credit is due this action of more than
forty years ago. Turner and those claiming by succession are in no
better place than Chapman would be were he now here a claimant.
Chapman, after his assignment of June 20, 1856, would not be heard
to claim return of warrant 29118 as valid. Bounty land warrants
arc not negotiable instruments, though assignable. The assignee
takes only the right the assignor had, and stands in his place, sub-
ject to the same defenses as might have been then made against him.
As Chapman, after his assignment of June 20, 1856, had no right.
Turner obtained none by the later assignment,
There are decisions of the Department that seem to hold the con-
trary. No. 622, Lester's Land Laws, Vol. 1, p. 612, holds (syllabus)
that " Two warrants being erroneously issued to the same party,
though one be obtained by fraud, both must be respected;" (ib. 621.
No. 636, syllabus) that, "Where a land warrant was erroneously
issued for one hundred and twenty acres, and the claimant was only
entitled to eighty acres, the warrant may be located by an assignee
who is purchaser for consideration and without notice, for its full
quantity;" (ib. 622, No. 637) that "Where both the original war-
rant and the duplicate are located, both must be satisfied, except in
cases of forgery;" Andrew Anderson et <tl. (1 L. D., 1, syllabus) :
u The Commissioner of Pensions has no authority to cancel a mili-
tary bounty land warrant in, the hands of an innocent assignee:*
L. C. Black (3 L. D., 101) to the same effect. The two decisions last
5194—Vol. 34—05 m 39
610 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
cited are based upon opinion of the Attorney-General of March 15,
1856 (T Opin., 657), and departmental decisions in Lester, Nos. 636
and 637, supra.
It does not appear in the report in any of these cases that the valid
and invalid warrants were both in the hands of the warrantee when
bis first assignment was made. It is sufficient for decision of this
case that such was the fact. The warrantee. Chapman, was estopped
by his assignment of warrant No. 28014 thereafter to assert validity
of 29118. The paper is not negotiable and that estoppel concludes
all privies under him claiming warrant 20118; so that the decisions
above cited are not controlling or applicable.
But these former departmental decisions are unsound in principle
in recognizing the United States as bound by misfeasance of its
officers in acts not warranted or authorized by the law prescribing
their duties. The Revised Statutes of the United States provides
that
:
Sec. 2414. All warrants for military bounty-lands which have heen or may
hereafter he issued under any law of the United States, and all valid locations
of the same, which have heen or may hereafter he made are hereby declared to
!)c assignable .... so as to vest the assignee with all the rights of the
original owner of the warrant or location.
It is only warrants " issued under any law of the United States "
that are assignable, and the assignee takes by the assignment merely
" all the rights of the original owner." It is folly to contend that
Chapman could himself have made location of both warrants and
have demanded patent upon both. If he could not, his assignee,
under this section, can not, for he takes only Chapman's right.
When Chapman made the assignment of warrant 29118, he had no
right. The decisions above cited, and any others to such effect, so
far as they hold that the validity of a military bounty land warrant,
after assignment, is not subject to inquiry, or must be recognized as
valid, if issued in excess or violation of law granting such bounty,
are hereby overruled. The opinion of the Attorney-General (7
Opin., 657), upon which such departmental decisions were founded,
was examined, criticised, discredited, and the fallacy of its reasoning
shown by Dillon, Circuit Judge, in Bronson v. Kukuk (3 Dill., 490,
494). The earlier opinion (5 Op., 387) appears to be the better
reasoned.
,
Your decision is affirmed.
MILITARY BOUNTY LAND WARRANT-DUPLICATE.
C L. HOOD.
The issue of a duplicate military bounty land warrant under the provisions of
the act of June 23, 1860 (now section 2441, Revised Statutes), in the belief
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that the original has been lost or destroyed, creates no new liability or
obligation on the part of the United States, where the original warrant had
been located and satisfied prior to the issue of the duplicate.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) May 16, 1906. (J. R. W.
)
C. L. Hood appealed from your decision of July 3, 1905, rejecting
his application for return of duplicate military bounty land warrant
No. 19257; issued under the act of March 3, 1855.(10 Stat., 701).
The original, issued January 21, 1850, to George W. Mitchell for
eighty acres, was assigned March 3, 1856, to Jesse Taylor, and June
7, 1856, wTas located at Decorah land office, Iowa, on the W. J of the
NW. J, Sec. 24, T. 95 N., E. 20 W., upon which patent issued to Tay-
lor August 13, 1867.
August 9, 1895, the Commissioner of Pensions issued to Mitchell
a duplicate, which he assigned August 21, 1858, to James Farasey,
who located it at La Crosse land office, Wisconsin, January 20, 1859,
upon the N. J of the SW. J, Sec. 22, T. 15 N., R. 6 W. December 6,
1864, the Commissioner of Pensions canceled it and declared it void,
February 6, 1886, the entryman was permitted to substitute cash for
the warrant location, and patent issued for the land November 19,
1886. November 19, 1904, C. L. Hood appeared by attorney, alleging
that through Farasey he became owner of the N. ^ of the SW. -j, Sec.
22, and sold it by warranty deed, filing an abstract of title of the
land showing such fact, after which he discovered that patent had
not issued, and to make title good had to pay the United States $100
in substitution for the canceled duplicate warrant, and asking return
of the duplicate warrant. July 3, 1905, your office denied the appli-
cation, and on Hood's motion for review adhered to that decision.
The evident theory and basis of the application is that the dupli-
cate warrant is valid and may be located on public lands, although
the original has been located and satisfied. The duplicate was issued
under the act of June 23, 1860 (12 Stat., 90), now codified as section
2441 of the Revised Statutes, which provides
:
Whenever it appears that any certificate or warrant, issued in pursuance of
any law granting bounty-land, has been lost or destroyed, whether the same
has been sold and assigned by the warrants or not, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is required to cause a new certificate or warrant of like tenor to be issued
in lieu thereof; which new certificate or warrant may be assigned, located, and
patented in like manner as other certificates or warrants for bounty-land are
now authorized by law to be assigned, located, and patented ; and in all cases
where warrants have been, or may be, re-issued, the original warrant, in whose-
ever hands it may be, shall be deemed and held to be null and void, and the
assignment thereof, if any there be. fraudulent; and no patent shall ever issue
for any land located therewith, unless such presumption of fraud in the assign-
ment be removed by due proof that the same was executed by the warrantee
in good faith and for a valuable consideration.
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This statute authorizes issue of a duplicate warrant only when the
original has been " lost or destroyed ; " that the duplicate is to stand
in place of the original, which is to be thenceforth deemed null and
void, and any assignment of it fraudulent, and no patent shall be
issued upon it, unless such presumption of fraud be removed by due
affirmative proof that it was executed in good faith for value. It is
evident from the statute that no power is given by issue of a dupli-
cate warrant to create a new liability or a double liability where only
one existed before. Had such power been given, the last clause,
"unless such presumption of fraud in the assignment be removed,"
could have no purpose.
When the duplicate of this warrant was issued, the land warrant
upon which it purported to issue no longer existed as an obligation
of the United States. It had been duly located June 7, 1856, at
Decorah, Iowa, more than two years before issue of the duplicate,
and by appropriation of public land was satisfied. George W.
Hendry (4 L. D., 172, 173). The case is in strict analogy to the
unauthorized reissue of a debenture or warrant once paid and satis-
fied, concerning which Dillon (Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., Sec.
409) says:
Payment by the treasurer or proper officer of a municipal corporation of its
orders or warrants ipso facto extinguishes them. If lent, reissued, or put into
circulation again by the officers after he has once obtained credit therefor, they
are not valid securities, not even, it seems, in the hands of an innocent holder,
citing Canal Bank v. Supervisors, 3 Denio, N. Y., 517 ; Halstead v. Moyer, 3
Comst, N. Y., 430 ; Sweet v. Carver, 16 Minn., 106.
The authorities are clear that a liability against the government
can not be created by the mistake, misprision, or fraud of its officer
acting without authority of law. It was held in Robertson v. Sichel
(127 U. S., 507, 515), that:
The government itself is not responsible for the misfeasances, or wrongs, or
negligences, or omissions of duty of the subordinate officers or agents whom it
employs ; since that would involve it, in all its operations, in endless embar-
rassments and difficulties and losses, which will be subversive of the public
interests.
It was held in Moffat v. United States (112 U. S., 24, 31), that:
The government does not guarantee the integrity of its officers, nor the val-
idity of their acts. It prescribes rules for them, requires an oath for the
faithful discharge of their duties, and exacts from them a bond with stringent
conditions. It also provides penalties for their misconduct or fraud, but there
its responsibility ends. They are but the servants of the law, and, if they
depart from its requirements, the government is not bound. There would be a
wild license to crime if their acts, in disregard of the law, were to be upheld
to protect third parties, as though performed in compliance with it.
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In Whiteside v. United States (93 U. S., 247, 257) it was held that
:
Torts committed by an officer in the service of the United States do not render
the government liable in an implied assumpsit, even though the acts done were
apparently for the public benefit.
It was held in Hart v. United States (95 U. S., 316, 318) that:
A government may be a loser by the negligence of its officers, but it never
becomes bound to others for the consequences of such neglect, unless it be by
express agreement to that effect.
The mistake of the officers of the United States in issuing this
duplicate warrant could not revive the obligation of the warrant then
already satisfied by location of the original upon public lands. The
obligation was thereby discharged and satisfied, and no authority of
law existed for its reissue. While no actual fraud is shown leading
up to issue of the duplicate, the case is strictly analogous in principle
to that of Marvin Hughitt (33 L. D., 544). The issue of the dupli-
cate being unauthorized, it is not and was never of any validity or
evidence of any right of its holder. To surrender it would simply
set afloat an instrument useful for no purpose but attempts to per-
petrate fraud against interests of the United States in the public
lands. Its return was therefore properly denied. It is impossible
that Farasey took assignment of the duplicate without notice. The
duplicate carried on its face conspicuously written in red ink " Du-
plicate," importing necessarily that it was not the original obligation,
but merely a copy of it, the validity of the original obligation as
continuing and unsatisfied being necessary to the validity of such
copy substituted for it, and pointing to the conditions on which its
validity and the power of the officer to issue it depended.
Your decision is affirmed.
school laxds-indemnity selection-indian reservation.
State of California.
Where a school section is embraced within the limits of an Indian reservation,
the State may, under the provisions of section 2275 of the Revised Statutes,
as amended by the act of February 28, 1891, waive its right thereto and
select other land in lieu thereof, notwithstanding such section was identi-
fied by survey prior to the establishment of the reservation.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) May 22, 1906. ( F. W. C)
The State of California has appealed from your office decision of
January 9, 1906, holding for cancellation its indemnity school laud
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selection, 'filed at the Stockton land office, California, July 11, 1899,
K. and R, No. 388, State No. 3236, for the SE. i of NW. J, Sec. 14,
and fractional N. \ of SW. J, Sec. 18, T. 9, S., R. 7 E., M. D. M., in
lieu of ,82 acres deficit in Sec. 36, T. 5 N., R. 23 W., S. B. M., within
a forest reserve, and the N. \ of SE. \ and SE. \ of SE. J, Sec, 36,
T. 15 S., R. 21 E., S. B. M., within the Yuma Indian Reservation,
because of the fact that the title to Sec. 36, T. 15 S., R. 21 E., S. B.
M., passed to the State prior to the executive order of January 9,
1884, creating the Yuma Indian Reservation, by the terms of which
there were excepted from said order all tracts to which valid rights
had attached. Said last-mentioned tract is therefore held not to con-
stitute a valid base for an indemnity selection, the case of State of
California (17 L. D., 71) being cited as authority.
In its appeal the State urges that the Department has already
granted indemnity to the State in lieu of most of the school sections
within the Yuma Indian Reservation, and that the State has also
selected and received indemnity for sections 16 and 36 within other
Indian reservations in California, and that the indemnity is permis-
sible under the provisions of the act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat.,
796), amending sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes.
In the case of State of California, on review (28 L. D., 57), the
matter at issue was the right of the State under the provisions of the
act of February 28, 1891, to take indemnity in lieu of a section 36
within the boundaries of the Sierra Forest Reserve, established by
executive order dated February 14, 1893. In said decision it was
stated that the section was surveyed prior to the establishment of the
reservation and that it was conceded that the State had full title to
the tract in that section and that it was not therefore within the power
of the Executive to reserve the same or in any way impair the State's
right thereto. While it was therefore within the boundaries of the
forest reservation, it was clearly not reserved. Nevertheless, the
Department held that it was possible for the State to take indemnity
under the act of February 28, 1891, referring to that part of the act
which provides
—
and other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated and granted,
and may be selected by said State or Territory, where sections 10 or 36 are
mineral land, or are included within any Indian, military or other reservation,
or are otherwise disposed of by the United States.
The township in question, namely, township 15 south, range 21
east, S. B. M., was surveyed in 1856, the approved plat having been
filed February 6, 1857. There is nothing suggested to defeat the
State's claim, so that its title became complete upon the identification
of the land by the filing of the township plat.
The order of January 9, 1884, creating the Yuma Indian Reserva-
tion, included section 36 of said township within the boundaries of
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the reservation thereby created, but the order provides " that any
tract or tracts included within the foregoing described townships, to
which valid rights have attached, under the laws of the United States,
are hereby excluded out of the reservation hereby made." So far as
this tract is concerned, the effect would have been the same had there
been no exclusion, so that the case is in all important particulars
similar to that considered in departmental decision in 28 L. D., 57,
before referred to, with the exception that there the lands were
included within the boundaries of a forest reserve, while here they are
included within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, both created
by executive order.
Under this presentation of the matter no sufficient reason appears
for permitting the selection in one case and denying it in the other.
While the case reported in 17 L. D., 71, was not specifically referred
to and overruled in the case last mentioned, the instructions of
December 19, 1893 (17 L. D., 576), were modified accordingly.
Those regulations provide by paragraph 4 " that selections, upon
the base of surveyed school sections within the said forest reser-
vations will not be allowed under any circumstances," and there
does not appear to have been any specific ruling of the Depart-
ment warranting this paragraph of the regulations, except the case
in 17 L. D., 71, hereinbefore referred to. Without, therefore, at this
time, attempting to distinguish the case under consideration from
that in 17 L. D., 71, it is believed, as before stated, that the case under
consideration is controlled by the decision in 2<S L. D., 57. herein-
before mentioned, and in view of the previous adjustment of similar
matters made by your office in apparent harmony with this decision,
the case is remanded for your further consideration and disposition
in accordance wTith the rule announced in the case reported in 28
L. D., 57, supra.
CONTESTANT—PREFERENCE RIGHT.
Michael L. vVeichselbaum.
A successful contestant is entitled to the full period of thirty days after the
case is finally closed and no longer open to proceedings on review or appeal.
within which to assert his preference right of entry.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) May 22,1906. (P. E. W.)
Michael L. Weichselbaum bas appealed to the Department from
your office decision of June 23, 1905, affirming that of the local officers
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and rejecting his application to enter, under the act of June 3, 1878
(20 Stat., 89), the E. J NE. J, SW. J NE. J and NE. J SE. J, Sec. 11,
T. 151 N., R. 26 W., Cass Lake, Minnesota.
Rejection was upon the ground of conflict with the prior applica-
tion of Malcolm C. Barry, under section 2307 of the Revised Statutes,
in the exercise of a preference right gained by successful contest of a
previous entry.
The undisputed record facts are that Barry's contest case against
the previous entry was closed, by decision of your office, on May 28,
l'.M)4; the annotation of cancellation of the previous entry was placed
on the tract book of the local office on June 2, 1901; Weichselbaum
filed his application to enter the land on June 6, 1901; registry letter-
notice of the cancellation of the previous entry and of his preference
right to enter the land was mailed to Barry by the local officers on
June 8, 1904; Barry received the notice on June 10, 1904, and filed
his said application on July 12, thirty-two days after notice. His
application was held to be seasonably filed and was allowed.
To the general rule that where notice is given by mail five days
additional are allowed for its transmission and five days for a return
thereon, AYeichselbaum urges the objection, basing this appeal thereon,
that it-
does not and cannot operate to extend the time in which to make application
under a preference right ; that the time is designated and stated in the act itself
and cannot he extended.
The real matter of inquiry on the record herein, however, is not
whether the said rule may extend the time granted by the act of May
14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), for the exercise of a preference right of entry,
but whether the allowed period of thirty days, properly set running,
had terminated before the application of Barry, in the exercise of
his preference right, was filed.
In the case of Lawrence v. Seeger, on review (25 L. D., 377), the
Department said
;
It is true that he was required under the law and regulations of the Depart-
ment to assert his preference right within thirty days from notice of the cancel-
lation of the contested entry. This he did not do. . . . He filed his applica-
tion in less than thirty days after the motion for review had heen disposed of,
which, under the circumstances, is held to be in time.
A sufficient reason for such holding is found in the fact that the
said motion for review might be sustained and thus the application
to enter, under preference right, would be confronted with an exist-
ing entry. Clearly, the period of preference right cannot, by notice
of cancellation of the former entry, be set running beyond control of
the Department under subsequent developments, or to the impairment
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or defeat of the contestant's right, and the statute must be construed
to mean that the contestant shall have notice of the cancellation of
the former entry and shall have a period of thirty days for filing,
after the time for a review has passed or the right to review has been
waived.
Thus in the case of Kiehlbauch /'. Simero (32 L. IX, 418) it was
held that—
The period of thirty days accorded a successful contestant within which to
exercise his preference right of entry ddes not begin to run until the case arising
niton his contest is finally closed.
In that case the former entryman had relinquished on June 28,
1902, and thus waived any right of review, yet it was held that the
preference right application, filed within thirty days after July 22,
L902, when the contest case was closed by your office, was seasonably
filed, and this without regard to the date when notice was given the
successful contestant. In the present case it is clear, from the stated
dates and acts, that the notice to Barry of cancellation, and of his
preference right, was premature, having been served during the time
within which the former entryman might proceed in review or appeal,
and it cannot be held to have set running the thirty days period to
which Barry was entitled after all possibility was gone of further
proceedings by said entryman.
In the case of Kleven v. Lundrigan (unreported), decided April
3, 1905, the Department, upon motion for review-, recalled its pre-
vious affirmative 1 decision and reversed the decision of your office
wherein it was held that
—
mistake due to any cause whatsoever could not add to the period during which
his preference right suhsisted, which right began on the day upon which lie
received the notice of the cancellation of Nelson's entry and of said preference
right.
Said departmental decision was upon the ground that the successful
contestant had been induced by a second and mistaken notice of his
preference right to delay his application to enter beyond the period
of thirty days from receipt of his first notice.
Following the said former decisions and the manifest reason and
intent of the act in question to give the successful contestant a prefer-
ence right for the full period of thirty days after his contest case is
finally closed and on longer open to proceedings in review or on ap-
peal, it must be held that Barry seasonably exercised his preference
right and has the superior right to make entry for the land in conflict.
Your office properly allowed Weichselbaum to so amend his applica-
tion that the land applied for may be contiguous and that there may
be no conflict with Barry's application.
Your said decision is affirmed.
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repayment—assignee—mortgagee.
Canadian and American Mortgage and Trust Company.
Repayment is not authorized under the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880,
where entry is properly allowed on the proof presented, but is subse-
quently canceled upon a showing that such proof is false ; and in this
respect an assignee has no bettor right than the entryman.
An applicant for repayment of the purchase money paid on a commuted home-
stead entry, who claims the right to repayment as mortgagee under a
mortgage executed prior to completion of the entry, is not an assignee
within the meaning of the statute and is therefore not entitled to repay-
ment.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office^
( F. L. C.
)
May 23, J 906. ( C, J. G.
)
An appeal has been filed by the Canadian and American Mort-
gage and Trust Company from the decision of your office of Feb-
ruary 10, 1906, denying its application for repayment of the pur-
chase money paid by Archie Alley upon making cash entry No.
7287, for the SE. \ of Sec. 20, T. 162 N., R. 44 W., Crookston, Minne-
sota.
Alley made homestead entry for the land described May 3, 1900,
which he commuted to cash entry October 9, 1902, his final proof on
its face showing compliance with law. A contest affidavit was filed
by Hiram Crawford July 11, 1908, in which it was alleged that
Alley never resided upon nor cultivated the land and that " his final
proof was made in fraud and contrary to law." A hearing was
had, notice having been personally served upon the entryman.
Crawford and his witnesses appeared and submitted testimony but
Alley made default. The local officers rendered decision recommend-
ing cancellation of the entry, which action your office affirmed upon
appeal, finding that the testimony presented at the hearing showed
that the statements made in Alley's final proof were false, and upon
further appeal the decision of your office was affirmed by the Depart-
ment.
The Canadian and American Mortgage and Trust Company is
claiming as the assignee or mortgagee of Alley. The action of your
office denying its a'pplication for repayment is based on the rule laid
down in several cited decisions under the act of June 16, 1880 (21
Stat., 287), to the effect that where an entry is properly allowed on
the proof presented but is subsequently canceled upon showing being
made that said proof was false, then repayment is not authorized
underpaid act ; and that in this respect an assignee can have no better
right than the entryman. Or, as set forth in the instructions govern-
ing repayments (30 L. D., 430, 435) :
If a tract of land were submitted to entry, and the proofs showed a compliance
with law, and the entry should be canceled because the proofs were shown to
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be false, it could not be held that the entry was "erroneously allowed; " and in
such case repayment would not be authorized.
October 6, 1902, a loan of $275 was made to Alley through the
Fargo Loan Agency of Fargo, North Dakota, by the Canadian and
American Mortgage and Trust Company, the company taking a
mortgage on the land embraced in Alley's cash entry. The mortgage
having been executed prior to the date of said entry, which was Octo-
ber 9, 1902, the mortgagee company is therefore not an assignee
within the meaning of the repayment statute. The rule given in the
instructions governing repayments, supra, is as follows:
Those persons are assignees, within the meaning of the statute authorizing
the repayment of purchase money, who purchase the land after entries thereof
are completed and take assignments of the title under such entries prior to
complete cancellation thereof, when the entries fail of confirmation for reasons
contemplated by law.
Hence, the cash entry of Alley not only did not fail of confirmation
" for reasons contemplated by law," in which respect the company
can occupy no better position than Alley, but as the transaction
under which the company claims, even if it be regarded in the nature 1
of an assignment, took place prior to the completion of said entry,
the company is not an assignee within the meaning of the repayment
act. As shown by an accompanying abstract, title to the land in
question is now claimed to be in the Canadian and American Mort-
gage and Trust Company, and for the purposes of this application
for repayment the company quit-claims said land to the United
States. All the transactions set forth in said abstract, including the
formal sale and deed of Alley, took place subsequently to the com-
plete cancellation of Alley's entry. Such transactions can not be
regarded as a consummation in the company of its mortgage trans-
action with Alley, said mortgage having been executed prior to the
completion of Alley's entry. It follows therefore that title to the
land has been in the United States since said cancellation, and that
the purported conveyances set out in the abstract were void and are
ineffective. Nor can it be justly claimed that the company is without
ladies or blame in the matter, since those who purchase or take
assignments of land prior to the completion of the entry therefor
do so at their own risk.
The decision of your office denying repayment herein is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT—SETTLEMENT-RED LAKE INDIAN LANDS.
Cathcart et al. v. Minnesota and Manitoba R. E. Co.
No ritfbts were acquired by settlement upon lands within tbe ceded portion of
the Red Lake Indian reservation prior to their opening to settlement and
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entry, and where snch settlement was entirely upon lands selected with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior prior to the opening, by the Min-
nesota and Manitoba Railroad Company, under its grant made by the act
of April 17, 1900, of right of way and necessary lands for terminal facilities
at the crossing of Rainy River, no entry can now be allowed of such lands.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner* of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
May 26, 1906. ( E. J. H
.
)
Lots 3 and 4 of Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W., Grookston, Minnesota,
land district, are a part of the lands in the Red Lake Indian Reserva-
tion, ceded to the United States under the provisions of the act of
January 11, 1889 (25 Stat., 042), and were embraced in the schedule
of lands approved by the Department on September 22, 1903, publi-
cation of which was made by circular of that date, and were opened
to settlement and entry on November 10, 1903.
The status of said lands with respect- to settlement and entry prior
to the date of said opening-
,
was defined in departmental circular of
August 1, 1899, wherein it was stated that there had been* no ap-
praisal, order for sale or opening to settlement, or for the advertise-
ment thereof, and all parties were warned not to make settlement
thereon, and that no rights could be secured thereby.
By act of Congress of April 17, 1900 (31 Stat., 13-1), the right of
way was granted to the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad Company,
fifty feet in width on each side of the center line of said railroad,
through the ceded lands of said reservation to a point on Rainy
River; also land adjacent to such right of way for station buildings,
machine shops, side tracks, turn tables, water stations, and such other
Structures as it might deem to its interest to erect, not to exceed 300
feet in width and 3000 feet in length for each station, to the extent
of one station for each ten miles of road, " except at the crossing of
said Rainy River, at which point said railroad company may take
not exceeding forty acres in addition to the grounds allowed for
station purposes for the corresponding section of ten miles: Pro-
vided, That no part of such lands herein granted shall be used except
in such manner and for such purposes only as are necessary for the
construction, maintenance, and convenient operation of said railroad."
July 13, 1900, the railroad company, in accordance with the terms
of said grant, filed in the local office a map showing the definite loca-
tion of its line of road and station grounds selected by it at the Rainy
River crossing, including all of lots 3 and 1 and a strip 110 feet in
width along the entire west line of the E. -| of SW. ^, Sec. 35, the
same being based on a survey completed June 4, 1900. An amended
map thereof was filed November 8, 1900, and December 5, 1900, the
same was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, " subject to all
the conditions, limitations and provisions of the act of Congress of
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March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 482), and the act of Congress of April IT.
1900 (31 Stat., 134), and subject also to all valid existing rights."
By the act of Congress of February 9, 1903 (32 Stat., 820), the
general townsite laws were declared to be extended and applicable
to any lands within said ceded Indian reservation.
November 4, 1903, prior to the opening of said lands to settlement
and entry, as hereinbefore shown, upon the petition of certain parties
claiming to be inhabitants of the village of Beaudette and engaged
in business there, M. A. Spooner, Judge of the District Court of the
15th Judicial District of Minnesota, in which Beltrami county is
situated, wherein the lands in controversy are located, filed in the
local office, his declaratory statement to the effect that it was his
intention to enter said lots 3 and 4 as a townsite, under the pro-
visions of sections 2387, 2388 and 2389 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, for the use and benefit of the inhabitants of said
village of Beaudette.
November 13, 1903, Thomas Cathcart tendered in said office his
application to make homestead entry of said lots, together with the
E. i of SW. i of said Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W. His application
was suspended pending the disposition of the townsite application,
from which action he appealed.
January 21, 1904, your office issued notice of a hearing upon the
townsite application and set April 5, 1904, therefor. Due service of
said notice was made and on said date the parties all appeared.
Cathcart hied a protest against the proposed entry of said lots 3 and 4
for townsite purposes. The railroad company also filed a protest
against the7 allowance of the townsite application, claiming that by
the approval to said company of its map of right of way and station
grounds, it was the owner of said lands. The townsite claimants and
Cathcart submitted testimony. Upon motion of the railroad com-
pany the case was continued for the purpose of taking the deposition
of Hector Baxter, president of said company, which deposition was
subsequently taken and filed September 15, 1904.
October 14, 1904, the local officers in their decision recited the tes-
timony of said Baxter to the effect that on June 27, 1901, he paid to
the United States the sum of $1458.26, in payment for the right of
way, station grounds, and additional land (lots 3 and 4) granted said
company at Beaudette, this payment being made at the rate of $1.25
per acre, the sum at which the special agent of the government ap-
praised said land; that it was and still is the intention of the com-
pany to use all of the land taken at Beaudette for terminal purposes,
and that the company had never permitted the use of said land for
other than railroad purposes.
It was found from the testimony of Cathcart and his witnesses,
which was undisputed, that he was 73 years of age and made settle-
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ment on the land in October, 1890; that he at once built a house and
commenced to clear land ; that in 1891 he moved his family upon the
Jand and had ever since resided there; that he continued to make
improvements until at the time of the hearing he had between 45 and
50 acres cleared, at a cost of $90 to $100 per acre, the land having
been heavily timbered, a dwelling house 50 feet square with wings
thereto, for which he had been offered $4000, also barns, stables for
stock, and numerous other buildings, all of his improvements being
of the value of $7000 to $8000; that he took the land for a home,
without expectation that a railroad would be built in there; that he
made no protest against the same and had never made any agree-
ment with the company regarding right of way, but had ordered off
parties who were building on the land.
It was also found from the testimony submitted on behalf of the
townsite claimants that the village of Beaudette was unincorporated
and was not regularly divided into blocks and streets; that at the
time of the hearing there were on the land six stores, five saloons,
three hotels, a meat market, school house and church combined, news-
paper office, feed store, barber shop, brewing company, warehouse,
depot and freight shed, and other buildings numbering in all about
thirty, some of which Avere substantial and others merely shanties,
and that they were nearly all located within the railroad station
grounds, which are 200 feet wTide on each side of the track; that the
inhabitants numbered, at the time of the filing of the townsite appli-
cation, between 80 and 100, many of whom were holding homestead
claims elsewhere.
It was held that the money paid by the company to the govern-
ment was not a payment for the land taken as right of way and
station grounds and the additional forty acres at Beaudette, but a
payment made under section 2 of the act of April 17, 1900, supra, for
" the amount of damages resulting to the tribe of Indians in their
tribal capacity, by reason of the construction of said railroad through
such ceded lands of the former Red Lake Indian Reservation," and
therefore " that by the payment of this sum of money to the govern-
ment, the title to the land did not pass from the government, but the
lands were simply granted to the company for railroad purposes,
and that a subsequent entryman or claimant could take the lands
only subject to the right of the railroad company to use those lands
for railroad purposes."
It was therefore recommended that the townsite application be
rejected, that the protest of the railroad company be dismissed, and
that Cathcart be permitted to make homestead entry of the lands
applied for by him, subject to the rights of the railroad company for
right of way and station grounds.
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From so much of said decision as denied the right of townsite entry
of said lots 3 and 4 of Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W., Judge Spooner,
on behalf of the Beaudette townsite applicants, appealed. The Min-
nesota and Manitoba Railroad Company also appealed from that
portion of said decision which denied its absolute title and exclusive
right of possession of all of said lots 3 and 4 under and by virtue of
the provisions of the act of April IT, 1900. supra.
April 21, 1905, your office decision said, substantially, that what-
ever title was acquired by the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad
Company to the lands in question, under the act of April IT, 1900,
supra, vested in said company on July 13, 1900, the date on which its
map of definite location was filed, and that if the company on that
date acquired such title or right to the lands as would entitle it to
demand and enforce exclusive possession and use thereof, it necessa-
rily followed that no rights thereto had been acquired by Cathcart or
the townsite settlers, in view of the fact that settlement on said lands
prior to November 10, 1903, had been expressly prohibited by depart-
mental circular of August 11, 1899.
As to the character of said grant to the railroad company, the cases
of New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. (1T2 U. S., lTl), and
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. Roberts (152 U. S., 114);
and Melder v. White (28 L. D., 412), in each of which cases said
question was in issue, were considered. As a result thereof it was
found that " the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad Company ac-
quired and holds, by virtue of the grant made by Congress, a con-
ditional fee in the lands covered by the approved map of the definite
location of its right of way and station grounds at the Rainy River
crossing, including all of lots 3 and 4, and 140 feet in width along the
entire west line of the E. $ of SW. \ of Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W. ;"
and that such a fee, as well as a fee simple, leaves nothing in the
United States which can be passed to another.
It was held that as the railroad company, on July 13, 1900, filed
a map designating its right of way and station grounds, which had
departmental approval on December 5, 1900, and had constructed its
road, its title was superior to any rights which Cathcart might have
by virtue of his extensive and valuable improvements and residence
for many years on the land.
Regarding the townsite settlers, the most of whom, it was said.
came upon the land subsequently to the completion of the 1 railroad in
1900, or with notice of its intended construction, it was held thai
they must be conclusively presumed to have 1 had knowledge of the
company's right to the lands, and that there was not sufficient evi-
dence to establish a meritorious townsite settlement prior to July 13,
1900, or for some time subsequent thereto.
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From said decision Cathcart, and also Judge Spooner. acting as
trustee for the townsite settlers, have appealed to the Department.
It is claimed on behalf of Cathcart that the grants in the cases cited
by your office as having conveyed a base or qualified fee, differ mate-
rially from the grant made to the Southern Kansas Railway Com-
pany by the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat., 73), which was under con-
sideration in the case of Smith v. Townsend (148 U. S., 490), wherein
said grant was held to convey merely an easement ; that the grant to
the last-mentioned company contains a limitation upon the use of
the land not found in the other grants named, to wit: "That no
part of such lands herein granted shall be used except in such manner
and for such purposes, only, as are necessary for the construction, main-
tenance and convenient operation of said railroad; " also that in said
grant the right to amend or repeal is given without reservation, which
is not the case in said other grants; that it was mainly these provisions
in said act of 1884, which caused the court to hold that the grant made
therein was a mere easement, and it is urged that as said provisions
are contained in the act of 1900, making the grant in question to
the Minnesota and Manitoba Company, which grant it is also claimed
is very similar in terms to the grant of 1884, said grant of 1900 should
be held to convey merely an easement and Cathcart be allowed to
make entry subject to the rights of the railroad company for right of
Way and station grounds.
It should be noted that the grant in question to the railroad com-
pany was for right of way and station grounds, and in addition
thereto forty acres at the Rainy River crossing. Lots 3 and 4 selected
by the company at said point, under its grant of forty acres, contain
31.35 and 27.90 acres, respectively, or 59.25 acres in the aggregate.
The right of way passes through said lots and the station grounds
are mainly thereon. No claim is made that more than forty acres
of said lots remain after allowing for said right of Avay and station
grounds, so that no part of said tracts would be left to Cathcart under
his homestead claim, unless he has the right to make entry thereof
subject to the right of the railroad company under its grant.
In the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Smith
(171 U. S., 260), the title to certain lots in the city of Bismarck was
involved. Said lots were wholly within the right of way of 400 feet
in width, granted to said railroad company by the act of July 2, 1864,
and were claimed by the company thereunder. The road was con-
structed in 1873, the report of acceptance thereof approved by the
President on December 1, 1873, and the company had maintained
and operated said road ever since. Smith claimed title under deed
of conveyance from the corporate authorities of the city of Bismarck,
as part of a townsite plat patented to the mayor of said city on July
21, 1879. It was held that:
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By granting a right of way 400 feet in width Congress must be understood to
have conclusively determined that a strip of that width was necessary for a
public work of such importance and it was not competent for a court, at the
suit of a private party, to adjudge that only 25 feet thereof were occupied for
railroad purposes, in the face of the grant and of the finding that the entire
land in dispute was within 200 feet of the track of the railroad as actually con-
structed, and that the railroad company was in actual possession thereof by its
tenants.
The precise character of the business carried on by such tenants is not dis-
closed, but the court is permitted to presume that it is consistent with the public
duties and purposes of the railroad company; and at any rate a forfeiture for
mis-user could not be enforced in a private action.
Ill the case under consideration herein the lands were a part of the
ceded Red Lake Indian Reservation and were not opened to settle-
ment and entry until November 10, 11)03. The railroad company
had, on July 13, 1900, filed its map of definite location of right
of way and station grounds, and showing the appropriation of
all of lots 3 and 4. The road was constructed and the amount of
damages resulting from the construction thereof paid long prior to
the opening of the lands to settlement and entry. Cathcart secured
no rights to the land by reason of his settlement prior to such open-
ing, but it would seem that the railroad company's rights, under its
grant, attached on July 13, 1900, the date of the filing of its map.
If it were held that, under the terms of the grant, the railroad
company would be required to show that lots 3 and 4 were needed
for terminal purposes, it would seem that the approval of the ma]) of
definite location of the right of way and station grounds, and selec-.
tion of said lots, was an adjudication by the Secretary of the Interior
that the same were needed for such purposes. And while it does not
appear that said lots, outside of the right of way and station grounds,
have as yet been used by the company in the construction, main-
tenance and o2)eration of its road, testimony was submitted to the
effect that it was and still is the intention of the company to use the
same for terminal purposes.
If there was any part of lots 3 and 4 left to which Cathcart's right
under this settlement could attach, after the appropriation by the
railroad company for its right of way and station grounds and the
forty acres to which it was entitled under its grant, he might be
allowed to make entry of said lots subject to the company's rights
to the portion claimed by it under its grant, but said company's
rights appear to cover the entire lots.
In view of the situation in this case it would not seem to make any
difference whether the grant in question to the railroad company be
held to convey a base fee, or merely an easement. Under the decision
of the court in the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Smith.
supra, until a forfeiture has been declared for mis-user or non-user,
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said lots can not be entered by Cathcart, and such forfeiture " could
not be enforced in a private action."
As to the townsite applicants, it appears that the rights of the rail-
road company under its grant attached on July 13, 1900, upon the
filing of its map of definite location of right of way and station
grounds and appropriation of lots 3 and 4, and that the road was
constructed through said lands long prior to the passage of the act
extending the townsite laws to lands within said reservation. Most
of the townsite settlers came upon the land subsequently to the com-
pletion of the road or with the knowledge of its intended construc-
tion. It was held in the case of Link v. Union Pacific Railroad com-
pany (6 L. I)., 322), that "the construction and operation of a rail-
road is sufficient to put subsequent settlers within the limits of the
grant on inquiry as to the rights of the road, and parties claiming
adversely thereto."
Moreover, it appears that the buildings of Cathcart and store build-
ing of J. M. Loughlin, who is not a townsite applicant, are the only
ones built upon brick or stone foundations and really permanent in
character. Those of the applicants are wholly within the limits of
the station grounds, except four or five small shanties and stables
whj^h are outside and quite scattered. Several of the parties enu-
merated as such settlers appear to have been merely at work, or stay-
ing there for a short time, also quite a number were holding home-
stead entries and claiming residence on other lands in the vicinity.
The Department is of opinion that the evidence fails to estab-
lish the fact that there was a meritorious townsite settlement on the
land prior to July 13, 1900, or prior to the completion and operation
of the road.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed. The townsite appli-
cation is denied, and the homestead application of Cathcart rejected
as to said lots 3 and 4.
umatilla indian lands-acts of march 3, 1885, and july 1, 190^2-
preferfnce right—proof.
Burroughs v. Carroll.
The act of July 1, 1902, supplementary to the act of March .3, 1885, relating to
the disposition of lands in the Umatilla Indian reservation, accords to bond
fide settlers a preference right to purchase the lands settled upon for the
period of ninety days, and where during that period purchase is made by
one claiming the preference right, but who in fact is not entitled thereto,
the entry allowed thereon will not be canceled for invalidity on that ground
alone, where there was no existing preference right in another to the lands
at the time such entry was made.
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No tinio is specified in the act of March 3, 1885, within which a purchaser
thereunder must make the required proof of residence and cultivation, but
it rests with the claimant when it shall be submitted, so long as it be
within a reasonable time, and when submitted, the claimant, in the face of
a contest charging failure to comply with the law in the matter of residence,
must stand or fall upon the showing made, and will not be permitted, if
the proof be insufficient or fraudulent, to cure the -default.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F.L. C.) May 31,1906. (E. O. P.)
Rosa Carroll has appealed to the Department from your office
decision of September 14, 1905, holding for cancellation her cash
entry, made August 19, 1902, for lots 11, 12, 19 and 20, Sec. 7, T. 1 S.,
R, 33 E., untimbered lands, and the NE. J of NE. J, Sec. 22, T. 1,
R,. 35 E., timbered lands, La Grande land district, Oregon, upon
contest initiated against said entry by B. L. Burroughs. The entry
in question was made under the provisions of the act of March 3,
1885 (23 Stat., 340), as amended by the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat,,
730).
The affidavit of contest sets out as grounds for the cancellation of
the entry
:
That the said Rosa Carroll was not prior to the first day of July, 1902, or at
any other time, a bona fide settler or resident on the above described tract of
land or any part thereof, nor had she prior to said date, settled upon or lived
upon said tract of land or any part thereof, as by law required, or at all.
That the said Rosa Carroll did not in any way comply with the act of Con-
gress which was approved the first day of July, 1902, entitled an act to provide
for the sale of the unsold portions of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, so that
she might procure a preference right of ninety days from said date to purchase
said land as a bona fide settler.
That the said Rosa Carroll did make application to purchase said tract of land
under the preference right clause of said act of Congress.
That the said Rosa Carroll was, on the nineteenth day of August, 1902, and
for a long time prior thereto had been, the lawful wife of William J. Carroll,
and that while they were husband and wife, the said William J. Carroll also
purchased a quarter section of said land on said reservation, as follows, to wit,
cash entry number five hundred and ninety five, being lots numbered three,
eight, fifteen and sixteen of section number eighteen, township one south, range
thirty three E., W. M., and made October 22, 1902.
That the said Rosa Carroll made application to purchase said land at the
instance and request and for the use and benefit of Henry Wade.
That said Rosa Carroll has not at any time before or since making said entry
established a residence or lived upon said tract of land or any part thereof, nor
has she in any manner improved said land.
A correct decision of the questions presented by the appeal makes
it necessary at the outset to determine the sufficiency of the charges
made to sustain the contest, and this in turn depends upon a correct
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construction of the acts under which the entry under investigation
was made.
But for departmental decisions heretofore rendered it would be
necessary, in this connection, to fix the relation of the separate acts
and to discover what, if any, effect the latter act has upon the original
statute in so far as it might modify, restrict, or enlarge any of its
provisions, as it is by the latter act alone that the preference right to
enter any of these lands is conferred. However, this question has
been settled by departmental decisions in the cases of Davis v. Nelson
(33 L. IX, 119), and Hoover v. Jones (ib., ±7'2) , wherein it was
decided that the two acts are in pari materia, and that the effect of
the later act was not restrictive but on the contrary was supplemental
to the first and enlarged the original act by permitting a disposition
of the lands at private sale as well as at public sale, but upon the same
terms and conditions as provided by the original act governing public
sales. The second act also enlarged the first to the extent that a
preference right to enter was conferred upon a specified class.
In the case of Davis v. Nelson, supra, it was said:
Reading the two acts together and looking to the purpose of Congress, it is
obvious that the acts should be read as if the second were merely another section
of the first and provided that the remaining lands, which were not disposed of
at public sale, should be subject to private cash entry.
In addition, the preference right mentioned was conferred, but
beyond this no greater effect can be given to the second act to extend
the terms of the first.
This brings us to an examination of that part of the contest charge
touching the alleged wrongful assertion of such preference right b}'
Carroll. The opinion of the Department, after a careful examina-
tion of all the evidence before it, briefly stated, is: She had not per-
formed the necessary acts or any act of bona fide settlement on the
land at the time she asserted the preference right of entry, and was
not therefore entitled to claim such right. That she did claim it is
evident from the statements made and relied upon by her in her
applications, but, even conceding that the claim was erroneously
asserted, it does not necessarily follow that the validity of her entry
is in any manner affected thereby. If at the time she asserted such
right she might as easily have made her entry without claiming the
benefit thereof, the Department is of opinion that it is wholly imma-
terial so far as the validity of her entry is concerned, how she
proceeded. Had there been an intervening adverse preference right
set up within the ninety-day period allowed for asserting it, then as
between the parties claiming such right the question must be deter-
mined, and in such case if entry has been made by one under a
preference to which he is not entitled, his entry must be canceled
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 629
upon the protest of a party entitled to a superior right. But it is
not believed that an entry made by one during the ninety-day period
even though under a mistaken claim of preference, can, under the
statute, be canceled for invalidity on that ground alone, if no superior
adverse preference right is set up until after the expiration of that
period. Certainly it can not be canceled where there is no such
superior adverse right existing, for in such case the entryman was
not compelled to seek the protection of such right but might as well
have based his right to enter solely upon his naked application. In
other words, where there is no existing preference right in another
at the time of entry, the assertion of such right by the claimant is
wholly unnecessary and can not therefore be held to be more than a
mere irregularity in no way affecting the validity of his entry. The
contest in so far as it rests upon allegations touching the preference
right of Carroll must fail.
It is further contended that the allegations going to the failure
of Carroll to maintain residence on the land are insufficient as ground
of contest. In the opinion of the Department there is no lack of
proof of her failure in this respect. The finding of your office that
Carroll was not the head of a family at the time she made the entry
is undoubtedly correct, and she could not therefore, coincident with
the maintenance of marital relations with her husband, who, it is
admitted, never resided on the land after entry, establish her claim
of separate residence thereon. However, the original statute not
having been modified, except as already stated, must govern as to
residence, and unless it warrants the bringing of contest upon this
ground, the contention of claimant must be sustained. The statute,
after reciting the manner of making entry, payment, etc., declares:
And before patent shall issue for untimbered lands the purchaser shall make
satisfactory proof that he has resided upon the lands purchased at least one
year and has reduced at least twenty-five acres to cultivation.
In departmental decision in the case of Charles O. Fanning
(20 L. D., 297, 298), construing the effect of the statute as to resi-
dence, it was held, defining the action to be taken where no satisfac-
tory proof of residence had been made
:
While you should refuse to issue patent upon a purchase of these lands until
satisfactory proof of residence and cultivation, as required, is shown, yet, if
llie payments are made within the time required, an entry can not be avoided,
and I have, therefore, to direct that Fanning be advised of the rejection of his
proof and that said entry be suspended until satisfactory proof is made show-
ing compliance with the law in the matter of residence and cultivation.
It is clear that upon this construction contest can not be sustained
upon the charge that claimant has failed to comply with the law in
the matter of residence until the time within which such proof shall
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be submitted is fixed. This the statute does not do. But it does not
necessarily follow that because of this the fulfillment of the condition
may be indefinitely postponed.
But in a case of conveyance upon condition, where a prompt performance
thereof is necessary to give the grantor, or the one who is to avail himself of
the same, the whole benefit contemplated to be secured to him, or where its
immediate fruition formed his motive for entering into the agreement, the
grantee shall not have his lifetime for its performance, but must do it in a
reasonable time. [Wash. Real Prop., Vol. 2, p. 11.]
When the claimant submits his proof he elects to stand or fall
thereon. By his own act he determines the time within which proof
shall be submitted; he fixes the period which before was indefinite
and determinable only by the grantor, and in the face of a contest will
not be permitted, if the proof is insufficient or fraudulent, to cure his
default. The broad language used in the Fanning case {supra) was
not intended to extend the general rule beyond well established
limits. The submission of final proof is a declaration on the part of
claimant that all the requirements of law have been honestly and
fully met, (Langer v. Wasman 34 L. D., 426, 430.) By such act
contest is invited and if by such means the fraudulent nature of the
proof is disclosed, claimant has no equitable right remaining upon
which to base a request to submit new proof. If there were no
adverse claims and the proof submitted was in some respect unsatis-
factory but untainted with fraud, as in the Fanning case (supra),
further opportunity might be afforded claimant to submit other
proof.
Final proof having been submitted by Carroll, her entry thereupon
became contestable for failure to establish and maintain residence on
the land, and the charge having been fully sustained, her entry must
be canceled. The judgment of your office is accordingly hereby
affirmed.
settlers upon st. paul, minneapolis and manitoba railway lands.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, May 22, 1906.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
Gentlemen: The act of April 17, 1906 (Public, No. 106), reads as
follows
:
That all qualified homesteaders who made settlement upon and improved
any of the land hereinafter designated and who were prevented from securing
title to such land by reason of the contracts hereinafter described shall, in
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making final proof upon homestead entries made for other lands, be given credit
for the period of their bona fide residence on and the amount of their respective
improvements upon the land for which they were so prevented from completing
title, including the time of continuous residence upon and improvements of said
land while defending in good faith their respective claims thereto as home-
stead settlers. The land above referred to is that part of the indemnity grant
to the Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company defined. by the
acts of Congress dated, respectively, March third, eighteen hundred and fifty-
seven (Eleventh Statutes, page one hundred and ninety-five, chapter ninety-
nine), and March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-five (Thirteenth Statutes,
page five hundred and twenty-six, chapter one hundred and five), which by rea-
son of certain contracts between Reverend John Ireland and the Saint Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, one dated July seventeenth, eight-
een hundred and eighty, and one dated March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and
eighty-three (more particularly described in the decision of the Commissioner
of the General Land Office contained in his letter of February third, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, in the appeal of the case of John Ireland against
Joseph Bennon and others from the action of the local land office and at Saint
Cloud, Minnesota), the said John Ireland and those with whom he contracted
to sell certain of said lands, either for himself or for said railway company,
were held authorized to purchase from the United States under the provision
of section five of the act of March third, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven
(Twenty-fourth Statutes, page five hundrd and fifty-six), after the date upon
which the claim of said railway company to receive said lands as indemnity
lands had been deified and canceled by the Interior Department : Provided, That
no such person shall be entitled to the benefits of this act who shall fail to make
entry within two years after the passage thereof: And provided further, That
this act shall not be considered as entitling any person to make another home-
stead entry who shall have received the benefits of the homestead law since
being prevented, as aforesaid, from completing title to the lands so settled
upon and improved by him.
- The persons intended to be benefited by this act are those who set-
tled as homestead claimants upon lands within the indemnity limits
of the grants by Congress to aid in the construction of the St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway and who failed to obtain title
because of the superior claims of Reverend John Ireland and others
under the act of March 3, 1887, as purchasers from said railway com-
pany, and such claimants to come within the provisions of the law
must have been qualified homesteaders at the time of their settlements
and residence upon their original claims, and their entries must be
made within two years from the date of the approval of this act, to
wit, on or before April IT, 11)08. Those persons who have received the
benefits of the homestead law since being prevented from completing
title to the lands within the limits of the railway grants settled upon
and improved by them are excluded from the benefits of the act.
Therefore, when any homestead claimant in making final proof on
his homestead entry claims credit under the provisions of this act for
the period of his residence and the amount of his improvements upon
his original claim, which may include the time of his continuous resi-
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dence and improvements while defending in good faith his claim as a
homestead settler, you will require him to make affidavit as to the facts
relative to his settlement, residence, and improvements thereon which
must describe such claim by legal subdivisions and be corroborated by
the affidavits of at least two witnesses having knowledge of such facts,
and said affidavits must satisfactorily show compliance with the law to
the extent claimed, as they will form part of the final proof for the
land, title to which is sought.
You will also require the claimant to make affidavit that he has not
received the benefits of the homestead laws since being prevented
from completing title to the land originally settled upon and claimed.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, May 22, 1906 :
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
opening of ceded portion of crow indian reservation in montana.
By the President of the United States.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, By an agreement between the Indians of the Crow
Indian Reservation in Montana, on the one part, and Benjamin F.
Barge, James H. McNeely, and Charles G. Hoyt, Commissioners on
behalf of the United States, on the other part, amended and ratified
b}r act of Congress approved April twenty-seven, nineteen hundred
and four (33 Stat., 352), said Indians ceded, granted, and relin-
quished to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and
to the unallotted lands within the following boundaries, to-wit
:
Beginning at the northeast corner of the said Crow Indian Reservation
;
thence running due south to a point lying due east of the northeast corner of
the Fort Custer military reservation ; thence running due west to the northwest
corner of said Fort Custer military reservation; thence due south to the south-
west corner of said Fort Custer military reservation ; thence due west to the
intersection of the line hetween sections ten and eleven, township two south,
range twenty-eight east of the Principal Meridian of Montana ; thence due
north to the intersection of the Montana hase line ; thence due west to the
intersection of the western boundary of the Crow Indian Reservation ; thence in
a northeasterly direction following the present boundary of said reservation to
the point of beginning.
And, Whereas, Under the act of Congress ratifying said agree-
ment, among other things, it was provided
:
That the unallotted lands, except such lands as may have been
withdrawn for reclamation under the act of June seventeen, nine-
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teen hundred and two (32 Stat., 388), and such tracts as may have
been reserved for thirty days after the date of opening as subject to
the preference right of entry of the purchasers of the improvements
of the former Indian claimants thereon, and except sections sixteen
and thirty-six, or lands selected in lieu thereof, which are reserved
for common school purposes and are granted to the State of Mon-
tana for such purposes, shall be disposed of under the homestead,
townsite, and mineral land laws of the United States, and shall be
opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President,
which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which the lands
may be settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to
make entry thereof; and no person shall be permitted to settle upon,
occupy, or enter any of said lands, except as prescribed in such proc-
lamation, until after the expiration of sixty days from the time when
the same are open to settlement and entry: Provide^ That as to the
lands opened under such proclamation, all rights of honorably dis-
charged Union soldiers and sailors of the late Civil and the Spanish
war, or the Philippine insurrection, as defined and described in sec-
tions twenty-three hundred and four and twenty-three hundred and
five of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of March first,
nineteen hundred and one (31 Stat., 847), shall not be abridged.
Now, Therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the said act of Con-
gress, do hereby declare and make known that all of the unallotted
lands in said reservation, except such as may at that time have been
withdrawn for reclamation under said act of June seventeenth,
nineteen hundred and two, and such lands as may have been reserved
as subject to the preference right of entry of the purchasers of the
improvements of the former Indian claimants thereon, and except
sections sixteen and thirty-six, or lands selected in lieu thereof,
which are reserved for common school purposes for the State of
Montana, will, on and after the sixteenth day of July, nineteen
hundred and six, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not
otherwise, be opened to settlement, entry, and disposition under the
general provisions of the homestead, townsite, and mineral land
laws of the United States.
And it is further provided that, commencing at 9 o'clock a. m. on
Thursday, June 14, 190(>, and ending at 6 o'clock p. m., Thursday,
June 28, 1906, a registration will be held at Miles City and Billings,
State of Montana, and Sheridan, State of Wyoming, for the purpose
of ascertaining what persons desire to enter, settle upon, and acquire
title to any of said ceded lands under the homestead law, and of
ascertaining their qualifications so to do. To obtain registration
each applicant will be required to show himself duly qualified to
make homestead entry of these lands under existing laws, by written
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application to be made on a blank furnished only at the places
herein designated for registration, by the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office, and to give the registering officers such appropriate
matters of description and identity as will protect the applicant and
the government against any attempted impersonation. Registra-
tion can not be effected through the use of the mails or the employ-
ment of an agent, except that honorably discharged soldiers and
sailors entitled to the benefits of section twenty-three hundred and
four of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by
the act of Congress approved March first, nineteen hundred and one
(31 Stat., 8-17), may present their applications for registration and
due proofs of their qualifications through an agent of their own
selection, having a duly executed power of attorney on a blank fur-
nished by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, but no
person will be permitted to act as agent for more than one such sol-
dier or sailor. No person will be permitted to register more than
once or in any other than his true name.
Each applicant who shows himself duly qualified will be registered
and given a nontransferable certificate to that effect, which will entitle
him to go upon and examine the lands to be opened hereunder; but
the only purpose for which he can go upon and examine said lands is
that of enabling him later on, as herein provided, to understandingly
select the lands for which he may make entry. No one will be permit-
ted to make settlement upon any of said lands in advance of the
opening herein provided for, and during the first sixty days follow-
ing said opening no one but registered applicants will be permitted
to make homestead settlement upon any of said lands, and then only in
pursuance of a homestead entry duly allowed by the local land officers,
or of a soldiers' declaratory statement duly accepted by such officers.
The order in which, during the first sixty days following the open-
ing, the registered applicants will be permitted to make homestead
entry of the lands opened hereunder, will be determined by a drawing
for the district publicly held at Billings, Montana, commencing at
9 o'clock a. m., Monday, July 2, 1906, and continuing for such
period as may be necessary to complete the same. The drawing will
be had under the supervision and immediate observance of a com-
mittee of three persons wdiose integrity is such as to make their con-
trol of the drawing a guaranty of fairness. The members of this
committee will be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who
will prescribe suitable compensation for their services. Preparatory
to this drawing the registration officers will, at the time of regis-
tering each applicant who shows himself duly qualified, make out
a card, which must be signed by the applicant, and giving such a
description of the applicant as will enable the local land officers to
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thereafter identify him. This card will be subsequently sealed in a
separate envelope which will bear no other distinguishing label or
mark than such as may be necessary to show that it is to go into the
drawing. These envelopes w ill be carefully preserved and remain
sealed until opened in the course of the drawing herein provided.
When the registration is completed all of these sealed envelopes
will be brought together at the place of the drawing and turned over
to the committee in charge of the drawing, who, in such manner as
in their judgment will be attended with entire fairness and equality
of opportunity, shall proceed to draw out and open the separate
envelopes and give to each inclosed card a number in the order in
which the envelope containing the same is drawn. The result of the
drawing will be certified by the committee to the officers of the
district and will determine the order in which the applicants may
make homestead entry of said lands and settlement thereon.
Notice of the drawings, stating the name of each applicant and
number assigned to him by the drawing, will be posted each day at
the place of drawing, and each applicant will be notified of his num-
ber and of the day upon which he must make his entry by a postal
card mailed to him at the address given by him at the time of regis-
tration. The result of each day's drawing will also be given to the
press to be published as a matter of news. Applications for home-
stead entry of said lands during the first sixty days following the
opening can be made only by registered applicants and in the order
established by the drawing.
Commencing on Monday, July 10, 190G, at 9 o'clock a. m., the
applications of those drawing numbers 1 to 125, inclusive, must be
presented at the land office in Billings, Montana, in the land district
in which said lands are situated, and will be considered in their
numerical order during the first day, and the applications of those
drawing numbers 12G to 250, inclusive, must be presented and will be
considered in their numerical order during the second da}', and so
on at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under the home-
stead law, and desired thereunder, have been entered. If any appli-
cant fails to appear and present his application for entry when the
number assigned to him by the drawing is reached, his right to
enter will be passed until after the other applications assigned for
that day have been disposed of, when he will be given another oppor-
tunity to make entry, failing in which he will be deemed to have
abandoned his right to make entry under such drawing.
To obtain the allowance of a homestead entry, each applicant must
personally present the certificate of registration theretofore issued
to him, together with a regular application and the necessary accom-
panying proofs, together with the regular land office fees, but an
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honorably discharged soldier or sailor may file his declaratory state-
ment through his agent, who can represent but one soldier or sailor
as in the matter of registration.
Persons who make homestead entry for any of the ceded lands will
be required to pay four dollars per acre, payment in all cases to be
made as follows: One dollar per acre at the time of entry, and the
remainder to he paid in four equal annual installments, the first
installment to be paid at the end of the second year. Upon all
entries the usual fee and commissions shall be paid, as provided for
in the homestead laws on lands the price of which is one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre.
In case any entryman fails to make the payments herein provided
for, or any of them, promptly when due, all rights in and to the
lands covered by his or her entry shall at once cease, and any pay-
ments theretofore made shall be forfeited, and the entry shall be
held for cancellation and canceled, and the land embraced therein
shall thereupon be subject to entry at the price and upon the terms
above set forth. Lands entered under the townsite and mineral land
laws shall be paid for in amount and manner as provided by said
laws, but in no case at a less price than that fixed for such lands if
entered under the homestead laws.
The production of the certificate of registration will be dispensed
with only upon satisfactory proof of its loss or destruction. If at
the time of considering his regular application for entry it appears
that an applicant is disqualified from making homestead entry of
these lands, his application will be rejected, notwithstanding his
prior registration. If any applicant shall register more than once
hereunder, or in any other than his true name, or shall transfer his
registration certificate, he will thereby lose all the benefits of the
registration and drawing herein provided for. and will be precluded
from entering or settling upon any of said lands during the first
sixty days following said opening.
Any person or persons desiring to found, or to suggest establish-
ing, a town site upon any of the said lands, at any point, may. at any
time before the opening herein provided for. file in the land office a
written application to that effect, describing by legal subdivisions the
lands intended to be affected, and stating fully and under oath the
necessity or propriety of founding or establishing a town at that
place. The local officers will forthwith transmit said petition to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office with their recommenda-
tion in the premises. Such Commissioner, if he believes the public
interests will be subserved thereby, will, if the Secretary of the
Interior approve thereof, issue an order withdrawing the lands
described in such petition, or any portion thereof, from homestead
entry and settlement and directing that the same be held for the
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time being for disposal under the towrisite laws of the United States
ir such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may from time to
time direct; and, if at any time after such withdrawal has been
made it is determined that the lands so withdrawn are not needed
for townsite purposes they may be released from such withdrawal
and then disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead
laws in the manner prescribed herein.
All persons are especially admonished that under the said act of
Congress approved April 27, 1904, it is provided that no person shall
be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any of said lands, except
in the manner prescribed in this proclamation, until after the expira-
tion of sixty days from the time when the same are opened to settle-
ment and entry, and the lands are not subject to mineral exploration
or location during that period. After the expiration of said period
of sixty days, but not before, as hereinbefore prescribed, any of said
lands which are non-mineral, remaining undisposed of, may be set-
tled upon, occupied, and entered under the general provisions of the
homestead and townsite laws of the United States in like manner
as if the manner of effecting such settlement, occupancy, and entry
had not been prescribed herein in obedience to law, and such of said
lands as are mineral will then be subject to the provisions of the
mining laws.
The Secretary of the Interior shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations necessary to carry into full effect the opening herein
provided for.
In witness whereof, I have hereto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 24th day of May, in the year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, and of the Independ-
ence of the United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
| seal. | Theodore Roosevelt.
By the President
:
Elihu Root,
Secretary of State.
opening of ceoed portion of crow indian reservation in montana.
Regulations.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, May ,J'h 1906.
Register and Receiver,
United States Land Offi'r<\ Billings, Montana.
Gentlemen: The following regulations are hereby prescribed for
the purpose of carrying into effect the opening of the ceded portion
of the Crow Indian Reservation in the State of Montana, provided
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for iii the act of Congress of April 27, 1904 (33 Stat., 352), and in
the President's proclamation of May 24, 1906, thereunder:
First. Applications either to file soldiers' declaratory statement or
make homestead entry of these lands must, on presentation, in accord-
ance with proclamation opening said lands to entry and settlement,
be accepted or rejected, but local officers may, in their discretion,
permit amendment of a defective application during the day only
on which same is presented.
Second. No appeal to General Land Office will be allowed or con-
sidered unless taken within one day, Sundays excepted, after the
rejection of the application.
Third. After rejection of an application, whether an appeal be
taken or not, the land will continue to be subject to entry as before,
excepting that any subsequent applicant for the same land must be
informed of the prior rejected application and that the subsequent
application, if allowed, will be subject to the disposition of the prior
application upon the appeal, if any is taken from the rejection
thereof, which fact must be noted upon the receipt or certificate
issued upon the allowance of the subsequent application.
Fourth. Where an appeal is taken the papers will be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will be at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with appropriate recommendation, when the matter wilLbe promptly
decided and closed.
Fifth. Applications to contest entries allowed for these lands filed
during the sixty days from date of opening will also be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will at once be
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with proper recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided.
Sixth. These regulations will supersede, during the sixty days
from the opening of these lands, any rule of practice or other regu-
lation governing the disposition of applications with Avhich they may
conflict, and will apply to all appeals taken from the action of the
local officers during said period of sixty days.
Seventh. The purpose of these regulations is to provide an ade-
quate and speedy method of correcting any material errors in local
offices, and at the same time to discourage groundless appeals and
put it out of the power of a disappointed applicant to indefinitely
tie up the land or force another to pay him to withdraw his appeal.
Give all possible publicity, through the press and otherwise, to
these regulations.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, May 24, 1906
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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ceded crow indian lands-homestead entry-oualifications.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, R. C, May 2Jh 1906.
The following persons are not qualified to make homestead entry of
the lands of the ceded portion of the Crow Indian Reservation-, in
Montana
:
1. Any person who has made a prior homestead entry and is not entitled to
make a second homestead entry. Under the act of June 5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267),
any person who made a homestead entry and commuted the same prior to June
5, 1900, is entitled to make a second homestead entry; under the act of May 22,
1902 (32 Stat, 20.3), any person who made final five-year proof, prior to May 17,
19(>(>, on lands to he sold tor the benefit of Indians, and paid the price provided
by law opening the land to settlement, and who would have been entitled under
the "free homestead" law to have received title without such payment, had not
proof been made prior thereto, is entitled to make a second homestead entry ;
under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 527), any person who, prior to April 28,
1904, made homestead entry but was unable to perfect the entry on account of
some unavoidable complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account
of an honest mistake as to the character of the land, provided he made a hona
fair effort to comply with the homestead law and did not relinquish his entry
for a consideration, is entitled to make a second homestead entry ; under section
2 of said act any person who has made a homestead entry of a quantity of land
containing less than 100 acres, and is still owning and occupying the same, may
enter a sufficient quantity of lands contiguous to the lands embraced in his
original entry to make up the full amount of 160 acres; under section 6 of the
act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), any person who has made a homestead
entry for less than 160 acres, and has received the receiver's final receipt there-
for, is entitled to enter enough additional land, not necessarily contiguous to
the original entry, to make 160 acres.
2. A married woman, unless she has been deserted or abandoned by her hus-
band.
3. One not a citizen of the United States, who has not declared his intention
to become such.
4. Anyone under 21 years of age, not the head of a family, unless he served in
the Army or Navy of the United States for not less than fourteen days during
actual war.
5. Anyone who is the proprietor of more than 100 acres of land in any State
or Territory.
0. One who has acquired title to, or is claiming under any of the public land
laws, in pursuance of settlement or entries made since August 30, 1890, an
amount of land other than mineral land, which, with the tract now sought to be
entered, will exceed in the aggregate 320 acres.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, May 24, 1906:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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OPENING OF SHOSHONE OR WIND RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION IN
WYOMING.
By the President of the United States.
A PKOCLAMATIOX.
Whereas, By an agreement between the Shoshone and Arapahoe
tribes of Indians, belonging to the Shoshone or Wind River reserva-
tion in the State of Wyoming, on the one part, and James McLaugh-
lin, a United States Indian Inspector, on the other part, amended
and ratified by act of Congress approved March third, nineteen
hundred and five (33 Stat., 1016), the said Indian tribe ceded,
granted, and relinquished to the United States all the right, title,
and interest which they may have had to all of the unallotted lands
embraced within said reservation, except the lands within and
bounded by the following described lines:
Beginning in the midchannel of the Big Wind River at a point where said
stream crosses the western boundary of the said reservation; thence in a south-
easterly direction following the midchannel of the Big Wind River to its con-
junction with the Little Wind or Big Popo-Agie River, near the northeast cor-
ner of township one south, range four east; thence up the midchannel of the
Big Popo-Agie River in a southwesterly direction to the month of the North
Fork of the said Big Popo-Agie River: thence up the midchannel of said North
Fork of the Big-Popo-Agie River to its intersection witli the southern boundary
of the said reservation, near the southwest corner of section twenty-one, town-
ship two south, range one west; thence due west along the said southern bound-
ary of the said reservation to the southwest corner of the same; thence north
along the western boundary of said reservation to the place of beginning.
And. Whereas, It was provided by said act of March three, nine-
teen hundred and five, that said unallotted lands ceded to the United
States under said agreement should be disposed of under the provi-
sions of the homestead, townsite, coal and mineral land laws of the
United States, and should be opened to settlement and entry by proc-
lamation of the President of the United States on June fifteenth,
nineteen hundred and six. which proclamation shall prescribe the
manner in which the lands shall be settled upon, occupied, and entered
by persons permitted to make entry thereof, and no person shall be
permitted to settle upon, occupy or enter said lands except as pre-
scribed in said proclamation, until after the expiration of sixty days
from the time when the same are open to settlement and entry; and
the rights of honorably discharged soldiers and sailors of the late
civil and Spanish wars, as defined and described in sections twenty-
three hundred and four and twenty-three hundred and five of the
Eevised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the act of
March one, nineteen hundred and one, shall not be abridged;
And, Whereas, The time for the opening of said unalloted lands
was extended to the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and
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six, unless the President shall determine that the same may be opened
at an earlier date, by Public Resolution of Congress, approved March
twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and six (Public Resolution No.
Twelve)
;
Now, Therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by the said
Act and Resolution of Congress, do hereby declare and make known
that all the unallotted lands in the ceded portion of said reservation,
except such as may at that time have been reserved for carrying out
the provisions of said amended treaty relative to the rights of Asmus
Boysen, allowing him to locate in accordance with the Government
surveys not to exceed six hundred and forty acres in the form of a
square, of mineral Or coal lands in said reservation, and to purchase
the same, will, on and after the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hun-
dred and six, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not otherwise,
be opened to settlement, entry, and disposition under the general pro-
visions of the homestead, townsite, coal, and mineral land laws of the
United States.
And it is further directed and provided that commencing at nine
o'clock a. m., on Monday, July 16, 1906, and ending at six o'clock
p. m., Tuesday, July 31, 190G, a registration will be held at Lander,
Shoshoni, and Thermopolis; also, at Worland, provided that the Big
Horn Railroad, now in course of construction, shall be completed and
doing a passenger traffic to that place on July 1G, 1906, for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the names and qualifications of all persons who
desire to enter, settle upon, or acquire title to any of said ceded lands
under the homestead laws.
To obtain registration for the purpose of making a homestead entry
of any of said ceded lands each applicant will be required to show
himself duly qualified under the law to make such entry, and this
showing must be made by the presentation of a sworn application for
registration executed on a blank furnished by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office which can be obtained only at the time and places
of registration herein mentioned, and each person registering must
give the registering officer such appropriate matters of description
and identification as will protect the applicant and the Government
against any attempted impersonation.
Registration can not be effected through the use of the mails or the
employment of an agent, excepting that honorably discharged soldiers
and sailors entitled to the benefits of section twenty-three hundred
and four of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended
by the act of Congress approved March one, nineteen hundred
and one (31 Stat., 847), may present their applications for registra-
tion for the purpose of making a homestead entry and make due proof
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of their qualifications through an agent of their own selection having
a duly executed power of attorney on a blank furnished by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, but no person will be permitted
to act as agent for more than one soldier or sailor. No person will
be permitted to register more than once, nor will he be permitted to
register in any other than his true name.
Each applicant who shows himself duly qualified will be registered
and given a non-transferable certificate to that effect, and each per-
son holding such certificate will be entitled to go upon any ceded
lands subject to entry hereunder and examine such lands, but the only
purpose for which he can go uj^on and examine such lands is to enable
him later on, as herein provided, to understanding^ select the lands
for which he may make entry.
The order in which during the first sixty days following the open-
ing the registered applicants will be permitted to make homestead
entry of lands opened hereunder will be determined by a drawing for
the district, held at Lander, Wyoming, commencing at nine o'clock
a. m., Saturday, August 4, 1906, and continuing for such period nec-
essary to complete the same. The drawing will be had under the
supervision and immediate observance of a committee of three persons
whose integrity is such as to make their control of the drawing a
guaranty of its fairness. The members of this committee will be
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who will prescribe suit-
able compensation for their services. Preparatory to this drawing
the registration officers will, at the time of registering each applicant
who shows himself duly qualified, make out a card which must be
signed by the applicant, and give such a description of the applicant
as will enable the local land officers to thereafter identify him. This
card will be subsequently sealed in a separate envelope which will
bear no other distinguishing label or mark than such as may be neces-
sary to show that it is to go into the drawing. These envelopes will
be carefully preserved and remain sealed until opened in the course
of the drawing herein provided. When the registration is completed
all of these sealed envelopes will be brought together at the place of
drawing and turned over to the committee in charge of the drawing,
who, in such manner as in their judgment will be attended with entire
fairness and equality of opportunity, shall proceed to draw out and
open the separate envelopes and to give to each inclosed card a num-
ber in the order in which the envelope containing the same is drawn.
The result of the drawing will be certified to the officers of the district
and will determine the order in which the applicants may make
homestead entry of said lands and settlement thereon.
Notices of the drawing, stating the name of each applicant and the
number assigned to him by the drawing, will be posted each day at
the place of the drawing, and each applicant will be notified of his
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number and the day upon which he must make his entry, by a postal
card mailed to him at the address given by him at the time of the
registration. The result of each day's drawing will also be given to
the press and published as a matter of news. Applications for home-
stead entry during the sixty days following the opening can be
made only by registered applicants and in the order established by
the drawing.
Commencing August fifteenth, nineteen hundred and six, at nine
o'clock a. m., the applications of those persons drawing numbers 1 to
100, inclusive, entitling them to make homestead entries, must be pre-
sented at the land office at Lander, Wyoming, in the land district in
which the said lands are situated and will be considered in their
numerical order during the first day, and the applications of those
drawing numbers 101 to 200, inclusive, entitling them to make home-
stead entries, must be presented and will be considered in their
numerical order during the second day, and so on, Sundays excluded,
at the rate of 100 such applications per day until and including August
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and six ; on and after August twenty-
seventh, nineteen hundred and six, such applications will be consid-
ered in like manner at the rate of 120 per day, Sundays excluded,
until and including September sixth, nineteen hundred and six; on
and after September seventh, nineteen hundred and six, such applica-
tions will be considered at the rate of 140 per day, Sundays excluded,
until and including September eighteenth, nineteen hundred and six;
on and after September nineteenth, nineteen hundred and six, such
applications will be considered at the rate of 100 per day, Sundays
excluded, until and including September twenty-ninth, nineteen hun-
dred and six; and on and after October one, nineteen hundred and
six, such applications will be considered at the rate of 170 per day,
Sundays excluded, until and including October thirteenth, nineteen
hundred and six, the expiration of the sixty day period.
If any applicant fails to appear and present his application to
make a homestead entry, when the number assigned to him by the
drawing is reached, his application to enter will be passed until after
the other applications assigned to that day have been disposed of,
when he will, on that day, be given another opportunity to make
entry, and if he fail to do so he will be deemed to have abandoned
his right to make entry under such drawing.
To obtain the allowance of a homestead entry each applicant will
personally present the certificate of registration theretofore issued to
him, together with a regular homestead application and the neces-
sary accompanying proofs, together with the regular land office fees,
but an honorably discharged soldier or sailor may file his declaratory
statement through his agent, who can represent but one soldier or
sailor as in the matter of registration.
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The production of the certificate of registration will be dispensed
with only upon satisfactory proof of its loss or destruction. If, at
the time of considering the regular application to enter, it appear
that the applicant is disqualified from making homestead entry on
these lands his application will be rejected notwithstanding his prior
registration. If any applicant shall register more than once here-
under or in any other than his true name, or shall transfer his regis-
tration certificate, he will thereby lose all the benefits of the regis-
tration and drawing herein provided for and will be precluded from
entering or settling upon any of said lands during the first sixty days
following the opening.
Persons who make homestead entries for any of the ceded lands
within two years after the opening of the same to entry shall pay one
dollar and fifty cents per acre for the lands embraced in their entries
and for all of the ceded lands thereafter entered under the homestead
laws the sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre shall be
paid, payment in all cases to be made as follows
:
Fifty cents per acre at the time of making entry and twenty-five
cents per acre each year thereafter until the price per acre herein-
before provided shall have been fully paid. Upon all entries the
usual fees and commissions shall be paid as provided for in the home-
stead laws on lands the price of which is one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre.
In case any entryman fails to make the payments hereinbefore
provided for under homestead entries within the time stated, the right
of said entryman to the lands covered by his or her entry shall be for-
feited and the entry will be canceled.
Any person or persons desiring to found, or to suggest establish-
ing, a townsite upon any of the said lands, at any point, may, at any
time before the opening herein provided for, file in the land office a
written application to that effect, describing by legal subdivisions the
lands intended to be affected, and stating fully and under oath the
necessity or propriety of founding or establishing a town at that
place. The local officers will forthwith transmit said petition to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office with their recommendations
in the premises. Such Commissioner, if he believe the public inter-
ests will be subserved thereby, will, if the Secretary of the Interior ap-
prove thereof, issue an order withdrawing the lands described in
such petition, or any portion thereof, from homestead entry and set-
tlement and directing that the same be held for the time being for
disposal under the townsite laws of the United States in such manner
as the Secretary of the Interior may from time to time direct; and,
if at any time after such withdrawal has been made it is determined
that the lands so withdrawn are not needed for townsite purposes,
they may be released from such withdrawal and then disposed of
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under the general provisions of the homestead laws in the manner
prescribed herein.
The lands entered under the townsite, coal and mineral land laws
shall be paid for in amount and manner provided by the laws under
which they are entered, and unless entry and payment under mineral
locations shall be made within three years from date of location, all
rights thereunder shall cease.
All persons are especially admonished that under said act of Con-
gress approved March three, nineteen hundred and five, it is provided
that no person shall be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any
of said lands except in the manner prescribed in this proclamation
until after the expiration of sixty days from the time when the same
are opened to settlement and entry. After the expiration of said
period of sixty days, but not before, as herein prescribed, any of said
lands remaining undisposed of may be settled upon, occupied, en-
tered, or located under the general provisions of the homestead,
townsite, coal and mineral land laws of the United States in like
manner as if the manner affecting such settlement, occupancy, entry,
and location had not been prescribed herein in obedience to law.
The Secretary of the Interior shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations necessary to carry into full effect the opening herein
provided for.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 2nd day of June in the year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
[seal.] Theodore Roosevelt
By the President
:
Elihu Root,
Secretary of State.
opening of ceded portion of shoshone or wind rtver indian
reservation in wyoming.
Regulations.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June 4, 1906.
Register and Receiver,
United States Land Office, Lander, Wyoming.
Gentlemen: The following regulations are hereby prescribed for
tha purpose of carrying into effect the opening of the ceded portion
of the Shoshone or Wind River Indian Reservation in the State of
Wyoming, provided for in the act of Congress of March 3, 1905 (33
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Stat., 1016), and in the President's proclamation of June 2, 1906,
thereunder
:
First. Applications either to file soldiers' declaratory statement or
make homestead entry of these lands must, on presentation, in ac-
cordance with proclamation opening said lands to entry and settle-
ment, be accepted or rejected, but local officers may, in their discre-
tion, permit amendment of a defective application during the day
only on which same is presented.
Second. No appeal to General Land Office will be allowed or con-
sidered unless taken within one day, Sundays excepted, after the
rejection of the application.
Third. After rejection of an application, whether an appeal be
taken or not, the land will continue to be subject to entry as before,
excepting that any subsequent applicant for the same land must be
informed of the prior rejected application and that the subsequent
application, if allowed, will be subject to the disposition of the prior
application upon the appeal, if any is taken from the rejection
thereof, which fact must be noted upon the receipt or certificate
issued upon the allowance of the subsequent application.
Fourth. Where an appeal is taken the papers will be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will be at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with appropriate recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided and closed.
Fifth. Applications to contest entries allowed for these lands filed
during the sixty days from date of opening will also be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will at once be
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with proper recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided.
Sixth. These regulations will supersede, during the sixty days
from the opening of these lands, any rule of practice or other regu-
lation governing the disposition of applications with which they
may conflict, and will apply to all appeals taken from the action of
the local officers during said period of sixty days.
Seventh. The purpose of these regulations is to provide an ade-
quate and speedy method of correcting any material errors in local
offices, and at the same time to discourage groundless appeals and
put it out of the power of a disappointed applicant to indefinitely
tie up the land or force another to pay him to withdraw his appeal.
Give all possible publicity, through the press and otherwise, to
these regulations.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved June 4, 1906
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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SHOSHONE OR WIND RIVER INDIAN LANDS—HOMESTEAD ENTRY—QUALI-
FICATIONS.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June {, 1900:
The following persons are not qualified to make homestead entry
of the lands of the ceded portion of the Shoshone or Wind River
Indian Reservation in Wyoming:
1. Any person who has made a prior homestead entry and is not entitled to
make a second homestead entry. Under the act of June 5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267),
any person who made a homestead entry and commuted the same prior to June
5, 1900, is entitled to make a second homestead entry. Under the act of May 22,
1902 (32 Stat, 203), any person who made final five-year proof, prior to May
17, 1900, on lands to be sold for the benefit of the Indians, and paid the price
provided by law opening the land to settlement, and who would have been en-
titled under the " free homestead " law to have received title without such
payment, had not proof been made prior thereto, is entitled to make a second
homestead entry; under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat, 527), any person
who, prior to April 28, 1904, made homestead entry but was unable to perfect
the entry on account of some unavoidable complication of his personal or busi-
ness affairs, or on account of an honest mistake as to the character of the
land, provided he made a bona fide effort to comply with the homestead law
and did not relinquish his entry for a consideration, is entitled to make a sec-
ond homestead entry ; under section 2 of said act any person who has made a
homestead entry of a quantity of land containing less than 160 acres, and is
still owning and occupying the same, may enter a sufficient quantity of lands
contiguous to the lands embraced in his original entry to make up the full
amount of 160 acres; under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat,
854), any person who has made a homestead entry for less than 160 acres, and
has received the receiver's final receipt therefor, is entitled to enter enough
additional land, not necessarily contiguous to the original entry, to make 160
acres.
2. A married woman, unless she has been deserted or abandoned by her hus-
band.
3. One not a citizen of the United States, and who has not declared his inten-
tion to become such.
4. Anyone under 21 years of age, not the head of a family, unless he served
in the Army or Navy of the United States for not less than fourteen days during
actual war.
5. Anyone who is the proprietor of more than 100 acres of land in any State
or Territory.
6. One who has acquired title to, or is claiming under any of the public land
laws, in pursuance of settlement or entries made since August 30. 1890, an
amount of land other than mineral land, which, with the tract now sought to
be entered, will exceed in the aggregate 320 acres.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved June 4, 1906 :
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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EVEN-NUMBERED MINERAL SECTIONS IN FORMER UNCOMPAHGRE INDIAN
RESERVATION, UTAH.
By the President of the United States.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, by the act of Congress approved June 7, 1897 (30 Stat.,
87), it was provided:
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby directed to allot agricultural lands
in severalty to the Uncompahgre Ute Indians now located upon or belonging to
the Uncompahgre Indian reservation in the State of Utah, said allotments to
be upon the Uncompahgre and Uintah reservations or elsewhere in said State.
And all the lands of said Uncompahgre reservation not theretofore allotted in
severalty to said Uncompahgre Utes shall, on and after the first day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, be open for location and entry under all the
land laws of the United States ; excepting, however, therefrom all lands con-
taining gilsonite, asphalt, elaterite, or other like substances.
And the title to all of the said lands containing gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite,
or other like substances, is reserved to the United States.
And whereas, it is provided by the act of Congress approved
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat., 998), entitled, "An act making appropria-
tions for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian Depart-
ment," etc., as follows
:
That in the lands within the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation, in the
State of Utah, containing gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite, or other like sub-
stances, which were reserved from location and entry by provision in the act
of Congress entitled "An act making appropriations for the current and contin-
gent expenses of the Indian department, and for fulfilling treaty stipulations
with various Indian tribes, for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and for other purposes," approved June seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, all discoveries and locations of any such
mineral lands by qualified persons prior to January first, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one, not previously discovered and located, who recorded notices of such
discoveries and locations prior to January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-
one, either in the State of Colorado, or in the office of the county recorder of
Uintah county, Utah, shall have all the force and effect accorded by law to
locations of mining claims upon the public domain. All such locations may
hereafter be perfected, and patents shall be issued therefor upon compliance
with the requirements of the mineral land laws, provided that the owners of
such locations shall relocate their respective claims and record the same in the
office of the county recorder of Uintah county, Utah, within ninety days after
the passage of this act. All locations of any such mineral lands made and
recorded on or subsequent to January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one,
are hereby' declared to be null and void ; and the remainder of the lands here-
tofore reserved as aforesaid because of the mineral substances contained in
them, in so far as the same may be within even numbered sections, shall be
sold and disposed of in tracts not exceeding forty acres, or a quarter of a
quarter of a section, in such manner and upon such terms and with such restric-
tions as may be prescribed in a proclamation of the President of the United
States issued for that purpose not less than one hundred and twenty days after
the passage of this act, and not less than ninety days before the time of sale
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or disposal, and the balance of said lands and also all the mineral therein are
hereby specifically reserved for future action of Congress.
Now, therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by law, do
hereby declare and make known that the even-numbered sections of
surveyed lands in said former Uncompahgre Indian reservation in
Utah, heretofore reserved by said act of June 7, 1897, to the United
States as containing deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or
other like substances, saving and excepting such of said even-num-
bered sections as may be appropriated and claimed under discoveries
and locations made and recorded prior to January first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-one, and relocated and re-recorded as specified
by said act of March third, nineteen hundred and three (32 Stat.,
998), and saving and excepting lands allotted to Indians, and all
other lands legally reserved or appropriated, shall be offered for sale
upon sealed bids at the Vernal, Utah, land office in tracts not exceed-
ing forty acres in the aggregate, or the smallest legal subdivision
approximating that area; and that the even-numbered sections of
said lands, now unsurveyed, after the date on which the township
plat of survey thereof is officially filed in the local land office in the
usual manner, as well as any of the lands offered at this sale remain-
ing unsold may be advertised and sealed bids invited therefor upon
the same terms at the same place and at such time as may be specified
in a public notice duly given by direction of the Secretary of the
Interior. Inasmuch as the government is unable to determine defi-
nitely those tracts in the surveyed even-numbered sections princi-
pally valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other
like substances bids may be offered for any forty-acre tract or lot
approximating that area subject to the regulations as to proof of
character of the land, to be hereafter issued.
The bids for the lands offered will be opened at the Vernal, Utah,
land office on Saturday, September 15, 190G, commencing at one
o'clock p. m., mountain standard time, and will continue from day
to day until all bids have been examined.
All bids to receive consideration must be filed in the district land
office at Vernal, Utah, before 4 : 30 o'clock p. m. of the day preceding
that set for the opening of the bids.
The right is reserved to reject any and all bids.
As an individual, or as a member of an association, the purchaser
must be twenty-one years of age and a citizen of the United States
or have declared his intention to become such citizen.
Bids for said lands shall be in accordance with such form, and at
such minimum price as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior who shall also prescribe all additional rules and regulations
necessary to carry into full effect the sale herein provided for.
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In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 6th day of June in the year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
[seal.] Theodore Roosevelt.
By the President
:
Elihu Root, Secretary of State.
even-numbered mineral sections in former uncompaiigre
indian reservation, utah.
Circular.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June 25, 1906.
For the purpose of carrying into effect the sale of the even-
numbered sections in the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation
in Utah, valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or
other like substances under the President's proclamation dated June
G, 1906, the following regulations are prescribed.
Sealed bids must be prepared, filed, received, opened and acted
on in accordance with the following requirements:
First. Each bid must be made on a form similar to that attached
hereto which shall be furnished upon application to the register and
receiver of the Vernal, Utah, land office or the Commissioner of the
General Land Office and must be signed by the bidder who shall
be a citizen of the United States and who shall therein give his
post-office address.
Second. Each bid must be sealed in a separate envelope which shall
be addressed to the " Register and Receiver, United States Land
Office, Vernal, Utah," and such envelope must bear an indorsement
across its face showing that it contains a bid for land in the even-
numbered sections in the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation
containing deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like
substances and must not bear any indication of the amount of such
bid or the description of the tract bid for.
Third. Each bid must be accompanied by a check payable to the
Secretary of the Interior certified by the proper official of a national
bank for twenty per centum of the amount of such bid which check
must be by the bidder placed in the envelope containing the bid.
Fourth. No bid will be considered that is received by such register
and receiver after 4 : 30 o'clock p. m., mountain standard time, on
Thursday the fourteenth day of September, nineteen hundred and six.
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Fifth. Separate bids must be made for each forty-acre tract or
fractional lot constituting a quarter of a quarter section.
.
No bid
Avill be considered describing the tract bid for otherwise than as it
is described on the official plats of survey.
Sixth. Each bidder may present bids for any number of tracts but
with each bid must make and transmit the deposit above required.
Seventh. No bid will be accepted for said lands which shall be at
a less rate than five dollars per acre for the land embraced in such
bid.
Eighth. The bids will be opened by the register and receiver at
their office in the presence of such bidders as may care to attend on
Friday the fifteenth day of September, 1906, at 1 p. m., mountain
standard time, and the register and receiver will indorse on each bid
the name of the bidder, the amount of the bid and the amount of the
deposit immediately after the bids are opened.
Ninth. The register and receiver will then transmit the several
bids with the certified checks to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office. The Commissioner will transmit the said bids to the
Secretary of the Interior with his recommendation in the premises.
Tenth. Notice of the award by the Secretary of the Interior upon
the said sealed bids will be given to each of the bidders by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office through ordinary mail to the
address given in his bid.
Eleventh. The balance due on all the accepted bids after crediting
thereon the respective certified checks will become due and must be
paid to the register and receiver of the said local land office within
thirty days from the date of the mailing of notice by the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office as aforesaid and if not so paid the
amount deposited with such bid as hereinbefore provided will be for-
feited to the United States to be disposed of as are other proceeds
arising from said sale under said act and the land will be thereafter
re-offered under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
the Secretary of the Interior.
Twelfth. On the payment of the amount of their bids by the pur-
chasers as hereinbefore provided the register and receiver will issue
the ordinary cash certificates and receipts modified by endorsements
across the face thereof showing that same are issued for lands of the
former Uncompahgre Indian reservation in Utah valuable for de-
posits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like substances, under
the act of March 3, 11)08 (32 Stat., 998), which will be transmitted to
this office as the basis of patent. The duplicate receipt will be given
to the purchaser by the receiver upon the full payment.
Thirteenth. Each bidder will be required to file with his bid an
affidavit showing himself to be a citizen of the United States, twenty-
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one years of age, and furnish evidence in the form of affidavits duly
corroborated that the lands sought to be purchased by him are prin-
cipally valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other
like substances, and that the same are not claimed or held under dis-
covery and location made and recorded prior to January 1, 1891,
and relocated and re-recorded as specified in the act.
Fourteenth. All bids will be subject to mineral claims asserted by
parties claiming a preference right to the lands entered by reason of
the terms of said act of March 3, 1903, and for the purpose of giving
such adverse claimants an opportunity of presenting their objections
no patents will issue on the lands sold for a period of thirty days from
date of issuance of final receipt. Parties alleging the lands sold to
be non-mineral or valuable solely for minerals other than those named
in this circular or otherwise legally appropriated may also be heard
within the period specified. All protests against the sale must be
under oath and duly corroborated and when based upon a claim of
preference right under the act shall be accompanied by record evi-
dence of location showing a compliance with the terms of the act.
Cases arising under this paragraph will be adjudicated under the
rules of practice of the Department of the Interior so far as they
are applicable but the proceedings will be treated as special until the
final determination thereof.
Very respectfully, W. A. Richards,
Commissioner.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
BID.
The Secretary of the Interior,
Sir: I,
,
of , State of , a citizen of the United
States, do hereby bid and offer to pay dollars per acre for the following
described tract of land of the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation in Utah
valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like substances
:
I herewith enclose certified check of — , for dollars, the
same being twenty per cent of the total amount of this bid for the above
described land, the same to be retained and credited as part payment of the
purchase price should this bid be accepted, or retained by the United States as
a forfeit on my part if this bid is accepted and I should within thirty days
from the mailing of the notice by the Commissioner of the General Land Office
of its acceptance, fail to pay the register and receiver at the Vernal, Utah, land
office the balance due on this bid. I inclose herewith evidence of citizenship
and evidence that the lands sought to be purchased by me are principally valu-
able for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like substances and
that the same was not claimed or held under discovery or location made and
recorded prior to January 1, 1891, and relocated and re-recorded as specified in
the act.
This day of , 190G.
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WITHDRAWAL UNDER ACT OF JUNE 17, 1902—SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL
ENTRY—FORT ASSINIBOINE MILITARY RESERVATION.
Mary C. Sands.
An entry is a contract between the government and the entryman, and until all
the requisites of an entry have been met no contract exists and the appli-
cant can acquire no vested right to the land which will prevent a with-
drawal thereof by the government.
Lands withdrawn under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, from all dis-
position "except under the homestead laws," are not subject to soldiers'
additional entry under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
The fact that the act of April 18, 189(3, provides that the hinds in the abandoned
portion of the Fort Assiniboine military reservation, thereby opened to
entry, shall be disposed of only under the laws therein specifically named,
does not prevent a withdrawal, under the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902, of any of said lands as to which no vested right has attached.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 6, 1906. (D. C. H.)
Mary C. Sands, as assignee of Abram C. Peterbaugh, has ap-
pealed from your office decision of August 3, 1905, holding for can-
cellation her soldiers' additional entry for lot 7 of Sec. 3, T. 32 N.,
R. 15 E., Greatfalls, Montana, containing 3G.54 acres, and allowed
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes on April 22, 1905, in ac-
cordance with instructions contained in your office letter of March
25, 1905. Your office held said entry for cancellation, for the reason
that it appeared from the records of said office that the township in
which the land in question is situated was withdrawn under the act
of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), by order of the Secretary of the
Interior, dated April 12, 1905, and that therefore the land embraced
in the said entry was not subject to location under a soldiers' addi-
tional homestead right at the time the entry was allowed, April 22,
1905. The appeal is based on the following grounds
:
1. Applicant's rights became vested before the land was withdrawn.
2. The Secretary had no authority under the act of June 17, 1902, to withdraw
this land from entry because the land was not subject to withdrawal uuder
said act.
Appellant's contention under the first assignment of error seems to
be based upon the fact that since your office by its former letter of
March 25, 1905. directed that her application for said land be allowed,
her rights thereby became vested and could not be interfered with or
prejudiced by the subsequent order of April 12, 1905, withdrawing
the land.
This contention is not sound and cannot be admitted. It has been
held that an entry is a contract between the government and the en-
tryman. Under the law three things are necessary to be done in
order to constitute an entry on public lands: first, the applicant must
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make an affidavit setting forth the facts which entitle him to make the
entry; second, he must make a formal application; and third, he must
make payment of the money required. Until all three of these
requisites are complied with, no such contract exists, and the appli-
cant can acquire no vested rights in the land sought to be entered.
The receiver's receipt filed in this case shows that the money was not
paid until April 22, 1905, at which time it also appears that the final
certificate was issued. There being then no contract existing between
the government and the applicant at the date of the withdrawal of
the township in which the land in question is situated, the applicant
acquired no vested rights by his application to enter said land,
although the same Avas filed before the lands in said township Avere
ordered to be withdrawn.
It is further contended by appellant that soldiers' additional entries
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes are in the nature of home-
stead entries, and although lands susceptible of irrigation, under the
act of June IT, 1902, supra, may be withdrawn from entry except
under the homestead laws, the lands are still, under said exception,
subject to entry by one holding a right under the aforesaid section of
the Eevised Statutes.
The question presented by this contention was well and carefully
considered by the Department in the cases of Cornelius J. MacNa-
mara and William W. Wooldridge (33 L. D., 520 and 525), and it was
therein held that lands withdrawn under the act of June 17, 1902, as
susceptible of irrigation, are not subject to soldiers' additional entry
under section 2306 of the Eevised Statutes, and now, upon reconsid-
eration of the question and the matters urged in support of appel-
lant's contention, the Department sees no reason for disturbing the
decisions rendered in the aforesaid cases, and they will be adhered to.
It is also contended that the land in question is within the limits
of that portion of the Fort Assiniboine military reservation, which
was abandoned in 1888, and for that reason was not a part of the
public lands and not subject to withdrawal under the act of June 17,
1902.
To sustain this contention the appellant cites the act of April 18,
1896 (29 Stat,, 95), which, among other things, provides that the
abandoned portion of said reservation
—
shall be open to the operation of the laws regulating homestead entry, except
section twenty-three hundred and one of the Revised Statutes, and to entry
under the townsite laws and the laws governing the disposal of coal lands,
desert lands, and mineral lands, and shall not he subject to sale under the
provisions of any act relating to the sale of abandoned military reservations.
Appellant insists that under the provisions of said act of 1896,
limiting the lands to entry for the purposes therein specially named,
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the Secretary of the Interior was precluded from withdrawing said
lands for irrigation purposes under the act of June 17, 1902.
There is no force in this contention. The restriction in the said act
of 189G, limiting the lands to entries of the character therein speci-
fied, did not deprive Congress of control over said lands, and of the
right to subject them to use for any other purpose which in its
judgment it might deem suitable and proper.
The Secretary of the Interior having by virtue of the authority
given by said act of 1902 withdrawn the land in question from entry
for the purposes therein specified, before any vested right attached
thereto, said withdrawal must be given full force and effect. See
instructions of January 13, 1904 (32 L. D., 387-388).
Upon a full consideration of the whole matter, your decision is
hereby affirmed.
mining claim—expenditure—claims held in common.
Lawson Butte Consolidated Copper Mine.
Improvements made upon one or more of several contiguous mining claims held
in common may be accepted as applicable to tbe entire group, in satisfac-
tion of the statutory requirement relative to the expenditure of five hun-
dred dollars upon or for the benefit of each of the claims, only where the
purpose of such improvements is to facilitate the extraction of mineral
from the claims, and the improvements are of such character as to redound
to the benefit of all the claims in this respect ; and the fact that the
mineral formation covered by the claims is a continuous deposit consti-
tuting one ore mass, will not justify applying the cost of improvements on
one of the claims toward meeting the requirements of the statute as to the
others, unless it appear that such improvements will aid in the extraction
of mineral from, or tend to promote the development of, such other claims.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 8, 1906. (G. N. B.)
December 29, 1902, the Trinity Copper Company made entry
under the name of Lawson Butte Consolidated Copper Mine, for
the Lawson Butte, Poker, 44, Bories, Sunshine, Comet, Montana,
Columbia, Sheep Springs, 99, Colorado, Martin, Mascot, Eobin, In-
terview, Doe, Big Buck, Blue Jay, Boston Copper, Black Oak, Pine
Bur, Lester, and Sage, contiguous lode mining claims, survey No.
3937, Redding, California.
July 18, 1904, your office held the entry for cancellation to the ex-
tent of the Lawson Butte, Poker, 14, Black Oak, Pine Bur, Lester,
Sage, Doe, Big Buck, and Blue Jay claims, on the stated ground that
the certificate of the surveyor-general does not show that five hun-
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dred dollars' worth of labor had been expended or improvements
made upon or for the benefit of each of said claims prior to the
expiration of the period of publication. Subsequently the company
submitted a number of affidavits with a view to establish that the
improvements made are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute. By decision of April 13, 11)05, your office held the showing
made to be insufficient and adhered to the former decision.
The company has appealed to the Department.
It appears from the evidence that the claims in the group extend
over and cover both sides of a high ridge or mountain. The Doe,
Big Buck, and Blue Jay claims lie at the bottom of the westerly side
of the ridge and are crossed by Spring creek. The remainder of the
excluded claims lie at the bottom of the easterly side of the ridge.
The improvements certified by the surveyor-general consist of tun-
nels, cuts, a shaft, buildings, and trails, and aggregate in value
$14,(>40, which (exclusive of the trails valued at $500) might be
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute, provided the
improvements were so situated and of such a character as to redound
to the benefit of all the claims. The value of the expenditures upon
each of the excluded claims is less than $500. The surveyor-general
certifies that a tunnel upon the Interview claim, valued at $2,000, and
one on the Robin claim, valued at $1,400, are for the benefit of those
claims, and also for the benefit of the Colorado, 99, Doe, Big Buck,
and Blue Jay claims. The tunnels referred to are projected in a
northeasterly direction and away from the Doe, Big Buck, and Blue
Jay claims, and the portals thereof, from the official plat, appear to
be at least 1,000 feet above any portion of the surface of said claims.
The surveyor-general also certifies that a tunnel on the Mascot
claim, valued at $4,000, one on the Boston Copper, valued at $1,700,
and one on the Columbia, valued at $1,200, and the additional im-
provements, in the way of numerous shallow open cuts, small tunnels,
and a shaft, in the aggregate valued at $2,285, which he found at
different points on ten of the claims, are for the benefit of the claims
upon which they are situated as well as the other claims in the group.
The tunnels referred to do not run toward the 44, Poker, Lawson
Butte, Black Oak, Pine Bur, Lester, and Sage claims, nor toward the
other excluded claims. The portals are at a much higher elevation
than any portion of the said claims, and at a considerable distance
therefrom. It is not shown by the surveyor-general's certificate, or
otherwise, that the other improvements mentioned were designed, or
could be used, for the benefit of other claims than those upon which
they are situated.
It is asserted by the appellant that the evidence shows that the
mineral formation covered by the claims is a continuous deposit con-
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stituting the ore mass of or in the mountain, and because thereof it
is contended that the improvements made and certified by the sur-
veyor-general are a good and sufficient means or system of develop-
ment of all the claims.
It is well settled that improvements made upon one or more of
several contiguous claims held in common may be accepted in satis-
faction of the statutory requirement only where the purpose of such
improvements is to facilitate the extraction of mineral from the
claims, and the improvements are of such character as to redound to
the benefit of all the claims in this respect. Copper Glance Lode
(29 L. D., 542,549), and authorities cited. It must appear that each
of the claims constituting the group will profit by the work done or
improvements made upon one or more of such claims. Elmer F.
Cassel (32 L. D., 85, 87.)
Assuming that the mineral exists in a practically continuous mass
in the body of the mountain and extends under the surface of the
entire group of claims embraced in the entry, as asserted by the
appellant, it does not appear how the tunnels relied upon, which are
projected away from and at a point high aboA7e the surface of the
excluded claims, could in any manner aid in the extraction of mineral
from such excluded claims, or could tend to promote their develop-
ment. The tunnels if continued in their projected courses would
not reach the deposit under the surface of the excluded claims, and
could not by any possibility be utilized for their benefit. Under
these circumstances the improvements relied upon to satisfy the
statutory requirement are not such as may be applied to the claims
excluded from the entry. The decision of your office is affirmed.
school lands—identification by survey-lands excepted-acts
february 32, 1889, and february 28, 1891.
State of South Dakota v. Riley.
Under the grant of sections sixteen and thirty-six made to the State of South
Dakota for school purposes by the act of February 22, 1889, the State takes
no vested interest or title to any particular land until it is identified by
survey, and prior to such identification the grant, as to any particular
tract, may be wholly defeated by settlement, the State's only remedy in
such case being under the indemnity provisions of said act and of the act of
February 28, 1891, amending sections 2275 and 227(5 of the Revised Stat-
utes.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 8, 1006. (J. R. W.)
The State of South Dakota filed a motion for review of depart-
mental decision of June V2S, 11)05 (unreported), dismissing its protest
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against allowance of Mathew Eiley's final proof on his homestead
entry as to the E. J of the SE. J, Sec. 36, T. 3 S., R. 3 E., Rapid City,
South Dakota.
Riley has resided on the land continuously since May, 1891. The
land is in the Black Hills forest reserve, created by executive proc-
lamation of February 22, 1897 (29 Stat., 902). The township plat
of survey was filed in the local office December 15, 1899. The
entry was not made until July 25, 1902, under the act of April 15,
1902 (32 Stat, 106).
The motion involves two points: (1) that the school land grant
to the State was in jiresenii of specific sections, whether surveyed or
not; (2) but if not so, then upon Riley's failure to make entry within
three months from filing of the plat, the State's right attached, and
Congress was without power to divest that right.
The grant was made b/y sections 10 and 11 of the act of February
22, 1889 (25 Stat., 676, 679), which, so far as here material, pro-
vides that
:
Sec. 10. That upon tbe admission of each of said States into the Union sec-
tions numbered sixteen and thirty-six in every township of said proposed
States, and where such sections, or any parts thereof, have been sold or other-
wise disposed of by or under tbe authority of any act of Congress, other lands
equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one-quarter section,
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which the same is taken,
are hereby granted to said States for the support of common schools, such
indemnity lands to be selected within said States in such manner as the legis-
lature may provide, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior: Pro-
vided, That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections embraced in permanent
reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to the
grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced
in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the
grants or to the indemnity provisions of this act until the reservation shall
have been extinguished and such lands be restored to, and become a part of
the public domain.
Sec. 11. * * * and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption, home-
stead entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the United States,
whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be reserved for school purposes only.
It is necessary to a proper construction of the act to consider all
its provisions and other legislation on the same subject and the
administrative constructions thereof, as well as, and in connection
with, the last quoted clause, in determining its proper meaning.
That Congress did not intend absolutely to dispose of the sections
granted, beyond any power to control their use and disposal in such
manner as to exclude the State from any benefit of them, is clear
from the proviso to section 10, which declared those sections in per-
manent reservations for national purposes not subject to the grant,
and those in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character
not subject to the grant until the reservation is extinguished. The
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proviso was not limited to reservations then existing, but is unlimited
ms to the time of their creation. There is no appropriate word like
" existing," or other word of like meaning, to so limit the power of
Congress to withhold some of the granted sections. The United
States being absolute owner of the lands could impose such limita-
tion and qualification of its grant as it saw fit. But were there no
qualification, the provision for indemnity for sections granted neces-
sarily implies a power to defeat the grant by reservation to public
use, or by other grants, prior to the survey and ascertainment of the
sections granted.
All former grants of this character gave the States the sections
granted, without restriction to surveyed land. The words " surveyed
or unsurveyed " add nothing to the effect of the grant. Such, grants
have always been construed as effective to grant lands not at the
time surveyed, as well as those then surveyed, attaching when survey
was made. The United States therefore had the right, notwithstand-
ing the last clause quoted of the grant, to provide how the land
might be disposed of and the grant be defeated. It was for the
United States alone to provide the rule or lapse of time whereby the
settlement right should become barred. If Congress saw fit by the
act of April 15, 1902, to extend the time for the settler to assert the
right of entry that he had failed in proper time to assert, its action
in that respect can not be questioned by the State. Within what
time the settlement right shall be presented is one properly to be
determined by the United States.
Reservations are not infrequently made of unsurveyed lands.
Before survey what lands pass to the State by its grant are impos-
sible of identification. It has always been the rule of construction
of school land grants to the States that the right to any particular
tract of land is not fixed until the tract is identified by the approval
of the plats of survey. Congress knew of this established rule of
construction, and had it intended that a different rule should apply
to the grant here in question it would presumably have so declared
in unequivocal terms. That the grant was not one of the specific
tracts, but of quantity to be filled from certain sections, if undisposed
of before survey, and was subject to amendment and change by
later legislation, was early held by the Department, and that con-
struction has been adhered to. In instructions of April 22, 1891
(12 L. I)., 400, 403), referring to the act of February 28, 1891 (26
Stat., 796), amending sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes,
after discussion of the principles involved. Secretary Noble held thai :
In view of all the facts and circumstances herein set forth, I have no hesi-
tation in concluding that the provisions of the prior act of February 22. 1889
[Sees. 10 and 11 in question], in so far as they are in conflict with those of
said sections 2275 and 2270 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the later
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act of February 28, 1891, are superseded by the provisions of said sections as
amended, and that the grants of school lands to those States mentioned in said
act of February 22, 1889, are to be administered and adjusted under tlie pro-
visions of this later general law.
And (ib., 401) it was held that:
It is now [by act of 1891] provided in substance: that where settlements
are made before survey which are found to have been made upon sections
sixteen or thirty-six, those sections shall be subject to the claim of such settlers,
and that the State or Territory shall have indemnity for such lands. Indem-
nity is also provided where such sections " are mineral lands or are included
within any Indian, military, or other reservation, or are otherwise disposed of by
the United States."
This construction is the basis of the decisions in State of Washing-
ton v. Kuhn (24 L. D., 12, 13), Todd v. State of Washington (24
L. D., 100), Noyes v. State of Montana (29 L. D., 095), instructions
of August 9, 1904 (33 L. D., 181), and the decision in Schumacher v.
State of Washington (33 L. D., 454). The rule will not now be
overturned or disturbed, unless it be judicially held to be erroneous.
In Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold, etc., Company (93 U. S., 634, 638).
considering a similar act, in words of present grant, the court held
:
It is true that there are words of present grant in this law ; but, in constru-
ing it, we are not to look at any single phrase in it, but to its whole scope, in
order to arrive at the intention of the makers of it. " It is better always," says
Judge Sharswood, " to adhere to a plain common-sense interpretation of the
words of a statute, than to apply to them refined and technical rules of gram-
matical construction. Qygefs Estate, 65 Penn. St. 312. If a literal interpreta-
tion of any part of it would operate unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be
contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken as a whole, it should be
rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true meaning, when expres-
sions in it are rendered ambiguous by their connection with other clauses, than
by considering the necessity for it, and the causes which induced its enactment.
Again (page 639), referring to the decision in Schulenberg v. Har-
riman (21 Wal., 44), the court observed that "in this instance words
of qualification restrict the operation of those of present grant.' 1
This decision is cited by the court in Hawaii v. Mankichi (190 U. S.,
213), as good authority in construction of statutes, and also in Min-
nesota v. Hitchcock (185 U. S., 399 and 400), to the construction of
the school land grant to that State, showing that it is still regarded
by the court as authority. As the words " surveyed or unsurveyed "
nowise enlarged the grant beyond what similar acts without them
have always been held to pass, the decision is applicable to the pres-
ent case, and it is held that under the grant in question the State of
South Dakota takes no vested interest or title to any particular land
until it is identified by survey, and that prior to such identification
the grant, as to any particular tract, may be wholly defeated by set-
tlement, the State's only remedy in such cases being under the indem-
nity provision of the acts of 1889 and 1891, supra.
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The motion therefore presents no cause to vacate, recall, or modify
said decision, and is denied, and the decision is adhered to.
NORTHERN PACIFIC GRANT—LANDS CLASSIFIED AS MINERAL—ACT OF
JULY 1, 1898.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Frei et al.
Lands classified as mineral under the provisions of the act of February 2C>, 1895,
are not subject to selection by the Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
June <?, 1906. ( F. W. C.
)
The Department has considered the appeal by the Northern Pacific
Railway Company, as successor in interest to the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, from your office decision of February 24, 1904,
holding for cancellation its selection of the NE. \ and SE. J, Sec. 1,
T. 43 N., R. 2 E., Cceur d'Alene land district, Idaho, made under the
provisions of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat,, 597, 020), and also its
selection of the NW. J and SW. \ of said section 1, made under the
provisions of the act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat, 993).
March 15, 1899, the Governor of Idaho made application for the
survey of this township under the provisions of the act of August 18,
1894 (28 Stat., 372, 394). It does not appear, however, that publica-
tion was ever made as required by said act or that any selection or
claim has been filed on behalf of the State to any portion of the
lands here in question, and no further consideration need be given to
the claim of the State to these lands at this time, if any it has.
June 21, 1901, while the land was yet unsurveyed, the Northern
Pacific Railway Company filed its selection for the NE. J and SE. J
of said section, under the act of July 1, 1898, supra, and on October 1,
following, selected the remainder of the section under the act of
March 2, 1899, supra. The plat of survey of the township was not
filed in the local land office until August 21, 1903, and on September
11, and October 8, following, the railway company filed new lists
conforming its previous selections above referred to to the lines of
the public survey. At the time of the filing of the township plat,
Samuel Frei presented a homestead application for the SE. \ NW. J,
SW. 1- NE. J, NE. I SW. i and NW. J SE. J of said section 1, and
Thomas T. Ritter made similar application for the SE. J SW. J, N. ^
SE. I and SW. J SE. ^ of said section. These applications were
rejected for conflict with 'the prior selections above referred to.
November 22, following, Frei and Ritter each presented duly cor-
roborated affidavits, alleging settlements upon the land applied for,
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Frei, July 9, 1901, and Ritter June 5, 1901; also that they had
resided upon the lands since dates of settlement and made valuable
improvements thereon, those of Frei being valued at $500 and those
of Ritter at $300. They each requested hearings in order to offer
proof in support of their allegations of settlement and improvement.
In the disposition of the cases made in your office decision of Feb-
ruary 24, 1904, it became unnecessary to act upon their request for
hearings, it being held therein that the selections under the act of
1898 by the railway company should be canceled because the lands
selected had been, in October, 1899, classified as mineral land by
commissioners appointed under the act of February 26, 1895 (28
Stat., .683), which classification received departmental approval
March 26, 1901, and was held to bar the selection in question. It
was also held that, as the base given for the selection made under
the act of March 2, 1899, was of lands outside the primary limits of
the Northern Pacific land grant, although within the Pacific Forest
Reserve, it did not furnish a sufficient base for the selection under
said act. It wTas further noted that both Frei and Ritter claimed
the NW. I SE. J of said section, but action looking to a determina-
tion of their respective rights in and to said tract was postponed
until the final determination of the railway company's claims under
the selections in question. The company has appealed to this Depart-
ment and filed a brief in support thereof.
With regard to the selections under the act of 1899, the questions
raised are fully disposed of in the decision of this Department in
the case of Northern Pacific Railway Company ?'. Mann (33 L. D.,
621), and for the reasons therein given your office decision rejecting
the selection under the act of 1899 is affirmed.
With regard to the selection under the act of July 1, 1898, it is
admitted that the decision of your office is supported by paragraph
12 of the regulations issued under said act, dated February 14, 1899
(28 L. D., 103), which is as follows:
Subject to the limitations named in paragraphs 13 and 14, selections may be
made from any public lands within a State into which the Northern Pacific
railroad land-grant extends, surveyed or unsurveyed, not valuable for stone,
iron or coal, not subject to valid adverse claim, and not occupied by a settler
at the time of such selection ; but odd-numbered sections within ihe Bozeman,
Helena, and Missoula land districts in the State of Montana, and the Coeur
d'Alene land district in the State of Idaho, which are also within the i.rimary
limits of said land-grant, can not be selected by or patented to the railroad
claimant unless they have been finally classified as non-mineral under the act
of February 26, 1895 (28 Stat., G8.3).
But it is earnestly contended that said regulation is not in harmony
with the instructions and decisions of this Department under the act
of February 26, 1895, supra, as found in 25 I;. D., 446, and 26 L. D.,
423, and the purpose of the present appeal is to secure a modification
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of the regulations issued under the act of July 1, 1898, in the para-
graph above quoted.
The portions of the instructions under the act of 1895, above re-
ferred to, specifically quoted in the appeal under consideration, relate
to the purpose of said act of 1895, which was to facilitate the adjust-
ment of the Northern Pacific land-grant by enabling the Secretary
of the Interior to ascertain without delay, for the purposes of that
adjustment, what lands within the limits of the grant to said com-
pany in the particular districts named in the States of Montana and
Idaho, were mineral in character and for that reason excepted from
the grant, and the effect of the mineral classification under said act
with regard to the subsequent disposition thereof under the general
land laws, it being held that such classification forever barred the
land from the railroad grant but did not prevent other disposition
of the land where subsequent investigation showed the tracts lo be
non-mineral in character. A careful examination of the instruc-
tions referred to furnishes no sufficient guide for determining the
question at issue in the case under consideration.
The act of 181)5, under which classification was made of tiie lands
in question as mineral, by its first section authorizes and directs the
Secretary of the Interior to cause all lands within certain specified
districts in the States of Montana and Idaho, within the Northern'
Pacific land-grant
—
to he examined and classified by commissioners to be appointed as hereinafter
provided, with special reference to the mineral or non-mineral character of such
lands, and to reject, cancel, and disallow any and all claims or filings hereto-
fore made, or which may hereafter be made, by or on behalf of the said North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company on any lands in said land districtis, which upon
examination shall be classified as provided in this act as mineral lands.
Again, section 7 of said act provides:
That no patent or other evidence of title shall he issued or delivered to said
Northern Pacific Railroad Company for any land in said land districts until
such land shall have been examined and classified as nonmineral. as provided
for in this act. and such patent or other evidence of title shall only issue then
to such land, if any, in said land districts as said company may be, by law
and compliance therewith and by the said classification, entitled to, and any
patent, certificate, or record of selection, or other evidence of title or right to
possession of any land in said land districts, issued, entered, or delivered to
said Northern Pacific Railroad Company in violation of the provisions of this
act shall be void: Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be taken
or construed as recognizing or confirming any grant of land or the right to
any land in the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company, or as waiving or in
any wise affecting any right on the part of the United States againsl the said
Northern Pacific Railroad Company to claim a forfeiture of any land grant
heretofore made to said company,,
Other provisions of this act afford the company due and full
opportunity to be heard in opposition to the mineral classification by
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the commissioners named under the act before the final classification
of the lands by the Secretary of the Interior. Any lands classified,
however, as mineral under this act are forever excluded from the
operation of the Northern Pacific land-grant. The provisions above
quoted authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior
—
to reject, cancel and disallow any and all claims or filings heretofore made, or
which may hereafter be made, by or on behalf of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company on any lands in said land districts which, upon examination, shall be
classified as provided in this act as mineral lands—
and declares void any patent issued to said Northern Pacific Railroad
Company in violation of the provisions of said act.
It is claimed in the appeal under consideration that these pro-
visions of the act of 1895 relate only to lands included in the original
grant; that the act of July 1, 1898, is a separate grant in itself;
that it provides a different rule of adjustment, in this, that under
the original grant lands containing iron and coal were not excluded
from the grant, while under the act of 1898 such lands are specific-
ally excluded; also that the provisions of the act of 1898 have equal
operation along the entire line of the Northern Pacific railroad and,
as a consequence, that the provisions of the act of 1895, limited to
certain districts in Montana and Idaho, do not apply.
The act of 1898, like other relief acts, was passed primarily for
the protection of individual claimants as against the Northern Pa-
cific land-grant, and provided for a speedy adjustment of conflicting
claims within the Northern Pacific land-grant by first affording the
individual claimant an opportunity to transfer his claim to other
public lands of the character described or to retain the railroad lands
formerly claimed, and in the latter event the railroad company was to
be invited to relinquish all its right, title and interest in and to such
land, whereupon it was to be entitled to select other lands in lieu of
the land relinquished and patents were to " issue for the land so
selected as though it had been originally granted." Under the
scheme thus provided the lands selected took the place or were in
lieu of the lands relinquished and claimed under the original grant
•and thus became, upon selection, a part of the original grant. This
is made plain by the part of the act just quoted as well as by that
further provision of the act which provides that
—
nothing in this act shall he construed as enlarging the quantity of land which
the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company is entitled to under laws hereto-
fore enacted.
In paragraph 10 of the regulations issued under the act of 1898. in
referring to that portion of the act just quoted, it is said:
Under the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat, 365), the railroad company became
entitled to all the odd-numbered sections within the primary limits of the
grant or to indemnity for such as were " granted, sold, reserved, occupied by
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homestead settlers, or preempted, or otherwise disposed of," at the date of
the definite location <>f its line of road. Thus the maximum quantity of lands
to which the company was entitled is established by ascertaining the area
included in odd-numbered sections within the primary limits of the grant as
adjusted to the line of definite location. The clause in the act of July 1. 1898,
providing against an enlargement of the quantity of lands to which the railroad
company was then entitled has reference to the maximum quantity ascertained
as aforesaid, and does not restrict the privilege of making selections under that
act to those instances where the railroad claimant has an absolute legal right
to the particular lands relinquished, a matter which would not be involved in an
ascertainment of the quantity of the grant.
The general indemnity provisions found in the acts of July 2,
1864 (13 Stat.. 365), and the resolution of May 31. 1870 (16 Stat,
378). limit selection- to certain prescribed limits. The act of 1898
limits the selections to be made thereunder to certain states. Selec-
tion- under the latter act are nevertheless indemnity and when made
become a part of and are in partial satisfaction of the original grant.
The selection in question is not only on behalf of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, being made by its successor in interest,
but i- primarily on account of the Northern Pacific land-grant, and
in the opinion of this Department, any patent or evidence of title
given to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company or its successor in
interest, under a claim predicated upon the Northern Pacific land-
grant, to land- classified as mineral under the provisions of the act of
February 26, 1895, supra, would lie void.
To permit the company to make selection of lands classified as
mineral under the act of 1895, thus reopening the adjudication made
under said act. would destroy all that was accomplished thereunder,
and the fact that the act of 1898 is more restrictive in its provisions,
excluding coal and iron lands, included under the original act, is no
reason therefor. Had it been otherwise, L c. had the original act
excluded coal and iron land-, and the act of 1898 permitted selection
to bo made for such lauds, the company's position would have been
much stronger.
Finally it i> urged that under existing practice individual claim-
ant- to land- within the limits of the Northern Pacific land-grant
are permitted, under the provisions of the act of 1898, to transfer their
claim- to land- classified a- mineral under the act of 1895, and. as
the language used to define the class of lands that may be selected by
the railroad company under the act of L898, and those to which the
individual claimant- may. under said act. transfer their claims, is
the same, that equal opportunity should be afforded the railroad
company t<> make -election of these lands. In answer thereto it i-
sufficient to say: first, that the individual claimant was not. like
the railroad company, interested at the time of the classification and
consequently was not afforded due and full opportunity to be heard
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upon the question of the character of the lands prior to their final
classification, and, second, that the exclusive provisions of the act of
1895 relate only to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and those
claiming under or through its land-grant.
The entire matter considered, the Department affirms your office
decision and the selections in question will be canceled.
LAND IN INDIAN RESERVATION-LIEU SELECTION—ACT OF APRIL 21,
1 904.
Regulations.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June 8, 1906.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
Gentlemen: The act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat,, 189, 211), mak-
ing appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the
Indian Office and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with the various
Indian tribes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1905, provides, inter
alia—
That any private land over which an Indian reservation has been extended
by executive order, may be exchanged at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior and at the expense of the owner thereof and under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, for vacant
nonmineral, nontimbered, surveyed public lands of equal area and value and
situate in the same State or Territory.
Preliminary to making relinquishment and selection of other lands
under the provisions of the foregoing act, the owner of any private
land over which an Indian reservation has been extended by execu-
tive order, must file with the Commissioner of the General Land
Office an application addressed to the Secretary of the Interior,
requesting that he be permitted to surrender the lands by him owned
and to select other lands in lieu thereof, pursuant to the provisions
of the act of April 21, 1901 (33 Stat., 211), conformable to the rules
and regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Interior and sub-
ject to the exercise of the Secretary's discretion. The land proposed
to be surrendered must be accurately described by legal subdivisions
if surveyed, or in the event that it is unsurveyed by such designation
as will readily enable the Commissioner of the General Land Office
to identify it. There may accompany such application a brief, or
argument, setting forth such reasons as the petitioner may see proper
to offer, why the application to accept such land as a basis of selection
under the aforesaid act should be entertained by the Secretary of the
Interior. This petition, with report thereon, will be submitted by
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the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the Secretary of the
Interior. It will then be referred by the Secretary to the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for report as to whether the described lands
are needed for the use of the Indians, and such recommendations as
the Commissioner may deem proper. If the Secretary is of opinion,
after considering the application, that it is inadvisable for the Gov-
ernment to acquire the title to the land described therein, under the
provisions of the aforesaid net, he will deny the application.
If, however, the Secretary decides to entertain the proposition, sub-
ject to the further exercise of his discretion, he will so order, and
thereafter selections may be made by the petitioner, or applicant,
under the rules, regulations, restrictions, limitations, and conditions
herein following:
PRIVATE LANDS SUBJECT TO EXCHANCJK.
1. Private lands subject to exchange under the provisions of this
act include all lands within the limits of an Indian reservation estab
lished by executive order, to which the right to a patent or its equiva-
lent has been earned by full compliance with the laws of the United
States governing the disposal of said lands.
RELINQUISHMENT OR RECONVEYANCE.
2. Relinquishment or reconveyance made in pursuance of this act
must be executed and acknowledged in the same manner as convey-
ance of real property is required to be executed and acknowledged by
the laws of the State or Territory in which the land is situated.
Where the relinquishment or reconveyance is made by an individual
it must show whether the person relinquishing is married or single;
and if married, the wife or husband of such person, as the case may
be, must join in the execution of the relinquishment or reconveyance in
such manner as to effectually bar any right or estate of dower, cur-
tesy, or homestead, or any other claim whatsoever to the land relin-
quished, or it must be fully shown that under the laws of the State
or Territory in which the relinquished land is situated such wife or
husband has no interest whatever, present or prospective, which
makes her or his joinder in the relinquishment or reconveyance neces-
sary. Where the relinquishment or reconveyance is by a corporation
it should be recited in the instrument of transfer that it was executed
pursuant to an order, or by the directions of the board of directors or
other governing body, a copy of which order or direction should
accompany such instrument of transfer which must follow in the
matter of its execution strictly the laws of the State or Territory in
which the land is situated relating to corporate conveyances, and
should bear the impress of the corporate seal.
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ABSTRACT OF TITLE.
3. Each relinquishment or reconveyance must be accompanied by a
duly authenticated abstract of title showing that at the time the
relinquishment or reconveyance was executed the title was in the
party making the same, and that the land was free from conflicting
record claims, tax liability, judgment or mortgage liens, pending
suits, or other incumbrances.
AUTHENTICATION OF ABSTRACT.
4. The certificate of authentication of the abstract must be signed
by the recorder of deeds under his official seal and must show that the
title memoranda is a full, true, and complete abstract of all matters
of record or on file in his office, including all conveyances, mortgages
or other incumbrances, judgments against the various grantors,
mechanics, or other liens, lis pendens, and all other instruments
which are required by law to be filed with the recording officer,
affecting in any manner whatsoever the title to the described land.
The custodian of the tax records must certify that all taxes levied or
assessed against the land or that could operate as a lien thereon have
been fully paid and that there are no unredeemed tax sales and no
tax deeds outstanding, as shown by the records of his office. The
absence of judgment liens or pending suits against the various grant-
ors which might affect the title of the land relinquished or recon-
veyed, must be shown by the official certificates of the clerks of all
courts of record whose judgments under the laws of the United
States, or the State or Territory in which the land is situated, would
be a lien on the land reconveyed or relinquished, without being tran-
scribed other than on the court records.
LANDS SUBJECT TO SELECTION.
5. Selections under the provisions of this act are restricted to sur-
veyed, nonmineral, nontimbered, vacant unreserved public lands situ-
ated in the same State or Territory as, and equal in area and value to,
the lands relinquished.
SELECTIONS.
0. Selections must be made by the owner of the land relinquished
or in his name by a duly authorized agent or attorney-in-fact; and
when made by an agent or attorney-in-fact proof of authority must
be furnished.
APPLICATIONS TO SELECT.
7. Applications to select hereunder must be filed in the proper
local land office and must specifically describe the land desired to be
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surrendered and that sought to be selected, the county and State, or
Territory, as well as the Indian reservation, and the land district
wherein situated must be given of the land relinquished. It must, in
each instance, be represented that the applicant is the owner of the
land relinquished and that he desires to surrender the same to the
Government and select in lieu thereof public lands under the provi-
sions of the act of April 21, 11)04 (33 Stat, 211) ; that the land sur-
rendered and that selected therein described are of equal area and
value; that the land selected is nonmineral, nontimbered, vacant and
unoccupied public land; that the applicant will, without cost to the
Government, place the deed of relinquishment of record and extend
the abstract of title to the date of the recordation thereof upon being
notified so to do by the land department; and that upon the request
of the Secretary of the Interior he will deposit with him a reasonable
amount of money to enable the Secretary to investigate and deter-
mine the legality of the selection.
8. The application must be accompanied by a deed of relinquish-
ment or reconveyance to the land tendered as the basis of exchange,
duly executed, and a properly authenticated abstract of title to the
land, by the required commissions, and proof that the relinquished
land and that selected are equal in area and value; that the selected
land is nonmineral, nontimbered, vacant and unoccupied adversely
to the selector therein; that the land relinquished and offered in
exchange has not been made the basis of another selection, and that
the land applied for is not situated within a mineral township nor
within six miles of a mining claim, or in default of the showing last
mentioned, a request for notice of publication must be made, etc.,
and satisfactory evidence that the Secretary has, subject to the further
exercise of his discretion, entertained the selector's preliminary
application to reconvey the basis land and select other lands in lieu
thereof.
1). The affidavit or affidavits to support a selection under this act
must be made by the selector or by some credible person possessed of
the requisite personal knowledge in the premises, and may be executed
before any officer qualified to administer oaths, and must be corrobo-
rated by at least one person who has no personal interest in the
exchange and who is familiar with the character and condition and
value of the land selected and the value of the land relinquished.
This affidavit or affidavits, fully corroborated, must show that the
land selected is nonmineral and nontimbered in character; that it
contains no salt springs or deposit of salt in any form sufficient to
render it chiefly valuable therefor; that it is not in any manner
occupied adversely to the selector; that it is not situated within a
mineral township or within six miles of a mining claim, and that
the lands selected and the lands relinquished are equal in area and
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value, and are situated in the same State or Territory. The selector
may post and publish notice of his application in lieu of the showing
as to the mineral character of the township and the proximity of
mining claims.
10. Forms of application for selection under this act and accom-
panying affidavits as to relinquished and selected land, as set out
hereinafter in these instructions, or their equivalents, should be
used. All proofs and papers necessary to complete a selection must
be filed at one and the same time, except as herein otherwise specially
provided.
PUBLICATION.
11. Where the land in the application to select is within six miles of
a mining claim or within a mineral township, or if the applicant fails
to showT that the land is not within a mineral township nor within
six miles of a mining claim, you will require the applicant, within
twenty days from the filing of his application, to begin publication of
notice thereof at his own expense in a newspaper to be designated by
the register as of general circulation in the vicinity of the land and
published nearest thereto. Such publication must cover a period of
thirty days, during which time a similar notice of the application
must be posted in the local land office and upon each and every non-
contiguous tract included in the application.
12. The notice should describe the land applied for and give the
date of application, and state that the purpose thereof is to allow all
persons claiming the land under the mining laws, or desiring to show
it to be mineral in character, an opportunity to file objection to such
application with the local officers of the land district in which the
land is situate and to establish their interest therein or the mineral
character thereof.
13. Proof of publication shall consist of an affidavit of the pub-
lisher, or of the foreman or other proper employee, of the newspaper
in which the notice was published, with a copy of the published notice
attached. Proof of posting upon the land, and that such notice
remained posted during the entire period required, shall be made by
the applicant or some credible person having personal knowledge of
the fact. The register shall certify to posting in his office. The first
and last dates of such publication and posting shall, in all cases, be
given.
MISCELLANEOUS.
14. Owmers of lands over which an Indian reservation has been
extended by executive order will not be permitted to make selection
for noncontiguous tracts in lieu of compact bodies of land situated
within such reservations, and all rights of selection based upon lands
situated within the same section shall be restricted to one section.
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Any attempt on the part of the owner of land within a reservation to
avoid this rule by making surrender to the Government by separate
deeds or by a sale of part of the land to another person after the
approval of these regulations will defeat the proposed transfer.
15. Fees must be paid by the applicant at the time of filing his
application in the local land office at the rate of $1 each to the regis-
ter and receiver for each 160 acres or fraction thereof included in
his application.
16. Selections made under this act will not be passed to patent until
after four months following the filing of the application in the local
office. This is to enable any person claiming an adverse right to the
selected land to have full opportunity to regularly assert said right.
17. The land relinquished and the land selected must be, as nearly
as practicable, equal in area, but the rules of approximation obtaining
in other classes of entries will be observed.
18. Applications to select under the provisions of this act will not
defeat the right of the Secretary of the Interior or of the President of
the United States to withdraw or reserve the land for such proposed
public purposes or uses as they may deem proper prior to the approval
of the selection by the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary,
acting within the exercise of his discretion, may reject any and all
applications at any time prior to final approval of the same for any
reason appearing to him good and sufficient, notwithstanding the
application may have been received and certified by the local office
and recommended for approval by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, but all asserted rights, based upon application or set-
tlement subsequent to the filing of applications under the provisions
of this act with the register and receiver, will be held subject thereto,
and suspended pending the final determination thereof.
PRACTICE.
19. Notices of additional or further requirements, rejections or
other adverse actions of registers and receivers, the Commissioner,
or the Secretary will be given, and the rights of appeal, review, or
rehearing recognized in the manner now prescribed by the rules of
practice, except as herein otherwise provided.
20. If application to contest or a protest or other objection shall at
any time be filed against the selection or the application to select, you
will forward the same to this office for its consideration and dispo-
sition.
21. Applications to enter filed subsequent to and in conflict with
applications to select under this act will be suspended by you and held
to await the final disposition of the application hereunder except
where such subsequent application to enter is supported by allegations
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of prior right, in which event you will transmit the conflicting
application to enter to this office.
22. Applications presented to your office under the provisions of
the foregoing act, not in substantial compliance with the requirements
herein made, or not accompanied by the prescribed proofs, or if the
land offered as a basis of exchange is not situated within the bound-
aries of an Indian reservation created by executive order, will be
rejected by you. All applications sufficient in form, accompanied
by the required proofs, will be accepted for transmission as here-
inbefore provided, and you will note on your records against the
land: "Application of
,
act April 21, 1904, pending."
The register will certify the condition of your records on the appli-
cations, and you will transmit the papers to this office unless publica-
tion is necessary, in which event you will forward the record
promptly after the filing of the proofs thereof in your office.
23. The Commissioner will, upon the receipt of an application to
select under the provisions of this act in the General Land Office,
cause the same to be examined, and if, in his judgment, the rules and
regulations have been complied with he will transmit the records
to the Secretary with his report and recommendation. If, however,
the Commissioner finds that the selection is defective or that the rules
and regulations have not been complied with, he will reject the selec-
tion or require further proofs.
24. If upon examination of an application to select under this act
the Secretary decides that it should be allowed, the applicant will be
required to have his relinquishment recorded in the manner pre-
scribed by the State or Territory where the land is situated, and to
have the abstract of title extended down to and including the date
the deed of relinquishment or conveyance was recorded.
25. If the Secretary be of opinion that further evidence as to value
and character of the land involved is necessary, he may institute such
an inquiry as he may deem advisable, and may require the applicant
to deposit a sum of money to defray the expense of the investigation.
In any case where deposit shall be required to defray the expense of
an investigation it will be made with the Secretary of the Interior, to
be held and disbursed by him or under his directions.
26. If the Secretary approve the proposed exchange the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office will, as soon as practicable, after
the receipt of the advice of such approval, make suitable notations on
the records of his office and notify the local office wherein the selected
land is subject to disposal thereof. The Commissioner in his letter to
the local office will require that the applicant be notified of the
approval of his application, and informed that he will be allowed
sixty days in which to place the deed of reconveyance or relinquish-
ment of record and to extend the abstract of title down to and includ-
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ing the date of the recordation of such deed, and that he be further
advised that in default of action within the time specified the appli-
cation will be finally rejected without further notice.
27. Approvals by the Secretary of the Interior will be subject to
and conditioned upon the bona fide compliance on the part of the
applicant with all the regulations and requirements herein or which
may, by direction of the Secretary of the Interior, be hereafter
promulgated.
28. The Secretary of the Interior may, in the exercise of the dis-
cretion in him vested by law, withhold his approval from any appli-
cation.made under the provisions of this act, although the applicant
may have complied with the rules and regulations herein prescribed.
Owners of land situated within the boundaries of Indian reserves,
created by executive order, are hereby specifically informed that if,
in the opinion of the Secretary, the approval of any application,
made under the provisions of this act, would be inimical to the pub-
lic interests, such application will be rejected.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved :
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
4—088.
SELECTION IN LIEU OF LAND IN INDIAN RESERVATION.
(Act April 21, 1904.)
To the Rcc/islcr and Receiver, United States Land Office,
Gentlemen :
I am the owner of the Meridian, containing acres; said land is
situated in the County of , State of , within the boundaries of the
Indian Reservation, and is located within the land district;
I desire to relinquish and reconvey said lands to the United States and in lieu
thereof to select the land district, State of , containing
acres, under the provisions of the act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat, 211).
In compliance with the regulations under said act I have made and executed a
deed of reconveyance to the United States of the tract first above described
Situated within the said Indian Reservation, and in relation thereto
have caused a proper abstract of title to he made and authenticated, both of
which are herewith submitted, and I do hereby bind myself and promise to
have said deed placed of record and the abstract of title duly extended to the
date of the recordation of such deed without cost to the United States upon
leceipt of notice 1 from the Land' Department that I am required so to do. I
further agree that I will deposit with the Secretary of the Interior, upon
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demand, a reasonable sum of money to be by him expended in investigating
tbe bona fides of this application.
There are also submitted certificates from tbe proper officers showing that the
land relinquished, or surrendered, is free from incumbrance of any kind; also
an affidavit, duly corroborated, showing the land selected to be nontimbered and
nonmineral in character and unoccupied, and that the lands surrendered and
the lands selected herein described are equal in area and value. I therefore
nsk that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, a United
States patent issue to me for the tract or tracts herein selected.
Dated,
Land Office at
190—
I, - — , Register of the land office, do hereby certify that the land
above selected, in lieu of the land herein relinquished to the United States, is
free from conflict, and that there is no adverse filing, entry, or claim thereto.
Register.
Selection approved by the Secretary, . 100—
.
Approved by the Commissioner, , 100—
.
Approved for patent,—
,
100—
.
4—089.
AFFIDAVIT FOR SELECTIONS.
[Under act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat., 211).]
INDIAN RESERVATIONS.
[To be made by the selector, or other credible person cognizant of the facts,
before an officer authorized to administer oaths. Before being sworn, affi-
ant should be advised of the penalties of a false oath.]
Department of the Interior,
United States Land Office,
, 190—.
being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is
a citizen of the United States, and that his post-office address is ;
that he is well acquainted with the character, condition, and value of the
following-described land, and with each and every legal subdivision thereof,
having personally examined the same, to wit
:
that his personal knowledge of said land enables him to testify understandingly
witli respect thereto; that there is not, within the limits of said land, any known
vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead,
tin, or copper ; that there is not, within the limits of said land, any known
deposit of coal, or any known placer deposit, oil, or other valuable mineral;
that said land contains no salt springs, or known deposits of salt in any form,
sufficient to render it chiefly valuable therefor; that no portion of said land is
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claimed for mining purposes under the local customs or rules of miners, or
otherwise; that said land is essentially nonmineral in character, has upon it no
mining or other improvements, and is not in any manner occupied adversely to
the selector; and that the selection thereof is not made for the purpose of
obtaining title to mineral land. Affiant further says that he is well acquainted
with the value of the hereinafter described land, having frequently passed
over the same, and that from personal observation and knowledge he states
that the lands hereinbefore and hereinafter described are of equal value;
I hereby certify that the foregoing affidavit was read to affiant in my pres-
ence before he signed his name thereto ; that said affiant is to me personally
known (or lias been satisfactorily identified before me by ), and
I verily believe him to be a credible person and the person he represents him-
self to be; and that this affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before me at my
office in , on this day of , 190—
.
Note.—It must also be shown by affidavit or otherwise whether the selected
land is within six miles of a mining claim.
desert land entry—annual expenditure.
Stevenson v. Scharry.
The annual expenditures upon a desert land entry, and proof thereof, required
by the act of March 3, 1891, are for the information of the land department
and as evidence of the good faith of the entryman, and a contest for
default of such proof may be defeated by the filing of proof subsequent
to the initiation of the contest, but prior to final action thereon, showing
that the requisite annual expenditure has in fact been made.
The desert land law requires an annual expenditure of one dollar per acre
for each acre embraced in the entry, for the first, second and third years,
but does not require that the first or any other annual expenditure shall
effect reclamation of any part of the land, the sole requirement in that
respect being that the land shall be reclaimed within the period allowed
therefor.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 9, 1906. (J. R. W.)
John Scharry filed a motion for review of departmental decision
of March 25, 1905 (unreported), cancelling his desert land entry for
the W. i SW. J, Sec. 10, T. 7 N., R. 31 E., Walla Walla, Washing-
ton, in the contest of William Stevenson against him. Such motion,
for cause shown, was entertained, and with brief thereon has been
served and responded to and the record is now before the Depart-
ment for its final action.
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There is no substantial controversy upon any question of fact.
Scharry's entry was made April 29, 1902. July 25, 1903, Stevenson
filed a contest affidavit charging (1) failure of Scharry to expend
one dollar per acre or any sum in improving the land since the entry,
and (2) failure to make annual proof within the time required.
September 16, 1903, a hearing was held at the local office in which
both parties fully participated. The evidence disclosed that Scharry
had purchased of the Walla Walla and Columbia Irrigation Com-
pany, in February, 1903, a water right for this land, agreeing to pay
therefor $1,600 and a yearly rate of $1.50 per acre. One hundred
dollars was then paid. The company on its part agreed and obli-
gated itself to furnish for the land one-twentieth of a cubic foot of
water per second continuously from April 15 to October 15. The
contract was not formally signed by the company until July 29, 1903.
The evidence showed that the Water Company located its ditch in 1892
or 1893 and relocated it during the summer of 1903 ; that it had ex-
pended between $19,000 and $20,000 in construction of a ditch over
eight miles long from its proposed intake to within three miles of the
land. When this was done is not shown by the record. No diver-
sion dam had been constructed nor could water be turned into the
ditch until such work should be done and flumes be constructed for
crossing depressions of ground intersecting the course of the ditch.
The proposed expenditure for completion of the project was between
$75,000 and $100,000. The annual proof required of the entryman
was not filed until the day of the hearing. The local office was of
opinion that the default of annual proof was not of itself fatal to
the entry. Upon the second ground of contest the local office found
that—
the purchase of a contract for a water right and the payment of one hundred
dollars on the same might he considered as an improvement within the intent
of the law, if the said company were an actual bona fide company, with irrigat-
ing ditches, reservoirs, laterals, etc., in operation, from which to supply water
to said land. In proof of expenditures, such as is submitted in this case, it
devolves upon the entryman to show affirmatively whether or not said company
has to sell, or is ahle to deliver, the water to irrigate said lands, as per the
terms of said contract. This he has failed to do. There are many irrigation
schemes, and prospective irrigation projects in this part of the country. These
usually consist of preliminary surveys, with the hope of securing capital to build
ditches through the country, but it does not follow that each of these companies,
with the very remote possibility of ever getting water, or of building a ditch at
all, has anything of value to sell.
We are of the opinion that in this case the Walla Walla and Columbia Irriga-
tion Company has no water right to sell. Therefore Mr. Scharry's contract is of
no value.
Your office held the entry for cancellation for default of annual
proof, citing Hochwart v. Maresh (31 L. D., 276) and Andrew Clay-
burg (20 L. D., Ill) as authority therefor, and such action was
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affirmed by the Department. The local office clearly held that default
of annual proof was not of itself sufficient cause for cancellation of
the entry if the requisite annual proof is in fact filed before its final
action upon the entry, but recommended cancellation of the entry
because there was no present ability of the irrigation company to
perform its contract. This holding was not adhered to by your office
and the cancellation was based upon the default of annual proof.
The desert land act as amended March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095),
orovides, among other things
—
That no land shall he patented to any person under this act unless he or his
assignors shall have expended in the necessary irrigation, reclamation, and
cultivation thereof, by means of main canals and branch ditches, and in perma-
nent improvements upon the land, and in the purchase of water rights for the
irrigation of the same, at least three dollars per acre of whole tract reclaimed
and patented in the manner following: Within one year after making entry for
such tract of desert land as aforesaid, the party so entering shall expend not
less than one dollar per acre for the purposes aforesaid; and he shall in like
manner expend the sum of one dollar per acre during the second and also
during the third year thereafter, until the full sum of three dollars per acre is
so expended. Said party shall file during each year with the register, proof, by
the affidavits of two or more credible witnesses, that the full sum of one dollar
per acre has been expended in such necessary improvements during such year,
and the manner in which expended, and at the expiration of the third year a
map or plan showing the character and extent of such improvements. If any
party who has made such application shall fail during any year to file the
testimony aforesaid, the lands shall revert to the United States, and the twenty-
five cents advanced payment shall be forfeited to the United States, and the
entry shall be cancelled.
The original desert land act (19 Stat., 377) gave a period of three
years for reclamation without requirement of annual expenditure or
proof of it. Section five, above quoted, added by the act of 1891,
required proof of annual expenditures in efforts to effect reclamation
and imposed a forfeiture in default of such expenditure and proof.
The proper construction of the act therefore is, that the requirement
for annual expenditure and of proof of it is for information of the
land department of the good faith of the entryman and to prevent
long segregation of lands so entered where no diligence is shown in
matters of reclamation. This being the evident purpose of the pro-
vision, the essential thing is diligence and good faith rather than
the actual formal proof of it.
In Andrew Clayburg (20 L. D., Ill), referring to this section, it
was held that
—
This makes the failure to file this testimony during any year as the ground
upon which his entry may he canceled, and in every case where there is a total
failure to file such testimony during any year after a desert declaration has
been filed, upon information of such failure, your office clearly has full and
complete jurisdiction to proceed, under rules of practice, against such entry
and to finally cancel the same for such failure. * * * In other words, the
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filing of the .yearly testimony showing the expenditure <>f the requisite amount
on the land is all that is required to show full compliance with the law.
The intent of the act as requiring evidence of good faith, and the
interlocutory character of such proofs and of the proceedings thereon
is the clear general purport of that decision.
In Hochwart v. Maresh, supra, your office held that a charge of
do fault in filing proof of annual expenditure upon a desert land
entry did not state a cause of action and this ruling was reversed by
the Department upon authority of Andrew Clayburg, supra. That
decision however did not go to the extent of holding that default in
filing of final proof necessitated cancellation of the entry if the requi-
site annual expenditure had been in fact made, and formal proof of
it was tendered. The report in the latter case indicates that is was
substantially ex parte, as the case came to the Department upon con-
testant's appeal and no service had been made, though service by
publication was attempted. It did not show that the requisite annual
expenditure had been made and that the default was merely in the
formal proof of it and that formal proof was in fact later tendered.
The right of a contestant under the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat.,
140), does not attach until the final successful result of his contest.
Strader v. Goodhue (31 L. D., 137) ; Emma H. Pike (32 L. I)., 395)
;
McCraney v. Heirs of Hayes (33 L. D., 21). The preference right is
in the nature of a reward to an informer and is intended to prevent
fraudulent appropriation of public lands. Pending the adjudication
of a proceeding in the land department there is full jurisdiction to
recognize and adjust the equities of the entryman. Williams v.
United States (138 U. S., 511, 524); Strader t>. Goodhue, supra;
McCraney v. Heirs of Hayes, supra. The case last cited is strictly
analogous to the one at bar, final proof being allowed after initiation
of a contest for default of such proof. The local office held correctly
on that branch of the present case. A contest for default of annual
proof may be defeated by proof subsequent to its initiation but prior
to final action therein, that the requisite annual expenditure was in
fact made, and the motion for review is well grounded in this respect.
As to the first ground of contest the local office erred. The law re-
quires merely annual expenditure to the requisite amount, in good
faith for purpose of reclamation. It does not require that the first
or any other annual expenditure shall effect reclamation of any part
of the land. His expenditure must be honestly intended to effect
reclamation of the land, but the sole further requirement is that the
tract shall be reclaimed within the time allowed. There was but one
witness to support the charge. He testified, among other things
—
I know what he [the entryman] has been doing part of last year. Part of the
time he has been out with the engineers on the ditch. . . . They were running
the lines over the ditch both with a level and by a transit—in the vicinity of
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the land, yes sir. ... I don't know that he was working to get water on it,
I suppose he was though. He was out with the engineers running over the
ground—the ditch.
He further testified that the contestant knew such fact of the entry-
man's efforts and told him of it. The entryman and another witness
testified to the same facts in substance and to the fact of the contract,
the payment of $100, the doing of work on the ditch, and that he had
further, at expense of several hundred dollars, endeavored to interest
persons in Seattle and elsewhere to invest capital in the canal project,
among whom he names Dr. Smith, State Senator Kinnear, Mr. Hal-
lenbeck, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Cameron, " and various other parties/ 1
whom he had taken over the ditch line. In view of the Department
this evinces good faith, and actual expenditure to the requisite amount
being shown, the entry is entitled to stand intact subject to the entry-
man's future compliance with the law.
The Department decision herein is therefore recalled and vacated,
the action of the local office and decision of your office are reversed,
and the contest is dismissed.
RIGHT OF WAY-TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES-SECTION 3, ACT
OF MARCH 3, 1901.
Opinion.
The approval by the Secretary of the Interior of the plats of incorporated cities
and towns in the Indian Territory operates as a dedication of the streets
and alleys thereof to public use, and thereafter, the Indians no longer
having any interest in the ground embraced in such streets and alleys, the
Secretary of the Interior has no authority to subject them to the terms of
section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901, authorizing him, among other things,
to grant rights of way for the construction of telephone and telegraph lines
within and through incorporated cities and towns in the Indian Territory.
Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of flic Interior^
June 9, 1006. (G.B.G.)
By reference of the Acting Secretary, I am asked for opinion " as
to whether rights of way in the nature of an easement should be
granted by the Department for the construction of telephone lines
within incorporated cities and towns in the Indian Territory after
the approval of the town plat, after the streets and alleys of such
towns have already been dedicated to public use, and whether gen-
eral damages should be assessed against such lines constructed after
the approval of the town plat."
The phrase in this question as propounded—to wit : " rights of
way in the nature of an easement"
—
indicates that reference is had
to section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat,, 1058, 1083). This
section authorizes the Secretary of the Interior
—
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to grant a right of way in the nature of an easement for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of telephone and telegraph lines ....
through any Indian reservation, through any lands held by an Indian tribe or
nation in the Indian Territory, through any lands reserved for an Indian
agency or Indian school, or for other purpose in connection with the Indian
service, or through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any
individual Indian under any law or treaty, but which have not been convoyed
to the allottee with full power of alienation.
A further provision is, that " the compensation to be paid the
tribes in their tribal capacity and the individual allottees for such
right of way through their lands shall be determined in such manner
as the Secretary of the Interior may direct."
I am of opinion that the approval of the plats of these towns
within the Indian Territory by the Secretary of the Interior oper-
ated as a dedication of the streets and alleys therein to public use.
This view has heretofore been expressed by the Department in letter
of August 18, 1900 (I. T. I). 2606-1900), and in an opinion of Feb-
ruary 2, 1905, I expressed a substantially similar view upon a kindred
matter (see 19 Opinions, Assistant Attorney-General, 86, 87). This
being true, it results that upon the approval of such plats all interest
of the Indians in the streets and alleys of these towns terminated and
the ground ceased to be such as the Secretary of the Interior is au-
thorized to subject to the terms of the act of March 3, 1901, supra.
Legislative policy is in accord with this view of the law, as is evi-
denced by a provision in the act of April 26, 1906 (Public—No. 129),
that " all municipal corporations in the Indian Territory are hereby
authorized to vacate streets and alleys or parts thereof, and said
streets and alleys, when vacated, shall revert to and become the
property of the abutting property owners."
I advise you therefore that the Secretary of the Interior is not
authorized to grant rights of way for the construction of telephone
lines within incorporated cities and towns in the Indian Territory
after the approval of the town plat, and necessarily that general
damages in the nature of compensation to the Indians may not be
assessed against such lines constructed after such approval and
dedication.
Approved
:
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
APPLICATION TO AMEND—OATH—OFFICER.
Schuyler C. Reneau.
An application to amend a homestead entry, as well as all affidavits filed in sup-
port thereof, should be executed before some officer designated by section
2294 of the Revised Statutes and the acts of March 11, 1902, and March 4,
1904, amending that section.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 11, 1906. (E. O. P.)
Schuyler C. Reneau has appealed to the Department from your
office decision of October 13, 1905, rejecting his application to amend
his original homestead entry, made August 6, 1901, for the SW. |,
Sec. 19, and NW. J, Sec. 30, T. 19 N., R. 36 W., containing 325.06
acres, to include in lieu of said tracts, the N. J, NW. J SE. J, NE. \
SW. i, W. J SW. J, Sec. 33, and S. \ S. i, Sec. 28, T. 20 N., R. 37 W.,
Broken Bow land district, Nebraska.
At the time said application to amend was filed a portion of the
land therein described was embraced in the soldiers 1 declaratory
statement filed by Charles II. Bunemann, which was subsequently
rejected by the local officers as to part thereof because the tracts de-
scribed were non-contiguous. After the rendition of the decision
now under consideration, Bunemann withdrew his appeal from the
decision of the local officers and directed that his declaratory state-
ment be held for naught. The record was thus cleared of any prior
claim which might have been asserted by Bunemann to the tracts in
conflict with the amended application of Reneau and leaves for deter-
mination at this time only the questions presented by the amended
application of Reneau.
Your office, in rejecting said application, held:
From the facts stated it appears that Bunemann was the prior applicant for
the tracts in conflict, and Reneau's application does not conform to the regula-
tions governing amendments (see page 18, general circular of January 29, 1904),
it not appearing from the showing made that the land applied for is that which
was originally intended to he entered.
The Department is of opinion that at the time your office decision
was rendered the application of Reneau to amend could not have been
accepted as to the land in conflict, then covered by the declaratory
statement of Bunemann, but this objection has been removed by the
withdrawal of the claim of Bunemann for the tracts in conflict.
The matters set forth in the affidavit filed in support of the pending
application fail to clearly show that the land now applied for Avas
the land examined by Reneau prior to the time he made his original
entry. His original entry included but approximately half the
area now applied for and it is difficult to believe that Reneau did in
fact examine all the land described in his present application, prior to
making the entry he now asks to amend.
The report of the local officers required by departmental circular
of January 11, 1889 ( 8 L. D., 187), was made prior to the withdrawal
of the claim of Bunemann, and is too incomplete to be of service to
the Department in passing upon the accuracy of the statements
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contained in Reneau's affidavit. By said circular it is directed that
the local officers
—
transmit the application to this office with your joint report both as to the
existence of the error, the diligence of the entryman, and the credibility of
each person testifying thereto.
The Department is clearly of opinion an application to amend,
as well as the affidavits filed in support thereof, must be executed
before one of the officials designated by section 2294 of the Revised
Statutes, and the acts of March 11, 1902 (32 Stat., 63), and March
1. 1904 (33 Stat., 59), and that Reneau's application and the affi-
davits, executed before a notary public, can not be accepted.
For the reason herein assigned, the action of your office is hereby
affirmed.
MINING CLAIM—NOTICE—SECTION 2327, HEVISED STATUTES, AS
AMENDED BY ACT OF APRII^ 28, 1904.
Frank G. Peck.
The provisions of the act of April 28, 1004, amending section 2P>27 of the
Revised Statutes, relate exclusively to the question of, and are intended
to prescribe the rule or guide whereby to determine, the subject-matter
of mineral patents—that is, the particular tract actually conveyed by any
such patent whenever the question may arise—and in no wise modify
or affect any requirement of the mining statutes with respect to notice
of an application for patent, nor can they have any effect to cure defects
or irregularities in the notice of patent proceedings had in any case.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 13, 1006. ((I. J. H.)
November 5, 1889, patent No. 15322 issued to Joseph N. H. Irwin
for the Nelson lode mining claim, Del Norte (then Lake City) land
district, Colorado.
July 27, 1904, Frank G. Peck, claiming to be the present owner of
the patented Nelson claim, hied in your office a petition for an
amended survey and the issuance of a corrected patent for said claim,
alleging in support thereof, among other things, in substance and
effect, that the deputy mineral surveyor who made the survey upon
which the patent is based erroneously described the claim as situated
in Sec, 34, T. 41 N., E, 2 W., whereas it is in fact located in Sec. 34,
T. 42 N., E. 1 W., N. M. P. M., and that he also made a slight error,
both as to course and distance, in fixing the tie line connecting the
claim with a corner of the public surveys.
September 9, 1904, your office authorized Peck to make application
for an amended survey of the claim, which he did, and amended sur-
vey was made in October, 1904. Upon receipt of the field notes and
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plat of the amended survey, which show the claim to be actually
located in T. 42 N., R. 1 W., instead of in T. 41 N., R. 2 W., N. M.
P. M., and also show that the tie line connecting the claim with a
corner of the public surveys, as fixed by the former survey, is slightly
in error both as to course and distance, your office, by decision of
March 13, 1905, held that—
The showing establishes the contention of the claimant and yon will now
advise him that he will be permitted to republish and repost notice of applica-
tion for patent for the statutory period and furnish proof thereof. This is
necessary because Of the fact that the land actually claimed is situated eight
or I en miles from the land previously published for. Upon the completion of
said publication and posting, the claimant may submit proof thereof, surrender
the erroneous patent, accompanying the same by a reconveyance of the land
covered thereby to the United States and an abstract of title brought down to
date, whereupon steps will be taken in the direction of the issuance of a new and
correct patent, if all be found regular.
April 8, 1905, Peck filed motion for review of that decision, in so
far as it required him to republish and repost notice of application for
patent and furnish proof thereof. By your office decision of May 2.
1905, the motion for review was denied. Peck has appealed to the
Department.
It is contended to support the appeal, in substance and effect, that
the notice as posted and published in the original patent proceedings
was sufficient, and that under the provisions of the act of April 28,
1904 (33 Stat., 545), amending section 2327 of the Revised Statutes,
the claim as bounded by the lines actually marked, defined, and es-
tablished on the ground by the monuments of the official surve}^ upon
which the patent grant is based should be deemed to be patented
under the patent already issued, and that therefore a new patent cor-
rectly describing the claim according to the amended survey should
issue without requiring reposting and republication of notice.
The notice as published and as posted in the local office, the field
notes of survey, the final certificate of entry, and all papers in the
record relating to the original patent proceedings in which the town-
ship and range are given, erroneously describe the claim as situated
in township 41 north, range 2 west. No names of adjoining or
near-by claims are given in the notice, it being stated therein: "Ad-
joining claims, if any, unknown."
The published notice of an application for patent should desig-
nate with substantial accuracy the situation of the applicant's claim
on the ground, and
—
should contain such matter as will inform a man of ordinary prudence having
an interest in a mining location conflicting witb the one applied for. thai applica-
tion is made for patent to the ground in conflict, thereby giving him an oppor-
tunity to file and prosecute an adverse claim ami thus assert and protect bis
rights as provided by section 232G, Revised Statutes. Hallett and Hamburg
Lodes (27 L. D., 101, 108).
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The notice in the present case, which, as before stated, describes
the land as situated in a township and range other than those in which
it is actually located, and which contains no mention of near-by claims
or other matters which might indicate that the claim is located else-
where on the face of the earth than at the point therein specified,
can not be said to designate the location of the claim on the ground
with substantial accuracy. That the notice as published and posted
did not describe the true location of the claims with substantial ac-
curacy is evidenced by the fact that, with a copy of the notice before
it, the land department issued a patent purporting to convey a tract
of land some eight or ten miles distant from the tract actually claimed
and intended to be described in the notice. There was nothing in the
notice to in any wise indicate that it was intended to apply to another
and different tract than that which by its terms it purported to cover.
So far as shown by the copy of the notice or from any other papers
before the land department in connection with the original patent
proceedings, the claim appeared to be located in township 41 north,
range 2 west, and the land department could not do otherwise than
issue patent on the record as it stood. No notice having ever been
published describing the claim as it is actually located on the ground,
obviously the land department would not be warranted to issue a
patent therefor in lieu of the one heretofore issued, without first re-
quiring posting and publication of proper notice, as required by law,
with a view to giving possible adverse claimants an opportunity to
assert and protect their rights.
As to the contention based upon the act of April 28, 1904, supra,
it would appear to be sufficient to say that if the tract marked on the
ground by the monuments of the official survey, though situated in a
different township from that in which the tract actually described in
the notice is situated, must be deemed to be embraced within the terms
of and conveyed by the patent already issued, there would be no neces-
sity for the issuance of a new patent. But has the act any application
to this case? The section (2327) as amended reads as follows:
The description of vein or lode claims upon surveyed lands shall designate
the location of the claims with reference to the lines of the public survey, but
need not conform therewith ; but where patents have been or shall be issued
for claims upon unsurveyed lands, the surveyors-general, in extending the public
survey, shall adjust the same to the boundaries of said patented claims so as
in no case to interfere with or change the true location of such claims as they
are officially established upon the ground. Where patents have issued for
mineral lands, those lands only shall be segregated and shall be deemed to be
patented which are bounded by the lines actually marked, defined, and estab-
lished upon the ground by the monuments of the official survey upon which the
patent grant is based, and surveyors-general in executing subsequent patent sur-
veys, whether upon surveyed or unsurveyed lands, shall be governed accordingly.
The said monuments shall at all times constitute the highest authority as to
what land is patented, and in case of any conflict between the said monuments of
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such patented claims and the descriptions of said claims in the patents issued
therefor the monuments on the ground shall govern, and erroneous or incon-
sistent descriptions or calls in the patent descriptions shall give way thereto.
This section is a part of the general mining laws and should be
construed, if possible, to harmonize with the other portions of such
laws. Section 2325, also a part of the general mining laws, provides,
among other things, that notice of the application for patent to a
mining claim shall be published for a period of sixty days. The main
purpose of publication of the notice is to apprise any one having an
interest in a mining location conflicting with the one applied for
that application is made for patent to the ground in conflict, and to
afford him opportunity to assert and protect his rights in the manner
provided by section 232G. To issue patent on a claim as to which
notice has never been published might deprive adverse claimants, if
any there be, of opportunity to assert and protect their claims in the
manner provided by law. This the land department has no authority
to do.
As the unambiguous terms thereof disclose, the amendatory pro-
visions of the act of 1904 relate exclusively to the question of, and are
intended to prescribe the rule or guide whereby to determine, the
subject-matter of mineral patents; that is, the particular tract actu-
ally conveyed by any such patent whenever the question may arise.
Those provisions in no wise modify or affect any requirement of the
mining statutes with respect to notice of an application for patent;
nor have they, nor were they intended to have, the effect to cure any
defect or irregularity in the notice of patent proceedings had in any
case. What has or has not actually passed by the outstanding Nelson
patent is not the question here. The only question presented is,
whether the notice already given would justify the issuance of a new
patent, in lieu of the former, expressly embracing the claim as defined
and described by the amended survey; and that question is above
answered in the negative.
The decision of your office, as appealed from, is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD—SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL—REISSUE OF EOST CERTIFICATE.
Herman C. Ilfeld.
The more fact that a certificate of additional right has issued in the name of
the soldier under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes will not prevent him
from selling ami divesting himself of the right itself, of which the certifi-
cate is merely the evidence; and upon satisfactory showing of the loss or
• destruction of the certificate', it may be reissued and recertified in the
name of the assignee entitled to the right.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 13, 1900. (P. E. W.)
The Department has before it the appeal of Herman C. Ilfeld
from your office decision of April 10, 1906, rejecting his application,
as assignee, for reissue and recertification to him of the certificate of
right issued to Henry Eaton, April 17, 1882, for his additional right
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
There is no question as to the validity of said additional right in
Eaton and there is no dispute as to the facts in the case. It appears
that your office at the time of the issue of the said certificate of right
transmitted the same to Eaton's attorneys at Springfield, Missouri,
who filed his application therefor, and that it was lost or destroyed
in their office, and never reached Eaton. Seventeen years later, not
knowing that said certificate had been issued, and supposing that his
application therefor had been rejected, Eaton, on December 14, 1899,
sold and assigned all his additional right under said section 2306
of the Revised Statutes, to Theodore F. Barnes, for $120, and on
December 22, 1899, he made a further sale and assignment of all his
said right to said Barnes, the consideration being $1.00. In the
former assignment Eaton declared under oath that he had made no
previous sale or assignment of his said additional right. In the
latter it is declared that the assignment is made for the express pur-
pose of " divesting Eaton of all right to make an additional entry,
and to convey said right to the exclusive use of said Barnes." With
said second assignment Eaton executed, and delivered to Barnes,
his affidavit stating:
I have not made any prior application for an additional homestead entry
under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States nor has a certificate of right of entry been issued to me ; and that I have
not heretofore disposed in any manner of my right of entry granted by said
section 2306 . . . and that I have this day assigned my said right of entry
to Theodore F. Barnes.
On June 18, 1900, said Barnes assigned all of said additional right
of entry to Herman C. Ilfeld, the appellant herein, who, on July 23,
1900, applied to locate the same upon the W. ^ NE. J, Sec. 26, T. 8 N.,
R. 18 E., Santa Fe, New Mexico Territory.
August 4, 1900, said Eaton executed an instrument purporting to
convey to John H. Howell all his interest in the lost certificate of
right. The said instrument is not with the record, having been filed
in your office by Howell and subsequently withdrawn by him, but a
copy thereof is with the record, as " Exhibit A", attached to Ilfeld's
present application, and identified by affidavits of said Howell and
John M. Rankin, his attorney, who drafted the said instrument.
Therein Eaton states that through certain attorneys of Springfield,
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Missouri, he, in February, L882, applied to your office for a certificate
of right, but that k * never having heard from his attorneys respecting
his said application, he supposed that said application had been
rejected," but that he had recently been advised of its issue and de-
livery to his said attorneys; that he had never seen the certificate nor
had it in his possession ; that he
—
has never sold said certificate, nor his right thereto, nor his right to an addi-
tional entry, to any one whomsoever, but that lie is. at the present time (August
4, 1900) the true and lawful owner of said certificate and right to an additional
entry of 80 acres
;
and that he
—
hereby sells
. . . and conveys to John II. Howell . . . all of the affi-
ant's right, title and interest in and to the certificate herein described, and to
his right to an additional homestead entry of 80 acres.
August 14, 11)00, Howell filed the said affidavit and bill of sale in
3^0111* office, together with his own affidavit stating that he was " the
true and lawful owner of the soldiers 1 additional homestead certifi-
cate which was issued to Henry Eaton on the 17th day of April, 1882,
for 80 acres," and by virtue thereof asked for the reissuance of said
lost certificate and its recertification to himself under the provisions
of the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat,, 397).
This application was withdrawn by Howell on October 2G, 1900,
for the reason that he had learned of the said sale, on December 22,
1899, to Barnes of Eaton's additional right, alleged to be uncertified.
By your office letter of November 13, 1900, all papers filed by Howell
were returned to him and he transmitted Eaton's affidavit and bill
of sale to Eaton's attorneys, receiving back the amount he had paid
therefor. Howell and the local officers made affidavit to the fore-
going facts showing the disposition made of Eaton's said affidavit
and bill of sale to Howell, and the local officers thereupon requested
that the'lost certificate be reissued and recertified to Ilfeld, the ap-
pellant herein.
November 8, 1901, your office rejected Ilfeld's application to locate
Eaton's assignment on the land described, on the ground that the
said certificate of right issued to Eaton was outstanding and unac-
counted for.
October 27, 1905, Ilfeld applied to your office for the reissue of
Eaton's lost certificate and for its recertification to himself. This
application was supported generally by a showing of the fact- herein-
before staled, and particularly by a copy of the affidavit and bill of
sale from Eaton to Howell and by the affidavit of J. lv. Milner, one
of Eaton's said counsel at Springfield. Missouri, explaining how
Eaton's said certificate was lost in his office and stating that the same
never reached Eaton, and was never sold nor in any manner dis-
posed of.
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Your office having called for the original affidavit furnished Howell
by Eaton, dated August 4, 1000, and in order to perfect Ilfeld's ap-
plication, there was hied, on February 26, 1906, the affidavit of
Howell, stating that the copy of Eaton's assignment to Howell at-
tached to Ilfeld's application herein, as " Exhibt A," is a " true and
full copy " and that the facts stated in Ilfeld's application arc true
to affiant's personal knowledge. Also the affidavit of John M. Rankin
stating that he drafted said affidavit and assignment from Eaton to
Howell, and conducted the negotiations between them and has per-
sonal knowledge of the facts; that said "Exhibit A" is a "'rescript
of a carbon copy of the original affidavit and bill of sale executed by
Eaton on August 4, 1900, for the purpose of selling his lost certificate
to John H. Howell, 1 ' and that the original affidavit was returned to
Eaton in order to secure the refunding to Howell of the money paid
Eaton for his alleged right. The record also shows that with a view
to still further strengthen Ilfeld's application and showing herein, a
detailed statement in the form of an affidavit of all the foregoing
facts was prepared by counsel for appellant and sent to said Eaton
to be executed by him, that Eaton, refusing to execute the same
unless and until he was paid the sum of $120, transmitted the same
to your office. Thereon is the endorsement: "If they would send
the money, papers would be signed." Therewith he enclosed the
check given him by said Barnes in payment for his said right, and
his affidavit stating that he " did bargain " with Barnes's agent, " the
sale being for add. Hd. 80 acres, untaken soldier's pre-emption,"
and
—
that be now makes this affidavit for the purpose of setting aside the pretended
sale to T. F. Barnes for the reason that he, said Barnes, has never made any
payment for my right to said land as per agreement. lie did send check for the
amount claimed, $120, which is enclosed.
Your office letter of December 16, 1005, in reply to the foregoing
from Eaton, states that the said check has the following condition
typewritten thereon
:
His additional homestead, 80 acres, to he legal and accepted by U. S. Land
Commissioner, reasonable time allotted for examination.
Your said letter advised Eaton, that
—
it appears from the records of this office that you executed a complete assign-
ment of your alleged additional right on December 14, 1800, in favor of Theodore
F. Barnes in consideration of $120, the receipt of which you acknowledged in
said assignment ... It appears . . . that a certificate of right was
issued to you on April 17, 1882, and transmitted to Milner and Lisenby, at Spring-
field, Mo., and that said certificate was never located but is still outstanding
and unsatisfied . . . Mr. Herman C. Ilfeld is now seeking to have said cer-
tificate, which is alleged to have been lost, recertified in his name, and, as a part
of the evidence of his ownership he submits a copy of an affidavit executed by
you on August 4, 1000, wherein you acknowledged to have sold to Mr. John H.
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Howell of this city all of your right, title and interest in and to said certificate
of right. In view of the foregoing it does not appear that you have any rights
in the premises which this office has any power to protect.
It is clear from the foregoing that Eaton, in ignorance of the issue
of said certificate of right, made a sale and assignment to Barnes
which divested him of all right under said section 230G. This sale
being prior to the transaction with Howell was not affected thereby
even if the latter sale had not been revoked. There is, therefore, no
right in Howell and no remaining right in Eaton which will impair
or defeat the right sought to be asserted herein by Barnes's assignee.
The mere fact that a certificate of right had been issued to Eaton
could not prevent him from selling, and divesting himself of. the
right itself, of which the said certificate was merely the evidence.
If the certificate should be found and should prove never to have
been otherwise disposed of, it would enure to the benefit of any one
taking under Eaton's sale and assignment and the Department is
unable to concur in the conclusions readied by your office that ** the
right which Mr. Eaton sold to Mr. Howell has been restored to him
by his repayment to Mr. Howell of the purchase money " and that
Eaton " is the owner of the additional right represented by the cer-
tificate." Eaton's repayment to Howell was in recognition of the
fact that he was not the owner of the right and could not convey it
to Howell. The applicant herein, Ilfeld, now stands in the place of
Eaton and is invested with all the rights Eaton had before his sale
to Barnes. The only question remaining for consideration is, there-
fore, whether the loss or destruction of the said certificate is suffi-
ciently shown to justify the conclusion that it is not in existence and
will not be presented. It was issued more than 24 years ago, was
never in the possession of the beneficiary nor seen by him, and its
disappearance is reasonably accounted for by a member of the law
firm which filed Eaton's application therefor. This case is to be dis-
tinguished from that of Charles Tompkins, assignee of Lorenzo D.
Findley (32 L. D., 246), which is relied on in the decision herein
appealed from, wherein a certificate of right was by the beneficiary
claimed to have been fraudulently procured and assigned without his
knowledge. The Department said therein:
There is no sufficient evidence in the case to warrant a finding that the cer-
tificate was fraudulently procured, and there is not a particle of evidence to
show that the certificate lias been lost or destroyed.
It was held in that case that an application, by an assignee of the
beneficiary named in said certificate of right for an additional entry
in the face of the said certificate of right, could not be allowed upon
the sole ground that the certificate had been outstanding for 25 years
without being located or presented for recertification. In the present
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case the recertification is asked by the assignee of the beneficiary
named in the certificate who admits its issue and joins his counsel in
explaining that it was lost or destroyed in their office without ever
reaching him.
Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the Department is
of the opinion that the non-existence of the said certificate of right is
sufficiently shown to justify its reissue and recertification in the name
of Ilfeld as assignee of the beneficiary named therein.
Your said decision is hereby reversed.
homestead entry—kinkaid act.
Henry Hookstra.
In determining the "extreme length " of a homestead entry under the " Kin-
kaid Act," the measurement should follow the lines of the public survey,
and no entry should be allowed for any tract exceeding two miles either in
length or breadth, and no application for an entry in as nearly compact
form as possible should be rejected solely because its combined length and
breadth or diagonal measurement exceeds two miles.
Where an entrymau under the " Kinkaid Act" does not include in his entry the
full area allowed by law, for the reason that there is no land subject to
entry adjoining that entered, he may, if adjoining land thereafter become
subject to entry, enlarge his original entry so as to include therein the full
area allowed by law.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 15, 1906.
'
(A. W. P.)
An appeal has been filed on behalf of Henry Hookstra from your
office decision of December 18, 1905, rejecting his application to
amend his homestead entry No, 18792, made June 28, 1904, for the
SE. J, Sec. 8, S. i S. J, Sec. 9, S. J SW. J, Sec. 10, and the N. J NW.
1, Sec. 15, T. 27 N., K. 16 W., O'Neill, Nebraska, land district, so as
to embrace, in addition thereto, the SW. J NW. J, N. J SW. J, SW.
i SW. J, Sec. 15, in said township and range.
It will be observed that Hookstra 's original homestead entry,
which contains four hundred and eighty acres, was made under sec-
tion 1 of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547—commonly known
as the " Kinkaid Act "), under which section, according to his show-
ing as to qualifications, made in support thereof, he would have been
entitled to make entry for the full area of six hundred and forty
acres.
In support of the present application, filed at the local office Au-
gust 28, 1905, Hookstra alleges, by affidavit duly corroborated, that
at the time he made the original entry he was desirous of making as
large an entry as possible under the act, but by reason of the con-
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tiguous tracts of land having been taken by other persons, the four
hundred and eighty acres were as large an area as he could then
obtain; that at date of such entry he intended to initiate a contest
against homestead entry No. 17535, made on May 16, 1902, by Au-
gust Dreyer, for the SW. \ NW. J, W. J SW. J and SE. \ SW. J,
Sec. 15, of said township 27 north, range 1(> west, but upon examina-
tion of the records at the local office found that one J. D. McGinley
had already, of date May 28, 1904, initiated a contest against the
same, which was then pending and undetermined; that if he had
taken such action he would have set out in an affidavit and hied with
his homestead application that he did not elect to exhaust his home-
stead right by making entry of four hundred and eighty acres; that
said McGinley failed to prosecute his contest, and because thereof it
was dismissed on October 24, 1904; that on December 9, 1904, he
(Hookstra) initiated a contest against the same, as result of which
said entry was canceled by your office letter of July 11, 1905, notice
of which he was given by the local officers on July 29, 1905 ; and
that by reason of the cancelation of said entry so contested the NE.
} SW. J, Sec. 15, which has at all times been vacant, is nearer his
original entry than the SE. \ of the SW. 5, Sec. 15, for which reason
he includes it in his present application, instead of the last described
tract.
Your action in rejecting said application was based on the ground
that—
The act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat, 547), provides that entries shall he "as
nearly compact in form as possible," and " in no event over two miles in
extreme length."
Mr. Hookstra 's application to amend his entry No. 18702 must he denied, for
the reason that if the desired land were embraced in the entry, the form of same
would violate the two-mile limitation contained in the statute.
It is now urged in support of the appeal that it was error to con-
strue the words "extreme length" found in the act to mean the
greatest distance between any two points of the tract composed of
the entry and the land embraced in said application ; and that by such
construction the original entry would also exceed the two-mile limit
as to length.
Considering this phase of the case, it appears that Hookstra's entry
is two miles in length and three-fourths of a mile in breadth, while,
with the land now applied for, the tract would remain the same
length, but be one and a half miles in breadth. Hence the combined
length and breadth of this tract would equal three and one-half miles.
But, as now suggested on appeal, by the same process of reasoning
the combined length and breadth of the original entry, would be two
and three-quarters miles. Measuring diagonally from the extreme
northwest to the southeast corners of the entire tract, it would also
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exceed two miles, but this is likewise true as to the original entry.
The Department, however, does not accept either of the above plans of
measurement in determining the extreme length of an entry, as pre-
scribed by the act in question. If such a plan were adopted where
an entry embraced an entire section, the combined length and width
would be two miles, and if it embraced one-half of two adjoining
parallel sections, its combined measurement would be two and one-half
miles, while by diagonal measurement it would also exceed two miles
in length. But certainly an application embracing such a tract could
not properly be rejected solely on the ground that it exceeded the
two-mile limitation.
In determining the extreme length of an entry in contemplation of
this act, therefore, the Department is of the opinion that the measure-
ment must follow the lines of the public survey, and that no entry
can be allowed for any tract exceeding two miles either in length or
breadth, but also that no application for six hundred and forty acres
in as nearly compact form as possible should be rejected solely be-
cause its combined length and breadth or diagonal measurement
might exceed two miles.
Considering this application on the shoAving made in support
thereof, it will be observed that technically it is not an application
for amendment, but rather an application to enlarge the original
entry so as to include additional adjoining land now vacant, but
formerly embraced in the homestead entry of another, which »was
canceled as result of applicant's contest. While it has generally been
held that the election of a qualified party, when filing for a home-
stead, to take less than the law allows him, is a waiver of his claim
for a larger quantity, yet applications of this character have been
allowed where through ignorance or misinformation the entryman has
been misled as to his rights, and no adverse claim has intervened
(Josiah Cox, 27 L. D., 389; Charles Carson, 32 L. D.. 176); also
where he had clearly disclosed his intention to so amend to include an
adjoining tract, when he had cleared the record of an existing entry
covering it. (Hadley v. Walter, 25 L. D., 27-6; Joseph Heisel, 26
L. D., 69; Daniel L. Hartley, idem., 663; Green Piggott, 34 L. D.,
573.) In the case of Ella Pollard (33 L. I)., 110) it was also held,
according to the s}dlabus, which appears to sum up correctly the doc-
irine announced therein, that:
Where a desert land entryman does not include in his entry the full area
allowed by law, for the reason that there is no vacant land adjoining that
entered which is susceptible of irrigation and reclamation, he may, if adjoin-
ing land of the character subject to desert land entry thereafter becomes
vacant, enlarge his original entry so as to include therein the full area allowed
by law.
The facts in this case are very similar and in all material respects
the same as in the case at bar. While it is true that the former was
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an application to amend or enlarge a desert land entry, yet the prin-
ciple is the same, and there appears to be no good reason why it may
not govern in the disposition of the case now under consideration.
In accordance with the views herein expressed, the decision of your
office is reversed, and, in the absence of any other material objection,
the application will be allowed.
lilght of way for telephone and telegraph lines—act oe
february 15, 1901.
Regulations.
Paragraph 54 of the regulations of September 28, 1905, requiring that all
applications for rights of way under the act of February 15, 1901, for tele-
graph and telephone lines, must be accompanied by an official statement
of the Post Office Department showing that the applicant has complied
with the regulations under title 05 of the Revised Statutes, revoked.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(S. V. P.) June 18, 1900. (F. W. C.j
By letter from Acting Postmaster General, dated the 31st ultimo,
the attention of this Department is invited to paragraph 54 of the
regulations concerning right of way for canals, ditches and reser-
voirs, and for permission to use rights of way for telegraph and tele-
phone lines, electric plants, etc., approved by this Department Sep-
tember 28, last (34 L. D., 212, 232), which provides that-
All applications for the use of a right of way under this act, through any
lands designated therein, for telegraph and telephone purposes, must be accom-
panied by an official statement from the Post-Office Department showing that
the applicant has complied with its regulations under title sixty-five of the
Revised Statutes of the United States and amendments thereto.
This regulation is issued under the act of February 15, 1901 (31
Stat,, 790), which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to permit
the use of rights of way through the public lands, forest and other
reservations of the United States and certain named parks in Cali-
fornia, for electric plants, poles and lines for the generation and dis-
tribution of electric power and for telegraph and telephone pur-
poses, and for canals, ditches, pipes, and pipe lines, etc.
Attention is also invited to the filing in March, 1905, by the Stand-
ard Consolidated Mining Company, with the Post-Office Department,
of its alleged acceptance of the restrictions and obligations of the act
of Congress approved July 24, 18(H), entitled, "An act to aid in the
construction of telegraph lines and to secure to the Government the
use of the same for postal and military purposes, 1 ' and of acts amend-
atory thereof, which acceptance was evidently filed in furtherance of
the requirement of paragraph 54 of the regulations above quoted.
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With regard to said Standard Consolidated Mining Company, the
letter from the Acting Postmaster General states:
It was stated by the company that it proposed to erect a telephone line in
township 3 north, range 24 east, M. D. M., to he used entirely for private pur-
poses, to connect the electric power house situated on Green Creek, which had
been occupied by the company for twelve years preceding, with its storage
system on the head waters of said creek; and that the line was to be about ton
miles in length.
It was advised by the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Depart-
ment that this corporation was not a telegraph company within the meaning
of the act of 1866, supra, and not entitled to any of the benefits of that act;
that the act of 1901 is not amendatory of the act of 1866, and that the Post-
master General was not required therefore to file the proffered acceptance.
As authority for his conclusion, the Assistant Attorney General referred to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Richmond v. Southern Pell
Telephone Company (174 U. S., 761), and an opinion of the Attorney General
published in volume 24 Opinions of Attorneys-General, at page 603.
Following the opinion thus expressed by the Assistant Attorney General, this
Department declines to file alleged acceptances proffered by telephone companies
of the benefits and obligations of the acts of 1866 and 1001, and, as will have
been seen, such policy conflicts with the quoted regulations of the Department
of the Interior, to fhe serious embarrassment of such companies.
I have the honor to suggest that this matter be taken up between the Depart-
ment of the Interior and the Post Office Department for the purpose of arriving
at some arrangement which will obviate the difficulty herein set forth.
By act of February 15, 1901, supra, it is provided:
That the Secretary of the Interior be, and hereby is, authorized and empow-
ered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of rights
of way through the public lands, forest and other reservations of the United
States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant national parks, California,
for electrical plants, poles, and lines for the generation and distribution of elec-
trical power, and for telephone and telegraph purposes, and for canals, ditches,
pipes and pipe lines, flumes, tunnels, or other water conduits, and for water
plants, dams, and reservoirs used to promote irrigation or mining or quarry-
ing, or the manufacturing or cutting of timber or lumber, or the supplying of
water for domestic, public, or any other beneficial uses to the extent of the
ground occupied by such canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, reservoirs, or other
water conduits or water plants, or electrical or other works permitted hereunder,
and not to exceed fifty feet on each side of the marginal limits, or not to exceed
fifty feet on each side of the center line of such pipes and pipe lines, electrical,
telegraph, and telephone lines and poles, by any citizen, association, or corpora-
tion of the United States, where it is intended by such to exercise the use per-
mitted hereunder or any one or more of the purposes herein named : Provided,
That such permits shall be allowed within or through any of said parks or any
forest, military, Indian, or other reservation only upon the approval of the chief
officer of the Department under whose supervision such park or reservation
falls and upon a finding by him that the same is not incompatible with the pub-
lic interest: Provided further, That all permits given hereunder for telegraph
and telephone purposes shall be subject to the provision of title sixty-five of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, and amendments thereto, regulating
rights of way for telegraph companies over the public domain : And provided
further, That any permission given by the Secretary of the Interior under the
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provisions of this act may be revoked by him or his successor in his discretion,
and shall not be held to confer any right, or easement, or interest in, to, or over
any public land, reservation, or park.
It will be seen that this act makes all permits given thereunder for
telegraph and telephone purposes " subject to the provision of title
sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of the United States and amend-
ments thereto, regulating rights of way for telegraph companies over
the public domain." It is clear therefore that any permit which
might be obtained from this Department under said act would be sub-
ject to all the burdens of title G5 of the Revised Statutes, and this
without regard to any action on the part of the applicant for the per-
mit in the matter of filing with the Post-office Department of an ac-
ceptance of the restrictions and obligations of the matters included
under title 65 of the Revised Statutes.
There is no question iioav before the Department as to the effect of
the proviso to the act of February 15, 1901, as to the burdens imposed,
nor any claim for benefits by reason thereof, and from a careful con-
sideration of the entire matter the requirement of paragraph 54 of
the regulations approved September 28, 1905, supra, seems to be
unnecessary, and compliance with its conditions will not be longer
exacted.
settlement rights—adverse possession—estoppel.
Peterson v. Palmer.
One who fails to assert any claim to a tract of public land in the adverse posses-
sion of another, and remains silent, though knowing that the adverse occu-
pant continues to claim, occupy, and improve the land, is estopped thereby
from subsequently asserting a prior settlement right thereto in himself,
notwithstanding the tract is found upon survey to be a part of the technical
quarter-section upon which his improvements are located.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(S. V. P.) June 18, 1906. (J. L. McC.)
The plat of T. 26 N., R. 19 W., Kalispell land district, Montana,
was filed in the local office on October 17, 1904.
On the same day Lulu Palmer made homestead entry for lots 6
and 7 and the E. £ of the SW. J of Sec. G, in said township.
On November 17, 1904, Neils Peterson filed affidavit of contest
against said entry, alleging prior settlement on the SE. J of the SE.
I of Sec. 6, the W. i of the NW. J and the NE. J of the NW. J of
Sec. 7, same township and range.
The land in dispute is the forty-acre tract constituting the SE. J
of the SW.
-I
of said section 6.
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A hearing was had, at which it wTas shown that Miss Palmer set-
tled on the land on August 20, 1902, by commencing the building
of a house (on the NW. J of said SW. |), in which she took up her
residence as soon as it was finished, and continued to reside therein
until the date of her entry. She made no improvements upon the
forty-acre tract in controversy ; but she testified that while work was
in progress on her house—about August 22, 1902—her uncle, F. F.
Stevens, posted notices on the land setting forth the extent of her
claim. Inasmuch as counsel for the contestant express a doubt
whether any notices were ever posted, or if so, that they were posted
where any person would be likeley to see them, it may not be amiss
to quote the testimony on this point—abbreviated by the omission
of some needless verbiage:
There was no necessity for placing more than two notices up there any way
because all the north and east is a rough country .... and nobody
travels in there ; but on the south side of this quarter, .... in going
hunting they will go down that road, and turn off into the timber; . . . .
so I went over near this southeast corner in question .... where there
is a creek comes along, . . . and there is a trail comes in along about
there ; . . . . and a few acres of open timber ; and I thought it a most
feasible place for a hunter to pass, so I stuck up a notice there stating how
she had taken the land.
Q. Did that notice state that she claimed that forty among others?—A. Yes,
sir, in a square, and warned them against trespassing; and then the other notice
was put on a tree along the main traveled road.
Q. From your observation of the forty when you put up those notices, are
you able to testify whether there was any person living on the land, or any
improvements upon the same?—A. There was none whatever ; there was nothing
but an old trail.
In behalf of the contestant it is claimed that the forty-acre tract
in controversy was first occupied, some time in the summer of May,
1902, by one John Tisdale; he remained about a year, and sold his
improvements and possessory right to J. A. Folk; he, in January,
1904, sold to J. II. Parker; he, on May 3, 1904, sold his improvements
to the contestant Peterson, who made a few more improvements upon
the tract in controversy, in section 6, and built a house, in which he
established residence, in section 7.
In view of the facts above set forth the local officers found and
held
:
We fail to find that the contestee ever established the corners or boundaries
of the land claimed by her, to wit, the SW. i of Sec. G, or in any manner exer-
cised any right of ownership over the SE. i of the SW. i of said Sec. G, but
rather acquiesced in the acts of improvement performed by John Tisdale, the
original locator of the disputed 40, and his successors in interest ; that the
contestee never establisbed any possession or control either by act of location,
settlement or improvement of SE. i of SW. i, Sec. G, T. 2G N., R. 19 W.
We further find that Neils Peterson, successor in interest to Robert II.
Parker, settled upon this disputed 40, together with other lands claimed by him
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in Sec 7. to wit, lots 1 and 2 and the NE. I of X\V. |, said Sec. 7, in the month
of May, 1004, and has since continued to reside upon and cultivate the same
without any notice on the part of contestee or others of any adverse claim to
the land claimed by him, and that by reason of such settlement, occupation,
and improvement, the said Neils Peterson is the owner of the tract in dispute.
Miss Palmer appealed; and your office, on September 30, 100.).
rendered a decision the gist of which follows:
It has been repeatedly held by the Department that settlement rests solely
on acts performed in person by the party claiming the benefit thereof (see 8
L. D., 623 ; 13 L. D., 142 ; 20 L. D., 010). Whatever acts of settlement the party
from whom Peterson purchased performed, could in no manner inure to the
benefit of Peterson. Miss Palmer claimed, and had a right to claim, by reason
of her settlement and residence, the entire SW. j ; and as Peterson did not
appear on the scene until two years afterward, it follows that Miss Palmer
has the superior right to the land. Your decision is therefore reversed; the
contest is dismissed; and the contestee's homestead entry will remain intact.
From this action the contestant has filed an appeal by his local
attorney, supported by an argument from his resident attorney.
The appeal alleges that your office erred in holding that " the
simple facts that are necessary to determine the issue in this case are
that Miss Palmer settled on the SW. J of Sec. G in August, 1902,
and has resided there to the date of her entry."
The appeal does injustice to your decision by isolating a single
sentence, and omitting to quote the other " simple facts " set forth in
sentences that immediately follow the one above quoted.
The remaining nine allegations of error are substantially different
forms of repeating the one numbered " 5 "
—
The Hon. Commissioner erred in not holding that from a time antedating
the settlement of said Lulu Palmer within said section, continuously, until
the time of hearing, said southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of said
section six was in the possession and occupation of and claimed by parties
other than said contestee, under the homestead laws, and that during the same
time until she made entry of said land said Lulu Palmer made no claim to said
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter.
The argument accompanying the appeal contends:
If the record of evidence in this case had been carefully examined below, it
ought to have been apparent to the writer of that decision that the case was con-
ducted on the ground that Miss Palmer's claim never extended by reason of her
settlement to the tract in dispute, hut was an afterthought; that she never, by
word, act, or deed, did anything to advise anyone of the extension of her claim
to this tract ; that she sat idly by while others were occupying and improving it.
and acquiesced in their acts of settlement thereon, thus evidencing a hick of
purpose on her part to include said tract within her claim, while a1 the same
time her inaction in respect of the claim constituted, under the circumstances,
a fraud on her part, if she in fact did intend to claim it.
Neither of contestant's counsel makes any direct reference to the
fact upon which Miss Palmer appears principally to rely: to wit,
the frequent ruling of the Department that improvements made upon
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public land prior to survey constitute notice of claim to the entire
technical quarter-section upon which they are found (sec Luke v.
Birdwell, 20 L. IX, 338, and many other cases). Nevertheless, their
contention is to the effect that by her actions she excluded herself
from the operations of said ruling, and is now estopped from claim-
ing the tract in controversy. This contention merits careful consid-
eration.
When Miss Palmer settled upon the northwest quarter of this
quarter-section, in August, 1902, the " forty " in controversy was
occupied by John Tisdale. She does not allege that she ever in-
formed him that she claimed it. Indeed, it does not appear that she
ever saw him.
J. A. Folk took possession of the tract in May, 1903. She became
well acquainted with him and his family; went to his cabin, she tes-
tifies (see page 73 of the transcript of the testimony), " nearly every
day, to get milk of him." She adds:
I was at his house one day, and he asked me how I took my claim? and I
said I took it in a square.
Q. Where was he living then?—A. He was living on this forty.
Q. What more did he say to you, if anything?—A. That was all the conversa-
tion.
Here was certainly a good opportunity for her to tell him that her
claim, which she " took in a square," included the " forty " on which
they two were conversing; but it does not appear that she did so.
Folk sold out to Parker, who took up his residence in the house on
the " forty " in controversy ; but it does not appear that Miss Palmer
ever informed him that she claimed the land.
Next came the contestant, Peterson. He is a Dane by birth, and
understands the English language so poorly that his examination at
the hearing had to be conducted through an interpreter. The first
witness was his son-in-law, B. A. Shak. He testified that Peterson,
prior to his purchase of the land, had been living in Minnesota ; but
finding the winters there too cold for him, and wishing to live near
his daughter, he asked his son-in-law to find some land in his
(the son-in-law's) vicinity, which he (Peterson) could purchase and
make his home upon for the remainder of his life. While looking
about with this end in view7
,
Shak found Mr. Parker living upon
the tract in controversy, claiming it as his own, but willing to sell
if he could get his price. Upon examining with a tentative purpose
of purchasing, witness found a twTo-room cabin (in which Parker and
his family lived), some open ground about it, and Parker in the act
of cutting down more trees to increase the cultivable area; one
hundred and fifty fruit trees set out, a barn, a root-house, a chicken-
house, and " a spring fixed up for use "-—the tract being enclosed with
a pole-and-brush fence, sufficient to prevent the incursions of cattle.
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Parker claimed the undisputed right to the land—so far as a right
could be obtained before survey; and neither he nor the witness had
the least idea that any other claimant was in existence. On May 3,
190-1, Parker executed a document stating, " I have this day sold and
conveyed my improvements on my squatter's claim," the description
that followed including the tract in controversy, "to Nels Peterson,
;u id received payment for the same 1 '—not stating the consideration;
but witness Fred. Wyman, " scaler and timber-cruiser," states in his
deposition that the improvements were worth from $800 to $350.
Peterson thereupon removed, with his family, from Minnesota to
Montana, took up his residence on a part of the land so purchased—
but not on the part here in controversy, as on account of his age he
found it hard work to climb the hill leading to the house; so he built
another house, on land more nearly level. Then he fenced his entire
claim, setting posts perpendicularly in the ground and adding one
wire on top of the pole-and-brush fence originally surrounding the
tract in controversy. Witness William Myers, who put up the fence,
being asked why he did not build a better one, replied, " The simple
reason is, the old gentleman said he was out of money." This witness
also cultivated and hoed about the trees in the orchard, until they
were " in as nice condition as any trees in the country ; " and did
other work in the way of improving the land in controversy. The
contestant kept a cow, grazing her upon this "forty;" and Miss
Palmer testifies
:
Q. Mi. Peterson kept a cow there, and you got milk from them, didn't yon?
—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Frequently—that is, they supplied you with milk all this summer?—A.
No, sir, not all the time.
(,). While they had milk they supplied you?—A. Yes, sir.
Although buying—at least, obtaining—milk of the Peterson family
daily during the summer, given by a cow that was pastured on the
land she now claims, which land Peterson was fencing and other-
wise improving, Miss Palmer never mentioned to the Petersons
that she claimed it; and the first that Peterson knew of such claim
was when he and his son-in-law, Shak, the day after the filing of
the township plat (being unaware of any necessity for exceeding
haste), came to the local office to file for the tract (with the other
" forties " settled upon by Peterson).
Thus, during all the period from the date of her alleged settlement
(August 20, 1902), until the filing of the township plat (October IT.
1904), while all the time in frequent and much of the time in daily
communication with the parties claiming the land, residing upon it,
and expending their money in improving it, Miss Palmer stood idly
by, and gave none of the parties any intimation of her claim. Tier
conduct conies within the scope and intent of the legal maxim, "* He
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who will not speak when he should speak, will not be heard when
he would speak." As was said by the court in the case of Hill v.
Epley (31 Perm. State Reports, p. 334, cited with approval in Pendle-
ton v. Grannis, 14 L. D., 381) :
Where the conduct of a party has heen such as to induce action by another,
he shall he precluded from afterward asserting, to the prejudice of that other,
the contrary of that of which his conduct has induced the belief. The primary
ground of the doctrine is, that it would be a fraud on a party to assert what his
previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial others have acted.
Still more completely covering the case here under consideration is
the departmental ruling in Roberts et al. v. Gordon (14 L. D., 475,
481) :
One who fails to assert any claim to a tract of public land which is in the
adverse possession of another, and remains silent, though knowing that the
adverse occupant continues to claim, occupy, and improve the land, is estopi>ed_
thereby from subsequently denying the good faith of said occupant, and assert-
ing a right of priority in himself.
After a careful consideration of all the testimony, together with
the appeal and the argument filed in support thereof, the Depart-
ment is constrained to reverse the decision of your office, and to
direct that Miss Palmer's entry be canceled as to the land in conflict,
and that of Neils Peterson be allowed, unless some other reason to the
contrary shall appear.
yellowstone forest reserve—certain lands open to
homestead settlement and entry.
Instructions.
Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. G.\ June 19, 1906.
Register and Receiver, Lander, Wyoming.
Gentlemen: March 15, 1900, the following act (Public, No. 46)
was approved
:
AN ACT To extend the provisions of the homestead laws to certain lands in the Yellow-
stone forest reserve.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Ignited
States of America in Congress assembled, That the general provisions of the
homestead laws of the United States be, and the same are hereby, extended to
and over the surveyed lands in townships forty-eight, forty-nine, and fifty, and
ranges one hundred and five and one hundred and six, within the Yellowstone
forest reserve, and the said lands shall be subject to entry ninety days after
the passage of this act, within which ninety day period the Secretary of Agri-
culture may set aside such portions of said lands as were not occupied by a
bona fide settler January first, nineteen hundred and six, not to exceed in the
aggregate one hundred and sixty acres, as may be necessary for forest reserve
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administrative purposes, which lands so set aside shall not be subject to settle-
ment, entry or location during the life of the forest reserve: Provided, That
the commutation clause of the homestead laws shall not apply to the said lands,
and any bona fide settler who made settlement on said lands prior to January
first, nineteen hundred and six, and who had prior to that time lost or exer-
cised his homestead right, may enter and perfect title to the lands settled upon
by him as though his homestead right had not been lost or exercised, upon the
payment of the sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre for the land
included in his entry at the time of making final proof.
The said act docs not take the land out of the reserve, but merely
permits settlement and entry under the homestead law, and applies
to the surveyed lands only. It does not permit settlement or entry of
the unsurveyed portion of said townships. The surveyed lands are
subject to appropriation under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes
only, without the right of commutation, and any application to enter
or appropriate the land under any other law, except the mineral law,
must be rejected.
Bona fde settlers on the land have a preference right of entry and
those whose settlements were made prior to January 1, 1900, may
make entry notwithstanding they may have previously lost or ex-
ercised their homestead right, but will be required to make payment
for the land entered at the rate of $1.25 per acre at the time of mak-
ing final proof. As to parties other than such settlers who attempt
a second use of the right to make entry, you will be governed by the
act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 527), construed by the Department
in the case of Cox v. Wells, 33 L. I)., 657. Applicants to make
second entry under the provisions hereof must describe the land
formerly entered in such manner as to enable this office to readily
identify the entry. Bona pic settlers will be allowed credit for the
time heretofore spent on the land entered. While the land has been
subject to settlement since the approval of the act, March 15, L906,
the same does not become subject to entry until ninety days after
that date, or on June 13, 1906. The entries will be made in the
regular manner and given a regular number of your homestead
series, referring to the act as authority therefor.
Below follows a list of the land selected under said act by the
Secretary of Agriculture for forestry administrative purposes, and
the same are not subject to settlement or entry; nor will any settle-
ment subsequent to January 1, 1906, prevail against the selection by
the Agricultural Department
:
Lots 6, 8, NW. .1 SE. \ and SE. \ SW. .',, Sec. 4, T. 48 N., R. inc.
W., 6th P. M.
Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved :
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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INDIAN LAND-ALLOTMENT-HOMESTEAD ENTRY.
George H. Dupuis.
An Indian to whom land in a reservation has been allotted as a member of a
tribe, but which land has never become a part of the public domain subject
to the general provisions of the homestead law, can not, as a citizen of the
United States, make homestead entry, under section 2289 of the Revised
Statutes, of the land so allotted to him.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 21, 1906. (C. J. G.)
An appeal has been filed by George H. Dupuis from the decision
of your office of December 27, 1905, sustaining the action of the local
officers denying his application to make homestead entry under sec-
tion 2289 of the Revised Statutes for the NW. J of Sec. 34, T 31 N.,
R. 4 W.j O'Neill, Nebraska.
The applicant is a Santee Sioux Indian and in an accompanying
affidavit alleges:
In the year 1885 and for many years previous thereto I had voluntarily taken
up my residence on the land above described within Knox County, Nebraska,
separate and apart from any and all tribes of Indians and did on such occasion
adopt the habits of civilized life and from said time to the present I have vol-
untarily kept my said residence separate and apart from any and all tribes of
Indians and have kept up and within the habits and customs of civilized life
and have not returned to the customs and manners of my tribe, whereby I
am, and from the year 1887 have been, a citizen of the United States and as
such am entitled to all the rights and privileges of citizens.
I am the identical person for whom the above described land is set and held
apart for occupancy and homestead under the 6th article of the Sioux Treaty of
1868 ; that I have not made proof under said sixth article and have not re-
ceived patent or : any title to said land or certificate therefor and I hereby
elect to hold and occupy the land above described under and by virtue of section
2289 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and in consideration of filing
on said land under the general homestead laws, I hereby waive my right to hold
and claim said land under said sixth article of said Treaty.
I further show that I took up my residence on the above described land in
1885 and from said date to the present have held and occupied the same as my
homestead, continuously.
I further show that I have made lasting and valuable improvements on said
land consisting of 140 acres of breaking, done in 1885 and since, that I have also
a house 16 feet by 28 feet; also barns and fencing, etc., and have made divers
other improvements.
It is stated in the decision of your office that the schedule of allot-
ments and assignments to Santee Sioux Indians shows the land now
applied for by Dupuis to be embraced in allotment No. 192, made to
him March 31, 1885. His application was rejected by the local officers
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for this reason. The concluding paragraph of the treaty of April 29,
18G8 (15 Stat,, G35, 637), with the different tribes of Sioux Indians,
under which said land was set apart for Dupuis. is in part as follows:
And it is further stipulated that any male Indians over eighteen years of age,
of any band or tribe that is or shall hereafter become a party to this treaty,
who now is or who shall hereafter become a resident or occupant of any reser-
vation or territory not included in the tract of country designated and described
in this treaty for the permanent home of the Indians, which is not mineral land,
nor reserved by the United States for special purposes other than Indian occu-
pation, and who shall have made improvements thereon of the value of two
hundred dollars or more, and continuously occupied the same as a homestead
for the term of three years, shall be entitled to receive from the United States
a patent for one hundred and sixty acres of land including his said improve-
ments, the same to be in the form of the legal subdivisions of the surveys of the
public lands. Upon application in writing, sustained by the proof of two disin-
terested witnesses, made to the register of the local land office when the land
sought to be entered is within a land district, and when the tract sought to be
entered is not in any land district, then upon said application and proof being
made to the commissioner of the general land office, and the right of such
Indian or Indians to enter such tract or tracts of land shall accrue and be per-
fect from the date of his first improvements, and no longer. And any Indian
or Indians receiving a patent for land under the foregoing provisions, shall
thereby and from thenceforth become and be a citizen of the United States,
and be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of such citizens, and shall,
at the same time, retain all his rights to benefits accruing to Indians under this
treaty.
A proviso in the act of March 1, 1883 (22 Stat., 433, 444), is as
follows
:
That the patents authorized to be issued to certain individual Indians by
the concluding paragraph of article six of the treaty with the Sioux Indians,
proclaimed, the twenty-fourth day of February, eighteen hundred and sixty-
nine, shall be of the legal effect and declare that the United Stales does and
will hold the land thus allotted for the period of twenty-five years in trust
for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have
been made, or in case of his decease, of his heirs, according to the laws of
the State or Territory where such land is located, and that at (lie expiration of
said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian
or his heirs as aforesaid in fee discharged of said trust and free of all charge
©r incumbrance whatsoever, and no contract by any such Indian creating any
charge or incumbrance thereon or liability of said land for payment thereof
shall be valid.
It is alleged that certificate never issued to Dupuis for the land
set apart for him, that he never applied for nor received patent un-
der article 6 of the treaty of 18G8, and the records of your office do
not show that trust patent ever issued to him under the act of L883.
His present application is based on the claim thai he has lived on
his land separate and apart from his tribe, lias 'adopted the habits
of civilized life, and theref6re, under the general allotment act of
February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), is a citizen of the United State-
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and as such is entitled to all the rights and privileges of other
citizens. Section 6 of said act provides, among other things
:
Every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who has
voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from
any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is
hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the
rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens, etc.
A citizen of the United States can only make homestead entry,
under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes, of lands subject thereto
and that are part of the public domain. The land in question was
allotted to Dupuis as part of an Indian reservation and such allot-
ment was made and he was entitled thereto by virtue of being a
member of the Santee Sioux tribe of Indians. The fact that the
land was set apart for him under article G of the treaty of 1868 in
itself determines the character of said land and distinguishes it from
public lands subject to entry under the general provisions of the
homestead law. The lands in said reservation not theretofore allot-
ted to Indians were by executive order restored to the public domain
on April 15, 1885, but the land set apart for Dupuis March 31,
1885, was not so restored; and his election to waive his right to hold
the land under article G of the treaty and enter the same under sec-
tion 2289 of the Revised Statutes, does not make it public land.
On the contrary, it was held for his benefit, he and it remained under
the supervision of the Indian department and upon the required
showing a trust patent declaring " that the United States does and
will hold the land " for his benefit was to be issued. As stated the
land constituted a part of an Indian reservation which was dis-
posed of by treaty stipulation in a specific manner and whatever
rights Dupuis had or acquired in said land were based on the fact
of his being a member of the Santee Sioux tribe of Indians. These
are far different attributes from those contemplated by the act of
1887 having reference to an Indian who takes np his residence
separate and apart from his tribe and who by reason thereof acquires
the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States, among
them being the right to make homestead entry of public lands under
section 2289 of the Revised Statutes.
The decision of your office concludes as follows
:
If no appeal is taken from this decision, a patent in trust will be issued to
him, as provided by the act of March 1, 1883, supra.
This is undoubtedly the proper course to pursue, provided Dupuis
possesses the requisite qualifications under article 6 of the treaty of
1868. Accordingly, if a trust patent shall be issued, then if Dupuis
can show the proper qualifications patent in fee simple may issue to
him under the act of May 8, 190G (Public—Xo. 149), which provides:
That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is hereby
authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent
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and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to
such allottee a patent in fee simple, etc.
The decision of your office, in so far as it denies the application of
Dupuis to make homestead entry under section 2289 of the Revised
Statutes, is hereby affirmed, and the papers are returned for appro-
priate action, after further consideration, and investigation if neces-
sary, in accordance with the views herein expressed.
REPAYMENT—TIMBER AND STONE APPLICATION.
T. J. Murphy.
Where an applicant under the timber and stone act states in his declaratory
statement that he has personally examined the land applied for, when as
a matter of fact he has not done so, but in his final proof swears that no
inspection of the land has ever been made by him, entry on such proof can
not be allowed, but as the purchase money paid by him upon submission of
the proof still remains in the control and custody of the land department,
repayment thereof may be made.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. L. C.
)
June 21
,
1906. ( C. J. G.
)
An appeal has been filed by T. J. Murphy from the decision of your
office of October 17, 1905, rejecting his application for the return of
the purchase money paid by him upon submitting final proof under
the timber and stone act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), for the NE. J
of Sec. 32, T. 28 S., R. 16 E., Lakeview, Oregon.
Murphy filed declaratory statement under said act in October, 1902,
in which he alleged, among other things
—
that I have personally examined said land, and from my personal knowledge
state that said land is unfit for cultivation, and valuable chiefly for its timber
;
that it is uninhabited ; that it contains no mining or other improvements.
' He advertised to make proof January 21, 1903, but failed to do so
and thereupon made application to readvertise, which was rejected
by the local officers on the ground of his failure to submit proof on
the date named or within ten days thereafter. Murphy stated that
his failure was due to the fact that he did not have the money re-
quired to pay the purchase price for the land and attendant expenses;
that his application was made in good faith and it was his intention
to perfect title to the land. Upon. appeal your office directed the
local officers, in the absence of any adverse claim to the land, to
allow Murphy to readvertise. This he did and submitted proof
October 20, 1904, which was rejected by the local officers for the
reason that no personal examination of the land had been made by
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Murphy. An appeal was taken to your office December 12, 1904, in
which it was urged that it was error to hold that Murphy could not
make entry under the act of 1878 without a personal examination of
the land, citing the case of Hoover v. Sailing (110 Fed. Rep., 43).
As hereinbefore shown, he stated in his declaratory statement that he
had made a personal examination of the land. In his final proof,
replying to question 4—"Are you acquainted with the land above
described by personal inspection of each of its smallest legal sub-
divisions? "—Murphy stated: "I am not." And in answer to ques-
tion 5—"When and in what manner was such inspection made? "
—
he replied, " Made none." In support of his appeal Murphy alleged
that he was advised by a United States commissioner that it was not
necessary for him to personally inspect the land; that he had no
recollection of having made a sworn statement to the effect that he
had made such examination. Your office, however, sustained the
action of the local officers, holding that Murphy was not qualified to
make entry under the timber and stone act, basing such holding on
unreported departmental decision of July 9, 1902, in which, refer-
ring to decision in the case of Hoover v. Sailing, supra, it was said:
The Department has already had occasion to consider the effect that should
be given this decision in the administration of the act above cited, but has not
found it necessary, up to the present time, to pass finally upon the question,
and it is not deemed advisable to make any change in the existing regulations.
Your office also referred to the case of Patrick McNamee (32 L. D.,
GOO), wherein it is held (syllabus) :
Where an applicant to purchase under the act of June 3, 1878, states in his
preliminary affidavit that he has personally examined the land, and it subse-
quently appears from his final proof that he had not made personal examination
of the land prior to making such affidavit, his application will be rejected.
On September 20, 1905, Murphy filed the following affidavit in
your office:
In 1002, I was manager of the Honeyman McBride's wholesale woolen house,
and in that capacity, frequently met Jacob Wrage, a tailor, at that time doing
business in Corvallis. He repeatedly asked me or advised me to take out a
timber claim. 1 refused many times, principally under plea that I had not
time to go on the land. His answer was to me always that there was no occa-
sion for me to go on the land, and he showed me a citation, which he re-
ceived from J. W. Hamaker, U. S. Land Commissioner of Klamath Falls, in
which the Court decided personal examination was not necessary. Such a
citation is attached to the papers, which is in your office, and which I showed
in Klamath Falls to the commissioner at the time I made application for final
proof.
About October, 1002, I decided to make an application, and one Sunday morn-
ing as I was about to leave Portland, Wrage called at my residence and asked
me to sign the application. I looked hurriedly at it and saw that it was an
application of land. I did not read it carefully or thoroughly and my careless-
ness has placed me in the unfortunate position I am now in. I received a copy
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of the County Examiner, the paper in which my application was published in
due time, and then noticed that a sworn statement was supposed to have heen
made by Thomas J. Murphy.
I expressed my uneasiness to Wrage when I sent him money, but in his an-
swer the same excuse was given, that is was not necessary to appear in person.
In January, 1903, Wrage warned me not to send down money for final proof.
On February the 4th, I received another letter from Wrage, in which he en-
closed the letter of Ilamaker of January 27th, 1903, to him showing that il* I
intended to cheat the Government or make any false representation, I might
have done so at that time, and now have possession of the receipt or the patent
from your office.
In January or early in February of 100.'), Ilamaker was in Portland, and
Wrage requested me to call and see Mr. Ilamaker, which I refused. On Feb-
ruary 25th an answer received from me by Ilamaker, asking him about the
status of the case at that time, he sent me a copy of the affidavit for re-adver-
tisement; also a favor of his on March 14th referring to the same matter: one
of which letters contained a citation of Judge Grosscup relating to the decision
in a case similar to mine.
During the spring of 1903 I called at the Surveyors General office in Portland
and had an interview with Mr. Linnen, one of your staff from Washingtou. I
explained the case thoroughly to him and showed him all the papers in my
possession. He asked me to call again and Col. Green, Mr. Linnen and myself
talked the matter over, and I received an impression in my mind which evi-
dently was wrong, that under the many peculiar circumstances, and in the face
of the citation sent to me by Ilamaker, that a personal inspection of the land
would be waived.
I then pressed the matter from the Lake View office and in March, 1904,
I was given permission to re-advertise. I complied with all the requirements
at the time, and in October I visited Klamath Falls and made application for
final proof. In Klamath Falls I had an interview with one of your special
agents, a Mr. Shaw, I think, was his name, and told the circumstances to
him, and he also expressed his opinion that it was not necessary under the
circumstances for me to visit the land. The same day I appeared before him
to make final proof. . . .
Your office, in passing upon Murphy's application for return of
purchase money, concluded as follows:
There is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Murphy's signature to the sworn
statement No. 1431, for the NE. i of Sec. 32, T. 38 S., R. IT E., is genuine, and
that the statement therein that he had personally examined said land is false.
and that he attempted to take advantage of said sworn statement when he asked
to be allowed to re-advertise and when he made his final proof.
As Mr. Murphy has been guilty of false swearing and deceit in his sworn
statement, he is not entitled to the return of the purchase money now in the
hands of the Receiver, and you will so advise the party and of his right of
appeal. See case of James T. Pall (33 L. I)., 560).
It is not denied that Murphy signed the declaratory statement in
which your office finds he was guilty of false swearing. In view
of the fact that it was made to appear that he had not personally
examined the land involved prior to such statement, lie could not be
permitted to complete entry for said land. The ad of 1878 has
uniformly been construed by the Department as requiring such per-
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sonal examination. Patrick McNamee, supra; Grace P. Feather-
stone (32 L. I)., 631). Hence, it was properly held that Murphy Avas
not qualified to enter the land applied for by him. While the state-
ment contained in his declaratory statement as to having " per-
sonally examined " the land was an erroneous one, yet under the facts
disclosed it is not necessarily proven that such statement was made
with the deliberate and culpable purpose of deceiving and defrauding
the Government. On the contrary, when making final proof he
openly stated that he had not personally examined the land. The
misstatement contained in his declaratory was therefore not carried
into his final proof upon which he sought to perfect entry'. The
case under the facts resolves itself rather, as claimed in the appeal,
not into an attempt to make entry based upon the statement that he
had personally examined the land, but into an attempt to make entry
regardless of the fact that he had not personally examined the land
as stated in his final proof. The case is clearly distinguished from
that of James T. Ball, supra. There, not only the declaratory state-
ment but the final proof contained false statements. Upon the face
of the final proof in that case entry was allowable, and that con-
summation was avoided only by an investigation disclosing the falsity
of both declaratory statement and final proof. Here, Murphy's
final proof disclosed facts upon its face which showed the entry could
not be allowed. As the money in question still remains in the con-
trol and custody of the land department it may, for proper reasons, be
returned to the purchaser, no specific statutory authority being re-
quired to do so. It is believed sufficient showing and Avarrant have
been made to entitle Murphy to a return of the money applied for by
him. The decision of your office is accordingly hereby reversed, and
if no other objection shall appear, the money question will be re-
turned.
townsite proof-indian land.
Diocese of Duluth v. Bena Townsite.
There is no requirement that townsite proof shall be made by persons not resi-
dent of the town, and such residence does not affect their competency to
make such proof.
The act of March 3, 1905, authorizes the purchase by the diocese of Duluth of
one hundred and sixty acres of land in the ceded Chippewa Indian reserva-
tion, but as that act does not recognize any rights as accruing to the diocese
by virtue of applications theretofore made by it for the dedication, or pur-
chase, of certain of said lands for mission or church purposes, any applica-
tion by the diocese under said act can not be given relation to the earlier
applications made prior to the passage of the act, to the prejudice of inter-
vening adverse rights.
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Acting Secretary Wilson to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, June 26, 1906. (J. R. AY.
)
The Protestant Episcopal Mission of the Diocese of Duluth ap-
pealed from your decision of March 6, 1906, rejecting its application
under the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat, 1048, 10G8), to purchase the
SE. J of the SE. | , Sec. 27, and the NE. J of the NE. J, Sec. 34, T. 145
X., R. 28 W., Cass Lake, Minnesota, and awarding the right of entry
of them to the judge of the district court, as trustee, as part of the
Bena Townsite.
The land is within the ceded Chippewa Indian reservation opened
to entry under the acts of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat,, 642), June 27,
1902 (32 Stat., 400), and February 9, 1903 (32 Stat,, 820), which lat-
ter act extended the townsite laws thereto. April 28, 1902, the arch-
deacon of the diocese, superintendent of missions, applied, through
the acting Indian agent, Leech Lake, to have these tracts set apart
for church purposes, which the Department held to be not permissible
under the provisions of law then existing for disposal of these lands.
October 27, 1903, and June 27, 1904, respectively, W. S. McClenahan,
judge of the district court in and for Cass count}^, and J. G. McGarry,
probate judge in and for said county, filed their respective townsite
declaratory statements for three hundred and twenty acres, including
these lands, each alleging an urban settlement and occupation of them
October 19, 1903, and applying to purchase them as trustee for the
occupants. November 22, and June 28, 1904, respectively, the local
office rejected these applications, for the reason that April 23, 1903,
these lands were withdrawn from entry and reserved " for the pur-
poses of reforestation," notified to the local office December 3, 1903.
Upon petition of the townsite settlers, the Department, February 13,
1904, held (unreported) that, if urban settlement of the land was
made before December 3, 1903, the case should be governed by the de-
cision in Richards Townsite (32 L. D., 319). After examination and
report by a special agent, directed by the Department, April 30, 1904,
the withdrawal of April 23, 1903, was modified to exclude these lands
therefrom. May 9, 1904, for the reason that Congress was consider-
ing a bill for disposal of these lands to the Diocese of Duluth, pro-
mulgation of its decision of April 30, 1904, was suspended by the
Department until March 31, 1905, when, Congress having adjourned
without passing the bill, the order of suspension was vacated ; and, on
March 6, 1905, the diocese by its archdeacon filed with (he Secretary
of the Interior and in your office applications to purchase the lands
under the act of March 3, 1905, supra, and April 17. 1905, filed a
similar application in the ,local office, which rejected the same, and
appeal was taken from that action to your office,
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June 13, 1905, in Bena Townsite (34 L. D., 24), it was held that
within and for the State of Minnesota, the judge of the district court
within and for the county, being designated by the law of that State
to act as the townsite trustee, was the proper officer to make the
entry.
In the meantime, March 8, and April 20, 1905, protests of the
archdeacon of the diocese were filed against the townsite entry, and
notice was ordered given of any further proceedings looking to ap-
propriation of these lands. Notice was duly given by the applicant
for townsite entry that he would offer proof at the local office, Sep-
tember 16, 1905, at which time both parties appeared, and the dio-
cese renewed its protest. Part of the record is a stipulation by coun-
sel for the parties respecting procedure.
November 13, 1905, the local office found that urban settlement was
made upon the lands October 19, 1903, by eleven persons, named,
who did some street clearing and other improvements between that
time and January 12, 1904, when the Indian agent ordered them
off and took charge of their properties and belongings ; that Septem-
ber 7, or 8, 1904, lines were run, some clearing done, and buildings
attempted to be built, when the agent stopped, and September 10,
1904, gave claimants notice to desist from further attempt at town
development; that April, 1905, the notice being recalled, the urban
settlers renewed their development work, and at the date of hearing
there were on the townsite twenty-one framed residences, two store
buildings, three-quarters of a mile of streets opened, cleared, and
partially graded ; the SE. ^ of the SE. J, Sec. 27, and part of the
N. | of the NE. ^, Sec. 34, were platted; the value of improvements
was $8,000; fifteen residents owned their houses, and with their fami-
lies resided therein on the townsite, and others not owning their
houses resided there with their families; that, excluding Indians,
there were not one hundred persons having a " fixed place of resi-
dence " upon the townsite, and that the SE. J of the SE. J, Sec. 27,
and the N. J of the NE. J, Sec. 34, only were settled upon, and were
all the land that could be entered as a townsite under the proof.
Both parties appealed to your office.
Your office reviewing the evidence pointed out omissions and er-
rors in the local office computation of residents, and found that
something more than one hundred and one persons were fixed resi-
dents of the townsite, and held that prior to the act of March 3,
1905, supra, there was no authority for dedication of any of these
lands to church or mission purposes, so that the prior application of
the diocese could not segregate them from appropriation as a town-
site; that the urban settlement, October, 1903, and application for
townsite entry under the act of February 9, 1903, supra, did segre-
gate the land and exclude it from purchase by the diocese; that the
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townsite application and proof are sufficient in form and substance,
and warrant entry of the three hundred and twenty acres applied
for, including the two tracts here in controversy, and allowed the
townsite entry, conditioned upon payment for the land and ap-
praised value of the timber thereon amounting, in the aggregate, to
$2401. The Diocese of Duluth appealed from your decision.
It is assigned as errors of your decision that the townsite proof
was not made by disinterested witnesses; in not finding that the
entry is speculative, for the benefit of a private corporation organized
as the Bena Townsite Company; in finding that there were one hun-
dred inhabitants, or that the lands were occupied as a townsite from
October 19, 1903, to April 28, 1905; in finding that the application
of the diocese under the act of March 3, 1905, was not " a continuance
of and consummation of the rights and equities therein dating from
March 1, 1902, and prior thereto," and was subsequent to the town-
site application.
The Department is not cited to any rule or decision requiring proof
in townsite cases by witnesses not resident of the town. All resi-
dents of the town are in such cases interested as beneficiaries of the
entry, but the notoriety of the fact of urban settlement is such that
the probability of entry upon fictitious evidence is much more remote
than is that of fictitious proof of compliance with law in case of
private entry. The case of W. W. Burke (1 L. D., 9G), cited by
appellant, was not a decision of the Department. That in Cassius
C. Hammond (7 L. D., 88) was, however, departmental, and holds
that with settlement claimants' proof, there must be two corroborat-
ing witnesses. It is true, in strictly technical sense, that a townsite
entry is generically a settlement entry, and all occupants of lots or
tracts within the town are interested, as their expectant titles must
come through the entry by their trustee. The rule however in ease
of Cassius C. Hammond does not exclude their competency. The
probability of conspiracy and false testimony is much more remote
in ease of townsite than of private entries, and the number of people
in a village community is a matter capable of observation to people
generally and capable of rebuttal, and the reason for proof by dis-
interested witnesses does not exist.
It is also impossible that a townsite entry under the laws of the
United States can be speculative, or for the benefit of a private cor-
poration. The law requires the entry to be for use and benefit of the
occupants or residents of the town, and the trust is enforceable by the
courts for benefit of the occupants as to the tracts which they sev-
erally occupy, and for the town community as to tracts not appro-
priated. Without neglect ,of duty or breach of the trust, there can
not be a speculative towmsite entry.
712 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
As to the number of resident inhabitants, the concurring findings
of the local office and your office to the number of ninety-seven are
fully supported by the testimony, and that number is sufficient to
include more than the land claimed by the diocese, but examination
of the evidence and the finding of the local office shows that it inad-
vertently overlooked and failed to include the family of Fred Tib-
bets, wife and child, and the local office deemed the telegraph operator
and the railroad agent not proper to be enumerated because they
boarded at the hotel, instead of living in houses owned by themselves
or rented. The latter two persons should not be regarded as tran-
sients. They must be regarded as members of the urban community,
as they or some other person in their stead to perform their duty
must be in and part of the community, so long as a railroad and a
telegraph with station and office exist in the town to transact the
business of transportation of persons and freight, and transmission
of intelligence. While persons in such employment are liable to be
transferred by their employers to other points, the necessity of traffic
requires the presence of such person, and while such a person is in
the town with no present probability of being transferred elsewhere,
he must be regarded as one of the residents entitled to be enumerated
in computing the number of the community or town population.
The act of March 3, 1905, contained nothing recognizing the
former requests of the diocese for dedication of these lands to mission
or church purposes, or for their purchase. No application under the
act could therefore be given relation to the earlier applications made
prior to date of its passage. In the meantime, the act of February
9, 1903, opened the land to urban appropriation, and such appro-
priation was made. Thereby the land became segregated against any
later appropriation by the diocese to its use.
The forcible exclusion of the urban settlers by the Indian agent
did not affect their rights acquired by settlement. The finding of the
local office and your office that their settlement was in good faith is
supported fully by the evidence in the record.
Your decision is affirmed.
contest affidavit-priority of application.
Jones et al. v. Bettis.
An application to contest received by mail will not be regarded as having been
presented or filed until it is taken up, numbered, and entered of record, and
where a contest application is presented in person and in the ordinary
course of business is accepted, numbered, and entered of record, and
another application to contest the same entry is at that time, unknown to
the local officers, in the unopened mail in the office, priority will be accorded
the application first accepted and filed.
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Acting Secretary Wilson to the Commissioner of the General Land
( F. L. C.
)
Office, June 26, 1900. ( A. W. P.
)
George W. Jones has appealed from your office decision of October
28, 1905, wherein you affirm the action of the local -officers in rejecting
his affidavit of contest against homestead entry No. 2G804 ( Wakeeney
scries), made by Minnie Bettis on October 24, 1903, for the SW. },
Sec. 12, T. 13 S., E. 39 W., Colby, Kansas, land district, and awarding
a prior right of contest against said entry to Joseph Henry Wells.
It appears from a note attached to Jones's affidavit of contest,
signed by the register and receiver, that it
—
'was filed in this office about :30 A. M., September 4, 1005, and rejected for the
reason that at A. M., on September 4. 1905, the contest affidavit of Joseph
Henry Wells against said homestead entry was upon the register's desk in the
unopened mail, and filed prior to the affidavit of George W. Jones.
The following notice appears to have been given Jones by letter
of September 4, 1905, signed by the register
:
Referring to your application to contest II. E. No. 20804 made Oct. 24th,
1004 1100.°,], by Minnie Bettis, for the SW. h Sec. 12, T. 13 S., R. 30 W., you
are advised that at A. M. Sept. 4th, 100— [1005]. a contest affidavit for the
above land by Joseph II. Wells, was in the mail and unopened on the regis-
ter's desk, at the time you made your application, shortly after A. M., hence
notice can not issue to you for the reason that the application of Wells was
the first filed, the mail was not opened until after you left the office, as other-
wise you would have been informed when here.
In affirming the above action of the local officers, by decision of
October 28, 1905, yon state that
:
It is alleged by Jones, by way of affidavit, that he reached your office at
four minutes after nine o'clock on the morning of September 4, and made in-
quiry if a contest had been filed against said entry and was informed that
there was not; that the receiver then gave him a blank affidavit of contest
and affiant sat down at his desk and prepared the affidavit; that affiant re-
mained in your office until noon of the same day, and received no notice of any
other contest.
In the matter of alleged simultaneous applications to contest it has been held
that the first one accepted is entitled to proceed. (33 L. I)., 582.) The same
rule would not apply in this case for the reason that Wells's affidavit had been
m your office some minutes before Jones reached there and for one-half hour
before the contest affidavit of Jones was actually filed.
I see no sufficient reason for disturbing your action in awarding the prior
light of contest to Wells, whose affidavit will remain suspended pending the
final termination of the contest brought by the former.
From said decision Jones lias appealed to this Department, urging
that it was error to award (he prior right of contest to Wells. He
also alleges thai the record does not warrant the statements con-
tained in your office decision'. " that he reached the local office at four
minutes after nine o'clock on the morning of September 4," and that
his " affidavit of contest was filed at 9 :30 A. M."
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The first statement appears to have been based upon Jones's cor-
roborated affidavit accompanying his appeal to your office. Therein
he alleges that when he arrived at the local office " it was just four
minutes of 9 o'clock." In the corroborating affidavits of Fred B.
Lewis and Martha Coleman it is alleged that affiants arrived at the
local office a few minutes before nine o'clock A. M., and that Jones
arrived a minute or two later. As to the second statement, it will be
observed that in the note attached to Jones's affidavit the local officers
state that it " was filed in this office about 9 :30 A. M." Referring to
the Wells affidavit therein they state that it was upon the register's
desk in the unopened mail, and filed prior to Jones's affidavit. In the
letter to Jones notifying him of the rejection thereof, they refer to
his application as having been made " shortly after 9 A. M." Therein
they again state that at 9 A. M. the Wells application was in the
unopened mail on the register's desk, which " was not opened until
after you left the office." It will also be observed that the local offi-
cers in their letter transmitting the appeal of Jones to your office state
that when the door was opened at 9 A. M. Jones " entered the office,
procured the status of said entry No. 26804, called for and received a
blank affidavit of contest, sat down at a desk and at his leisure pre-
pared, presented, and was sworn to his affidavit of contest against
said homestead entry, all of which transpired after the office was
opened at 9 o'clock A. M., on said September 4, 1905, while the affi-
davit of contest of Joseph Henry Wells was on file promptly at and
before 9 o'clock A. M. on said day."
From the above quotations from the record it would appear that
neither of the statements contained in your office decision, to which
objection is made, is technically correct. This is material, however,
only to the extent that such corrections may affect the determination
as to which of the affidavits was first filed with the local officers.
The only question presented herein for consideration is as to the
priority between Jones and Wells as contestants of Minnie Bettis's
homestead entry. It is clear from certain statements contained in
the local officers' letters, and hereinbefore quoted, that at the time
Jones appeared at the local land office and prior to the subsequent
filing of his affidavit of contest, the contest affidavit of Wells was in
the unopened mail on the register's desk ; but that this mail was not-
opened until after his (Jones's) affidavit had been accepted and con-
test fee paid. Can such a contest application in the unopened mail
on the register's desk be said to have been filed prior to one properly
tendered at the local office by an applicant and accepted without
knowledge of the receipt of the mail application? Both the find-
ing of the local officers and decision of your office hold in the affirm-
ative. In your said decision it was determined that the two appli-
cations in question were not simultaneously filed, as in the case of
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Barnes v. Smith (33 L. D., 582), therein cited. In that case, it will
be observed, both applications were presented by mail and received
;it the local office at the same time. However, they were not regarded
as simultaneous, it being held that the one first taken up, numbered,
and entered on the records, in the regular course of business, was
entitled to precedence. While not governing in the case at bar, yet
it might reasonably be inferred from the principle therein enunci-
ated, and the Department now so holds, that where a contest applica-
tion is received by mail, it will not be regarded as having been
presented or filed until such application has in fact been taken up,
numbered, and entered on the records.
In the somewhat similar case of Kelso v. Janeway et </J. (22 L. D.,
242), it was held (syllabus) that:
As between two applications to contest an entry, one received by mail in
due course, and lying unopened on the register's desk at nine o'clock in the
morning, and one presented in person at such hour, priority should be accorded
the latter.
The effect of this holding would appear to give precedence to the
application presented in person over that received and among the
unopened mail at 9 A. M., only when the former was in fact also
tendered at that hour, but the decision seems to go further than indi-
cated by the above syllabus. Therein it was said (p. 244) that:
Where applications received by mail are lying on the desk of the local officers
on the opening of the office for business, if in the ordinary course of business
the mail is in fact opened and the application thus in business hours becomes
presented to the officers, it will have priority, but if in like manner an appli-
cant presents his contest at once, at nine (/clock or before the mail is opened,
then such application should have priority.
In the case at bar, as stated, Wells's application was in the
unopened mail at 9 A. M., at which hour upon the opening of the
local office Jones entered, procured the status of the homestead entry
of Minnie Bettis, received a blank affidavit which he prepared, was
sworn to, and filed shortly thereafter, but prior to the opening of the
mail and filing of the Wells contest application, and in accordance
with the views herein expressed priority must be accorded the appli-
cation of Jones, and the judgment of your office to the contrary
reversed.
Accompanying the record is also an appeal prosecuted by the
entrywoman, Minnie Bettis, and a separate protest of George W.
Jones from what purports to be the erroneous action of the local offi-
cers in proceeding with hearing and determination of the Wells con-
test during the pendency of Jones's appeal, but, as the same were no
part thereof, they have not been considered by the Department, but
are herewith returned, with'the accompanying papers, lor appropri-
ate action by your office.
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school land-survey-fractional township.
State of California.
Where at the time of survey of a township a portion thereof was returned as a
" salt lake now dry," and no further survey of the township has since been
made, the State, after a lapse of more than forty years, is justified in
accepting such survey as a final and complete survey of the township and in
proceeding with the adjustment of its school land grant upon the theory
that the township is fractional.
Acting Secretary Wilson to the Commissioner of the General Land
(F. L. C.) Office, June 26, 1900. (F. W. C.)
The State of California has appealed from your office decision of
December 15, 1905, holding for cancellation its indemnity school
land list of selections, K. and E. No. 198, state No. 301G, being of lot
2 and NE. J of SW. J, Sec. 3, S. i of SE. J of Sec. 28, NAV. J NW. J,
Sec. 32, N. i of NW. J and SE. J NE. J, Sec. 34, all in T. 40 N., E.
3 W., M. D. M., Eedding land district, California, embracing 314.70
acres, the selection being made in lieu of undescribed lands amounting
to 314.70 acres, Sec. 16, T. 30 S., E. 38 E., M. D. M., alleged to be
mineral in character.
The decision appealed from holds that the selection is invalid for
the reason that the base land is unsurveyed. Other objections are-
made to the list but are immaterial in view of the conclusion herein
reached.
It seems that survey was made of township 30 south, range 38 east,
M. D. M., in 1856, by which public lands within the township were
surveyed into sections and parts of sections, amounting to 14136.36
acres, the remaining portion of the township, about 9000 acres, being
returned as within a " salt lake now dry." If the portion of the town-
ship within said lake was dry land it should have been regularly sur-
veyed and platted and not meandered. No further or additional sur-
vey has ever been made of the portion of the township returned as
within the limits of this lake.
On this return the question arises : Was the State on May 10, 1897,
more than forty years after the survey of 1856, warranted in treating
that survey as a complete survey of the township and proceeding with
the adjustment of its grant in aid of common schools, accordingly?
Without determining at this time as to whether survey should have
been made of the portion of the township shown by the survey of
1856 to be within a lake, or whether survey thereof could now be
made, under all the circumstances it is the opinion of this Department
that the State was fully warranted in accepting the survey of 1856 as
a final and complete survey of the township, and in proceeding in the
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adjustment of its school land grant upon the theory that the town-
ship was fractional. Under this theory the State became entitled to
9G0 acres under its school grant on account of said township. By the
survey of 1856, section 3G is in place. There was no section 1G, the
part of the township corresponding thereto being within the reported
" dry lake."
If the State took the entire section 36 she would still be* entitled to
indemnity, because of the fractional township, to the amount of 320
acres, and if no other selections have been made on account of the loss
of section 16 it would seem that the selection in question might be
passed, if otherwise satisfactory. The fact that the State in its selec-
tion specifically defines the loss as being a part of section 16, mineral
in character, should not defeat its substantial rights in the premises,
provided it amends its list so as to show that the lieu lands are
claimed because of the fractional character of the township. If the
State insists, however, and persists in its claim to the section 16 in
place, lost because of mineral character, she must await such time as,
by appropriate survey, the said section 16 may be identified.
In view of this holding it is deemed inadvisable to pass finally upon
the sufficiency of the selection in its present form, and the matter is
therefore remanded to your office for further consideration and de-
cision in the light of the holding herein made.
Richmond and Other Lode Claims.
Motion for review of departmental decision of April 12, 1906,
34 L. D., 554, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, June 30, 1906.
school land grant—exemption of mineral lands.
State of South Dakota v. Delicate.
The grant of sections sixteen and thirty-six, to the State of South Dakota for
school purposes, by the act of February 22, 1880, took effect on the admis-
sion of the State into the Union as to lands of the class and character
subject to the grant in such of said sections as were at that date identified
by the government surveys. As to unsurveyed lands, the grant does not
attach until identification by approved survey, and if at that time any of
the lands embraced in such sections are known to be mineral in character
they are excepted from the grant.
Any portion of the superficial area within the boundary lines fixed by the
location of a valid lode mining claim, in conflict with a school section,
may rightfully be claimed and held under the mining laws.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the (Jawnil Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 30, 1906.
'
(F. H. B.)
December 30, 1901, Thomas W. Delicate, as trustee, made entry
(No. 1243) for the Road Agent and six other lode mining claims,
survey No. 1408, Rapid City, South Dakota, land district.
It appearing from the field notes of survey and the official plat
that one of the claims of the entered group, the Atlantic, embraces
a small conflict with, and in the northeast corner of, school section
16, T. 2 S., R. 6 E., B. H. M., your office, December 12, 1903, directed
the local officers, among other things, to notify the proper authorities
of the State of South Dakota accordingly and to allow them sixty
days within which to show cause why the mining claim should not
pass to patent.
In response the State asserted, through its Attorney-General, and
submitted a written argument to sustain, its claim to the land in con-
troversy, and prayed that to the extent thereof the mineral entry be
canceled and title thereto declared to be vested in the State.
Thereafter, by decision of January 16, 1905, finding and stating
the facts to be that the Atlantic claim was located January 2, 1897,
and that the township survey embracing the school section in ques-
tion was executed August 12 to September 8, 1898, approved May 23,
1899, your office sustained the entry upon the ground, in substance and
effect, that until the section was identified by the approved survey no
right in the State could attach, and that prior to identification and at
the time the mining claim was located the land in controversy was
subject to location and entry under the mining laws.
From that decision the State has appealed to the Department. In
brief and in so far as is pertinent to the present controversv, its con-
tention is that by virtue of the provisions of the enabling act of
February 22, 1889 (25 Stat., 676), whereunder it (together with
North Dakota, Montana, and Washington) was admitted to the
Union, and whereby sections 16 and 36 in every township were granted
to the State for the benefit of public schools, the right and title of
the State attached absolutely, at and as of the date of the act, to all
lands, whether surveyed or unsurveyed—then and thereafter in-
cluded in such sections—except only as to such lands as were known
at that date to be mineral in character.
The granting provisions of the enabling act, applicable to the
four States admitted under it and upon which the appellant State
here relies, are contained in sections 10 and 11 thereof, as follows:
Sec. 10. That upon the admission of each of said States into the Union sec-
tions numbered sixteen and thirty-six in everey township of said proposed
States, and where such sections, or any parts thereof, have been sold or other-
wise disposed of by or under the authority of any act of Congress, other lands
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equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one-quarter section.
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which (he same is taken,
are hereby granted to said States for the support of common schools, such
indemnity lands to be selected within said States in such manner as the legis-
lature may provide, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior: Pro-
vided, That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections embraced in permanent
reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to the
grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced
in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the
grants or to the indemnity provisions of this act until the reservation shall
have been extinguished and such lands be restored to, and become a part of, the
public domain.
Sec. 11. That all lands herein granted for educational purposes shall be dis-
posed of only at public sale, and at a price not less than ten dollars per acre,
the proceeds to constitute a permanent school-fund, the interest of which only
shall be expended in support of said schools. But said lands may, under
such regulations as the legislatures shall prescribe, be leased for periods of not
more than five years, in quantities not exceeding one section to any one per*
son or company; and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption, homestead
entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be reserved for school purposes only.
It is urged that the reservation, in section 11, from pre-emption,
homestead entry or any other entry under the land laws of the
United States, of the lands therein referred to, " whether surveyed or
unsurveyed," distinguishes the grant, in respect of the time when the
State's title to the unsurveyed lands takes effect, from the usual grants
to other States for like purposes; and, as lending strength to this
view, that the exceptions from the operation of the grant, recited in
section 10, are in terms of the past tense and include only sections 16
and 36 sold or otherwise disposed of, or embraced in permanent reser-
vations, etc., at the date of the act.
To support its contention the State cites certain decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, with respect to grants to particular
States, containing expressions to the general effect that words of
present grant, in the absence of restraining clauses, import an imme-
diate transfer of title—a grant in praesenti—although subsequent
proceedings may be required to give precision to that title and attach
it to specific tracts, and that whenever the identity of the granted
lands is ascertained the title relates back to the date of the grant.
It may be remarked, in passing to a consideration of the question
presented by the appeal, that the grants to the four States admitted
under the enabling act of sections L6 and 36, if available, were to take
effect " upon the admission of each of said States into the Union "
and not as of the date of the act; and South Dakota's admission was
proclaimed by the President November 2, 1889 (26 Stat.. L549).
The infirmity in the State's contention, in the view of the Depart-
ment, is in respect of the force and effect of the grant so far as per-
tains to the unsurveyed lands which should be or were thereafter.
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upon extension of the public surveys, embraced in sections 1G and 36.
Neither the terms of the act nor the decisions cited sustain the theory
that, unless excepted by reason of conditions existing at the date of
the State's admission, such lands forthwith became subject to and are
within the operation of the grant.
In Schulenberg v. Harriman (21 Wall., 44, 02), cited by the State,
the court said that " unless there are other clauses in a statute
restraining the operation of words of present grant, these must be
taken in their natural sense to import an immediate transfer of title,
although subsequent proceedings may be required to give precision
to that title and attach it to specific tracts." And in the case of Grin-
nell v. Railroad Co. (103 U. S., 739), cited in the same connection, it
was held that the grant of alternate odd-numbered sections, within
certain limits, on each side of lines of railroad to be thereafter con-
structed was a grant in praesenti, and that upon definite location of
the roads the identity of the granted lands was ascertained and the
title related back to the date of the grant.
The Department fully recognizes the force of the general prin-
ciple expressed in the first of the above cases, followed and in effect
restated in the second, but the question here, as in any case, is in
its application. Clearly, as the language imports, the principle is
applicable only with respect to such lands as are within the in-
tendment and purview of the grant; or as it may be stated, observ-
ing the language of the court in the second case, the title which re-
lates back to the date of the grant must attach, upon ascertainment
of their identity, to the "granted" lands. What is within the
grant in each case is the first inquiry; and here the grants by the
sections above quoted are subject to the further provisions of section
18 of the act, as follows
:
That all mineral lands shall be exempted from the grants made by this act.
But if sections sixteen and thirty-six, or any subdivision or portion of any
smallest subdivision thereof in any township shall be found by the Department
of the Interior to be mineral lands, said States are hereby authorized and
empowered to select, in legal subdivisions, an equal quantity of other unappro-
priated lands in said States, in lieu thereof, for the use and benefit of the com-
mon schools of said States.
In view of the express provisions of this section it is manifest
that the last clause of section 11 was not intended to include mineral
lands or entries thereof under the mining laws ; and equally that the
excepting provisions of section 10, the language of which is pointed
out by the State as indicating the time at which adverse rights
must have intervened, have no application to mineral appropriations.
By the terms of section 18 mineral lands are expressly exempted
from the grants made by the act, and adequate provision is made for
indemnity to each of the States concerned for such sections 16 and
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36, or subdivisions thereof, as " shall be found. ... to be min-
eral lands," the tense importing that future disclosures were in con-
templation. The express exemption is but a substantial reiteration
of the provisions of section 2318, Kevised Statutes, long antedating
the State's grant, that
—
In all cases lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except
as otherwise expressly directed by law.
Pursuant thereto it has usually been specifically provided in the
various grants made by Congress that mineral lands should be ex-
empted ; and the exemption is uniformly held to embrace all lands
known to be mineral in character at the date title thereto would
otherwise definitely vest.
The cases above mentioned are types of others cited by the State,
and involved grants to aid in the future construction of lines of
railroad. Giving the fullest effect to what is said by the court in
each case, in connection with the facts thereof, as to the terms of
present grant in which the various acts under consideration were
framed, as importing grants in praesenti, and as to the retrospective
relation of title upon identification of the subject-matter by the
filing of maps of definite location, it does not follow, and the court
has not held, that title will so relate and embrace lands which are
ascertained prior to the filing of such maps to be of any excepted class
or character. In holding, therefore, that upon definite attachment
title relates back to the date of the granting act the court plainly
speaks only of the lands to which title actually attaches under and by
virtue of the act.
The doctrine of the relation of title necessarily implies the im-
perfection of title until the time when the relation occurs. So in
this case, upon the public lands which were unsurveyed at the date
of the State's admission there were no sections 16 and 36 to pass by
the grant. Until the public surveys were extended thereover the
State's title, if any, was in prospect merely: that title could attach
only to the specific sections. Not until those sections were ascer-
tained and established could the grant become operative as to them
and the legal title thereto pass, and then only if they were of the
class and character of lands subject to the grant.
That lands thereafter embraced in sections 16 and 36 and at that
time known to be mineral in character were not intended to pass
under the grant is, as before suggested, plainly apparent from the
exempting provisions of section 18 of the act, which embrace all
lands which "shall be found. ... to be mineral lands." It is not
a defeat of the grant in any part by conditions subsequently arising:
mineral lands, if known to be such, are not within the grant ; and the
grant can not attach to specific sections, or parts of sections, compris-
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ing lands of known mineral character. Any such lands, therefore, so
found to be mineral in character prior to the ascertainment, by
approved survey, of sections 1G and 36, at which time the grant would
otherwise become operative as to them and the legal title thereto pass,
are within the exemption. See Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Co. (154 U.S., 288).
The question hereinabove discussed was considered by the Depart-
ment in the recent case of State of South Dakota v. Trinity Gold
Mining Company (34 L. D., 485), and, by reason of the similarity
in material particulars in the corresponding sections of the acts pro-
viding for grants of lands to Utah and to South Dakota for the
support of common schools, was disposed of under the principles
remarked in the case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim (33 L. D., 37)
and announced in the decisions cited in the latter case, which came
up from Utah. The principles as thus announced are of equal ap-
plication and force here; but in view of the contentions which are
elaborately and earnestly pressed upon the attention of the Depart-
ment in the case at bar, and especially whereby it is sought to dis-
tinguish the grant here involved, the question has in this case been
reviewed at length.
It is also objected by the State, in effect, that as the conflict em-
braces but a portion of the superficial area of the Atlantic claim,
which is not asserted to contain in itself any mineral deposits, it
was not exempted from the grant, irrespective of the date when
the latter would take effect. In reply to this it may be said, whilst the
portion of the mining claim so in conflict with the school section is
altogether at one side and south of the indicated lode line of the
claim, yet as it is within the boundary lines fixed by the location,
which appears to be in all respects regular, it may rightfully be
claimed and held under the mining laws. This is well explained
in Lindley on Mines (2nd Ed., Vol. I, Sec. 71, p. 101), wherein,
contrasting the original lode law of July 2G, 1866 (14 Stat., 251),
with the general law of May 10, 1872 (17 Stat., 91), the author of
that treatise says:
Under the act of 1872 tbe miner locates a surface which must be so defined
as to include the top, or apex, of his lode. Failing in this, he obtains nothing.
If he mistakes the course of his vein, it is his loss. He can only hold the
vein on its course to the extent that the top, or apex, thereof is found within
his boundaries. He may thus acquire a superficies fifteen hundred feet in
length by six hundred feet in width, if local regulations do not restrict these
measurements.
In other words, under the old law he located the lode. Under the new, he
must locate a piece of land containing the top, or apex, of the lode. While
the vein is still the principal thing, in that it is for the sake of the vein
that the location is made, the location must be of a piece of land including the
top, or apex, of the vein. If he makes such a location, containing the top, or
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apex, of his discovered lode, be will be entitled to all other lodes having their
tops, or apices, within their surface boundaries.
It is not alleged on the part of the State that there has been no
sufficient lode discovery within the limits of the Atlantic claim, and
no further question remains to be considered.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
school land grant—mining claim—plioof of mineral
character.
State of South Dakota v. Walsh.
Where the mineral character of a mining claim in conflict with a section
claimed by the State under its school-land grant is challenged ,by the
State, the usual formal proofs under mineral patent proceedings will not
suffice, but in such case the mineral character of the claim involved must
be established by substantive proof; and the State is not bound to take
the initiative at a hearing ordered to determine that question.
Case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim, 33 L. D., 37, cited and distinguished.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.) June 30, 1900. ' (F. H. B.)
The State of South Dakota has appealed from your office decision
of October 12, 11)05, holding for dismissal its protest against the
entry (No. 1507, July 18, 1904) by John Walsh, Jr., for the Mitchell
lode mining claim, survey No. 1811, Rapid City, South Dakota, land
district, embracing a conflict with school section 30, T. 5 N., R. 2 E.,
B. H. M.
February 24, 1905, after mineral entry had been made and the
record received, your office directed the local officers to notify the
State authorities of the allowance of the entry and that sixty days'
time would be afforded them within which to show cause why it
should not be permitted to stand.
In response the State submitted protest against the entry in which
it is denied that the land in controversy was known to be mineral in
character at the date of approval of the township survey embracing
the section in question, it being also therein contended that the grant
to the State of sections 10 and 30 took effect as a present grant as to
all sections not otherwise appropriated or known to be mineral in
character at the date of the State's admission to the Union.
Upon receipt of the protest, and on May 0, 1905, your office ordered
a hearing, to determine whether the conflict area was known to be
mineral in character " at the ,date the right of the Stale would other-
wise have attached thereto." What date was considered in that con-
nection, or whether the question in that behalf raised by the protest
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of the State was discussed in this particular case, does not appear
from the record.
However, by the decision first above mentioned, from which the
pending appeal is taken, your office dismissed the protest, Siting
that the local officers had
—
transmitted evidence of service of said order for a hearing upon the mineral
claimant and also upon the State authorities and reported that default was
made by both parties at the hearing, and that no action of any kind had been
taken therein.
The mining claim involved was located August 1, 1899, the abstract
of title recites; and the records of your office disclose that the public
survey embracing tin 1 section concerned was executed October 27-28,
1899, and approved March 6, 1901. It is averred on behalf of the
State that in the field notes of survey of the township which includes
the land in controversy, the lands therein were returned as agri-
cultural.
For the reasons given in the case of South Dakota r. Delicate, this
day decided by the Department (31 L. D., 717). the tract in contro-
versy i^ excepted from the grant to the State if known to be mineral
in character prior to the approval of the public survey identifying
the section with which the conflict appears.
In the case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim (33 L. D., 37) the
Department held (syllabus) that
—
A mineral location, made prior to the admission of the State of Utah into the
Union, was not of itself sufficient to establish the mineral character of the land
located so as to defeat the grant to the State for school purposes made by sec-
tion of the act of July 1G, 1894; but where the State was specially notified of
the pendency of an application for patent under such location, and made no
objection by way of protest or otherwise to the allowance of the mineral entry,
it is bound by the record made upon such application, and a hearing for the
purpose of determining the character of the land is unnecessary.
In the present case, however, the State of South Dakota responded
to the notice specially served on it by denying that the tract in contro-
versy was known to be mineral in character " at the date of field sur-
vey or approval of survey." Upon extension of the public surveys
and approval thereof, in the absence of anything in the official records
to the contrary, each section 16 and 30 thereby ascertained pre-
sumptively passes to the State under its grant. Where, therefore, the
mineral character of a conflicting mining claim is challenged as in this
case, the usual formal proofs under mineral patent proceedings will
not suffice. In such case the mineral character of the claim involved
must be established by substantive proof, and the State is not bound
to take the initiative at a hearing ordered for that purpose. The
mineral entry allowed here without previous notice to the State can
not have the effect to cast the burden upon the State ; and the date of
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approval of the survey whereby the schoo] section has been identified
and defined is the date as of which the mineral character of the claim
must be established.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly, and the record
i- returned for further proceedings agreeably hereto.
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Abandonment.
See Contest.
Adverse Claim.
See Mining Claim.
Alaskan Lands.
Paragraph 13 of regulations of
August 1, 1004, relating to townsites
in Alaska, amended 71
The provisions of section G of the
act of May 14, 180S, conferring upon
the Secretary of the Interior author-
ity to sell to the owner or owners of
a wagon road or tramway, not to ex-
ceed twenty acres of public land, for
terminal facilities, at each end of the
road, contemplates the sale of an ab-
solute fee in the lands, and where
the lands, at the date applied for,
are included within a forest reserve,
they are not subject to sale under
said section, notwithstanding the
wagon road or tramway in connec-
tion with which they are desired
may have been constructed prior to
the creation of the reserve 10
In view of the provisions of the
act of February 1, 1905, transferring
to the Secretary of Agriculture the
execution of certain laws affecting
public lands within the limits of for-
est reserves, and the construction
placed upon that act by the Secre-
tary of the Interior and concurred in
by the Secretary of Agriculture, ap-
plications for permits for use of
rights of way within forest reserves
on account of wagon roads or tram-
ways, under section of the act of
May 14, 1808, come within the juris-
diction and control of the Secretary
of Agriculture 10
Allotment.
See Indian Lands.
Amendment.
See Application,
Appeal.
See Practice.
Page.
Applieation.
No rights are acquired by an ap-
plication to purchase under the tim-
ber and stone act presented at a time
when the land is not subject to
such appropriation 380
Pending the disposition of a
school land indemnity selection, even
though erroneously received, no oth-
er application including any portion
of the land embraced in such selec-
tion should be accepted, nor will any
rights be considered as initiated by
the tender of any such application 12
Applicants for public lands lose
no rights by. mistakes and laches of
officers of the land department ; but
persons claiming the benefit of this
rule must show that they have an in-
choate right and that they have not
been so dilatory in assertion of it as
to give rival bona fide applicants :i
superior right 380
An application to amend a home-
stead entry, as well as all affidavits
filed in support thereof, should be
executed before some officer desig-
nated by section 2204 of the Re-
vised Statutes and the acts of March
11, 1002, and March 4, 1004, amend-
ing that section 680
An appeal from the rejection of a
defective application to enter does
not operate to reserve the land and
entitles the applicant only to a judg-
ment as to the correctness of such
action at the time it was taken, and
where the application was properly
rejected, it is immaterial, in the face
of an adverse appropriation of the
land, whether the applicant received
proper notice of such action 541
Where a foreign-horn homestead
applicant fails to file with his appli-
cation proof of naturalization, or
that he has declared his intention to
become a citizen of the United
States, it is within the discretion of
the local officers to receive and bold
the application and afford the appli-
cant an opportunity to furnish the
required proof. <>r to reject the ap-
plication outright, in which Latter
event it can have no effect to segre
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Page,
gate the land from other appropria-
tion 541
Where proceedings are instituted
on behalf of the Government solely
for the purpose of clearing the record
of an existing entry, no question of
a preference right is involved, and
where a relinquishment is subse-
quently filed and there are no valid
adverse rights outstanding, the rule
that no application to enter shall be
received until proper notation of the
cancellation of the entry is made
upon the records of the local office,
has no application 437
Approximation.
See Horn est cad, sub-title, Soldiers'
Additional; Alining claim.
Arid Land.
Circular of April 4, 1906, relative
to applications for water rights
under act of .Tune 17, 1902 544
The act of .Tune 17, 1902, affords
authority for the purchase by the
United States of an incomplete irri-
gation system to be used in connec-
tion with, and to become a part of, a
larger system contemplated by the
government 351
Public lands lying within the irri-
gable area of a reclamation project
constructed under the provisions of
the act of Tune 17, 1902, can be dis-
posed of only under the homestead
law and in conformity with the legal
subdivisions defined by the public
land surveys 65
Lands withdrawn under the pro-
visions of the act of June 17, 1902,
from all disposition " except under
the homestead laws," are not subject
to soldiers' additional entry under
section 2306 of the Revised Statutes. 653
An application to make soldiers'
additional entry under section 2300
of the Revised Statutes, although
filed prior to the passage of the act
of June 17, 1902, and pending at the
date of an order withdrawing the
lands covered thereby under the pro-
visions of said act, is not effective to
except the lands from such with-
drawal 311
An application to enter under the
provisions of section 2306 of the Re-
vised Statutes, even though approved
by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, will not, prior to the al-
lowance of entry thereon, prevent a
withdrawal of the land covered there-
by under provisions of the act of
June 17, 1902 560
Directions given relative to the
Page
survey, subdivision, appraisal and
sale of certain lands in Idaho with-
in the irrigable area of the Minidoka
reclamation project, withdrawn from
entry, except under the homestead
law, for disposal in accordance with
the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902, and subsequently reserved by
the President, under section 23S0 of
the Revised Statutes, as a town site_ 16
There is nothing in the act of Tune
17, 1902, to prohibit a graduated
scale of the annual payments re-
quired of users of water from rec-
lamation projects constructed under
said act, and in all cases where it
is deemed advisable this plan of pay-
ment may be adopted 78
The drilling of wells in the vicin-
ity of an irrigation project, for the
purpose of determining whether
underground water exists that may
be made available in connection with
the project, comes within the power
conferred by the second section of
the act of Tune 17, 1902, " to make
examinations and surveys . . . for
the development of waters " 533
Under the authority conferred upon
the Secretary of the Interior by the
act of Tune 17, 1902, he may, in his
discretion, enter into contracts for
the construction of irrigation works
or construct such works by labor em-
ployed and operated under the super-
intendence and direction of govern-
ment officials 567
No such rights are acquired by set-
tlement upon lands embraced in the
entry of another as will attach upon
cancellation of such entry, where at
that time the lands are withdrawn
for use in connection with an irriga-
tion project under the act of Tune
17. 10(»2; nor is there any authority
in said act for purchase by the gov-
ernment of the settler's claim or of
the improvements placed upon the
land by him 478
The act of Tune 17, 1902, contem-
plates that the United States shall
be the full owner of irrigation works
constructed thereunder, and clearly
inhibits the acquisition of property,
for use in connection with an irriga-
tion project, subject to servitudes or
perpetual obligation to pay rents to
a landlord holding the legal title
thereto 180
Uncompleted claims to lands with-
drawn under the provisions of the
act of Tune 17, 1902, and determined
to be needed for construction of irri-
gation works in connection with a
project that has been found practi-
cable, should not be allowed to be
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perfected, but should remain in the
same status as existed at the time
the determination was made and the
rights of the claimants adjusted
upon the basis of that status 421
Lands hold by virtue of a desert
land entry are held in private owner-
ship within the meaning of the act
of June 17, 1902, and the entryman
or his assignee is entitled to the
same rights and privileges and is
subject to the same conditions and
limitations, so far as the right to
the use of water is concerned, as any
other owner of lands within the irri-
gable area of an irrigation project
constructed under the provisions of
said act 29
All entries of lands withdrawn
under the provisions of the act of
June 17, 1902, are subject to the con-
ditions imposed by section 3 thereof,
and a revocation of the withdrawal
operates to remove those conditions
and leaves the entries in the same
situation as entries made prior to the
withdrawal, and such conditions can
not, by force of a second withdrawal,
be reimposed upon such of the en-
trios made during the period of the
first withdrawal as had not been
perfected at the date of the second
withdrawal 445
The provision of section 5 of the
act of June 17, 1902, restricting the
sale of a right to use water for land
in private ownership to not more 4
than one hundred and sixty acres,
will not prevent the recognition of a
vested water right for a larger area
and protection of the same by allow-
ing the continued flowage of the
water covered by the right through
the works constructed by the gov-
ernment 351
The Secretary of the Interior has
authority to make temporary leases
of lands reserved or acquired by pur-
chase for use in connection with an
irrigation project contemplated un-
der the provisions of the act of June
17, 1902, whore use under the pro-
posed lease will not interfere with
the use and control of the lands
when needed for the purposes con-
templated by the reservation or pur-
chase 480
A homesteader whose entry is
within the irrigable area of an irri-
gation project under the act of June
17, 1902, but not subject to the re-
strictions, limitations and conditions
of said act, can not, under the law,
prior to the acquisition of title to
the land, enter into an agreemenl
to convey to a water-users associa-
x'age.
tion any portion of the land em-
braced in his entry, to be held in
trust by such association and sold
for the benefit of the homesteader to
persons competent to make entry of
such lands 532
The fact that the act of April 18,
1896, provides that the lands in the
abandoned portion of the Fori As
siniboine military reservation, there-
by opened to entry, .shall be dis-
posed of only under the laws therein
specifically named, does not prevent
a withdrawal, under the provisions
of the act of June 17, 1902, of any
of said lands as to which no vested
right has attached 653
Lands formerly within the Fort
Buford military reservation were by
the act of May 19, 1900, restored to
the public domain and made subject
to existing laws relating to disposal
of the public lands, except such laws
as are not specifically named therein,
and are subject to withdrawal under
the reclamation act as other por-
tions of the public domain subject
to entry under the general land
laws ; and a withdrawal of such
lands for reclamation purposes is
effective as to all of the lands for
which entry was not made within
three months from the filing of the
township plat, and prior to the with-
drawal 347
The power conferred upon the Sec-
retary of the Interior by the act of
Juno 17, 1902, to make the neces-
sary withdrawals to carry into effect
the provisions of the act, and to ac-
quire rights and property for the
purpose contemplated, implies the
right to appropriate for irrigation
purposes public lands to which the
United States has the full legal and
equitable title, but the inchoate
rights acquired by a bona fide settle-
ment made in pursuance of and in
strict compliance with the public
land laws should not be arbitrarily
taken without compensation. In de-
termining the compensation it
should be considered with reference
to the loss sustained by the settler
in depriving him of his inchoate
right by the arbitrary taking of
lands which he had cultivated, im-.
proved and resided upon under au-
thority of law with a view to the
acquisition of the title 155
The Secretary of the Interior has
no authority under the provisions of
(lie seventh section of the act of
June 17, 1902, to compensate settlers
upon lands within the limits of a
withdrawal made in connection with
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an irrigation project unless they
have in good faith acquired an in-
choate right to the land hy com-
plying with the requirements of law
up to the date of the withdrawal and
have such a claim as ought to be re-
spected by the United States 155
Withdrawals under the provisions
of the act of June 17, 1902, in con-
nection with irrigation projects, will
be made as follows :
1. When a site has been selected,
with a view to making an examina-
tion and survey for the purpose of
determining whether the construc-
tion of an irrigation project upon
such site is practicable and advis-
able, a withdrawal will immediately
be made of all lands believed to be
susceptible of irrigation from such
contemplated works, in accordance
with the second form of withdrawal
provided for by the third section of
the act of June 17, 1902, and at the
same time a preliminary withdrawal
will be made of lands that may be
needed for use in the construction
and operation of the works, which
will reserve such lands from entry
of every character but will not affect
entries previously made.
2. As soon as it shall be deter-
mined that the project is practicable
and advisable and the construction
of the same is approved and author-
ized by the Secretary of the Interior,
a withdrawal will be made of all
public lands shown by the examina-
tion and survey to be required for
use in the construction and opera-
tion of the works, and all persons
who may have made entry of such
lands within such withdrawal prior
to the preliminary withdrawal and
who have not acquired a vested right
thereto, will be notified of the appro-
priation of their lands for irrigation
purposes and that their entries will
be canceled and their improvements
paid for by the government as pro-
vided for by the eighth and ninth
sections of the circular of June 6,
1905, unless sufficient cause be shown
within sixty days from the date of
such notice 15S
Canals and Ditches.
See Right of Way.
Circulars and Instructions.
See Tabic of, page XXIII.
Coal Land.
The affidavit prescribed by para-
graph 32 of the coal-land regula-
Page.
tions must be made by the claimant
himself 49
A " preference right of entry "
under section 2348 of the Revised
Statutes arises where any person or
persons, severally qualified to enter,
have opened and improved any coal
mine or mines upon the public lands,
and are in actual possession of the
same ; and such right accrues only to
the person or persons who have so
opened and improved such mine or
mines, and have the possession
thereof 178
A " preference right of entry
"
under section 2348 of the Revised
Statutes is not created, or initiated,
by the filing of a declaratory state-
ment under section 2349. The office
of the declaratory statement is to
preserve the right, not to create it.
If the right does not exist, the
declaratory statement has no office
to perform and is without force or
effect for any purpose 178
It is not in all cases essential to
the validity of an application to pur-
chase coal lands, or to the comple-
tion of proceedings thereunder, that
the applicant show that he had ac-
tually opened and improved a mine of
coal on the lands applied for. This
is necessary only where the applicant
asserts a preference right of entry
under the statute and must main-
tain his assertion or suffer defeat in
favor of another applicant or claim-
ant 178
It is not essential to the validity
of an application by an association
of four persons to purchase six hun-
dred (or six hundred and forty)
acres of coal lands that the appli-
cants shall have opened and im-
proved a mine or mines of coal on
each of the tracts embraced in the
application. It is sufficient in such
case, where there are no conflicting
claimants, that the applicants show
that they are severally qualified to
purchase, that the lands applied for
are of the character subject to sale
under the coal land laws, and that
as an association of persons the
applicants have expended not less
than five thousand dollars in working
and improving a mine or mines of
coal on the lands 267
In determining whether a tract of
public land contains coal deposits the
well known rules of evidence are as
applicable as in any other case, and
whatever is relevant to and bears in
any degree upon the question is ad-
missible in evidence 194
In such cases the characteristics
peculiar to coal deposits are to be
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kept in view, and the presence of
such deposits may be determined
upon authenticated evidence of con-
ditions which constitute the sufficient
guide of the geologist or coal ex-
pert 194
Where an association of four per-
sons has expended not less than five
thousand dollars in working and im-
proving a mine or mines of coal on
the public lands such association, in
the absence of any prior or superior
claim, may enter under the coal land
laws not exceeding six hundred and
forty acres, including such mining
improvements, even though no declar-
atory statement may have been filed
for the lands 447
The object and purpose of a declar-
atory statement under section 2: ,>49
of the Revised Statutes are to give
notice of, and to .preserve for the
period specified in section 2350, a
preference right of entry already ac-
quired under section 2348 ; and such
preference right of entry is not cre-
ated or initiated by the filing of a
declaratory statement 448
If the privilege of postponing
entry in the manner provided by sec-
tions 2349 and 2350, after a prefer-
ence right of entry shall have been
acquired under section 2348, be not
desired by the claimant, the filing
of a declaratory statement before
application or entry is not necessary
or required ; and in such case, even
if the claimant should fail to make
application to enter and to pay for
the lands within the sixty days al-
lowed by section 2349 for tiling a
declaratory statement, neither the
failure in this respect nor failure to
file a declaratory statement would
operate to forfeit the right to pur-
chase and enter the lands except in
favor of some other qualified ap-
plicant : 448
Confirmation.
Under the proviso to section 7 of
(lie act of March ::. 1891, the filing
of a protest, bringing to the notice
of the government the invalidity or
illegality of an entry, within two
years from the date of the issuance
of the receiver's final receipt, oper-
ates to suspend tlie running of the
statute and will defeat confirmation
of the entry under said provision
whether the land department actu-
ally orders an investigation of the
matters charged in the protest with-
in the two-year period or not 11
C'ontesi.
Generally
Page.
The allegation in an affidavit of
contest that land " is more valuable
for the timber and stone," does not
by necessary implication charge that
the land is mineral in character and
does not constitute a sufficient basis
for a contest 115
Initiation of.
An application to contest received
by mail will not be regarded as hav-
ing been presented or filed until it is
taken up, numbered, and entered of
record, and where a contest applica-
tion is presented in person and in the
ordinary course of business is ac-
cepted, numbered, and entered of
record, and another application to
contest the same entry is at that
time, unknown to the local officers,
in the unopened mail in the office,
priority will be accorded the appli-
cation first accepted and filed 712
Desert Land.
A contest based solely upon the
ground that the entry is invalid be-
cause the land embraced therein is
not of the character subject to such
entry, may be allowed, notwithstand-
ing the entry, at the date of the ini-
tiation of the contest, was embraced
in an order of suspension issued by
the land department 301
In case of the suspension of an
entry by order of the land depart-
ment the entryman is not compelled
to comply with the law during the
period of suspension, and contest on
the ground of failure to comply with
the requirements of the law during
such period should not be allowed 302
Where contest against a suspended
entry, on the ground of failure to
comply with law, is erroneously al-
lowed by the local officers, and hear-
ing had thereon, the testimony ad-
duced at the hearing, having I o
taken without jurisdiction, can not
be considered upon removal of the
suspension 302
A contest against a desert-land
entry, based solely upon the ground
that the land is non-desert in char-
acter, may properly be entertained
during suspension of the entry: bul
a contest charging that the entry
man has failed to comply with the
requirements of the law should not
be entertained during such period
where the suspension becomes effec-
tive prior to the expiration of the
statutory life of the entry 450
82 INDEX.
Tage.
A direction by the Secretary of the
Interior to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to withhold the
issuance of patent on all desert-land
entries within a given land district
does not amount to a suspension of
such entries, and the jurisdiction of
the' local officers to consider contests
against the same is in no wise af-
fected thereby 426
The authority of the local officers
to order a hearing on a contest
against a desert-land entry is in no
wise affected by an order of the land
department suspending all desert-
land entries in the township in which
the entry in question is situated,
where the order of suspension was
not issued until after the expiration
of the statutory lifetime of the
entry 426
Homestead.
An affidavit of contest against a
homestead entry, charging, in effect,
that the entrywoman had, since mak-
ing entry, married and gone to re-
side with her husband upon his un-
completed homestead entry, but con-
taining no charge that she had
abandoned her claim for more than
six months prior to the initiation of
the contest, does not state facts suffi-
cient to warrant cancellation of the
entry, and should not be entertained- 463
In case of a contest against a
homestead entry based upon the
charge that the entryman is disquali-
fied to make entry by reason of being
the owner of 160 acres of land, proof
of the technical vesting in the entry-
man, by devise or operation of law,
of a naked legal title that is, or may
be, subject to outstanding claims
against the estate of the person from
whom the title moves, will not, in
itself, be held to disqualify the entry-
man who thus acquires the title, but
it must be further shown that the
title so acquired is a beneficial one 330
In case of a contest against a
homestead entry on the ground of
abandonment, it is not essential that
the charge in the affidavit of contest,
required by the act of June 16, 1898,
that the entryman's absence was not
due to service in the army, navy or
marine corps, shall follow the word-
ing of the statute, it being sufficient
if the language employed in effect or
by necessary implication excludes
military, naval and marine corps
service as the cause of the entry-
man's absence 534
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Contestant.
A successful contestant is entitled
to the full period of thirty days after
the case is finally closed and no
longer open to proceedings on review
or appeal, within which to assert his
preference right of entry 615
The preference right of entry ac-
corded a successful contestant by
the act of May 14, 1880, does not
accrue to one who contests and pro-
cures the rejection of an application
to purchase under the act of June 3,
1878 377
The mere tender, by an applicant
to purchase under the timber and
stone act, of the required proof,
purchase price and fees, which are
properly refused by the local offi-
cers, is not the equivalent of an
" entry," within the meaning of the
act of May 14, 1880, according a
preference right to one who contests
and procures the cancellation of an
entry 371
General allegations in a protest
filed with a view to defeating a suc-
cessful contestant's preference right,
tending to show a speculative intent
and immoral practice in other con-
tests instituted by the same contest-
ant, are not sufficient to bring into
question his preference right in a
case wherein his conduct is unim-
peached 376
Cultivation.
See Homestead.
Deposition.
See Evidence.
Desert Land.
See Entry.
Directions given that a hearing be
had for the purpose of determining
the character of certain lands in the
Burns land district, Oregon, alleged
to be desert lands and selected by the
State under the act of August 18.
1894 589
The Department declines to ap-
prove the application of the State of
Washington for the segregation of
certain lands in that State under the
provisions of the act of August 18,
1894, known as the Carey act, and
further declines to adopt the sugges-
tion of the State to the effect that the
government proceed with the recla-
mation of the lands, which fall
within the irrigable area of a con-
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templated irrigation project under
the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902, and, after reclamation shall
have hee.n accomplished under the
proposed project, to allow the State
the benefits thereof as though per-
formed by it under the provisions of
the Carey act 453
Ditches and (aiiaU.
Sec Right of Way.
Entry.
Generally.
An entry is a contract between the
government and the entryman, and
until all the requisites of an entry
have been met no contract exists and
the applicant can acquire no vested
right to the land which will prevent
a withdrawal thereof by the govern-
ment 653
The Secretary of the Interior has
no authority to enter into any agree-
ment providing that an entry of pub-
lic lands may be consummated in any
manner or at any time other than as
provided by the law under which
such entry is made 351
Desert Land.
The desert -land act of March 3,
1877, as amended by the act of March
:>>, 1891, requires that sufficient water
he conducted upon the land embraced
in the entry to reclaim it from its
desert character and render it suit-
able for agricultural purposes, and
that one-eighth of the land be placed
under cultivation 488
As proof of cultivation within con-
templation of the desert-land act
actual tillage must as a rule be
shown 488
The act of March 3, 1891, contem-
plates that the expenditures made
upon a desert land entry in compli-
ance with the requirements of sec-
lion 5 thereof shall be for permanent
improvements necessary to the irri-
gation, reclamation and cultivation
of the land, and as residence upon a
desert land entry is not required, the
erection of a dwelling-house thereon
is not a permanent improvement in
contemplation of the act 465
The mere purchase by a desert-
land entryman of well casing alleged
to he with a view to constructing an
artesian well on the land embraced
in his entry, but which was never
used for such purpose, nor even 're-
moved to the land, hut was paid for
bw note and left in the warehouse of
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the merchant from whom it was pur-
chased, does not constitute a " per-
manent improvement" within the
meaning of the desert land act, and
the value thereof can not he applied
toward meeting the requirements of
the law relating to annual expendi-
ture U79
The annual expenditures upon a
desert land entry, and proof thereof,
required by the act of March 3, 1891,
are for the information of the land
department and as evidence of the
good faith of the entryman, and a
contest for default of such proof may
be defeated by the filing of proof sub
sequent to the initiation of the con-
test, but prior to final action thereon,
showing that, the requisite annual
expenditure has in fact been made_ <'.7r»
The desert land law requires an
annual expenditure of one dollar per
acre for each acre embraced in the
entry, for the first, second and third
years, hut does not require that the
first or any other annual expendi-
ture shall effect reclamation of any
part of the land, the sole require-
ment in that respect being that the
land shall be reclaimed within the
period allowed therefor 675
A direction by (he Secretary of
I he Interior to the Commissioner of
the General Land Office to withhold
the issuance of patent on all desert-
land entries within a given land (lis
trict does not amount to a suspen-
sion of such entries, and the jurisdic
tion of the local officers to consider
contests against the same is in no
wise affected thereby 426
The authority of the local officers
to order a hearing on a contest
against a desert-land entry is in no
wise affected by an order of the land
department suspending all desert-
land entries in the township in
which the entry in question is situ
ated, where the order of suspension
was not issued until after the ex-
piration of the statutory lifetime of
the entry 120
Where a desert-land entry is sus-
pended by the land department prior
to the expiration of the statutory
life of the entry, for the purpose of
investigating the character of the
land, a contest againsl the same.
charging that the land is dob desert
in character, and also that the entry
man has failed to comply with the
law in the matter of reclamation,
may be entertained in so far as it
Charges the nun desert character of
the land, but should be dismissed as
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to the charge relating to non-com-
pliance with law; and if as a result
of (he contest it be determined that
the land is of a character subject to
entry under the desert-land law, the
suspension should be removed 521
In case of an application by a cor-
poration to make desert-land entry,
it is within the power and it is the
duty of the land department to in-
quire into the qualifications of the
individuals composing the corpora-
tion to make entry in their own right
under the provisions of the desert-
land law 430
It is within the power and is the
duty of the land department to re-
quire a corporation, seeking to ac-
quire title to a desert land entry as
assignee of the original entryman,
to show that the individual members
composing the corporation are not
disqualified under the desert land
law to hold and acquire title to such
entry 443
Recognition in the act of March
3, 1891, of the right of assignment
of desert-land entries furnishes no
authority for recognizing a right on
the part of a desert-land entryman
to enter "into an executory contract
to convey the land after the issuance
of patent and to thereafter proceed
with the submission of final proof
in furtherance of such contract 383
A citizen of one State or Territory
who goes to another State or Terri-
tory with the avowed intention to
make his permanent home therein,
and in his sworn application to make
desert land entry declares himself to
be a resident of such State or Terri-
tory, is held to be a " resident citi-
zen " thereof within the meaning of
the desert land law and in that re-
spect qualified to make such entry
therein, where in. pursuance of his
expressed intention he makes his
home in such State or Territory,
even though he may not, at the date
of making the entry, have acquired
a political residence in the State or
Territory such as would entitle him
to the voting privilege 586
Homestead.
The fact that land is more valu-
able for the timber and stone thereon
than for agricultural purposes does
not exclude it from appropriation
under the homestead laws, if not
mineral in character 115
Equitable Adjudication.
Where the only objection to con-
firmation of a military bounty land
Page,
warrant location, made in good faith,
is the purely technical one that
through inadvertence of the land de-
partment the land covered thereby
was never formally offered at public
sale under the provisions of the act
of July 4, 1876, as it should have
been, of which fact the locator was
ignorant, the location may be re-
ferred to the P>oard of Equitable Ad-
judication for confirmation under
Rule 11 21
Estoppel.
one who fails to assert any claim
to a tract of public- land in the ad-
verse possession of another, and re-
mains silent, though knowing that
the adverse occupant continues to
claim, occupy, and improve the land,
is estopped thereby from subse-
quently asserting a prior settlement
right thereto in himself, notwith-
standing the tract is found upon
survey to be a part of the technical
quarter-section upon which his im-
provements are located 695
Evidence.
The entire cost of depositions
taken under and by virtue of the
provisions of the act of January .",1.
1903, must be paid by the party in
whose behalf they are taken 398
Fees.
An applicant to make homestead
entry is not entitled to have the
fees and commissions paid by him
upon a prior homestead entry, can-
celed for conflict, applied in pay-
ment of the fees and commissions
required in connection with his sec-
ond application ; but, upon proper
application therefor, the fees and
commissions paid upon the canceled
entry will be repaid under the pro-
visions of section 2 of the act of
June 16, 1880 251
Final Proof.
Circular of August 1, 1905, rela-
tive to final proof on claims within
forest reserves 63
Circular of May 9, 1906, prescrib-
ing rules to be observed in passing
on final proofs 601
The right conferred by law upon
the heirs of a deceased homestead
entryman to submit final proof on the
entry can not be delegated to an-
other 46
An applicant to purchase under
the timber and stone act is entitled
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to a copy of the final proof sub-
mitted on his application 133
Where in final proof proceedings
a witness is asked to give a categor-
ical answer to an interrogatory, he
should be permitted, in connection
therewith, to state such facts and
circumstances in explanation thereof
as in his opinion make the categor-
ical answer the correct one to the
question he is required to answer in
such form 133
Where the final proof submitted
on an entry made under section 2307
of the Revised Statutes shows that
the entrywoman never established
actual residence upon the land, al-
though notified in accordance with
the directions contained in depart-
mental decision in the Anna Bowes
case that if she desired to retain her
entry she would be required to begin
actual residence upon the land with-
in six months from notice, such proof
is insufficient and will be rejected ;
but where it appears that the proof
was offered prior to the expiration
of six months from the date of such
notice, the entry should not be can-
celed unless it be first ascertained
that she did not begin actual resi-
dence upon the land within the pre-
scribed period 118
Forest Land.
Sec Reservation.
Homestead.
See Entry.
Generally.
Where a homestead claimant, by
contract to convey the land em-
braced in his entry after the submis-
sion of final proof, puts it beyond his
power to acquire title under the en-
try exce| >t by perjury, he thereby for-
feits his rights, and upon proof of
such fact the entry will be canceled- 40
Widow; Heirs; Devisee.
There is no provision of the home-
stead law by which any rights or
claims to public lands, prior to the
issuance of patent, can be devised or
succeeded to and perfected by, or on
behalf of, other than citizens of the
United States 51
A homestead entryman who at the
time of his death had not acquired
the legal title to the land embraced
in his entry, was not at such time,
by reason of his claim under the en-
try, a person " holding real prop-
erty," within the meaning of article
Tage.
1 of the treaty of March ^, 1899, be-
tween the United States and Great
Britain, and his alien heirs, subjects
of the latter country, have therefore
no such claim or right to the lands
embraced in the entry as is entitled
to protection under the provisions of
said treaty 51
The heirs of a deceased homestead
entryman may delegate to another
the power to perform for their bene-
fit the cultivation on the entry re-
quired by law. and such cultivation,
if actually carried on in good faith
for the required period, constitutes
compliance with the homestead law
the same as though performed by the
heirs themselves 40
By virtue of the provisions of sec-
tion 2305 of the Revised Statutes as
amended by the act of March 1. 1901,
proof of the death of a homestead
entryman while actually engaged in
the military service of the United
States renders unnecessary any
showing that would have been other-
wise required touching his compli-
ance with law in the matters of resi-
dence, cultivation and improvement. 302
The properly-constituted adminis-
trator of the estate of a deceased
homestead entryman is authorized to
submit final proof under the provi-
sions of section 2305 of the Revised
Statutes as amended by the act of
March 1, 1001. as his " legal repre-
sentative " 392
Upon satisfactory proof of the
death of a homestead entryman
while actually engaged in the mili-
tary service of the United States,
leaving no widow or minor orphan
children surviving him, it is the duty
of the land department, under the
provisions of section L':'»i)7> of the Re-
vised Statutes as amended by the act
of March 1, 1901, to issue patent to
his "legal representatives." leaving
it to the courts to determine in
whom the title shall vest 392
Indian.
An Indian to whom land in a res-
ervation has been allotted as a mem-
ber of a tribe, but which land has
never become a part of the public
domain subject to the general provi-
sions of the homestead law. can not,
as a citizen of the United States.
make homestead entry, under section
2289 of the Revised Statutes, of the
land so allotted to him 702
Additional.
A homestead entryman is not en-
titled to make a second entry under
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the provisions of the act of April 28,
1904, ."»:: St;it., 527, upon a showing
that he relinquished his original
entry for the reason that the land
embraced therein was unsuitable for
farming purposes and was not of
sufficient acreage to enable him to
support himself and family by using
the land for grazing purposes GO
Circular of April 10, 1006, under
act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547),
commonly known as the " Kinkaid
Act" 54G
Circular of May 31, 1904, under
act of April 28, 1904, amended 87
Circular of September 1, 1905,
relative to second entries under sec-
tion 3, act of June 5, 1900, and sec- -
tion 1, act of April 28, 1904 114
The act of April 28, 1904, known
as the " Kinkaid Act," does not re-
peal any of the provisions of the
homestead laws, but merely amends
said laws by allowing entry of a
greater number of acres, within the
limits designated, than is permitted
thereunder, and one disqualified to
make entry under the general home-
stead laws, by reason of being the
owner of more than one hundred
and sixty acres of land, is therefore
likewise disqualified to make entry
under said act 502
The qualifications of au applicant
to make additional entry under tbe
act of April 28, 1904, must be de-
termined as of the date of the pre-
sentation of the application and not
as of the date when his original en-
try was made 502
Residence upon the land embraced
in the original homestead entry is an
indispensable prerequisite to the
preference right to enter additional
contiguous land accorded by the act
of April 28, 1904 527
The act of April 28, 1904, known
as the " Kinkaid Act, ' authorizes a
second or additional homestead en-
try of so much land, within the lim-
its defined in the act, as added to
that embraced in the first entry shall
not exceed six hundred and forty
acres, regardless of the fact that the
entryman may have relinquished his
first entry for a valuable considera-
tion 435
The act of April 28, 1904, com-
monly known as the " Kinkaid Act,"
contemplates only one additional en-
try under its provisions ; and where
such entry is made, even though for
an amount of land less than author-
ized by the act, the right is thereby
exhausted 468
The right to make additional
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homestead entry accorded by section'
2 of the act of April 28, 1904, gen-
erally known as the " Kinkaid Act,"
is limited to persons who made their
original entries prior to the date of
said act 134
The right of additional entry pro-
vided for hy section 2 of the act of
April 28, 1904, is limited to persons
who theretofore had entered under
the homestead laws lands within
the territory described in the act,
and who own and occupy such
lands, and can only be exercised
Upon lands contiguous to the original
entry GO
The right of additional entry ac-
corded by the proviso to section 3 of
the act of April 28, 1904, extends to
all persons who prior to application
to exercise said privilege had made
homestead entry, and there is no
warrant in the act for further limit-
ing the right, as is done in the in-
structions of May 31, 1904, issued
under said act, to a homesteader
who had resided upon and culti-
vated the land embraced in his orig-
inal entry for the period required
by law 60
Where an application to make
homestead entry was pending at the
date of the act of April 28, 1904, and
prior to allowance of entry thereon
the applicant presented a supple
menial application to enter addi-
tional lands under the provisions of
said act, requesting that the two ap-
plications be considered together,
the fact that entry on the original
application was inadvertently al-
lowed without considering the sup-
plemental application, does not war-
rant rejection of the application for
additional entry on the ground that
the original entry was allowed sub-
sequently to the passage of the act 274
An additional entry under the act
of April 28, 1904, even though for a
less amount of land than authorized
by the act, exhausts the right ; but
where at the time the entryman
sought to exercise his additional
right, part of the lands contiguous to
his original entry and subject to his
preference right and desired to be en-
tered by him, were found to be em-
braced within an existing though in-
valid additional entry made by an-
other under said act, and he there-
upon made entry for a less amount
of land than he was entitled to en-
ter, and thereafter by means of a
contest procured the cancellation of
the invalid entry covering the re-
mainder of the lands desired by him,
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he may, upon the cancellation of
such invalid entry, be permitted to
enter such lands in accordance with
his original intention 527
Where one entitled to make addi-
tional entry under the act of April
28, 1904, exercises his right for a
less amount of land than he is en-
titled to enter, and at the time of
making such entry announces his in-
tention to amend his additional en-
try to include other lands desired by
him, sufficient to aggregate the quan-
tity to which he is entitled under the
act, as soon as he succeeds in clear-
ing the records of other claims to
such adidtional lands, and takes
prompt action to that end, he may
be permitted to amend his entry in
accordance with such purpose when
the additional lands desired by him
become subject to entry, provided the
rule as to compactness be observed- _ 573
In determining the " extreme
length " of a homestead entry under
the " Kinkaid Act," the measure-
ment should follow the lines of the
public survey, and no entry should
be allowed for any tract exceeding
two miles either in length or breadth,
and no application for ah entry in as
nearly compact form as possible
should be rejected solely because its
combined length and breadth or
diagonal measurement exceeds two
miles 690
Where an entryman under the
" Kinkaid Act " does not include in
his entry the full area allowed by
law, for the reason that there is no
land subject to entry adjoining that
entered, he may, if adjoining land
thereafter becomes subject to entry,
enlarge his original entry so as to in-
clude therein the full area allowed
by law 690
Adjoining Farm.
One who has exercised the home-
stead privilege, even though for less
than 160 acres, and thereby ex-
hausted bis homestead right, is dis-
qualified to make an adjoining farm
entry under section 2289 of the Re-
vised Statutes 537
Soldiers'.
In computing the period of service
of a soldier " who has served in the
army of the United States," within
the meaning of that phrase as used
in section 230 1 of the Revised Stat-
utes, the entrance of the soldier into
the army will be considered as dat-
Page.
ing from his muster into the service,
and not from his enrollment u: »
r
Soldiers' Additional.
In every case where the soldier
rendered the requisite military serv-
ice and made homestead entry for
less than one hundred and sixty
acres prior to the adoption of the
Revised Statutes, the proper founda-
tion exists for an additional entry
under the provisions of sections 2300
and 2307 of the Revised Statutes,
notwithstanding the soldier may
have died prior to the enactment of
said legislation :',:;:!
Sections 2300 and 2307 of the
Revised Statutes do not contemplate
more than one additional right of
entry, founded upon one and the
same military service 339
Sections 2300 and 2307 of the Re-
vised Statutes do not contemplate
more than one additional right of
entry, founded upon one and the
same military service ; and the ex-
istence of a valid additional right
based upon a homestead entry made
by the soldier, precludes an inde-
pendent additional right to his
widow, or after her death to the
heirs of her estate, based upon a
homestead entry made by her 333
Location having been allowed of a
portion of an additional right based
upon a homestead entry made by the
widow of a soldier, and recertifica-
tion made for the remainder of the
right, it is held, upon application
being made for the allowance of a
further additional right based upon
an entry made by the soldier him-
self, that no foundation therefor ex-
ists, the additional right allowed on
the homestead entry of the widow
being considered as having been
based upon the homestead entry of
the soldier 339
The additional right accruing to
the widow of a soldier, under sec
tions 2306 and 2307 of the Revised
Statutes, by reason of an entry for
less than one hundred and sixty
acres made by herself, is a property
right vested in her, and is not for-
feited by her remarriage or death ;
but in case of her remarriage is held
in abeyance during coverture, and in
event of her death remains an asset
of her estate 341
The additional right of entry ac
cruing to the widow of a soldier un-
der the provisions of sections 2306
and 2307 of the Revised Statutes,
5194—Vol. 34—05 m-
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based upon an entry made by her-
self, is not lost, forfeited or extin-
guished by her remarriage, but is
merely held in abeyance during cov-
erture, and upon removal of such
disability may be exercised or dis-
posed of by her as though she had
remained the soldier's widow 342
Where a soldier qualified to make
additional entry under the provi-
sions of section 2306 of the Revised
Statutes dies without having exer-
cised or disposed of such right, his
widow is, in the first instance, en-
titled thereto, by virtue of the pro-
visions of section 2307, but if she
remarry or die without having exer-
cised or disposed of the right, his
minor orphan children become en-
titled thereto, and if not exercised
or disposed of by them, through a
guardian, during their minority, the
right remains an asset of the sol-
dier's estate 333
In case a soldier's widow entitled
to make additional entry under sec-
tions 230G and 2307 of the Revised
Statutes, by virtue of an entry for
less than one hundred and sixty
acres made by herself, remarries,
without having exercised or disposed
of such right, it can not be asserted
during coverture ; nor can the fact
that the only child of the soldier
joined the widow in an assignment of
such right in any wise affect the situ-
ation, in view of the fact that the
right is based upon an entry made by
the widow and not by the soldier 345
The mere fact that a certificate of
additional right has issued in the
name of the soldier under section
2300 of the Revised Statutes will
not prevent him from selling and
divesting himself of the right it-
self, of which the certificate is
merely the evidence ; and upon satis-
factory showing of the loss or de-
struction of the certificate, it may be
reissued and recertified in the name
of the assignee entitled to the right- 685
Only one application of the rule
of approximation is allowed to each
original right of soldiers' additional
entry, and where the right is divided,
the rule may be applied only in the
location of one portion thereof; but
where a portion of a right is located
for a tract of land embracing merely
a fraction of an acre excess, such
small excess will not, under the rule
<lc mini in is non curat lex, be re-
garded as preventing the holder of
the remainder of the right, in mak-
ing location thereof, from applying
the rule of approximation „_ .— 441
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Act of March 2, 1889.
The right to make an additional
entry accorded by section 5 of the
act of March 2, 1880, arises only
where the original entry was made
prior to the passage of said act, and
can be exercised only upon land con-
tiguous to that embraced in the orig-
inal entry ; but the additional entry
provided for by section 6 of said act
may be allowed whether the original
entry was made prior or subsequent
to the passage of said act and for
land contiguous or noncontiguous to
the original entry 537
By the exercise of the right to
make additional homestead entry
conferred by section 6 of the act of
March 2, 1889, even though for a
less amount of land than might have
been taken thereunder, the entryman
thereby exhausts the privilege
granted by said section 294
Indemnity.
See Railroad Grant School Land.
Indian Land§.
See Reservation.
Proclamation of July 14, 1905,
opening Uintah lands 1
Proclamation of August 2, 1005,
modifying proclamation of July 14,
1905, opening Uintah lands 6
Regulations of July 15, 1905, gov-
erning opening of Uintah lands 7
Circular of July 15, 1905, defining
persons not qualified to enter Uintah
lands 8
Instructions of October 16, 1905,
relative to disposition of Uintah
lands after expiration of " sixty-day
period " 176
Circular of February 20, 1906, un-
der act of January 27, 1906, relative
to extension of time within which to
establish residence on Uintah lands- 452
Instructions of November 7, 1905,
relative to lands in Round Valley
reservation opened to settlement and
entry 248
Proclamation of May 24, 1906,
opening Crow lands 632
Regulations of May 24, 1906, gov-
erning opening of Crow lands 637
Circular of May 24, 1906, defining
persons not qualified to enter Crow
lands 639
Proclamation of June 2, 1906,
opening Shoshone or Wind River
lands 640
Regulations of June 4, 1906, gov-
erning opening of Shoshone or Wind
River lands--,-- ,-,=„.„.— 645
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Circular defining persons not qual-
ified to enter Shoshone or Wind
River lands 647
Proclamation of June 6, 1906,
opening even-numhered mineral sec-
tions in Uncorapahgre reservation 048
Circular of June 25, 1906, relative
to sale of even-numhered mineral
sections in Uncompahgre reserva-
tion 650
The general laws prohibiting the
introduction of intoxicating liquors
into the Indian country are appli-
cable to towns in the Osage Indian
reservation 419
There is no provision in the act
of March 3, 1905, relating to town-
sites in the Osage Indian reservation,
authorizing the Secretary of the In-
terior to insert in deeds for lots in
such townsites a clause prohibiting
the sale or storage of liquor on the
premises conveyed and providing for
a forfeiture of title in case of viola-
tion of the prohibition 418
Opinion expressed that the " liquor
clause" now inserted in deeds by
heirs of deceased Indian allottees,
prohibiting the sale or storage of
liquor on the land conveyed, and pro-
viding for a reversion of title in case
of violation of the prohibition., should
be modified by a further provision
"that the rights of mortgagees in
good faith, their heirs and assigns,
shall not be voided or jeopardized by
such reversion 412
Opinion expressed that it is inad-
visable to insert in deeds by heirs of
deceased allottees in the Yankton In-
dian reservation the " liquor clause,"
prohibiting the sale or storage of
liquor on the land conveyed and pro-
viding for a reversion of title in case
of violation of the prohibition, the
agreement with the Yankton Indians
and the provisions of the act of
August 15, 1S!)4, ratifying the same,
being the proper authority which
should be invoked for the protection
of the Indians in that respect 415
An Indian to whom land in a res-
ervation has been allotted as a mem-
ber of a tribe, but which land has
never become a part of the public
domain subject to the general pro-
visions of the homestead law, can
not, as a citizen of the United States,
make homestead .entry, under section
2289 of the Revised Statutes, of the
land so allotted to him 702
Where an Indian woman, a mem-
ber of one tribe, marries an Indian
man, a member of another tribe, bul
is never enrolled as a member of
her husband's tribe, she is entitled to
Page,
an allotment in her own tribe, as
the head of a family, notwithstand-
ing her husband, prior to his mar-
riage, received an allotment in his
tribe as a single person 252
A married woman, not the head of
a family, is not qualified, under the
provisions of section 2 of the act of
June 5, 1872, to make entry of lands
in the Bitter Root Valley opened to
settlement by said act 313
The authority conferred upon the
Secretary of the Interior by the act
of December 21, 1904, to sell and
dispose of certain lands claimed by
the Yakima Indians and adjoining
their then-recognized reservation on
the west, held to embrace such of
said lands as fall within the limits
of the Mount Ranier forest reserve- 13
There is no authority for leas-
ing lands formerly within the Uintah
Indian reservation and withdrawn
generally for reservoir purposes un-
der the act of March :>, 1905, where
such lands have not been appro-
priated for any particular purpose so
as to take them out of the category
of public lands 549
No rights could be acquired by set-
tlement upon lands within the ceded
limits of the Red Lake Indian reser-
vation, with a view to making home-
stead entry thereof, prior to the
opening of said lands to settlement
and entry 94
No rights were acquired by settle-
ment upon lands within the ceded
portion of the Red Lake Indian res-
ervation prior to their opening to
settlement and entry, and where such
settlement was entirely upon lands
selected with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior prior to the
opening, by the Minnesota and Mani-
toba Railroad Company, under its
grant made by the act of April 17,
1900, of right of way and necessary
lands for terminal facilities at the
crossing of Rainy River, no entry can
now be allowed of such lands 619
In view of the provisions of the
act of February 9, 1903, which ex-
tended the townsite laws to the
lands within the ceded limits of the
Red Lake Indian reservation and
authorized their occupation for town-
site purposes prior to formal open-
ing thereof to disposition under the
homestead laws, the occupation of a
portion of said lands as a townsite
prior to and on the date they were
opened to settlement and entry, pre-
vented the attachment of any rights
on that date under a settlemenl with
a view to acquiring title under the
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homestead laws, covering the same
land, initiated prior to occupation of
the land for townsite purposes
The act of July 1, 1902, supple-
mentary to the act of March 3, 1885,
relating to the disposition of lands in
the Umatilla Indian reservation, ac-
cords to bona fide settlers a prefer-
ence right to purchase the lands set-
tled upon for the period of ninety
days, and where during that period
purchase is made by one claiming the
preference right, but who in fact is
not entitled thereto, the entry al-
lowed thereon will not be canceled
for invalidity on the that ground
alone, where there was no existing
preference right in another to the
lands at the time such entry was
made
No time is specified in the act of
March 3, 1885, within which a pur-
chaser thereunder must make the re-
quired proof of residence and cultiva-
tion, but it rests with the claimant
when it shall be submitted, so long as
it be within a reasonable time, and
when submitted, the claimant, in the
face of a contest charging failure to
comply with the law in the matter of
residence, must stand or fall upon
the showing made, and will not be
permitted, if the proof be insufficient
or fraudulent, to cure the default
The act of March 3, 1905, author-
izes the purchase by the diocese of
Duluth of one hundred and sixty
acres of land in the ceded Chippewa
Indian reservation, but as that act
does not recognize any rights as ac-
cruing to the diocese by virtue of
applications theretofore made by it
for the dedication, or purchase, of
certain of said lands for mission or
church purposes, any application by
the diocese under said act can not lie
given relation to the earlier applica-
tions made prior to the passage of
the act, to the prejudice of interven-
ing adverse rights
Insanity.
It is not necessary in invoking I lie
confirmatory provisions of the act
of June 8, 1880, in instances where a
homesteader has become insane, to
show that such homesteader is a citi-
zen of the United States, it being-
only necessary to show that he had
complied with the provisions of the
homestead law up to the time of
becoming insane
Irrigation.
See Arid Land,
626
70s
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Isolated Tract.
Circular of July 3, 1905, directing
that notices of sales of isolated
tracts shall specify the date, place,
and hour of commencement of sale__ 14
Circular of November 4, 1905,
relative to suspension of applications
for isolated tracts containing less
than forty acres 245
Jurisdiction.
See Land Department; Public
Land.
Land Department.
Circular of May 12, 1906, under
section 452, R. S., relative to entries
by employes of General Land Offiee__ 605
The Secretary of the Interior has
no authority to enter into any agree-
ment providing that an entry of pub-
lic lands may be consummated in any
manner or at any time other than
as provided by the law under which
such entry is made 351
In the administration of the public
land laws the land department has
no authority to determine on their
behalf alleged rights of claimants
thereunder except where such claim-
ants seek to obtain the legal or para-
mount title to the lands claimed
;
and where a claimant seeks to obtain
the legal title to a tract of public
land the inquiry by the land depart-
ment is directed to questions affect-
ing his right to have such legal title
conveyed to him and not to questions
relating to possessory or other rights
unrelated to and disconnected with
his application for the legal title 276
Lieu Selection.
See Reservation, sub-titles Forest
Lands and Indian; School Lands.
Harried Woman.
See Indian Land.
Mineral Lands.
Under the provisions of section 16
of the act of March 3, 1891, town-
site entries may be made by incorpo-
rated towns and cities on the min-
eral lands of the United States, sub-
ject to existing rights under any
valid mining claim or possession,
lode or placer, held under existing
law 102
The fact that a tract of land was,
prior to survey, classified as mineral
under the act of February 26, 1895,
can not be considered as a classifica-
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Hon of the lands as mineral " at
the time of actual government sur-
vey," within (he meaning of the act
of August 5, 1892 , 211
Mining Claim.
Generally.
Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of regu-
lations amended 260
All affidavits under the mining
laws are required to he verified in
accordance with the provisions of
section 2335 of the Revised Statutes,
except where authority for their exe-
cution is otherwise specifically given
by statute 314
Proceedings to secure a mineral
patent by one without interest in, or
control over, the lands applied for,
arc without authority of law and no
rights can be acquired thereunder 500
To sustain an application for min-
eral patent, as against persons al-
leging the land to be non-mineral, it
must appear that mineral exists in
the land in quantity and of value
sufficient to subject it to disposal
under the mining laws 59G
Where the mineral character of a
mining claim in conflict with a sec-
tion claimed by the State under its
school-land grant is challenged by
the State, the usual formal proofs
under mineral patent proceedings
will not suffice, but in such case
the mineral character of the claim
involved must be established by sub-
stantive proof ; and the State is not
bound to take the initiative at a
hearing ordered to determine that
question 723
Case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode
Claim, 33 L. D., 37, cited and distin-
guished 723
Proceedings for patent to a mining
claim embracing land lying partly
within one land district and partly
within another, conducted wholly
within one land district, and the
allowance of entry thereon covering
the entire claim, are in no wise
effective as to the lands lying with-
out such land district, and do not
constitute substantial compliance
with law as to such lands, within
the meaning of sections 2450 to 24."
of the Revised Statutes, such as
would warrant confirmation of the
entry in its entirety under said sec-
tions 40
An applicant for patent to a min-
ing claim who, invoking the provi-
sions of section 2332 of the Revised
Statutes, proves that he, or his
grautors, has held and worked the
Page.
claim for the period of time pre-
scribed by the local statutes of limi-
tation for mining claims, is not re-
quired to produce record evidence of
his location, or to give any reason
for not producing such evidence 462
Section 2332 simply declares what
proof shall be sufficient to show pos-
sessory title in an applicant for
patent, in the absence of any adverse
claim, and does not dispense with the
requirement of section 2325 of an
expenditure of five hundred dollars
in labor or improvements upon the
claim, as a prerequisite to the issu-
ance of a patent 462
The main purpose of section 2332
of the Revised Statutes is to declare
that evidence of the holding and
working of a mining claim for a
period equal to the time prescribed
by the local statute of limitations
for mining claims shall be consid-
ered as sufficiently establishing the
location of the claim and the ap-
plicant's right thereunder " in the
absence of any adverse claim," and
there is no authority for restricting
the application of the provisions of
said section to such cases only in
which the applicant for patent is un-
able by reason of the lapse of time
or the loss of mining records by fire
or otherwise to furnish the proof
of possessory title required by the
mining laws
The limit of the grant to the
Raven Mining Company made by
the act of May 27, 1002, was the
privilege to locate, under the mining
laws, one hundred mining claims
upon the unallotted lands of the
Uintah and White River tribes of
Ute Indians, and neither that act
nor any of the subsequent acts ex-
tending the time of opening said un-
allotted lands relieved said company
from compliance with the provision
of section 2325 of the Revised Stat-
utes requiring payment to be made
for lands embraced in a mining claim
as a condition to the issuance of
patent therefor under the mining
laws
182
306
Location.
A location under the mining laws
does not of itself amount to an ap-
propriation of land in such a sense
as to preclude the inclusion of the
same, or parts thereof, within the
limits of a subsequent location, sub
ject to such existing rights as may
be thereafter maintained under the
prior location
Any portion of the superficial
i t
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area within the boundary lines fixed
by the location of a valid lode min-
ing claim, in conflict with a school
section, may rightfully he claimed
and held under the mining laws 717
The owners of unpatented mining
claims located upon the mineral
lands of the United States are en-
titled to the exclusive and peaceable
possession of their claims so long as
they continue to comply with the re-
quirements of the law respecting pos-
sessory rights, and are not required
1<> apply for patent at any time, or
ever, in order to preserve such pos-
sessory rights 270
Locations upon the mineral lands
of the United States, lawfully pos
sessed and held under the mining
laws at the date of a townsite entry
embracing such locations, are within
the meaning of the language of sec-
tion 1G of the act of March 3, 1891,
" any valid mining claim or posses-
sion held under existing law," and
can not be injuriously affected by
the allowance of such entry ; and the
mineral claimant may, upon proper
proceedings and proofs as in other
cases, obtain patent for his claim
notwithstanding the townsite entry
or the issuance of patent thereon 276
In determining whether an alleged
mineral location is a " valid mining
claim or possession " within the
meaning of the general townsite
laws and section 1G of the act of
March 3, 1891, relating to townsite
entries by incorporated towns and
cities on the mineral lands of the
United States, the question of the
character of the land is a primary
one; and if the mineral claimant has
had ample time and opportunity to
show by exploration and development
whether valuable mineral deposits
exist on the land, and has not done
so, and has not in any manner es-
tablished that the location embraces
mineral land under the well-settled
rules of determination in cases where
the character of the land is directly
in issue, his location can not be held
to be a valid mining claim or poses-
sion within the meaning of the law_ 590
Application.
Whenever proceedings under an
application for mineral patent have
failed, by reason of a default incur-
able as to tbem, the application
stands rejected, but may, if not in
itself or for any extrinsic reason
fatally defective, be made the instru-
ment of renewed proceedings. It is
not, however, in the interval a pend-
Page.
ing application, and can be consid-
ered as renewed, and as again tak-
ing effect, only as of the date pro-
ceedings under it are actively re-
sumed 72
An application for patent embra-
cing a lode within the limits of a
placer claim for which patent appli-
cation is pending can not be per-
mitted to proceed beyond the point
of filing in the absence of a deter-
mination by the land department that
the lode was known to exist at the
date of the filing of the placer ap-
plication ; and the law does not con-
template a proceeding to that end
before the land department, or the
acceptance by the latter of such lode
application, when an adverse suit
against the placer applicant has been
begun by the lode claimant, during
the pendency of which all proceed-
ings in that department must be
stayed 72
Survey.
A portion of an irregular legal sub-
division is not sufficiently identified
to enable the Department to ac-
curately describe the same in a pat-
ent by an attempted description
thereof in terms of the public-land
surveys, and where patent is sought
to a placer mining claim embracing
a portion of an irregular legal sub-
division or lot an official survey of
the particular portion claimed will
be required 9
Notice.
The mining laws do not require
that the notice of an application for
patent to a mining claim by a cor-
poration shall designate the State or
Territory under the laws of which
the corporation was organized 568
A recital of exclusion of conflict
in the notice of an application for
patent to a mining claim as effectu-
ally eliminates the conflict area as if
the exception and exclusion were in
terms declared in the application for
patent itself 554
By the newspaper published near-
est a mining claim, within the con-
templation of section 2325, Revised
Statutes, is meant the newspaper of
established character and general
circulation in the vicinity of the
claim which is nearest in point of
practicable accessibility ; that is,
nearest by the distance from the
claim involved over the most nearly
direct traversable route, and over
which the editions of the paper are
or may be transported by the usual
INDEX. 748
Page.
and available means of conveyance.
The distance in contemplation is that
which must actually be traveled to
bring the paper into the neighbor-
hood of the claim, in order that the
intended office of the notice may in
that vicinity be performed 281
Section 2325 of the Revised Stat-
utes requires that an applicant for
patent under the mining laws shall
file with his application an official
plat of the claim or claims applied
for, and shall post a copy of such
plat, together with a notice of the
application for patent, in a conspic-
uous place on the land embraced in
the plat, previous to the filing of the
application, "and shall file an affi-
davit of at least two persons that such
notice has been duly posted." The
words " such notice " have been uni-
formly construed by the land depart-
ment to embrace both the plat and
notice referred to. Held: That the
requirement as to the affidavit is
mandatory, and where such affidavit
is not filed all proceedings upon the
application for patent are without
authority of law 583
The provisions of the act of April
28, 1004, amending section 2327 of
the Revised Statutes, relate exclu-
sively to the question of, and are in-
tended to prescribe the rule or guide
whereby to determine, the subject-
matter of mineral patents—that is,
the particular tract actually con-
veyed by any such patent whenever
the question may arise—and in no
wise modify Or affect any require-
ment of the mining statutes with re-
spect to notice of an application for
patent, nor can they have any effect
to cure defects or irregularities in
the notice of patent proceedings had
in any case 682
Adverse Claim.
An adverse claim under section
2326 of the Revised Statutes is re-
quired to be filed "during the period
of publication" of notice of the ap-
plication for patent, and where the
last day of such period falls on Sun-
day, an adverse claim filed on the fol-
lowing Monday can not be recognized
by (he land department as an ad-
verse claim within the meaning of
said sec) ion and can not have the
effect to stay the patent proceedings
upon (lie application 568
The only judicial proceedings in
which a claim may become involved,
resulting in delay which would
otherwise he fatal to entry, and
which will protect the li-; 1 !:; of
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the applicant for patent during their
pendency, are those arising under
the mining laws themselves, where-
by the applicant is prevented from
completing his patent proceedings
prior to final determination of the
litigation 56
The general principle of the ex-
clusive judicial cognizance of con-
troversies involving the right of pos-
session as between rival mineral
claimants and the binding force of a
court's award in such a case has in
view a possessory right which is the
essential basis of, and which may
ultimately ripen into, the legal title
obtainable from the government
under the mining laws ; but it nec-
essarily remains for the land depart-
ment, in the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion and in the discharge of its
duty, to determine in any such case
the force and effect as against the
United States of the possessory right
so awarded by the court 401
Where a placer adverse claimant,
on the strength of his placer loca-
tion, prevails in a suit under section
2326, Revised Statutes, against an
applicant for patent to lode claims
within the placer limits, and the
placer location should thereafter be
found by the land department, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, to em-
brace non-placer land, the posses-
sory right so awarded would fail as
a basis of title to the portion of the
placer location in controversy and
equally to the lodes therein embraced,
and would fall short of that effective
basic right essential to the fore
closure of any purely lode rights in
the patent applicant; and the latter
would have suffered no prejudice by
reason of the judgment of the court 401
Having prevailed in the adverse
suit solely by virtue of his placer
location, any additional rights which
the successful adverse claimant
might set up under subsequent lode
locations by him of the ground in
controversy would be wholly inde-
pendent of the court's award 101
The oath to an adverse claim,
made by the agent or attorney-in-
fact of the adverse claimant, under
the act of April 26, 1882, must be
verified before an authorized officer
within the land district where Hie
adverse claim is situated, in accord-
ance with the provisions of section
2:::;n, R. s 314
Where the oath to an adverse
claim is made by the agenl of the
adverse claimant outside of the land
district, although before a notary
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public whose jurisdiction extends
throughout a county lying partly
within and partly without the land
district, such adverse claim is not
properly verified .within the meaning
of said section 2335 314
Discovery and Expenditure.
The cost of construction or such
portions of wagon roads, used in
the transportation of supplies to and
ore from a mining claim or claims,
as extend beyond the boundaries of
the latter can not he accepted in sat-
isfaction of the statutory require-
ment with respect to the expendi-
ture in labor or improvements for
jiatent purposes, the connection be-
tween the outlying portions of the
roads and active mining operations
or development being too remote to
justify their acceptance 556
Improvements made upon one or
more of several contiguous mining
claims held in common may be ac-
cepted as applicable to the entire
group, in satisfaction of the statu-
tory requirement relative to the ex-
penditure of five hundred dollars
upon or for the benefit of each of
the claims, only where the purpose
of such improvements is to facilitate
the extraction of mineral from the
claims, and the improvements are
of such character as to redound to
the benefit of all the claims in this
respect ; and the fact that the min-
eral formation covered by the claims
is a continuous deposit constituting
one ore mass, will not justify apply-
ing the cost of improvements on
one of the claims toward meeting the
requirements of the statute as to the
others, unless it appear that such
improvements will aid in the extrac-
tion of mineral from, or tend to pro-
mote the development of, such other
claims 655
Entry.
Lands not embraced in the appli-
cation for patent for a mining claim,
and in the published and posted no-
tice and other proceedings, can not
be embraced in the entry 260
Lode.
The mining laws contemplate that
the end lines of a lode claim shall
have substantial existence in fact,
and in length shall reasonably com-
port with the width of the claim as
located 470
In case of a mining location upon
a blanket lode or vein, the lode line
Page,
may not be extended in zigzag form
so as to make the distance between
the side lines of the claim exceed
the width of six hundred feet al-
lowed by law in the location of vein
or lode claims 470
Placer.
The rule of approximation per-
mitted in entries under the home-
stead and other public-land laws pro-
viding for the disposal of nonmineral
lands has no application to locations
and entries under the mining laws__ 9
The smallest legal subdivision of
the public surveys provided for by
the mining laws is a subdivision of
ten acres, in square form ; and such
laws do not contemplate that in the
location and entry of placer mining
claims rectangular tracts of five
acres may be recognized and treated
as legal subdivisions 260
The mining laws contemplate that
in all cases, except in instances
where impracticable so to do, placer
mining locations must be made in
conformity with the system of public-
land surveys, that is, rectangular in
form and of dimensions correspond-
ing to appropriate legal subdivisions,
and with east-and-west and north-
and-south boundary lines 56
The fact that a placer mining lo-
cation, if made to conform as nearly
as practicable to the system of pub-
lic-land surveys and the rectangular
subdivisions of such surveys, as re-
quired by section 2331 of the Re-
vised Statutes, would embrace small
portions of land not valuable for
placer mining, constitutes no reason
for failure to conform the location
to such system and legal subdivi-
sions, where, if so conformed, the
land embraced in the location would
be as a whole more valuable for
placer mining than for agricultural
purposes 42
It is no objection to the validity
of a placer location that it em-
braces veins or lodes as well as
placer deposits 42
A location under the mining laws
does not of itself amount to an ap-
propriation of land in such a sense as
to preclude the inclusion of the same,
or parts thereof, within the limits of
a subsequent location, subject to sue'.
existing rights as may be thereafter
maintained under the prior loca-
tion : and the fact that a place' loca-
tion, if made to conform to legal sub-
divisions of the public surveys, would
embrace all or a portion of the land
covered by a prior location, is not a
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sufficient reason for failure to eon-
form the placer location to legal sub-
divisions, as required by section 2331
of the Revised Statutes 44
The fact that portions of other
claims already entered may be em-
braced in a placer location by con-
forming the same to legal subdivi-
sions, does not make such conformity
impracticable, within the meaning
of section 2331 of the Revised Stat-
utes, inasmuch as under the law
such entered claims may be excluded
from patent proceedings involving
the placer 44
Mill Site.
Section 2337 of the Revised Stat-
utes contemplates that at the time
application is made for patent to a
mill-site claim the land embraced
therein is being used or occupied for
mining or milling purposes 325
Section 2337 does not contemplate
that patent may be obtained for a
separate mill site for each of a group
of contiguous lode claims held and
worked under a common ownership,
and where more than one mill site
is applied for in connection with a
group of lode claims a sufficient and
satisfactory reason therefor must be
shown ;'--•">
The provision of section 2337 of
the Revised Statutes that : " Where
non-mineral land not contiguous to
the vein or lode is used or occupied
by the proprietor of such vein or
lode for mining or milling purposes,
such non-adjacent surface ground
may be embraced and included in an
application for a patent for such vein
or lode, and the same may be pat-
ented therewith, subject to the same
preliminary requirements as to sur-
vey and notice as are applicable to
veins or lodes." construed. IFvltJ:
The words " vein or lode," in said
seel ion. are not used in the re-
stricted sense of indicating a body
of mineral, or mineral -bearing rock,
in place, only, but are used in the
larger sense of designating a lo-
cated vein or lode claim, and that
only non-mineral land not contiguous
to a vein or lode claim may be ap-
propriated for mill-site purposes 320
Direction given that all applica-
tions for mill site patents which may
be made and carried to entry before
July 1, 1906, or which may, by pro
lest or otherwise^, without the fault
of the applicant, he prevented from
being carried to entry before that
date, where the locations of the
claims were made and perfected
Page.
under the law in all other respects
prior to January 1, 1904, shall be
adjudicated, in respect to the matter
of contiguity of the mill-site claims
to vein or lode claims, under the
practice which prevailed in the Gen-
eral Land Office prior to the depart-
mental ruling in the case of Alaska
Copper Company 320
Notice.
See Isolated Tract; Mining Claim;
Practice ; Settlement.
Officers.
Applicants for public lands lose
no rights by mistakes and laches of
officers of the land department ; but
persons claiming the benefit of this
rule must show that they have an in-
choate right and that they have not
been so dilatory in assertion of it as
to give rival bona fide applicants a
superior right 380
Oklahoma Lands.
Sections sixteen, thirty-six, thir-
teen and thirty-three of the lands
ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa and
Apache Indians under agreement rati-
fied by the act of June 6, 1900, re-
served for school and other pur-
poses, are not subject to the opera-
tion of the mining laws 54
Under the provision of the act of
June 0, 1900, relating to the opening
to settlement and entry of the ceded
Kiowa, Comanche and Apache lands,
authorizing qualified entrymen hav-
ing lands adjoining the lands ceded,
whose entries embrace less than 160
acres, to enter so much of the ceded
lands lying contiguous as shall, with
the lands already entered, make in
the aggregate 160 acres, such entry
men may make extension of their
existing entries so as to include por-
tions of sections thirteen and thirty-
three within the ceded country, not-
withstanding the provision of said
act reserving said sections for uni-
versity, agricultural colleges, normal
schools and public buildings of the
Territory and future State of Okla
homa, and for all lands so lost the
Territory must look to the indemnity
provisions of its grant : 163
Patent.
Suit for the cancellation of a
patenl will not be advised by the
land department merely because such
patent was inadvertently issued; but
it must appear that some interest of
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the government, or of some party to
whom it is under obligation, has suf-
fered by such inadvertent action 298
Where patent has inadvertently
issued for a tract of land, the land
department, notwithstanding the ti-
tle has passed out of the government,
has authority to order a hearing be-
tween claimants under tlje patent
and persons asserting adverse rights
to the land, with a view to determin-
ing the advisablity or necessity for
bringing suit for cancellation of the
patent 29S
The provisions of the act of April
28, 1904, amending section 2327 of
the Revised Statutes, relate exclu-
sively to the question of, and are in-
tended to prescribe the rule or guide
whereby to determine, the subject-
matter of mineral patents—that is,
the particular tract actually con-
veyed by any such patent whenever
the question may arise 682
Practice.
See Rules Cited and Construed,
page XXIX.
The Rules of Practice require that
notice of an appeal to the Depart-
ment shall be served upon the ap-
pellee or his counsel ; but where de-
cision in a case is inadvertently ren-
dered by the Department in the ab-
sence of proof of service of the ap-
peal, such decision will not be dis-
turbed on motion for review, in the
absence of a showing of reversible
error, merely because of want of
proper service of the appeal 371
In case a contest is erroneously
dismissed upon motion of the entry-
man, the General Land Office is with-
out authority to reverse such action
and then dispose of the case on the
evidence theretofore submitted by
contestant, without first affording
the entryman an opportunity to pre-
sent his defense 396
Where the testimony in a case is
authorized to be taken elsewhere
than at the local office, neither party
should be permitted to submit fur-
ther testimony on the day set for
the. hearing at the local office, ex-
cept upon due notice to the other
and proper order therefor 396
Where a contestant fails at the
hearing to sustain the allegations in
the affidavit of contest relative to
the nonmilitary service of the home-
stead entryman charged with aban-
donment, and the defendant there-
upon moves that the contest be for
that reason dismissed, a new trial
Rage,
should not be granted for the pur-
pose of permitting the contestant to
supply the proof he neglected to pro-
duce at the hearing, but the contest
should be dismissed 203
Objection to the jurisdiction of
the local office, on the ground that
the record does not afford due proof
of service of notice of contest, is not
well founded where the fact of legal
service is not denied 534
Where the affidavit filed as a basis
for an order of publication of notice
* of contest against an entry does not
specifically allege that the entryman
is a nonresident of the State or
Territory in which the land is lo-
cated, it should show the date or
dates upon which inquiries as to the
entryman's whereabouts were made,
that they were made with a view to
obtaining personal service of the
notice, and that at that time the
contestant was prepared to make
personal service of the notice if the
entryman were found within the
State or Territory wherein the land
is situated 473
After a case involving conflicting
claims to a tract of public land has
been closed in the land department,
the Secretary of the Interior, in the
exercise of his supervisory power,
will, upon reopening the case for
further consideration, be governed by
the same rule, in determining the
rights of the parties, as is observed
by the courts in a proceeding to
charge the holder of a patent from
the United States as trustee ; that is,
it must not only be shown that the
party to whom the land has been
awarded is not entitled to it, but
that the party attacking his claim
has the better right thereto, and
that if the law had been properly
administered, the land would have
been awarded to him 82
Preference Right.
See Contestant.
Private Claim.
Under the provisions of section 7
of the act of July 23, 1866, persons
who in good faith and for a valuable
consideration purchased lands from
those who claimed and were thought
to be Mexican grantees or assigns,
are entitled, provided they fulfil the
other conditions of the act, to pur-
chase such of said lands found not
to be included in the grant as fin-
ally surveyed, regardless of what
other lands, not within the lines of
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their original purchase, were fin-
ally found to be the lands granted— 07
Where the tie line purporting to
connect the survey of a private land
claim with the public-land surveys is
shown to be erroneous, the actual
locus of the claim as defined and sur-
veyed on the ground must prevail— 67
The " necessary expenses " of mak-
ing survey and plat of private land
grants under the provisions of sec-
tion K> of the act of March 3, 1891,
one half of which are to be paid by
the grant-claimant, embrace all the
expenses necessary to the comple-
tion of such a survey as will be en-
titled to approval by the Court of
Private Land Claims, including the
cost of publication of notice of the
survey required by the statute and
the cost of additional surveys, where
necessary and ordered by the court,
but not including the cost of exami-
nations in the field made by special
agents of the land department 130
There is no provision in the act of
March 3, 1891, requiring one claim-
ing a complete and perfect title
through the Spanish or Mexican
government to lands situated within
the territory embraced in the Gads-
den Purchase, who does not come
into court voluntarily for the pur-
pose of having his title confirmed
under section 8 of said act, but is
brought into court by the United
States without his consent, to except
from his claim, and, as a condition
to the confirmation of his title, to
recognize the title of the United
Slates to, such portions of the lands
claimed by him as may have been
sold or disposed of by the United
States 500
The United States may, under the
provisions of said act, bring the
grant claimant into court without
his consent, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether he has any title to
the lands claimed, and, if so, the
extent of such title, but not for the
purpose of confirming the title to
portions of said lands sold or dis-
posed of by the United States 500
The Commissioner of the General
Land Ofiice is without authority or
discretion to adjudge anil determine
whether the survey of a private land
grant conforms to the decree of the
court confirming the grant, but has
simply to perform the ministerial
duty of issuing patent for the land
according to the lines of flic survey
as approved by the court and in ac-
cordance with the terms of (lie de-
cree r>o<;
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Pul) I if Land.
The provisions in the act of Au-
gust 30, 1890, limiting the amount
of land to which title may be ac-
quired by any one person, under the
public land laws, to 320 acres, has
no application to private cash en-
tries made under the provisions of
section 2354 of the Revised Statutes.
The Secretary of the Interior has
no power to withdraw from disposal
under the general land laws public
lands occupied and improved by a
town for the purpose of storing and
conducting a water supply to the
town, pending Congressional action
authorizing the town authorities to
make entry of the same ; but action
upon any application to enter such
lands may be suspended by the land
department until the town authori-
ties have been afforded opportunity
to secure the contemplated legisla-
tion
In the administration of the pub-
lic land laws the land department
has no authority to determine on
their behalf alleged rights of claim-
ants thereunder except where such
claimants seek to obtain the legal
or paramount title to the lands
claimed ; and where a claimant seeks
to obtain the legal title to a tract
of public land the inquiry by the
land department is directed to ques-
tions affecting his right to have
such legal title conveyed to him and
not to questions relating to posses-
sory or other rights unrelated to and
disconnected with his application for
the legal title
Railroad Cirant.
See Railroad Lands; Bight <</
Way.
Generally.
No rights were acquired by settle-
ment upon lands within the ceded
portion of the Red Lake Indian res
ervation prior to their opening to
settlement and entry, and where
such settlement was entirely upon
lands selected with the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior prior to
the opening, by the Minnesota and
Manitoba Railroad Company, under
its gran) made by the act of April
17, 1900, of ri-hf of way and neces
sary lands for terminal facilities a I
the crossing of Rainy Liver, no entry
can now lie allowed of such lands
I NDEM NITY.
The Northern Pacific Railway
Company is entitled to indemnity for
242
144
270
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lands lost to the grant made by the
act of July 2, 1864, to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, on ac-
count of the prior grant of May 5,
1864, to the Lake Superior and Mis-
sissippi Railroad Company, between
Thomson's Junction and Duluth 105
A railroad indemnity selection,
valid when made, under depart-
mental order relieving the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company from the
designation of a particular loss as a
basis for the selection, will not he
avoided upon an allegation that a
loss subsequently designated, in obe-
dience to departmental order of Au-
gust 4, 1885, was not the nearest
available loss. Any requirement for
the specification of a loss as a basis
for an indemnity selection is only for
departmental information and as an
aid in the adjustment of the grant— 105
All action looking to the disposition
of lands involved in second indem
nity selections made by the Northern
Pacific Railway Company in lieu of
lands alleged to have been lost to its
grant within the limits of the with-
drawal on general route of the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Railroad
Company, has been suspended by
the land department to await final
determination of the question (now
pending before the Supreme Court
of the United States) whether lands
so situated furnish a sufficient basis
for second indemnity selection ; but
where it appears that any such
lands are embraced in entries al-
lowed prior to selection by the com-
pany, the suspension as to such
lands will no longer continue. Ac-
tion on such entries will proceed in
due course and the selection to that
extent will be canceled 207
Adjustment.
The Northern Pacific Railway
Company is the lawful successor in
interest to the land-grant rights of
the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany 105
Directions given that in case a
selection by the Northern Pacific
Railway Company is canceled for
conflict, and thereafter, in the ad-
justment of the conflicting claims
under the provisions of the act of
July 1, 1808, the individual claim is
canceled upon relinquishment, the
selection of the company be imme-
diately reinstated 364
An application to purchase under
the provisions of the act of June 3,
1878, presented prior to, but upon
which proof and payment were not
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made until after, January 1, 1898,
does not present a claim for adjust-
ment under the provisions of the act
of July 1, 1898 105
Where an applicant to purchase
under the provisions of the act of
June 3, 1878, is allowed to make
proof and payment in violation of an
order withdrawing the land from en-
try, no claim is thereby initiated
falling within the remedial provi-
sions of the act of July 1, 1898 105
Lands classified as mineral under
the provisions of the act of February
26, 1895, are not subject to selection
by the Northern Pacific Railway
Company under the provisions of
the act of July 1, 1898 661
Where at the time of the passage
of the act of July 1, 1898, the con-
flicting claims of a homestead set-
tler and the Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company to a tract of land
were of a character subject to ad-
justment under that act, the fact
that the settler subsequently pur-
chased the land from the company in
order to protect his improvements
will not prevent him from transfer-
ring his claim to other lands in ac-
cordance with the provisions of said
act 209
Where a tract of land falling with-
in the Northern Pacific land grant
and not excepted therefrom was sold
by the company prior to January 1,
1898, and the purchaser thereafter,
because of the erroneous decision of
the land department holding said
land to have been excepted from the
railroad grant, sought to supplement
his title by purchase of the lands
from the United States under the
provisions of section 5 of the act of
March 3, 1887, these facts alone do
not present such conflicting claims
to the land on January 1, 1898, be-
tween the purchaser and the com-
pany, as are subject to adjustment
under the act of July 1, 1S98 575
Where a tract of land was inad-
vertently patented to the Northern
Pacific Railway Company, either
prior or subsequently to the act of
July 1, 1S98, during the pendency
of an application to make home-
stead entry thereof based upon settle-
ment made in good faith prior to
January 1, 1898, the conflicting
claims of the company and the set-
tler are subject to adjustment under
the provisions of said act, notwith-
standing the issuance of such patent- 146
The provisions of the act of July
1, 1898, are applicable to patented
lands, whether patented before or
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after the passage of the act, if such
lands are in dispute between the
company and the individual claim-
ant and belong to either of the
classes described therein, and where
patents issued to individual claim-
ants prior to the passage of the act,
under rulings then, in force, which
under rulings now governing would
have to be held to have been im-
properly issued, the conflicting
claims to such lands are subject to
adjustment under the provisions of
said act, provided the company has
not, by the selection of other lands
in lieu of those in controversy, or
otherwise, abandoned its claim there-
to 484
Under the provisions of the act of
July 1, 1898, the Northern Pacific
Railway Company is bound to accept
the list of lands subject to relin-
quishment under said act prepared
and submitted to it by the Secretary
of the Interior, and can not, as a
matter of right, require of the indi-
viduaf claimant the establishment of
his claim at a hearing ; but where a
settlement claim has, upon an ex
parte showing by the settler, been
included in such a list, the Depart-
ment, notwithstanding the approval
of the list, has the right to inquire,
by hearing or otherwise, whether the
showing- on which the tract was
listed represented the true condi-
tion or status of the tract involved
on January 1, 1898 153
All action looking to the disposi-
tion of lands involved in second in-
demnity selections made by the
Northern racific Railway Company
in lieu of lands alleged to have been
lost to its grant within the limits of
the withdrawal on general route of
the Lake Superior and Mississippi
Railroad Company, has been sus-
pended by the land department to
await final determination of the ques-
tion (now pending before the Su-
preme Court of the United States)
whether lands so situated furnish
a sufficient basis for second indem-
nity selection ; but where it appears
that any such lands are embraced in
entries allowed prior to selection by
the company, the suspension as to
such lands will no longer continue.
Action on such entries will pro-
ceed in flue course and the selec-
tion to that extent will be canceled.
In case of a decision favorable to
the company on the question pend-
ing before the court, it may then re-
linquish whatever claim it may have
to the lands under its selection, with
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a view to selection of other lands in
lieu thereof under the provisions of
the act of July 1, 1898 207
Railroad Lands.
See Railroad Grant.
Circular of May 22, 1900, under
act of April 17, 1900, relative in
settlers upon St. Paul, Minneapolis
and Manitoba railway lands 630
The fact that a tract of land was.
prior to survey, classified as min-
eral under the act of February 20,
1895, can not be considered as a
classification of the lands as mineral
"at the time of actual government
survey," within the meaning of the
act of August 5, 1892 211
Even if it be admitted, as contend-
ed by the Northern Pacific Railway
Company, that the Northern Pacific
land grant can never be fully satis-
fied from selections made within the
limits provided for in the act of
July 2, 1804, and the joint resolution
of May 31, 1870, such fact furnishes
no authority for permitting the com-
pany to relinquish the lands within
the Mount Ranier National Park
and the Pacific forest reserve fall-
ing within the secondary or indemnity
limits of its grant, and to select
other lands in lieu thereof, under the
provisions of the act of March 2,
1899 148
The act of April 19, 1904, provid-
ing that settlers or entrymen upon
lands within the indemnity limits
of the grant in aid of the Chicago,
St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha
railway, and also within the primary
limits of the grant in aid of the Wis-
consin Central railroad, restored to
the public domain November 2, 1891,
by order of the land department, who
were prevented from obtaining title
under the public land laws because
under the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Wisconsin Cen-
tral Railroad Company v. Forsythe
the lands were held not to be ex-
cepted from the grant to the Wis
consin Central company, lias no ap
plication to lands opposite the uncon-
structed portion of the Wisconsin
Central road, which fall within the
forfeiture provisions of the aci of
September 29, 1890 388
The act of February 24, 1905, re-
lating to lands within the Mobile
and Girard railroad grant, according
to a homestead entrynian coining
within its provisions the privilege
to transfer his claim to other lands,
does not contemplate that an entry-
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man who has completed his entry
under the commutation provisions of
the homestead law and received final
certificate thereon shall, in the exer-
cise of the privilege accorded hy said
act, make a second homestead entry
and submit proof thereon, after due
notice, as required in making an
original homestead entry, nor that
the lands applied for shall be a com-
pact body of contiguous land, but
where not contiguous all the land
must be within the same land dis-
trict, and where the aggregate of the
legal subdivisions applied for ex-
ceeds the acreage embraced in the
original entry, the entryman will be
required to pay for such excess 517
An application to exercise the privi-
lege of transfer accorded by the act
of February 24, 1905, is not required
to be made by the entryman in per-
son ; nor is he required to furnish an
affidavit under the act of August 30,
1890, to the effect that he has not
since that date made entry of or ac-
quired title to a quantity of land
under the agricultural land laws,
which, with the land now applied
for, will exceed three hundred and
twenty acres 517
Reclamation.
See Arid Lands.
Repayment.
An applicant for repayment of
money paid by reason of an over-
charge for area in excess of that
actually embraced in the entry, will
be required to furnish non-alienation
affidavit or to show fully the nature,
terms and conditions of any sale
and conveyance of the land 471
Where entry under the act of June
3, 1878, was erroneously allowed for
land chiefly valuable for its mineral
deposits and upon which mining
claims had been located and improve-
ments made prior to the timber land
entry, but of which the entryman
had no knowledge, and it appears
that he acted in good faith and did
not procure the entry through mis-
representation, repayment of the pur-
chase money paid by him may be al-
lowed 263
Where an applicant under the tim-
ber and stone act states in his declar-
atory statement that he has person-
ally examined the land applied for,
when as a matter of fact he has not
done so, but in his final proof swears
that no inspection of the land has
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ever been made by him, entry on
such proof can not be allowed, but
as the purchase money paid by him
upon submission of the proof still
remains in the control and custody
of the land department, repayment
thereof may be made 705
Repayment is not authorized under
the provisions of the act of June 16,
1880, where entry is properly allowed
on the proof presented, but is sub-
sequently canceled upon a showing
that such proof is false ; and in this
respect an assignee has no better
right than the entryman 618
An applicant for repayment of the
purchase money paid on a com-
muted homestead entry, who claims
the right to repayment as mortgagee
under a mortgage executed prior to
completion of the entry, is not an
assignee within the meaning of the
statute and is therefore not entitled
to repayment 618
While paragraph 13 of the instruc-
tions governing repayments, ap-
proved January 22, 1901, provides
that " where there has been a con-
veyance of the land and the original
purchaser applies for repayment, he
must show that he has indemnified
his assignee or perfected the title in
him through another source, or pro-
duce a full reconveyance to himself
from the last grantee or assignee,"
any successor of such original pur-
chaser in a line of conveyances is
equally within the reason of the rule
and should be given the same stand-
ing as his grantor.: 328
A pre-emption entryman who paid
double minimum price for lands sup-
posed to be within the limits of a
railroad grant, but which were sub-
sequently held not to be within such
limits, is entitled to repayment of
the excess of one dollar and twenty-
five cents per acre paid by him ; but
where payment was made partly in
cash and partly by land warrant, the
Secretary of the Interior has no
authority, in making repayment, to
draw his warrant for an amount
greater than the cash payment made
by the entryman ; and in such case,
where the amount of the cash pay-
ment is not sufficient to make the re-
payment due the entryman in full,
he may be permitted to make an ad-
ditional cash payment of such an
amount as added to the sum orig-
inally paid by him in cash will ag-
gregate the cost of the land at one
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre,
and thereupon have the land warrant
returned to him unsatisfied 551
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Reservation.
See Right of Way ; School Land.
Indian.
Regulations of June 8, 1906, un-
der act of April 21, 1904, relative to
selections in lieu of lands in Indian
reservations 666
Military.
The fact that the act of April 18,
1896, provides that the lands in the
ahandoned portion of the Fort As-
siniboine military reservation, there-
by opened to entry, shall be dis-
posed of only under the laws therein
specifically named, does not prevent
a withdrawal, under the provisions
of the act of June 17, 1902, of any
of said lands as to which no vested
right has attached 653
Forest Lands.
Generally.
Circular of August 1, 1905, rela-
tive to final proof on claims within
forest reserves 63
Circular of July 7, 1905, under act
of February 7, 1905, relating to
rights of way over lands segregated
from Yosemite National Park and
included in Sierra forest reserve 15
Instructions of June 19, 1906, un-
der act of March 15, 1906, relative
to opening of certain lands in Yel-
lowstone forest reserve to settlement
and entry 700
Directions given that all applica-
tions for rights of way or other
privileges over or upon public lands
in forest reserves, now pending be-
fore the General Land Office and
falling wholly within the jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture, as
defined in departmental letter of
June 8, 1905 (concurred in by the
Secretary of Agriculture in letter of
June 13, 1905), be transmitted to
the Department of Agriculture for
consideration and disposition G4
Where applications for rights of
way or other privileges affect lands
lying partly within and partly with-
out forest reserves, and involve (pies-
lions within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and also
questions within (he jurisdiction of
the land department, separate appli-
cations will not be required, but In
such cases the application will be
examined, and, if found regular,
approved by the land department an
so far as it affects lands without the
reserve, and then transmitted to the
Department of Agriculture for .on
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sideration and such action as may be
proper relative to the lands within
the reserve ; but in the event it ap-
pear that the right to use lands
without the reserve is subordinate to
permission to use lands within the
reserve, the application should first
be passed upon by the Secretary of
Agriculture 64
Act of June >,, 1897.
Two distinct classes of exchanges
are authorized by the act of June 4,
1897 : first, perfected titles, where
title is given and title is received, in
which case nothing is required to
be done by the selector but to vest
the United States with good title to
the land relinquished in a forest re-
serve and to select the land taken in
lieu thereof in accordance with the
law and regulations governing such
exchanges ; and second, unperfected
claims, wherein the lands taken in
exchange are taken by the selector
with credit for his previous partial
compliance with the law governing
his entry, settlement, or claim upon
the relinquished land, but with obli-
gation under such law to do such
acts as he had, prior to his relin-
quishment, not yet performed 126
Where a selection tendered under
the exchange provisions of the act of
June 4, 1897, is in conflict with a
prior pending application, the se-
lector should be apprised of the con-
flict and given opportunity to pro-
tect his rights by proper proceed-
ings 122
Where a selection tendered under
the exchange provisions of the act
of June 4, 1897, is in conflict, in
part, with prior pending applica-
tions, it should not, for that reason,
be rejected in its entirety, but the
selector should be afforded oppor-
tunity to protect his rights by proper
proceedings 301
The fact that land is more valuable
for the timber and stone thereon than
for agricultural purposes does not
bar selection thereof under the provi-
sions of the act of June 4, 1897, if
not mineral in character 115
Pending disposition of a school-
land indemnity selection, even though
erroneously received, selection of the
same land in lieu of a tract in a
forest reserve relinquished under the
exchange' provisions of the act of
June 4. 1897, should not be allowed- 119
The fact that a successful contest-
ant who in the exercise of his pref-
erence right applies to select the land
under the act of Juno 1, 1897, did
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not have title to the land assigned
as base for 'the selection at the date
of the initiation of the contest, fur-
nishes no ground for rejection of the
application, it being only necessary
that the selector have title to the
base land at the time he initiates the
proceeding for an exchange under the
act by relinquishing it to the United
States 1 370
Lands formerly embraced within
the Fort Assinniboine military reser-
vation, and opened to entry by the
act of April 18, 189G, are subject to
selection in lieu of lands within a
forest reserve relinquished to the
United States under the exchange
provisions of the act of June 4, 1897- 290
The provision in the act of July 4,
1884, that the lands in the former
Columbia Indian reservation by said
act restored to the public domain
should be disposed of " to actual set-
tlers under the homestead laws
only," is no bar to the selection of
portions of said lands in lieu of an
unperfected claim to lands in a for-
est reserve, based upon homestead
settlement, and relinquished under
the exchange provisions of the act of
June 4, 1897 127
The provision of the act of June 6,
1900, which declares that subse-
quently to October 1, 1900, "all se-
lections of land made in lieu of a
tract covered by an unperfected
bona fide claim, or by a patent, in-
cluded within a public forest reser-
vation, .... shall be confined to
vacant surveyed non-mineral public
lands which are subject to homestead
entry," applies only to selections
made under the provisions of the act
of June 4, 1897, and has no appli-
cation to selections made by the
Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of
March 2, 1899 88
Where at the date of the act of
March 3, 1905, repealing the ex-
change provisions of the act of June
4, 1897, no selection had been made
in lieu of lands within a forest re-
serve relinquished to the United
States in accordance with the provi-
sions of the act of 1897, the land
department is without authority to
now permit such selection to be
made 458
In case a selection under the ex-
change provisions of the act of June
4, 1897, is canceled for conflict with
a prior settlement claim, and another
selection for a like quantity of land
is made in lieu thereof, under the
proviso to the act of March 3, 1905,
Page,
the abstract of title of the relin-
quished land assigned as a basis
for (be selection must be extended to
the date of the later application 504
A selection under the provisions of
the act of June 4, 1897, for a less
area than embraced in the relin-
quished land offered as a base, not
the result of mischance or misprision
on the part of the local officers, is a
waiver of the excess ; and there is
nothing in the act of March 3, 1905,
repealing the act of June 4, 1897,
authorizing the selector to make a
further selection based upon such
excess area 578
Where prior to the repeal of the
exchange provisions of the act of
June 4, 1897, by the act of March 3,
1905, selection was made and ap-
proved for unsurveyed lands de-
scribed in terms of legal subdivisions
of the public surveys, and upon sur-
vey some of the subdivisions were
shown to be fractional and to con-
tain a less area than contemplated
by the selection, the selector may,
under the saving provisions of the
act of March 3, 1905, make addi-
tional selection to cover such de-
ficiency 603
Reservoir Lands.
See Arid Land; Right of Way.
Residence.
The fact that a homestead entry-^
man holds an official position the
duties of which are required to be
performed at some place other than
on the land embraced in his entry,
constitutes no sufficient excuse for
his absence from the claim, unless it
be shown that his absence is actually
due to his official position or employ-
ment 30
A homestead entryman is entitled
to the exclusive possession and en-
joyment of the land embraced in
his entry, and where he in good faith
builds a house upon the land with a
view to establishing residence and
complying with the law, but is pre-
vented by the threats of a rival
claimant from establishing residence
upon the particular portion of the
land selected by him for that pur-
pose, it is not incumbent upon him
to establish his residence upon an-
other portion of the land, and he will
not be held in default for failure to
do so 348
Failure of a homestead entryman
to reside upon his claim, necessitated
by employment in the public service,
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will not be construed an abandon-
ment thereof, where he in good faith
established and maintained residence
prior to engaging in such service and
has continued to comply with the
requirements of the law in the mat-
ters of cultivation and improvement ;
but such employment will not relieve
from the necessity of establishing
residence nor excuse the entryman's
failure in that respect 396
Right of Way.
Regulations relative to applica-
tions for use of name of United
States in judicial proceedings to for-
feit rights of way 358
Circular of July 7, 1905, under
act of February 7, 1905, relating to
rights of way over lands segregated
from Yosemite National Park and
included in Sierra forest reserve 15
Regulations of September 28, 1905,
relative to rights of way for canals,
ditches, reservoirs, telegraph and
telephone lines, etc 212
Paragraph 2 of circular of Febru-
ary 11, 1904, and paragraphs 3 and
66 of the circular of September 28,
1905, relating to rights of way for
railroads, canals, reservoirs, etc.,
amended 583
Paragraph 54 of the regulations
of September 28, 1905, requiring that
all applications for rights of way
under the act of February 15, 1901,
for telegraph and telephone lines,
must be accompanied by an official
statement of the Post Office Depart-
ment showing that the applicant has
complied with the regulations under
title 65 of the Revised Statutes, re-
voked 693
Directions given that all appli-
cations for rights of way or other
privileges over or upon public lands
in forest reserves, now pending be-
fore the General Land Office and
falling wholly within the jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture.
as defined in departmental letter of
June 8. 1905 (concurred in by the
Secretary of Agriculture in letter
of June 13, 1905), be transmitted
to the Department of Agriculture
for consideration and disposition 04
Where applications for rights of
way or other privileges affect lands
lying partly within and partly with-
out forest reserves, and involve
questions within the jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture ,and
also questions within the jurisdiction
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of the land department, separate
applications will not be required, but
in such cases the application will be
examined, and, if found regular, ap-
proved by the land department in so
far as it affects lands without the re-
serve, and then transmitted to the
Department of Agriculture for con-
sideration and such action as may
be proper relative to the lands with-
in the reserve; but in the event it
appear that the right to use lands
without the reserve is subordinate to
permission to use lands within the
reserve, the application should first
be passed upon by the Secretary of
Agriculture 64
No rights can be initiated for the
use or benefit of any railroad com-
pany under the provisions of section
1 of the act of March 3, 1875, prior
to the organization of such com-
pany under the laws of a State or
Territory 593
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six made to the Territory of
New Mexico for school purposes by
the act of June 21, 1898, is a grant
in pracsenti, and any question as to
the authority of the Territory to
grant rights of way for railroads
across any such lands is one for de-
termination by the officers of the
Territory and not by the Secretary
of the Interior 518
The right of way granted by sec-
tion 13 of the act of February 28,
1902, is a mere easement, for " depot
grounds, terminals, and other rail-
way purposes," and the grantee has
no authority to extract oil from the
grounds embraced in a right of way
acquired under said act 504
The act of March 3, 1901, specific-
ally provides that telephone and
telegraph lines constructed under its
provisions shall be operated and
maintained under rules and regula-
tions to be prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, which carries
with it the power to require sworn
statements from the person, com-
pany, or corporation operating the
lines, to the end that the annual tax
be properly assessed and collected ;
but in the event of noncompliance
with such requirement, it is not with-
in the power of the Secretary, under
executive authority, to close the
places of business of the offending
parties, any question as to the for-
feiture of the right of way being a
matter for determination by the
courts 288
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The annual tax upon telephone and
telegraph lines referred to in section
3 of the act of March 3, 1901, is con-
ditioned upon two things : ( 1 ) The
line upon which the tax is sought to
be imposed must he upon lands such
as the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to subject to the terms of
the act, and (2) the line must not be
subject to State or Territorial taxa-
tion. Where the line upon which the
tax is sought to be imposed runs
through any of the lands which the
Secretary is authorized to subject
to the terms of the act, and is not
subject to State or Territorial taxa-
tion, such line is under the act sub-
ject to an annual tax not exceeding-
five dollars for each ten miles there-
of constructed and maintained, re-
gardless of any tax which may be
levied and collected by a munici-
pality through which the line runs__ 28S
Rights of way under the provisions
of section 3 of the act of March 3,
1901, are " in the nature of an ease-
ment," and are property rights sub-
ject to sale or transfer without the
consent of the Secretary of the In-
terior 288
The term " line,'" as employed in
section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901,
means the right of way granted, and
each separate line of poles is held to
constitute an independent line, upon
which the grantee may place as many
wires as he chooses, the tax to be
assessed against the property only
at the rate of five dollars for each ten
miles of line. In towns, where no
well-defined system of parallel wires
is maintained, each wire will be re-
garded as covering a separate right
of way, and, if otherwise within the
terms of the act, is subject to tax-
ation as such 288
The approval by the Secretary of
the Interior of the plats of incor-
porated cities and towns in the In-
dian Territory operates as a dedica-
tion of the streets and alleys thereof
to public use, and thereafter, the In-
dians no longer having any interest
in the ground embraced in such
streets and alleys, the Secretary of
the Interior has no authority to sub-
ject them to the terms of section 3
of the act of March 3, 1901, author-
izing him, among other things, to
grant rights of way for the construc-
tion of telephone and telegraph lines
within and through incorporated
cities and towns in the Indian Ter-
ritory G79
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Riparian Rights.
Upon the admission of a State into
the Union it acquires in its sovereign
capacity the right to all the soil
under navigable rivers, subject to the
power of Congress to regulate com-
merce among the States and with for-
eign nations, and all lands that may
afterward form upon the beds of
such streams become the property of
the sovereign State, or of the pro-
prietor of the shore lands, in virtue
of his riparian right, according to the
law of the State in which the land is
situated 423
School Land.
Generally.
Sections sixteen, thirty-six, thir-
teen and thirty-three of the lands
ceded by the Comanche. Kiowa and
Apache Indians under agreement
ratified by the act of June 6. 1900,
reserved for school and other pur-
poses, are not subject to the opera-
tion of the mining laws 54
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six made to the Territory of
New Mexico for school purposes by
the act of June 21, 1898, is a grant
in praesenti, and any question as to
the authority of the Territory to
grant rights of way for railroads
across any such lands is one for de-
termination by the officers of the
Territory and not by the Secretary
of the Interjor 548
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six made to the State of South
Dakota for school purposes by the
act of February 22, 1889, took effect
on the admission of the State into
the Union, as to lands at that date
identified by the government survey,
but as to such of the indicated sec-
tions as had not been surveyed at
the date of the admission of the
State, the right of the State does not
attach unless and until identified by
survey, and if at the time of survey
they are known to be mineral in
character, they are excepted from
the grant 485
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six, to the State of South Da-
kota for school purposes, by the act
of February 22, 1889, took effect on
the admission of the State into the
Union as to lands of the class and
character subject to the grant in
such of said sections as were at that
date identified by the government
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surveys. As to unsurveyed lands,
the grant does not attach until
identification by approved survey,
and if at that time any of the lands
embraced in such sections are known
to be mineral in character they are
excepted from the grant 717
Indemnity.
Regulations of January 10, 1906,
relative to school indemnity selec-
tions 305
The requirement in rule 2 of the
instructions of March 6, 1903, that
with each list of indemnity school
selections " a certificate of the
proper authorities that the base
lands have not been sold, encum-
bered, or otherwise disposed of,"
shall be furnished by the State, ad-
hered to 245
Tending the disposition of a
schoo.i land indemnity selection, even
though erroneously received, no other
application including any portion of
the land embraced in such selection
should be accepted, nor will any
rights be considered as initiated by
the tender of any such application__ 12
In the adjustment of school land
grants, it is within the power, and is
the duty, of the land department to
see that sufficient losses, or quanti-
ties of land to which the State
might have been entitled under its
grant had they been in place and not
otherwise disposed of, equal in
amount to previous certifications on
account of the grant, approximately,
are furnished as a base for such pre-
vious approvals or certifications, be-
fore other approvals and certifica-
tions are made on account of the
grant 270
There is nothing in the act of
March 1, 1877, relating to indemnity
school land selections in the State
of California, in conflict with this
requirement 270
Where a school section is em-
braced within the limits of an In-
dian reservation, the State may, un-
der the provisions of section 227.~> of
the Revised Statutes, as amended by
the act of February 28, 1891, waive
its right thereto and select other
land in lieu thereof, noth withstand-
ing such section was identified by
survey prior to the establishment
of the reservation 013
Under the grant of sections six-
teen and thirty-six made to the
State of South Dakota for scliool'pur-
poses by the act of February 22,
1889, the State takes no vested in-
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terest or title to any particular land
until it is identified by survey, and
prior to such identification the grant,
as to any particular tract, may be
wholly defeated by settlement, the
State's only remedy in such case be-
ing under the indemnity provisions of
said act and of the act of February
28, 1891, amending sections 2L!7r>
and 2270 of the Revised Statutes___ 657
Where the title to school sections
has vested in the Territory of New
Mexico under the grant made by the
act of June 21, 1898, and such sec-
tions are subsequently embraced
within a reservation created by exec-
utive order, the Territory may, under
the provisions of section 2275 of
the Revised Statutes, as amended by
the act of February 28, 1891, waive
its right thereto and select other
lands in lieu thereof 599
The act of February 28, 1891,
amending section 2275 of the Re-
vised Statutes, protects all rights ac-
quired by settlements made prior to
survey in the field upon sections six-
teen or thirty-six, reserved for
school purposes, but where a town-
ship is ordered surveyed on applica-
tion in behalf of the State, under
the act of August 18, 1894, and the
lands are withdrawn for the purposes
specified therein, such settlements
only as were made prior to the with-
drawal are protected as against the
State 434
Where at the time of survey of a
township a portion thereof was re-
turned as a '• salt lake now dry,"
and no further survey of the town-
ship has since been made, the State,
after a lapse of more than forty
years, is justified in accepting such
survey as a final and complete sur-
vey of the township and in proceed-
ing with the adjustment of its school
land grant upon the theory that the
township is fractional 710
Where public lands of the United
States are in good faitli purchased
from a State in the belief that the
State has acquired title thereto un-
der its school grant, and in faith of
such purchase are held and occupied
for many years, entry thereof by a
third party should not lie allowed
without first affording the State an
opportunity to make good the title
purported to be conveyed by it. by
assigning a proper and sufficient
basis and making selection of the
land under its school grant; and in
case of failure on the part of the
State to make the title good, the
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present claimant through purchase
from the State should be afforded
opportunity to protect his rights by
himself making entry of the land
under the public land laws 304
Selection.
See Railroad Grant; Reservation ;
School Land ; States and Territories;
Swamp Land.
Settlement.
As between rival applicants for
the same land, the prior settler
must maintain his prior right by
continued compliance with the law__ 298
No rights can be acquired by acts
of settlement as against an entry-
man claiming under a prior record
entry, but as between subsequent
claimants the prior actual settler is
entitled to precedence upon the can-
cellation of the entry or extinguish-
ment of the record title 257
The rule that settlement rights
can not be acquired by the tenant or
employe of another which can be
set up to defeat intervening rights,
is not applicable in all cases where
the relation of landlord and tenant
is established, and should never be
extended to cases where the rela-
tion of tenant was assumed merely
for the purpose of protecting settle-
ment rights and in furtherance of a
bona fide intention on the part of a
settler to assert his rights at the
first opportunity 257
Settlement upon lands in advance
of the hour of opening, in violation
of an order of the land department
prohibiting such settlement, confers
no rights upon the settler as against
the first legal applicant to enter the
land after the hour of opening, and
such settler can not, by virtue of
his mere presence upon and occu-
pancy of the land after the hour of
opening, with the improvements
made prior to that time, secure a
settlement right 524
Notice of a settlement claim,
posted conspicuously on the land,
is sufficient to protect the claim
against one who subsequently makes
application for a portion thereof
under the timber and stone act,
whether the timber-land applicant has
actual notice of the settlement claim
or not, provided the posted notice
was of such character that it might
have been seen by a reasonable exer-
cise of diligence 00
Notice of a settlement claim,
posted on a subdivision thereof out-
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side of the technical quarter-section
on which the improvements are lo-
cated, will protect the settler's
claim to such subdivision as against
the claim of one who subsequently
makes application therefor under the
timber and stone act 90
One who fails to assert any claim
to a tract of public land in the ad-
verse possession of another, and re-
mains silent, though knowing that
the adverse occupant continues to
claim, occupy, and improve the land,
is estopped thereby from subse-
quently asserting a prior settlement
right thereto in himself, notwith-
standing the tract is found upon
survey to be a part of the technical
quarter-section upon which his im-
provements are located 695
Special Agent.
Circular of February 14, 1906,
relative to manner of proceeding on
special agents' reports 439
States and Territories.
See School Land; Swamp Land.
Failure on the part of a State to
publish notice of an application for
the survey of lands within thirty
days from the date of such applica-
tion, as provided by the act of Au-
gust 18, 1894, does not affect its
preference right to select such lands,
for the period of sixty days from
the filing of the township plat of
survey, conferred by the act of
March 3, 1893 139
The provision in the act of March
3, 1893, according to certain States
a preference right, over all persons
or corporations, except prior settlers,
for a period of sixty days from the
filing of the township plat of survey,
within which to select lands under
grants made by the act of February
22, 1889, was not repealed by the
provisions of the act of August 18.
1894, according a similar right of
selection for a period to extend
from the date of application by the
State for the survey of the lands un-
til the expiration of sixty days from
the date of the filing of the town-
ship plat, provided notice of the ap-
plication for survey be published
within thirty days from the date of
the filing of such application 139
The preference right, for a period
of sixty days from the filing of the
township plat of survey, accorded
the State (Idaho) by the act of
March 3. 1893, within which to
make selection of lands under grants
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to the State, does not segregate the
lands against other applications,
" but they should be received, subject
to the State's right, and. if that be
not exercised, take effect, if other-
wise entitled to approval, as of the
date of their presentation 301
All leases or " permits for right
of pasturage" issued by the hoard
of public lands of the Territory of
New Mexico under the provisions of
acts of the legislative assembly of
that Territory, and covering any of
the lands granted to the Territory
by the act of June 21, 1S98, should
be limited, in accordance with the
provisions of section 10 of that act,
to not exceeding one section or 640
acres of land to any person, corpora-
tion, or association of persons, and
all such leases or permits must be
submitted to the Secretary of the
Interior for his approval 143
Statutes.
See Acts of Congress and Revised
Statutes cited and construed, pages
XXV and XXVIII.
Survey.
It is within the power of the land
department at any time to re-trace
any surveys it has made whenever
it becomes necessary to the deter-
mination of a question pending be-
fore it for its decision involving
rights in public lands 188
The provision of the act of August
18, 1804, authorizing the survey, on
application in behalf of the State,
of any unsurveyed townships of pub-
lic lands therein, and the withdrawal
thereof from the date of the appli-
cation until the expiration of sixty
days from the filing of the township
plat, with a view to satisfy the
puhiic land grants to the State, au-
thorizes and requires the withdrawal
of all of the lands in the townships
for the survey of which application
is made oh behalf of the State 433
Swubii|» Land.
In the adjustment of all claims for
public lands in the State of Minne-
sota initiated in accordance with
law prior to survey of the lands, in
instances where selection thereof is
made by the State under its swamp
land grant, and the held notes of
survey afford a sufficient basis for
such selection, the land department
will, by hearing or otherwise, deter-
mine the true character ot the lands.
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notwithstanding the return of the
field notes of survey of the township_ 22
In the adjustment of all claims
resting on a selection or exchange <>t
lands, presented in accordance with
law for public lands in the State of
Minnesota, prior to survey thereof,
the land department will, by hearing
or otherwise, determine the true
character of the lands selected, if
claim is presented thereto on behalf
of the State under its swamp land
grant, based upon the field notes of
survey, notwithstanding the return
of the field notes of survey of the
township may afford a sufficient base
for the State's claim . 151
The issuance of patent upon en-
tries embracing lands alleged by the
State to have passed to it under its
swamp land grant terminates the
jurisdiction of the land department
thereover ; and any question as to
the character of the lands and
whether the issuance of patent there-
for was inadvertent will be inquired
into only for the purpose of deter-
mining whether recommendations
should be made for the institution of
suit to set aside the patent. The
question as to whether the issuance
of patent amounted to an adjudica-
tion that said lands were not swamp,
and therefore did not pass to the
State under its grant, is one for de-
termination by the courts, and not
by the land department 246
Timber and Sloiie Aet.
" Lands chiefly valuable for stone "
are subject to entry under the act
of June 3, 1878, regardless of whether
or not the stone can. under exist-
ing conditions, considering the cost
of quarrying and transportation, be
marketed at a profit 123
An executive order reserving lands
for a specific public purpose has the
same effect, as against an application
to purchase under the act of June :'..
1878, as an adverse claim of a pri-
vate individual 191
Where an applicanl to purchase
under the act of June :;. 1N7V fails
to submit proof on the day fixed
therefor in the published notice, or
within ten days thereafter where pre
vented by accident or unavoidable
delay from submitting it on the day
set therefor, a withdrawal thereto
fore made for forestry purposes, cm
bracing the land, thereupon immedi-
ately attaches and becomes effective
as to such land, regardless of the
tact that the applicant, within the
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ten-day period after the date fixed
in the notice, may have filed applica-
tion to readvertise notice of inten-
tion to submit proof 101
The affidavit or sworn statement
required of an applicant to pur-
chase under the timber and stone
act must be sworn to in the county,
parish or land district where the
land 'is situated; and where in such
statement the land intended to be
taken is incorrectly described, and
an application to amend the original
statement so as to properly describe
the lands desired is filed, the amend-
atory affidavit must be sworn to in
the same manner as required in case
of an original affidavit 539
An agreement or contract entered
into by a timber and stone entryman,
prior to final proof and the issuance
of certificate, for the sale of the
timber on the land, is in violation of
the provisions of the act of June 3,
1878, against the speculative entry
of timber lands for the
7
benefit of
another 581
An applicant to purchase under
the timber and stone act does not be-
come the owner of the land applied
for, with legal right to sell, mort-
gage, or otherwise encumber the
same, until the required proof has
been furnished, the purchase price
tendered and received, receipt given
therefor, and final certificate issued,
and at any time prior thereto the
land department may require the ap-
plicant to furnish an affidavit of
non-alienation 476
In case of an application by a
married woman to purchase under
the timber and stone act, it is imma-
terial whether the proof that she
proposes to make, the purchase with
her separate money and for her own
use and benefit be shown by the par-
ticular specified affidavits in the
regulations, or in some other man-
ner, so long as the facts required to
be shown are proved by competent
evidence in some portion of the
record 129
The fact that a married woman
making application to purchase
under the timber and stone act pro-
poses to pay from her separate
money only the fees and expenses of
making the entry, and to borrow
upon her own credit, to be secured
by mortgage on the land, the sum
necessary to pay therefor, does not
of itself impugn the good faith of the
applicant, in the absence of any-
thing tending to show that the per-
son from whom she proposes to bor-
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row the purchase money is a lumber-
man or engaged in acquiring tim-
bered lands, or that under pretense
of a mortgage security the entry is
made or intended to be for his bene-
fit or that of any person other than
the applicant herself 133
An applicant to purchase under
the timber and stone act is entitled
to a copy of the final proof sub-
mitted on his application 133
Tiinl>er Cutting.
The provisions of section 8 of the
act of March 3, 1891, as amended by
act of the same date, conferring
upon the residents of certain States
and Territories authority to cut tim-
ber on the public lands for agricul-
tural, mining, manufacturing or
domestic purposes, contemplate the
cutting and use of timber for smelt-
ing purposes 78
Cities and counties are " resi-
dents " of the State in which they
are located, within the meaning of
that term as used in section 8 of the
act of March 3, 1891, as amended,
conferring upon the residents of
certain States and Territories au-
thority to cut timber on the public
lands for agricultural, mining, manu-
facturing, or domestic purposes 112
Timber used by cities for con-
structing electric-light plants and
building bridges, and by counties for
building bridges and constructing
flumes across the county roads, is
used for " domestic purposes
"
within the meaning of section 8 of
the act of March 3, 1891, as
amended 112
Townsite.
Paragraph 13 of regulations of
August 1, 1904, relative to townsites
in Alaska, amended 71
There is no requirement that
townsite proof shall be made by per-
sons not resident of the town, and
such residence does not affect their
competency to make such proof 708
Under the provisions of section 16
of the act of March 3, 1891, town-
site entries may be made by incor-
porated towns and cities on the
mineral lands of the United States,
subject to existing rights under any
valid mining claim or possession,
lode or placer, held under existing
law 102
Under section 11 of the act of
March 3, 1891, attorney's fees may
be properly included in the account
of a townsite trustee, as legitimate
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expenses incident to the execution of
his trust, and allowed by the land de-
partment, where necessary and not
in excess of a just and reasonable
amount 287
The term " judge of the county
court for the county," employed in
section 2387 of the Revised Statutes
to designate the officer authorized to
make townsite entry under said sec-
tion, as trustee for the several use
and benefit of the occupants of the
townsite, embraces any presiding ju-
dicial officer of a court having juris-
diction within the county : and where
any one of several officers coming
within the purview of the statute is
designated by the State legislature
as the proper officer to assume the
trust and make the entry, such desig-
nation is entitled to be recognized by
the officers of the land department- _ 24
Where a patent has not issued for
a public reservation in a townsite at
the date the townsite is vacated, and
the original entryman for such reser-
vation fails to make application
therefor within six months from the
vacation of the townsite, it there-
upon, under the provisions of the act
of May 11, 1896, becomes subject to
disposal as an isolated tract under
section 2455 of the Revised Statutes,
and can not be disposed of in any
other manner 356
The reservation of a lot in a town-
site in the Territory of Oklahoma for
the purpose of erecting thereon an
armory for use of a company of the
Oklahoma National Guard, consti-
tutes a reservation for " the pub-
lic interest " within the meaning of
section 4 of the act of May 14, 1890,
authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to reserve any undisposed-
of lots in townsites in said Territory
for " public use as sites for public
buildings " if in his judgment " such
reservation would be for the public
interest " 530
In view of the provisions of the
act of February 9, 1903, which ex-
tended the townsite laws to the lands
within the ceded limits of the Red
Lake Indian reservation and au-
thorized their occupation for town-
site purposes prior to formal opening
thereof to disposition under the
homestead laws, the occupation of a
portion of said lands as a townsite
m
prior to and on the date they were
opened to settlement and entry, pre-
vented the attachment of any rights
on that date under a settlement with
Page,
a view to acquiring title under the
homestead laws, covering the same
land, initiated prior to occupation of
the land for townsite purposes 94
Warrant.
Where the only objection to con-
firmation of a military bounty land
warrant location, made in good faith,
is the purely technical one that
through inadvertence of the land de-
partment the land covered thereby
was never formally offered at public
sale under the provisions of the act
of July 4, 1876, as it should have
been, of which fact the locator was
ignorant, the location may be re-
ferred to the Board of Equitable
Adjudication for confirmation under
Rule 11 21
The location of a military bounty
land warrant issued prior to the
death of the warrantee, by one
claiming through an assignment of
the warrant from 'the widow of the
warrantee, will not be confirmed in
the absence of proof showing that the
widow was the sole heir, or was
authorized to assign the interests of
the other heirs, if there were any__ 37
The substitution of cash for a mili-
tary bounty land warrant will not be
permitted where the only obstacle
to confirmation of the location under
the warrant is the refusal of the
locator or transferee to endeavor to
procure the necessary proof to es-
tablish the validity of the location__ 37
Where two military bounty land
warrants are erroneously issued upon
the same military service, both can
not be recognized, and where in such
case the warrantee, having both
warrants in his possession, assigns
one of them, he is estopped there-
after to assert the validity of the
other, and an assignee of such in-
valid warrant has no higher legal
right than the warrantee 606
The issue of a duplicate military
bounty land warrant under the pro-
visions of the act of June 23, 1860
(now section 2441, Revised Statutes),
in the belief that the original has
been lost or destroyed, creates no
new liability or obligation on the
part of the United States, where the
original warrant had been located
and satisfied prior to the issu.' of
the duplicate 610
Water Right.
See Arid Lund.
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